Chapter IV: Part 4

Cabinet at 3. A great deal of conversation of which the result was that a remonstrance should be made to Russia on the subject of the terms of the peace. This remonstrance will temperately but strongly, more by statement of facts than by observations, show that the peace is not such as the Emperor had given us reason to expect he would require, and that it in reality threatens the existence of the Turkish Empire; that the destruction of that Empire would seriously affect the peace of Europe by changing the relative position of the several States.

Aberdeen wants a guarantee of the territorial possessions of Turkey, not of its Government. [Footnote: It is observable that this guarantee seems to have said nothing of the internal system of government, and so far to have been unconditional. It would therefore have gone considerably beyond the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1878. It would also have applied to Europe as well as Asia. It is a commentary on the statement of Mr. Gladstone, in later days a colleague of Lord Aberdeen, that no statesman whom he had known in former times would ever have listened to the idea of such an engagement.] I think no one seems much inclined to agree with him. Such a guarantee would impose obligations without conferring rights upon us. It would be a guarantee which would give rise to infinite complications, and which would embarrass us very much.

Without a guarantee we may succeed in bringing the great States to an understanding that the distribution of the Turkish territories, in the event of the falling to pieces of that State, must be a subject for the decision of a Congress.

Austria has expressed herself very frankly. She is ready to do anything. She sees the danger and desires to know our view of it. The real view of France does not seem to be very different; but there is no dependence to be placed upon a Government trembling for its life. Prussia will be satisfied with the peace. Her sovereign is very weak, and the Prussians think their interest is served by the progress of Russia in a direction contrary to them, and in which she menaces Austria.

The smuggling case is said to tell against Lord Stuart. He writes unintelligibly, and the French will not trust him--so I shall not be sorry if we can get rid of him.

With Lord Heytesbury we are all dissatisfied, and have been from the beginning. There is a Council on Monday, and we have a Cabinet on Sunday at 3, when we are to hear Aberdeen's letter, and may probably have the Treaty.

There seems a determination to effect an armistice by force if the Conference will not order it in Greece.

We have nine good ships there. The Russians seven bad ones, and the French two.

Before the Conference can proceed the 10th Article of the Treaty of Peace must be declared _non avenu_--that which obliges the Porte to accept the Protocol of March 22--all negotiation upon that Protocol having been committed by Russia to the French and English Ambassadors, and it having been expressly reserved to the Porte by us, that her objections should be fairly weighed.

The French have taken advantage of the peace to order their troops home from the Morea.

_October 9._

Read many of the Protocols of the early Conferences after the Russian, declaration of war. I shall to-morrow read these again carefully and sketch _my_ State paper.

If I was in opposition I should describe the details relative to the Principalities, as showing the moderation of the thief who would stipulate that men should sleep with their doors open, till they have ransomed themselves by paying their uttermost farthing.

_October 10._

Received a letter from Sir J. Malcolm. He seems pleased with the secret dispatches relative to Persia and the Pacha of Bagdad. He seems upon the whole very much gratified, and very grateful.

He strongly presses the appointment of an Indian as his successor, and mentions Sir Ch. Metcalfe and Jenkins. He likewise mentions a Mr. Chaplin, of whom I never heard. I take Jenkins to be a cleverer man than Sir Ch. Metcalfe, [Footnote: Afterwards Lord Metcalfe.] who rather disappoints me.

Had three letters by Petersburg from Colonel McDonald, the last dated in August. The Persians, thoroughly alarmed, are doing all they can to satisfy the Emperor Nicholas by punishing the persons engaged in the massacre of the Russian mission; but they had an insurrection to quell on banishing the High Priest, who was at the head of all. As they conclude all the bad characters had a hand in it they mean to take the opportunity of punishing them. Paskewitz is said to have from 20,000 to 22,000 men--to have sustained no loss in the late engagements, but to suffer from the plague. At Erzeroum the Mahometans are not only satisfied, but well pleased. The Government of a Russian general is better than that of a Turkish Pasha.

The Prince Abbas Mirza is at last doing something towards making an army. Major Hart, alone, however, keeps it together. The troops are as yet ill- armed, but they have their pay. McDonald thinks the King not likely to live long. He wants a cypher.

_October 11, Sunday._

Came up from Worthing to a Cabinet. Before we met read the last letters from Lord Heytesbury, which show a degree of infatuation respecting the Russians, which is quite wonderful.

Before we began to talk Rothschild called out the Duke of Wellington, and offered at once all the money to pay the Russian Indemnity. He said he only wanted the guarantee of England!

If the Russians remained in the Principalities there would be a general war.

Irvine, an English loan jobber, saw the Duke yesterday with the same offer.

The joke is that Rothschild is to pay the money for the Turks, and to be made King of Jerusalem.

Aberdeen began by begging we would first settle the Greek question. He brought a paper the Russians were willing to deliver in containing a sort of apology for the 10th Article, and declaring that it by no means interfered with the powers of the Conference. We took a great deal of time in considering whether we should not suggest some alteration in this paper--some is to be proposed--not very essential.

We had a long discussion as to the name of the new State. At last it seemed to be thought 'Sovereign Prince of Greece' was the best. Aberdeen thinks he shall have little difficulty about the Prince. The Russians agree to the description given; but I dare say they imagine we mean to describe a different man. I suspect they think we want to give them Leopold.

