Chapter XI: Section I: Smell (6)

Neither is it strictly accurate to say that Verbs are always marks of motion, or of action, even including, as the author does, by an extension of the meaning of those terms, every process which is attended with a feeling of effort. Many verbs, of the kind which grammarians call neuter or intransitive verbs, express rest, or inaction: as sit, lie, and in some cases, stand. It is true however that the verbs first invented, as far as we know anything of them, expressed forms of motion, and the principal function of verbs still is to affirm or deny action. Or, to speak yet more generally, it is by means of verbs that we predicate events. Events, or changes, are the most important facts, to us, in the surrounding world. Verbs are the resource which language affords for predicating events. They are not the names of events; all names of events are substantives, as sunrise, disaster, or *infinitives, as _to rise_, and infinitives are logically substantives. But it is by means of verbs that we assert, or give information of, events; as, The sun rises, or, Disaster has occurred. There is, however, a class of neuter verbs already referred to, which do not predicate events, but states of an unchanging object, as lie, sit, remain, exist. It would be incorrect, therefore, to give a definition of Verbs which should limit them to the expression of events. I am inclined to think that the distinction between nouns and verbs is not logical, but merely grammatical, and that every word, whatever be its meaning, must be reputed a verb, which is so constructed grammatically that it can only be used as the predicate of a proposition. Any meaning whatever is, in strictness, capable of being thrown into this form: but it is only certain meanings, chiefly actions or events, which there is, in general, any motive for putting into this particular shape.--_Ed._]

{156} 6. We have, last of all, under this head, to consider the marking power of a very peculiar, and most comprehensive word, the SUBSTANTIVE VERB, as it has been called by grammarians, or the word expressive of BEING. The steps, which we have already traced, in the process of naming, will aid us in obtaining a true conception of this, which is one of the most important steps, in that process.

We have seen that, beside the names of particular species of motions, as walking, running, flying, there was occasion for a general name which might include {157} the whole of those motions. For this purpose, the names Action and Acting were employed. It is now to be remembered, that those sensations which we mark by the names of action, as walking, running, &c., are but part of the sensations which we derive from objects; that we have other sensations, and clusters of sensations, from them, on account of which we apply to them other names; as when we call a man tall, on account of certain sensations; dark, on account of certain other sensations, and so on. Now, as we had occasion for a name to include the separate clusters, called walking, running, flying, rolling, falling, and so on, and for that purpose adopted the name Acting; so, having from objects other sensations than those marked by the word acting, we have occasion for a name which shall include both those sensations, and those comprehended in the word acting along with them: in short, a word that shall embrace all sensations, of whatever kind, which any object is capable of exciting in us. This purpose is effected by the word affirmative of Existence. When we affirm of any thing that it EXISTS, that it IS: what we mean, is, that we may have sensations from it; nothing, without ourselves, being known to us, or capable of being known, but through the medium of our senses.

There is the same occasion for making the Substantive Verb connote the three distinctions of TIME PAST, TIME PRESENT, and TIME FUTURE, as in the case of other verbs; also to connote the distinctions of PERSONS and NUMBERS; and, lastly, to connote the THREE MODES, that in which there is no reference to any thing preceding, that in which there is a reference to something preceding, and that in which reference {158} is made to the will of one of the PERSONS. Accordingly the Substantive Verb has TENSES, MOODS, NUMBERS, and PERSONS, like any other verb.

Such is the nature and object of the Substantive Verb. It is the most GENERICAL of all the words, which we have characterized, as marks upon marks. These are the words usually called ATTRIBUTIVES. According to the view which we have given of them, they may be more appropriately denominated, SECONDARY MARKS. The names of the larger classes, as tree, horse, strength, we may call PRIMARY MARKS. The subsidiary names by which smaller classes are marked out of the larger; as when we say, tall tree, great strength, running horse, walking man; that is, all attributives, or marks applied upon marks; we may call SECONDARY MARKS.

{159} SECTION IV.

PREDICATION.

The purposes of language are two. We have occasion to mark sensations or ideas singly; and we have occasion to mark them in trains; in other words, we have need of contrivances to mark not only sensations and ideas; but also the order of them. The contrivances which are necessary to mark this order are the main cause of the complexity of language.

If all names were names of one sort, there would be no difficulty in marking a train of the feelings which they serve to denote. Thus, if all names were names of individuals, as John, James, Peter, we should have no difficulty in marking a train of the ideas of these individuals; all that would be necessary would be to set down the marks, one after another, in the same order in which, one after another, the ideas occurred.

If all names were names of Species, as man, horse, eagle, the facility of marking the order of the ideas which they represent would be the same. If the idea man occurred first, the idea horse second, the idea eagle third; all that would be necessary would be to put down the name or mark man the first, the name or mark horse the second, and the order of marks would represent the order of ideas.

