Chapter XXXV: Section 3: Neither the Constitution, nor any amendment (1)

thereof, shall be construed to give Congress power to
regulate, abolish, or control, within any State, the
relation established or recognized by the laws thereof
touching persons held to labor or involuntary service
therein, nor to interfere with or abolish involuntary
service in the District of Columbia without the consent of
Maryland, and without the consent of the owners, or making
the owners who do not consent just compensation; nor the
power to interfere with or prohibit Representatives and
others from bringing with them, to the District of Columbia,
retaining and taking away, persons so held to labor or
service; nor the power to interfere with or abolish
involuntary service in places under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States within those States and
Territories where the same is established or recognized.

That is, they shall not prohibit it as to future acquired territory, where it is established or recognized. Will not the inference be claimed from such an expression, that where it is not established and not recognized, they may prohibit it? Will it not be said that the expression of one exception to the power of Congress to prohibit slavery in the Territories excludes the idea of an exception to that power when slavery is not recognized in the Territories?

Mr. COLLAMER:--If the gentleman will indulge me a moment, I desire to say that is a section declaring that Congress shall not abolish slavery in the dock-yards, &c., in the States where it is recognized. There is nothing in it about future acquired territory.

Mr. HUNTER:--This third section applies not only to present but to future acquired territory. It is not confined, like the first section, to the territory at present acquired. It is not confined to dock-yards and arsenals in the Territories and States. If the Senator will examine it, he will find that it is applied to all places where the United States have exclusive jurisdiction. "Exclusive jurisdiction" is the word. Will it not be claimed that they have exclusive jurisdiction in the Territories of the United States? Will not those who have the power to construe, and carry out their construction, so construe it? Will they not say it is a prohibition to Congress to prohibit slavery where it is recognized in the Territories or States, but not a denial of the right to prohibit slavery in Territories where it is not recognized by law, although that Territory may be vacant and uninhabited?

Mr. COLLAMER:--That clause of the section is, that Congress shall not have power--

"To interfere with or abolish involuntary service in places
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States within
those States and Territories where the same is established
or recognized."

That, so far as I have read, is confined only to where they have local jurisdiction in the States holding slaves.

Mr. HUNTER:--I thought so at first myself; but the Senator will find, on a further examination, I think, that he is mistaken. They shall not prohibit it wherever they have exclusive jurisdiction in places where slavery "is established or recognized." It is not confined to dock-yards, forts, and arsenals. Why should it be in the Territories? They have exclusive jurisdiction over the whole. There is reason for confining it to dock-yards in the States; but there is no reason for confining it to dock-yards, &c., in the Territories. But that is not the construction which will be given; the construction given to it will be, that they shall not prohibit it where they have exclusive jurisdiction, if it is recognized in such places; but if it be not recognized in such places, where they have exclusive jurisdiction, I say the inference will be drawn, plausibly, if not justly, that they shall have power to prohibit; and I say if this be so, then it is a power (so far as Mexican territories are concerned, if there should be any acquisition there) by which the South will be forever estopped; because there the Mexicans have abolished slavery, and there, under this clause giving in that territory exclusive jurisdiction, the party now controlling the Government would claim the right to prohibit it. And what a difference between our position then and our position now under the decision of the Supreme Court! Under the decision of that court, all the people of all the States have a right to go into the common territory with their institutions. It belongs to all in common, and Congress cannot prohibit them from taking their property there.

I say that those who have the power to carry out any construction they choose to give, would be interested in putting upon it the construction which I fear; and it would be difficult to raise an argument which they would deem conclusive against it. But take it the other way; suppose that the Senator from Vermont is right in his first supposition, that it was only meant to be applied to forts, arsenals, and dock-yards, then I ask what settlement does this proposition give us in regard to future acquired territories; what earthly settlement is it? We have all the old difficulties to encounter that we have to meet now, every one of them. We not only have all the old difficulties to encounter, but the slaveholder would have an additional obstacle which this first clause would put in his way. It requires that the right to slaves in the present territory shall be tried by the common law, and it might be said in court that the inferences drawn heretofore from those provisions of the Constitution recognizing slavery were to be overruled by the fact that the people in their latest action--by way of constitutional amendment--had introduced another rule in order to determine the _status_ of those held to involuntary service or labor, and the consequence of that would be that the South never could acquire another foot of territory; that is, the few southern States who are left in the Union.

