Chapter XXXVI: Section 3: Neither the Constitution, nor any amendment (2)

Now, the honorable Senator says that means only the remedy of the common law; that you are to take the law of the Territory, whatever it may be, and administer that, by confining it to the remedies known to the common law. I deny the interpretation. The Senator may be right, or I may be right. I say the text does not warrant the interpretation. The text refers to the rights in the relation of master and slave, and says they (those rights) shall be the subject of judicial cognizance, according to the course of common law. Now, I ask, what is the common law that is thus made a part of the Constitution for the subject to which it refers? Is it the law of England? There is no common law, that I am aware of, known to jurists as the law of England. There is no law in the State of Virginia, and, I presume, none in the State of Kentucky, known as common law. The State of Virginia, when it became independent as a colony of Great Britain, adopted and made its own that which before had been the common law of England, and therefore the common law of the colony. The State of Virginia (and I instance that only because I am familiar with it), when it became independent, adopted as its law the common law of England, as that common law stood at the commencement of the fourth year of James I.; and thereby, by statute, made that which had been the common law, the law of Virginia. Now, it is the law of Virginia, not because it is the common law, but because statutes made it the law of Virginia. But is the common law of Virginia, if you will call it by that name, the common law of Kentucky; or is the common law of Kentucky the common law of Missouri; or is the law of those three States, or any other State, now the common law of England? I demand to know, therefore, when we make the common law a part of the Constitution, if this enactment should prevail, what is meant by the common law? To that vague, grand residuum of judicial legislation we are to be remitted for our rights between master and slave, if this is enacted.

Now, sir, suppose it were so: my colleague has well said (and I will not repeat it after him, for I should only weaken it), that there is not one judicial interpreter or expounder of the common law, in any one of the free States, in reference to the relation of master and slave, that does not deny that the master has any property in his slave, at this day and this hour. Why, sir, what is the pending controversy between the State of Ohio, one of the free States, and the State of Kentucky, one of the slave States--a controversy depending here recently in the Supreme Court? The Governor of Kentucky demanded, under the Constitution, the rendition of a fugitive from justice, who had abducted a slave from Kentucky, and carried him into Ohio. The Governor of Ohio refused the demand, upon the ground that there could be no stealing of a man; that there could be no property in man; and that the slave, being a man, was not a subject of theft, of larceny; and he refused, and refuses up to this day, under the common law, to recognize the existence of property in man.

Now, take the common law of England at this day: here, within the last three or four weeks, the Queen's Bench, in England, has declared as the common law, that if a slave murders his master, or murders the agent of his master, in the attempt to recapture him, he is justified. That is the common law to which we are to be remitted for the rights resulting from the relations of master and slave. Sir, I have looked back a little to see what the common law was in England in this famous Somerset case, I find this in the argument of the counsel there, expounding the common law, which was afterwards sustained by Lord MANSFIELD in his decision:

"But it has been said by great authorities, though slavery,
in its full extent, be incompatible with the natural rights
of mankind, and the principles of good government, yet a
moderate servitude may be tolerated, nay, sometimes must be
maintained."

And again:

"There is now, at last, an attempt, and the first yet known,
to introduce it [slavery] into England. Long and
uninterrupted usage, from the origin of the common law,
stands to oppose its revival."

And again:

"A new species has never arisen till now; for had it,
remedies and powers there, would have been at law;
therefore, the most violent presumption against it, is the
silence of the laws, were there nothing more. It is very
doubtful whether the laws of England will permit a man to
bind himself by contract to serve for life; certainly will
not suffer him to invest another man with despotism, nor
prevent his own right to dispose of property."

And again:

"There are very few instances, few, indeed, of decisions as
to slaves in this country. Two in Charles II., where it was
adjudged trover would lie. Chamberlayne and Perrin, William
III., trover brought for taking a negro slave; adjudged it
would not lie. 4th Ann., action of trover; judgment by
default. On arrest of judgment, resolved that trover would
not lie. Such the determinations in all but two cases; and
those the earliest, and disallowed by the subsequent
decisions. Lord HOLT: 'As soon as a slave enters England he
becomes free.'"

In the opinion of the court, of Lord MANSFIELD, as to these principles of common law, that very distinguished and able judge, who made the law, as I understand, for the occasion, but certainly ruled it as the common law, says this:

"The state of slavery is of such a nature that it is
incapable of being introduced for any reasons, moral or
political; but only by positive law, which preserves its
force long after the reasons, occasion, and time itself from
whence it was created, is erased from memory. It's so odious
that nothing can be suffered to support it but positive law.
Whatever inconveniences, therefore, may follow from a
decision, I cannot say this case is allowed or approved by
the law of England."

