Chapter XII: Section I: Smell (7)

It may seem strange that the verb which signifies existence should have been employed in so many different languages as the sign of predication, if there is no real connection between the two meanings. But languages have been built up by the extension of an originally small number of words, with or without alterations of form, to express new meanings, the choice of the word being often determined by very distant analogies. In the present case, the analogy is not distant. All our predications are intended to declare the manner in which something affects, or would affect, ourselves or others. Our idea of existence is simply the idea of something which affects or would affect us somehow, without distinction of mode. Everything, therefore, which we can have occasion to assert of an existing thing, may be looked upon as a particular mode of its existence. Since snow is white, and since snow exists, it may be said to exist white; and if a sign was wanted by which to predicate white of snow, the word exists would be very likely to present itself. But most of our predications do relate to existing things: and this being so, it is in the ordinary course of the human mind that the same sign should be adhered to when we are predicating something of a merely imaginary thing (an abstraction, for instance) and that, being so used, it should create an association between the abstraction and the notion of real existence.--_Ed._]

{179} We have now observed, wherein Predication consists, and the instruments by which it is performed. {180} We have also, in part, contemplated the End which it is destined to fulfil; that is, to mark the order in which sensations and ideas follow one another in a {181} train. On this last part of the subject, however, the following observations are still required.

The trains, the order of which we have occasion to {182} mark, may for the elucidation of the present subject, be divided into two classes. We have occasion to {183} mark, either, first, The series of the objects we have seen, heard, or otherwise perceived by our senses; or, {184} secondly, A train of thoughts which may have passed in our minds.

1. When we come to record a train of the objects we have perceived, that is, a train of sensations, the sensations have become ideas; for the objects are not now acting on our senses, and the sensations are at an end.

The order of the objects of our senses, is either the order of time, or the order of place. The first is the order of SUCCESSION; when one object comes first, another next, and so on. The second is the order of POSITION; when the objects are considered as simultaneous, but different in distance and direction from a particular point.

Let us observe in what manner the artifice of {185} Predication is adapted to the marking of a train in either of those orders: and first, with respect to a train in the order of Time.

Of this the following may be taken as a simple example. "The sun rises; clouds form; clouds cover the sky; lightning flashes; thunder roars." It is easy in these expressions to observe, what were the sensations, and in what order they succeeded one another. It is also observable, that the order is denoted by so many Predications; and that Predication is our only expedient for denoting their order. First sensation, "sight of the sun;" second sensation, "rising of the sun;" these two denoted shortly and in their order by the Predication, "the sun rises." Third sensation, "sight of clouds;" fourth sensation, "forming of clouds;" these two again shortly denoted in their order by the Predication, "clouds form." The next, "clouds cover the sky," needs no further explanation; but there is a peculiar artifice of language in the two following Predications; "lightning flashes," "thunder roars," which deserves to be well understood. "Lightning flashes;" here there is but one sensation, the sensation of sight, which we call a flash. But there are various kinds of flashes; this is a peculiar one, and I want to mark peculiarly what it is. It is not a flash on the earth, but a flash in the sky; it will not, however, sufficiently distinguish the flash in question, to say, the sky flashes, because other flashes come from the sky. What then is my contrivance? I form the fancy of a cause of this particular flash, though I know nothing concerning it, and for this unknown cause I invent a name, and call it lightning. I have then an expression which always accurately {186} marks the sensation I mean to denote: I say, "the lightning flashes," "a flash of lightning," and so on. "Thunder roars," is another case of the same artifice. The noise here is the only sensation; but in order to distinguish it from all other noises, I invent a name for its unknown cause, and by its means can mark the sensation with perfect precision.

The Fictions, after this manner resorted to, for the purpose of marking; though important among the artifices of naming; have contributed largely to the misdirection of thought.

By the unfortunate ambiguity of the _Copula_, EXISTENCE is affirmed of them in every Predication into which they enter. The idea of EXISTENCE becomes, by this means, inseparable from them; and their true nature, as Creatures of the mind, and nothing more, is rarely, and not without difficulty, perceived.

The mode in which a train, in the order of place, is marked by the artifice of Predication, may be thus exemplified: "The house is on a hill; a lawn is in front; a stable is on the left hand; a garden is on the right; a wood is behind." It is not necessary, after the exposition of the preceding example, to exhibit the detail of the marking performed by these Predications. The reader can trace the sensations, the order of them, and the mode of the marking, according to the specimen which has just been exhibited.

2. The trains of thought which pass in our minds, are sequences, the items of which are connected in three principal ways: 1st, as cause and effect; 2dly, as resembling; 3dly, as included under the same name. A short illustration of each of these cases will {187} complete the account of predication, as a contrivance for marking the order of ideas.

