Chapter XIII: Recapitulation

The writer, in these pages, has shown by what must be conceded on all sides, irrefragable evidence that school histories are in error in saying the Battle of New Orleans was fought after peace, and was therefore a needless battle.

The writer has also shown by evidence he considers conclusive, that England held as invalid the title of the United States to Louisiana, acquired by sale from Bonaparte to the United States in 1803; that England deliberately planned the conquest of Louisiana (with the resultant development, if successful, of a great dominion to the west of the United States, like Canada on the North). That evidence is mainly furnished by the British themselves. First in the British note to the United States Peace Commissioners, criticizing the title of the United States to Louisiana; and, second, in the fitting out and dispatching of the expedition against New Orleans during the peace negotiations; in the complete Civil Government staff, for Louisiana, carried by the expedition; in the record of the peace negotiations, first in the insistence by the British upon the Uti Possidetis principle, and, second, when that failed, in the proposal of words to be inserted in the Mutual Restoration clause, which proposal finally resulted in the word, “Possessions” in that clause, under which England could hold that Louisiana, having been taken, was not subject to return, not being a possession of the United States; further in the letter of Prime Minister Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh, assuming British occupation of New Orleans, outlining purpose to “frighten Madison” into signing the Treaty (thus leaving England in possession of Louisiana).

After close and careful study, the writer presents as a summary of his conclusion as to the value of the Battle of New Orleans:

First, that it was a highly necessary battle on the part of the United States, rendered so by British aggression;

Second, that the statement in school and other histories that it was fought after peace is entirely false, the Peace Treaty itself being evidence. (All historians, past, present, and to come, cannot change the text of that Treaty);

Third, that it saved the Louisiana Purchase to the United States or averted another war with England;

Fourth, that it settled forever the question of the title to Louisiana;

Fifth, that it created a profound impression on the world. Speaking, as one orator has put it, in language all nations could understand, that the young American Republic had the will to be free and the power to enforce that will;

Sixth, that it marked the last time that the foot of a foreign foe has been set on American soil, except when Mexico invaded Texas in 1846;

Seventh, that it practically added to the Peace Treaty that impressment and orders in council would no longer be imposed by England, for these obnoxious policies were never sought to be revived;

Eighth, that it saved this sorely harassed, nearly treason-torn country, at a critical time in its life, from threatened and possible disunion, and re-established national self-respect;

Ninth, that it made Andrew Jackson a national hero, resulting in his election as President of the United States, and the establishment of what is known as the Jackson era;

Tenth, that it resulted in mutual respect and friendship between the United States and England, which has endured to this day, and which it is hoped will perpetually endure.

Could any battle have had a greater or more varied effect?

School historians and other historians, in appraising the battle as a needless and useless one, do violence to truth and grossly impose upon Young America, as well as America in general.

The underlying American sentiment of honor, truth and justice demands revision of these school histories, and that right speedily.

In conclusion, the writer recommends, as revision, in those histories which desire to dispose of the Battle of New Orleans in a paragraph, the following:

The Battle of New Orleans, fought January 8, 1815, was one of the most brilliant defensive victories in history. Many historians have classed it as a needless victory in that it was fought after peace. That is an error, for the Peace Treaty, signed by the Commissioners of the two countries, December 24, 1814, specifically provided that it should not be effective until ratified by both sides. It was not ratified by the United States until February 17, 1815, soon after its reception. The news of the victory came at a critical time in the history of the country, and was received with great enthusiasm everywhere. It settled forever all question as to the title of the United States to Louisiana. It saved Louisiana, or a least averted another war with England. It resulted in lasting, solid peace with England, which should permanently endure. As illustration of the character of that peace, it may be pointed out that the boundary line between the United States and Canada extending about three thousand miles, has not, on either side, a fort or fortification. God help the English-speaking people if one should ever be necessary!

_The End._

ADDENDA.

WORDING OF THE TREATY OF GHENT.

In addition to the references cited on pages 18 and 30 as to the full text of the Treaty of Ghent reference may be given to volume compiled by Hunter Miller entitled: “Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America.” (See volume 2, pages 574-584.)

ENGLISH CRITICISM OF U. S. TITLE TO LOUISIANA.

The third and fourth paragraphs of the note of the British Commissioners to the American Commissioners at Ghent October 8, 1814, read as follows:

In adverting for this purpose to the acquisition of Louisiana, the undersigned must observe that the instrument by which the consent of His Catholic Majesty is alleged to have been given to the cession of it has never been made public. His Catholic Majesty was no party to the treaty by which the cession was made, and if any sanction has been subsequently obtained from him, it must have been, like other contemporaneous acts of that monarch, involuntary, and, as such, cannot alter the character of the transaction. The Marquis of Yrujo, the minister of His Catholic Majesty at Washington, in a letter addressed to the President of the United States, formally protested against the cession, and the right of France to make it; yet in the face of this protestation, so strongly evincing the decided opinion of Spain as to the illegality of the proceeding, the President of the United States ratified the treaty. Can it be contended that the annexation of Louisiana, under such circumstances, did not mark a spirit of territorial aggrandizement?

His Britannic Majesty did certainly express satisfaction when the American Government communicated the event that Louisiana, a valuable colony in the possession of France, with whom the war had just been renewed, instead of remaining in the hands of his enemy, had been ceded to the United States, at that time professing the most friendly disposition towards Great Britain, and an intention of providing for her interest in the acquisition. But the conditions under which France had acquired Louisiana from Spain were not communicated; the refusal of Spain to consent to its alienation was not known; the protest of her ambassador had not been made; and many other circumstances attending the transaction, on which it is now unnecessary to dilate, were, as there is good to believe, industriously concealed. (From American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Volume III, page 721.)