I need not go back to authority. We have it abundantly in our own country, in all the free States, so far as I know, without exception. They deny what the amendment of my honorable friend from Kentucky affirms. They deny that there is property in a slave. The amendment of the Senator affirms there is property in a slave. This section is silent, ominously silent, portentously and potentially silent. It is not only silent, Mr. President, but when it refers you to that code of law which is to protect the right of the master to the slave, it refers you to the common law, and the common law to be expounded by the Federal courts, and the common law, which is judicially and historically known to the whole country, to be expounded in all the free States as one that denies that very property which we say must be secured. That is our position under this section. Sir, the State of Virginia has said that we must have adequate guarantees; and I am asked here to vote away what little guarantees we have. I am asked, almost in the high ethics or morals of revealed religion, when my adversary takes away my cloak, that I shall give him my coat also. I am required to do that by this section. We believe that our rights are secured under the present Constitution; we know that they have been withheld by the political party which has now come into power; we believe that they are insecure unless there are further and adequate guarantees; but, so far from their being proposed by the section before us, in my judgment, what little we have is taken away. Sir, I cannot vote for these propositions. I regret it. I was prepared, whether it had the approval of my judgment or not, to follow the instructions of my State, and to vote for the amendment offered by the honorable Senator from Kentucky after it had been modified, as was required by the resolutions of my State.

The amendment of the Senator from Kentucky was so modified, I do not know whether at the instance of Virginia or not; but it was modified by a vote of this Senate, so as to embrace what was required in the resolutions of Virginia. I am not at liberty to recommend, or, in the language of the Constitution, to propose to the States this section of the thirteenth article; because it not only withholds, but denies by withholding, any security, far less that security which the State of Virginia requires.

There are further provisions in this proposition that are objectionable, one of which was pointed out by my colleague: that which calls upon Congress to legislate on that clause of the Constitution which secures to the citizens of one State all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States. I need not say that any legislation on that subject by Congress would be any thing but the messenger of peace to which the honorable Senator from Kentucky looks. Why, sir, it has been found indispensable in slaveholding States, as a part of their police regulations, to punish all persons who were either of the State or otherwise, who tamper with the slaves, who have intercourse with them that is forbidden by law, far more those who preach to them sedition, or insurrection, or revolt; and yet, if we were to be controlled within the body of the State by Federal relations in our interior police, we should be completely at the mercy of the free States.

Mr. President, I should have been certainly gratified, if my honored State of Virginia had been successful in the mediation which she invited of all the States, with a view to agree upon an adjustment which would guaranty the rights of the South. I deeply deplore, and I doubt not my State will deplore, that that mediation has not been effected. So far from impugning any motives or purpose of that honorable and distinguished body, I doubt not that, in the short time that was allowed to them, they got together the best mode of adjustment which would satisfy their judgment, but which I am sure will not satisfy the judgment of the Southern States, but would place them in still greater peril, if they were to admit that to become a part of the Constitution. I did not intend to do more than state my objections to it as briefly as I could. I have done so temperately and without heat, I regret that I cannot, as one Senator, propose this as an amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:--I wish only to reply for a single moment to the material objection urged by the Senator from Virginia. The portion of the article to which the Senator from Virginia objects, declares that the _status_ of persons bound to service and labor shall remain unchanged; that neither Congress nor the Territorial Legislature shall pass any law affecting the relation, or the rights growing out of the relation between master and servant--I do not pretend to recite the exact words; but that is the exact idea--well knowing that, according to the laws of the Territory, the _status_ of slavery was fully established, and all the rights of the master in and to his servant established, as they exist in the State of Missouri, or the State of Virginia, by positive law of the Territory. It is therefore equivalent to saying that that law shall stand, when it says that the _status_ shall continue unchanged. It then goes on to say (which I admit was altogether unnecessary) that the remedy for the violation of the rights of the master, whatever they might be, shall be had in the Federal courts, and according to the course of the common law. Now, sir, what right does this take away from any slaveholder? That law which secured and gave him a right, is declared to be unchangeable. That law acknowledges his property in any sense in which you please to take it, or in any sense in which it is applicable. It acknowledges it, and gives legal remedies for the violation of it; and in addition to all that, and, as I admit, by a sort of pleonasm of expression, it says that he shall have his remedy in the Federal court, according to the course of the common law.

Mr. MASON:--Will the Senator allow me a moment?

Mr. CRITTENDEN:--Certainly.

