Chapter XI: Introduction (11)

There can be no escape from these conclusions, but to deny that the ordinance has ever had any validity under the Constitution; which would be scarcely less than to deny that the Constitution itself had ever been a valid instrument. Having the like unequivocal sanction of national authority, and expressing alike in the words of Mr. Toombs, "the collective will of the whole," they must stand or fall together.

Originally the territory was not divided by the line of 36° 30´, or by any other line giving part to freedom and part to slavery. It was all secured, and by consent of the South, to freedom. There is nothing, therefore, in the original compromise, to justify the remark of the Editor of the Boston _Courier_ in a recent number of that paper, that "below the line of 36° 30´, the South have the right of prescription." Freedom has an older prescriptive right to all the Territories. The line established by the compromise, between slavery permitted and slavery prohibited, was the boundary line between the then existing States and the Territory of the United States; or the line between exclusive national jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the States. It is an erroneous assumption, therefore, that the free States, by the introduction of slavery south of 36° 30´, as well as north of it, would receive more than a fair share or moiety of rights and privileges, as between States or parties entitled to equal privileges. The idea that the extension of slavery under the Federal Government can be claimed by anybody south or north as a right, is wholly inadmissible. The _Courier_ will hold the following declarations from Mr. WEBSTER to be good authority, if others do not:

"Wherever there is a foot of land to be staid back from
becoming slave territory, I am ready to assert the principle
of excluding slavery." "We are to use the first and last,
and every occasion which offers, to oppose the extension of
slave power."

"I have to say, that while I hold with as much integrity, I
trust, and faithfulness, as any citizen of this country, to
all the original amendments and compromises in which the
Constitution under which we now live was adopted, I never
could, and never can persuade myself to be in favor of the
admission of other States into this Union as slave States
with the inequalities which were allowed and accorded to the
slaveholding States then in existence by the Constitution. I
do not think that the free States ever expected, or could
expect, that they would be called upon to admit further
slave States.... I think they have the clearest right to
require that the State coming into the Union, shall come in
upon an equality; and if the existence of slavery be an
impediment to coming in on an equality, then the State
proposing to come in should be required to remove that
inequality by abolishing slavery or take the alternative of
being excluded. I put my opposition on the political ground
that it deranges the balance of the Constitution."

Wherever there is a foot of land to be staid back from slavery! Every occasion to be used to oppose the extension of the slave power! New States to abolish the inequality of slavery, or be excluded! I suppose Northern conservatives of the class referred to have endorsed those doctrines and declarations of Mr. WEBSTER a thousand times, as sound, national, conservative, and constitutional. But no Republican, so far as I know, has ever proposed to go an inch beyond the line of policy they indicated. The Chicago, or Republican Platform, certainly does not. And yet that same line of policy, when advocated by Republicans, is denounced as unsound, sectional, radical, and unconstitutional.

We have a great deal said about the equality of the States; of the new with the original States. This is said to be a fundamental doctrine of the Constitution.

It is claimed that citizens of the slaveholding States have an equal right in the Territories with the citizens of the non-slaveholding States; and I admit they have. But it is also claimed that they have the same right to the protection of property in slaves as property in cotton. This I deny. There is no such doctrine of State equality in the Constitution, nor was any thing like it contemplated by its framers. On the contrary, the Constitution denied this doctrine by clear implication, certainly for the first twenty years. It withheld from Congress the power to prohibit the importation of slaves into the "existing" States till 1808, while their importation into the Territories and new States might be prohibited at once. Ohio was admitted in 1802. Congress had power to prohibit the importation of slaves into that State from that time, and did do it in effect by the very terms and conditions of her admission, which required that her Constitution and Government should not be repugnant to the ordinance of the 13th of July, 1787, which interdicted slavery. But Congress had no power to prohibit the importation of slaves into Georgia till after 1808. Georgia and Ohio, therefore, in this respect, were not political equals from 1802 to 1808.

Nor have the States been all political equals in the sense claimed, since 1808. It will surprise many to be told that there is nothing in the Constitution about State equality, and especially nothing that affirms the equality of the new with the original States, even after 1808. And yet this is true. The only passages which refer to the new States, except impliedly in the importation clause, are these: "New States may be admitted by Congress into the Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State." There is nothing, certainly, in this language to show that the new States were to be admitted on an equality, or an equal footing with the original States.

And yet provision was made, when the Constitution was framed, for the admission of all the new States to be formed in United States Territory then possessed, "on an equal footing with the original States." But it was a footing of equality which was in nowise inconsistent with an absolute denial of the right to establish the inequality of slavery. And this is proved by the only compact in the English language contemporaneous with the Constitution which touches the subject, namely, that part of the fifth article of compact in the ordinance of 1787 which I have already quoted. There can be no shadow of claim that any thing else secured, or pretended to secure, the right of new States to admission into the Union on an equal footing with the original States. That, I admit, did. It is, to repeat it, in these words:

"Whenever any of said States shall have sixty thousand free
inhabitants therein, such State shall be admitted, by its
delegates, into the Congress of the United States, on an
equal footing with the original States in all respects
whatever, and shall be at liberty to form a permanent
Constitution and State Government; _provided_ the
Constitution and Government so to be formed, shall be
republican in conformity to the principles of these
articles," the 6th, which prohibited slavery, included.