To illustrate a sequence, connected as Cause and Effect, let me suppose that I have a flint and steel in my hand, which I am about to strike, one against the other, but at that instant perceive a barrel of gunpowder open, close before me. I withhold the stroke in consequence of the train of thought which suggests to me the ultimate effect. If I have occasion to mark the train, I can only do it by a series of Predications, each of which marks a sequence in the train of causes and effects. "I strike the flint on the steel," first sequence. "The stroke produces a spark," second sequence. "The spark falls on gunpowder," third sequence. "The spark ignites the gunpowder," fourth sequence. "The gunpowder ignited makes an explosion," fifth sequence. The ideas contained in these propositions must all have passed through my mind, and this is the only mode in which language enables me to mark them in their order.[55]

[Editor's footnote 55: It is necessary again to notice the consistent omission, throughout the author's theory of Predication, of the element Belief. In the case supposed, the ideas contained in all the propositions might have passed through the mind, without our being led to assert the propositions. I might have thought of every step in the series of phenomena mentioned, might have pictured all of them in my imagination, and have come to the conclusion that they would not happen. I therefore should not have made, either in words or in thought, the predication, This gunpowder will explode if I strike the flint against the steel. Yet the same ideas would have passed through my mind in the same order, in which they stand in the text. The only deficient link would have been the final one, the Belief.--_Ed._]

{188} The sequences of which the items are connected by Resemblance will not require much illustration. I see A, who suggests B to me by his stature. B suggests C by the length of his nose. C suggests D by the similarity of their profession, and so on. The series of my thoughts is sufficiently obvious. How do I proceed when I have occasion to mark it? I use a series of predications. "I see A;" this predication marks the first item, my sight of A. "A is tall," the second. "A man of like tallness is B," the third; and so on.

The mode in which thoughts are united in a Syllogism, is the leading example of the third case. Let us consider the following very familiar instance. "Every tree is a vegetable: every oak is a tree: therefore, every oak is a vegetable." This is evidently a process of naming. The primary idea is that of the object called an oak; from the name oak, I proceed to the name tree, finding that the name oak, is included in the name tree; and from the name tree, I proceed to the name vegetable, finding that the name tree is included in the name vegetable, and by consequence the name oak. This is the series of thoughts, which is marked in order, by the three propositions or predications of the syllogism.[56]

[Editor's footnote 56: For the present I shall only remark on this theory of the syllogism, that it must stand or fall with the theory of Predication of which it is the sequel. If, as I have maintained, the propositions which are the premises of the syllogism are not correctly described as mere processes of naming, neither is the formula by which a third proposition is elicited from these two a process of mere naming. What it is, will be considered hereafter.--_Ed._]

{189} The Predications of Arithmetic are another instance of the same thing. "One and one are two." This again is a mere process of naming. What I call one and one, in numbering things, are objects, sensations, or clusters of sensations; suppose, the striking of the clock. The same sounds which I call one and one, I call also two; I have for these sensations, therefore, two names which are exactly equivalent: so when I say, one and one and one are three: or when I say, two and two are four: ten and ten are twenty: and the same when I put together any two numbers whatsoever. The series of thoughts in these instances is merely a series of names applicable to the same thing, and meaning the same thing.

Beside the two purposes of language, of which I took notice at the beginning of this inquiry; the recording of a man's thoughts for his own use, and the communication of them to others; there is a use, to which language is subservient, of which some account is yet to be given. There are complex sensations, and complex ideas, made up of so many items, that one is not distinguishable from another. Thus, a figure of one hundred sides, is not distinguishable from one of ninety-nine sides. A thousand men in a crowd are not distinguishable from nine hundred and ninety-nine. But in all cases, in which the complexity of the idea arises from the repetition of the same idea, names can be invented upon a plan, which shall render them distinct, up to the very highest degree of complication. Numbers are a set of names contrived upon this plan, and for this very purpose. Ten and the numbers below ten, are the repetition of so many ones: twenty, thirty, forty, &c., up to a hundred, are {190} the repetition of so many tens: two hundred, three hundred, &c., the repetition of so many hundreds; and so on. These are names, which afford an immediate reference to the ones or units, of which they are composed; and the highest numbers are as easily distinguished by the difference of a unit as the lowest. All the processes of Arithmetic are only so many contrivances to substitute a distinct name for an indistinct one. What, for example, is the purpose of addition? Suppose I have six numbers, of which I desire to take the sum, 18, 14, 9, 25, 19, 15; these names, eighteen, and fourteen, and nine, &c., form a compound name; but a name which is not distinct. By summing them up, I get another name, exactly equivalent, one hundred, which is in the highest degree distinct, and gives me an immediate reference to the units or items of which it is composed; and this is of the highest utility.

That the Predications of Geometry are of the same nature with those of Arithmetic, is a truth of the greatest importance, and capable of being established by very obvious reasoning. It is well known, that all reasoning about quantity can be expressed in the form of algebraic equations. But the two sides of an algebraic equation are of necessity two marks or two names for the same thing; of which the one on the right-hand side is more distinct, at least to the present purpose of the inquirer, than the one on the left-hand side; and the whole purpose of an algebraic investigation, which is a mere series of changes of names, is to obtain, at last, a distinct name, a name the marking power of which is perfectly known to us, on the right-hand side of the equation. The language of geometry {191} itself, in the more simple cases, makes manifest the same observation. The amount of the three angles of a triangle, is twice a right angle. I arrive at this conclusion, as it is called, by a process of reasoning: that is to say, I find out a name "twice a right angle," which much more distinctly points out to me a certain quantity, than my first name, "amount of the three angles of a triangle;" and the process by which I arrive at this name is a successive change of names, and nothing more; as any one may prove to himself by merely observing the steps of the demonstration.[57]

