Chapter XLIII: Section XXXVIII: Chapter VI (5)

[262] A good picture of the state of Central Spain in January and February 1813 may be got from the Memoirs of d’Espinchel, of the 2nd Hussars, an officer charged with the raising of contributions in La Mancha--a melancholy record of violence and treachery, assassination by guerrilleros and reprisals by the French, of villages plundered and magistrates shot. D’Espinchel had mainly to deal with the bands of El Medico and the Empecinado. See his _Souvenirs militaires_, pp. 86-110.

[263] Vide v. pp. 550-8.

[264] See Mina’s Life of himself, pp. 39-43. He declares that the French custom-house at Yrun paid him 100 _onzas de oro_ (£300) a month, for leave to pass goods across the Bidassoa.

[265] The remains of Thomières’ unlucky division, cut to pieces at Salamanca--the 1st, 65th, and 101st Line.

[266] 64th Line.

[267] _Correspondance du Roi Joseph_, ix. p. 224.

[268] Jourdan, _Mémoires_, p. 452.

[269] Clarke to King Joseph, _Correspondance du Roi_, ix. p. 186.

[270] See vol. ii, pp. 465-6.

[271] For text see Toreno, iii. p. 149.

[272] _Wellington Dispatches_, ix. p. 467.

[273] Ibid., pp. 474-5, October 5.

[274] Bathurst to Wellington, October 21. _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 462.

[275] See above, pp. 61-2.

[276] Roughly correct: the joint force of the Castilian and Estremaduran divisions in October 1812 was 8,000 men with the colours--there were some 7,000 men in dépôts and garrisons.

[277] In November the 3rd Army had about 5,000 men with the colours, 3,000 in dépôt: the 2nd, 7,000, excluding the guerrilleros of the Empecinado and Duran.

[278] Two days later Wellington sent Carvajal a definite instance of this friction. The Civil Intendant of Old Castile had collected a magazine for the benefit of the garrison of Rodrigo. The Captain-General had seized it, and used it to support his own staff. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 623.

[279] Wellington to Carvajal. _Dispatches_, ix. pp. 604-5.

[280] For the exact text of the reply see the Spanish Minister of War’s letter. _Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. pp. 170-1.

[281] See _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp. 529-30 and 546.

[282] Wellesley to Castlereagh. _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 530.

[283] They were the Duke of Infantado, Admiral Villaviciencio, and Señors Ignacio Rivas, Mosquera, and Villamil. The last two were reputed very anti-British.

[284] This Act had been a great demonstration of the ‘Liberales’, and they were desirous of punishing certain canons and bishops who had refused to read it publicly in their cathedrals; an odd parallel to the case of James II and the Seven Bishops in English history.

[285] Including the presentation of a thundering letter from the British Prince-Regent: see H. Wellesley to Wellington, July 28, _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. p. 160 and ibid., p. 188.

[286] See especially below the difficulties with the Galician army as to ammunition, and the Andalusian reserve as to transport and magazines.

[287] _Dispatches_, x. pp. 211-12.

[288] See _Dispatches_, x. p. 181, when Wellington writes in March: ‘There is not a single battalion or squadron fit to take the field, not in the whole kingdom of Spain a dépôt of provisions that would keep one battalion for one day--not a shilling of money in any military chest.’

[289] _Wellington Dispatches_, x. p. 199.

[290] See above, vol. iii. pp. 193, 415-17, and iv. p. 71. The best sketch of the personalities of the Portuguese regency is that in Lord Wellesley’s _Memorandum respecting Portugal_, in _Wellington Dispatches, Suppl._, vii. pp. 199-204, a very interesting document.

[291] Now Marquis de Borba by his father’s death in 1812.

[292] See e. g. _Wellington Dispatches_, x. pp. 37 and 106-7.

[293] See e. g. the cases dealt with in _Wellington Dispatches, Suppl._, vii. pp. 240 and 316.

[294] e. g. _Wellington Dispatches_, x. p. 129, and another case accompanied by the murder of a soldier, x. p. 117.

[295] See _Wellington Dispatches_, x. pp. 131, 191, and 201.

[296] See _Wellington Dispatches_, x. p. 88 and ix. p. 615.

[297] See Wellington to Forjaz, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 353.

[298] See Wellington to Bathurst, ibid., ix. pp. 461-2.

[299] Wellington to the Prince-Regent of Portugal, _Dispatches_, x. pp. 284-7.

[300] Wellington to Stuart, ibid., x. pp. 342, &c.

[301] See Meneval’s _Mémoires_, iii. p. 317.

[302] It was generally known in London next day. See Sir G. Jackson’s _Memoirs_, iii. p. 447.

[303] Liverpool to Wellington. _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp. 502-3.

[304] Lord Liverpool doubted whether Prussia or Austria would move. Prussia might stir, if only she was sure that Austria would support her. But ‘the councils of Vienna at this time are abject.’

[305] Though on February 17 Wellington heard of the departure northward of the 7th (Polish) Lancers, and some squadrons of Gendarmerie belonging to the Army of the North. But this was too small a move to serve as the base of a deduction. _Dispatches_, x. p. 125.

[306] Wellington to Bathurst. _Dispatches_, x. p. 177.

[307] Ibid., p. 207, March 17.

[308] By an intercepted letter from the King to Reille, dated March 14, now in the ‘Scovell Cyphers,’ which mentions both facts.

[309] Wellington to Graham, April 7. _Dispatches_, x. p. 270.

[310] In the ‘Scovell Cyphers,’ like the dispatch quoted above.

[311] Wellington to Bathurst, January 26. _Dispatches_, x. p. 39; cf. ibid., p. 256.

[312] _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp. 601-2, April 7.

[313] Wellington to Bathurst. _Dispatches_, x. p. 307.

[314] For details see Schwertfeger’s _History of the K.G.L._, vol. i, pp. 500-50.

[315] See letters in von Wacholz’s Diary, pp. 311-12. It is doubtful if the men, largely waifs and prisoners of all nations, felt the same zeal as the officers.

[316] See vol. i, pp. 371, &c.

[317] _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp. 449-50.

[318] Henry Wellesley to Wellington. _Supplementary Dispatches_, x, pp. 571-3.

[319] Bathurst to Wellington, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. 577, and Castlereagh to Sir Charles Stuart, ibid., p. 586, March 3, 1813.

[320] See above, vol. v, pp. 342-7.

[321] Wellington to Bathurst. _Dispatches_, x. pp. 384-5.

[322] For this forgotten raid in December 1813, see _Études Napoléoniennes_, 1914, p. 191. For the Genoa affair see C. T. Atkinson in the _R.U.S.I. Journal_, 1915.

