Chapter XXX: Section 16: That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, (4)

Mr. Spaight is a worthy Man, of some abilities, and fortune. Without possessing a Genius to render him brilliant, he is able to discharge any public trust that his Country may repose in him. He is about 31 years of age....

South Carolina.

Jno. Rutledge, Chs. Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, and Pierce Butler Esquires.

Mr. Rutledge is one of those characters who was highly mounted at the commencement of the late revolution; his reputation in the first Congress gave him a distinguished rank among the American Worthies. He was bred to the Law, and now acts as one of the Chancellors of South Carolina. This Gentleman is much famed in his own State as an Orator, but in my opinion he is too rapid in his public speaking to be denominated an agreeable Orator. He is undoubtedly a man of abilities, and a Gentleman of distinction and fortune. Mr. Rutledge was once Governor of South Carolina. He is about 48 years of age.

Mr. Chas. Cotesworth Pinckney is a Gentleman of Family and fortune....

Mr. Charles Pinckney is a young Gentleman of most promising talents. He is, altho only 24 years of age, in possession of a very great variety of knowledge. Government, Law, History, and Philosophy are his favorite studies, but he is intimately acquainted with many species of polite learning....

* * * * *

For Georgia.

Wm. Few, Abraham Baldwin, Wm. Pierce, and Wm. Houstoun Esqrs.

Mr. Few possesses a strong natural Genius, and from application has acquired some knowledge of legal matters; and he practices at the bar of Georgia, and speaks tolerably well in the Legislature. He has been twice a Member of Congress, and served in that capacity with fidelity to his State, and honor to himself. Mr. Few is about 35 years of age.

Mr. Baldwin is a Gentleman of superior abilities, and joins in a public debate with great art and eloquence. Having laid the foundation of a compleat classical education at Harvard College, he pursues every other study with ease. He is well acquainted with Books and Characters, and has an accommodating turn of mind, which enables him to gain the confidence of Men, and to understand them. He is a practicing Attorney in Georgia, and has been twice a Member of Congress. Mr. Baldwin is about 38 years of age.

Mr. Houstoun is an Attorney at Law. ... He is a Gentleman of Family, and was educated in England. As to his legal or political knowledge, he has very little to boast of. Nature seems to have done more for his corporeal than mental powers. His person is striking....

161. One Day in the Philadelphia Convention

Madison's _Journal_. The day chosen was the closing day of debate
on the "Connecticut Compromise" proposition, when the Convention
came near disruption. For the narrative, cf. _American History and
Government_, # 203.

SATURDAY, JUNE 30th

_In Convention,_--Mr. BREARLY [New Jersey][153] moved that the President write to the Executive of New Hampshire, informing it that the business depending before the Convention was of such a nature as to require the immediate attendance of the Deputies of that State. In support of his motion, he observed that the difficulties of the subject, and the diversity of opinions called for all the assistance we could possibly obtain. (It was well understood that the object was to add New Hampshire to the number of States opposed to the doctrine of proportional representation, which it was presumed, from her relative size, she must be adverse to.)

Mr. PATTERSON [New Jersey] seconded the motion.

Mr. RUTLEDGE [South Carolina] could see neither the necessity nor propriety of such a measure. They are not unapprised of the meeting, and can attend if they choose.

Rhode Island might as well be urged to appoint and send deputies. Are we to suspend the business until the Deputies arrive? If we proceed, he hoped all the great points would be adjusted before the letter could produce its effect.

Mr. KING [Massachusetts] said he had written more than once as a private correspondent, and the answer gave him every reason to expect that State would be represented very shortly, if it should be so at all. Circumstances of a personal nature had hitherto prevented it. A letter could have no effect.

Mr. WILSON [Pennsylvania] wished to know, whether it would be consistent with rule or reason of secrecy, to communicate to New Hampshire that the business was of such a nature as the motion described. It would spread a great alarm. Besides he doubted the propriety of soliciting any State on the subject, the meeting being merely voluntary.