Mr. MASON:--With the permission of the Senator I will put this proposition to him: He says that the meaning of the language, "according to the course of the common law," is confined to the remedy. Now, admitting that to be the case, for the sake of the argument, suppose, in one of these Territories, a slave is purloined, seduced, got away; the slave of A gets into the possession of B, and he is there at work for him upon his farm, or in his house, and A brings an action of trover to recover him; that is an action known to the common law; and the decision of the Federal court is, that trover lies only to recover property, and a slave is not property: what is the remedy? That is the decision in England; and I presume it would be the decision in the free States, if the suit were brought.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:--It was to avoid going into definitions of that sort that this language was employed in the amendments of the Convention. They saw and had before them the law of New Mexico, which did acknowledge the existence of this right as fully as it is acknowledged by the law of Virginia. However it may be disputed here, however legal opinions may differ about it, the law of New Mexico established property in slaves; and there the law stands; and the Convention now comes and says that _status_ shall remain unchanged.

Mr. BRAGG:--Oh, no.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:--That is the resolution.

Mr. BRAGG:--Will the honorable Senator allow me a word, for I am very anxious to understand it?

Mr. CRITTENDEN:--Certainly.

Mr. BRAGG:--The Senator says it provides that that law, the law of New Mexico, whatever it may be, shall remain unchanged, if I understand him, and that that fixes the _status_ of slavery in the Territory. I call the attention of the Senator to the language. I think that only fixes the _status_ of persons now in the Territory, and not those to be carried there hereafter--not the _status_ of slavery, but the _status_ of persons who are there now, held to service or labor, and not the _status_ of those who are to be carried there in future. That is provided for in the language which it follows in another part.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:--Here it is, sir:

"In all the present territory south of that line"--

Which I have explained, and which gentlemen admit to be embraced in the Territory of New Mexico--

"the _status_ of persons held to involuntary service or
labor, as it now exists."

It is not as to such slaves as are now there, but such slavery as now exists.

Mr. BRAGG:--If it said that, I admit that it would cover the _status_ of slavery.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:--It does say that. It seems to me that is the only construction that can be given to the language. It could not be intended to confine it to the twenty-six slaves that are now held there, especially when they provided, in a subsequent article, that it shall be lawful for any one to carry slaves there.

Mr. BRAGG:--Will the honorable Senator again allow me to interrupt him?

Mr. CRITTENDEN:--Certainly.

Mr. BRAGG:--I have not the slightest doubt that a great many who voted for the proposition consider it as the Senator does. I have equally as little doubt that others intended it to mean precisely what I have stated. I cannot see, for my life, while they were framing a constitutional provision, why they did not place this matter beyond any sort of doubt. If they intended to recognize slavery, they could have said so in one word. If they intended not to recognize it, they could have said it in another word. If they intended to mystify and leave in doubt, then they have been very successful in accomplishing their purpose.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:--"In all the present territory south of that line, the _status_ of persons held to involuntary service or labor, as it now exists;" not as they now exist; not in respect to those that are there now; but part of the same sort of slavery which now exists, shall continue to exist unchanged until the Territory becomes a State; and in the mean time persons shall be admitted to go into that Territory and carry their slaves with them. Now, I submit it to my honorable friend if it is not entirely improbable that any such construction as he suggests can prevail before any court that seeks to attain the real intention of the parties who made this proposition? It is such slavery as now exists. Persons held to that service--you may carry as many there as you please. Put them both together, and they would read so; and they being in the same instrument, can there be a doubt that ought to alarm us here, that the construction will be given to it which I place upon it, that it was intended not to be confined merely to persons now there and held to servitude, but as well to those who might be carried there hereafter? This is all I will say in reference to that; and I submit it to the candor and the judgment of my honorable friend from North Carolina, in which I have entire confidence, whatever result he may come to, that if we put the two propositions together, all doubt would seem to be removed.

Now, sir, my friend from Virginia will argue this question as if the question of slavery was to be decided according to the course of the common law, and then refers us to the express declarations and decisions as though the common law decided that slavery could not exist. What sort of construction would that make of this provision? Here they have provided that the law establishing slavery shall exist, that the property of the master in him shall be recognized as it is there established by law; and then the gentleman supposes that to be exactly contradictory, to refer to the common law as furnishing the rule of decision, which common law says there can be no property, as he interprets it, in man, and that when trover was brought for a slave--

Mr. MASON:--Not as I interpret it, but as interpreted in England.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:--I know that. He says it may be so interpreted; that when trover was brought for a slave in England, the judges decided there was no property in man. Could the same judges, sitting in a court in New Mexico, have given that decision when the law there established such property? In such a case, their decision must be different. They are referring, according to him, to two contradictory rules: one establishing slavery and acknowledging property in the master, and the other the common law denouncing and deciding against the right of property in man. This could not have been their intention, nor can this be the construction. We cannot consider these gentlemen to have changed their opinion from one sentence to another, to have left an incongruity and a contradiction expressed upon the face of the same section.