[323] See Wellington to Torrens, May 28, 1812. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 182. Yet Wellington, unconsulted though he had been, expresses his thanks to the Duke for fixing upon a successor to Murray.

[324] _Creevey Papers_, i. p. 173.

[325] _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp. 427-8.

[326] _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p, 457.

[327] Oddly enough, Wellington wanted the Duke of York to take the initiative and odium, by appointing Gordon to a home post. The Duke refused, holding that Wellington must take the responsibility.

[328] _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 499.

[329] Ibid., p. 527.

[330] See examples on page 138, above.

[331] See above, pp. 151-2.

[332] See Wellington to Torrens, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp. 494-5.

[333] Ibid., p. 486.

[334] _Wellington Dispatches_, ix. p. 592.

[335] Wellington to Bathurst, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 484.

[336] Duke of York to Bathurst, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp. 516-17.

[337] He was bothering Lord Bathurst for a peerage, which he was not yet destined to obtain. _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 515. He was put off with the colonelcy of a cavalry regiment.

[338] Bathurst to Wellington, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp. 538-9.

[339] Ibid., vii. pp. 577-8.

[340] The 2nd, 20th, 51st, 68th, 74th, 77th, 94th Regiments.

[341] The 9th, 11th, 24th, 27th, 30th, 34th, 39th, 44th, 47th, 53rd, 58th, 66th, 81st, 83rd, 87th, as also _Chasseurs Britanniques_ and Brunswick-Oels.

[342] 2nd, 2/24th, 2/30th, 2/31st, 2/44th, 51st, 2/53rd, 2/58th, 2/66th, 68th, 2/83rd, 94th.

[343] 1st Prov. Batt. = 2/31st and 2/66th; 2nd = 2nd and 2/53rd; 3rd = 2/24th and 2/58th; 4th = 2/30th and 2/44th.

[344] e.g. the 51st and 68th. _Wellington Dispatches_, ix. p. 609.

[345] The Duke to Wellington, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp. 524-5.

[346] Wellington to Torrens, _Dispatches_, x. pp. 77-8.

[347] The Duke to Wellington, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 553, February 17.

[348] Ibid., vii. pp. 581-3.

[349] The 2/30th and 2/44th.

[350] The 51st, 68th, 2/83rd, and 94th.

[351] 2nd, 2/24th, 2/31st, 2/53rd, 2/58th, 2/66th.

[352] 7th, 10th, 15th, 18th Hussars.

[353] 2/59th (from Cadiz), 2/62nd, 76th, 77th (from Lisbon garrison), 2/84th, 85th.

[354] On all this the reader interested in military finance will find excellent commentaries in chap. i of vol. ix of Mr. Fortescue’s _History of the British Army_, which appeared three months after this chapter of mine was written.

[355] See _Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. p. 212.

[356] Ibid., vii. pp. 539-41.

[357] He was captured by a raiding party, while watching the enemy from too short a distance, on August 31.

[358] So Clarke to the King, _Corresp. du Roi Joseph_, vol. ix. p. 189.

[359] Jourdan, _Mémoires_, p. 452.

[360] See _Corresp. du Roi Joseph_, ix. p. 187.

[361] See account in the Memoirs of Patterson of the 50th, pp. 303-5.

[362] See dispatch in Girod’s _Vie militaire du Général Foy_, pp. 386-7. The whole is written in a boastful and unconvincing style, unworthy of such a good soldier. Colonel Harrison’s report is singularly vague and short. He only says that the enemy made off, leaving their dead behind.

[363] Desprez to Joseph, from Paris, January 3, _Corresp. R. J._ ix. pp. 180-2.

[364] _Nap. Corresp._ xxiv, no. 19411.

[365] See vol. v. pp. 538-9.

[366] Miot de Melito, iii. pp. 263-4.

[367] See above, pp. 215-16.

[368] Two regiments which had only two battalions in February 1813 got cut down to one apiece.

[369] A brigade not a division, since the Hessian regiment perished at Badajoz.

[370] He had also later to give up the 22nd, a weak one-battalion regiment of 700 bayonets.

[371] See above, p. 188.

[372] Even the 2nd Dragoons, the first regiment scheduled, though it started in March, shows casualties at Vittoria, so did not get away.

[373] See Joseph to Suchet, _Correspondance_, ix. p. 200.

[374] See _Mémoires du Roi Joseph_, ix. p. 134.

[375] Clarke to Joseph, _Correspondance_, ix. p. 193 (February 2).

[376] Ibid. (February 12), pp. 194-5.

[377] Clarke to Joseph, February 12. Ibid., pp. 197-9.

[378] See above, p. 219.

[379] _Correspondance du Roi Joseph_, ix. p. 290, written just before Clarke got news of Wellington’s start.

[380] See above, pp. 190-91.

[381] Dispatch of February 26, _Correspondance du Roi Joseph_, ix. p. 206.

[382] See vol. iv. p. 472.

[383] _Mémoires_, iv. p. 202.

[384] ‘Au lieu de les poursuivre, de les inquiéter, d’aller au devant de leurs entreprises, on attendait la nouvelle de leurs tentatives sur un point pour s’y porter soi-même: on agissait toujours après l’événement.’ Clarke to Clausel, _Correspondance du Roi Joseph_, ix. p. 210.

[385] Clarke to Clausel, March 9, _Correspondance du Roi Joseph_, ix. 209-12--a very long and interesting dispatch, of which this is only a short _précis_.

[386] For a long account of the Combat of Poza, see Vacani, vol. vi. pp. 228-33.

[387] Martinien’s lists show casualties in the 3rd, 52nd, and 105th Line and 10th Léger of Abbé’s division on this day, so he had clearly gone out in force.

[388] The interesting dispatch of Leguia, the captor of Fuenterrabia, will be found in the Appendix to Arteche, vol. xiii.

[389] Mina’s claim to have annihilated these unfortunate troops is sustained by Martinien’s lists, which show 8 officers killed and 23 wounded in the 25th Léger and 27th Line, at Lerin, March 31. There would not be more than 40 or 45 officers present with two battalions.

[390] Expressed at some length in the great guerrillero’s _Memoirs_.

[391] Who has a long and interesting narrative of the expedition in his vol. vi. pp. 240-50.

[392] Vacani’s statement that the Italian division lost this day only 110 men, is made absurd by the lists in Martinien, which show that the 4th, 6th, and 2nd Ligeros lost that day 3 officers killed and 16 wounded--which implies a total casualty list of at least 350.

[393] In Martinien’s lists there are five officer-casualties given for this fight, but they do not include all the names of officers mentioned as killed by Vacani in his narrative.