On motion of Mr. BREARLY.

New York, New Jersey, aye--2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no--5; Maryland divided; Pennsylvania, Delaware, Georgia, not on the floor.

The motion of Mr. ELLSWORTH being resumed, for allowing each State an equal vote in the second branch,--[154]

Mr. WILSON did not expect such a motion after the establishment of the contrary principle in the first branch; and considering the reasons which would oppose it, even if an equal vote had been allowed in the first branch. The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. ELLSWORTH) had pronounced, that if the motion should not be acceded to, of all the States north of Pennsylvania one only would agree to any General Government. He entertained more favourable hopes of Connecticut and of the other Northern States. He hoped the alarms exceeded their cause, and that they would not abandon a country to which they were bound by so many strong and endearing ties. But should the deplored event happen, it would neither stagger his sentiments nor his duty. _If the minority of the people of America refuse to coalesce with the majority on just and proper principles; if a separation must take place, it could never happen on better grounds._ The votes of yesterday against the just principle of representation were as twenty-two to ninety of the people of America. Taking the opinions to be the same on this point, and he was sure, if there was any room for change, it could not be on the side of the majority, the question will be, shall less than one-fourth of the United States withdraw themselves from the Union, or shall more than three-fourths renounce the inherent, indisputable and unalienable rights of men, in favor of the artificial system of States? If issue must be joined, it was on this point he would choose to join it. The gentleman from Connecticut, in supposing that the preponderance secured to the majority in the first branch had removed the objections to an equality of votes in the second branch for the security of the minority, narrowed the case extremely. Such an equality will enable the minority to control, in all cases whatsoever, the sentiments and interests of the majority. Seven States will control six: seven States, according to the estimates that had been used, composed twenty-four ninetieths of the whole people. It would be in the power, then, of less than one-third to overrule two-thirds, whenever a question should happen to divide the States in that manner....

Mr. ELLSWORTH. The capital objection of Mr. WILSON, "that the minority will rule the majority," is not true. =_The power is given to the few to save them from being destroyed by the many._= If an equality of votes had been given to them in both branches, the objection might have weight. Is it a novel thing that the few should have a check on the many? Is it not the case in the British Constitution, the wisdom of which so many gentlemen have united in applauding? Have not the House of Lords, who form so small a proportion of the nation, a negative on the laws, as a necessary defence of their peculiar rights against the encroachments of the Commons? No instance of a confederacy has existed in which an equality of voices has not been exercised by the members of it. We are running from one extreme to another. We are razing the foundations of the building, when we need only repair the roof. No salutary measure has been lost for want of _a majority of the States_ to favor it. If security be all that the great States wish for, the first branch secures them. The danger of combinations among them is not imaginary. Although no particular abuses could be foreseen by him the possibility of them would be sufficient to alarm him. But he could easily conceive cases in which they might result from such combinations. Suppose, that, in pursuance of some commercial treaty or arrangement, three or four free ports and no more were to be established, would not combinations be formed in favor of Boston, Philadelphia, and some port of the Chesapeake? A like concert might be formed in the appointment of the great offices. He appealed again to =_the obligations of the Federal compact_= [Articles of Confederation] =_in force_=, and which had been entered =_into with so much solemnity; persuading himself that some regard would still be paid to the plighted faith under which each State, small as well as great, held an equal right of suffrage in the general councils_=. His remarks were not the result of partial or local views. The State he represented (Connecticut) held a middle rank.

