Chapter VIII: Negotiations at Ghent—Continued

We will now return to the parleys at Ghent. The British continued to insist on the Uti Possidetis as a basis of a Peace Treaty, but proposed that it be “subject to such modifications as mutual convenience may be found to require.” In a letter to the British Commissioners, dated October 18th, Lord Bathurst, quoted by Updyke (page 288), cited several points on which mutual accommodations might be had; but Louisiana was not one of the points. For if it had been there would have seemingly been no use planning and sending out the great expedition for the “reduction of that province.”

From many interesting details touching the Uti Possidetis proposals, the reader is referred to Updyke (“The Diplomacy of the War of 1812”), pages 288 to 319.

Finally, realizing the unshaken adherence of the Americans to the antebellum status, the British gave up the Uti Possidetis demand, and by specific wording obviously sought to protect the Louisiana design.

In the amended proposal of the British (see British to American ministers Nov. 26, 1814), there are two things highly pertinent to the inquiry we are conducting, to establish the real value of the Battle of New Orleans. The first was the provision that peace would not be effective until after ratification by both countries. The second consisted in the proposed wording for the mutual restoration clause as follows: “Belonging to either party, taken by the other.” The effect of this wording in the mutual restoration clause, would have been that all territory belonging to either party, taken by the other, should be returned. But this would not embrace Louisiana, for from the English standpoint, it did not legally belong to the United States.

As to the first point, a quotation is here given from Updyke (page 317): “The amended project returned by the British commissioners provided that the notification for the cessation of the war be issued after ratifications of the treaty should have been exchanged rather than at the time of the signature. This was designed, it was supposed, to give time for the completion of the British plans against New Orleans, the successful outcome of which was never doubted.”

The American ministers, on November 30th, consented to the substitution of the day of exchange of ratifications for that of the signature of the treaty, as the time for cessation of hostilities, and for regulating the period when prizes at sea shall be restored. (See American to British ministers, Nov. 30, 1814.)

This agreement was duly carried into the treaty, as we have heretofore set forth, Article XI, prescribing all details.

The American ministers opposed the proposed words in the mutual restoration clause, “belonging to either party, taken by the other.” They insisted on the words, “taken by either party from the other.” Strong reasons were given by the Americans for their attitude, but the British ministers refused to yield, saying the matter would be referred to their Government (Updyke, pp. 324-325).

The British Government, on December 6th, instructed their Commissioners to insist upon the retention of the words in dispute, and advanced skilful arguments, in which the real purpose was not revealed. For a digest of these arguments, see Updyke, pages 335-336.

To the present day reader, having knowledge of the expedition, which was then on its way to capture New Orleans, the English purpose seems very manifest.

With diplomatic art the British Government sought to make it appear that the disputed words, “belonging to either party and taken by the other,” were founded in the objective relating to the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay during the time of the agreed upon reference to a commission to determine the ownership of these Islands.

The Americans, not aware, of course, of the expedition against New Orleans, accepted the viewpoint advanced as to the disputed words, but while rejecting the words, indicated that they would be “willing to admit such a modification as should secure the right of Great Britain from being affected or impaired by yielding possession of the Islands to the United States.” (Updyke, p. 343.)

The British ministers replied, arguing England’s position. That position in effect was, that during the war she had taken these islands, the title to which was in dispute, and that to call upon her to restore them, because they were occupied by the United States at the beginning of the war, would be unjust; that having agreed to a commission to settle the ownership of the islands, she was willing, if need be, to accede to a clause which would especially guard the ultimate right against the prejudice which the American ministers feared might arise from the continued possession by Great Britain. The British ministers admitted the comparatively small value of the territory in question, but claimed that yielding possession of the Islands involved a point of honor on the part of Great Britain, and, if insisted upon, might make the conclusion of peace impossible. (See Updyke, pp. 343-344; report of conference of Dec. 12, 1814, given by British Commissioners to Lord Castlereagh.)

The Americans yielded the point, and thus it appears that the British Government secured the accession of the principle of the great concealed objective on a matter of minor importance. Thus the word “possessions” was admitted into the mutual restoration clause of the peace treaty.

That mutual restoration clause, as adopted, and incorporated in Article 1, of the Treaty of Ghent, reads as follows:

“All territory, places and possessions whatsoever, taken by either party from the other during the War, or which may be taken after the signing of this Treaty, excepting only the Islands hereinafter mentioned, shall be restored without delay and without causing any destruction or carrying away of any of the artillery or other public property originally captured in the said forts or places, and which shall remain therein upon the exchange of the ratification of this Treaty, or any slaves or other private property; and all archives, records, deeds, and papers, either of a public nature or belonging to private persons, which, in the course of the War, may have fallen into the hands of the officers, of either party shall be, as far as may be practicable, forthwith restored and delivered to the proper authorities and persons to whom they respectively belong. Such of the Islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy as are claimed by both parties, shall remain in the possession of the party in whose occupation they may be at the time of the exchange of the ratification of this Treaty until the decision respecting the title to said islands shall have been made in conformity with the fourth article of this Treaty. No disposition made by this Treaty as to such possession of such islands and territories claimed by both parties shall, in any manner whatever, be construed to affect the right of either.”