But we have already seen, that the facility of communication requires names of different degrees of {160} comprehensiveness; names of individuals, names of classes, and names both of the larger and the smaller classes. For the younger and less instructed part of my readers, it may be necessary to mention, that the names of the smaller classes, are called names of Species, or specific names; the names of the larger classes, names of Genera, or generic names. Thus, the term animal, denotes a large class; a class which contains the smaller classes, man, horse, dog, &c. The name animal, therefore, is called a Genus, or a generic name; the name man, a Species, or a specific name.

In using names of these different kinds; names of individuals when the idea is restricted to one individual; and, for brevity, the names of classes; the names of the less when necessary, of the large when practicable; there is perpetual need of the substitution of one name for another. When I have used the names, James and John, Thomas and William, and many more, having to speak of such peculiarities of each, as distinguish him from every other, I may proceed to speak of them in general, as included in a class. When this happens, I have occasion for the name of the class, and to substitute the name of the class, for the names of the individuals. By what contrivance is this performed? I have the name of the individual, _John_; and the name of the class _man_; and I can set down my two names; _John_, _man_; in juxta-position. But this is not sufficient to effect the communication I desire; namely, that the word man is a mark of the same idea of which John is a mark, and a mark of other ideas along with it, those to wit, of which James, Thomas, &c. are marks. To complete my contrivance, I invent a mark, which, placed between my marks, {161} _John_ and _man_, fixes the idea I mean to convey, that _man_, is another mark to that idea of which _John_ is a mark, while it is a mark of the other ideas, of which _James_, _Thomas_, &c., are marks. For this purpose, we use in English, the mark "is." By help of this, my object is immediately attained. I say, _John_ "is" a _man_. I, then, use the word _man_, instead of the word _John_, with many advantages; because every thing which I can affirm of the word _man_, is true not only of _John_, but of _James_, and _Peter_, and every other individual of the class.

The joining of two names by this peculiar mark is the act which has been denominated, PREDICATION; and it is the grand contrivance by which the marks of sensations and ideas are so ordered in discourse, as to mark the order of the trains, which it is our purpose to communicate, or to record.

The form of expression, "John is a man," is called a Proposition. It consists of three marks. Of these, "John," is denominated the SUBJECT; "man," the PREDICATE; and "is," the COPULA. To speak generally, and in the language of the grammarians, the nominative of the verb is the _subject_ of the proposition; the substantive, or adjective, which agrees with the nominative, is the _predicate_, and the verb is the _copula_.

By a few simple examples, the reader may render familiar to himself the use of PREDICATION, as the grand expedient, by which language is enabled to mark not only sensations and ideas, but also the order of them.[48]

[Editor's footnote 48: The theory of Predication here set forth, stands in need of further elucidation, and perhaps of some correction and addition.

The account which the author gives of a Predication, or Proposition, is, first, that it is a mode of so putting together the marks of sensations and ideas, as to mark the order of them. Secondly, that it consists in substituting one name for another, so as to signify that a certain name (called the predicate), is a mark of the same idea which another name (called the subject) is a mark of.

It must be allowed that a predication, or proposition, is intended to mark some portion of the order either of our sensations or of our ideas, _i.e._, some part of the coexistences or sequences which take place either in our minds, or in what we term the external world. But what sort of order is it that a predication marks? An order supposed to be believed in. When _John_, or _man_, are said to be marks of an individual object, all there is in the matter is that these words, being associated with the idea of the object, are intended to raise that idea in the mind of the person who hears or reads them. But when we say, John is a man, or, John is an old man, we intend to do more than call up in the hearer's mind the images of John, of a man, and of an old man. We intend to do more than inform him that we have thought of, or even seen, John and a man, or John and an old man, together. We inform him of a fact respecting John, namely, that he _is_ an old man, or at all events, of our belief that this is a fact. The characteristic difference between a predication and any other form of speech, is, that it does not merely bring to mind a certain object (which is the only function of a mark, merely as such); it asserts something respecting it. Now it may be true, and I think it is true, that every assertion, every object of Belief,--everything that can be true or false--that can be an object of assent or dissent--is some order of sensations or of ideas: some coexistence or succession of sensations or ideas actually experienced, or supposed capable of being experienced. And thus it may appear in the end that in expressing a belief, we are after all only declaring the order of a group or series of sensations or ideas. But the order which we declare is not an imaginary order; it is an order believed to be real. Whatever view we adopt of the psychological nature of Belief, it is necessary to distinguish between the mere suggestion, to the mind of a certain order among sensations or ideas such as takes place when we think of the alphabet, or the numeration table and the indication that this order is an actual fact, which is occurring, or which has occurred once or oftener, or which, in certain definite circumstances, always occurs; which are the things indicated as true by an affirmative predication, and as false by a negative one.

