Chapter XI: Book II: ======== (5)

So far as this goes, a government, instead of checking, accelerates the decline of a people; but, as this is not a natural cause of decline, as it is not universal or necessary, it is to be considered with due

--- {147} The Chinese, and, in general, the nations of Asia have not been considered as included in this inquiry. The Chinese, in particular, are a people in a permanent situation: they do not increase in riches, and they seem to have no tendency to decline. Their laws and mode of education and living remain the same. -=-

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regard to particular circumstances. In general, we may say, that, in place of inviting the lower classes to pass their time in drinking, by the innumerable receptacles that there are for those who are addicted to that vice, every impediment should be put in the way. Drinking is a vice, the disposition to which grows with its gratification; most other avocations (for drinking in moderation is only such) have no tendency of the sort. Those enjoyments which have a tendency to degenerate into vice should be kept under some check; those which have no such tendency ought to be encouraged; for, where the main and general mass of the population of a country is corrupted, it is impossible to prevent its decline. If it remains uncorrupted, the matter is very easy, or, more properly, it may be said that prosperity is the natural consequence.

Manners will always be found of more consequence than laws, and they depend, in a great measure, on the wise regulations of government in every country.

Not only do most governments profit by laying the vices of the people under contribution; but, as revenue is, by a very false rule, taken as a criterion from which the prosperity of a nation may be estimated, the very evil that brings on decay serves to disguise its approach. A nation may be irretrievably undone, before it is perceived that it has any tendency to decline; it is, therefore, unwise for governments to wait till they see the effects of decay, and then to hope to counteract them; they must look before-hand, and prevent, otherwise all their exertions will prove ineffectual. [end of page #174]

CHAP. X.

_Of the external Causes of Decline.--the Envy and Enmity of other Nations.--their Efforts, both in Peace and War, to bring Wealthy Nations down to their level_.

The external causes of the decline of nations are much more simple in themselves than the internal ones, besides which, their action is more visible; the way of operation is such as to excite attention, and has made them thought more worthy of being recorded.

The origin of envy and enmity are the same. The possession of what is desirable, in a superior degree, is the cause of envy. That occasions injurious and unjust proceedings, and enmity is the consequence, though both originated in the same feeling at first, they assume distinct characteristics in the course of time.

The desire of possession, in order to enjoy, is the cause of enmity and envy; and all the crimes of nations, and of individuals, have the same common origin.

It follows, as a natural consequence, arising from this state of things, that those nations which enjoyed a superior degree of wealth, became the objects of the envy of others. If that wealth was accompanied by sufficient power for its protection, then the only way to endeavour to share it was by imitation; but if the wealth was found unprotected, then conquest or violence was always considered as the most ready way of obtaining possession.

The wandering Arabs, who are the only nations that profess robbery at the present day, (by land,) follow still the same maxim with regard to those whose wealth they mean to enjoy. If too powerful to be compelled by force to give up what they have got, they traffic and barter with the merchants of a caravan; but if they find themselves able to take, they never give themselves the trouble to adopt the legitimate but less expeditious method of plunder and robbery =sic=. [end of page #175]

As it has been found that wealth operates, by degrees, in destroying the bravery of a people, after a certain time, so it happens that, in the common course of things, a moment arrives when it is considered safe, by some one power or other, to attack the wealthy nation, and partake of its riches; thus it was that the cities of Tyre and of Babylon were attacked by Alexander; and thus it was that his successors, in their turn, were attacked and conquered by the Romans; and, again, the Romans themselves, by the barbarous nations of the north.

Besides those great revolutions, of which the consequences were permanent, there have been endless and innumerable struggles for the possession of wealth, amongst different nations; but the real and leading causes are so uniform, and so evident, that there is not a shadow of a doubt left on that subject.

Mr. Burke had good reason to say that the external causes were much easier traced, and more simple, than the internal ones; for, the Romans excepted, the instances of rich nations attacking and conquering poor ones are very rare indeed.

The Romans had erected their republic on a different plan from that of any other; they had neither arts, industry, nor territory of their own, and they conquered nations upon speculation, and for the sake of civilizing the people, and making them contribute revenue; how they were successful has been explained. But even the Romans would not have attacked poor nations, if they had been, at an earlier period, possessed of the means of attacking those that were wealthy.