Aberdeen read a letter he proposed sending to Lord Stuart, the purport of which was that we wanted to know what he meant to do towards redeeming France from the responsibility she had incurred and made us incur by giving instructions to Count Guilleminot, stating the terms of peace and the moderation of the Emperor--instructions which misled our Ambassador, and induced the two Ambassadors to give assurances to the Porte which events proved to be unfounded.

The letter, I think, likewise desired him to enquire in what form our joint representations as to the amount of the indemnity were to be made. To these the Ambassadors have pledged the two Cabinets.

There was a great deal more in the letter which is to be left out. It went into the details of the treaty, or rather of its effects.

The offer is to be made to the Turks of an independent Greece, from the Gulf of Volo to Missolonghi, or of a Greece under Suzeraineté, with Negropont, and the line from Volo to the Gulf of Arta.

I think we are all agreed that at the commencement of the war it was our interest to take as little as possible from Turkey--that now it is our interest to make Greece a substantive State, which may hereafter receive the _débris_ of the Ottoman Empire. [Footnote: This may explain the apparently illiberal views of many of the Cabinet as to the Greek boundaries. They saw the difficulty of any halting place outside the Isthmus of Corinth, short of a wider boundary even than that ultimately adopted.]

As to the really important matter, the remonstrance to Russia, nothing was done. Nothing is, I conclude, written, and Aberdeen does not like Cabinet criticism, nor do I think the Cabinet at all agreed as to what should be said. Dudley's letters used to occupy us for days, and certainly they were the better for it--although we lost a good deal of time occasionally.

Aberdeen said he would send it to me. I think I shall write an _esquisse_ myself. We are to have no more Cabinets for some time. The Chancellor wishes to have the remaining fortnight of his holidays uninterrupted.

_October 12._

Went to town at quarter-past one. To the Foreign Office. The treaty arrived last night. Lord Aberdeen took it with him to Windsor. It differs materially from the _projet_. The Articles respecting indemnity are _relégués_ to a separate transaction. The payment of 100,000 ducats is to lead to the evacuation of Adrianople; 400,000 form the next payment, then 500,000, and 500,000, making the sum originally demanded for individual losses; but, as I understand Mr. Backhouse, eighteen months must elapse before Turkey can be evacuated to the Danube. I had much conversation with him as to other points. On looking into the Act of the Congress I find the Powers adhering to it may be considered as binding themselves not to _disturb_ the territorial arrangements that Act establishes; but they are not bound to _maintain_ them. Thus if France appropriated to herself Spain, she would violate the treaty, but no Power signing the treaty would be obliged, by virtue of that Act, to make war upon France for doing so.

That the general treaty contains no guarantee is evident from the specific guarantee of the cessions made by Saxony to Prussia, which would have been unnecessary if the spirit of the treaty had been that of existent guarantee.

_October 13._

Cabinet room. Found Lord Rosslyn there. Read the treaty.

The King was very well yesterday. The Recorder's Report was so long that half was deferred.

The last dispatches from Persia, which arrived on Friday, were opened at the Foreign Office, and read by everybody. Aberdeen sent them to the Duke, who has probably taken them to Walmer in his carriage. The Chairs sent for them, and could not get them. I must put a stop to this. I have written to Lord Heytesbury to beg he will in future forward letters to their address.

Wrote a 'proposed draft' to Lord Heytesbury, directing him, if he should have reason to think the Russians intend to exact further concession from Persia, to intimate that such an attempt will be considered by his Majesty as unfriendly to himself as an Asiatic Power. I doubt my getting the Duke to agree to the sending of this despatch; but I shall try.

_October 14._

Carried my proposed letter to Lord Heytesbury to Aberdeen, who agrees to send it with a trifling alteration, at least one not very important. Read to him my proposed letter to Lord Heytesbury on the Peace of Adrianople. He seemed to approve of great part of it. He has done nothing at his yet, and seems to think there is no hurry!

We shall stand very ill in Parliament if we have nothing to show. I think mine is a good _cadre_ of a letter, but that specific instructions should be given to Lord Heytesbury as to what he shall endeavour to obtain in a separate despatch.

Read my drafts to Lord Rosslyn after dinner. He seemed to think the view I took was the right, and that much of what I had written was very good, but that it might be shortened. So I think.

_October 15._

Henry copied the draft to Lord Heytesbury, for the Duke, to whom I sent it with a letter.

Showed the Chairs the draft to Lord Heytesbury on Persia. They were much pleased with it. So was old Jones. Sent it to the Duke. In little doubt his approving it.

Received from the Duke the Persian despatches which I gave to the Chairs. The Duke had not read them.

Received from him a letter on the subject of half-Batta. He says as an officer he should have thought there was a compromise in 1801. That it should be looked into as a question of economy. That above all things in dealing with an army you must _be just_.

The Duke thinks the publication of the letter of Lord Combermere's secretary indiscreet and _wicked_, and is very angry with Lord Combermere.

A letter will be written to the Government on the subject, directing enquiry.

_October 19, Sunday._

Read McDonald's despatches from Persia, and sent them to the Duke, with a letter suggesting the heads of a letter to the Envoy.

