Chapter XXXVIII: Section I (6)

A person administers to another person a medicine. It turns out to be poison. The person whose act the administration was, believing the drug to be salubrious, not hurtful, anticipated good consequences; in other words, intended the benefit of the patient; intending, and anticipating, here, being only two names for the same thing. He did not foresee the evil consequences; and this we commonly express by saying he did not intend them. If the person who administered the drug, instead of believing it to be a proper medicine, and anticipating from it salutary effects, knew it to be poison, anticipating from it destructive effects, he would be said to intend those effects.

It thus appears, that when a man, having certain consequences of an act in view, proceeds to the performance of the act, the having in view, or anticipating, receives, in these circumstances, the name of intention. It is a case of anticipation, anticipation in peculiar circumstances, and is marked by a peculiar name.

The consequence of an act may be such, that the person had no reason to anticipate them, or could not possibly anticipate them; or they may be such, that, though actually not foreseen, they might, with more or less of care, have been foreseen. These are questions respecting the nature of one solitary act. {401} They are what in law are called questions of fact. The exact determination of them is essential to the right decision of the judge in the particular case; but any further consideration of them is not within the province of this inquiry.[69]

[Editor's footnote 69: This chapter is devoted to clearing up the confusion and disentangling the ambiguity connected with the word Intention. And it fully attains the purpose, save where the refusal to admit any difference between expectation and a strong association, throws a certain haze over an operation into which they both enter.

Intention, when the word is used in reference to our future conduct, is well characterized by the author as "the strong anticipation of a future will." It is an unfaltering present belief that we shall hereafter will a particular act, or a particular course of action. There may be, over and above this belief, an intention "that nothing shall occur to hinder that intention of its effect;" "the intention not to frustrate an existing intention." The author thinks that "this second intention is included in the first:" but it is not necessarily so. It is the first intention, fortified by some additional motive which creates a special desire that this particular desire and intention should continue. It is another case of what the author never recognizes, the desire of a desire.

Intention, when we are said to intend the consequences of our actions, means the foresight, or expectation of those consequences; which is a totally different thing from desiring them. The particular consequences in question, though foreseen may be disagreeable to us: the act may be done for the sake of other consequences. Intention, and motive, are two very different things. But it is the intention, that is, the foresight of consequences, which constitutes the moral rightness or wrongness of the act. Which among the many consequences of a crime, are those, foresight of which constitutes guilt, and non-foresight entitles to acquittal, depends on the particular nature of the case. We may say generally, that it is the hurtful consequences. When the question arises judicially, we must say it is the consequences which the law intended to prevent. Reverting to the author's illustration; a person who gives a drug to a patient, who dies in consequence, is not guilty (at least of intentional crime) if he expected good consequences, or no consequences at all, from its administration. He is guilty, if he expected that the consequence would be death; because that was the consequence which the legislator intended to prevent. He is guilty, even if he thought that the death of the patient would be a good to the world: because, though the law did not intend to prevent good to the world, it did intend to prevent persons from killing one another. Judged by a moral instead of a legal standard, the man may be innocent; or guilty of a different offence, that of not using his thinking faculty with sufficient calmness and impartiality, to perceive that in such a case as that of taking life, the general presumption of pernicious consequences ought to outweigh a particular person's opinion that preponderant good consequences would be produced in the particular instance.--_Ed._]

{402} Thus, then, the Exposition of the Human Mind, as far as the imperfection of the execution may allow the accomplishment to be predicated of the attempt, may be regarded as brought to its close. The phenomena which characterize man as a thinking Being, have been brought forward, have been carefully resolved into their component elements, and traced to certain general and undisputed laws. I should call this the THEORY of the Human Mind, if I could hope that the word would be understood in its original and literal meaning, that is, VIEWING or OBSERVING, AND CORRECTLY RECORDING THE MATTERS OBSERVED. This is the task, the execution of which {403} has been endeavoured throughout the preceding pages. But, unhappily, the word Theory has been perverted to denote an operation very different from this, an operation by which VIEWING--OBSERVING--is superseded; an operation which essentially consists in SUPPOSING, AND SETTING DOWN MATTERS SUPPOSED AS MATTERS OBSERVED. Theory, in fact, has been confounded with Hypothesis; and it is probably vain to think of restoring it to its proper signification.

If, however, the _Theoretical_, or Expository part of the Doctrine of the Human Mind were perfected; another great branch, the _Practical_ (which, to be rationally founded, must be founded on the Theoretical) would still remain. This subject, it appears, might be conveniently treated in three Books:

I. The Book of Logic; containing the Practical Rules for conducting the mind in its search after Truth:

II. The Book of Ethics; or the Book of Rules for regulating the actions of human beings, so as to deduce from them the greatest amount of good, both to the actor himself, and to his fellow-creatures at large:

III. The Book of Education; or the Book of Rules, for training the Individual to the greatest excellence of his nature; that is, to the highest possible state of efficiency (ability and will included), as cause of good to himself, and to his species.

THE END.

LONDON:

SAVILL, EDWARDS AND CO., PRINTERS, CHANDOS STREET,

COVENT GARDEN.

* * * * *

Transcriber's Note

All editions of this text were published in two volumes. This file has combined them. The only consequential change to the original material is that the Contents pages for Volume 2 are repeated immediately after the Contents of Volume 1.

Footnotes James Mill's text had a few footnotes, indicated by single asterisks. His later commentators' work was printed as footnotes, numbered consecutively through each volume (though there is no note 36 in volume 1), and attributed by an initial (or "Editor's note") at the end. In this text each note is attributed to its author (James Mill being called Mill; John Stuart Mill, Editor). John Stuart Mill made one note in James' style, 7* in volume 1 (where the attribution has been marked by an asterisk). There are footnotes in Grote's main footnote, and in a couple of other footnotes, marked as in the original. All footnotes are now placed after the paragraph in which they occur.

Corrections Corrected text is indicated by a preceding *. The following corrections have been made (usually confirmed by reference to the earlier editions):

Location Original Correction
Volume 1
p. 11 denonominate denominate
p. 95 and of
footnote 47 infinities infinitives
footnote 54 existtence existence
p. 195 their there
footnote 59 gutteral guttural
p. 204 {blank} 2
p. 217 predicacations predications
p. 256 rationes _rationes_
footnote g b 6
footnote j accute acute
footnote 82 6 5
footnote 87 phrase phase
p. 363 it its
p. 447 unconciousness unconsciousness
Volume 2
Contents 369 396
p. 45 : ;
p. 72 former formed
p. 89 succeeds succeed
p. 122 measure measured
p. 129 end quote mark missing at footnote 8*
p. 136 Read Reid
footnote 30 not nor
p. 312 comprehend comprehended
footnote 59 physicial physical

Two uncorrections might be noticed: in volume 1, pp. 61-62 the Mills read 'Brobdignagian,' following, it seems, an edition with that spelling instead of the usual 'Brobdingnag'; in volume 2, page 387 'casual' is given in both editions but 'causal' seems better sense.

Other matters Page numbers are preserved in-text within {}.

Italic or gesperrt text is enclosed by _ _.

Greek text is transliterated thus: breathings marked ( for hard, ) for soft, accents / for acute, \ for grave, = for circumflex, all after their vowel; iota subscript is marked |. In footnote 53 of Volume 1, [)i] is used to stand for i with a breve above it, in a rendering of Wotiak.