Necessity obliged them to begin with Italy: their safety made them defend themselves against the Gauls, and, till they had a navy, it was impracticable to carry their conquests into Asia or Africa; but, after they had conquered Carthage, they lost very little time in attacking Egypt, and those countries occupied by the successors of Alexander.

The taking of Constantinople was the last decided victory of this sort, and in nothing but time and circumstance did it differ from the others; in all the great outlines it was exactly the same. [end of page #176]

The effeminacy and luxury of the rich, those interior causes, of which we have already spoken, always give facility to those efforts which envy and avarice excite.

The rivalship, in time of peace, is a contest confined to modern nations; or, at least, but little known to the ancients. Indeed, it is only amongst commercial nations that it can exist. There can be no competition in agriculture; and, indeed, it is only in war, or in commerce, that nations can interfere with each other.

The Phoenicians were the only commercial people of antiquity. Carthage was the colony, and received the Indian produce at second hand. It was in no way a rival.

When Solomon mounted on the throne of his father David, he applied himself to commerce; but the wisdom and power he possessed were such as bore down all opposition during his reign. Having married the daughter of the King of Egypt, who assisted him in several conquests, he founded the city of Palmyra, or Tadmore in the Wilderness, for the greater conveniency of the Eastern trade. The King of Tyre was his ally, but he was so, most probably, from necessity, for the alliance was very unnatural; and, soon after the death of Solomon, the Tyrians excited the King of Babylon to destroy Jerusalem: so, that if there had been, in ancient times, more people concerned in commerce, there is no doubt there would likewise have been more envy and rivality. =sic=

The cities of Italy, the Dutch, the Flemish, the English, and the French, have been incessantly struggling to supplant each other in manufactures and commerce; and the war of custom-house duties and drawbacks has become very active and formidable.

This modern species of warfare is not only less bloody, but the object is more legitimate, and the consequences neither so sudden nor so fatal as open force; to which is to be added, that if a nation will but determine to be industrious, it never can be greatly injured. If it enjoyed any peculiarly great advantages, those may, indeed, be wrested from it, but that is only taking away what it has no right to possess, and what it may always do without. [end of page #177]

The intention of this inquiry is not to discover a method by which a nation may engross the trade that ought to belong to others, it is only to enable it, by industry and other means, to guard against the approaches of adversity, which tend to sink it far below its level, thereby making way for the elevation of some other nation, on the ruins of its greatness.

As, in the interior causes of decline, we have traced the most part to the manners and habits of the people, so, in the exterior causes, it will be found that much depends upon the conduct of the government. [end of page #178]

CHAP. XI.

_Why the Intercourse between Nations is ultimately in Favour of the poorer one, though not so at first_.

In all commercial intercourse with each other, (or competition in selling to a third nation,) the poorer nation has the advantage in its gain; but this advantage is generally prevented by the length of credit which the wealthy nation is enabled to give, by which manufacturers are sometimes ruined in their own country by strangers, who can neither rival them in lowness of price nor goodness in quality.

In countries that are poor, those who have the selling, but not the manufacturing of goods, are so much greater gainers by selling goods purchased on credit, of which they can keep a good stock and assortment, than in selling from a shop or store scantily supplied with ready money, that there is not almost any question about either price or quality; there is not scarcely an alternative. In one line, a man can begin who has scarcely any capital, and do a great deal of business; he can even afford to sell the articles he purchases on credit with very little profit, because they procure him ready money; whereas, if he sells an article upon which he has no credit, he must replace it with another, by paying money immediately. The consequence is, that while those who sell to the public are poor, the nation or manufacturer that gives the longest credit will have the preference; but this is daily diminishing, for even with the capital of the rich nation itself, the manufactures of the poor one are encouraged; the manner is as follows:

A, at New York, purchases goods for one thousand pounds from B, at London, which he sells without any profit, and, perhaps, at a considerable loss; because B gives him twelve months credit. But A, who has, by this means, got hold of money, as if by a loan, will not lay that out with B, nor let him touch it till the year's end; and, having made no profit by the sale of B's goods, he must turn to advantage the money he obtained for them. According to the situation of mat-[end of page #179] ters in the country, and the nature of A's concerns, he will make more or less, but what he makes it is not the business to investigate; it is sufficient to know, that he will lay his ready money out with those who will sell cheap, in order to get by it; that is to say, he will lay it out with some person in his own country. {148} Thus, though the rich nation sells goods on credit at a price which cannot be obtained for them by the purchaser, yet its capital serves to give activity to the manufacturers in the poor country. It is true, that this operation is slow, but it produces an effect in time, and finishes by robbing the wealthy nation of its superiority, obtained by giving credit. It is thus that in all their intercourse, the first advantage is to the rich nation, but terminates in favour of the poor; for whenever equality of prices are the question, and both can give sufficient credit, the poorer nation has the advantage in point of price.