I am told that here is a provision that you cannot acquire territory except by the assent of a majority of the Senators from both sections. Does any man believe that the North, with its eighteen, soon to be twenty, or thirty, non-slaveholding States, would allow a majority of six, or seven, or eight slave States, that are now attached to them, to prevent them from acquiring any territory hereafter? Would they agree to such an amendment, in the first instance; and if they did, how long before they would change this restriction in the Constitution? Indeed, it is hardly to be supposed that they will agree to it in the first instance, so far as it regards the acquisition of territory; but of what avail would it be to the South? There is but one conceivable acquisition--I speak of possible things, and I hope gentlemen will not understand me as coveting my neighbor's goods, or desiring to lay violent hands on the property of any other States or nations--but, if things should so happen that we could rightfully acquire Cuba, under my view of the probable construction to be given to this clause, and because slavery there is recognized, Congress might be prevented from prohibiting it; but, everywhere else, the South would be shut out and excluded.

Then, sir, what would be its position? It would be prevented from acquiring any territory under this Government as an outlet for its slaves; and the only chance of securing that necessity of its condition would be to quit this Union and join the Southern Confederacy, which can acquire territory. It would be an inducement to disunion so strong as would almost force them to it.

Let us go a little further. Here is another clause holding out the same temptation:

"The foreign slave-trade is hereby forever prohibited, and
it shall be the _duty_ of Congress to pass laws to prevent
the importation of slaves, coolies, or persons held to
service or labor, into the United States and the Territories
from places beyond the limits thereof."

This is to be the duty of Congress. As it now stands, it is in the power of Congress. When it was merely given as a power to Congress, was there a failure to execute that power? Do we not know that every State in the present Confederation has desired to suppress the African slave-trade? Some do it from sentiment and principle; some from interest; but there is a controlling motive with each and all of them. It is safe enough to leave it where it stood, giving Congress the power merely. Here you make it their duty. Suppose this case: the States that have left us have set up another Government, another Confederation; under this clause you forbid us to buy their slaves, to interchange and trade in slaves with them: what will be the consequence? They will exclude us from selling our slaves in their territory, and where then do we stand? If you should think it prudent, if you should think it politic, you would have no means, under this proposed amendment, of allowing that to be done between these two coterminous countries. Though it would be to the advantage of both Confederacies that there should be this interchange, you preclude Congress from allowing it; and then where would that place the border slave States? They would not be able to sell their slaves in the States further South; and if they carried them there, they would have to emigrate with them. You would thus prevent Congress from adopting a regulation which would make it possible for them to remain in this Union with safety, with advantage, to themselves. Why was this put in? Why not have left it where it stood, giving Congress the power, when we all know that there is no State in the present Confederation that would not exercise that power for the purpose of suppressing the slave-trade from Africa? This probably would constitute the only exception. Why shut ourselves out from allowing the exception?

But, Mr. President, my desire is to be brief; I do not want to consume the time of the Senate; I am merely endeavoring to state the points of objection as briefly as I can. Here is, at the close of it, another provision which, it seems to me, contains the seeds of civil war; and that is this: "Congress shall provide by law for securing to the citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States;" that is to say, Congress shall have power to pass laws to force the States to receive those persons whom they have excluded from police considerations--considerations of domestic safety. Yes, sir, to force the States to receive persons who would be dangerous to their peace; to force upon them, if you will, abolition lecturers; to force upon them persons whom they regard as the most dangerous emissaries that could be sent among them; to enable Congress to obtrude, in fact, into all the business of the States. That was not intended when the Constitution was framed, and never ought to have been. The present provision in regard to the rights of citizens in the several States, I regard as in the nature of an inter-treaty stipulation. It is a duty imposed on each State, for the violation of which there is no remedy; no remedy, unless the State aggrieved may resort sometimes to retaliation.

There are various things of that sort in the Constitution. Duties imposed upon the States, but without a remedy for the failure to execute them. No State shall keep a standing army; but suppose it does: what are you to do? Congress cannot remedy it; and it would not be right to give Congress the power to remedy it. You have to trust something to the sense of right and duty of the States themselves; and so it should be in regard to this matter of citizens. Suppose one State should say that the citizens of another should not sue in its courts; how is Congress to enforce their right? Is Congress to say they shall be allowed to sue, and that the Sheriffs and officers of the State shall execute the process? Is it proposed to allow Congress, by law, to interpose in all these delicate matters? Is it not far better to leave it to the sense of justice of the States--to their sense of duty and of honor? Have we not got along very well while we left it there? If there be any instances in which there have been exceptions, they are instances in which persons have been excluded on account of police considerations, deemed to be dangerous to the safety of the people who excluded them. Is it proposed so to amend the Constitution as to take from the people of the States this right of self-defence?

