Chapter VI: Conscience

The gradual character of the evolution of Altruism--Paul
Friedmann on the genesis of benevolence--The observable growth
of Altruism from Egoism in the individual--Human society as
necessitated by increase of the species--Criticism of Darwin's
form of statement on this point--The mixed character of the
motives which lead to advancement--The necessity of evolution,
primal organisms once having come into existence--General
features of the moral evolution in the human race--Personal and
Social Virtues--Racial evolution as subordinate to the evolution
of the species--Criticism of Stephen--The theory of the
connection of Intelligence and Morality--Testimony of Maudsley,
Lombroso, Dugdale--The advantages of conformity to social
standards--Definition of "advantage"--Arguments from the general
direction of social advancement--The direction of evolution in
the race as a whole and in the individual not always the
same--Conclusion: the connection of Intelligence with Morality
not invariable--Definition of Morality--Identification of
Morality with Justice--Special rules of morality--Morality as
inward--The virtue of Truthfulness--Necessity of individual
sacrifice--Dependence of Justice on certain general features of
particular circumstances---Definition of Conscience--The mixed
character of remorse--The theory of Conscience as a special
sense--Criticism of Utilitarianism--Criticism of some forms of
reaction against Utilitarianism--The terms "higher" and "lower"
as applied to pleasures and "ends"--The idea of a "return to
Nature"--The objection to Evolutional Ethics on the ground of
degradation--Struggle as an element of virtue--The evolution of
social rewards and punishments--Criticism of the objection to
state-punishment on the ground of Determinism--Morality and the
question of the Transcendental--Conscience in other species--The
contempt for "mere habit"--The concepts of Cause and Effect as
applied to the moral evolution 423-465