With regard to rivalling each other, in a third place, the poor nation has the advantage, if the merchants there have the means of paying with ready money, because the price is lower than that of the richer country. {149} If they have not that means, they cannot deal with them, but must wait till they have, by perseverance; and, in course of time, come to have the means when the poor nation is certain to enter into competition with advantage.

But this is not the only way in which the capital of a rich nation is employed in fostering a rivalship in a poorer nation. Were the manufacturers the only persons who sold goods, it would be confined to this; but that is not the case, for merchants, who are the sellers, study only where they can purchase the cheapest; thus English merchants purchase cloths in Silesia, watches in Switzerland, fire- arms at Liege,

--- {148} The Dutch used to give long credit, and buy with ready money, by which means they had great advantage for a long time; but, at last, the ready money they paid to some, and the credit they gave to others, set their industry at work, and they became rivals. Dutch capital was, at one period, of great service to the English, as that of England now is to the Americans.

{149} This is not meant to apply to any particular sort of manufacture. In some, a nation may have a permanent advantage over another; in others, only a temporary one, and in the greater portion no other advantage than what arises from superior capital. -=-

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in preference to laying out the money in England or Ireland; and they will give credit, as before explained, to the nation that wants it.

In this manner it is, that the capital of a rich country supplies the want of it in poorer ones, and that, by degrees, a nation saps the foundation of its own wealth and greatness, and gives encouragement to them in others.

It is then that the weight of taxes, the high price of commodities, and the various causes which encumber those who live in wealthy nations, begin to produce a pernicious effect. The tendency of industry is to remove its abode, and the capital of the merchants, who know no country, but understand arithmetic, and the profits of trade, gives the industry the means of doing it with more ease and promptitude.

The Dutch, for the last century, employed their capital in this manner, and, at one time, were the chief carriers, for they secured custom by paying readily and giving credit largely. They ruined many of their own manufactures in this manner, but it is impossible to separate the calculation of gain from the mercantile system and mercantile practice in individuals; therefore it is no reproach to their patriotism, for patriotism cannot be the rule in purchasing goods from an individual. A merchant can have no other rule, but his own advantage, or, if he has, he will soon be ruined.

There are many manufactures in England that originally rose by means of Dutch capital, not lent capital, but by ready money paid for goods, which were carried to other nations, and sold here upon credit.

The English have, for a long time, been able to do this piece of business for themselves; and, of course, the Dutch did not find the same means of supporting their carrying trade; and as they had ruined many of their own manufactures, they sunk both as a commercial and manufacturing people.

If the time should ever come that capital should be so abundant in all nations, as that obtaining credit will not be an object, then it will be seen that no nation will have so very great a share of manufactures and commerce more than others, as has hitherto been the case.

In countries where the common practice is to sell, chiefly, for [end of page #181] ready money, great fortunes are seldom gained. Even in wealthy countries, in branches of business where no credit is given, great fortunes are very seldom got, and for a very simple reason. The business is pretty equally divided. But in a country that gives long credits, or in a branch of trade on which long credits are given, we always see some individuals gaining immense fortunes, by means of doing a great deal more business than others, who, having less capital, are enabled to do less.

There is not any one thing in which a nation resembles an individual so much, as in mercantile transactions; the rule of one is the rule of all, and the rich individual acts like a rich nation, and the poor one like a poor nation. The consequences are the same in both cases. The rich carry on an extensive trade, by means of great capital; the poor, a limited one, dependant =sic= chiefly on industry; but wherever the poor persevere in good conduct, they finish by getting the command of the capital of the rich, and then becoming their rivals.