Nor, sir, do they refer--and that is my answer to my friend from Virginia--to the common law as furnishing the rule of decision at all. The proceedings shall be according to the course of the common law; that is all. If any violation is done to the rights of the master, he may sue; and, for his greater security, he may sue in the Federal courts; and, for greater security still, the law shall be administered according to the course of the common law. The common law is referred to as determining the mode of trial. We say according to the course of the civil law, and we say according to the course of the common law. What do we mean? We mean this marked and characteristic and essential difference: the course of the civil law is for the judge, without the intervention of a jury, to decide facts as well as the law. The common law takes away from the judge the power of deciding the facts, and demands a trial by jury. What this convention mean, therefore, by this provision is, that trial shall be by jury, according to the course of the common law. That is the explanation of the difficulty, and thus all doubt is removed. By these plain provisions--plain in themselves, and made plainer still by being taken with the context--they say you shall have your rule of right, according to the law of the Territory, which is in your favor as to the right to hold persons as property; that law shall be your security; you shall have a remedy for any violation of that right in the Federal courts, and you shall have that remedy, not according to the course of the civil law, in which the judge is to decide, who might be against you, but in which a jury shall be called to decide the fact according to the course of the common law. That is the whole of it.

Mr. MASON:--Mr. President--

Mr. POLK:--If the Senator will allow me, before the Senator from Kentucky sits down, I will ask him if the Mexican law establishes slavery, or if it does any thing more than to protect the right of the master to his slave? If that is the only establishment of it, then it is established by implication merely.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:--I really do not know whether the gentleman would consider it as establishing or merely protecting. I do not know that there is a law in any State of the Union that _eo nomine_ establishes slavery; I do not know.

Mr. POLK:--The object of the inquiry was this: it has been contended heretofore that, by the law of Mexico, there could be no slavery there; and then there is another law of New Mexico professing to protect the right of property. I have never seen that New Mexican law.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:--I believe I have answered the gentleman as far as my information extends. I have examined that law. It is as strong in favor of the master as the laws of Kentucky or Missouri. I believe it is the law of Mississippi transcribed literally, _verbatim_. That is my understanding. The law is as complete on the subject as the law of any State that I know of.

Mr. MASON:--Mr. President, if the Senator from Kentucky is right, and, in the interpretation of this section, the courts are necessarily to consider the expression, "according to the course of the common law," to which slaveholders are referred for the enforcing of the relation of master and slave, as referring only to common law remedies, then I am at no loss to conceive, after our experience of judicial interpretation against slavery, by what sort of artificial and sophistic reasoning those judges of the Federal courts may feel themselves bound to withhold the remedy. Why, sir, are we to shut our ears and our eyes against experience passing before us every day? What is the present Constitution? The second section of the fourth article is in these words:

"A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or
other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in
another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority
of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be
removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime."

That is the text of the Constitution. What is the interpretation in the free States? In the State of Kentucky an African is property, under their laws and usages, and has been so for two hundred years; for it was so when it was a part of Virginia; and did it ever enter into the mind of man to conceive that this plain text of the Constitution would be resisted, upon the ground that property in man was not acknowledged? And yet it is done. If I am not mistaken, the honorable Senator from New York [Mr. SEWARD], not now in his seat, when Governor of New York, made that very question with the Governor of Virginia; and seeing this, are we to be willingly blind to this as the actual, judicial, and executive interpretation in every thing that affects the question of slavery as it stands in that section, and that, too, while we are seeking equality? Sir, it never entered into the mind of man, at the time this Constitution was formed, to credit that the time could ever come in the relations of these States when a man who fled from the State of Kentucky because he had stolen a negro into the State of Ohio, was screened from the operation of the Constitution, because in Ohio they do not deem a negro to be the subject of property; and yet that is the fact, the very issue now depending between those States; and we are asked to be blind, willingly blind, to all that experience at the very time we are attempting to secure a guarantee for violated rights!