Mr. MADISON did justice to the able and close reasoning of Mr. ELLSWORTH, but must observe that it did not always accord with itself. On another occasion, the large States were described by him as the aristocratic States, ready to oppress the small. Now the small are the House of Lords, requiring a negative to defend them against the more numerous Commons. Mr. ELLSWORTH had also erred in saying that no instance had existed in which confederated states had not retained to themselves a perfect equality of suffrage. Passing over the German system, in which the King of Prussia has nine voices, he reminded Mr. ELLSWORTH of the Lycian confederacy, in which the component members had votes proportioned to their importance, and which Montesquieu recommends as the fittest model for that form of government. Had the fact been as stated by Mr. ELLSWORTH, it would have been of little avail to him, or rather would have strengthened the arguments against him; the history and fate of the several confederacies, modern as well as ancient, demonstrating some radical vice in their structure. In reply to the appeal of Mr. ELLSWORTH to the faith plighted in the existing federal compact, he remarked, that the party claiming from others an adherence to a common engagement, ought at least to be guiltless itself of a violation. Of all the States, however, Connecticut was perhaps least able to urge this plea. Besides the various omissions to perform the stipulated acts, from which no State was free, the Legislature of that State had, by a pretty recent vote, _positively refused_ to pass a law for complying with the requisitions of Congress, and transmitted a copy of the vote to Congress.[155] It was urged, he said, continually, that an equality of votes in the second branch was not only necessary to secure the small, but would be perfectly safe to the large ones; whose majority in the first branch was an effectual bulwark. But notwithstanding this apparent defence, the majority of States might still injure the majority of the people. ... He admitted that every peculiar interest, whether in any class of citizens or any description of States, ought to be secured as far as possible. Wherever there is danger of attack, there ought to be given a constitutional power of defence. =But he contended that the States were divided into different interests, not by their difference of size, but other circumstances; the most material of which resulted partly from climate, but principally from the effects of their having or not having slaves. These two causes concurred in forming the great division of interests in the United States. It did not lie between the large and small States. It lay between the Northern and Southern. ...=

Mr. ELLSWORTH assured the House, that, whatever might be thought of the Representatives of Connecticut, the State was entirely Federal in her disposition. He appealed to her great exertions during the war, in supplying both men and money. _The muster-rolls would show she had more troops in the field than Virginia._[156] If she had been delinquent, it had been from inability, and not more so than other States.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. MADISON animadverted on the delinquency of the States, when his object required him to prove that the constitution of Congress was faulty. Congress is not to blame for the faults of the States. Their measures have been right, and the only thing wanting has been a further power in Congress to render them effectual.

Mr. DAVIE [North Carolina] was much embarrassed, and wished for explanations. The Report of the Committee [of the Whole], allowing the Legislatures to choose the Senate, and establishing a proportional representation in it, seemed to be impracticable. There will, according to this rule, be ninety members in the outset, and the number will increase as new States are added. It was impossible that so numerous a body could possess the activity and other qualities required in it. Were he to vote on the comparative merits of the Report, as it stood, and the amendment, he should be constrained to prefer the latter.... Under this view of the subject, he could not vote for any plan for the Senate yet proposed. He thought that, in general, there were extremes on both sides. _We were partly federal, partly national, in our union_; and he did not see why the Government might not in some respects operate on the States, in others on the people.

Mr. WILSON admitted the question concerning the number of Senators to be embarrassing. If the smallest States be allowed one, and the others in proportion, the Senate will certainly be too numerous. He looked forward to the time when the smallest States will contain a hundred thousand souls at least. Let there be then one Senator in each, for every hundred thousand souls, and let the States not having that number of inhabitants be allowed one. He was willing himself to submit to this temporary concession to the small States; and threw out the idea as a ground of compromise....

Doctor FRANKLIN. The diversity of opinions turns on two points. If a proportional representation takes place, the small States contend that their liberties will be in danger. If an equality of votes is to be put in its place, the large States say their money will be in danger. When a broad table is to be made, and the edges of planks do not fit, the artist takes a little from both, and makes a good joint. In like manner, here, both sides must part from some of their demands, in order that they may join in some accommodating proposition. He had prepared one which he would read, that it might lie on the table for consideration. The proposition was in the words following:

"That the Legislatures of the several States shall choose and send
an equal number of delegates, namely ..., who are to compose the
second branch of the General Legislature.