[394] Not the 24th as in Vacani and Belmas. See Girod de l’Ain’s _Life of Foy_, p. 260.

[395] Figures in Belmas are (in detail) Foy’s own division (10 battalions) 5,513 men, Palombini’s (5 battalions) 2,474, artillery 409, Sarrut’s division about 4,500. Foy left behind Aussenac’s brigade about 1,500, and the garrison of Bilbao about 2,000.

[396] For horrid details of mishandlings of both sexes see Marcel (of the 6th Léger) in his _Campagnes d’Espagne_, pp. 193-4. Marcel is a _raconteur_, but Belmas bears him out (iv. p. 566).

[397] Napier says the Spanish loss was 180--which seems more probable. The British ships lost one officer and sixteen men wounded, by Bloye’s report. As to the French loss, we have the names of 3 officers killed and 6 wounded during the operation--which looks like 150 to 180 casualties.

[398] See above, vol. ii. p. 341.

[399] 1/10th, 1/27th, 1/58th, 1/81st, and 2/27th which came in time for Castalla, also a battalion of grenadier companies of units in Sicily.

[400] 4th and 6th Line battalions, and a light battalion composed of the light companies of 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and of De Roll and Dillon.

[401] Three companies of De Roll and four of Dillon--the whole making up a battalion 800 bayonets and the Calabrese Free Corps.

[402] 1st and 2nd Italian Levy, and two battalions of Sicilian Estero Regiment.

[403] Those of Villacampa, Mijares, and Sarsfield.

[404] For details see letter of February 22nd in Sir Samuel Whittingham’s _Memoirs_, pp. 172-4. He says that Colonel Grant, commanding the 2nd Italian Levy, had made himself cordially detested by his men by ‘employing the minute worry of the old British School,’ and that Bourke of the 1st Italian Levy had much more control over his men.

[405] Murray to Wellington. _Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. p. 191.

[406] See his letter of March 19th, written after the skirmish: ‘Our army is concentrating itself, and a few days I hope will bring on a general action, in which I hope to play my part’ (_Memoirs_, p. 188).

[407] Murray to Wellington. _Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. p. 200.

[408] Napier blames the British Government for having got things into such a position of double command that Bentinck could withdraw from Spain troops which he had sent there, and which had passed under Wellington’s authority (v. p. 54). Wellington seems to have made no objection to this particular recall (_Dispatches_, vii. p. 260), thinking (I suppose) that the risk of losing Sicily was much more serious than the deduction of 2,000 men from the Alicante side-show. He wrote at any rate to Murray to send them off at once, if he had not done so already. The fault, of course, lay with Bentinck, for denuding Sicily before he was sure of the stability of the new Constitution.

[409] Murray to Wellington, April 2. _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 605. The 6th K.G.L. was present at Castalla on April 13th.

[410] Wellington, _Dispatches_, x. p. 162.

[411] The best account of all this from the Spanish point of view is a dispatch written by Colonel Potons y Moxica, Elio’s chief of the staff, in the Record Office, ‘East Coast of Spain’ file. It is equally valuable for the battle of Castalla.

[412] Consisting of 2/27th British, Calabrese Free Corps, 1st Italian Levy, and the rifle companies of 3rd and 8th K.G.L.

[413] Two squadrons 20th Light Dragoons, the troop of Foreign Hussars, and some of Whittingham’s Spaniards, two squadrons of Olivenza.

[414] I do not know who was commanding this division (3rd of the Murcian army) in April: its divisional general, Sarsfield, was absent. It included Bailen, Badajoz, America, Alpujarras, Corona, and Guadix: O’Ronan had it in the preceding autumn.

[415] Potons y Moxica’s dispatch says that ‘la entrega del castillo provino de una especie de sedicion en la tropa de Velez Malaga,’ which is conclusive. Why Napier (v. 57) calls Velez Malaga ‘the finest regiment in the Spanish army’ I cannot conceive. It was one of O’Donnell’s old regiments, cut to pieces at Castalla in the preceding July, and hastily filled up with drafts. I suspect that Napier is paraphrasing Suchet’s description of this corps as ‘mille hommes de belles troupes.’ Except that they had been recently re-clothed from the British subsidy, there was nothing ‘fine’ about them.

[416] In his own narrative he says that he sent in the 1st and 3rd Léger, 14th, 114th, and 121st Line--a big deployment of forces.

[417] The best account of the combat of Biar is that of the anonymous officer of the 2/27th, quoted at length by Trimble in his _History of the Inniskilling Regiment_, pp. 61-2. See also the less trustworthy Landsheit (of the ‘Foreign Hussars’), ii. pp. 86-9.

[418] De Roll-Dillon, 81st, and one of Whittingham’s Spanish battalions. They had some casualties--the Spaniards 29, De Roll-Dillon probably 25: its total casualty list for the days April 12-13 of 34 cannot be divided between the two actions.

[419] It is impossible to disentangle the losses of Adam’s brigade on April 12 and April 13, given together in Murray’s report. But on the second day the 2/27th regiment was the only unit seriously engaged. The total for both days was killed 1 officer and 56 men, wounded 10 officers and 231 men, missing 32 men: or a total of 330. If we _deduct_ 40 for assumed losses of the 2/27th on the second day, and 30 more for casual losses of the other units on April 13--they were engaged but not seriously--and _add_ 29 for losses in Whittingham’s battalion (he gives the figure himself) and 25 (including 9 missing) for those in De Roll-Dillon (which was barely under fire on the second day and lost 34 altogether), we must conclude that the total was very close to 300.

[420] The light company 7th K.G.L., two newly arrived squadrons of Brunswick Hussars, and two batteries.

[421] 2/27th, Calabrese Free Corps, 1st Italian Levy, two light companies K.G.L.

[422] 1/27th, 4th and 6th K.G.L., ‘Estero’ regiment (two battalions).

[423] 1/10th, 1/58th, 1/81st British, composite battalion of De Roll-Dillon, 2nd Italian Levy.

[424] Cordoba, Mallorca, Guadalajara, 2nd of Burgos, 2nd of Murcia, 5th Grenadiers.

[425] Chinchilla, Canarias, Alicante, Cazadores de Valencia, Voluntarios de Aragon.

[426] Two squadrons each of Olivenza and Almanza.

[427] Napier, v. 58, quoting Donkin MSS., which are unpublished and unfindable.

[428] Landsheit, ii. p. 91.

[429] Suchet says that to support the voltigeurs he sent in only _four_ battalions of the 3rd Léger and 121st--but most undoubtedly the 114th attacked also, for it lost four officers killed and nine wounded, as many as the 3rd Léger, and this means 250 casualties at least in the rank and file.