Now, I said, Mr. President, that, if I were to tax my ingenuity, I might find a mode, even if the honorable Senator is right in ascribing to this clause of the section the necessary interpretation that it refers to remedies only. The Senator says the previous part of the section establishes the relation, as he construes it, not directly like the resolution of the honorable Senator which we offer here as an amendment, which establishes directly that there is property in slaves. This does not; but designedly avoids it; not from any improper motive--I do not ascribe that--but it is not only silent, but it avoids the very question. I suppose the honorable Senator is right in saying this language, judicial cognizance, according to the course of the common law, refers only to the remedy. Now, I tax my ingenuity to know how a court, in one of the free States, always leaning, of course, against slavery, would reason out that proposition, whether the remedy could be applied. Suppose an action of trover is brought. The inquiry would be, what is the remedy? We are told this is the remedy for which you are to apply to the law. A remedy is nothing in the world but a redress for wrong. Before you can apply the remedy, therefore, you must ascertain whether a wrong has been committed for which the remedy is adequate. Well, it comes from one side: the wrong was in taking the negro from the possession of the owner, against the local law of the Territory. The answer would be, "that may be true as far as the local law of the Territory is concerned; but here the Constitution adopts the common law as part of its text, and points the judges to the common law, and it applies the remedy." Now, the remedy is redress of the wrong, and we are bound to see that the wrong is one to which the remedy is applicable. The remedy is to recover property in the possession of one who is not entitled to it, and the common law, which applies that remedy to that wrong, says there is no wrong inflicted by taking the negro from the possession of his owner. It comes to that. It is suggested to me by the honorable Senator from Vermont [Mr. COLLAMER], that the common law, as a remedy, is one applicable to a common-law wrong. I do not say that the reasoning is just; I do not say that it is juridical; but I say, in our experience, we should be willingly blind if we take that for a security which will only be a snare.

Mr. PUGH:--Mr. President, it is very well known to the Senate that I prefer the proposition of the Senator from Kentucky, as a matter of individual choice, to the proposition which is proposed by the Peace Conference. Nevertheless, that Conference having been authorized, if not by Congress, at all events, so far as my State is concerned, by the act of her Legislature; and an overwhelming majority of the commissioners having agreed to this proposition as it stands, I shall hesitate very much in departing from it, whatever might be my individual opinion; but certainly if I thought the two Senators from Virginia had given it a correct interpretation, I should not agree to it. Now, as to this clause, it, in my judgment, had better have been omitted:

"The same shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the
Federal courts, according to the course of the common law."

I suggest that the common law is referred to as fixing a right simply. The course of the common law is a phrase defined for more than two hundred years, in Latin, in English, and in Norman French. It means the formula of proceeding. I understood the Senator from Virginia [Mr. MASON] to say that it had been decided in several of the courts that an action of trover could not be brought for a negro slave in England. I think I am familiar with the case. It is reported in Salkeld's Reports, Lord Raymond's Reports, and in the Modern Reports--the same case reported three times; but the same court which decided that trover would not lie, because trover included the idea of property in the man himself, in the same opinion said that trespass on the case would lie for the loss of the service; so that it was all a question of pleading, and no question of right at all. It is within my recollection--and I believe the case was brought to the Supreme Court on a writ of error, and can be found in Howard's Reports--that a citizen of Kentucky declared in trespass on the case for taking away his slaves, and added two counts in trover. What is trover but an action of trespass on the case? Nothing more; and it never was any thing more. The measure of damages is the same in both actions--the value of the service of the servant; and yet that controversy on mere pleading--which, in nine-tenths of the States of this Union, has ceased to be of any value, because they have a code of procedure, is made a terrific objection here.

Now, sir, I have never read the code of New Mexico, and I do not propose to read it; but it is perfectly understood that that Territorial Legislature, pursuing the privilege, if you call it privilege, conferred by the compromise measures of 1850, has established the relation of master and slave, or master and servant, as perfectly as it is established in any of the fifteen so-called slaveholding States. I do not admire this word "_status_" which we find in the report of the Peace Conference; but as to the meaning of that word, I cannot be in any doubt. It does not refer to any persons in particular; it refers to a legal relation of servitude as between master and servant, and it provides that that relation, or condition, or _status_, shall not be changed; that for all wrongs or controversies arising out of that there shall be a remedy through the Federal judiciary.