There is one thing peculiar to the intercourse of rich and poor nations, in which it differs from the intercourse between rich and poor individuals in the same country. Money, which is the common measure of value, has a different price in different countries, and, indeed, in different parts of the same country. If a man, from a poor country, carries a bushel of corn with him into a rich, he can live as long upon it as if he had remained where he was; but if he carry the money, that would have bought a bushel of corn at home, he perhaps may not be able to live upon it half so long. {150}

The effect that this produces, in the intercourse between two countries, is, that in proportion as the difference becomes greater, the rich country feels it can command more of the industry of the poor, and the poor feels it can command less of the industry of the rich; so that

--- {150} In common life, this difference, between carrying money and necessaries, is perfectly well understood, but it is experience that is the teacher; and the rough countryman, or woman, when they have the opportunity of judging from fact, understand the motives as well as the most profound and ingenius =sic= writer on political economy. -=-

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when their industry can be both applied, with any degree of equality, to the same object, the poor supplies the rich, and therefore increases its own wealth.

It is thus that great numbers of the people in London are fed with butcher-meat from Scotland, and wear shoes from Yorkshire; but there would be a very limited sale in either of those places for meat from Smithfield, or shoes manufactured in London. {151}

This diminution of the value of money, that takes place in all rich countries, serves farther to increase the advantage of poorer ones in manufacturing, and accelerates the natural effect of competition, which is facilitated, as has been said, by the capital of the rich country giving activity to the industry of the poorer one.

This last neither can be called an exterior nor an interior cause, as it is derived entirely from the relative situations of the two countries, and belongs to both, or originates in both; but, as it raises the poor nation nearer the level of the rich one, its effect gradually becomes less powerful. Though there is no means of preventing the operation of two nations coming nearly to a level by this means, yet it does not appear to be a necessary consequence that the nation that was the richer should become the poorer. As this, however, has been a general case, we must conclude it to be a natural one, but there we stop, and make a distinction between what is natural only, and what is a necessary effect. Their coming to a level was a necessary effect; but, though the other may be natural, it cannot be necessary, and therefore may be counteracted; to find the means of doing this, is all that is proposed by the present inquiry.

--- {151} If it was not for taxes and rent, that are chiefly spent in large towns, as well as law-expenses, and the prices of luxuries, of dress, and furniture, the cities, like London, would soon be reduced. -=-

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CHAP. XII.

_Conclusion of exteror Causes.--Are seldom of much Importance, unless favoured by interior ones.--Rich Nations, with care, capable, in most Cases, of prolonging their Prosperity.--Digression on the Importance of Public Revenue, illustrated by a statistical Chart_.

The exterior causes of the decline of any nation, that has risen above its level, though formidable, are nothing, in comparison to the interior causes, and are of no great effect without their co-operation.

As the government of a country has an influence over the interior causes, so its alliances, and the laws of nations, though not very well attended to, (yet seldom altogether forgot,) have a tendency to stop the progress of the exterior causes, before they advance too far; that is to say, before they absolutely depress a nation.

For several centuries, the stronger nations of Europe protected the weaker, and the matter was carried so far, that the weak powers generally gained the most. Prussia and Sardinia are two examples of nations rising by political connections; and though the system is lately changed, and Poland has been despoiled and divided amongst nations, to each of which it was superior in power only two centuries ago, and though Holland and Switzerland groan under the yoke of France, yet, it is to be hoped, the old system is not abandoned, otherwise there will be no end to the encroachments of the great powers on the smaller.

The means of communicating, between nations, are now easy; they have felt the advantage of preserving a sort of balance, {152} and the ad-

--- {152} The expression, balance of power, gives a false idea. It seems to imply, that alliances in Europe were so nicely arranged, as to make the force of nations, in opposite interests, equal; but this never was the case for half an hour, nor was it ever intended. The whole [end of page #184] that is meant, is to prevent the present order from being overturned, by one nation annihilating or subduing another; and then, by their united strength, swallowing up a third, as was the case with the Romans. -=-

vantages are so great, that they probably never will be entirely abandoned, though we have strong proofs, of late years, that they are not always held very sacred.

The chart subjoined to this, giving a statistical representation of the powers of Europe, shews nearly in what manner power is distributed at this time; the population and extent are there represented with accuracy: these are the foundation of power; and the amount of the revenue may be said to shew the means, which a nation has of exerting that power. (For the description and explanation see the page opposite the chart). [Transcriber's note: seemingly a reference to Chart No. 2; the explanation in fact appears on page 190.]

The balance of power, however well attended to, could not prevent the decline of a nation from interior causes. It may prevent the operation of exterior causes from pushing a nation to the extreme of humiliation, by taking advantage of its internal situation. But the decline of almost every nation has commenced within its own bosom, and has been completed by causes acting from without.