And this is all there is, contemporaneous with the Constitution, on the subject of the equality of the States. The very instrument, then, which secured the admission of new States, on an equal footing with the original States, itself provided that they were never to tolerate slavery.

The new States, then, neither were to have, nor have they, any political equality which the prohibition violates, as Southern gentlemen contend. Certainly those formed and admitted under the plan of Government devised by the fathers, have not. In this sense they are not political equals. The original States were, from the beginning, and have ever been, political equals in this and every sense. Not, however, because the Constitution says they are, for it says nothing on the subject; but because they were independent sovereignties, and as such, made a compact which united them under one Federal Government, with discriminating restrictions upon the subject of slavery, or upon any other subject. But the fact that the evil and inequality of slavery existed in the original States, and was tolerated from necessity, was no reason why it should be allowed in the Territories and new States, where it did not and need never exist. So the power of the Territories and new States was sufficiently restricted to secure equality in personal rights and freedom to all the "inhabitants." Of course it cannot be pretended that the mere fact that one or more States had established, and had power to perpetuate slavery, secured to new States the right to establish and perpetuate the same enormity, as a necessary result of State equality. That would make the right or power of one State, resulting from State equality, necessarily coextensive with tolerated evil in another. Manifestly "the fathers" had no such idea as this. Theirs was the common sense and rational idea that a moral and political evil which existed in the old States, and could not be removed, need not for that reason be tolerated in new States.

The Constitution guarantees to each State a republican form of Government merely; but the ordinance of 1787 provides that the "Constitution and Government of each new State shall be republican." Why this difference? In the original States slavery existed, or in most of them; and so far they were anti-republican in fact and practice, though republican in form. The framers of the Constitution, having no power to abolish this anti-republican institution of slavery in those States, did nothing more than guarantee them Governments republican in form. But having the power to exclude it from the new States, they did exclude it, and provided that their constitutions and governments should be republican. That this was the reason for the difference may be inferred from the remark of LUTHER MARTIN, a distinguished member of the Federal Convention, that "slavery is inconsistent with the genius of republicanism," and of General HEATH in the Massachusetts Convention, that "Congress has declared that the new States shall be republican and have no slavery." No other reason can be given. Thus republicanism in fact, and not in form merely, was made a condition of admitting new States. This is part of the unalterable compact to which validity was given by the Constitution. The Constitution, therefore, while it guarantees a republican form of government, does in fact, by giving validity to the ordinance, guarantee republican governments to the new States. This is another very significant fact harmonizing perfectly with all the other facts in the original plan for extending the Union by admitting States from Territories.

The States are all equals, or not, according to the terms of their admission. The original States became members of the Union upon the single condition of ratifying the Constitution, which left them at liberty to tolerate slavery or not. But the States formed in the only Territory which belonged to the United States at the time the Constitution was framed, were admitted on condition that slavery should be perpetually interdicted within their limits, and as parties to an unalterable compact to that effect.

Slavery was regarded, South as well as North, when the Constitution was adopted, as a moral and political evil. This had been the general sentiment of the country many years before, and continued to be long after that period. The representatives of the extensive district of Darien in Georgia, on the 12th of January, 1775, spoke of slavery as "founded in injustice and cruelty, and highly dangerous to our liberties." JEFFERSON pronounced it "an injustice and enormity." The present Chief Justice of the United States, Mr. TANEY, who acted many years ago as counsel of Rev. Mr. GRUBER, who was indicted in the State of Maryland for preaching a sermon on the evils of slavery, spoke as follows in his defence:

"Mr. GRUBER did quote the language of our great act of
National Independence, and insisted on the principles
contained in that venerated instrument. He did rebuke those
masters who, in the exercise of power, are deaf to the call
of humanity, and he warned them of the evils they might
bring upon themselves. He did speak in abhorrence of those
who live by trading in human flesh, and enrich themselves by
tearing the husband from the wife, the infant from the bosom
of the mother, and this was the head and front of his
offending. So far is he from being the object of punishment
in any form of proceeding, that we are prepared to maintain
the same principles, and to use, if necessary, the same
language here in the Temple of Justice, and in the presence
of those who are the ministers of the law."

"A hard necessity, indeed, compels us to endure the evils of
slavery for a time. While it continues it is a blot on our
national character; and every real lover of freedom
confidently hopes that it will be effectually, though it
must be gradually, wiped away, and earnestly looks for the
means by which the necessary object may be best obtained.
And until it shall be accomplished, until the time shall
come when we can point, without a blush, to the language
held in the Declaration of Independence, every part of
humanity will seek to lighten the galling chain of slavery,
and better, to the utmost of his power, the wretched
condition of the slave."