[Editor's footnote 57: I cannot see any propriety in the expression that when we infer the sum of the three angles of a triangle to be twice a right angle, the operation consists in finding a second name which more distinctly points out the quantity than the first name. When we assent to the proof of this theorem, we do much more than obtain a new and more expressive name for a known fact; we learn a fact previously unknown. It is true that one result of our knowledge of this theorem is to give us a name for the sum of the three angles, "the marking power of which is perfectly known to us:" but it was not for want of knowing the marking power of the phrase "sum of the three angles of a triangle" that we did not know what that sum amounted to. We knew perfectly what the expression "sum of the three angles" was appointed to mark. What we have obtained, that we did not previously possess, is not a better mark for the same thing, but an additional fact to mark the fact which is marked by predicating of that sum, the phrase "twice a right angle."--_Ed._]

There is one important class of words, the NAMES of NAMES; of which we shall have occasion to take account more particularly hereafter, and of which it is necessary here to speak only as they form a variety of Predication. A few examples will make the case {192} intelligible. WORD is a generical name for all Names. It is not the name of a Thing, as chair is the name of a thing, or watch, or picture. But word is a _name_ for these several _names_; chair is a word, watch is a word, picture is a word, and so of all other names. Thus grammatical and logical terms are names of names. The word _noun_, is the name of one class of words, _verb_ of another, _preposition_ of another, and so on. The word _sentence_, is the name of a series of words put together for a certain purpose; the word _paragraph_ the same; and so _oration_, _discourse_, _essay_, _treatise_, &c. The words _genus_ and _species_, are not names of things, but of names. Genus is not the name of any thing called animal or any thing called body; it is a name of the _names_ animal, body, and so on; the _name_ animal is a _genus_, the name _body_ is a _genus_; and in like manner is the _name_ man a _species_, the _name_ horse, the name crow, and so on. The name _proposition_, the name _syllogism_, are names of a series of words put together for a particular purpose; and so is the term _definition_; and the term _argument_. It will be easily seen that these words enter into Predication precisely on the same principles as other words. Either the more distinct is predicated of the less distinct, its equivalent; or the more comprehensive of the less comprehensive. Thus we say, that nouns and verbs are declinables; preposition and adverb indeclinables; where the more comprehensive terms are predicated of the less. Thus we say, that adjectives and verbs are attributes; where the more distinct is predicated of the less.[58]

[Editor's footnote 58: This exposition of the class of words which are properly names of names, belongs originally to Hobbes, and is highly {193} important. They are a kind of names, the signification of which is very often misunderstood, and has given occasion to much hazy speculation. It should however be remarked that the words genus and species are not solely names of names; they are ambiguous. A genus never indeed means (as many of the schoolmen supposed) an abstract entity, distinct from all the individuals composing the class; but it often means the sum of those individuals taken collectively; the class as a whole, distinguished on the one hand from the single objects comprising it, and on the other hand from the class name.--_Ed._]

{194} SECTION V.

PRONOUNS.

The principal part of the artifice of Naming is now explained. We have considered the nature of the more necessary marks, and the manner in which they are combined so as to represent the order of a train. Beside those marks, which are the fundamental part of language, there are several classes of auxiliary words or marks, the use of which is, to abbreviate expression, and to render it, what is of great importance, a more rapid vehicle of thought. These are usually comprehended under the titles of pronoun, adverb, preposition, and conjunction; a classification which, for our present purpose, has the best recommendation, that of being familiarly known.

It is to be distinctly understood, that in the account which is here to be given of the subsidiary parts of speech, it is but one part of the explanation of them which will be attempted. The ideas, which many of them stand for, are of the most complicated kind, and have not yet been expounded. We are, therefore, not yet prepared to point out the items which they mark. Our present business is only to indicate the mode in which they are used in Predication, as part of the great contrivance for marking the order of a train of ideas, and for economizing the number of words.

It is also necessary to observe, that I have limited myself, in this part, to brief indications, without {195} going into minute development, the length of which, it appeared to me, would not be compensated by the advantage.

In all speech *there is a _speaker_; there is some _person spoken to_; and there is some _person_ or _thing spoken of_. These objects constitute three Classes, marks of which are perpetually required. Any artifice, therefore, to abridge the use of marks, of such frequent recurrence, was highly to be desired. One expedient offered itself obviously, as likely to prove of the highest utility. Speakers constituted one class, with numerous names; persons spoken to, a second class; persons and things spoken of, a third. A generical name might be invented for each class; a name, which would include all of a class, and which singly might be used as the substitute of many. For this end were the Personal Pronouns invented and such is their character and office. "I," is the generical mark which includes all marks of the class, _speakers_. "Thou," is a generical mark, which includes all marks of the class, _persons spoken to_. "He," "she," "it," are marks, which include all marks of the class, _persons_ or _things spoken of_.