"That in all cases or questions wherein the sovereignty of
individual States may be affected, or whereby their authority over
their own citizens may be diminished, or the authority of the
General Government within the several States augmented, each State
shall have equal suffrage.

"That in the appointment of all civil officers of the General
Government, in the election of whom the second branch may by the
constitution have part, each State shall have equal suffrage.

"That in fixing the salaries of such officers, and in all
allowances for public services, and generally in all appropriations
and disposition of money to be drawn out of the general Treasury;
and in all laws for supplying that Treasury, the Delegates of the
several States shall have suffrage in proportion to the sums which
their respective States do actually contribute to the Treasury."

Where a ship had many owners, this was the rule of deciding on her expedition. He had been one of the ministers from this country to France during the joint war, and would have been very glad if allowed to vote in distributing the money to carry it on.

Mr. KING observed, that the simple question was, whether each State should have an equal vote in the second branch; that it must be apparent to those gentlemen who liked neither the motion for this quality, nor the Report as it stood, that the Report was as susceptible of melioration as the motion; that a reform would be nugatory and nominal only, if we should make another Congress of the proposed Senate; that if the adherence to an equality of votes was fixed and unalterable, there could not be less obstinacy on the other side; and that =_we were in fact cut asunder already, and it was in vain to shut our eyes against it_=. That he was, however, filled with astonishment, that, if we were convinced that every _man_ in America was secured in all his rights, we should be ready to sacrifice this substantial good to the phantom of _State_ sovereignty. That his feelings were more harrowed and his fears more agitated for his country than he could express; that he conceived this to be the last opportunity of providing for its liberty and happiness: that he could not, therefore, but repeat his amazement, that when a just government, founded on a fair representation of the _People_ of America, was within our reach, we should renounce the blessing, from an attachment to the ideal freedom and importance of _States_. That should this wonderful illusion continue to prevail, his mind was prepared for any event, rather than sit down under a Government founded on a vicious principle of representation, and which must be as short-lived as it would be unjust. He might prevail on himself to accede to some such expedient as had been hinted by Mr. WILSON; but =_he never could listen to an equality of votes, as proposed in the motion_=.

Mr. DAYTON. =_When assertion is given for proof, and terror substituted for argument, he presumed they would have no effect, however eloquently spoken._= It should have been shown that the evils we have experienced have proceeded from the equality now objected to; and that the seeds of dissolution for the State Governments are not sown in the General Government. He considered the system on the table [Virginia Plan] as a novelty, an amphibious monster; and was persuaded that it never would be received by the people.

Mr. MARTIN [Maryland] =_would never confederate, if it could not be done on just principles_= [_i.e._, giving small States equal voice in at least one House].

Mr. MADISON would acquiesce in the concession hinted by Mr. WILSON, on condition that a due independence should be given to the Senate. The plan in its present shape makes the Senate absolutely dependent on the States. The Senate, therefore, is only another edition of Congress. He knew the faults of that body, and had used a bold language against it. Still he would preserve the State rights as carefully as the trial by jury.