If we once introduced this as an amendment to the Constitution, what would become of the feeble southern States, six or seven (for Delaware can hardly be considered as a slave State), that would be left? Arkansas may conclude to secede when she shall determine finally upon her position in the Union. What would become of us in the hands of this powerful majority, who would pass what laws they pleased in regard to the introduction of their citizens among us, and the rights of those citizens to do as they pleased after they got there? Is it not obvious that these various changes would lead to endless discontents, to irreparable breaches between these States? Would you not certainly drive out the Border States? They would say, "If we go south, we ally ourselves to a homogeneous people; we shall have none of these difficulties; we have no reason to fear their citizens; we can grant all these privileges without the least difficulty or danger; we can send our slaves south from a country where they are not profitable, to one where they are; but if we stay here, we are forbidden to do any of these things; if we stay here, we are prevented from ever obtaining any outlet for our slave property." Will you not offer them the highest inducements, nay, will you not make it almost necessary for them to leave you, if you should adopt such a proposition as this?

Nor is that all, Mr. President. Our present Constitution--for I am comparing our position under it with that in which this would place us--in most of its difficult provisions has been expounded--expounded by the action of the State Governments, by the action of all the departments of the Federal Government. We have had legal interpretations in the decisions of the State and Federal courts. We have come almost to a point--indeed, I, who believe that the Dred Scott decision is law, think we have come to a point--where we have a legal exposition on the whole of these matters. Are we to be turned aside from that, to wander into a new sea of doubt and difficulty and ambiguity? No candid man can take this up and say it is not full of double constructions, full of ambiguities, giving ground for new quarrels between the sections, to new constructions of courts, to new lawsuits.

Mr. COLLAMER:--And to be perpetual.

Mr. HUNTER:--Yes, sir; and to be made perpetual. We cannot change them afterwards, if we want to do it. I can conceive nothing that would endanger what is left of this Union so much as the adoption of this proposition, although it has been produced by persons so eminent and so respectable as those who composed the Peace Congress.

I know that this measure does emanate from a body eminently patriotic and wise, entitled to the public deference and affection; and for their work I feel all possible respect. Against that work I will pronounce nothing except what the necessities of the occasion may require. But when the peace, the safety, the rights of the State which I seek to represent--when the peace of the whole country, as it seems to me, would be so seriously imperilled as it would be if this were adopted, I feel bound by a sense of what I owe to those who sent me here, bound by a sense of what I owe to those who have some respect for my opinions, to express them here on this occasion, and to give briefly the points and the heads upon which I differ from the conclusions of that Congress. Indeed, sir, before taking my seat, I may suggest a doubt whether I am in truth acting against any thing which they have really done. I was informed by a member of that Congress that they never did take a vote upon this proposed article, as a whole.

Mr. DOOLITTLE:--If the Senator will allow me, I beg leave to state that I was informed of the same fact by a distinguished member of the Convention; and I was further informed that the person who claims to be the secretary of the Convention was never elected as such. And there is another fact stated in the preamble that I know is not correctly stated: that the State of Wisconsin was in that Convention, or took any part in it. How many more mistakes there are in the preamble, I am unable to say.

Mr. HUNTER:--I believe it is certain that they never did take a vote on this article as a whole, but upon its separate sections. I think it equally probable that it could not have passed as a whole. That opinion was expressed to me by a member. As it did pass, I think there were three or four States not voting; and the States not voting were supposed to be against it. Under such circumstances, I do not know that this is to be taken as an expression of the will of that Congress. Further: I will say, in regard to myself, that a majority of the members from my own State voted against it, and were very decided in their opposition to it. They believed it was not such a proposition as the South could safely accept; and that majority, I believe, have returned home to express that opinion to the State Convention, and to give their reasons for it. Under all these circumstances, I have thought that I ought to present, as a counter proposition (believing that the people whom I represent cannot and ought not to accept these), resolutions upon which they have said they were willing to settle this controversy. I believe the State of Kentucky has declared the same thing. I understand the State of California has done likewise. I believe, though I may be mistaken, that Tennessee has said the same. The State of North Carolina has made the same declaration unanimously. To the last, I believe I may add Missouri.

