Chapter VII: Negotiations at Ghent

A separate chapter is devoted to the joint conference at Ghent because therein is shown the subtle, diplomatically concealed, purpose of the then English Government. The record of the proceedings of the conference, in order to be fully understood, should be read in the light of the afterwards revealed fact that, at the same time these negotiations were being conducted, the expedition against Louisiana was secretly planned and dispatched. Things that are puzzling in the making often become clear in the aftermath. And so it is in this case.

The defeat and resultant abdication of Napoleon (April 4, 1814) released England’s European troops for pursuing the American war with greater vigor, and to punish the United States for having declared war at England’s most embarrassing moment. It would not be a violent assumption to say that at least some members of the British Government felt that the time was opportune at last to take Louisiana and thus redress a grievance nurtured since 1803, when Bonaparte snatched that great domain from England’s outstretched hands.

The exact date on which the Louisiana expedition was determined upon is not material. Plain evidence discloses that during the joint peace negotiation its details were arranged and the army sent forward to take New Orleans. We now know that after the capture of Washington by the British and the burning and sacking of the public buildings there (August 24, 1814), the British invading forces, after being later repulsed in an attack upon Baltimore, repaired under orders to Nigril Bay, Jamaica, to await recruits for the expedition against New Orleans. With the time then required for ocean travel, these orders must have been given prior to, or about the time of the meeting of the Peace Commissioners at Ghent, August 4, 1814.

Let us visualize the two groups assembled at Ghent. First, consider the five Americans. They were earnestly desirous of a quick and honorable peace. Their country was riven with dissatisfaction produced by a powerful anti-administration and anti-war party, seemingly in control of the northeastern states, making dire threats, unless hostilities were soon ended.

The American Commissioners were prepared and authorized to forego the questions of impressment and orders in council, which caused the war, and conclude a peace pact on the basis of the status before the war. For a month they had been waiting the coming of the British Commissioners. It is evident there was a purpose on the part of the British Government to delay.

The second group consisted of three suave English Commissioners, who appeared at Ghent, as before stated, August 4th.

These English Commissioners began by making, on behalf of their Government, demands objectionable and humiliating, the discussion of which, often at long distance with the London Government officials, consumed time. Finally the American Commissioners were forced to write to Washington for further instructions.

From “The Diplomacy of the War of 1812,” by Frank A. Updyke, which is a most valuable account of the Peace conference, quotation is given from pages 220 and 221. “It was the unanimous opinion of the American ministers that Great Britain’s policy was to consume as much time as possible before the termination of negotiations, in order that some decided victory might be gained in the war which would make it easier for her to insist upon her demands.”

This quotation is given to show that our ministers recognized the British tactics as sparring for time; but the record does not show that any one of them thought of New Orleans as the objective point of British design.

The records in connection with the negotiations are voluminous, and make very interesting reading. But viewed in the after revealed facts, the truth stands out so clearly that the proceedings of the Peace Conference in English consideration and the secret expedition to capture New Orleans were so closely inter-related that in arriving at the material verity, much material in that conference should be disregarded as intended by the English to delay and becloud, and so matters coming before the Conference referring to Louisiana should only be considered in connection with our mission.

Frank A. Updyke, Ph.D. of Dartmouth College, in his “The Diplomacy of the War of 1812,” quoted from above, has given a condensed, fully annotated, account of the proceedings of the Peace Conference. It is a work, published in 1915, which deserves place as a supplementary textbook in every college and high school. I have made liberal use of Dr. Updyke’s volume, which merits high place for research effort and reference.

The Joint Commission had been in session a little over two months when the first note was struck significant of the British underlying purpose. It was in the communication of the English Government through their ministers to the American Commissioners. The document was dated October 8, 1814. (See American State papers.)

“The first paragraph,” says Updyke (page 269), “attempted to show the illegality of the purchase of Louisiana and the spirit of territorial aggrandisement on the part of the United States which this act manifested.”

It might have been inferred that this attack upon the legality of the title to Louisiana would be followed by a demand of some sort; but no such demand was made. In fact, the treaty as finally adopted, contained no mention of Louisiana.

It is highly pertinent to ask a question as to what was the purpose of this attack upon the title of Louisiana. All such things have a purpose.

In the light of present knowledge that purpose is clear. The great expedition against New Orleans being near completion, it is obvious that the British Government recognized the good diplomatic position before the world, after the capture of Louisiana, of showing a record of fair warning as justification for retention.

The reply of the Americans to the note of October 8th was dated October 13th. (See American State papers.)

Quotation is given from Updyke, page 284:

“While endeavoring to make the reply brief, the American ministers could not refrain from discussing some other topics adverted to by the British in their note. The British ministers had made the charge that the acquisition of Louisiana by the United States was illegal, Spain having offered a remonstrance against its cession and the right of France to make it. To this the American note responded that, although the Spanish minister at Washington had made such remonstrance, at that very time orders were given by Spain for the delivery of Louisiana to France. So France was in actual possession of the territory when she disposed of it to the United States.”

Another matter, although not in chronological turn, may be here presented, as showing further the English attitude towards Louisiana. In the course of the note of the Americans to the British, dated November 10, 1814 (see American State papers), Updyke says, page 307: “The American note refused to consent to the British proposal to fix the northwest boundary by the line from the lake of the Woods to the Mississippi unless the boundaries of Louisiana should also be provided for in the settlement.”

The British ministers in referring the note to their Government, said they were unwilling to consent to a discussion of the Louisiana boundary, for their doing so might be taken as a recognition of the right of the United States to the occupation of the territory. (See Updyke, page 310.)

What might be called the Uti Possidetis scheme was embraced in a British note of October 21st (see American State papers). The British proposed the Uti Possidetis principle, as a basis of settlement, under which each side would keep what territory it should be possessed of at the promulgation of peace.

The reason behind this proposal seems now very patent. The adoption of this principle would have enabled England, by indisputable treaty right, to retain Louisiana, which she confidently expected to take.

But the Americans opposed this principle and firmly insisted on a treaty based upon conditions at the beginning of the war.

The English were very insistent and for a time there appeared a new danger that the conference would break up. But, as will appear later, British diplomacy, the most skilful in the world, found a way to accomplish the main objective of the Uti Possidetis; that is to say, the retention of Louisiana after the expected reduction of New Orleans.

While these peace negotiations were simmering at Ghent, the well-planned, secret expedition against New Orleans was completed in detail, and with confident feeling of assurance that, because of its size and veteran fibre, it would be invincible, it was finally put on its way to join the waiting troops at Nigril Bay, Jamaica. Sir Edward Pakenham was appointed Commander of the Expeditionary forces. A. C. Buell, in his “History of Andrew Jackson,” published in 1904, states that Pakenham’s order was dated November 4, 1814, and read according to English war office minute; that General Pakenham “shall proceed to Plymouth and embark there for Louisiana to assume command of the forces operating for the reduction of that province.” Buell cites as authority Bathurst papers; State Paper Office, London.

On the assumption of the correctness of Buell’s citation, the term “Province” as applied to Louisiana, in English official orders, represents the radical difference of viewpoint as to Louisiana at the time between the British Government and the American Union, of which the English termed province was a fair possession from which already one state had been carved. (Louisiana in 1812.)

While the British Expedition was ploughing the seas, unexpected resistance was forming under an American general, who didn’t know what defeat was.