Mr. BEDFORD [Delaware] contended, that there was no middle way between a perfect consolidation, and a mere confederacy of the States. The first is out of the question; and in the latter they must continue, if not perfectly, yet _equally_, sovereign. If political societies possess ambition, avarice, and all the other passions which render them formidable to each other, ought we not to view them in this light here? Will not the same motives operate in America as elsewhere? If any gentleman doubts it, let him look at the votes. Have they not been dictated by interest, by ambition? =_Are not the large States evidently seeking to aggrandize themselves at the expense of the small?_= They think, no doubt, that they have right on their side, but interest has blinded their eyes. Look at Georgia. Though a small State at present, she is actuated by the prospect of soon being a great one. South Carolina is actuated both by present interest, and future prospects. She hopes, too, to see the other States cut down to her own dimensions. North Carolina has the same motives of present and future interest. Virginia follows. Maryland is not on that side of the question. Pennsylvania has a direct and future interest. Massachusetts has a decided and palpable interest in the part she takes. ... =_The three large States have a common interest to bind them together in commerce._= But whether a combination, as we supposed, shall take place among them, in either case the small States must be ruined. We must, like Solon, make such a government as the people will approve. Will the smaller States ever agree to the proposed degradation of them? It is not true that the people will not agree to enlarge the powers of the present Congress. The language of the people has been, that Congress ought to have the power of collecting an impost, and of coercing the States where it may be necessary. On the first point they have been explicit, and, in a manner, unanimous in their declarations. And must they not agree to this, and similar measures, if they ever mean to discharge their engagements? The little States are willing to observe their engagements, _=but will meet the large ones on no ground but that of the Confederation. We have been told, with dictatorial air, this is the last moment for a fair trial in favor of a good government. It will be the last, indeed, if the propositions reported from the Committee go forth to the people. He was under no apprehensions. The large States dare not dissolve the Confederation.= If they do, the small ones will find some foreign ally, of more honour and good faith, who will take them by the hand, and do them justice._ He did not mean, by this, to intimidate or alarm. It was a natural consequence, which ought to be avoided by enlarging the Federal powers, not annihilating the Federal system. This is what the people expect. All agree in the necessity of a more efficient government, and why not make such an one as they desire?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Under a National Government, he should participate in the national security, as remarked by Mr. KING; but that was all. What he wanted was domestic happiness. The National Government could not descend to the local objects on which this depended. It could only embrace objects of a general nature. He turned his eyes, therefore, for the preservation of his rights, to the State Governments. From these alone he could derive the greatest happiness he expects in this life. His happiness depends on their existence, as much as a new-born infant on its mother for nourishment. If this reasoning was not satisfactory, he had nothing to add that could be so.

Mr. KING was for preserving the States in a subordinate degree, and as far as they could be necessary for the purposes stated by Mr. ELLSWORTH. He did not think a full answer had been given to those who apprehended a dangerous encroachment on their jurisdictions. ... He could not sit down without taking some notice of the language of the honorable gentleman from Delaware (Mr. BEDFORD). It was not he [King] that had uttered a dictatorial language. This intemperance had marked the honorable gentleman himself. It was not he [King] who, with a vehemence unprecedented in that House, had declared himself ready to turn his hopes from our common country, and court the protection of some foreign hand. This, too, was the language of the honorable member himself. He was grieved that such an expression had dropped from his lips. The gentleman could only excuse it to himself on the score of passion. For himself, _whatever might be his distress, he would never court relief from a foreign power_.

Adjourned.

[The vote, taken on the opening of the next session, is recorded as
follows:

"_In Convention_,--On the question for allowing each State one vote
in the second branch, as moved by Mr. ELLSWORTH, it was lost, by
an equal division of votes,--Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, aye--5; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, no--5; Georgia, divided (Mr.
Baldwin aye, Mr. Houston, no)."

This was a tie, intentionally made so by the Georgia delegate who
voted last. For this and for the final victory of the "Compromise,"
cf. _American History and Government_, # 203.]

FOOTNOTES:

[150] This was an old royal form, now used by the _State_ instead of by the King.

[151] Some States dated: "in the year of the Sovereignty and Independence of the United States the Eleventh." Others were even more specific than Georgia; as, "in the Eleventh year of the Independence of the Delaware State"; or, as in New York,--"the Eleventh year of the Independence of the Said State."

[152] Later, Mason became again convinced there was much such danger. Cf. No. 161 below.

[153] Observe the motion was a "small-State" move, opposed by the "large States" in debate as in vote.

[154] This motion had been made the day before. The Convention had previously agreed that voting in the "first branch" should be in proportion to population.

[155] This begins the rather unhappy "personalities" of the debate.

[156] Cf. note above.

XXVIII. RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION[157]

162. George Mason's Objections to the Constitution, 1787

Kate Mason Rowland's _Life of George Mason_ (1892), II, 387-390.