The Treaty, from which the clause above is quoted, can of course be found in Washington, but copy may be seen at almost any general public library, in the volume herebefore referred to containing various Treaties of the United States.

The reader, who has been following us in our showing of the various stages of the development of the British design to protect, by diplomacy, the Louisiana expedition, will recognize the significance of the word “possessions.” By reason of that word, the British were in position to maintain, after capturing Louisiana, that it was not subject to return under the mutual restoration clause adopted, not being, under English construction, a legal “possession” of the United States, formal notice of that construction having been given in the treaty negotiations. The subtly accomplished insertion of the word in the treaty represented a triumph of ulterior British diplomatic design over the very able, hard-headed, but open and candid American commissioners, who were entirely in the dark as to the Expedition dispatched to seize Louisiana.

That word was of course not as exclusive of argument as the Uti Possidetis principle first proposed, and insisted upon almost as a sine qua non; nor was it as clear as the wording subsequently urged, “belonging to either party and taken by the other”; but it was all sufficient, backed by the British conviction that Louisiana was not a legal possession of the United States, and supported by the mighty British martial power, then unleashed from European war.

It is obvious to the writer that but for the word “possessions,” or wording of similar import, the treaty would not have been agreed to by the British; in fact, such indication was given by the British ministers at the joint conference December 12th, under the guise of the principle pertaining to the Passamaquoddy Islands.

Any presumption that Great Britain, after planning the great expedition against Louisiana, would have, within a few weeks following the final dispatch of the military forces, signed a peace treaty, recalling those forces from an attained, long-dreamed-of conquest, is a reflection upon the intelligence of the British Government of 1814-15.

With the treaty agreed to, the English Government became anxious about its ratification by President Madison. Significant evidence of this is furnished by Doctor Updyke, in his work from which we have already made a number of quotations. On page 355, Updyke says, “The British ministry had hoped that their last communication would enable the commissioners to close the negotiations for the treaty of peace. They were, however, suspicious of President Madison, and feared he would not sign the treaty. For this reason it was stipulated that the war should not cease until after the exchange of ratifications at Washington. They counted upon having a strong English fleet in the Chesapeake and the Delaware at the time that Baker, the bearer of the British copy of the treaty, should reach Washington; and they also counted upon the disposition of the Eastern states to secede from the Union, as likely to ‘frighten Madison.’ It was suggested that if Madison should refuse to ratify the treaty the British Government should immediately propose to make a separate treaty with the New England States, which it was believed could be accomplished.”

Dr. Updyke gives as authority for the foregoing paragraph: “Liverpool to Castlereagh, December 23, 1814; Wellington Supplementary Dispatches, IX, 495.”

Lord Liverpool was prime minister and Lord Castlereagh was secretary for foreign affairs.

The digest given of correspondence between these high English Government officials makes it plain that the English Government was anxious for ratification of the Peace Treaty and that they were fearful that Madison would not sign.

As confirmatory of the Liverpool apprehension it may be mentioned that the _London Times_, December 31, 1814 (see British Museum), said that the ratification by Madison depended upon the outcome of the expedition against New Orleans. The _London Times_ was unfriendly to the Liverpool government, and was also very hostile to the United States. In the circumstances it may fairly be presumed that to allay criticism of the treaty the press was informed of the expected New Orleans coup.

In view of the unanimous action of the American Commissioners in agreeing to the Treaty, it becomes very evident that the British Government anticipated that something would transpire before the Treaty reached Washington that might cause the President to withhold his approval. In the light of present knowledge, that something was the expected British capture of New Orleans. We may well ask the question, as to why the British Government was so anxious for the ratification of the Treaty as to plan to “frighten Madison” and threaten separate peace with New England, thus disrupting the Union, if that Government expected to turn back Louisiana after its anticipated conquest. That question carries its own obvious answer.

Happily for us, and for England as consequences have proved, and for the world, the dilemma in which the English statesmen thought President Madison would be placed, was averted.

While Carroll, with the American copy of the Treaty, and Baker, with the English copy, also having authority to exchange ratification, ploughed the seas, an event was in the making of destiny, which, when brought forth, utterly confounded the carefully laid plans of the Liverpool-Castlereagh Government, and in fact ushered in a new epoch, a new and greater era for the young American Republic—never again to be pointed to as an experiment.