By forming Adjectives from certain kinds of Nouns we obtain a useful class of specific names. From wool we make woollen; and woollen, attached to various generic names, furnishes us with specific names; thus we say woollen cloth, which is a species of cloth; woollen yarn, which is a species of yarn; woollen garment, which is a species of garment. So, from the word gold we make golden, which furnishes us with a greater number of specific names; from wood wooden, which furnishes us with a still greater number. Adjectives are {196} formed in like manner from the personal pronouns: from I, my or mine; from Thou, thy or thine; from He, She, It, his, hers, its; also from the plurals of them, ours, yours, theirs. These adjectives answer a purpose of very frequent recurrence; that of singling out, from any class of objects, a sub-class, or an individual, bearing a peculiar relation, to the _person speaking_, the _person spoken to_, or the _person_ or _thing spoken of_. Thus, when I say, my sheep or my oxen, I denote a sub-class of those animals, those which stand in the relation of property to the speaker; when I say thy sheep or oxen, I denote a sub-class in the same relation to the person spoken to; and when I say his sheep or oxen, a sub-class, standing in that relation to the person spoken of. When I say my son, thy wife, his father, I single out individuals having that relation.

The Demonstrative Pronouns, This and That, are of great utility. They serve to individualize any thing in a class. One of these marks put upon a specific mark, makes it an individual mark. Thus, the mark "man," is the name of a class: put upon it the mark this, or that; this man, and that man, are marks, signs, or names, of individuals. In this manner innumerable individual names can be made, without adding a single word to the cumbrous materials of language.

The nature of the Relative Pronoun is not difficult to understand. It supplies the place of a personal pronoun and a conjunction, in connecting a Predication with the subject, or predicate of another proposition. Thus, "John received a wound, which occasioned his death," is of the same import as "John received a wound, _and it_ occasioned his death." This {197} is a case in which the Relative connects a subsequent predication with the _predicate_ of an antecedent predication. The following are cases in which it connects a subordinate predication with the _subject_ of the principal one: "Erasmus, _who_ was a lover of truth, but of a timid character, hesitated between the new and the old religion." Erasmus, _and he_ was a lover of truth, &c. "The man _who_ spoke to you is my father." "The man spoke to you, _and he_ is my father."[59]

[Findlater's footnote 59: There is really no well marked distinction between relative pronouns and demonstrative pronouns, either in their origin or in their use. Of the demonstrative roots _ka_, _sa_, _ta_, _ja_, derivatives from the *guttural _ka_ prevail as relatives in Latin and its modern descendants (Lat. _qui_, It. _che_, Fr. _qui_), and in the Teutonic languages (Goth. _hva_, Eng. _who_, Ger. _wer_, _welch_), but by no means exclusively. In Greek the relative differs little from the article, which is also used as a demonstrative and a personal pronoun. Modern Italian uses as a demonstrative a compound of the Latin _qui_ with _iste_ and _illa_--_questo_, _quella_. In German the relative proper, viz. _welch_, is comparatively little used, its place being supplied by the article _der_, which is merely an unemphatic demonstrative; and in English _that_ is perhaps as often used as who or which.

The relative serves for two purposes, which it is useful to distinguish. (1) It may add on either a clause containing an independent proposition, as in the example in the text, "John received a wound, which occasioned his death;" or a clause dependent in some way upon the preceding--_e.g._ assigning the reason of it, as, "It was unjust to punish the servant, who only did what he was ordered." (2) The clause introduced by the relative may serve simply to limit or define a noun, in the way that an adjective or another noun in apposition does, as "The man who spoke to you is my father." It is in this latter use of the relative, and in no other, that it is permissible in English to use _that_; to substitute _that_ for _which_ in the first of the other two sentences, or for _who_ in the second, would give a different meaning. Now it is only in the cases in which _that_ could not be substituted for who or which that the relative involves the force of a conjunction; and it is not always _and_ that is the conjunction involved. The conjunction has no verbal expression, and never had; it is only suggested, and the mind supplies that which best suits the logical connection. When the predication of the relative clause is co-ordinate with the preceding, as in the first example, _and_ is the proper conjunction to supply. In the sentence about the punishment of the servant, _who_ is equivalent to _for he_; and in that about Erasmus, in the text, to _inasmuch as he_. When the relative clause merely defines, no conjunction of any kind is even implied. In such a sentence as "He rewarded the man that rescued him," the relative clause is the answer to a question naturally suggested by "He rewarded the man"--what man? "The or that (man) rescued him;" which is equivalent to, "his rescuer." To resolve it into "And that man rescued him," gives quite a different meaning; namely, that he rewarded some man (otherwise known to the hearers) for something (likewise known to them), and that this man now rescued him.--_F._]

{198} The Interrogative is easily explained. It is merely the Relative, in a very elliptical form of expression. The interrogative sentence, "_Who_ gave you that book?" when the subaudition is supplied, is thus expressed: The person gave you the book, _and him_ I will you to name to me. "_What_ is the hour of the day?" is an elliptical form of,--It is an hour of the day, _and it_ I will you to tell me.

{199} SECTION VI.

ADVERBS.