[430] Whittingham, _Memoirs_, p. 197.

[431] Mr. Fortescue (_British Army_, ix. p. 43) seems rather to lean to the idea that the staff, or at any rate Catanelli, resolved to force Murray to fight despite of himself. This may have been the case.

[432] Cordoba and 2nd of Burgos.

[433] Guadalajara.

[434] Murcia, Majorca, and 5th Grenadiers.

[435] 1st Léger, in reserve on the Cerro del Doncel.

[436] During which occurred the dramatic duel in front of the line between Captain Waldron and a French Grenadier officer mentioned in Napier, v. p. 59. The picturesqueness of the story induced some critics to doubt it. But there is no getting over the fact that Waldron gave his opponent’s weapon, which was a sword of honour presented by the Emperor, to the Quartermaster-General (Donkin), who forwarded it to the Duke of York, and the Commander-in-Chief gazetted Waldron to a brevet-majority in consequence. (See Trimble’s _Historical Record of the 27th_, p. 64.) It is extremely odd (as Arteche remarks) that Suchet in his short and insincere account of Castalla tells a story of a _French_ officer who killed an English officer in single combat (_Mémoires_, ii. p. 308).

[437] I am inclined to think the latter, as it is doubtful whether, with the spur between, Adam’s fighting-ground was visible from Whittingham’s.

[438] Taking Murray’s casualty list for comparison with Suchet’s, we find that he had 4 officers killed and 16 wounded to 649 men at Biar and Castalla, i. e. 1 officer to 32 men. But this was an exceptionally low proportion of officers lost. At such a rate Suchet might have lost 2,000 men! I take 1,300 as a fair estimate.

[439] Cf. Wellington, _Dispatches_, x. pp. 354-5, in which Wellington asks what sort of a victory was it, if Suchet was able to hold the pass of Biar, only two miles from the battlefield, till nightfall?

[440] See Appendix on Castalla losses, English and French, at the end of the volume.

[441] Six companies of Dillon came from Sicily, to replace the 2/67th at Cartagena.

[442] Wellington to Dumouriez, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. 482-3, and to Cooke, ibid. pp. 477-8.

[443] Wellington to Liverpool, November 23, 1812. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 572.

[444] Wellington to Graham, January 31. _Dispatches_, x. p. 67.

[445] Wellington to Bathurst. Ibid., p. 104.

[446] _Dispatches_, x. p. 464.

[447] Wellington to Henry Wellesley. _Dispatches_, x. p. 239.

[448] Wellington to Stapleton Cotton, ibid., p. 268, and to Bathurst, ibid. 295, speaking of the extraordinary dry spring. Dickson notes in his _Diary_ that for two months before April 4 there had been no rain.

[449] See _Dispatches_, x. pp. 372-3.

[450] Wellington to Beresford, April 24. _Dispatches_, x. p. 322.

[451] See above, pp. 224-5.

[452] Wellington to Bathurst, _Dispatches_, x. 372.

[453] Wellington to Bathurst, May 6. _Dispatches_, x. p. 361.

[454] Algarve, and Hussars of Estremadura.

[455] Pontevedra and Principe.

[456] Castaños himself during the campaign acted more as Captain-General than as Army-Commander--stationing himself at Salamanca and reorganizing the districts just recovered from the French.

[457] Apparently not without reason, if we can trust King Joseph’s correspondence, which contains notes of a treasonable intrigue in May, between certain officers of the 3rd Army and General Viruez, an _Afrancesado_ at Madrid. See _Correspondance du Roi_, ix. pp. 130 and 466.

[458] Total force a nominal 15,000, but dépôts, hospitals, petty garrisons, &c., absorbed a full third--the cavalry was 441 sabres only.

[459] See Codrington to Wellesley, January 18, in _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 569.

[460] Sarsfield with one of the two Catalan field divisions was normally operating as a sort of guerrillero on the Aragonese side. Manso generally hung about the Ampurdam with a brigade.

[461] The H.A. troops were ‘A’ Ross, ‘D’ Bean, ‘E’ Gardiner, ‘F’ Webber-Smith, and ‘I’ Ramsay. The foot companies were those of Dubourdieu (1st Division), Maxwell (2nd Division), Douglas (3rd Division), Sympher K.G.L. (4th Division), Lawson (5th Division), Brandreth (6th Division), Cairnes (7th Division). Tulloh’s Portuguese company was attached to the 2nd Division, Da Cunha’s to Silveira’s division. The reserve was composed of Webber-Smith’s H.A. troop, Arriaga’s Portuguese heavy 18-pounders, and Parker’s foot company. See Colonel Leslie’s edition of the _Dickson Papers_, ii. p. 719.

[462] Long was now in charge of Hill’s cavalry _vice_ Erskine, a general whose acts have so often required criticism. This unfortunate officer had committed suicide at Brozas during the winter, by leaping out of a lofty window while _non compos mentis_. The moment he was removed Wellington abolished the ‘2nd Cavalry Division’, and threw its two brigades into the general stock under Stapleton Cotton for the campaign of 1813.

[463] Wellington to Hill, _Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. pp. 206 and 216.

[464] 12th Dragoons, of Digeon’s division.

[465] This is Wellington’s own observation, _Dispatches_ x. 397, to Graham from Matilla.

[466] Wellington to Graham, _Dispatches_, x. 401.

[467] That the charges were not pushed home is shown by the casualties--10 wounded in the Royals, 1 killed no wounded in the 1st Hussars K.G.L.

[468] Creditable as was the conduct of Villatte’s infantry, it is hyperbole to say with Napier (v. p. 98) that ‘the dauntless survivors won their way in the face of 30,000 enemies!’ For only 1,600 British horsemen were up, and the nearest allied infantry was 6 or 8 miles away.

[469] Jourdan (_Mémoires_, p. 464) holds that Villatte was to blame, and ‘engagea le combat mal à propos,’ but considers that he was ‘faiblement suivi’ by Fane and Alten. He acknowledges the loss of some of Villatte’s guns, probably in error, for Wellington speaks of captured caissons only in his report of the affair. Martinien’s list of casualties shows hardly any officer-casualties on this day in Villatte’s division.

[470] See the elaborate dispatch of June 28 (to Hill, _Dispatches_, x. pp. 402-4).

[471] See Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 466.

[472] For all this see Wellington to Hill, _Dispatches_, x. pp. 402-4.

[473] There are some slips either in the original or the copy of the Marching Orders printed in _Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. pp. 215-16. For Carazedo, given on the itinerary of the 1st Division, is many miles from it, though it _is_ on the proper line of the 5th Division, which was going to Outeiro and not to Braganza. Limão on the itinerary of the 3rd Division should be Vinhas, if I am not mistaken.