That a predication differs from a name in doing more than merely calling up an idea, is admitted in what I have noted as the second half of the author's theory of Predication. That second half points out that every predication is a communication, intended to act, not on the mere ideas of the listener, but on his persuasion or belief: and what he is intended to believe, according to the author, is, that of the two names which are conjoined in the predication, one is a mark of the same idea (or let me add, of the same sensation or cluster of sensations) of which the other is a mark. This is a doctrine of Hobbes, the one which caused him to be termed by Leibnitz, in words which have been often quoted, "plus quam nominalis." It is quite true that when we predicate B of A--when we assert of A that it is a B--B must, if the assertion is true, be a name of A, _i.e._, a name applicable to A; one of the innumerable names which, in virtue of their signification, can be used as descriptive of A: but is this the information which we want to convey to the hearer? It is so when we are speaking only of names and their meaning, as when we enunciate a definition. In every other case, what we want to convey is a matter of fact, of which this relation between the names is but an incidental consequence. When we say, John walked out this morning, it is not a correct expression of the communication we desire to make, that "having walked out this morning" or "a person who has walked out this morning" are two of the innumerable names of John. They are only accidentally and momentarily names of John by reason of a certain event, and the information we mean to give is, that this event has happened. The event is not resolvable into an identity of meaning between names, but into an actual series of sensations that occurred to John, and a belief that any one who had been present and using his eyes would have had another series of sensations, which we call seeing John in the act of walking out. Again, when we say, Negroes are woolly-haired, we mean to make known to the hearer, not that woolly-haired is a name of every negro, but that wherever the cluster of sensations signified by the word negro, are experienced, the sensations signified by the word woolly-haired will be found either among them or conjoined with them. This is an order of sensations: and it is only in consequence of it that the name woolly-haired comes to be applicable to every individual of whom the term negro is a name.

There is nothing positively opposed to all this in the author's text: indeed he must be considered to have meant this, when he said, that by means of substituting one name for another, a predication marks the order of our sensations and ideas. The omission consists in not remarking that what is distinctively signified by a predication, as such, is Belief in a certain order of sensations or ideas. And when this has been said, the Hobbian addition, that it does so by declaring the predicate to be a name of everything of which the subject is a name, may be omitted as surplusage, and as diverting the mind from the essential features of the case. Predication may thus be defined, a form of speech which expresses a belief that a certain coexistence or sequence of sensations or ideas, did, does, or, under certain conditions, would take place: and the reverse of this when the predication is negative.--_Ed._]

{162} For the more complete elucidation of this important part of the business of Naming, it is necessary to {163} remark, that Logicians have classed Predications, under five heads; 1st, when the _Genus_ is predicated, {164} of any subject; 2dly, when the _Species_ is predicated; 3dly, when the _Specific Difference_ is predicated; 4thly, {165} when a _Property_ is predicated; 5thly, when an _Accident_ is predicated. These five classes of names, the things capable of being predicated, are named PREDICABLES. The five Predicables, in Latin, the language in which they are commonly expressed, are named _Genus_, _Species_, _Differentia_, _Proprium_, _Accidens_.

We have already seen, perhaps at sufficient length, the manner in which, and the end for which, the Genus, and the Species are predicated of any subject. It is, that the more comprehensive name, may be substituted for the less comprehensive; so that each of our marks may answer the purpose of marking, to as great an extent as possible. In this manner we substitute the word _man_, for example, for the word _Thomas_, when we predicate the Species of the individual, in the proposition, "Thomas is a man;" the word _animal_, for the word _man_, when we predicate the Genus of the Species, in the proposition, "man, is an animal."[49]

[Editor's footnote 49: If what has been said in the preceding note is correct, it is a very inadequate view of the purpose for which a generic or specific name is predicated of any subject, to say that it is in order that "the more comprehensive name may be substituted for the less comprehensive, so that each of our marks may answer the purpose of marking to as great an extent as possible." The more comprehensive and the less comprehensive name have each their uses, and the function of each not only could not be discharged with equal convenience by the other, but could not be discharged by it at all. The purpose, in predicating of anything the name of a class to which it belongs, is not to obtain a better or more commodious name for it, but to make known the fact of its possessing the attributes which constitute the class, and which are therefore signified by the class-name. It is evident that the name of one class cannot possibly perform this office vicariously for the name of another.--_Ed._]

{166} We have already, also, taken notice of the artifice, by which smaller classes are formed out of larger, by the help of secondary marks. Of these secondary marks, the principal classes are designated by the terms _Differentia_, _Proprium_, _Accidens_. No very distinct boundaries, are, indeed, marked by these terms; nor do they effect a scientific division; but, for the present purpose, the elucidation of the end to which Predication is subservient, they are sufficient.

_Differentia_ is always an Attributive, applicable to a Genus, and which, when combined with it, marks out a Species; as the word _rational_, which is applicable to the Genus _animal_, and when applied to it, in the phrase "rational animal," marks out a Species, and is synonymous with the word _man_. In a similar manner the word _sensitive_ is applicable to _body_, and marks out the subordinate Genus, _animal_.