The power of this class of words, in the great business of marking, and the extent of the service rendered by them, will be so easily seen, that a few words will suffice to explain them. Adverbs may be reduced under five heads; 1, Adverbs of Time; 2, Adverbs of Place; 3, Adverbs of Quantity; 4, Adverbs of Quality; 5, Adverbs of Relation. They are mostly abridgments, capable of being substituted for longer marks. And they are always employed for the purpose of putting a modification upon the Subject, or the Predicate, of a Proposition. A few examples will suffice for the further elucidation of this subject. "Anciently," is an adverb of time. It is of the same import as the expression, "In distant past time." It is applied to modify the subject, or predicate, of a proposition, as in the following example: "A number of men anciently in England had wives in common." "Had wives in common," is the predicate of the above proposition, and it is modified, or limited, in respect to time, by the word "anciently." Adverbs of place it is easy to exemplify in the same manner. Under adverbs of quantity all those which mark degrees may be included; as greatly, minutely: Thus, "He enlarged greatly upon patriotism:" "Greatly" here means "in many words;" and it modifies the predicate, "enlarged," &c. Adverbs of {200} quality and relation are exceedingly numerous, because they are easily made from the words which connote the quality or relation: thus, from hard, hardly; from loud, loudly; from sweet, sweetly; from warm, warmly: again, from father, paternally; from son, filially; from magistrate, magisterially; from high, highly; from expensive, expensively; and so on. In all this no difficulty is presented which requires removing.[60]

[Editor's footnote 60: In many cases, and even in some of the examples given, the adverb does not modify either the subject or the predicate, but the application of the one to the other. "Anciently," in the proposition cited, is intended to limit and qualify not men, nor community of wives, but the practice by men of community of wives: it is a circumstance affecting not the subject or the predicate, but the predication. The qualification of past and distant time attaches to the fact asserted, and to the copula, which is the mark of assertion. The reason of its seeming to attach to the predicate is because, as the author remarked in a previous section, the predicate, when a verb, includes the copula.--_Ed._]

{201} SECTION VII.

PREPOSITIONS.

It is easy to see in what manner Prepositions are employed to abridge the process of discourse. They render us the same service which, we have seen, is rendered by adjectives, in affording the means of naming minor classes, taken out of larger, with a great economy of names. Thus, when we say, "a man with a black skin," this compound name, "a man with a black skin;" is the name of a sub-class, taken out of the class man; and when we say, "a black man with a flat nose and woolly hair;" this still more compound name is the name of a minor class, taken out of the sub-class, "men with a black skin."

Prepositions always stand before some word of the class called by grammarians nouns substantive. And these nouns substantive they connect with other nouns substantive, with adjectives, or with verbs. We shall consider the use of them, in each of those cases.

1. Substantives are united to Substantives by prepositions, on purpose to mark something added, something taken away, something possessed or owned. Thus, a man with a dog, a horse without a saddle, a man of wealth, a man of pleasure, and so on.

It was first shewn by Mr. Horne Tooke, that prepositions, in their origin, are verbs, or nouns. Thus the prepositions in English, which note the modifications effected by adding to, or taking from, were {202} originally concrete words, which, beside something connoted by them, marked particularly _junction_, or _disjunction_. In the use of them as prepositions, that part of their signification, which we have called the connotation, has been dropped; and the notation alone remains. Prepositions, therefore, are a sort of abstract terms, to answer a particular purpose. To express my idea of a man with a dog (a very complex idea, consisting of two clusters; one, that which is marked by the term man; the other, that which is marked by the term dog); it is not enough that I set down the term Man, and the term Dog; it is necessary, besides, that I have a mark for that particular _junction_ of them, which my mind is making. For that mark I use the preposition "with." "Without" denotes disjunction in a similar manner, and requires no further explanation. The preposition "of," by which possession or ownership is denoted, (formerly, as remarked by Mr. Gilchrist, written _og_, _oc_, _ac_, &c.), is _eke_, or add. If we suppose that our verb _have_ is of the same origin, _of_ is merely the verb, which signifies possessing; and the learner may thus conceive the nature of its different applications.[7*] "A man of wealth," a man hav(ing) wealth; "a field of ten acres," a field hav(ing) ten acres; so, "a house of splendour;" "a woman of gallantry;" in all of which cases, beside the two clusters of ideas, marked by the two names which the preposition connects, there is an idea of possession coming between.

[*Mill's footnote 7: See note at p. 209.]

Here, however, a peculiarity is to be noted. When there is a possessor, there is something possessed. {203} The preposition, therefore, which marks the relation between the possessor and the possessed, stands ambiguously between the active and the passive power. It, therefore, partakes more of the active or the passive signification, according to the position of the words which it is employed to connect. In the instances previously given, we have seen that it had clearly an active signification. In the following it has clearly a passive. "The book of John;" the book _of_, hav(ed) John. "The Creator of the world;" Creator hav(ed). "The wealth of Croesus;" wealth hav(ed).

Of is employed in a partitive sense, when one of the words denotes a part of the other; as "half of the army;" "many of the people;" "much of the loss." In this case the idea of possession is sufficiently obvious to support the analogy. The parts are possessed, had, by the whole. "Part of the debt," part hav(ed) the debt.

It is easy to see how the preposition with a substantive, serves the purpose of a new adjective. Thus, in the expression, "a man with one eye," the words, "with one eye," might have been supplied by an adjective, having the same meaning or marking power; and the French language actually has such an adjective, in the mark _borgne_. We say, a man with red hair, and we have the adjective, red-haired; a man of wealth, and we have the adjective, wealthy; a man of strength, and we have the adjective, strong; cases which distinctly exemplify our observation.