The Russians have given up one of the two crores due, and allow five years for paying the other. They mean, therefore, to rule Persia _by influence_. However, there is a good Mahometan and Anti-Russian feeling beyond the Euphrates, and if mischief happens, it is our fault.

Received a letter from Hardinge respecting half-Batta. He is for standing firm and giving some general boon, as an addition to marching money, to the whole army. That is my idea. I am sure it is the safest course.

Wrote to Loch, suggesting it, and at the same time advised him to answer the paragraphs respecting half-Batta, and not give misrepresentations too much head.

_October 20._

Two letters from the Duke, written very hastily. It is evident he did not like my making a sketch of a letter to Lord Heytesbury, and that he does not like any difference of opinion as to the Batta question.

On the first point I still think I was right. He mentions some ideas of Russia ordering Diebitch across the Balkan, and even the Danube, of her giving up the Principalities, &c. In short he says all we know is that there is a peace--we do not know what it is--and it would be ridiculous to remonstrate against we know not what.

My draft was written before these reports were spread; and I only, from anxiety to have the despatch well written and soon, sketched what I thought would do.

As to the reports, I have told Aberdeen I cannot believe Russia has on a sudden ceased to be ambitious, or to use perfidy as a mode of accomplishing ambitious ends. She may give out she will make these changes--she may make some--but her object is to prevent all combination on the part of Austria, France, and England. If we do not remonstrate against what is signed, we shall lose all credit, if that which is executed should be comparatively favourable, and we shall incur great blame if no relaxation takes place. A remonstrance might be so worded as to do no harm to Turkey or to Europe, and to do good to us.

The Duke's other letter was on the Batta question, upon which he does not like contradiction, yet I think his course would lead to continued demands on the part of all the armies. I have told him I shall be in town to see the Chairs on Saturday, and will try to see him on Friday, and, if he wishes, bring the Chairs to him on Saturday.

_October 21._

Received a long confused letter from Fitzgerald upon my project of a draft to Lord Heytesbury. He was at Sudborn, [Footnote: Seat of Lord Hertford, in Suffolk] where the Duke was. The Duke was not so much inclined to think the Russians would make any considerable concessions as Aberdeen, but he thought, and had made Fitzgerald think, it would be premature to remonstrate. I have written to Fitzgerald and told him my opinion more at length than I told Aberdeen yesterday.

_October 23._

Cabinet room. Read the despatches from Petersburg and Paris. All the hints of the Emperor of Russia's intention of not retaining his army in Turkey come through Paris, Nesselrode having on September 29 spoken thus specifically to the Duke de Mortemart, and merely talked about taking less money and making some change in the guarantees to Lord Heytesbury. I did not see Aberdeen, who was engaged with the Spanish Minister.

I do not depart from my original idea that Russia does all this to gain time, and with as much perfidy as she has shown throughout.

Polignac would take a loyal view if he durst.

I cannot see the Duke till Monday, as he does not return to London till Sunday evening.

I saw Hardinge and had a long talk with him about Batta, &c.

_October 24._

Chairs at 11.

The Chairs say the Court have the matter entirely in their hands as to Batta. They wish to have the opinion of the Cabinet, and to be governed by that. I have written to the Duke to tell him so.

I am glad there is to be a Cabinet, because I think a Cabinet will take a more popular view of the question than the Duke, and, as I think, a juster view. I am for standing firm.

The Duke's letter on Persian affairs arrived while I was with the Chairs. I read it to them. The Duke suggests that McDonald should raise his escort in Persia--an excellent idea. He objects to Major Hart having an assignment of land. He thinks Willock may be recalled. The officers not; but if the prince will pay them, so much the better. I think the Duke may be right as to the assignments of land. Upon all the other points I entirely agree with him. Read last night a letter of Lushington's, or rather a minute, which shows he is determined to remain.

Cabinet room. Cunningham came in and showed me a draft of Aberdeen's to our Minister in Spain on the recognition by Spain of Don Miguel--finding excuses for Spain, and saying we cannot do it. What I saw was the _brouillon_ which had been sent to the Duke. It had his observations in pencil, and it seems Aberdeen sends all his proposed despatches to him and alters them at his suggestion. Certainly Aberdeen, left to himself, would be a very incautious writer.

_October 26._

Office early. Saw Captain Hanchett on the subject of the navigation of the Red Sea. He was there two years and a half. He says in going in you should make Aden and wait there for a wind. Water can be had there. Avoid Mocha, where the anchorage is dangerous and the water bad, and go to the Island of Cameran, then straight up in mid channel. All the dangers are visible, and in the mid channel there are none. Cosseir a good little harbour, the danger is going up to Suez; but that easy for a steamer. He worked with topgallant sails against the north-west monsoon. There is a breeze along shore at all times. The danger has been occasioned by the timid sailing of the Arabs, who always hug the shore, and anchor at night.

_October 27._

I omitted yesterday to mention that at the Foreign Office I saw some despatches just received from Sir R. Gordon. I think the date of the first was October 2. He had the day before at last got the Turks to ratify the treaty, but it seems there was a hitch, and until the ratification the officers did not set off to stop hostilities in Asia. A Pasha had advanced on Philippopoli and General Geismar on Sophia. Diebitch threatened to advance on Constantinople. However, the day after he wrote his threatening letter he must have received the ratifications. The Sultan is very anxious to get the Egyptian fleet to Constantinople, probably as a pledge for the allegiance of the Pasha, and to show his greatest vassal obeys him. The Turks say it is the moral effect of the presence of the fleet on their own subjects that they want, that they have no idea of not acting faithfully. Sir R. Gordon assures me they mean to preserve the peace and must.