Mr. JOHNSON, of Maryland:--Where did you get that?

Mr. GOODRICH:--I got it from a printed sermon recently preached by Dr. ORVILLE DEWEY, of Boston.

And Mr. CALHOUN, in the United States Senate, in 1838, said that "many in the South once believed that slavery was a moral and political evil;" and Mr. BUTLER, late a United States Senator from South Carolina, said in the Senate in 1850, that he "remembered the time when slavery was regarded as a moral evil, even in South Carolina."

In such a state of public sentiment, it is certainly no marvel that slavery was not allowed to extend into the Territories and new States. It was not prohibited in the northwest territory, because it was supposed to be, or would become, an evil in that territory particularly, or a greater evil there than anywhere else; but because it was regarded as an evil everywhere, and therefore wrong to permit its extension anywhere, when there was power to prevent it. There can be no doubt it would have been prohibited in the Territories and new States of Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee, if Georgia and North Carolina, previous to the Federal Convention, had ceded them to the United States upon the same conditions Virginia had ceded the northwest territory. Proof of this is found in the fact that the plan of territorial governments interdicting slavery forever after 1800, embraced all territory ceded, or to be ceded by individual States; and still further proof is in the fact, that the cessions by Georgia and North Carolina, after the adoption of the Constitution, were upon the express condition that slavery should not be prohibited; thereby showing that the policy of the Federal Government, as they understood it, was restrictive of slavery in the far southern latitudes as well as in the more northern, and that they expected the power to restrict would be exercised, if not withheld in the deeds of cession. A proposition was, in fact, made to apply the anti-slavery clause of 1787, to all the southern part of the Mississippi territory, now the southern parts of Alabama and Mississippi, by the act of April 7th, 1798, it being supposed at one time that it belonged to the United States; but the debate shows that the proposition was withdrawn because the jurisdiction was in Georgia, or because not five members of Congress, after the question was examined, believed otherwise. Georgia claimed absolute title and right of jurisdiction, and denied all right on the part of the United States to interfere with slavery. Congress did, however, prohibit the importation of slaves into the territory, and declare every slave so imported to be entitled to his freedom. This was probably wholly unauthorized, as it was six years before Georgia ceded it to the United States, and ten years before Congress had power to prohibit the importation of slaves into that State. But these facts show a strong disposition on the part of "the fathers" to curtail and circumscribe slavery, even in the far south, and at the hazard, too, of exercising doubtful power.

Nothing can be clearer than that the original States had a right to form a Federal Government on such terms as to themselves as they could mutually agree upon, and to fix the terms upon which they would permit new members to be admitted. The Northern States were under no obligation to protect slavery at all, not even by permitting fugitives to be reclaimed within their limits. If, then, they were willing to concede that right to the original States, only upon condition that slavery should not be allowed to extend, who will say they had not a right to make that condition, or that, if agreed to, it would not be valid and binding? With their views of slavery, believing it to be a moral and political evil, it was certainly their first and highest duty to make effectual provision against its extension, before undertaking, for any reason, to give the least protection to it. Such provision they supposed they had made, and it was this that justified them, if any thing could, in conceding the right of reclamation.

The free, or northern States, in the exercise of their admitted right in deciding upon the terms of Union, insisted on making it a fundamental and ever-binding condition that no obligation to protect slavery in Illinois should ever exist; and this was done for reasons which render it morally certain that they would have insisted on the same condition in reference to Missouri, if Missouri had been part of the original territory. It would be preposterous to suppose that while they would not consent to guarantee slavery in any manner in Illinois, because they believed it to be a moral and political evil, they meant at the same time to make a Government that could obligate them to guarantee it in the adjoining Territory or State of Missouri, either by the return of fugitive slaves, or in any other manner. They meant no such thing, nor can an honest interpretation of the terms of union bind them to such guarantee now. The right to recapture fugitive slaves could not exist without the consent of the free States; and as that consent was given upon conditions and with limitations, by necessary implication and every sound principle of construction, they reserved the right to say whether it should exist upon other conditions and with other limitations, or without either condition or limitation.

Mr. WICKLIFFE:--No one from Kentucky or Virginia wishes to alter the ordinance of 1787. For GOD'S sake spare us the argument.