2. We come now to shew in what manner, and with what advantage, prepositions are employed to connect Substantives with Adjectives. The following {204} classes of adjectives will furnish sufficient illustration of this part of the subject: 1, Adjectives of place or position; *2, Adjectives of time or succession; 3, Adjectives signifying profit or disprofit; 4, Adjectives of plenty or want; 5, Adjectives signifying an affection or state of the mind.

Adjectives of position, such as near, distant, high, low, have the ordinary power of adjectives, as marks upon marks; and an additional power, which will best be explained by examples. When we say "a distant house," "a neighbouring town;" the words "distant," and "neighbouring," are not only marks upon "house," and "town," but refer to something else: "a _distant_ house," is a house distant from _something_; "a _neighbouring_ town," is a town neighbouring _something_: it may mean "a house distant from my house," "a town neighbouring my house:" in these cases, we should say that the adjective has both a notation, and a connotation. The adjective _distant_, for example, notes _house_, and connotes _my house_; neighbouring, notes _town_, connotes _my house_. It is next, however, to be observed, that the connotation, in such cases, would be vague without a mark to determine it. The expression would be very imperfect, if, after the word high, we were merely to put the word "hill;" and say, "the house is high the hill;" or, "the house is distant the post-town." Prepositions supply this defect. We say, "the house is high _on_ the hill;" "the house is distant _from_ the post-town." In the case of some adjectives, their juxta-position makes the reference sufficiently precise; and in that case, the preposition may be dispensed with; as, near the town, near the road, &c.

{205} It is observable, that the adjectives of position are not numerous. Some very general ones are used; and the sub-species are formed out of them by the aid of prepositions. Thus we have the word placed, which includes all positions; and this, joined with a substantive and a preposition, marks positions of all kinds: thus we can say, placed on the right hand, placed on the left hand, placed behind the house, placed before the house, placed above it, placed below it, placed in it, and so on.

It is not my intention to inquire into the precise meaning of each of the prepositions. It is sufficient to have given a sample of the inquiry, as in the case of the prepositions which connect substantives with substantives; and to have shewn the mode of their signification, as a kind of abstract terms, either active or passive.

The varieties of time or succession are not many, and the words to denote them, proportionally few. Previous, simultaneous, posterior, are the principal adjectives; and the terms to which these words of reference point, are marked by prepositions: thus we say, previous to, simultaneous to, and also with; "with," as we have seen, denoting junction, sameness of time.

Adjectives of profit or disprofit, need prepositions to mark their connexion with the things benefited or hurt; as, hurtful to the crop; good for the health. These adjectives afford a good example of the manner in which generical adjectives are divided into numerous sub-species, without the inconvenience of new names, by the aid of the prepositions: thus, hurtful, which notes all kinds of hurtfulness, is made to note {206} its various species, in the following manner: hurtful to the health, hurtful to the eyes, hurtful to the stomach, hurtful to the crops, hurtful to the reputation: all different species of hurtfulness, which might be noted by adjectives severally appropriated to them.

There is nothing particular to be remarked of the manner in which adjectives of plenty, or want, or those signifying an affection of the mind, are connected with the objects they connote, by prepositions; we shall, therefore, proceed to shew the manner in which verbs are connected with substantives, by their means.

3. All verbs are adjectives, either active or passive, put into a particular form, for the sake of a particular connotation. All actions, saving those which begin and end in the actor, have a reference to a patient, or something acted on; and the being acted on; the passion as it is called; has a reference to the actor. Action, therefore, and passion, are relative terms, standing in the order of cause and effect; agent and patient, are the names of the subjects of the action and the passion, the cause and the effect.

Most actions are motions, or named by analogy to motions. In applying terms denoting motion, there is particular occasion for marking the two points of termination; the point at which it began, and the point at which it ended. This is effected by the name of the two places, and a preposition. The contrivance will be sufficiently illustrated by an obvious example: "John travelled from London to Dover:" "Travelled," the name of the motion; London, the point of commencement; Dover, the point of termination: from, a word denoting commencement, {207} connecting London with travelled; to, a word signifying completion, connecting the word Dover, with the word travelled.

Some verbs, which imply motion, have their main, or only reference, to the point of its termination. Thus, he stopped at Dover: he struck him on the head: he stabbed him in the side. These prepositions, whatever their precise import, which we shall not now stop to inquire, mark, when thus applied to the name of the place at which the respective motions terminated, the connexion of the two names, that of the motion, and that of its point of termination.

With respect to motions, we have occasion to mark, not only the points of their commencement and termination, but also their direction. The direction of a motion, by which we mean the position of the moving body, at the several points of its course, can only be marked by a reference to other bodies, whose position is known. Thus, "He walked through the field." The direction of the walk, or the position of the walking man, at the several moments of it, is marked by a reference to the field whose position is known to me, and a word which means from side to side. The expression, "It flew in a straight line," is less full and particular in its marking, but clear and distinct, as far as it goes, by reference to a modification of position; namely, a line, with which I am perfectly familiar.