He has written the representation the Turkish ambassador is to present to the Emperor. It would be a good remonstrance for us, but it is not a good one for the Turks. It is very well written, but it is quite European in its style, and the Russians will at once know, as I did, the author.

The Turks intended to send a splendid embassy to Petersburg, and Halil Pasha, once the slave of the Seraskier, now the Sultan's son-in-law, was to have been the ambassador. He is their least officer. However, Diebitch tells them they must not send it till they have the Emperor's consent. The Turks have ready the first 100,000 ducats, to get the Russians out of Adrianople.

I should say from these despatches that things do not look peaceful.

_October 28._

Had a letter yesterday from Mr. Elphinstone on Nazarre. It appears to be a fine on descents, &c., of Jaghire lands. I think his opinion will be different from Sir J. Malcolm's--the latter wishing to make the Jaghires hereditary, or rather to give a fee simple interest to the actual proprietor. Mr. Elphinstone, on the contrary, thinking they should be resumed on death without heirs.

_October 29._

Read a work just published by Colonel de Lacy Evans, on the practicability of a Russian invasion of India. The route would be first to China, across a desert from the shores of the Caspian--from China by water up the Oxus, to within 550 miles of Attock. The great difficulty is between the end of the river, and the southern side of the Hindoo Koosh. This difficulty, however, has been often surmounted, and the road is constantly travelled by caravans.

I think it is clear that the invasion of India could not be attempted till the third year; but when should we begin to take precautions? A Government wholly Asiatic would not be still if the Russians took possession of China; but ours, chained by European politics, would hardly move if they entered Cabul.

We ought to have full information as to Cabul, Bokhara, and China.

My letter of last year directed the attaining of information; but I dare say nothing has been done.

_October 30._

Received a Memorial from Mr. Fullerton, asking some remuneration beyond his salary for past services. He has a claim _if we were rich_. I think he should have 10,000 dollars. I dare say he thinks 20,000. Thoughtless extravagance is the destruction of generosity and even of justice.

Upon the subject of the invasion of India my idea is that the thing is not only practicable, but easy, unless we determine to act as an Asiatic Power. On the acquisition of Khiva by the Russians we should occupy Lahore and Cabul.[Footnote: It may be remembered that Lord Ellenborough strongly disapproved of any occupation of Afghanistan, or interference with its internal affairs, in 1840-42. At that time Russia had not advanced to Khiva. It is clear that he would not have held the same opinion as to our policy towards Afghanistan after the events of 1873-74.] It is not on the Indus that an enemy is to be met. If we do not meet him in Cabul, at the foot of the Hindoo Koosh, or in its passes, we had better remain in the Sutlege. If the Russians once occupy Cabul they may remain there with the Indus in their front, till they have organised insurrection in our rear, and completely equipped their army. I fear there are passes from Balkh upon Peshawur. If these could be closed and the enemy poured upon Cabul we should know where to meet him. Now we, being at Cabul, might be cut off from its resources by the descent of the enemy upon Peshawur.

There is some road from Roondorg through Cashmere, but I do not fear that. The road an enemy would choose would be that by the Valley of the Cachgu.

We know nothing of these passes, nothing of the country beyond them, nothing of the course of the Indus--but we should have full information so as to be able to crush an advancing enemy, by making the whole country hostile, which money would do.

To meet an invasion we must raise every regiment to 1,000 men.

168 Regiments
360 "
-----
1,008
504
------
60,480 Men, besides Artillery.
4,000 King's Inf. raised to 1,000 each Reg.
1,000 Do. four Regiments of Cavalry.
4,000 Four new Regiments.
2,000 Two new Cavalry.
Besides King's Artillery.
------
71,480

Besides the increase which would take place in the Irregular Corps, particularly in Skinner's.

A smaller increase than this would not be sufficient; for we should require 20,000 men at Delhi, 20,000 in Lahore, and 60,000 in Cabul. I speak of enrolled, not effectives--but with these augmentations the Regular Army would only be

148,000 N.I.
24,000 King's.
-------
172,000
20,000 Native Cavalry.
6,000 King's.
-------
198,000

The out provisional battalions, local corps, &c., of 198,000, I do not think above 100,000 could possibly be disposable, and there would not be 70,000 effectives. The Artillery must be very numerous. I omitted the Company's English Regiments, about 3,000 men.

Of all nations the Russians are the least adapted for an enterprise of this nature. They have neither medical staff nor commissariat, and the men are without resource. A French army would be the best. I doubt the possibility of Russia bringing more than 20,000 men to Cabul, and these could not descend the mountains till the third year, if Cabul was occupied. What I fear is an occupation of Khiva unknown to us. No preparation on our part-- no marching forward--so that in three or four months from leaving Khiva the enemy might be at Cabul. I am sure we can defeat the enterprise. We ought to defeat it before the enemy reaches the Indus. If 20,000 Russians should reach the Indus, it will be a sharp fight.