Mr. GOODRICH:--I understand no alteration is proposed in the ordinance; nor am I arguing against any such proposition. I am showing what the policy of 1787 was, and what the compact of the fathers was. And I am doing this because it is in the spirit of that policy and compact that Kentucky and Virginia tell us they wish to have this controversy adjusted. Massachusetts and the other Northern States meant to fix, and supposed they had fixed, a limit to their connection with, and responsibility for slavery. By consenting to the clause which secured the right of reclamation, they did become responsible for it to a certain extent. So far as it was supposed, when that clause was agreed to, that its effect would be the recapture of fugitive slaves, and their return to bondage, and so far as the purpose was to make such recapture and return lawful, so far the responsibility of adding to the security of slavery was voluntarily assumed. But this was limited to the existing States by excluding slavery from all United States territory. If any part of such territory had been left for slavery--enough for a single slave State--it might be said that its extension from a part was for reasons applicable only to a part, and so could not be considered as establishing the principle of non-extension. But now this cannot be said. Not a foot was left for slavery.

We thus see what the state of things would have been to-day if foreign territory had not been acquired. Such acquisitions were not originally contemplated, and of course not provided for. The first--Louisiana--was deemed unconstitutional by Mr. JEFFERSON, and yet it was made while he was President; but with no right, "according to the spirit of the compact of the fathers," to place the Federal Government or the States under any other relation to slavery in subsequently acquired territory than that which they sustained to it--the only one they would consent to sustain--in the Territories possessed at the time that compact was made.

A great deal is said about State rights. But the doctrine of State rights proves too much. Massachusetts had a clear and undoubted right originally to limit her obligations upon this subject. And she did limit them. The original compromise was "better security" to slavery in the original States, with no extension of it to the Territories and new States. This better security was the accepted consideration for waiving the right to extend, and Massachusetts may rightfully insist on this waived right to extend, so long as this "better security" is demanded of her.

Southern gentlemen in this Convention propose to be governed by the principles of the founders of the Government, and by the Constitution, or compact of union, as those founders understood it. By that they say they are willing to do as the fathers did, and adjust the present unhappy controversy by applying to new territory the same principles which the fathers applied to the old. Let me assure gentlemen from the slave States that if they are really in earnest in offering these terms of adjustment, this unhappy controversy can be settled in less than an hour's time. Having always claimed the right to recapture fugitive slaves in territory acquired since, as well as in that acquired before the adoption of the Constitution, the slave States have ever been bound, upon every principle of honor and fair dealing, to concede the original consideration for it, that is, prohibition. A purpose secretly entertained when that compromise was made, to use the Government in the manner it has actually been used, to enlarge the area of slavery and the obligation to guarantee it, would have been dishonest and fraudulent; but the fact that this purpose was conceived afterward, as it doubtless was, does not alter the case a whit. No man possessed of the facts can honestly claim that the bargain between the North and South, interpreted according to the true interest and meaning of both parties at the time of making it, can justify the extension of slavery a rod beyond the original States, or a particle of protection to it beyond the right to recover fugitives from such States.

Having thus shown, as I think I have, that an essential element in the basis of the "more perfect Union" on the question of slavery, was the principle of non-extension, we find the first failure to assert this principle was in the omission to apply it to the Louisiana purchase. The importation of slaves into that territory was immediately prohibited. That probably cut off the only source of supply from which danger of extension was then apprehended. The policy of the Government was well understood, and no apprehension of a practical departure from it existed. There was nothing in the circumstance of the purchase, or the reasons for making it, to excite such apprehension. But it was seen on the application of Missouri for admission, that the ordinance of 1787 should have been applied to it at the time of the purchase. If it had been, Louisiana, Missouri, and Arkansas would never have become slave States (the few slaves in New Orleans and vicinity being emancipated, as they should have been, upon some equitable principle), and the Missouri Compromise, which was the second departure from the original policy, would never have been made. The third was the annexation of Texas as a slave State, and the argument to divide it into three or four more. Annexation led to the war with Mexico, and the acquisition of a large part of her territory, and to the compromise of 1850, by which it was Congressionally agreed that the States formed in that territory might be admitted with slavery, if their Constitutions should so prescribe. This was the fourth departure from the original policy of prohibition. The fifth was the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in 1850, and the attempts to subjugate and enslave Kansas. That repeal made the change from the original policy radical and total. Certainly it is high time "to restore the Union and Constitution in the spirit in which they were established by the fathers."

And now, sir, I propose to begin the work of "restoring the policy of 1787," by applying the ordinance of 1787 to every foot of organized and unorganized territory, wherever situated, which now belongs to the United States, precisely as the fathers applied it to every foot of such territory at the time the Constitution was made; and I ask, in all earnestness and seriousness, what any member of the Convention can have to say against this, who sincerely desires to "restore the Union and Constitution in the spirit in which they were established by the fathers of the Republic," and is "ready to adjust the present unhappy controversy" in the same spirit? What, I beg to know, can be said against this mode of adjustment by those who are in favor of a "restoration of the Constitution to the principles and landmarks of our fathers," and of a "return to the policy of 1787"? Can any man doubt that that ordinance would have been extended over all these territories in 1787, if they had belonged to the United States at that time? Let slavery, then, be prohibited now precisely as the fathers prohibited it then. Copy that old ordinance word for word, and give it legal force and effect, and make it the basis of all laws, and all constitutions, and all governments in these Territories forever, because the fathers gave it such force and effect, and made it the basis of all laws, and all constitutions and all governments forever in all the Territories of the Union, in 1787. If that would not be a return to the "principles and landmarks of the fathers," and to the "policy of 1787," then I beg to know what would be? How is it possible--I put it to you, gentlemen of the South--how is it possible to persuade yourselves that the principles and policy of 1787 can be restored by adopting the resolutions of the General Assembly of Virginia? By what process is it that the gentleman (Mr. SEDDON) from Virginia, has come to believe that the South is entitled, according to the spirit of the compact of the fathers, "to the added guarantees" of which he speaks? According to the spirit of that compact it is manifest the slave States are entitled to no added guarantees.

