Chapter IV: Chicago in the Revolution

The years from 1754 to 1760 witnessed the overthrow of the power of France in the new world. For the fourth time in two generations England and France had joined in deadly combat. Twice the issue ended in a drawn contest; twice France was overwhelmed, and the English gained a decisive victory. Each of these great wars had its American counterpart, and the outcome of each was reflected in the disposition made in the treaty of peace of the territories of the warring nations in America. At the close of the two drawn contests there were no territorial changes. By the Treaty of Utrecht, which closed the Spanish Succession War, however, England made substantial territorial gains in North America at the expense of her defeated rival. Finally, by the Treaty of Paris of 1763, which registered the results of the Seven Years' War, France lost all of her vast American possessions on the mainland. Canada passed into the hands of the English, while the imperial domain of Louisiana, in the establishment of which La Salle and Tonty and many another intrepid Frenchman had toiled and died, was divided; all that lay west of the Mississippi was given to Spain, while the portion drained by the eastern tributaries of that stream fell to the English.

What the dividing line between Canada and Louisiana had been in the French period is not easy to determine. Nor is it necessary to our purpose to do so, for whether it had belonged to Canada or Louisiana, the region tributary to Chicago, since known as the old Northwest, was now the property of England. Her civilized rival crushed, however, another foe arose to resist the assumption by England of possession of her new-won territory. The idea of passing under the control of the English was extremely distasteful to a large proportion of the northwestern Indians. Under the leadership of Pontiac a conspiracy was formed in the spring of 1763 to wipe out in a day all the English posts from Pennsylvania to Lake Superior.[168] The execution of this terrible project stopped short of complete success. Fort Pitt and Detroit withstood the attacks of the savages. But Green Bay and Sault Ste. Marie were abandoned; the forts at Mackinac, Sandusky, Miami, St. Joseph, Ouiatanon, Presque Isle, and Venango were taken; and over two thousand frontier settlers were slain.

[Footnote 168: The classic account of these events is Parkman's Conspiracy of Pontiac. For a brief narrative see Winsor, _Mississippi Basin_, chaps, xxii, xxiii.]

The storm had not broken entirely without warning, and the effort to relieve the posts that still held out and to subdue the obstreperous savages was promptly begun. In August Colonel Bouquet threw a relieving force into Fort Pitt, having beaten off the savages at Bushy Run in a bloody battle of two days' duration. The following season two armies were sent into the Indian country between the Great Lakes and the Ohio. A force under Bradstreet passed by way of Niagara and the southern shore of Lake Erie to Detroit, from which place detachments were sent out to take possession of Sault Ste. Marie, Mackinac, and Green Bay. In the fall of 1764 Bouquet with the second army crossed the Ohio River and advanced into the valley of the Muskingum where, in November, the tribes of the surrounding region were forced to subscribe to the terms of peace which the invader imposed upon them.

Not until another year had passed did the English gain possession of the country bordering on the Illinois and the Wabash.[169] A force of four hundred men with which Major Loftus attempted to ascend the Mississippi to Fort Chartres in the spring of 1764 was defeated and driven back, when only two hundred and forty miles above New Orleans. A year later Lieutenant Fraser was sent down the Ohio from Fort Pitt to warn the tribes and the French of the prospective approach of a force of troops which was to follow after him. He succeeded in reaching the Illinois villages, but was glad to flee in disguise down the Mississippi. He owed his life to the protection of Pontiac, but before granting it that terrible chieftain had "kept him all one night in dread of being boiled alive."[170] A second herald now set out, in the person of the redoubtable George Croghan, to descend the Ohio from Fort Pitt to Fort Chartres. Near the mouth of the Wabash, however, he was seized by a band of Indians and carried prisoner to Vincennes. He was subsequently released at Ouiatanon, and made a treaty with the neighboring tribes; proceeding to Detroit he repeated his success with the savages there, and then returned to Niagara. On the receipt of Croghan's report of his success in treating with the Indians, a force of one hundred and twenty Highlanders of the famous Black Watch Regiment proceeded down the Ohio from Fort Pitt, and on October 10, 1765, at Fort Chartres of the Illinois, in the heart of the Mississippi Valley, the last banner of France east of the Mississippi was hauled down. "The lilies of France gave place to the red cross of St. George, and the long struggle was ended."[171] The control of the British over this region which was thus at last established was to continue unchallenged by a civilized power less than a decade and a half.