_November 1, 1829._

A letter from the Duke. He returned the papers I sent him. He has doubts as to the expediency of making the Commissary-General of Stores I proposed; but he seems to have supposed I wished to do away with the Military Board. I have explained what I meant.

He approves of my suggestions as to correspondence, but thinks every paper must be sent home, and the collections formed here. I have explained that I always intended every paper should be sent home, and I have told him that I had the opinion of the clerks I consulted that the collections might be framed in India, with a saving of time, and without diminishing the check on the local Governments.

_November 4._

Received from Aberdeen his draft of a remonstrance to Russia, which, it seems, must be sent at last. He has already shown it to the Duke and Peel.

There is no great substantive objection to it; but it is not very carefully written. I shall send it to him tomorrow with many proposed alterations. In the second box came Gaily [Footnote: H. Gaily Knight. Best known for his works on the Normans in Sicily, and Ecclesiastical Architecture in Italy.] Knight's letter to Aberdeen; which is a poor, flimsy production. A peacock's feather in the hilt of a Drawcansir's sword.

_November 5._

Altered, not only verbally, but substantially, Aberdeen's paper, and sent it to him.

Cabinet room. Read a Memorandum by Lord Heytesbury, of a conversation he has had with the Emperor of Russia. The Emperor expects the early downfall of the Porte--and a Revolution in France. Asks if another march to Paris would be possible? Lord Heytesbury saw Nesselrode afterwards and told him what the Emperor had said. Nesselrode said the Emperor always saw things _en noir_. He had a different opinion. He did not think the Porte in immediate danger, nor did he expect a French Revolution.

The other guarantees they talk of are further cessions in Asia, specifically Batoum, or the occupation of Varna, or Silistria, instead of the Principalities. The latter is worse, and the Turks will probably consent to neither. They do not value the Principalities, and they know Europe does.[Footnote: The Principalities, as commanding the lower course of the Danube, were all important to Austria especially. Thus, occupation by Russia, while it would have been felt as a menace to Central Europe, would have left Turkey a compact state beyond the Danube.]

_November 6._

Saw Aberdeen. He is always gloomy about _divisions_. He is afraid of an attack on Foreign Policy. He thinks the two parties will unite in that. He hears there has been some approximation between Lord Grey [Footnote: Lord Grey had been separated from the bulk of the Whig party since their junction with Canning in 1827.] and Lord Holland. At the same time it is said there is a notion of bringing in Lord Grey. I suspect this report to have been fabricated by the Ultra-Tories to annoy the King.

He thinks the Duke is annoyed, more particularly at the King's not treating him well, and at his Government not being well supported.

In fact, however, it is a Government which will not fall, for the King hates the Whigs; the people do not regard them. He may like the Tories, but he knows they cannot make a Government, and the Duke's Administration has four-fifths of the country.

Received a letter from the Duke, telling me he had settled Colonel McDonald's knighthood, and asking me if I should be ready to talk about India on the 13th. I said about Batta certainly; about India I had rather talk first to Lord Melville and him.

Wrote to the Duchess of Kent telling her a Bengal cavalry cadetship was at her disposal for the son of Colonel Harvey.

There is a very interesting letter from an English officer at Adrianople with respect to the state of the Russian army. It has suffered and suffers most dreadfully.

I told Aberdeen if I had seen the account of the conversation between Lord Heytesbury and the Emperor Nicholas before I read his proposed letter, I should have suggested that much stress should have been laid upon the effect the downfall of Turkey would have upon affairs in France.

Polignac seems confident he can stand. He thinks he has the Chambers. The French behave ill in the settlement of the Greek business, and object altogether to our man, Prince Philip of Hesse Homburg. They equally object to Prince Frederick of Orange, and to Prince Leopold, whom Russia would have had willingly. I wonder Aberdeen did not laugh when he was proposed. They want to settle the thing without a Prince. I suppose they want a Frenchman.

Aberdeen is for settling Greece as a Power into whose lap the broken parts of Turkey may fall. He gives up Euboea. That is, the surrender of Euboea is to be proposed to the Porte, with a frontier limited in other respects, instead of the protocol of March 22.

The Turks who have left the Morea have no indemnity. The Turks who are in the other parts of the new Greece remain. It is altogether a wonderful business. These anti-revolutionary States combining to revolutionise a rebellious province of an unoffending ally!

_November 11._

It seems the French do not like the idea of giving to the Turks the option of an independent State with smaller limits, or of a State under Suzeraineté with extended limits, contrary to the treaty, and sending at the same time secret instructions to the Ambassadors to insist upon the _entire_ independence of the new Greek State. The French seem likewise to have been offended at the protocol having been settled between Russia and us, before they were called in to give their opinion. No wonder. Certainly our diplomacy has not succeeded. We have failed in all our objects.

_November 13._

Cabinet. I was first called upon to say my say upon the general Indian question. I observed that the present prospective deficiency was one million a year. That until we could ascertain whether that deficiency could be diminished or done away with we were really not ourselves prepared to come to a decision upon the future government of India; nor would Parliament endure that the China trade should be closed upon the country for twenty years more without first inquiring whether it was necessary. The first question was, 'Can we make such a reduction of expenditure, or effect such an increase in income as to enable the Government of India to go on without any assistance direct or indirect from England?' If it can, then we have the China trade in our hands. If it cannot, we have to decide whether the necessary assistance shall be found by means of a continuance of the monopoly or in some other manner.