[474] Another odd error in Marching Orders given in _Wellington Dispatches_, x. p. 368, had turned the Portuguese heavy guns into infantry ‘18th Portuguese Brigade’ which should read ‘Portuguese 18-pounder brigade.’ There was no higher numbered Portuguese infantry brigade than the 10th. This misprint has misled many historians.

[475] See Tomkinson, p. 232, for the road by Chaves and Monforte.

[476] Improvised by dismantling artillery carriages. Wellington to Bathurst, _Dispatches_, x. 388.

[477] Wellington to Graham, _Dispatches_, x. p. 392.

[478] Minus Grant’s hussars, who only arrived on the 27th.

[479] Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 464. Note that Napier (v. 102) has got this expedition a week too late--May 29-30. His statement that the French cavalry got in touch with the northern wing of Graham’s army and was closely followed by British scouting parties, is contradicted by the absolute silence about any touch with the French in the diary of Tomkinson, whose regiment was at Tabara and must have been the one which Boyer would have met.

[480] Digeon’s own report, which chanced to be entirely inaccurate, was that on the 29th his reconnaissance reported that there were signs of intentions to throw trestle bridges across the Esla opposite the ford of Morellas, the lowest ford on the Esla toward the Douro, and at Santa Enferina opposite San Cebrian, where Spanish troops were visible. Also that at Almendra there was a post of British hussars. Only the third item was correct. (_Archives Nationaux_--copy lent me by Mr. Fortescue.)

[481] Tomkinson says that his regiment, the 16th Light Dragoons, was 20 hours on horseback this day, continually hurried off and countermarching (p. 235).

[482] Julian Sanchez’s lancers, from Hill’s wing, moving from Penauseude, got in the same night to Zamora.

[483] Digeon has an elaborate and unconvincing account of this affair in the long dispatch quoted above. He says that he had two regiments (16th and 21st Dragoons) drawn up in front of a bridge and ravine, awaiting the return of a reconnaissance sent to Toro: that the detachment arrived hotly pursued by British hussars, whereupon he resolved to retire, and told the brigade to file across the ravine. But the 16th Dragoons charged without orders, in order to save the flying party, and got engaged against fourfold numbers, while the 21st was retiring. They did wonders: killed or wounded 100 hussars, captured an officer and 13 men, and retired fighting on the battery and infantry at Pedroso, losing only 100 men.

[484] Two officers of the 16th were taken: the lists in Martinien show only one more officer wounded--from which we should gather that the resistance must have been poor. For a regiment fighting strongly should have had more officer-casualties than three to 208 other ranks. The 16th Dragoons must have been pretty well destroyed--with 1 officer and 108 men unwounded prisoners, 1 officer and 100 men wounded prisoners, and 1 officer and an unknown number of other ranks wounded but not captured. This was the same regiment which had lost the 1 officer and 32 men taken by their own carelessness at Val de Perdices on the 31st. It had been less than 400 strong by its last preserved morning-state.

[485] Jourdan, _Mémoires_, p. 463.

[486] See above, p. 327.

[487] 45th Ligne and 12th Léger.

[488] 2nd Hussars, 5th and 10th _Chasseurs à Cheval_. For an interesting narrative of Maransin’s and P. Soult’s manœuvres about Toledo, see the book of Wellington’s intelligence officer, Leith Hay, who was then a prisoner with them, having been captured while scouting (vol. ii. pp. 142-55).

[489] Clausel was sent a dispatch on May 27 _not_ ordering him to come south at once, but requesting him to send back Barbot, Taupin, and Foy if his operations were now completed in Navarre! _Mémoires du Roi Joseph_, ix. 280.

[490] Viz. four and a half divisions of the Army of the South, two of the Army of the Centre, one of the Army of Portugal, the King’s French Guards, and his trifling Spanish auxiliary force.

[491] Jourdan, _Mémoires_, p. 466.

[492] Jourdan, _Mémoires_, p. 467.

[493] Wellington to Graham, _Dispatches_, x. p. 411.

[494] Wellington to Giron, _Dispatches_, x. 413 and 414, and to O’Donoju, x. pp. 414-15.

[495] Viz. Wellington to Colonel Bourke from Melgar, June 10, _Dispatches_, x. p. 429.

[496] Wellington to Bourke from Melgar, June 10, _Dispatches_, x. 429.

[497] As, for example, in the letter to Bathurst about ships. _Dispatches_, x. 416.

[498] These sort of courtesies were most misplaced. The subject of discussion was the exchange of the British officer captured at Morales (see above, p. 332) for a French officer whom Gazan was anxious to get back. See _Dispatches_, x. 421, Wellington to Gazan; Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 467; and the narrative of the flag-bearer in Maxwell’s _Peninsular Sketches_, ii. pp. 97-8.

[499] Tomkinson’s _Diary_ (16th Light Dragoons), pp. 239-40.

[500] Maxwell’s _Peninsular Sketches_, ii. 37.

[501] _Dispatches_, x. 437.

[502] 1st and 5th with Bradford’s Portuguese.

[503] Food having run low, owing to the mule-transport falling behind.

[504] 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th Divisions and Pack’s Portuguese.

[505] Presumably Maucune’s brigade, which had been there some time, as well as the convoy escorts.

[506] ‘Grant begged Lord Wellington to allow him to attack the retiring infantry, but in spite of his pressing solicitations was not permitted.’ Maxwell’s _Peninsular Sketches_, ii. 99.

[507] Jourdan, _Mémoires_, p. 469.

[508] Cf. Miot de Melito in Ducasse, ix. p. 468.

[509] Cf. Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 470; Wellington _Dispatches_, x. pp. 436-7; Digeon’s Report, and the Appendix in Arteche, xiii. p. 486. Toreno (iii. p. 230) says that the citizens held that the French had intended the mine to work when they were gone, and to destroy the city and the incoming allied troops, but leans to the view that ignorance of the power of explosives explains all.

[510] _Dispatches_, x. p. 436.

[511] Sometimes called the bridge of Policutes, from the name of the village on the opposite bank.

[512] Tomkinson’s _Diary_, p. 341.

[513] Maxwell’s _Peninsular Sketches_, ii. p. 38.

[514] e.g. Wachholz of Brunswick-Oels, attached to the 4th Division, p. 314.

[515] See, for example, vol. ii. p. 586 and vol. iv. p. 159.

[516] These were the words of Colonel Arnaud, senior aide-de-camp to Gazan, conversing (most incautiously) with his prisoner Leith Hay, whose diary is most interesting for these days. See Leith Hay, ii. p. 176.