The common termination of the interior causes of decline is revolt, or a division into parties, when the party that has the disadvantage generally calls in some neighbour to its aid. This is the most miserable fate that can befal =sic= a country, and no punishment is sufficiently severe for the men, who have so far lost every sentiment of patriotism as to have recourse to such a step.

The exterior causes of decline, namely, rivalship in peace and the combined efforts of enemies in war may be considered as irresistible, if the government, which has the direction of a nation, does not act wisely; but, if it does, they may be put at defiance. If a nation preserves its interior sources of prosperity, and acts with moderation and firmness towards others, their envy and efforts will be without effect, and need never be a cause of much uneasiness.

In its relation to other nations, the government of a country acts like an individual. The first thing is to regulate its interior affairs, and, the next is, in treating with others, to consider circumstances, and take justice and moderation for a rule of conduct. [end of page #185]

The circuitous politics attributed to ambassadors, who represent states, is a common theme of invective: as custom has established it as a sort of rule, in all such transactions as they conduct, to conceal a part of what is meant, to demand more than is expected to be obtained, and offer less than is intended to be given, there is no immediate remedy; but this is only in the mode and manner of treating, and does not necessarily imply unfair intention. If it has become a custom to ask three by way of obtaining two, and of offering only two to prevent the necessity of giving four, (which would be expected if three, the number intended to be given, were offered at first) it is an abuse of language, in so far that what is expressed is neither meant by one, nor understood by the other to be meant; but, it is nothing more: neither is it a custom void of meaning; it is founded on the nature of man.

If men were perfect, and capable of seeing at one view what was fair, each might come prepared to ask exactly what he wanted, and determined not to yield any thing; and it would result from their being perfect, that each would just demand what was right, and the other was disposed to give; but, as men are not perfect, and as it is the inclination and even the duty of each to obtain the most favourable terms he can, (and as he does not see exactly what is right,) he naturally demands more than he has a right to expect, or than the other is disposed to give. If ambassadors met together with a determination to speak explicitly at first, and with a determination not to recede, the consequence would probably be, that they would not treat at all, so that the mode of receding a little does not absolutely imply that more is asked than is wished for, but that each party over-rates its own pretensions, in order to obtain what is right.

One thing is certain, that the treaties that have been the best observed have been those founded on equity, where the contracting parties were neither of them under the influence of fear or necessity.

The exterior dangers of a country are not only more simple in their nature than the interior ones, but, being less silent and gradual in their progress have been more noticed by historians.

Even the ambitious rapacity of the Romans was first directed [end of page #186] against Carthage, on account of its pride and injustice in attacking other states; and, in the history of the nations of the world, there is scarcely a single example of national prosperity being unattended with some degree of pride, arrogance, and injustice; nor can it easily be otherwise, for, notwithstanding all the boasted law of nations, power seems amongst them to be one of the principal claims on which right is founded, though, in the moral nature of things, power and right have not the most distant connection.

It is then an object for those who govern nations, in the first place, to counteract as much as possible the internal tendency to decline, arising from the causes that have been enumerated; and, after having done that, to regulate their conduct with regard to other nations, so as to protect themselves from those external causes of decline, on the existence of which they have no direct influence, but which are not capable of producing any great effect, unless favoured by the internal state of the country, and by the unwise conduct of those by whom it is governed.

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_Digression concerning the Importance of Public Revenue_.

No state, what ever its wealth may be, can possess power, unless a certain portion of that wealth is applicable to public purposes. As the want of revenue has not been a very common cause of weakness, we shall give, as an example, the almost solitary, but very strong, case of Poland. Its feebleness, in repelling the attacks of its enemies, was occasioned, in a great measure, by want of revenue. It was with far superior population, with more fertile soil, and a people no way inferior in bravery, greatly inferior in actual exertion to Prussia. When, at last, the Poles, seeing their danger, united together, and were willing to make every personal exertion and sacrifice, to preserve their country, they had no means of executing their good intentions. They had not kept up an army when it was not wanted, and they could not, on the emergency, create one when it was become necessary. [end of page #187]

The definition given of power makes it a relative thing, and, therefore, the revenue necessary to maintain that power or force must be relative also; it, therefore, depends on circumstances, what is to be considered as a sufficient or insufficient revenue.