I stated the increase of two millions in six years in the civil charges of Bengal; that the Court had issued the strongest instructions, and the local Government seemed to have a real intention to curtail expenditure. That I had done something, and should do all I could, investigating every item. Peel suggested a commission. I said that had occurred to me last year. The Duke, however, objected to a commission as really superseding the Governor- General and being the Government. Another objection certainly is the delay. Difficulties would be thrown in its way, and we should at last be obliged to decide without its final report, having thrown away our time here in waiting for it.

I mentioned that the character of the local Government was 'disrespect and disobedience.' That nothing but a long continuance of strict rule could bring India into real subjection. It was this disobedience which was the chief source of increased expenditure. It arose in a great measure from the unequal hand which had been held over them--the indulgence of the Court of Directors--and the great delays in the communication with India arising out of the system of correspondence. I had endeavoured to remedy that, and hoped to get an answer to letters within the year. It was now two years and a half. I had likewise endeavoured to make arrangements for steam communication by the Red Sea. I hoped to be able to send a letter to Bombay in sixty days.

The Cabinet seemed generally to acquiesce in the expediency of only having a Committee this year.

At first they all seemed to think the continuance of the government in the Company a matter of course. I told them that even with the China trade the Government could not now go on without great reductions of expenditure, and that I hoped the Cabinet would not come to a hasty decision upon a question involving so many important political and financial considerations. The present system was not one of great expense, but it was one involving great delay--and delay was expense, and not only expense but abandonment of authority. It was in this point of view that I hoped the Cabinet would look at the question when it came before them.

I mean to go quietly to work; but I mean, if I can, to substitute the King's government for that of the Company. [Footnote: This was not carried out till 1858, after the great mutiny.] I am sure that in doing so I shall confer a great benefit upon India and effect the measure which is most likely to retain for England the possession of India.

We afterwards spoke of the Batta question. I read Lord Wellesley's letter, and stated the opinions of Sir J. Malcolm, Sir Archibald Campbell, and Sir J. Nicholls.

I stated that it seemed the feeling in the army was excited more by the apprehension of further reductions than by the establishment of the half- Batta stations; that if concessions were made to the Bengal army, the other armies would be discontented and further demands would be made.

The Duke said, as a soldier, and having been in India at the time, he must say he thought the orders of 1828 [Footnote: Orders issued by Lord William Bentinck, abolishing full batta or the larger scale of allowances to the military at stations where half-batta only had been recognised, before the Act of the Bengal Government allowing full batta in consideration of officers providing themselves with quarters.--See Thornton's _British India_, pp. 221-25.] a breach of faith--but these having been issued, he thought we must stand to them. The general opinion was that as nothing could be said or done till the arrival of despatches, there could be no necessity for deciding.

I mentioned my Supreme Court Bill, which will be ready immediately.

I hope to save--ultimately 60,000 pounds a year in the Supreme Courts.

£
£1,000 on each Judge..... 9,000
1 Judge at Calcutta...... 5,000
1 Judge at M. and B...... 8,000
Recorder's Court......... 8,000
Fees at Calcutta........ 30,000
------
£60,000

Ireland is put off till Monday, that we may all read the papers. We dine with the Duke to-morrow.

The French oppose all the people we name for the Greek coronet. They have named Prince Charles of Bavaria, and the second son of the King of Bavaria with a regency till he is of age! However, this folly they did not press.

We first named Prince Philip of Hesse Homburg, whom the French would not hear of. Then Leopold! They did not like him. Prince Emilius of Hesse Darmstadt was thought of. The French have suggested Prince John of Saxony, second son of the King, a fine young man, about 28, but unknown. His elder brother too may soon succeed to the throne, and he has no children. Otherwise there is no objection to this Prince.

It seems to me they are running after trifles. Russia adheres to us as to the Prince, or rather remains neutral, thinking I have no doubt that France and England will quarrel about the feather.

The secret instruction which it was proposed to give to the Ambassadors is now abandoned, France having objected. They were to have been ordered to _insist_ upon Turkey taking one of two things of which she was to have ostensibly the pure option. Now they are only clearly to intimate their _wish_. However, it seems Russia will take a million of ducats less if Turkey will make Greece independent. That is, she will give up a claim to what she cannot get in order to effect that she has no right to ask.

The French Government have, by giving new rates of pension, got 1,600 old officers out of the army, and filled important stations with friends of their own. They think they shall stand.

I forgot to mention the Archduke Maximilian of Modena as one of the persons talked of for Greece. It seems uncertain whether any one of these Princes would take the coronet.

_November 14, Saturday._

Cabinet room. Rosslyn and afterwards Lord Bathurst there. Read the Irish papers, that is, Lord Francis Leveson's private letters to Peel and Peel's to him, with a letter from Peel to Leslie Foster, asking his opinion as to education and Maynooth, and Foster's reply. The latter is important. He thinks the political and religious hostility of the two parties is subsiding. The chiefs alone keep it up. The adherents are gradually falling off. To open the questions of education, &c., now, would be to open closing wounds, nor would anything be accomplished. The priests would resist everything proposed, and the Protestants would not be satisfied. The Kildare Street Society, however defective, does a great deal of good, more than could be expected from any new system we could carry at this moment.