[517] Foy to Jourdan, Bergara, June 19.

[518] Some of Hill’s troops used the bridge of Rampalares also, a few miles west of Puente Arenas.

[519] But did not follow the main road to Osma, going off by a by-path north of the sierras to Orduña.

[520] _Dispatches_, x. p. 450.

[521] Pakenham’s _Private Correspondence_ (ed. Lord Longford, 1914) gives no help. He only writes on June 24th, ‘Lord W. left me to protect his rear: I executed my duty, but have lost my laurel.... I have satisfied myself, and I hope my master’ (p. 211).

[522] In _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. the two papers on pp. 641 and 644 should be read together, the first giving the moves for Graham and the Light and 4th Divisions, the second for Hill and the 3rd and 7th Divisions.

[523] Jourdan, _Mémoires_, p. 472.

[524] Not Barbacena as in Napier: the latter place is in Portugal.

[525] They lost 1 officer and 1 man wounded only.

[526] Tomkinson’s _Diary_, p. 242.

[527] At least Martinien’s lists show one officer killed and five wounded--all but one in Sarrut’s regiments--which at the usual rate would mean 120 casualties.

[528] Most of these details are from the excellent account by an officer of the 43rd in Maxwell’s _Peninsular Sketches_, ii. pp. 39-40. This narrative was evidently seen by Napier, who reproduces many of its actual words, as I have done myself. It must have been lent him long before it was printed in 1845.

[529] Martinien’s lists show only 1 officer killed and 5 wounded this day in Maucune’s division--this means about 120-50 casualties, but of course does not include the unwounded prisoners from the baggage-guard. Jourdan says that the division had ‘une perte assez considérable.’

[530] See _Vie militaire du Général Foy_, pp. 206-7.

[531] _Vie militaire du Général Foy_, p. 206. The editor, Girod de l’Ain, seems to prove that Foy got no other dispatch, though Jourdan declares that several had been sent to him.

[532] It would appear, however, that though the 1st and 5th Divisions and Anson’s cavalry never went near Orduña, yet Bradford and Pack’s Portuguese (without artillery) had got so near it on the preceding day that Wellington let them go through it, bringing them back to the main body via Unza by a mountain path. See _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 647.

[533] Probably by Angulo, and the valley of the Gordajuela.

[534] He says so in his letter to the Conde d’Abispal, _Dispatches_, x. pp. 445-6. ‘Je les attaquerai demain, _s’ils ne font pas la retraite dans la nuit_.’

[535] Napier, v. p. 114.

[536] There is a good account of the skirmish on the Bayas in Wachholz, p. 314. He remarks on the abominable weather, ‘incredible for the time of year--continuous unbearable cold and rain--the sun visible only for short intervals. Very bad roads.’

[537] For all this see Tomkinson’s _Diary_, p. 243. His statement that the column went off on the Orduña road by _mistake_ and was at once set right, seems to me conclusive against Napier’s views.

[538] An English eye-witness calls it ‘nowhere fordable’: a French eye-witness ‘fordable everywhere’; both are wrong. Cf. Fortescue, ix. p. 152.

[539] Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 474.

[540] See Toreno, iii. pp. 233-6.

[541] There is an account of this skirmish in Digeon’s report, and in Hay’s _Reminiscences under Wellington_, pp. 107-8.

[542] Jourdan, p. 473.

[543] The fortified position north of the defile of Salinas, where the road from Bilbao to France joins the great _chaussée_.

[544] i. e. the position above the northern exit from the plain of Vittoria.

[545] Not counting Pakenham and Giron, but including Longa and Morillo.

[546] Digeon in his report insists that he thought there was something more behind Longa. But this is _ex post facto_ allegation.

[547] Napier, v. p. 134.

[548] Cf. events in the Nimy-Obourg Salient at Mons on August 22, 1914.

[549] The classical instance of the proper defence of a river front is (I suppose) Lee’s defence of the Rappahannock at the battle of Fredericksburg. For the ruinous fate of an army which gets across at one or two points of a long front, and is counter-attacked, cf. the battle of the Katzbach, fought two months after Vittoria.

[550] Especially the bridges of Tres Puentes and Nanclares by which a reconnaissance was made on June 20, and that of Mendoza up-stream. See Jourdan, p. 473.

[551] Blakiston’s _Twelve Years of Military Adventure_, ii. p. 207.

[552] And this not belonging to the Army of the South, but to d’Erlon--Avy’s 27th Chasseurs.

[553] This story is given by Gazan in his report, as a proof that Jourdan had ample warning that there was danger from the north as well as from the east.

[554] These troops were ‘nobody’s children’ and get ignored in Gazan’s and Reille’s reports. But we hear of the 3rd Line defending Gamarra Menor in one French report, a fact corroborated by its showing two officer-casualties in Martinien’s lists--the guns are mentioned in Tirlet’s artillery report. Cavalry of the Army of the North is vaguely mentioned--its presence seems established by an officer-casualty of the 15th Chasseurs in Martinien. I suspect the presence of part of the 10th Léger, which has an officer-casualty, Vittoria _22nd_ June, presumably a misprint for 21st.

[555] _Dispatches_, x. p. 449, says that Reille had two _divisions_ in reserve (they were only two _brigades_) in addition to his front line holding the bridges: and cf. x. p. 450, which says directly that four divisions of Reille’s army were present.

[556] Here comes in a curious incident, illustrating the extraordinary carelessness of the French Staff. Gazan was very anxious to get restored to him an artillery officer, a Captain Cheville, then a prisoner. As an exchange for him he sent into the British lines on the 20th, Captain Leith Hay, a captured British intelligence officer, who had been with the Army of the South for a month, and had witnessed the whole retreat, during which he had been freely in intercourse with General Maransin and many staff officers. On his release he was able to tell Wellington that the French were definitely halted, and expected to fight. Why exchange such a prisoner on such a day? See Leith Hay, ii. p. 190. Cf. _Wellington Dispatches_, x. p. 443, which corroborates Hay’s story.

[557] Jourdan, _Mémoires_, p. 475.

[558] Digeon had obstructed the bridges of Arriaga and Gamarra. The bridge of Villodas, below Gazan’s extreme right, had been partly barricaded. Not so Nanclares, Mendoza, and the bridge immediately below Tres Puentes.

[559] Diary of the 43rd officer, in Maxwell, ii. p. 40.

[560] There is a good account of the heroic death of Cadogan, a much-loved colonel of the 71st, in the diary of his quarter-master, William Gavin, of the same regiment. When aware that he was mortally hit, Cadogan refused to be moved from the field, and had himself propped up against two knapsacks, on a point from which his dying eyes could survey the whole field, and watched the fight to the bitter end.