In using verbs of action and passion, that is, words which mark a certain cluster of ideas, we have occasion to modify such clusters, by adding to, or taking from them, not only ideas of Position, as above, but various other ideas; of which the idea of {208} the Cause, or End, of the action, the idea of the Instrument with which it was performed, and the idea of the Manner of the performance, are among the principal. "John worked;" to this, a mark of a certain cluster of ideas, I want to make an addition, that of the Cause or End of his working. That End is, Bread. To mark this as the cause of his working, it is not enough to set down the name bread; I need a mark to fix its connexion with the working, and the kind of its connexion. I say, "John worked for (cause) bread." "John was robbed for (cause of the robbery) his money." The ideas of manner and instrument are commonly annexed by one preposition; "John worked with (joining) diligence," the manner; "John worked with a spade," the same idea, as "John with (joined) a spade worked;" spade, the instrument. "John worked by the job, worked by the day;" manner: "John worked by machinery," the instrument. "He was killed with barbarity, with a cudgel."

We say, done with hurry, or in a hurry, done in haste. "In," which seems to mark a modification of position, is here applied to that which does not admit of position. Hurry and haste seem in such expressions to be personified; to be things which surround an action, and in the midst of which it is done.

We have compound names for many actions. Thus we may say, "he hurt John," or "he did hurt to John," "he gave a lecture to John," or, "he lectured John." The reason why a preposition is required before the patient, in the case of the compound name of the action, and not of the single name, is, that the word which stands with respect to the verb in the {209} immediate relation of the recipient or patient of the action, is not the man, but the thing done. Thus, in the phrase, "he did hurt to John," it is not John which is done, but hurt: in the phrase, "he gave a lecture to John," it is not John who is given, but a lecture. There are here as it were, two patients, lecture, the primary, John, the secondary; juxta-position marks the connexion of the primary; but a preposition is necessary, to mark that of the secondary.

The following phrases seem to admit of a similar explanation. "He reminded him of his promise;" "he accused him of perjury;" "he deprived him of his wife:" the secondary patients being "promise," "perjury," "wife." He reminded him of his promise (hav(ed) his promise); the promise being the thing had or conceived in the reminding: accused him of perjury; perjury being the thing had in the accusation, the matter of the accusation: deprived him of his wife; his wife being the matter of the deprivation; the thing hav(ed) in it.[61]

[Findlater's footnote 61: The ingenious speculations of Mr. Tooke did great service to the cause of philology in England, by awakening a very general interest in the subject. But his knowledge of the cognate languages was far too circumscribed to warrant his sweeping inductions. In his day, in fact, the accesses had not yet been opened up to this new mine, nor the right veins struck that have since yielded such rich results. Accordingly nearly all Tooke's derivations are now discredited, and among others his account of prepositions. One or two English prepositions, of comparatively recent formation, seem to be formed from nouns; as _among_ Ang. Sax. _gemang_ or _ongemang_, _gemang_ meaning "mixture;" and _against_, Ang. Sax. _on-gegen_ in which _gegen_, from its use in cognate dialects, appears to be {210} a noun, though its primary meaning is not very clear. These however still involve a preposition which has to be accounted for. _Between_, again, is _by twain_, "near two;" and _except_, _save_, _during_ were originally participles in the case absolute; "except this" was originally "this excepted," Lat. hoc excepto. But the simple prepositions _in_, _of_, _by_ belong to the radical elements of language, and are more independent of nouns and verbs than nouns and verbs are of them. Comparative philology, which did not exist in Tooke's days, has shewn, that, besides predicative roots, as they are called--that is syllables expressive of some action or property, such as "to go," "to eat," "to be bright," "to speak," &c., which form the bases of nouns, adjectives, and verbs--there was a class of roots denoting simply relations in space, that is, place or direction (here or this, there or that, up, down, away, &c.). It is easy to see how the audible marks of such notions, at first, doubtless, vague enough, would be rendered precise and intelligible by gesticulations; or perhaps the gesticulations were the original signs, and the words mere involuntary exclamations accompanying them, and in time taking their place. These syllables have been called local, demonstrative, or pronominal roots, and play a most important part in language. They are joined to other roots to form derivatives of various kinds; and it is of them that the inflexional endings of nouns and verbs are built up. Singly or in combination, they constitute the pronouns, personal as well as demonstrative. Abstract as are now the meanings of _I_, _he_, they were once patent to the senses; _ma_ was an emphatic "here," calling attention to the speaker; _sa_ or _ta_, "there, that," something different from both speaker and hearer. Most of the prepositions originated in roots of this class. The roots of some of them, at least, are identical with those of pronouns; others express direction, and thus imply motion. Thus _up_ means, "(motion) from below to above;" in the root FR (as in _for_, _from_), which is represented in Sans. Gr. and Lat. by PR (pro), the ground idea is, motion or removal from the speaker, in the front direction. _Of_ is the Gothic _af_, Old Ger. _aba_ or _apa_, Sans. _apa_, Gr. [Greek: a)po\] {211} Lat. _a_ or _ab_. It is not easy to determine the precise physical relation primarily expressed by this particle; probably "proceeding from," or "descending or depending from." If there is any connection between _of_ and _have_, it is more likely that _have_ is derived from _of_ than the reverse. That not a few verbs have this kind of origin, is now recognised; the English _utter_ from _out_ is a signal example.