I can see why the commission made this distinction. There have been many who have insisted that the Congress of the United States should pass laws for the protection of the right of the master to the services of his slave in a Territory; but it has always been my opinion, that the worst thing the slaveholding States ever could have would be to have that; for there would be a perpetual controversy here from session to session, and from day to day, whether the law went far enough in giving protection or went too far; and they would be remitting their right to the adjudication of the Senators and Representatives from the non-slaveholding States. Others have insisted, as the propositions of my honorable friend from Kentucky provided, that the relation should be protected by the legislation of the territorial authority. I would rather it were so, individually, if they chose to establish it. The peace commission do not want that. They evidently do not want to quarrel with the Territorial Legislatures about the measure of legislation; but they declare the right, and then say that this right shall be enforced in the Federal judiciary according to the course of remedies and forms of the common law. I do not see how there can be a doubt; and yet, as I have said, it seems to me that a great deal of it is unnecessary verbiage. I do not mean to debate that; I am not one of the peace commissioners; I am not to select my words to express the idea; but I am here; and my State with other States, having appointed commissioners in view of a crisis like this, as they esteem it, and as I esteem it, and they having agreed upon a great variety of propositions, some of which commend themselves to my judgment and some do not; but taking it altogether as one proposition, I am satisfied that I must either vote for all of it, or let all of it fall. I would rather vote for the proposition of my honorable friend from Kentucky. I said that sixty days ago; and I have said it in season and out of season. I have expressed my views frequently. I think the proposition of the commissioners would be better expressed, though it would come to the same thing, in these words: "in all the territory south of that line, it is hereby declared that no law or regulation shall ever be made or have any effect denying or impairing the right of the inhabitants to the service or labor of such persons as were held in that condition in any State of the Union; and thence taken into the said Territory." That would have expressed my idea more clearly, yet I am satisfied with this; it amounts to that. Whether the word "_status_" be good Latin or good English, the meaning is very clear.

I believe I admonished the Senate two hours ago that time was very precious; and I shall not detain them myself.

Mr. BAKER:--Mr. President, I mean to vote for the passage of these proposed amendments, just as they are, without any change; and I propose to give very briefly a few of the reasons which govern my judgment in that act. I will do it as pointedly as I can, and I will certainly do it very briefly.

In the first place, I feel that I am but submitting to the people of the whole country, amendments which they, and they only, can incorporate in the present Constitution; and I do not believe that, in any state of the case, I can do very wrong in doing that; but when I consider the immediate condition of the country, I feel that I am doing very right. Twenty States assemble in what is called the Peace Convention. They recommend to us, in times of great trial and difficulty, the passage of these resolutions. They are eminent men; they are able men; they are--very many of them, at least--great men; they have been selected by the States which they respectively represent, because of their purity of character and ability. The country is in great trouble. Six States have seceded; and I am told by very many men in whom I have great confidence, that their States are to-day trembling in the balance. I believe it. I am told--and upon that subject I have not yet made up my mind--that the adoption of these measures by the people will heal the differences with the Border States. I do not believe that I can do wrong, therefore, in giving the people of the whole Union a chance to determine these questions.

In the beginning, I voted against the propositions of the distinguished Senator from Kentucky. Even then I did not perceive any great harm in submitting any propositions to the people of the United States which circumstances might appear to render necessary for any good purpose. I refused to vote for them, for two reasons: first, I believed something better might be attained; and second, I did not believe that the people of the States would agree to them. I do not believe that now, and for one simple reason: I think I may consider myself in some respect a representative of the opinion as well as the power of my own people. I am a Republican, a zealous and determined one. I have all my life been of the opinion that Congress ought not to protect slavery, and to extend the dominion of this Government for that purpose or with that possibility. A great many in the North, who are not Republicans, but are what we call DOUGLAS men, have shown, at the last election, under something of trial and sacrifice, that they too, do not believe that the Constitution does or ought to extend slavery. I am not disposed to give up that opinion; I do not believe they are. I was not disposed to give up when six States were in the Union who are now out, as they say; and I am not disposed to give it up yet. Independently of pride of opinion, I do not believe that kind of sacrifice would accomplish any good result.

These are the reasons in brief which induced me to vote with regret against the propositions of the distinguished Senator from Kentucky in the earlier portion of this session. But now, we are within two days of adjournment. Propositions essentially variant in their character to those are submitted here; and I am asked: "Will you, in your representative capacity, submit these to your people for their decision, either to accept or reject?" Now, why not? I need not dwell upon the fact that, while we are a representative, we are at the same time a democratic Government. I will not shut my eyes to the fact that twenty States appeal to us; I will not shut my eyes to the fact that there is imminent danger of permanent dissolution; I will not shut my eyes to the fact that, though the Republican party is in a constitutional majority, it is not yet, and it never has been, in an actual majority; and I do not believe that it is possible for one-third of the people to coerce the opinion of two-thirds.

Mr. WILKINSON:--I wish to ask the gentleman a question.

Mr. BAKER:--Do, sir.

Mr. WILKINSON:--I understand him as saying that the whole of the twenty States which were assembled in this Peace Convention agreed to this proposition.