Now, I am making a proposition to amend, by inserting the resolutions of the honorable Senator from Kentucky; upon which so many of the border slaveholding States have said they would settle the difference. Why not send them out to the States and the people? We know that some of them would settle on that. Why should we send out such a proposition as this, which there is every reason to believe they will not accept, and which will have the effect of dividing the conservative men of the North? Those northern men who are willing to settle on some proposition that would give satisfaction to the Border States, would just as soon vote for the CRITTENDEN resolutions as for these, and some probably would prefer to do so. They will waste all their strength, and efforts, and energies, in going for a proposition which the South in the end will not accept, or at least which I do not believe they will accept, as there is every reason to suppose they will not accept it. Then, when we know there are propositions upon which so many of the Border States have said they would be willing to settle existing difficulties, why not submit them? I think, under such circumstances, notwithstanding the respect which I feel for the members composing the Peace Congress, my duty to my own State, whose Legislature has spoken in regard to it, and my sympathy with so many of the Southern States who have declared the same opinion, should induce me to present the proposition which they desire instead of one to which none of them have as yet given their adhesion, and to which I have no idea they will ever agree.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:--I suppose, Mr. President, not only out of deference to the Presiding Officer of this body, but because it seems to me to be entirely reasonable, that the decision of the Chair on the question of order which was made as to the admissibility of these amendments, was correct. The question which these amendments present, I think, is a question of consistency or inconsistency with the proceeding in which we are engaged, with the resolutions offered by the Peace Conference; and each member, in deciding ultimately upon the question for or against the proposed amendment, will consider that question of consistency or inconsistency, and regulate his vote accordingly. It is not, perhaps, strictly a question of order, to be decided on the consistency or inconsistency of amendments. So I take it. I am willing it should be decided by this body. Now, what is it? The proposed amendment contravenes the whole nature of the transaction, and changes its character. The representatives of twenty-one or twenty-two States--we will not make any question about Kansas; whether it be in or not, is not material--the representatives and delegates of over twenty States of the Union have recommended to us the adoption of certain amendments to the Constitution, which they say will arrest the troubles of the country and adjust those great differences which now so much threaten us; and they ask Congress to propose these amendments to the several States, according to the fifth article of the Constitution, for their adoption. These amendments have been submitted to us, and the question is, whether we will submit them to the States or not? That I take to be the specific and solitary question. This imposes no obligation on us to sanction these constitutional amendments by proposing them to the people. We can do as we please upon that point; but what is the question and the only question? It is not whether we ourselves will propose amendments to the Constitution, but whether we will propose to the people the amendments which this Convention has proposed to us. Now, that whole character is effaced, and a new character is given to the transaction, if any one of the amendments proposed by Senators be adopted.

Suppose these same States, by their Legislatures, had respectively recommended to us these particular and specific constitutional amendments, asking us to propose them according to the Constitution: would it have been proper for us then to undertake to amend their resolutions? It would be a different transaction altogether. In the one instance, out of respect to the States, we are proposing their resolutions; in the other case, we are proposing our own to the States. Now, the question here is, whether the resolutions have come to us with a sufficient sanction to constitute in our minds a reason for referring to the States the amendments which the States themselves have asked. That is all. It seems to my mind to be a clear question. They have asked us, they have requested us, to submit their resolutions, and not any others, to the States; and the question is, will we comply with their request, not whether we will fabricate amendments of our own and refer them to the people. They have asked of us to submit their proposals; and the question is, whether we will do it.

This amendment implies, in the first instance, that we will not do that, because the moment we adopt the amendment of the Senator from Virginia, that moment we say in effect, "We will not propose your recommendations to the people; while proposing our own, which we will substitute for yours." That is passing by this Convention altogether; it is negativing the States represented in it.

If gentlemen take this view it will be a sufficient reason, I trust, in itself, for voting against the proposed amendment. These propositions which the Convention has recommended may be such as we may refuse; it is in our power to refuse; but the question is, whether a recommendation, coming so sanctioned to us, is not, in itself, a sufficient reason why Congress, if disposed to satisfy the people, shall do the small act of presenting this to the people themselves, for their adoption. We may reject it, if we please. The people, when it is sent to them, will, of course, have the power to reject or adopt it. The only question now is, whether we will give the States an opportunity of saying whether this proposition is satisfactory or not.

Sir, I do not wish to occupy time; but I cannot perceive the justice of the criticisms made upon these resolutions of the Convention. They seem to me to be perspicuous and intelligible in every part and in every sentence. I do not see where the difficulty is to arise. Gentlemen need not tell us here, in respect to these resolutions, that a member of the Convention told them thus and so. No matter what a member of the Convention told this one or that one about the votes that were given, it is certified to us, in a formal manner, by the President of the Convention--himself a Virginian, and once a President of the United States--that this is the result of the proceedings of the Convention.