As to Maynooth, to withdraw the grant would not diminish the funds, while it would increase the bad feeling.

The increased prevalence of outrage, arising more from a disorganised state of society than from politics or religion, and the _assassination_ plan, must be met by an extensive police, directed by stipendiary magistrates; and the expense of this police, and the indemnity to sufferers must be paid by the barony in which the outrage takes place.

All Peel's letters are very sensible. Lord Francis Leveson's are in an odd style, rather affected occasionally, and his ideas are almost always such as require to be overruled. He is a forward boy; but I see nothing of the statesman in him. We ought to have had Hardinge there.

Dined at the Duke's. A man of the name of Ashe is writing letters to the Duke of Cumberland threatening his life if he does not give up a book in MS.

This book of Ashe's is a romance detailing all sorts of scandals of the Royal Family, and of horrors of the Duke of Cumberland. The book is actually in the possession of the Duke of Wellington.

The King's violence, when there was an idea of Denman's [Footnote: The King always resented an offensive quotation of Denman's as counsel during the Queen's trial.] appearing for the Recorder, was greater, the Duke says, than what he showed during the Catholic question.

Lady Conyngham has been and is very ill. There is no idea of the Court going to Brighton.

_November 16._

Cabinet. France, Austria, and England to ask Don Pedro distinctly what he means to do. We certainly cannot go on as we are with Portugal for ever. Aberdeen fears France may acknowledge Miguel first, and thus take our place with Portugal.

The Duke says if we can keep Spain on good terms with Portugal, and with ourselves, the connection of France and Portugal does not signify, and we are much better off than with Portugal against Spain and France. This is true.

A long talk about Ashe, who has written a libel on the Duke of Cumberland, which the Duke gave to the Duke of Wellington. Ashe wants it back, and threatens if he has it not returned to him; but in a letter, and in such terms that the Attorney-General does not think him liable to prosecution. He might be held to bail, perhaps, but that would bring out the case. It was decided to do nothing, but to take precautions against his doing mischief. The Duke of Cumberland has been cautioned.

The Insurrection Act seems to be popular with Fitzgerald. Peel says it is bad in principle, and has the effect of placing the higher classes in hostility against the lower. The decision seemed to be to have a powerful police--stipendiary magistrates--frequent trials--constables appointed by Government--counties paying for additional police.

Peel suggests the division of Ireland into smaller districts, and the acquiring a personal knowledge of individuals, and making the districts responsible.

I believe the country is too populous, and the population too wicked, for this plan to succeed.

The murderers will be brought in from a distance.

The state of demoralisation in which the country is is dreadful. Murders are held to be of no account.

_November 17._

Read, as I came down to Worthing, Colonel McDonald's last despatches, and his private letter, which I received last night. Sent them to the Duke, and asked whether under the circumstances we should let Abbas Murza have some thousand stand of arms, Colonel McDonald doing his best to secure ultimate repayment.

The Persian cavalry raised by the Russians in their newly conquered territories seem to have fought as well as any troops in their service. Colonel McDonald says it is from a disciplined Persian army alone, commanded by Russian officers, that he dreads the invasion of India. A European force would be wasted by the climate. The Pasha of Suleimania had too European a taste, and wanted to make regular soldiers without pay or clothing. So his soldiers turned him out, and made his brother Pacha.

Colonel McDonald describes all that side of Turkey as going _au devant du conquérant_. Such has been the wretchedness of their government.

_Worthing, November 18, 1829._

At 11 P.M. received a letter from the Duke of Wellington by a messenger, telling me he regretted I had not met Lord Melville and him before the Cabinet, and proposing, as he and Lord Melville both wished to go out of town on Friday, that I should meet them either to-morrow, after 2, or on Friday morning.

I wrote to say I would be with him at 3 to-morrow.

_November 19._

Met the Duke and Lord Melville.

After conversation on topics connected with the subject we came to the point, which was that the Duke wished both to preserve the monopoly and the Company as administrators of Indian affairs.

The Duke is much swayed by early recollections. He is besides very desirous of having the City of London in his hands.

I admitted that the great and solid objection to placing the government of India directly in the hands of the Crown was the consequent increase of Parliamentary business, already too extensive to be well performed.

As to the China trade, if the Government of India can be conducted without the assistance derived from it, I saw no reason for its continuance; but I had rather continue the monopoly than lose the Company as a trading Company to China, for I thought the trade might be greatly endangered were their commerce to cease. I said that the continuance of the system of carrying on the government through the instrumentality of the Company was not inconsistent with giving to it the efficiency, the vigour, and the celerity of the King's Government.

Lord Melville admitted the cumbrousness of the present system.

The Duke seemed to have no objection to alterations in details, provided the principle were adhered to.

Both to-day and in the Cabinet on Friday last I was surprised by Lord Melville's inertness.

The Duke wishes Leach's paper to be 'the case to be proved.' This may be done, and yet the necessary improvements introduced.

Met Seymour, who had been with the Duke. He is just come from Berlin. He seemed to say that the great success of the war was wholly unexpected by the Emperor.

_November 20._

Wrote to Hylton Jolliffe to beg he would turn his attention to the subject of steam navigation to India by the Red Sea, as a private speculation.