Mason had been one of the most enthusiastic of the Philadelphia
Convention in its early stages, writing to his son, after a few
weeks, that he would "bury my bones in Philadelphia" rather than
injure the business by leaving prematurely, though his private
affairs were pressing. But he was more democratic than the
Convention, and, before its close, he came to look upon the results
with suspicion. He refused to sign the completed constitution,
and afterward he opposed its ratification in Virginia. Mason was
the chief author of the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 (No. 136
above). Cf. also No. 163.

_There is no Declaration of Rights_, and, the laws of the general government being paramount to the laws and constitution of the several States, the Declaration of Rights in the separate States are no security. _Nor are the people secured even in the enjoyment of the benefit of the common law._

In the House of Representatives there is not the substance but the shadow only of representation; which can never produce proper information in the legislature, or inspire confidence in the people; the laws will therefore be generally made by men little concerned in, and unacquainted with their effects and consequences.

The Senate have the power of altering all money bills, and of originating appropriations of money, and the salaries of the officers of their own appointment, in conjunction with the president of the United States, although they are not the representatives of the people or amenable to them.

These with their other great powers (viz.: their power in the appointment of ambassadors and all public officers; in making treaties, and in trying all impeachments; their influence upon and connection with the supreme Executive from these causes; their duration of office and their being a constantly existing body, almost continually sitting; joined with their being one complete branch of the legislature) will destroy any balance in the government, and enable them to accomplish what usurpations they please upon the rights and liberties of the people.

The Judiciary of the United States is so constructed and extended, as to absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the several States; thereby rendering law as tedious, intricate and expensive, and justice as unattainable, by a great part of the community, as in England, and enabling the rich to oppress and ruin the poor.

The President of the United States has no Constitutional Council, a thing unknown in any safe and regular government. He will therefore be unsupported by proper information and advice, and will generally be directed by minions and favorites; or he will become a tool to the Senate--or a Council of State will grow out of the principal officers of the great departments; the worst and most dangerous of all ingredients for such a Council in a free country. From this fatal defect has arisen the improper power of the Senate in the appointment of public officers, and the alarming dependence and connection between that branch of the legislature and the supreme Executive.

Hence also sprung that unnecessary officer the Vice-President, who for want of other employment is made president of the Senate, thereby dangerously blending the executive and legislative powers, besides always giving to some one of the States an unnecessary and unjust preeminence over the others.

The President of the United States has the unrestrained power of granting pardons for treason, which may be sometimes exercised to screen from punishment those whom he had secretly instigated to commit the crime, and thereby prevent a discovery of his own guilt.

By declaring all treaties supreme laws of the land, the Executive and the Senate have, in many cases, an exclusive power of legislation; which might have been avoided by proper distinctions with respect to treaties, and requiring the assent of the House of Representatives, where it could be done with safety.

By requiring only a majority to make all commercial and navigation laws, the five Southern States, whose produce and circumstances are totally different from that of the eight Northern and Eastern States, may be ruined, for such rigid and premature regulations may be made as will enable the merchants of the Northern and Eastern States not only to demand an exorbitant freight, but to monopolize the purchase of the commodities at their own price, for many years, to the great injury of the landed interest, and impoverishment of the people; and the danger is the greater as the gain on one side will be in proportion to the loss on the other. Whereas requiring two-thirds of the members present in both Houses would have produced mutual moderation, promoted the general interest, and removed an insuperable objection to the adoption of this government.

=_Under their own construction of the general clause, at the end of the enumerated powers_=,[158] the Congress may grant monopolies in trade and commerce, constitute new crimes, inflict unusual and severe punishments, and extend their powers as far as they shall think proper; so that the State legislatures have no security for the powers now presumed to remain to them, or the people for their rights.

_There is no declaration of any kind, for preserving the liberty of the press, or the trial by jury in civil causes; nor against the danger of standing armies in time of peace._

The State legislatures are restrained from laying export duties on their own produce.