Mr. HUNTER:--If the Senator will allow me, I will state to him how that occurred. It was decided, as it will be seen when we get the Journal, that, according to some rules of the old Convention, they should not vote upon a proposition as a whole, but upon each particular provision. That was the rule of the Convention; and therefore he certified it as the Convention had instructed. The vote was taken only section by section, and the vote was never taken on it as a whole. There is no inconsistency between what I have said, and the certificate of the President of the Convention, because, according to the rules adopted by them, he had to certify it if it was adopted by sections, though it was not voted upon as a whole.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:--I suppose this remark is intended to annul the Convention, and discredit all their proceedings, though the Senate have received the letter of the President and Secretary as authentic evidence that this does contain the result of the deliberations and the proceedings of the body. I take it so, whatever a discontented member here and there may have said to the contrary notwithstanding. He may have said it all truly, for aught I know, but we must regard this as the authentic act of the Convention; otherwise it was nothing; and it is certified to us by the proper authority as its act, by the President of the Convention, with the request that we shall adopt it. It must have had, in some form or shape, the sanction of a majority of the Convention, or it could not have been so certified to us. How they voted, whether upon parts or the whole, they gave such votes as, they thought were necessary to ascertain the meaning of the body, and the expression of their will and opinion upon the subject. This is what they have done.

I do not stop to inquire whether I like these resolutions better than I do those proposed by myself, or the amendments now offered by the Senator from Virginia. We are near the close of our session. I have looked upon the proceedings of this great and eminent body of men as the best evidence of public opinion outside of this body, and of the wish and will of the States they represent. I am for peace. I am for compromise. I have not an opinion on the subject of what would be best that I would not be perfectly willing to sacrifice to obtain any reasonable measure of pacification that would satisfy the majority. I want to save the country and adjust our present difficulties. [Applause in the galleries.]

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BRIGHT in the chair) called to order.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:--That is what I want to do. That is the object I am aiming at. I attach no particular importance--I feel, at least, no selfish attachment--to any opinions I may have proclaimed on the subject heretofore. I proclaimed those opinions because I thought them right; but I am ready to sacrifice them, any and every one of them, to any more satisfactory proposition that can be offered. I look upon the resolutions proposed by this Convention as furnishing us, if not the last, the best hope of an adjustment; the best hope for the safety of the people and the preservation of the Government. I will not stop to cavil about the construction of these words; but I see none of the difficulties that suggest themselves to the mind of my friend from Virginia. Look at that third section, which has been the subject of his particular criticism. Every part and portion of it is a negation of power to Congress, and nothing else; and yet he has argued as if it gave Congress power; as if it conferred more power upon Congress. It leaves to the States all the rights they now have; all the remedies which they now have; and consists merely in a negation of power to Congress. How can that take away the rights of the people? How can that make our condition worse? I cannot possibly see. It is nothing but a negative from beginning to end, and therefore it cannot take away any thing from the people. It may take from Congress, but cannot take away from the States, or the people, any thing. It is a negative in its form and in its language, from beginning to end, that Congress shall have no power to do this, that, or the other. If they have that power under the present Constitution, it is taken away. That is all. It takes away no power from the States. It takes away no rights from individuals. Its simple office is the negation of power to Congress. That is all there is in it; and how, under that, can the gentleman find constructions which are to increase our difficulties and diminish our rights? He says the language will need construction. So does all language need construction. I do not see that this is particularly so.

Now, sir, the Senator offers my own proposition as an amendment to this. I shall vote against my own proposition here; I shall vote for this. [Applause in the galleries.]

Mr. MASON:--I shall be constrained to require that the galleries be cleared, if there be any further demonstrations in that quarter.

Mr. BAKER:--I hope the galleries will not be cleared. The admiration of a noble sentiment is never out of place.

The PRESIDING OFFICER:--There is no motion to clear the galleries.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:--I shall vote for the amendments proposed by the Convention, and there I shall stand. That is the weapon offered now, and placed in my hand, by which, as I suppose, the Union of these States may be preserved; and I will not, out of any selfish preference for my own original opinions on this subject, sacrifice one idea or one particle of that hope. I go for the country; not for this resolution or that resolution, but any resolution, any proposition, that will pacify the country. Therefore, I vote against my own, to give place to a proposition which comes from an authority much higher than mine--from one hundred and thirty of the most eminent men of this country, out of which number a Senate might be selected that might well compare in point of talent and intellect and ability even with this honorable body. They have recommended this on arduous, laborious consultation with one another; through many difficulties, through many diversities of opinion, they have at last arrived at these conclusions, and sent them to us. Shall any Senator stand upon the little consideration, "this changes my resolution," and shall he compare that little atom of his production with the great end and object proposed to be attained for a whole nation? No, sir; not a moment. I believe our best hope of preservation is in adopting the resolutions proposed by this Convention, and I adhere to them against all amendments.