But another of the Virginia Commissioners (Mr. RIVES) tells us that this question of slavery in nowise concerns the free States. On this point I will quote from a very high authority, which Virginia, certainly, will respect. Mr. MADISON was a member of the first Congress under the Constitution. A colleague of his, Mr. PARKER, proposed a duty on the importation of slaves, and said he "hoped Congress would do all that lay in their power to restore to human nature its inherent privileges, and, if possible, wipe off the stigma under which America labors." Mr. MADISON, in remarking on that proposition, among other things said:

"Every addition the States receive to their number of slaves
tends to weaken and render them less capable of
self-defence. In case of hostilities with foreign nations,
they will be the means of inviting attack instead of
repelling invasion. It is a necessary duty of the General
Government to protect every part of their confines against
danger, as well internal as external. Every thing,
therefore, which tends to increase danger, though it be a
local affair, yet, if it involve national expense and
safety, becomes of concern to every part of the Union, and
is a proper subject for the consideration of those charged
with the general administration of the Government."

And we hear, too, a great deal about war, civil war, if this unhappy controversy is not satisfactorily adjusted, which means upon the terms proposed by the slave States. But do gentlemen mean that an appeal will be made to the sword, unless the Constitution shall be so amended as to "provide that slavery of the African race shall be effectually protected as property in all the territory of the United States, now held or hereafter acquired south of latitude 36° 30´"?--which is the proposition of Virginia. If that is what is meant, then let me, before I close, read an extract from one of the last speeches made by HENRY CLAY in the Senate of the United States. It is as follows:

"If, unhappily, we should be involved in war, civil war,
between the two portions of this Confederacy, in which the
effort upon the one side should be to restrain the
introduction of slavery into the new Territories, and upon
the other side to force its introduction there, what a
spectacle should we present to the astonishment of mankind,
in an effort, not to propagate rights, but--I must say it,
though I trust it will be understood to be said with no
design to excite feeling--a war to propagate wrongs!"

Mr. HOWARD moved an adjournment.

Mr. BRONSON objected, raising the question of order. He claimed that the Conference, by adopting the resolutions of Mr. RANDOLPH, had fixed the limits of the sessions, from 10 o'clock A.M., to 4 o'clock P.M.

The motion of Mr. HOWARD was not concurred in.

Mr. LOOMIS:--I feel that this is an important crisis in the affairs of the country. Perhaps it is the most important that ever occurred in American history. The first Convention of thirteen scattered States was earnestly engaged in protecting the liberties which had been won in the Revolution. It gave us a Constitution under which, for more than seventy years, we have lived prosperously and happily. Now political contests have taken place. New questions have arisen, and one portion of the Union believes the Constitution inadequate to protect its interests. The question which we are obliged to consider is: How shall we save the country? Disguise it as we may, deceive ourselves as we may, the country is in danger--in great and imminent danger. A solemn duty is imposed upon each one of us. How shall we save the country?

Virginia has invited this conference of her sister States. Pennsylvania responded to her call with all activity. Pennsylvania has responded because she understood and appreciated Virginia. There is great misapprehension in the North concerning this venerated State, as well in regard to her motives as in regard to the principles and feelings that influence her people in their intercourse with and their action toward other States of the Union. I know Virginia well. I have associated with her people. I have practiced before her judicial tribunals.

Some years ago I was greatly pressed by an abolitionist who was indicted in Virginia, to undertake his defence. He was very fearful that he would not receive an impartial trial, that the court and jury would participate in the public excitement. I told him that he need indulge in no such misapprehensions. I knew Virginia too well for that. I told him, however, that if he desired it, I would go; but it was simply to defend him, and secure him a fair trial--to act as his counsel. I could not represent his sentiments, for I am not and never was an abolitionist. I assumed his defence. I told him I would go, and I went. I did find great excitement there, but it did not surprise me. Many valuable slaves had shortly before escaped, some of them through the assistance and instrumentality of my client. Judge Fry was the presiding judge of the court. His liberality, and that of all his officers, was great--as great as I ever enjoyed in my own State. The sheriff of the county drew thirty-six jurymen. Of these, twelve were slaveholders, twelve were abolitionists, and twelve were non-slaveholders. When the jury was finally empannelled it consisted of nine abolitionists and three non-slaveholders.