[Footnote 169: For the facts given here I have relied on Winsor, _Mississippi Basin_. Edward G. Mason has written charmingly of these events in his _Chapters from Illinois History_.]

[Footnote 170: Mason, _op. cit._, 234.]

[Footnote 171: _Ibid._, 235.]

The old Northwest, to which Chicago belonged, did not participate actively in the Revolutionary struggle during its earlier stages. At the beginning of the war the British were, of course, in possession of all the Northwest. The vantage points from which they directed the affairs of this region were, in general, the old French posts, now occupied by British garrisons. Among these may be named Detroit, Mackinac, Fort Gage, and Cahokia. The first named of these was easily the most important center of British influence in the Northwest, being looked upon as the headquarters of the posts and the key to the fur trade and to the control of the Indian tribes of this region.[172] The fort was defended by a palisade of pickets and contained at the beginning of the year 1776 a garrison of one hundred and twenty men. In the town and country adjoining were three hundred and fifty men, mostly French, capable of bearing arms; and to complete the tale of Detroit's military resources, there floated in the river opposite the fort several tiny public vessels with crews aggregating thirty "seamen and servants."

[Footnote 172: James, "Indian Diplomacy and Opening of the Revolution in the West," in _Wisconsin State Historical Society, Proceedings_, 1909, 125.]

The only other considerable centers of white population in the Northwest were the old French posts on the Wabash, Ouiatanon and Vincennes, and, most populous of all, the settlements along the eastern shore of the Mississippi from the mouth of the Missouri to the mouth of the Ohio, on what later came to be known as the "American Bottom." At Ouiatanon, at the beginning of the Revolution there were about a dozen French families.[173] Vincennes had, in 1776, according to the report of Lieutenant Fraser, about sixty farmers.[174] This would imply a total population of between two and three hundred, and this estimate is borne out by a "census" of Indiana of 1769. This lists the names of sixty-six "Inhabitants" and states that in addition there are fifty women and one hundred and fifty children "belonging to the Inhabitants."[175] There were, at this time, fifty men capable of bearing arms, and during the next half-dozen years the population increased somewhat.

[Footnote 173: _Indiana Historical Society, Publications_, II, 338.]

[Footnote 174: _Ibid._, 410.]

[Footnote 175: _Ibid._, 439. Hamilton, who captured the place in 1778, states, however, that he found 621 inhabitants of whom 217 were able to bear arms (Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society Collections, IX, 495). This work will be cited henceforth as _Michigan Pioneer Collections_.]

In the Illinois settlements of the American Bottom in 1778 there was a population of about one thousand whites, and as many Indians and negroes.[176] The more populous settlements were Cahokia, with three hundred white inhabitants, and Kaskaskia, with five hundred whites and almost as many negroes.

[Footnote 176: For an account of these settlements see the introduction to the Cahokia Records, _Illinois Historical Collections_, II, pp. xiii ff.]

For the rest, the vast region which now teems with a population as prosperous and as highly civilized as any on the face of the globe was a wilderness. The Indian tribes could muster, according to the usual estimates, about eight thousand warriors, which would imply a total population several times as large.[177] The Chippewas alone numbered over half of this total. Our interest, however, is concerned rather with certain of the smaller tribes. Around the southern end of Lake Michigan, with a village at Chicago but with their principal seat on the St. Joseph River, were the Pottawatomies, numbering some four hundred warriors. To the south and southeast of these, in the modern states of Indiana and Ohio, were the Miamis, Shawnees, and other tribes, who were to contest the possession of the Northwest with the Americans even more fiercely than did Great Britain herself. To the north, at Milwaukee, was located a "horrid set of refractory Indians," according to the picturesque language of Colonel De Peyster, which seems to have been composed of the off-scourings of various tribes and bands. To the west and northwest, in northern Illinois and the state of Wisconsin, were the descendants of the Sacs and Foxes, the Winnebagoes, and other tribes.

[Footnote 177: James, _op. cit._, 137; Walker, _The Northwest during the Revolution_, 12.]

The advancing wave of English settlement pouring into the upper Ohio Valley had precipitated the French and Indian War. As yet this tidal wave of civilization had not crossed the Ohio, although it had spread out along its eastern valley as far south as Tennessee. The most important point along this extensive frontier was still, as in the days of the old war. Fort Pitt at the Forks of the Ohio.[178] It was the center, therefore, from which radiated the American efforts to control the northwestern tribes, just as, at a later date, it afforded the principal gateway through which the flood of civilization poured into this region.[179]

[Footnote 178: James, _op. cit._, 126.]