Mr. President, the only material or substantial change in respect to the first section of this proposed amendment from my first proposition is, that it omits all reference to territory hereafter acquired, limiting our consideration and our settlement to territory which we now have. When I first offered my resolutions, I explained somewhat in reference to that particular provision which related to future territory. I said that I wanted no more territory. Our great trouble now is from the magnitude of the territory which we have already acquired. New Mexico is one of our acquisitions, and what a subject of dispute it has been! I want no more acquisitions. My country is big enough, and great enough. I say that further acquisitions are dangerous. We have found them to be so. Our experience and our reason, then, unite in teaching us "to beware of that sin, ambition." National aggrandizement! I want no more. I proposed that, however, as the idea then was, that we wanted a settlement that was to last forever; to be eternal; to embrace the present and to embrace the future, with all its acquisitions, all its changes. Reflection since, and the arguments of others, I will say, have changed my opinion on that point. If they had not changed it, however, I should be ready here to sacrifice it and give it up, if thereby I could obtain the assent of any respectable portion of my countrymen to the propositions for peace. If we can settle in respect to what we have, in GOD'S name let us do it; and if we are to have future acquisitions, let us leave the troubles they may bring upon us to a future day. We have enough for to-day. I do not object, therefore, to the first section of the proposition of the Convention, that it is confined to the territory which we now have. The adjustment which they have made varies but little in substance in regard to the territorial question, and the question of slavery as connected with it, from my original proposition. South of the line which we propose to establish, 36° 30´, you have no foot of territory left, but what is embraced in the Territory of New Mexico. In New Mexico, by law of the Territory--a constitutional law, a valid law of the Territory--slavery exists as fully and completely as the law can establish it, or has established it.

Now, this proposition is, that the _status_ of things shall continue as it is until that Territory becomes a State; and when it becomes a State, let it dispose of the question of slavery as it chooses. There is no ambiguity about this. In substance, though in a different form of words, the same is expressed in my proposition. The proposition of the Convention is the same in substance, only omitting the words--a very proper and a very timely omission--supposed to be offensive in certain parts of the country, and substituting others that are equally well understood in all parts of the country, and which were less offensive to some.

Sir, now is the time for mediation; now is the time for pacification; now is the time to omit every word that can give offence or add to the irritation under which the country is. I desire, by the most moderate terms, by the most unoffending language, to reach some mode of adjustment that can give satisfaction to the whole country and reunite us all.

My friend from Virginia seems to apprehend that under these amendments we shall be worse off in respect to territory hereafter acquired. That is supposed to be sufficiently provided for and secured in the provision, that no future acquisition shall be made, by purchase or by treaty, except that treaty or that purchase be ratified by a majority of the Senators from the slaveholding States, as well as a majority of Senators from the non-slaveholding States. Does not this give the South a safe assurance, an assurance to be relied upon? My friend from Virginia says, however, do we believe the North, with its superior number, would submit to this provision of the Constitution? Why, sir, the Convention have had the caution to make this provision, if I understand them, irrepealable by any future amendment of the Constitution. There it stands, then, in the most solemn form that men can enter into any compact, in the most formal language by any terms that Government can establish, that all are bound by that provision of the Constitution which requires a majority from each section. When the gentleman asks whether we can believe for a moment that this law will be acquiesced in and adhered to, I say we must to some extent have confidence in one another, or all human society must lose its basis, not merely of government, but its foundation, and all society would be torn up at once by the roots. That confidence is the root of society; it is the root of all the associations of men in public or private life; it is the root and foundation of all government. What more can you have, what better security can you have than written, solemn terms upon any subject which is to regulate government? There is nothing more solemn among men, unless you would require angels to come down and make responses for them. Here you have the very highest security that can be given; and when any gentleman shall say these are not to be relied upon, he says there is no Government that stands upon any foundation that can be relied upon. Such an assertion strikes not at this provision; it strikes at the root of all government. What further security can be had? If our brethren of the other section were willing to give the highest possible security they could, what can they give more? Nothing. This argument, then, can avail nothing.