I never saw in my whole professional life a trial conducted with greater fairness or justice. The whole of it was entirely satisfactory to myself, and I believe to my client.

I have ever since entertained a feeling of the highest respect for Virginia. Her abstractions I confess I could never understand, nor did I ever wish to. They are her exclusive property, and she never uses them to the injury of her neighbors. If she chooses to make the resolutions of '98 a matter of importance, I do not know that anybody is injured.

I regretted to hear the imputations upon Virginia which some gentlemen have seen fit to make. Menace is not the habit of that ancient commonwealth. She does not indulge in it, and it would not become her. The gentleman from New York intimated that if a State came to him with a menace he would meet it with a menace. In this I agree with him. If Virginia came here with a menace I should meet her with defiance. But happily for us we have no occasion to consider the question in this light. If ever a State came to meet her sisters, to consult for the common good in a proper spirit, Virginia does so now.

A military chieftain once, when approaching his death, lamented that he had no children to transmit his name and his qualities to posterity. Virginia will never need to take up such a lamentation. She has children enough. She is the mother of WASHINGTON and JEFFERSON, of MADISON, MARSHALL, and CLAY. Rightly and justly she has been called the mother of States. She is the mother of States, and of millions of freemen.

I honor and respect Virginia, for she deserves it. She was among the foremost in the Revolutionary struggle; and since it was terminated, she has exhibited a continued example of patriotism and loyalty. Her sons have been among the ablest in our legislative councils, and even to-day she sets a noble example before the country, for the emulation of her sister States. Our interests are inseparably connected with her own. We will acknowledge the fact, and act in view of it. Let her remember, also, that she has a common interest with us. She will do so because she will be faithful to her old traditions as well as to her present duty.

I cannot believe that the time has come when it is necessary for us to contemplate a dissolution of the Union. The people are not prepared for such an awful event. We do not yet know how heavy sacrifices they will make to avoid it. Some States have left us I know, but I believe their absence is but temporary. We must have them back, and we will. As for the Border States leaving us in the present condition of affairs, with the present feeling of friendship for them, _that_ I regard as an impossibility. Why should the Border States go out of the Union when three-fourths of the present Congress are ready to give them all the guarantees they ask?

But let not Pennsylvania be misunderstood in her position. She will yield a vast deal for peace. She will examine and recognize the rights of every section of the country. She believes that when this is done, it is the duty of all to stand by the Union. She believes that the Border States cannot connect themselves with a so-called Southern Confederacy without involving themselves in a vortex of ruin. The President of the Southern Confederacy already talks about the smell of gunpowder, and about battles at the North. Well! he is a brave man no doubt, but if he will invade Pennsylvania we will resist him. Pennsylvania has gold enough to calm her friends; she has iron enough to cool her enemies.

But Pennsylvania desires no war. She will do all that an honorable State can do to avoid war. In that temper she sends her delegates here, and they will do all that honorable men can do to carry out her wishes. She has no desire to be a frontier State with her four hundred miles of border, which she must guard and protect if disunion takes place on the terms suggested. She will do all she can to avoid disunion. She is now a central State--the keystone of the arch. She wants no imaginary line drawn along her border, with herself on one side of it and enemies upon the other.

Pennsylvania has always kept faith with the Union. She has always performed all her duties toward the Federal Government with cheerfulness and fidelity. Her three millions of people are true to all their obligations now to the Government as well as to her sister States. Her voice is for peace. She would at all hazards avoid disunion. She would make many sacrifices to avoid civil war. Last of all, she would do all she could to save the Union; she would never permit the destruction of the country. My own position is easily defined. I fully sympathize with and endorse the position of Pennsylvania.

Mr. LOOMIS referred to the election, installation, and
message of the Governor of Pennsylvania, also to various
resolutions of political conventions in Pennsylvania, in
confirmation of his own views of the sentiments of the
people of that State, and continued:

I shall dwell but a short time upon the provisions of the proposed amendments. I can live under the Constitution as it is, or as it will be if these amendments are adopted. I shall uphold the Constitution. I shall commit myself to no opposite course. The whole amendment is connected with and concerns the question of slavery in the Territories. This has always been a fruitful source of trouble.

The character of the relation of the Government to the Territories, and the interests of the States in them, were questions raised in most of the States when the Constitution was adopted.

The compromise of 1820, it was hoped, settled one question concerning them--the question of slavery. But upon the repeal of the compromise the difficulty was opened again. Pennsylvania never took as ultra ground respecting this subject as many other States. She thought its importance was magnified. It is magnified now. If the South secured the amendment proposed it would not avail her much. The granting of it would not injure the North. The territory is unfitted for the profitable employment of slave labor. That is shown by experience. In ten years scarcely ten slaves had found their way into New Mexico and Arizona.