_Proprium_ is also an Attributive, and the Attributives classed under this title differ from those classed under the title _differentia_, chiefly in this; That those classed under _differentia_, are regarded as more expressly involved in the definition of the Species which they seem to cut out from the Genus. Thus, both _rational_, and _risible_, when applied to _animal_, cut out of it the class Man; but _rational_ is called DIFFERENTIA, _risible_ PROPRIUM, because _rational_, is strictly involved in the definition of _man_; _risible_ is not. Some Attributives are classed under the title _proprium_, which, when applied to the genus, do not constitute the same Species, constituted by the _differentia_, but a different Species; as _bipes_, two-footed animal, is the name of a class including at least the two classes of men, and birds; _hot-blooded animal_, is the name of a class so {167} large as to include man, horse, lion, dog, and the greater part of the more perfectly organized Species. There are some Attributives, classed under the title _proprium_, which cut out of the Genus a class even less than that which is cut by the _differentia_; as, for example, the word _grammatical_. This word grammatical, applied to the word animal, in the term "grammatical animal," separates a class so small, as to include only part of the Species man, those who are called Grammarians. Such Attributives, for an obvious reason, are applicable, as well to the name of the Species, as to that of the Genus. Thus, we say, "a grammatical man," as well as "a grammatical animal," and that with greater propriety, as cutting out the sub-species from the Species more immediately.

The Attributives, classed under the title _accidens_, are regarded, like those classed under _differentia_, and _proprium_, as applicable to the class cut out by the _differentia_, but applicable to it rather fortuitously than by any fixed connection. The term _lame_ is an example of such Attributives. The term _lame_, however, applied to the name of the Species, does not the less take out of it a sub-species, as "lame man," "lame horse."

With respect to these classes of Attributives (_Differentia_, _Proprium_, _Accidens_) this is necessary to be observed, and remembered; that they differ from one another only by the accident of their application. Thus, when _rational_, applied to the Genus _animal_, constitutes the Species man, all other Attributives applied to that Species are either _accidens_, or _proprium_; but these Attributives themselves may be the _differentia_ in the case of other classes. Thus, _warm-blooded_, applied to _man_, stands under the class _proprium_; but {168} when applied to the animals which stand distinguished from the cold-blooded, as constituting a class, it becomes the _differentia_, and _rational_, with respect to this comprehensive class, is only an _accidens_.[50]

[Editor's footnote 50: The author says, that no very distinct boundaries are marked by the three terms, Differentia, Proprium, and Accidens, nor do they effect a scientific division. As used, however, by the more accurate of the school logicians, they do mark out distinct boundaries, and do effect a scientific division.

Of the attributes common to a class, some have been taken into consideration in forming the class, and are included in the signification of its name. Such, in the case of man, are rationality, and the outward form which we call the human. These attributes are its Differentiæ; the fundamental differences which distinguish that class from the others most nearly allied to it. The school logicians were contented with one Differentia, whenever one was sufficient completely to circumscribe the class. But this was an error, because one attribute may be sufficient for distinction, and yet may not exhaust the signification of the class-name. All attributes, then, which are part of that signification, are set apart as Differentiæ. Other attributes, though not included among those which constitute the class, and which are directly signified by its name, are consequences of some of those which constitute the class, and always found along with them. These attributes of the class are its Propria. Thus, to be bounded by three straight lines is the Differentia of a triangle: to have the sum of its three angles equal to two right angles, being a consequence of its Differentia, is a Proprium of it. Rationality is a Differentia of the class Man: to be able to build cities is a Proprium, being a consequence of rationality, but not, as that is, included in the meaning of the word Man. All other attributes of the class, which are neither included in the meaning of the name, nor are consequences of any which are included, are Accidents, however universally and constantly they may be true of the class; as blackness, of crows.

The author's remark, that these three classes of Attributives differ from one another only in the accident of their application, is most just. There are not some attributes which are always Differentiæ, and others which are always Propria, or always Accidents. The same attribute which is a Differentia of one genus or species, may be, and often is, a Proprium or an Accidens of others, and so on.--_Ed._]

{169} We now arrive at a very important conclusion; for it thus appears, that all Predication, is Predication of Genus or Species, since the Attributives classed under the titles of _Differentia_, _Proprium_, _Accidens_, cannot be used but as part of the name of a Species. But we have seen, above, that Predication by Genus and Species is merely the substitution of one name for another, the more general for the less general; the fact of the substitution being marked by the _Copula_. It follows, if all Predication is by Genus and Species, that all Predication is the substitution of one name for another, the more for the less general.

It will be easy for the learner to make this material fact familiar to himself, by attending to a few instances. Thus, when it is said that man is rational, the term rational is evidently elliptical, and the word animal is understood. The word rational, according to grammatical language, is an adjective, and is significant only in conjunction with a substantive. According to logical language, it is a connotative term, and is without a meaning when disjoined from the object, the property or properties of which it connotes.[51]

[Editor's footnote 51: I am unable to feel the force of this remark. Every predication ascribes an attribute to a subject. Differentiae, Propria, and Accidents, agree with generic and specific names in expressing attributes, and the attributes they express are the whole of their meaning. I therefore cannot see why there should not be Predication of any of these, as well as of Genus and Species. These three Predicables, the author says, cannot be used but as part of the name of a genus or species: they are adjectives, and cannot be employed without a substantive understood. Allowing this to be logically, as it is grammatically, true, still the comprehensive and almost insignificant substantive, "thing" or "being," fully answers the purpose; and the entire meaning of the predication is contained in the adjective. These adjectives, as the author remarks, are connotative terms; but so, on his own shewing elsewhere, are all concrete substantives, except proper names. Why, when it is said that man is rational, must "the word animal" be "understood?" Nothing is understood but that the being, Man, has the attribute of reason. If we say, God is rational, is animal understood? It was only the Greeks who classed their gods as [Greek: zô=a a)tha/nata].