Both the general legislature and the State legislature are expressly prohibited making _ex post facto_ laws; though there never was nor can be a legislature but must and will make such laws, when necessity and the public safety require them; which will hereafter be a breach of all the constitutions in the Union, and afford precedents for other innovations.

=This government will set out a moderate aristocracy=: it is at present impossible to foresee whether it will, in its operation, produce a monarchy, or a corrupt, tyrannical aristocracy; it will most probably vibrate some years between the two, and then terminate in the one or the other.

The general legislature is restrained from prohibiting the further importation of slaves for twenty odd years; though such importations render the United States weaker, more vulnerable, and less capable of defence.

163. Mason's Explanation of the Preparation of his "Objections" (and Accusation of "Railroading" through the Plan of the Majority)

_George Mason to Thomas Jefferson_ [_in France_]

_Records of the Federal Convention_, III, 304-305.

VIRGINIA, GUNSTON HALL, May 26, 1788.

I make no Doubt that You have long ago received Copies of the new Constitution. ... Upon the most mature consideration I was capable of, and from Motives of sincere Patriotism, I was under the Necessity of refusing my Signature, as one of the Virginia Delegates; and drew up some general Objections; which I intended to offer, by way of Protest; but was discouraged from doing so, by the precipitate and intemperate, not to say indecent, Manner, in which the Business was conducted during the last week of the Convention, after the Patrons of this New Plan formed they had a decided Majority in their Favour: which was obtained by a Compromise between the Eastern and the two Southern States, to permit the latter to continue the Importation of Slaves for twenty odd years; a more favorite Object with them than the Liberty and Happiness of the People.

164. An Unfriendly Account of Hancock's Support of the Constitution in the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention of 1788

_Writings of Laco_, VII, 23 ff. (a series of "Letters" published by
Stephen Higginson and other Federalists, in 1789, to defeat Hancock
in his candidacy for reëlection to the governorship). Higginson
was a Boston merchant, and a leading Federalist. The "plan" he
refers to as placed in Hancock's hands, favored the adoption of the
Constitution with a list of amendments to be adopted later by the
new government.

There are men in every free society, who have not a common interest with the community at large; and who rely wholly on the popular affection in their favour, to give them promotion and support in publick life. ... Without abilities to make them really useful in publick life, and devoid of principles or merits that can command respect, they have no dependence but upon popular attention to bring them into view; and, having been long attentive to the popular pulse, and always acquainted with the darling object with the multitude for the time, they rarely fail to touch the right string, and to make the people subserve their own selfish and private views. ... There cannot be found within the compass of our memory, an instance, so strongly verifying the preceding observation, as that of Mr. H. and his adhering dependents....

... The course of his conduct from his reassuming the chair, to the meeting of our State Convention, for considering and adopting the new form of government for the Union, was nothing more than a renewed exhibition of the same levities, and a uniform preference of his own private interest, to that of the public.