The primary relations expressed by prepositions were always physical or sensible; but the transition to the abstruse mental relations which they now serve to mark (cause instrumentality, superiority, &c.) is, as a rule, sufficiently obvious. For example, "issuing or proceeding from" passes insensibly into "being part of," "belonging to," "in the possession of."--_F._]

{212} SECTION VIII.

CONJUNCTIONS.

The Conjunctions are distinguished from the Prepositions, by connecting Predications; while the Prepositions connect only Words.

There are seeming exceptions, however, to this description, the nature of which ought to be understood. They are all of one kind; they all belong to those cases of Predication, in which either the subject or the predicate consists of enumerated particulars; and in which the Conjunction is employed to mark the enumeration. Thus we say, "Four, and four, and two, are ten." Here the _subject_ of the predication consists of three enumerated particulars, and the conjunction seems to connect words, and not predications. In like manner, we say, "His bag was full of hares, and pheasants, and partridges." In this last case, the _predicate_ is composed of enumerated particulars. In these instances, the words called conjunctions, appear to perform the business of prepositions, in joining _words_: and in fact, they may be supplied by prepositions. Thus, instead of "four, and four, and two, are ten," we may say "four, with four, with two, are ten:" and, in the same way, "His bag was full of hares, and pheasants, and partridges," may be put "full of hares, with pheasants, with partridges." And nothing can be more simple than such a variety in the use of such words.

{213} _With_ means _join_; _and_ means _add_.[62] These are words of the same kind, and the same import; and nothing but use has appropriated the one to the joining of words rather than predications, the other to the joining of predications rather than words.

[Findlater's footnote 62: This is according to Tooke's etymology, who traces _and_ to an Ang. Sax. verb _anan_, to add. Unfortunately, Anglo-Saxon scholars deny that there is such a verb. The nearest to it is _unnan_, which means, however, merely "to wish well to," "to favour." No satisfactory account has been given of _and_, but the analogy of other conjunctions would connect it with a demonstrative root. J. Grimm is inclined to consider it as a nasalised form of the Lat. _et_; which in its turn may be an inversion of Greek [Greek: ti\], just as _ac_, is of [Greek: kai\].

All conjunctions are essentially adverbs, and derive their connective power from their adverbial meaning. This is well seen in _also_, the radical meaning of which is "all (quite) in that (the same) way." Most of the adverbs used as conjunctions are obviously oblique cases of pronouns; so, as, than, when, where, tum, ubi, quam, quum. In Gothic, _jah_, (Old Ger. _ja_, Finnish _ja_; of the same origin as Eng. _yes_) takes the place of _and_, and means "in that or the same (manner)." The Gr. [Greek: kai\] and the Lat. que, "and," are similarly oblique cases from the root _ka_, and equivalent to "in which or that (manner)." The identity of manner or circumstance constitutes the mental bond. It is easy to see how a preposition used adverbially and expressing proximity, distance, or other relative position, would connect predications or ideas; _e.g._ "_After_ he had rested a little, he began again."--_F._]

Our object, however, on the present occasion, is distinct, both from that of the grammarian, and that of the etymologist. We have shewn, that a set of marks are exceedingly useful to connect single words, and by what contrivances this end is accomplished; it remains for us to shew, what use there is of marks {214} to connect Predications; and by what contrivances that object is attained.

The occasions for the use of marks to connect Predications, seem to be of two kinds.

First, When two Predications are to be marked, as following one another.

Secondly, When they are to be marked, as modified, the one by the other.

1. Those of the first kind need but few words for their explanation.

I may say, "Newton was a mathematician," "Locke was a metaphysician," "Milton was a poet." So stated, these Predications do not mark any particular order in my thoughts. I desire, however, to show, that the ideas thereby expressed, were proximate parts of the train in my mind. The word _and_, which means _add_, placed between every pair, affords the requisite indication.

Like _and_, the conjunction _nor_ marks predications in sequence. It differs from _and_ only in uniting negative predications. "The act is not honourable, _nor_ is the man honest." In this case, it is obvious that _nor_, whatever its origin, has the meaning of _and not_. The predications then are two negative predications, the sequence of which, is marked by the word _and_.

_But_, though it has been otherwise classed, and called adversative, is of the same kind, and simply marks the sequence. Thus we say, "Catiline was a brave man, but Catiline was a wicked man." The meaning of _but_ is scarcely different from that of _and_, addition being the fundamental idea signified by both of them. The _opposition_ between the two predications is signified by the predications themselves, not by the {215} connective.[63] In fact, the sense would not be changed, if we substituted _and_ for _but_. It is only because, in use, _but_ has been commonly confined to the sequence of two _opposing_ predications, that the word _but_ is no sooner expressed, than an _opposing_ predication is anticipated. This is a simple case of association.

[Findlater's footnote 63: This is not strictly correct. _But_ is compounded of the two prepositions or local particles _by_ and _out_ (Ang. Sax. _bi utan_); and the force of it, in the example given in the text, may be thus paraphrased: "Catiline was a brave man; _but_ (_by_, near or beside that fact, put another fact, which is _out_, away, or different from it, namely) Catiline was a wicked man." This is something more than a simple case of association; the opposition is expressed as well as the addition.--_F._]