The exclusion of the three latter Predicables from predication probably recommended itself to the author as a support to his doctrine that all Predication is the substitution of one name for another, which he considered himself to have already demonstrated so far as regards Genus and Species. But proofs have just been given that in the predication of Genus and Species no more than in that of Differentia, Proprium, or Accidens, is anything which turns upon names the main consideration. Except in the case of definitions, and other merely verbal propositions, every proposition is intended to communicate a matter of fact: This subject has that attribute--This cluster of sensations is always accompanied by that sensation.

Let me remark by the way, that the word _connote_ is here used by the author in what I consider its legitimate sense--that in which a name is said to connote a property or properties belonging to the object it is predicated of. He afterwards casts off this use of the term, and introduces one the exact reverse: but of this hereafter.--_Ed._]

{170} With respect, however, to such examples as this last, namely, all those in which the predicate consists {171} of the genus and differentia, the proposition is a mere definition; and the predicate, and the subject, are precisely equivalent. Thus, "rational animal" is precisely the same class as "man;" and they are only two names for the same thing; the one a simple, or single-worded name; the other a complex, or double-worded, name. Such propositions therefore are, properly speaking, not Predications at all. When they are used for any other purpose than to make known, or to fix, the meaning of a term, they are useless, and are denominated identical propositions.[52]

[Editor's footnote 52: In this passage the author virtually gives up the part of his theory of Predication which is borrowed from Hobbes. According to his doctrine in this place, whenever the predicate and the subject are exactly equivalent, and "are only two names for the same thing," the predication serves only "to make known, or to fix, the meaning of a term," and "such propositions are, properly speaking, not Predications at all."--_Ed._]

The preceding expositions have shown the peculiar use of the _Copula_. The Predication consists, essentially, of two marks, whereof the first is called the Subject, the latter the Predicate; the Predicate being set down as a name to be used for every thing of which the Subject is a name; and the _Copula_ is merely a mark necessary to shew that the Predicate is to be taken and used as a substitute for the Subject.

There is a great convenience in giving to the _Copula_ the same powers of connotation, in respect of Time, {172} Manner, Person, and Number, as we have seen to be usefully annexed to the Verb.

It is necessary to explain a little this convenience; and the explanation will have another advantage, that it will still farther illustrate the manner in which Predication serves the great purpose of marking the Order of ideas in a Train.

If the sensations or ideas in a train were to be marked as merely so many independent items, the mode of marking the order of them would be simple; the order of the marks itself might suffice. If this, for example, were the train; smell of a rose, sight of a rat, sound of a trumpet, touch of velvet, prick of a pin, these names placed in order might denote the order of the sensations.

In the greater number of instances, however, it is necessary to mark the train as the train of somebody; and for this purpose additional machinery is required. Suppose that the train I have to mark is the train of John, a train of the sensations of John; what are the marks for which I shall have occasion? It is first of all evident that I must have a mark for John, and a mark for each of the sensations. Suppose it is my purpose to represent John as having a sensation by each of his senses, sight, smell, &c., how must I proceed? I have first the word John, for the mark of the person; and I have the word seeing, for the mark of the sensation. But beside the marks, "John," "seeing," I have occasion for a mark to show that I mean the mark "seeing" to be applied to the mark "John," and not to any other. For that purpose I use the word "is." I say "John is seeing," and the first sensation of John's train is now sufficiently {173} denoted. In the same manner I proceed with the rest; John is smelling, John is tasting, John is hearing, John is touching.

But I have often occasion to speak not only of John's present sensations, but of his past or his future sensations; not of John as merely now seeing, hearing, &c., but as having been, or as going to be, the subject of these sensations. The _Copula_ may be so contrived as most commodiously to connote the main distinctions of Time: not merely to mark the connection between the two marks which form the subject and the predicate of the proposition, but to mark, along with this, either past, or present, or future, Time. Thus, if I say John is seeing, the copula marks present time along with the peculiar connection between the predicate and the subject; if I say John was seeing, it connotes past time; if I say John will be seeing, it connotes future time.

As, in explaining the functions of verbs, there appeared a convenience in the contrivance by which they were made to connote three Manners; first, when no reference is made to any thing which is previously spoken of; secondly, when a reference is made to something which is previously spoken of; thirdly, when a reference is made to the will of one of the PERSONS; it will now be seen that there is the same convenience in making the _Copula_ connote these references by a similar contrivance. Thus, when we speak of a man having sensations, we may speak of him as having them or as not having them, in consequence of something previously spoken of; or we may speak of him as having them in consequence of our will. It is, therefore, useful, that the _Copula_ should {174} have moods as well as tenses. The same thing may be said of persons and numbers; of which no illustration seems to be required.