Mr. President, I have gone perhaps a little further than I ought to have done. It is not now necessary that I should enter into a vindication of every provision of these amendments offered by the Convention. It is sufficient to speak to the amendment which the gentleman has offered. Excluding territory hereafter to be acquired, I think, in substance, we ought to be satisfied with that; I believe that will make peace; I believe that will give substantial security to our rights, and to the rights which the Southern States claim. With that I am satisfied. It is enough for the dreadful occasion. It is the dreadful occasion that I want to get rid of. Rid me of this, rid the nation of this, and I am willing to take my chance for the future and meet the perils of every day that may come. Now is the appointed time upon which our destiny depends. Now is the emergency and exigency upon us. Let us provide for them. Save ourselves now, and trust to posterity and that Providence which has so long and so benignly guided this nation, to keep us from the further difficulties which in our national career may be in our way.

I prefer the propositions which the Convention have made to my own propositions, because I have no hope for my propositions. They have not been so fortunate as to receive the favor of my colleagues of the Senate from the North, the men whose sanction of them was necessary to give them effect. I transfer all my hopes of peace to these propositions and terms proposed by the Convention representing twenty-odd of the States of this Union--a large majority of all the States. I will not go into particulars about it; but since gentlemen have made some allusion to the out-of-door rumors and reports and sayings in respect to this Convention, I believe that perhaps a majority of those who voted for these amendments were men representing non-slaveholding States. I do not know the fact, and I will not state it, but I am under that impression now, and that impression encourages my hopes that the Senate, rather than see the country fall into ruin, fall into dismemberment, limb from limb, and blood flowing at the plucking out of every limb, will supply the remedy which is proposed. It seems to me proper and just. But little is asked, and great is the reward, and mighty are the consequences that are to flow from it.

Sir, I have occupied more of the time of the Senate on this particular question than I ought to have done.

Mr. MASON:--Mr. President, there is a very grave duty devolving upon the Senate on the proposition which is now before us. We are called upon, pursuant to the Constitution, to propose amendments to the Constitution. The fifth article of the Constitution says this:

"The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem
it necessary, shall propose amendments to this
Constitution."

Now, sir, I cannot agree, for one, to propose an amendment to this Constitution unless it has the sanction and the approbation of my judgment; and I suppose no other Senator will. I am bound, therefore, by every obligation of faith and honor to my State, when a proposition is submitted to the Senate as one that should be proposed to the States as an amendment to the Constitution, to examine it and understand it, and see it in all its bearings and effects, as far as my intellect will enable me, and to propose it or to withhold it by my vote, as I shall be guided by my judgment. I can see no other position of a Senator.

Now, sir, what are the facts? The country was convulsed by the success in the late presidential election of one of the political parties of the country. The tremor was evinced at once in all the Southern States, in a belief that their existence and their safety was imperilled by that election. Congress met. As was proper and necessary, the very first act in each House was to appoint a committee to take the condition of the country into consideration, and see if, by any mode of amendment to the Constitution, those perils could be avoided. A committee was raised in the collateral branch. A committee was raised in this Senate, I think upon the motion of the honorable Senator from Kentucky, actuated as he always is by principles of the highest patriotism. Those committees met. They remained in anxious deliberation for weeks. What was the result? They were unable to agree. I think the committee came before the Senate and admitted the fact. They could agree upon no form of amendment which they believed would remedy the evils and avert the perils under which the country suffered.

In that state of things, the Legislature of Virginia--my own honored State--having been called into special session on the 19th of January, passed a series of resolutions, one of which recites this:

"That on behalf of the Commonwealth of Virginia, an
invitation is hereby extended to all such States, whether
slaveholding or non-slaveholding, as are willing to unite
with Virginia in an earnest effort to adjust the present
unhappy controversies in the spirit in which the
Constitution was originally formed, and consistently with
its principles, so as to afford to the people of the
slaveholding States adequate guarantees for the security of
their rights."