This is a question of sectional interest, and may be one, to some extent, of political power. Examine, for a moment, the true interests of both the North and South, in the question as it is now presented. I mean the interest of the extremes, for the Border States certainly cannot have a very deep interest in it. They lay between the two sections, and to some extent sympathize with both. The valuable portion of our present territory is north of the line proposed. It is rich in agricultural and mineral resources. It will be changed in time into a number of powerful and wealthy States. Is it not desirable now to exclude slavery from them forever? Then as to the territory south. It is smaller in extent, and almost infinitely less valuable. Much of it is barren desert which can never be cultivated. Considered as a material interest, the South is asking but little. The North is giving up almost nothing, by agreeing to give the South the control of this section while it remains a territory. But the South does not ask even that. She simply asks to have those rights guaranteed, the existence of which are already practically conceded.

As to future territory, I would raise no question about it. We want no more territory north or south. Its acquisition would only be attended with new troubles. New questions would be raised to threaten the quiet of the country and the stability of our institutions. Why should we trouble ourselves about the acquisition of new territory when we have already enough for one hundred millions of people?

We may form a Constitution which will be entirely satisfactory to the nation now. We may extend our territory in such a way as to render a change indispensable. Considerations of climate and race will be constantly occurring, which will require new changes. The Federal Constitution may have been well enough adapted to the four millions of people to whom it was first applied, and it is not strange that the growth of the nation, and the new interests which have since arisen, should require some changes now. I say that we need no more territory.

What objection, then, can there be to compromising this matter, to arranging it to the satisfaction of all parties, if the rights of all can be regarded and secured? The course which I would follow in such a case, would be that indicated by traditional policy of statesmen in whom our people have had confidence--the policy of such men as HARRISON and HENRY CLAY.

I do not regard the provisions relating to slavery in the District of Columbia as of any practical consequence to the North. Pennsylvania cares little about it. There would seem to be a propriety in countenancing slavery here so long as it exists in the adjoining States.

The Border States ask us now for these guarantees. They ask them earnestly and in a spirit of loyalty to the Union. My answer to such a request, urged in such a spirit, is, that I would give them any guarantees I could within the limits of the Constitution.

Pennsylvania forms one of the brotherhood of States. She is in the Union, and she will remain there. She is bound to it by all the memories and associations of the past, and by all the hopes of the future. She will discharge, as she always has discharged, all her duties, all her obligations to the Union. No State exceeds her in devotion to it. But, at the same time, she will not be unmindful of her duties and her obligations to the other States. She would discharge these obligations as she can afford to discharge them, in a spirit of generosity and conciliation. In that spirit she will give her assent to these propositions of amendment. I believe I have fairly represented the opinions of Pennsylvania in what I have said, and I rely upon her people--my constituents--for my justification.

Mr. CHITTENDEN:--I will consult the pleasure of the Conference whether I shall proceed with my observations now, or during the evening session?

Mr. MOREHEAD: I think the Conference had better adjourn. I make the motion.

The motion was adopted, and the Conference adjourned to meet at half-past seven o'clock this evening.

* * * * *

EVENING SESSION--FOURTEENTH DAY.

WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, _February 21st, 1861._

The Conference was called to order at half-past seven o'clock, Mr. ALEXANDER in the chair.

Mr. CHITTENDEN: I feel gratified by the kindness which has given me an opportunity of making a few observations to the Conference, and I shall not abuse it.

The delegates from Vermont have acted throughout the session under great embarrassment. We hold our appointments from the Executive of that State. Her Legislature was not in session when the Virginia Resolutions were adopted, and the day fixed for the meeting of the Conference was so early that no time was given to the Governor of Vermont for consultation, or for taking any other means of ascertaining the temper of the State in relation to the Virginia plan. We were summoned by telegraph--myself upon an hour's notice--to come here, and we obeyed the summons.

By the rules of the Conference we are prohibited from correspondence with our constituents upon the subject of its action, and we are entirely without recent information concerning their views and wishes. But one course remains to us, and that we must inflexibly pursue. That is, to apply the propositions upon which we are called to vote, to the known and established opinions of our people upon the principles involved in them; and if these principles coincide with their opinions, to give our assent; if they do not, to withhold it. We hold it our duty to respect and obey the opinions of our constituents; and in our action here, such obedience is a pleasure.

First of all, before referring to the merits or demerits of these propositions, I wish to be informed distinctly upon one point. One section of the Union requires guarantees; the other does not. Here are two parties having different interests, proposing to themselves different courses of action. One of them proposes these guarantees in the form of what it calls a compromise. There are many subjects which, in the experience of life, we are obliged to compromise. All of us understand the meaning of the term. It implies that when two parties differ upon a subject of common interest, each is to yield something to the other, until both reach an agreement upon a middle ground, and the difference is settled. But one consequence always follows, always must follow, or it is in nowise a compromise: _Both parties are bound by the agreement._

There is another way in which compromises are effected. When opposing parties cannot come to an understanding, they agree to submit the matters in difference to some tribunal that can decide between them. A like consequence always follows from such a proceeding. The parties agree to _submit_ to the decision, to be _bound_ by it, and mutually undertake to carry it into effect, whatever the decision may be.