We come next to an observation respecting the _Copula_, to which the greatest attention is due. In all Languages, the Verb which denotes EXISTENCE has been employed to answer the additional purpose of the _Copula_ in Predication. The consequences of this have been most lamentable. There is thus a double meaning in the _Copula_, which has produced a most unfortunate mixture and confusion of ideas. It has involved in mystery the whole business of Predication; the grand contrivance by which language is rendered competent to its end. By darkening Predication, it has spread such a veil over the phenomena of mind, as concealed them from ordinary eyes, and allowed them to be but imperfectly seen by those which were the most discerning.

In our own language, the verb, TO BE, is the important word which is employed to connote, along with its Subject, whatever it be, the grand idea of EXISTENCE. Thus, if I use the first person singular of its indicative mood, and say, "I am," I affirm EXISTENCE of myself. "I am," is the equivalent of "I am EXISTING." In the first of these expressions, "I am," the mark "am" involves in it the force of two marks; it involves the meaning of the word "existing," and the marking power or meaning of the _Copula_. In the second expression "I am existing," the word "am" ought to serve the purpose of the _Copula_ only. But in reality its connotation of EXISTENCE still adheres to it; and whereas the expression ought to consist of the three established parts of a Predication; 1, the _subject_ {175} "I;" 2, the _predicate_ EXISTING; and 3, the _copula_; it in reality consists of, 1, the subject "I;" 2, the predicate EXISTING; 3, the _Copula_; which signifies, 4, EXISTING, over again.

Let us take, as another case, that in which the subject and predicate of my intended proposition are, the word "I" and "reading." I want for the purpose of predication only a _Copula_ to signify nakedly that the mark "reading" is applied to the mark "I;" but instead of this I am obliged to use a word which connotes EXISTENCE, along with the force of the _Copula_; and when I say "I am reading," not only _reading_ is predicated of me, but EXISTING also. Suppose, again, my subject is "John," my predicate "dead," I am obliged to use for my _Copula_ the word "is," which connotes EXISTENCE, and I thus predicate of John both _existence_ and _death_.

It may be easily collected, from this one example, what heterogeneous and inconsistent ideas may be forced into connection by the use of the Substantive Verb as the _Copula_ in Predication; and what confusion in the mental processes it tends to produce. It is in the case, however, of the higher abstractions, and the various combinations of ideas which the mind, in the processes of enquiring and marking, forms for its own convenience, to obtain a greater command over its stores and greater facility in communicating them, that the use of the verb which conjoins the Predication of EXISTENCE with every other Predication, has produced the wildest confusion, and been the most deeply injurious. Is it any wonder, for example, that _Chance_, and _Fate_, and _Nature_, have been personified, and have had an EXISTENCE ascribed {176} to them, as objects, when we have no means of predicating anything whatsoever of them, without predicating such EXISTENCE at the same time. If we say that "chance is nothing;" we predicate of it, by the word "is," both _existence_ and _nothingness_.

When this is the case, it is by no means to be wondered at, that philosophers should so long have inquired what those EXISTENCES are which abstract terms were employed to express; and should have lost themselves in fruitless speculations about the nature of entity, and quiddity, substance, and quality, space, time, necessity, eternity, and so on.

It is necessary here to take notice of a part of the marking power of Verbs, which could not be explained till the nature of the _copula_ was understood.

Every Verb involves in it the force of the _copula_. It combines the marking powers of an _adjective_, and of the _copula_; and all Verbs may be resolved into those elements. Thus, "John walks," is the same with "John is walking." Verbs, therefore, are attributives, of the same nature as adjectives, only with additional connotative powers; and they cut smaller classes out of larger, in the manner of adjectives. Thus "John walks," is an expression, the same in import as the Predication "John is a walking man;" and, walking men, standing men, running men, lying men, are all sub-species of the Species Man.

The same unhappy duplicity of meaning, which is incurred by using the _Substantive_ Verb as the _copula_ in Predication, is inflicted on _other_ Verbs, in that part of their marking power by which they exhibit the connection between the two terms of a Predication.

The _copula_, included in Verbs, is not the PURE _copula_, {177} but the ACTUAL _copula_; the _copula_ familiar and in constant use; namely, the Substantive Verb. From this it results, that whatever the peculiar attribute, which is predicated by means of any verb, EXISTENCE is always predicated along with it. Thus, when I say "John walks," which is equivalent to "John is walking," I predicate both existence, and walking, of John. When I say, "Caliban existed not," which is the same as "Caliban was not existing," I predicate both existence, and non-existence, of the imaginary being Caliban. By the two first words of the Predication, "Caliban was," existence is predicated of him; by the addition of the compound term "not existing," the opposite is predicated of him.