That is the recital of the resolution of the Legislature of Virginia: "to afford to the people of the slaveholding States adequate guarantees for the security of their rights;" and there was a further provision, that, if those States should meet and agree upon any form of adjustment, it should be submitted to Congress. A number of the States--some twenty or twenty-one, it seems--some by their Legislatures, some by their Executives--met the invitation of Virginia, and deputed their commissioners to the conference in Washington, to see if they could agree upon a mode of adjustment. We have the report of that Conference before us now, presented through a committee of this body; and they propose an additional article to the Constitution. Mr. President, the honorable Senator from Kentucky, who has pronounced so deserved a eulogium upon that body, does not exceed me in the respect which I bear to it. If there be one more than another Senator upon whom it would devolve to treat the work of that Convention with peculiar respect, it would devolve upon me and my colleague, because they met at the invitation of my State. I yield to none in the respect which I bear to those gentlemen or to the purity of their motives in the results which they have attained in that Conference; but, sir, I am bound by my obligations to the Constitution, by my honor as a man, by my faith to my own State, to understand what they have done, and to exhibit it either in recommendation or disapproval, as my judgment may dictate. _Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri._

I admit no authority to bind my judgment as a representative of one of the States of the Union. I yield my respect to what they have done; but I will scan it, and if, in my honest, unbiased judgment, I cannot recommend it as an amendment to the Constitution, I am bound to withhold that recommendation, and to give the reasons for it.

As I have said, sir, the State of Virginia, finding that Congress was at a loss for a mode of adjustment, invited the States to send commissioners here for this purpose:

"To agree upon something which would afford to the people of
the slaveholding States adequate guarantees for the security
of their rights."

Virginia knew that, under the Constitution as it was interpreted under the constituted authorities of the country as they have been elected, there was no security for their rights; and it was in the hope of obtaining such a security--Congress failing to agree upon it--that, at her invitation, these gentlemen from the different States met here in conference. I am to look, therefore, to their work, and to see if it affords that security for their rights; and if I am satisfied in my own judgment, as I honestly am--and the reasons for which I am now to announce to the world--that it not only affords no security for the rights of the South, but takes away what little they have, I should be a traitor if I would recommend it as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Now, sir, let us look at it. It is presented as an entire article, to be the thirteenth article, if adopted, of the Constitution. The first section of it relates to the Territories--the great and difficult point of division between the two sections. If that could be overcome--if these rights that are spoken of in the resolutions of Virginia in the Territories could be guaranteed by adequate securities to the slaveholding States--I believe the rest of the path would be smooth. It embraces almost the whole controversy. What securities are provided in the Territories to the slaveholding States by this first section of the thirteenth article? It proposes to divide the present Territories--for it is confined to them--by an east and west line, a parallel of latitude. North of that line, there is a clear cut entirely, unsusceptible of misinterpretation. None can doubt what the condition of servitude is north of that line. It is a clear cut; it is prohibited, and prohibited forever. No interpretation can mistake it; no casuist can doubt upon it; it is a work well done. North of that line involuntary servitude, except for crime, is prohibited. How is it south? My honorable colleague, I think, has well said that, south of that line, for our rights, at best we are remitted to a lawsuit. I will read the language:

"Nor shall any law be passed by Congress or the Territorial
Legislature to hinder or prevent the taking of such
persons--"

That is, persons held to service--

"from any of the States of this Union to said Territories,
nor to impair the rights arising from said relation."

Neither Congress nor the Territorial Legislature has power to interfere with the rights arising from the relation of master and servant, or master and slave. That is the meaning; that is clear. What next?

"But the same--"

The rights resulting from the relation of master and slave--

"shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the Federal
courts, according to the course of the common law."

There is the security for the rights of the South. South of that line they are remitted to the courts under the common law. Now, sir, let us examine that. By this section, if it is adopted as an article of the Constitution, the common law, _eo nomine_, is made a part of the Constitution, so far as it affects the relations of master and slave. Now, what is the common law? Who is there upon this floor that will tell me what common law is meant by this section? With all my respect for the thorough knowledge and the legal acquirements of the honorable Senator from Kentucky, I know he cannot tell me what common law is meant by that first section. We know, as jurists, what is meant by the term common law, for it is a technical term. The common law is the law of England, the unwritten law of England, the _lex non scripta_. That is the common law in its legal acceptation. Is it, then, the law of England that is made a part of the Constitution, and to which the master is remitted for the security of his rights between him and his servant? Will any gentleman tell me that it is the common law of England that is to be made a part of the Constitution to which we are to be remitted? If it is the common law of England, is it the common law of England as it stands at this day, on the first of March, 1861?

Mr. CRITTENDEN:--If my friend will allow me, I take it that that term applies only to the remedies known to the common law. The laws of the Territories are to be enforced, and the remedies under them are to be administered according to common law. The master is to have his rights according to the law of the Territory, and to secure those rights according to the common law.

Mr. MASON:--The language of the section is, that neither Congress nor the Territorial Legislature shall interfere to impair the rights arising from this relation of master and slave; "but the same"--that is, this relation between master and slave--"shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the Federal courts, according to the course of the common law."