[561] From Gazan’s report in the French Archives, written at St. Jean-Pied-du-Port in July--very much _ex post facto_. It was lent me by Mr. Fortescue, along with several other Vittorian documents.

[562] Diary of Cooke of the 43rd in Maxwell’s _Peninsular Sketches_, ii. 42.

[563] Graham’s Report, _Wellington Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. 7-8.

[564] Cooke, the 43rd officer in Maxwell’s _Peninsular Sketches_, ii. 44. The guns were undoubtedly the Horse Artillery battery on the high-road in front of Gazan’s centre.

[565] Of course, Cooke is understating the distance, which was about a quarter of a mile.

[566] This interesting narrative of Captain Cooke of the 43rd must have been in Napier’s hands before it was printed by Maxwell, as several phrases from it are repeated in Napier, vol. v, p. 121. Sir William himself was in England that day.

[567] He was, along with Stewart and Oswald, one of the three divisional generals who committed the gross breach of orders during the Burgos retreat mentioned above, p. 152.

[568] Cf. Burgoyne, _Life and Letters_, i. 263 (June 23, 1813), with Picton’s letters in _Wellington Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. 225, about ‘the 3rd Division being kept in the background, for Sir T. P. is by no means a favourite with Lord W.’ Cairnes (in Dickson, ed. Leslie) puts the change down as ‘most mortifying to Picton’.

[569] See Dalhousie to Wellington, in _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. p. 6, which leaves much unsaid.

[570] Narrative of one of Picton’s staff in Robinson’s _Life of Picton_, ii. 195-6.

[571] The third battery originally at Ariñez was Villatte’s divisional battery, which had gone off with him to the Puebla heights. Neither P. Soult nor Treillard had guns with them.

[572] Such turning _might_ have been done either by the two belated brigades of the 7th Division or by troops detached by Graham, who had several brigades to spare, which he never used, but might have sent to pass the Zadorra at the bridge of Yurre or the fords west of it, both well behind the new French line.

[573] Who was this officer? _Not_ Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Cother of the 71st nor Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Harrison of the 50th. Hope of the 92nd, in his rather detailed narrative of this fight, calls him ‘Colonel R----.’ I cannot identify him. Conceivably, it may have been Colonel Rooke, the senior officer of Hill’s staff who _may_ have been sent up the heights, and _may_ have taken over command on Cadogan’s being mortally wounded.

[574] So says the anonymous but invaluable ‘T. S.’ of the 71st. Leith Hay, a prisoner with the French in this campaign, remarks that they were all in their summer wear of long linen overcoats, with the cross-belts put on above.

[575] They were released at Pampeluna on the surrender of that fortress three months later, in a state of semi-starvation, having been carried on with Villatte’s division during the French retreat. They described to Gavin of the 71st, who happened to be present at the surrender, their unhappy fortunes. See his diary, p. 25.

[576] Gazan’s most unconvincing account of all this engagement is that ‘General Villatte attacked the enemy with his usual vigour: nothing could resist the shock of his division. The position, whose recapture ought to have assured us the victory, was retaken, as well as the height in front of Subijana. The enemy was routed at every point. Such was the position of the Army of the South, when news came to the King that our troops by the Zadorra were attacked, and could not maintain themselves. I was told to break off my attack and retire to a position further back.’

[577] The 71st lost, beside their well-loved colonel--the only man mentioned in Wellington’s private letter of next morning to his brother Henry (_Dispatches_, x. p. 454)--44 killed, 272 wounded, and nearly 40 prisoners: half the battalion. The 50th lost only 7 officers and 97 men; the 92nd no more than 20 men. If Villatte gave correct figures, his total loss was only 2 officers and 289 men--including 22 prisoners. Of these the 63rd, obviously the leading regiment, was responsible for 135 casualties, the 95th for 94. The other two regiments had practically no losses. These figures are very low, but seem to be corroborated by Martinien.

[578] Its heavy loss of 33 officers and 515 men out of about 2,200 present was nearly all, I believe, suffered at this point. The 2/87th with 244 casualties out of about 600 present lost 40 per cent. of its strength. Chassé’s French brigade, the immediate opponents, had 800 casualties, nearly all at this moment.

[579] Why did not Dalhousie support Colville more promptly? He had a bridge to cross, and some way to go, but was evidently late.

[580] These details come mainly out of the _Mémoire sur la Retraite des Armées françaises_ in the French Archives, lent me by Mr. Fortescue. Internal evidence shows it written by some member of D’Erlon’s staff. Tirlet’s report is also useful.

[581] Captured by skirmishers of the 1/95th, as it was retreating up the high road and was nearing Ariñez. The French infantry recovered it for a moment by a counter-stroke, but as the Riflemen had cut the traces and shot or removed the horses, they could not get the gun away. Tirlet says the battery lost only _one_ gun, which is corroborated by Costello of the 95th, present on the spot. Kincaid and other Riflemen say three.

[582] There is a curious problem connected with a correspondence (_Dispatches_, x. pp. 329-31) between Picton and Wellington on July 16--three weeks after the battle. Wellington apparently thought that Picton blamed the 88th for losing Ariñez in the first assault, while it was really only two companies of the 1/95th which had entered that village and been driven out. He says that he had seen the 88th coming into action in a very ragged line, and had himself halted them and dressed their front, before he let them go on: after this he did not notice what became of them, but saw them again after the fighting formed on the other side of the village.

What Wellington did not witness is chronicled by Costello of the 1/95th: after describing the repulse of the Riflemen, he notes their pleasure at seeing ‘our favourite third division’ coming down the road. Ariñez was promptly retaken and the advance recommenced. ‘I noticed a regiment, which by its yellow facings was the Connaught Rangers, marching in close column of companies to attack a French regiment drawn up in line on the verge of the hill, with a small village [Gomecha?] in its rear. The 88th, although under a heavy cannonade from the enemy’s artillery, continued advancing gallantly, while we skirmishers took ground to the left, close to the road, in order to allow them to oppose this line in front. Though we were hotly engaged I watched their movements. The 88th next deployed into line, advancing all the time towards their opponents, who seemed to wait very coolly for them. When they had approached within 300 yards the French poured in a volley, or I should rather say a running fire from right to left. As soon as the British regiment recovered the first shock, and closed their files on the gap that had been made, they commenced advancing at double time till within fifty yards nearer to the enemy, when they halted and in turn gave a running fire from the whole line, and then without a moment’s pause, cheered and charged up the hill against them. The French meanwhile were attempting to reload. But they were hard pressed by the British, who gave them no time for a second volley. They went immediately to the right about, making the best of their way to the village behind.’