A scene now opens upon us, very interesting and important:--The objects which [were] then presented for our consideration, were so novel, and of such magnitude, as deservedly engrossed the feelings and the attention of every man. No one could remain mute and indifferent, while the question as to the New Constitution was pending; and every one, who felt no other bias than a regard to the safety and happiness of our country, ... was most anxiously solicitous for its adoption. But the popular demagogues, and those [who] were very much embarrassed in their affairs, united to oppose it with all their might; and they laboured incessantly, night and day, to alarm the simple and credulous, by insinuating, that, however specious its appearance, and that of its advocates, tyranny and vassalage would result from its principles. The former of those descriptions were conscious, that a stable and efficient government would deprive them of all future importance, or support from the publick; and the latter of them knew, that nothing but weakness and convulsions in government could screen them from payment of their debts. How far Mr. H. was influenced by either, or both of those motives, it is not easy to determine; but no one, who recollects his general habits, who knows his situation and views, and was acquainted with the open conversation and conduct of his cabinet counsellors, can have a doubt of his being opposed to it. We all know, that Mr. Quondam, and Mr. Changeling, as well as the _once venerable old Patriot_ [Samuel Adams], who, by a notable defection, has lately thrown himself into the arms of Mr. H. in violation of every principle; and for the paltry privilege of sharing in his smiles, has, at the eve of life, cast an indelible stain over his former reputation--it is well known, I say, that these men do not dare to speak in publick a language opposite to that of their patron; and it is equally notorious, that they were open in their opposition to the Constitution--They even went so far as to vilify its compilers, that they might thence draw an argument to support their suggestions of its containing the seeds of latent tyranny and oppression. They endeavoured by every possible mean in their power, to create a popular clamour against the Constitution; but they failed in their attempt; and Mr. H. and his friends were obliged, upon their own principles to grow more cautious in their opposition. The good sense of the _Mechanicks of Boston_ had produced some manly and spirited resolutions, which effectually checked Mr. H. and his followers in their opposition to the Constitution; and eventually occasioned _four_ votes in its favour, which otherwise would have been most certainly against it. Had those resolutions not made their appearance, Mr. H. and three others of our Delegates would have been in the negative; but it was thought necessary by them, after they had appeared, to vote in favour of it. Having settled this point, the next thing was to do it with a good grace, and to profit as much by it as they could; and Mr. H. accordingly intimated to the advocates for the adoption, that he would appear in its favour, if they would make it worth his while. This intimation was given through a common friend, who assured the friends of the Constitution, that nothing more would be required on the part of Mr. H. than a promise to support him in the chair at the next election. This promise, though a bitter pill, was agreed to be given; for such was the state of things, that they were very much afraid to decide upon the question, whilst he was opposed to it. The famous conciliatory proposition of Mr. H. as it was called, was then prepared by the advocates, and adopted by him; but the truth is, he never was consulted about it, nor knew its contents, before it was handed to him to bring forward in Convention. At the appointed time, Mr. H. with all the parade of an Arbiter of States, came out with the motion, not only in the words, but the very original paper that was given him; and, with a confidence astonishing to all who were in the secret, he called it his own, and said it was the result of his own reflections on the subject, in the short intervals of ease which he had enjoyed, during a most painful disorder. In this pompous and farcical manner did he make that famous proposition, upon which he and his adherents have arrogated so much; but neither he nor they have any other merit in the case, than an attempt to deceive both parties can fairly entitle them. For, at the very time he was buoying up the hopes of the advocates, he was assuring the opposers of the Constitution, by his emissaries, that he was really adverse to it; and upon the strictest scrutiny we cannot find that any one vote was gained by his being ostensibly in favour of it. The votes of the Old Patriot, and Mr. Changeling, and Mr. Joyce, jun. we know were determined in its favour by the resolutions of the Mechanicks; but the votes of many others, who used implicitly to follow Mr. H. were in the negative, which were counted upon by the friends of the Constitution, as being certain on their side. This is a strong confirmation that Mr. H. was then playing a game, which these people well understood; and indeed they, some of them, explicitly declared it at the time. His subsequent conduct, in regard to amendments, is a clear proof also, that by appearing in its favour in Convention, he did not mean to support it; and that he was not serious when he declared his proposition to be only conciliatory, and not to remedy any defects existing in his mind in the constitution as reported, which he explicitly declared at the time was the case.

165. The Federal Constitution

Recommended by the Philadelphia Convention to the States, September
17, 1787; ratified by the ninth State, June 21, 1788; in effect,
April 30, 1789 (_American History and Government_, ## 210, 212).
The text is that authorized by the Department of State and
printed in the _Revised Statutes_ (1878), except for the footnote
references and the brackets used in a few instances to inclose
portions of the document no longer effective, and for the omission
of numbers for the paragraphs. Interpolated explanatory matter is
in the same type as this paragraph, and is placed within marks of
parenthesis.

We the People[159] of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare,[160] and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION for the United States of America.

ARTICLE I

SECTION 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.