Mr. BAKER:--My distinguished friend was writing, instead of listening, when he understood that. I did not mean to say that, and I did not.

Mr. WILKINSON:--I understood the Senator to say that twenty States appealed to us.

Mr. BAKER:--Yes, sir; just as I say that the Government appeals to another Government, I do not say every individual in it; just as I say that Congress appeals to another Government, not every individual member of Congress; but I do say, in the words of the proposition before us, that "they," the Peace Convention, composed of the States recited, "have approved what is herewith submitted, and respectfully request that your honorable body will submit it to conventions in the States, as article thirteen of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States." That is all I said, or, at least, it is all I meant to say.

Now, sir, suppose every argument that the distinguished Senators from Virginia have brought to bear on this proposition was true: what then? Is that any reason why it should not be submitted to the people? Suppose they do not approve of it: what then? It is their business, not ours. Suppose they should: it is a measure of peace, of security, of union. Sir, I know, as you do, many of the members of that Convention. I have acted with them as Whigs in old times, and I wish they could come back. I know they have proved in old times, as they will prove again, that they love this Union to the very depth and core of their hearts. I do not propose to give them up; I do not propose to weaken them; I do admire, with my whole heart, the sacrifice of opinion which they make, and which is typified by the noble expression of the distinguished Senator from Kentucky to-day. Party or no party, North or no North, I, at least, will meet him half way. My State is very far distant. She had no members in that Convention. I do not know whether she will approve this measure; but I know it will neither hurt that State nor me to give her a chance to determine. I know very well that the Senators from Virginia do not approve it. That is the very reason I do. [Laughter.] If I was sure they would not think me guilty of disrespect, I would remind them of what was said by a distinguished man in old times. Phocion, in the last days of his Republic--and I hope in that respect, at least, there will be no parallel--Phocion was once making a speech to the Athenian people, and something he said excited very great applause. He turned around to gentlemen, friends near him, and said: "What foolish thing have I been saying, that these people praise me?" Sir, if Virginia, represented as she is to-day--not as I believe she really is--but if Virginia, represented as she is here to-day, and as she has been during this session, were to approve these propositions, I should doubt them very much indeed.

I was surprised, however, to hear some things that the distinguished Senator from Virginia--I do not know whether to call him junior or senior--said. I do not mean the Senator who spoke last. He [Mr. HUNTER] says that this proposition here is worse than the old Constitution. If that be really so, what in the world has he been complaining of so bitterly? He tells us, now, that under the old Constitution slavery was secure. Then, why do you grumble? He considers it as secure, not only wherever it is, but wherever it can go--nay, more than that; wherever the Stars and Stripes of the American Republic can float. I have been telling my people that, as a Republican, for a long while, and complaining of the Dred Scott decision; but he says slavery is secured. All the complaint that the other Senator from Virginia [Mr. MASON] makes, is against the decision of the courts in the free States we have been in the habit of making, which he insists are against the decision of the Supreme Court, constituted other than we wished it was. We have been in the habit of believing that one of the great evils we complained of was under the old Constitution, and that a new construction was given to it, alien to the intention, wish, construction, of our fathers; and we have complained that the Supreme Court was so constituted that it could not be reversed. We complained, as partisans, that now this Senate and the other House were so composed that we had no power in the Government, save through the President. Now, the Senator from Virginia indorses the whole of it, and says they were very well off, and did beautifully. Then why dissolve; why threaten; why make a Peace Conference necessary?

Mr. President, let us be just to these propositions. As a Republican, I give up something when I vote for them; but remember, sir, I am not voting for them now; I am only voting to submit them to my people; and I shall go before them, when the time comes, being governed in my opinion and advice as to whether they shall vote for them or not, as I see that Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Missouri, by their people, desire. To be frank, sir; if this proposition will suit the Border States, if there will be peace and union, and loyalty and brotherhood, with this, I will vote for it at the polls with all my heart and with all my soul; but if I see that the counsels of the Senators from Virginia shall prevail; if my noble friend from Tennessee [Mr. JOHNSON] shall be overwhelmed; if secession shall still grow in the public mind there; if they are determined, upon artificial causes of complaint, as I believe, still to unite their fate, their destiny, and their hope, with the extremest South, then, perceiving them to be of no avail, I shall refuse them. Therefore, at the polls at last, I shall be governed as an individual citizen by my conviction at the moment of what the ultimate result of these propositions will be; but I am not voting for that to-day. I am saying: "People of the United States, I submit it to you; twenty States demand it; the peace of the country requires it; there is dissolution in the very atmosphere; States have gone off; others threaten; the Queen of England upon her throne declares to the whole world her sympathy with our unfortunate condition; foreign Governments denote that there is danger to-day that the greatest Confederation the world has ever seen is to be parted in pieces, never to be reunited." Now, not what I wish, not what I want, not what I would have, but all that I can get, is before me. I know that I do no harm. If the people of Oregon do not like it, they can easily reject it. If the people of Pennsylvania will not have it, they can easily throw it aside. If they do not believe there is danger of dissolution, if they prefer dissolution, if they think they can compel fifteen States to remain in or come back, or if they believe they will not go out, let them reject it. I repeat again, it is their business, it is not mine.