From this it is clear that the 88th fought on open ground, to the right of Ariñez and the high road. It was the centre regiment of the brigade: the 45th, therefore, must have been more to the right and well south of the road; the 74th on the high road were the actual takers of Ariñez. We have unluckily no description of Power’s Portuguese at the moment--but they lost heavily--the casualties being 25 officers and 386 men. They _must_ have been engaged with Leval’s 2nd Brigade, which had been stationed about and to the north of Gomecha, while the 1st Brigade held the village of Ariñez and the hill behind.

[583] The amusing story told of this storm by Harry Smith in his autobiography (i. pp. 97-8) is too good to be omitted. ‘My brigade was sent to support the 7th Division, which was hotly engaged. I was sent forward to report to Lord Dalhousie, who commanded. I found his lordship and his Q.M.G. Drake in deep conversation. I reported pretty quick, and asked for orders (the head of the brigade was just getting under fire). I repeated the question, “What orders, my lord?” Drake became somewhat animated, and I heard his lordship say, “Better take the village.” I roared out, “Certainly, my lord,” and off I galloped, both calling to me to come back, but “none are so deaf as those who won’t hear.” I told General Vandeleur we were immediately to take the village. The 52nd deployed into line, our Riflemen were sent out in every direction, keeping up a fire nothing could resist.... The 52nd in line and the swarm of Riflemen rushed at the village, and though the ground was intersected by gardens and ditches nothing ever checked us, until we reached the rear of it. There was never a more impetuous onset--nothing could resist such a burst of determination.’ Smith’s addition that the brigade took twelve guns in this charge seems (as Mr. Fortescue remarks) to be of more doubtful value.

Naturally there is nothing of this in Dalhousie’s dispatch--a most disappointing paper. It is mostly in a self-exculpatory tone, to justify his lateness and the absence of his two rear brigades. He _says_ that they came up at the same time as Vandeleur, which is certainly untrue, as neither of them had a single casualty all day. And they could not have failed to catch a shell or two if they had been anywhere near the fighting-line during the subsequent capture of Crispijana and Zuazo. Mr. Fortescue’s note that Captain Cairnes’s letter in the _Dickson Papers_, p. 916, proves that Barnes’s brigade had arrived by this time, is a misdeduction from Cairnes’s carelessness in talking of Grant’s brigade as ‘our first brigade,’ meaning thereby our leading brigade, not the brigade officially numbered 1. When Cairnes says that the ‘first brigade’ and the guns were ‘in their place,’ while the rest arrived very late in the action, we need only contrast the casualty lists--1st Brigade _nil_, 2nd Brigade 330 casualties, 3rd Brigade _nil_, to see what he means.

[584] It will be noticed that I put La Hermandad as the village where the heavy fighting took place, and which Vandeleur’s brigade stormed. All historians up to now have followed Napier in making Margarita the important place. A glance at the map will show that the latter village is too far forward to have been held for any time, after Leval had evacuated his original position on the great knoll facing Tres Puentes and Villodas.

I have to point out that neither Wellington nor Lord Dalhousie in the two contemporary dispatches (_Dispatches_, x. p. 451, and _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. pp. 4-6) mention either place by name--only speaking of ‘a village.’ D’Erlon’s staff-officer in the report of the Army of the Centre says that Margarita was held for some time but was rendered untenable by Leval’s retreat--so that Darmagnac had to go back to the heights behind. Gazan’s report says that the British were masters of Margarita before he took up his position on the heights above Ariñez, and that the _heights behind Margarita_ were the fighting position of D’Erlon. Of the diarists or chroniclers who issued their books _before the fifth volume of Napier_ came out, and who were present on this part of the field, Green (68th), Wheeler (51st), Captain Wood (82nd), mention no village names, nor do Lord Gough’s and Captain Cairnes’s contemporary letters, nor Geo. Simmons’ contemporary diary. Nor does Sir Harry Smith’s amusing account of his dealings with Lord Dalhousie before ‘the village’ which Vandeleur took (_Autobiography_, i. pp. 97-8) quoted in the preceding note.

After Napier’s book stated that the Light Division battalions took Margarita, and Gough with the 2/87th La Hermandad (a reversal of the real time and facts as I think), most later writers accepted these statements as gospel. But the report of Kruse, commanding the Nassau regiment, absolutely proves that Napier is wrong. Moreover, the rough map, annexed to D’Erlon’s original report of the battle in the French Archives, gives Hermandad as the position of Darmagnac, with his march thither _from_ Gomecha and _to_ Zuazo indicated by arrows. Kruse’s report may be found at length in the Nassau volume of Saussez’s _Les Allemands sous les Aigles_, pp. 340-1.

[585] This British claim is corroborated by the narrative of the French surgeon Fée, present at Abechuco that day.

[586] Though he had lost several when La Martinière was driven out of Gamarra Mayor (see above, p. 425) and Abechuco.

[587] The other regiments of Hay’s brigade were evidently kept in reserve, for the casualties of the 1/38th were eight only, and those of the 1/9th 25. The 8th Caçadores of Spry’s brigade lost 40 men, the Portuguese Line battalions only 41 between the four of them.

[588] Sergeant James Hale of the 1/9th, who has left us the only good detailed account of the fighting at Gamarra with which I am acquainted (pp. 105-6).

[589] Numbers impossible to determine, as they are never borne in the muster rolls of the Army of the Centre. But as they were 2,019 strong on July 16, when Soult reorganized the whole Army of Spain, they were probably 2,500 strong before the battle.

[590] So Tirlet, making allowances for the lost pieces.

[591] Viz. the divisional batteries of the 2nd Division (one British, one Portuguese), 3rd, 4th, 7th, Light, and Silveira’s Divisions, two H. A. batteries attached to the cavalry, two British and one Portuguese batteries of the reserve, and three Spanish guns belonging to Morillo.

[592] These notes are partly from Tirlet’s very interesting artillery report, partly from the narrative of the staff-officer of the Army of the Centre, already often quoted above.

[593] See tables of losses in Appendices, nos. xi and xii.

[594] _Memoirs_, p. 479.

[595] _Diary_ of Wachholz, attached with a Brunswick light company to the 4th Division, pp. 315-16.

[596] Thirty guns according to Garbé’s report--40 according to that of D’Erlon’s staff-officer, quoted above.

[597] Blaze, p. 244.

[598] What regiment was this? Obviously one of Colville’s or Grant’s--as obviously not the 51st, 68th, 82nd, 87th, 94th, from all of which we have narratives of the battle, which do not mention their being charged by cavalry or forming square. There remain the _Chasseurs Britanniques_, 1/5th, 2/83rd--it may have been any of these.