The instances, in which the more complicated formations of the mind are the subjects of this double Predication, are those which, from the importance of their consequences, deserve the greatest degree of attention. Thus, when we say "virtue exalts," both _existing_, and _exalting_, are predicated of virtue. When we say that "passion impels," both _existence_, and _impulsion_, are predicated of passion. When we say that "Time generates," and "Space contains all things," we affirm _existence_ of space and time, by the same expression by which we affirm of the one, that it generates; of the other, that it contains. This constancy of Predication, forcing the same constancy in the junction of the ideas, furnishes a remarkable instance of that important case of association, of which we took notice above, where, by frequency of association, two ideas become so joined, that the one constantly rises, and cannot be prevented from rising, in combination with the other. Thus it is, {178} that Time forces itself upon us as an _object_. So it is with Space. We cannot think of Space, we cannot think of Time, without thinking of them as existent. With the ideas of space and time, the idea of EXISTENCE, as it is predicated of objects, is so associated, by the use of the Substantive Verb as the _copula_ in predication, that we cannot disjoin them. The same would have been the case with Chance, and Fate, and Nature; if our religious education did not counteract the association. It was precisely the same, among the Greeks and Romans, whose religious education had not that effect.[53] [54]

[Findlater's footnote 53: The account of predication above given is in conformity with the phenomena of the family of languages known as the Indo-European. Logicians, in fact, in treating of this subject have had almost exclusive regard to Greek and Latin and the literary languages of modern Europe, which are all of one type. It might therefore be presumed that the theory thus formed would be found not to fit in all its parts when applied to languages of an altogether different structure. The mental process must doubtless be the same in all; but the words that express the several parts may be used in new and unprecedented ways. Were naturalists to construct a scheme of the animal organism without ever having seen any other animals than those of the vertebrate type, the theory would certainly fail in generality; certain organs or functions would be set down as essential to animal existence which acquaintance with other classes of creatures shows can be quite well dispensed with. Similarly, the current theory of predication, when viewed in the light of a wider and deeper knowledge of the organism of speech, seems to attach an exaggerated importance to the peculiar predicative power presumed to be inherent in verbs, and especially in the verb of existence. It is now a well known fact that in the monosyllabic class of languages, in which a third part of the human race express their thoughts, there is no distinction among the parts of speech. In Chinese, for example, the word _ta_ expresses indifferently great, greatness, to be great, to make great or magnify, greatly. It is only position that determines in each case how the word is to be understood; thus traditional convention assigns to _ta fu_ the meaning of "a great man," and to _fu ta_ that of "the man is great." Being habituated to the constant use of the verb _is_ in such a case as the latter, we are apt to suppose that the expression derives its predicative force from its suggesting the verb of existence, which the mind instinctively and necessarily supplies for itself. How little ground there is for this presumed necessity, has been conclusively shown by the late Mr. Garnett, in his profound and exhaustive essay on the Nature and Analysis of the Verb. Speaking of the theory that makes the essential difference between the verb and other parts of speech to reside in the verb substantive, which is to be supplied by the mind in all cases where the functions of the verb proper are to be called into requisition, he observes: "This theory presupposes the existence of a verb substantive in the languages in question, and consciousness of that existence and of the force and capabilities of the element in those who speak them. Unfortunately the Spanish grammarians, to whom we are indebted for what knowledge we possess of the Philippine dialects, unanimously concur in stating that there is no verb substantive either in Tagalá, Pampanga, or Bisaya, nor any means of supplying the place of one, except the employment of pronouns and particles. Mariner makes a similar remark respecting the Tonga language; and we may venture to affirm that there is not such a thing as a true verb substantive in any one member of the great Polynesian family.

"It is true that the Malayan, Javanese and Malagassy grammarians talk of words signifying _to be_; but an attentive comparison of the elements which they profess to give as such, shows clearly that they are no verbs at all, but simply pronouns or indeclinable particles, commonly indicating the time, place or manner of the specified action or relation. It is not therefore easy to conceive how the mind of a Philippine islander, or of any other person, can supply a word totally unknown to it, and which there is not a particle of evidence to show that it ever thought of."

Of the substitutes put in place of the substantive verb, by far the most common are pronouns, and particles indicating position. Thus in Coptic, the descendant of the ancient Egyptian, the demonstrative _pe_, "this," after a noun singular masculine, or _te_ when the noun is feminine, is equivalent to _is_; and _ne_, "these," after a plural, to _are_. In the ancient hieroglyphic monuments the function of the substantive verb is performed by the same means. Even in the Semitic languages, which have substantive verbs, pronouns are habitually used instead of them; so that _I I_, or _I he_, stands for _I am_, and _we we_ or _we they_, for _we are_. "Thou art my King" (Ps. 44, 5) is in the Hebrew "Thou _he_ my King;" "We are the servants of the God of heaven" (Ezra 5, 11) is in Chaldee "We _they_ servants of the God of heaven;" "I am the light of the world," is in Arabic "I _he_ the light of the world."