But, sir, whether I vote for it at the polls or not, in voting for it here it may be said that I give up some of my principles. Mr. President, we sometimes mistake our opinions for our principles. I am appealed to often; it is said to me: "You believed in the Chicago platform." Suppose I did. "Well, this varies from the Chicago platform." Suppose it does. I stand to-day, as I believe, in the presence of greater events than those which attend the making of a President. I stand, as I believe, at least, in the presence of peace and war; and if it were true that I did violate the Chicago platform, the Chicago platform is not a Constitution of the United States to me. If events, if circumstances change, I will violate it, appealing to my conscience, to my country, and to my God, to justify me according to the motive. [Applause in the galleries.]

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FOSTER in the chair). Order will be preserved in the galleries, or they will be cleared.

Mr. BAKER:--Again, sir, let us see how, as a Republican, I give up any thing. First, suppose I did: I would give up a great deal to preserve a great Government; I would give up a great deal to be able to shake hands with Kentucky and Tennessee as friends for the rest of my life, as I have in all that has gone before. I would not be ashamed to give up. I would not at least be giving up to traitorous secession, such as Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina are guilty of to-day; but I would be giving up to loyal and affectionate brethren, who implore me for the love of a common Union to do something to satisfy the doubts and fears of their people. I can stand that; I will do it.

Again, sir; how much do I give up? I have said, as a Republican, that Congress has the power to prohibit slavery in all the Territories of the United States. I believe it to-day. Talking about giving up, there are a good many other people that give up something here. Gentlemen on the other side, who have been contending that Congress had no power whatever to prohibit slavery, acknowledge that they were mistaken; at any rate they go for it; they do prohibit it by law, by the Constitution itself. Therefore I am not the only one that gives up.

Again: I believe it is wrong, politically wrong--I am not now discussing the social and moral question--but I believe it to be politically very wrong to establish slavery in the name of freedom. Sir, twelve years ago or more, it was my fortune, perhaps, to wander in a foreign land beneath the Stars and Stripes of my country. I went there, as I think, impelled by motives of patriotism, perhaps having mingled with them not a little desire of adventure, love of change, and that feverish excitement for which we people of this country are always and everywhere remarkable; but I believe, if I know myself, that I did suppose I was doing something to repay the country for much that she had done for me. Sir, often and again, wandering sometimes beneath

"Where Orizaba's purpled summit shone,"

sometimes by the dark pestilential river that marks the boundary between the two countries, often and often have I wondered to myself whether I was wandering and suffering there to spread slavery over an unwilling people. I am not sorry to see that now that is rendered impossible. I am not sorry to see that it is impossible, first, in the course of events; but if it were not so, I know, if these propositions shall pass, that the foul blot of slavery never will be extended over one foot of territory to be stolen or conquered by the people of the United States.

But I am asked, "What do you say about New Mexico?" I will tell you in twenty words. I am an older Republican than many of those I see around me, who vote to-day differently from me; not a better but an older. I voted in 1850, on the floor of the other House, against the compromise measures of that year. I did so, among other reasons, because I was not willing that Utah and New Mexico should become slave or free according to the wishes of their people, believing as I did then (I have changed my opinion in some respects since), that that was not best for the whole country. Contrary to my wishes, those compromise measures prevailed. New Mexico is nominally now, I believe, a slave Territory; that is, to use the words of the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. SEWARD], there are some twenty slaves in the whole Territory. There they may, they probably will, remain. I submit to my people a proposition, that if they approve it as a compromise, as a concession, for peace for the Union, as it happens that that little Territory includes all that possibly can be slave territory, they will let it alone till the people are able and willing to make their own State constitution. That is all. Do I state it fairly? Does it go beyond that?

First, I contend that I give up but little. I give it up, as I understand, for purposes of freedom; and the distinguished Senators from Virginia agree with me. They say, in substance, that I am getting a great deal more than I give; and I confess, taking that view of the subject, at least in part, I wonder that a good many more of my Republican friends do not go with me.