The reply of the American Commissioners is quoted on page 26 of this volume.

(Author’s note: From the foregoing we can better understand the refusal of the British Commissioners to discuss the northern boundary of Louisiana as proposed in American note of November 10. See page 26, this volume.)

THE UTI POSSIDETIS PROPOSAL.

The note of the British Commissioners, October 21, 1814, contained the following paragraph:

In regard to other boundaries, the American plenipotentiaries, in their note of August 24, appeared in some measure to object to the propositions then made by the undersigned, as not being on the basis of uti possidetis. The undersigned are willing to treat on that basis, subject to such modifications as mutual convenience may be found to require; and they trust that the American plenipotentiaries will show, by their ready acceptance of this basis, that they duly appreciate the moderation of His Majesty’s Government in so far consulting the honor and fair pretensions of the United States as, in the relative situation of the two countries, to authorize such a proposition. (From American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Volume III.)

(Author’s note: This is an adroit effort to put upon the Americans the initial suggestion of the Uti Possidetis. The Americans, after seeing the futility of any treaty agreement as to impressment and trade restriction, adhered steadily to the Status Quo Ante Bellum basis. They rejected the Uti Possidetis principle. It should be borne in mind that at the time of the above note the secret expedition against Louisiana, assembling in Nigril Bay, Jamaica, was nearing completion.)

TIME OF EFFECTIVENESS OF TREATY.

On November 10, 1814, the American Commissioners submitted a _projet_ of a treaty containing in article one the statement that “All hostilities, both by sea and land, shall immediately cease,” and in article fifteen the statement that “This treaty, when the same shall have been ratified on both sides, and the respective ratifications mutually exchanged, shall be binding upon both parties, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at ______ in the space of ______ months from this day, or sooner if possible.”

On November 26 the British Commissioners returned the _projet_, altered to read that “All hostilities, both by sea and land, shall cease after the exchange of ratifications as hereafter mentioned,” and that “This treaty, when the same shall have ratified on both sides, and the ratifications mutually exchanged, shall be binding on both parties, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington with all practical despatch, in the space of ______ months from this day, or sooner if practicable.”

On November 30, 1814, the American Commissioners stated in a note to the British Commissioners:

The undersigned consent that the day of the exchange of the ratifications be substituted to that of the signature of the treaty as the time for the cessation of hostilities, and for regulating the periods after which prizes at sea shall be restored; it being understood that measures shall be adopted for a speedy exchange of ratifications. (American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Volume III.)

(Author’s note: It will thus be seen that the British proposed the date of ratification as the time of the effectiveness of the treaty, and the cessation of hostilities, and that the Americans consented, thus carrying into the treaty the provision so uniformly overlooked by our historians.)

PASSAMAQUODDY ISLANDS.

(Author’s note: There was towards the end of the negotiations at Ghent much and voluminous correspondence, mainly on the part of the British, concerning the question involved in the Passamaquoddy Islands situation; it was magnified, admittedly, out of proportion to the subject involved, especially in view of the fact that the final disposition of these fisheries was relegated to a civil commission to meet after peace. The British, while conceding the relative insignificance of the islands, maintained that a question of honor was involved which might “prove an insuperable bar to the conclusion of peace at the present time.” In reading the mass of British correspondence on the subject of these islands one is forced to the conclusion that there was an underlying purpose.)

AS TO WORDING IN MUTUAL RESTORATION CLAUSE.

The American _projet_ of November 10 contained also the proposition that all territory, places, and possessions “taken by either party from the other during the war, or which may be taken after the signing of this treaty, shall be restored.”

The _projet_ returned on November 26 by the British Commissioners was altered to read all territory, places, and possessions, “belonging to either party and taken by the other during the war, or which may be taken after the signing of this treaty, shall be restored.”

The protocol of a conference of the American and British Commissioners, held on December 1, contained the following statements:

At a conference held this day, the American plenipotentiaries proposed the following alterations in their _projet_, as amended by the British plenipotentiaries: 1st—In article I, strike out the alteration consisting of the words “belonging to,” and “taken by,” and preserve the original reading, viz: “taken by either party from the other.”

This alteration was objected to by the British plenipotentiaries, and, after some discussion, reserved by them for the consideration of their Government. (Ibid., pages 735, 742.)

(Author’s note: The American Commissioners stated in a note December 14, to the British Commissioners that they agreed to accept the British proposal to “omit the words originally offered by them,” provided that the Passamaquoddy Islands should alone be excepted from the mutual restoration of territory. See American State Papers, Volume III, pages 743, 744, for full text of note. Also for text of letter from British Commissioners to British Government as of December 13, see Photostat in Library of Congress from Public Record Office, London—Foreign Office 5, Vol. 102. Thus in the mutual restoration clause of the treaty the words “all places, points, and ‘possessions’ whatsoever,” went in, without the clarifying term as to “possessions” proposed by the British. Did the British Government deem the clarification essential? Evidence, too strong for disbelief, shows it did not. The secret expedition against Louisiana was then well on its way, and expected to be in possession of New Orleans any day, with the full set of civil officers, carried on Admiral Cochran’s fleet, installed and in control. Evidence has been given showing the anxiety of British officials, after the signing of the treaty, as to its ratification by President Madison. If the British plans against Louisiana had succeeded would President Madison have ratified the treaty? That is a fair question for College debate.)

Transcriber’s Notes

—Retained publication information from the printed edition: this eBook
is public-domain in the country of publication.

—Silently corrected palpable typos; left non-standard spellings and
dialect unchanged.

—In the text versions only, text in italics is delimited by
_underscores_.

End of Project Gutenberg's Battle of New Orleans, by Reau Estes Folk