If the United States of America were accessible with ease to European nations, or if they had powerful neighbours on their own soil, they would find their present revenues quite unequal to preserving their independence; but, as it is, perhaps they are the most wealthy civilized nation in the world, if an excess of revenue constitutes wealth.

In Europe, whatever nations are unable to keep up forces sufficient to make those exertions which, according to their alliances and dangers, may be necessary, they are weak from want of revenue, and ought to augment it.

In the course of making greater exertions than the revenues would bear, some nations have contracted debts. It is not the purpose here to enter into the complication such debts occasion, and the alterations they make on the revenue, and the disposal of the revenue of a country; but, so far as that subject is yet understood, it appears that the clear revenue, after paying the interest of the debt, ought to be as great as it would be altogether, if there were no debt; that is to say, after paying interest, there ought to remain a sufficient surplus to pay all the expenses necessary for government and defence.

The money that goes for the payment of interest has some tendency to increase the influence of government at home, but is of no manner of use with regard to enemies.

From the statistical chart here annexed, which shews the relative proportion of the revenues of all the nations in Europe, as well as their actual amount, it is perfectly clear, that, great and extensive as the Russian empire is, it will not be very powerful until its revenues are considerably increased.

The great value of money, and the prices of provisions, and many sorts of warlike stores, enable great armies to be maintained in that country, even with small revenues; but the Russians can make no great effort, at a distance from home, till their revenues are augmented.

The revenues of Spain are considerable; but the free revenue is not, [end of page #188] and it has no credit to supply the place. The same thing may be said of Portugal; and if England had no credit, it would be in the same situation; but as it has better credit than any nation ever had, so, likewise, it is the only one whose efforts have never been in any way, or at any time, either restricted or suspended, for want of money to carry them into effect.

The Dutch were, at one time, situated nearly as England is now; they had not sufficient free revenue, but they had good credit; of which, however, they were not willing to make the necessary use, and the French marched into Amsterdam with greater ease than the Russians did into Warsaw.

The greatest victories of the French, during the revolution, were gained at a time when her regular revenues were inconsiderable, and when she was in a state of absolute bankruptcy. This is considered by some as a proof that force is independent of revenue, and that Frederick the Great was mistaken in saying, that money was the sinews of war; but this case has been misunderstood as well as misrepresented.

Though, in general, regular resources for money are necessary to support war, and regular resources imply revenue, it never was asserted, that, if irregular resources could be obtained, they would not answer the same purpose, so long as they lasted. During the first five years of the French revolution, a sum equal to at least four hundred millions sterling was consumed, besides what was pillaged from the enemy. So that at the time that France was without regular revenue, she was actually expending seventy-five millions sterling per annum: a sum greater than any other nation ever had at its disposal.

The impossibility of such a resource continuing is of no importance in the present argument, although it is luckily of very great importance to the peace of mankind. France supported war, for a certain time, by consuming capital, and without revenue, but not without money; so that what his Prussian Majesty said, stands uncontroverted, and the necessity of revenue, regular and durable, for the maintenance of regular and durable force, is established beyond the power of contradiction. [end of page #189]

EXPLANATION OF STATISTICAL CHART, NO. 2.

In this chart, the different nations of Europe are represented by circles, bearing the proportion of their relative extent. This is done in order to give a better idea of the proportions than a geographical map, where the dissimilar and irregular forms prevent the eye from making a comparison.

The graduated scale of lines represents millions of pounds sterling; and the red lines, that rise on the left of each circle, express the number of inhabitants in millions, which may be known by observing at what cross-line the red one stops.

The yellow lines, on the right of the circles, shew the amount of revenue in pounds sterling.

The nations stained green, are maritime powers; those stained pale red, are only powerful by land.

The dotted lines, to connect the extremities of the lines of population and revenue, serve, by their descent from right to left, or from left to right, to shew how revenue and population are proportioned to each other.

The impression made by this chart is such, that it is impossible not to see by what means Sweden and Denmark are of little importance, as to wealth or power; for, though population and territory are the original foundation of power, finances are the means of exerting it.

What must the consequences be if the Russian empire should one day become like other nations? If ever that should happen, it either will be divided, or it will crush all Europe.

The prodigious territory of Russia, and the immense revenues of England, are the most astonishing things represented in that chart; they are out of all proportion to the rest. [end of page #190]

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