_November 21._

Read a letter from Sir G. Murray. It seems the Duke, Lord Melville, and Sir George are to meet soon to consider whether some alteration should not be made in the rules of the Order of the Bath. I suggested that it might be an improvement to make civilians eligible to the lower grades of the Order. It might occasionally be very convenient to make a man a K.C.B. for civil service.

_Sunday, November 22._

Told Bankes what the Duke wished respecting the Charter; but I likewise told him it had not yet been so determined in Cabinet, and that there was no objection to our making the Government more rapid and vigorous, and less like the Tullietudlem coach. I desired him to consider this _confidential_ to himself and the Commissioners.

_November 25._

Received a note from Bankes announcing that the Duke had accepted his retirement from the office of secretary, and had consented to make him an extra commissioner.

This has long been an idea of Bankes's, of which I never could see rational ground. Indeed, he seems to acknowledge it is not his own idea, but that of others, that on his return to the Government he should not have returned to the same office. In fact it is the influence of the Duke of Cumberland, and it is evident from the endeavour to detach Bankes from the Government now that the Brunswickers still have hopes. It is like giving notice to Lot and his family before the fall of fire and brimstone.

Bankes's letter is full of kind and grateful expressions towards me. Indeed, we have always been on very friendly and confidential terms. I have expressed my regret at his resolution. I told him I think he acts upon mistaken views, and I assure him that in whatever position he may stand towards the Board, it will afford me much pleasure and advantage to remain on the same terms with him.

The Duke will be angry, and I do not think Bankes will soon get an office again.

_December 2._

Read for an hour at the Cabinet room. There is a curious account of a conversation between De Rigny and an Austrian friend at Smyrna. De Rigny thinks very ill of the Government, and of the state of France. He too wants the Rhine! He judges truly enough of the results of the treaty. 'England, Austria, and France will talk, but nothing will be done.' He says Russia was very foolish not to go on. She might have dared anything. However, the army seems to have suffered severely. They acknowledge the loss of 130,000 men in the two campaigns.

Diebitch has partly evacuated Adrianople, leaving there, however, 6,000 sick and a battalion. The plague spreads in the Principalities, and they do not know how to get the troops out of Turkey.

Zuylen de Neyvelt and others give a very bad account of the state of Constantinople. They say the Turkish Empire _cannot_ hold together.

I do not like Lord Stuart's account of the state of the French Ministry. They will bring in Villele, who is an able man, and he may save them; but theirs is a desperate game.

The French seem to be disposed to go along with us in negotiating with the Emperor of Brazil [Footnote: _i.e._ with the Emperor Don Pedro, father of the ultimately successful candidate for the Portuguese throne, Donna Maria de Gloria.] for the recognition of Miguel. There would be a stipulation for amnesty, &c.

_December 3._

The Chairs talked of Lord William Bentinck. They are very much out of humour with him and heartily wish he was at home. He has neither written privately nor publicly, except upon trifling matters, for five months. He has declared his opinion in favour of colonisation. He is very unpopular. On the subject of Sir W. Rumbold he and Sir Ch. Metcalfe are very hostile, taking extreme views on the different sides. This hostility upon one subject will lead to difference upon others. The Government is not respected--and certainly there has been no moment when it was of more importance that the head of the Government should be respected than when it is necessary to effect a great economical reform. They describe the feeling at Madras as being still worse. There they did not think the governor an _honest man_.

The Chairs expect a letter from Macdonald to the Secret Committee with copies of his last despatches which I have already received through Petersburg, so they are unwilling to accept a communication of them from me. The letter, permitting Abbas Murza to purchase 12,000 stand of arms and to pay for them by instalments, will therefore go without any reference to the last despatches received.

Saw Aberdeen. He agrees with me in feeling much apprehension on the state of France as well as of Turkey. He seems, however, to think more of the state of parties here, and does not like the looks of the Duke of Cumberland (who was nearly dying last week) and of the King. It seems the King, although very well satisfied with measures of a public nature, is annoyed at not carrying some small jobs.

There was a great party at Woburn lately, and the world of course say there is an approximation to the Grey party. Aberdeen thinks the Woburn party showed good wishes, and Lord Grey, it is said, does not mean to come up to town. However, he is said to think he has been slighted, whereas the Duke of Wellington _cannot_ do anything for him in the hostile state of the King's mind.

I told Aberdeen confidentially of Bankes's going out, which is an indication, no doubt, of continued hostility on the part of the Duke of Cumberland.

Saw Hardinge. Talked on various public subjects, and then told him of the probability that in three months Lord W. Bentinck would be recalled. I asked him whether he could be induced to go as Governor-General. He rejected the idea at first as unsuited to his rank in the army. I said we could make him Captain-General. He seemed to think it was a great field for a man who wished to obtain great fame, and if he was unmarried he would not be disinclined to go, but I should think domestic considerations would prevent him. I wish we had him as secretary in Ireland, but he is wanted _everywhere_. He is so useful. He would be _most useful_ in Ireland.

Saw the Duke. I told him what the Chairs had said. He said he always thought Lord William would not succeed. Who could we get to replace him? He had always thought it did not signify as long as we had _one_ man in India; but we must have _one_. I told him that, seeing the difficulty of selection, I had thought it right to tell him what was likely to happen. I should not be much surprised if he thought of Lord Tweddale, whom he thought of for Ireland. I do not know him at all.

_December 6._