There is still another way in which a _political_ compromise may be made. Its terms may be agreed upon, and then it may be submitted to the people for adoption. When adopted, it becomes the law of the land--equally binding upon all sections of the country. If it is rejected, the party which proposed it has secured its submission to the proper tribunal--it has been considered, and that party should, upon every principle of law or morality, acquiesce in the result.

Except in one of these three methods I know of no way in which a _compromise_ can be made. Let us apply these methods to the questions before us. One of them must be adopted if we _compromise_ at all.

In fact there is one principle which forms the very foundation of our Government, and it should be kept constantly in mind. We cannot negotiate, we cannot legislate, we cannot _compromise_, unless all parties will acknowledge its binding force. If there is a party that does not acknowledge this, in my judgment that party has no right to be here. It is not a Republican party. I do not use this term in a party sense, but in the sense which is used in the fourth article in the Constitution, where the United States are required to guarantee to every State a _republican_ form of Government. The principle to which I refer is this: That the will of the majority, constitutionally expressed, must control the Government, and all questions relating to it; and that will must be respected and obeyed by the minority.

Now, if the members representing the free States will accept these propositions of amendment in good faith--will agree to submit them through Congress to the people of the States, and to be bound by the decision of the majority, whatever that decision may be--will you, gentlemen of the slave States, do the same? I do not refer to the States which have undertaken to withdraw from the Union. I only call upon the members for the States here represented. You have the right to speak for your respective States. You are sent here for that purpose. You ask us to give our votes for proposals which are certainly unpleasant, not to say offensive to us, and to use such influence as we possess to induce Congress to submit these to the people. You express the highest degree of confidence in the result. This is _your_ plan of compromise. If we resist it, you charge us with standing between the people and your plan--of sacrificing the Union to our platform. Very well. If we will submit your propositions to the people, and agree to be bound by and to acquiesce in their decision, will you do the same? If you will, it may be of service to protract this discussion, to make these propositions as acceptable as possible. If you will not, we are wasting time. We may as well stop here. Believe me, sir, Vermont, as well as every other free State, will have too much self-respect to agree to the terms of a compromise which will bind one party and will not bind the other.

There is one thing farther which we must understand. It has been frequently referred to in debate, and I shall not enlarge upon it. Time must elapse before these propositions can be acted upon. The free States expect faithfully to observe all their duties to the General Government--to keep faith with it as they always have. Will the slave States do the same? Will they not only _not obstruct_ the Government in the execution of the laws, but will they _aid_ the Government in executing the laws? The answer to this inquiry is as important as the other.

Now, it is useless to tell the people of the free States, that such is the present condition of the South, such is the apprehension and distrust prevailing there, that we must give them these guarantees at once, without any longer delay or discussion--that if we do not they will secede. Such an argument as that, sir, is an unworthy argument; it is unfit to be used in an assembly of men met to confer upon the Constitution. This is not the way in which good constitutions are made, for one of the several parties to present its ultimatum, and then insist upon its adoption, under the threat that if it is not adopted they will go no farther. If such is the true condition of affairs in some of the States, and the gentlemen representing them are the best judges, then before proceeding to amend the Constitution to satisfy them, I think we had better try to put them into a frame of mind suitable for negotiation. A Constitution adopted in that way would be good for nothing. Let it once be understood that such claims will be recognized, and we shall have amendments to the Constitution proposed as often as any section can find a pretext for proposing them. The agreeable course to us all would be to yield to your pressing appeals. But you ask us to compromise upon most extraordinary terms. You will not give us the slightest assurance that the people of the slave States will acquiesce in the vote of the whole people upon your propositions. You even say, you will not acquiesce, if the decision is adverse. You are in doubt if they will be satisfied if the decision is in their favor; and some gentlemen frankly avow that these propositions in themselves are not satisfactory. The gentleman from Virginia, with an openness and a frankness which seems a part of his nature, tells us in substance that Virginia will not be satisfied with these; that Virginia is settled in her determination that slave property shall be respected; that it has as high a right to protection as any other property, and in some respects higher; that Virginia will have these rights acknowledged and secured _under_ the Constitution, or she will not be satisfied. The statement that she will _not be satisfied_, has a very peculiar and expressive signification.

Such being our present condition, I have little hope that good can come of our deliberations. We have started wrong. We should have settled the questions first, that the Union must be preserved, the laws enforced, and the duty of every State toward the Union performed, in every contingency and under all circumstances. Having resolved this, we could then go on, carefully consider the wants of every section, and we could afford to be generous in meeting the views of our Southern friends.