Although such modes of expression are foreign to the Indo-European languages, even they furnish abundant evidence of the predicative power of pronouns and particles. If any word required to have inherent in it the peculiar affirmative power attributed to verbs, it is the word _yes_. Accordingly Tooke derives it from the French imperative _a-yez_: forgetting, or not knowing, that the Anglo-Saxon _gese_ or _yea_ (cognate with the Sanscrit pronoun _ya_) was in existence long before the French _ayez_. The fact is that Eng. _yes_, Ger. _ja_, and the corresponding words in the other European languages are oblique cases of demonstrative pronouns, and mean simply "in this (manner)," or "thus." The Italian _si_ (yes) is from Lat. _sic_, (thus); the Provençal _oc_ is from Lat. _hoc_; and the modern Fr. _oui_ was originally a combination of _hoc illo_, and passed through the stages of _ocil_ and _oil_ into its present form.

The consideration of these and a multitude of similar phenomena suggests, that the Sanscrit _as-mi_, Gr. _ei-mi_, Lat. _s-um_ (for _es-um_), Eng. _a-m_, may have had for its root the demonstrative pronoun _sa_, and meant primarily "that (or there) as to me." Be that as it may, all philologists are agreed that the verbs now used to express _being_ in the abstract, expressed originally something physical and palpable. Thus Ital. _stato_, Fr. _été_, _been_, are from the Lat. _statum_, the participle of _sto_, "to stand;" and _exist_ itself meant "to stand out or be prominent." Eng. _be_, Lat. _fu-_ is identical with Gr. _phy-_ "to grow;" and, according to Max Müller, as the root of _as-mi_ meant "breath" or "breathing." It may then be safely affirmed that no word had for its primary function to express mere existence; it seems enough for the purpose of predication that existence be implied.

With regard to ordinary verbs, the analytic processes of comparative grammar show no traces of a substantive verb entering into their structure. It is now an accepted doctrine of philology that, as a rule, the root of a verb is of the nature of an abstract noun; and that it became a verb simply by the addition of a pronominal affix--as in the Greek [Greek: di/-dô-mi, di/-dô-s, di/-dô-si], in which the terminations were originally [Greek: -mi, -si, -ti]. The habits of thought arising out of the present analytic state of the Indo-European languages naturally lead us to conceive these pronominal affixes as nominatives. But _gift I_ does not seem a very natural way of getting at the meaning "I give;" and therefore Mr. Garnett maintains that the affixes were originally in an oblique case--the genitive or the instrumental--so that the literal meaning was "gift of me," or "giving by me." That this is the nature of the verb in the agglutinate languages--by far the most numerous class--it seems hardly possible to dispute; for in these the affixes remain rigidly distinct and little disguised. Thus, according to Garnett, the Wotiak, in order to express "my son," "thy son," &c., joins oblique cases of the personal pronouns to the noun _pi_ in the following way:--

pi-[)i] .... son of me
pi-ed . . . son of thee
pi-ez . . . son of him
pi-mi . . . son of us
pi-dy . . . son of you
pi-zy . . . son of them

In an exactly similar way the preterite of the verb to speak stands thus--

bera-i . . . speech of me == I spoke
bera-d . . . speech of thee
bera-z . . . speech of him
bera-my . . speech of us
bera-dy . . speech of you
bera-zy . . speech of them

In the Fiji language _loma_ means "heart" or "will;" and _loma-qu_ (heart of me) may, according to the connection, signify either "my heart or will," or "I will."

In the inflected languages the affixes are so amalgamated with the root and otherwise obliterated that there is no such direct evidence of their nature; but a great many facts tend to show that the structure of the verb was originally the same as in the agglutinate family.

If this analysis of the verb is correct, the affirmation of existence found no expression in the early stages of language; _the real copula connecting the subject with the predicate was the proposition contained in the oblique case of the pronominal affix_.--_F._]

[Editor's footnote 54: The interesting and important philological facts adduced by Mr. Findlater, confirm and illustrate in a very striking manner the doctrine in the text, of the radical distinction between the functions of the copula in predication, and those of the substantive verb; by shewing that many languages have no substantive verb, no verb expressive of mere *existence, and yet signify their predications by other means; and that probably all languages began without a substantive verb, though they must always have had predications.

The confusion between these two different functions in the European languages, and the ambiguity of the verb To Be, which fulfils them both, are among the most important of the minor philosophical truths to which attention has been called by the author of the Analysis. As in the case of many other luminous thoughts, an approach is found to have been made to it by previous thinkers. Hobbes, though he did not reach it, came very close to it, and it was still more distinctly anticipated by Laromiguière, though without any sufficient perception of its value. It occurs in a criticism on a passage of Pascal, and in the following words. "Quand on dit, l'être est, _etc._ le mot _est_, ou le verbe, n'exprime pas la même chose que le mot être, sujet de la définition. Si j'énonce la proposition suivante: Dieu est existant, je ne voudrais pas dire assurément, Dieu existe existant: cela ne ferait pas un sens; de même, si je dis que Virgile est poëte, je ne veux pas donner à entendre que Virgile existe. Le verbe _est_, dans la proposition, n'exprime donc pas l'existence réelle; il n'exprime qu'un rapport spécial entre le sujet et l'attribut, le rapport du contenant au contenu," &c. (Leçons de Philosophie, 7^{me} ed. vol. i. p. 307.) Having thus hit upon an unobvious truth in the course of an argument directed to another purpose, he passes on and takes no further notice of it.