[Footnote 179: On the rival efforts to control the northwestern tribes in the early period of the Revolution see _ibid._, 125 ff.]

The Americans at first strove to secure the neutrality of the Indians in the impending contest. But the disposition of the red man did not permit him to stand idly by while a war was going on, and the British more wisely directed their efforts to securing his active support. This policy was shortly copied by the Americans, and soon the perplexed red men were being plied with rival solicitations for alliance, accompanied by corresponding threats of punishment and prophecies of disaster which were to follow their failure to comply. The British urged them on to assail the outlying settlements of the American frontiers, counseling humanity to the vanquished, but effectually nullifying this counsel by offering rewards for all scalps brought in. Lieutenant-governor Hamilton at Detroit was particularly zealous in hounding the Indians on to the work of devastation.[180] The Americans, to their honor, offered rewards for prisoners but none for scalps. Two courses of action were open to the Americans in view of this situation. They might endeavor to punish the hostile Indians by launching retaliatory expeditions against them; or they might by capturing Detroit, from whence issued alike the supplies for the marauders and payment for the scalps they took, destroy the opposition at its fountain-head.[181] The latter course was urged by Colonel Morgan, the Indian agent for the Middle Department, a man of much experience among the Indians of the Northwest. The reasons which he advanced in support of this policy and against the alternative one were telling,[182] but his advice went unheeded. Seeing this, and believing a general Indian war was about to be precipitated, he resigned his office; the control of the Western Department passed into incompetent hands, and it seemed probable that the western frontier was about to be overrun by the British and Indians when an important diversion occurred. The advent of the Virginia "Hannibal," George Rogers Clark, in the Illinois country, compelled the British at Detroit to turn their attention to the defense of the Northwest, and shortly of Detroit itself, against the invader.

[Footnote 180: James, _op. cit._; Thwaites, How George Rogers Clark Won the Northwest, 8-10. Hamilton himself vigorously denied the charges of inhumanity which the Americans preferred against him. _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, IX, 490.]

[Footnote 181: James, _op. cit._, 141-42.]

[Footnote 182: For a statement of them, see _ibid._]

In 1776 Clark had cast in his lot with the young settlements of Kentucky.[183] These were nominally a part of Virginia, but in fact they were too remote to receive much protection from the mother colony. It was congenial, too, to the spirit of the American frontiersman to depend upon himself, and Clark, who had come to the conclusion that the only means of obtaining safety was to carry the war into the enemy's country, was one of those who favored action independently of authorization from the government of Virginia.

[Footnote 183: Many of the original documents pertaining to Clark's career in the Northwest have been printed in the _Illinois Historical Collections_, Vol. I; the _Michigan Pioneer Collections_; and the _Wisconsin Historical Collections_. Among the secondary accounts may be mentioned Dunn, _Indiana_; Winsor, _Westward Movement_, chap, viii; Thwaites, _How George Rogers Clark Won the Northwest_.]

Other counsels prevailed, however. The protection of the parent colony was sought, and as a result the Virginia Assembly declared the extension of its authority over the region and in December, 1776, created the county of Kentucky.[184] The next summer Clark learned from spies whom he had sent into the Illinois settlements that the French settlers were lukewarm in their allegiance to Great Britain and that only a few of them were participating in the raids against the Americans, which, fomented from Detroit, made these settlements their starting-point and base of operations. Fired by these reports with the purpose to conquer the Illinois settlements, he proceeded the same summer to Virginia. Here he laid his project before Governor Henry and received his authorization to raise and equip a force of troops for the work, and with this and a scanty supply of money he returned to Kentucky and launched the enterprise.

[Footnote 184: Winsor, _Westward Movement_, 116.]

In the spring of 1778 Clark collected a little army of about one hundred and fifty men at Redstone, now Brownsville, Pennsylvania, and dropped down the Monongahela and Ohio, taking on supplies and reinforcements at Pittsburgh and other places along the way. At the Falls of the Ohio, where the metropolis of Kentucky now stands, he paused long enough to build a blockhouse on Corn Island. On June 24, while the sun was obscured by a great eclipse, the journey was renewed, the objective being Kaskaskia, the principal settlement of the Illinois country. At Fort Massac the little party landed and began the overland march of one hundred and twenty miles to Kaskaskia. On the way the hunter who had been engaged to guide them lost his bearings. This created some excitement, and caused Clark, who suspected treachery, to threaten him with death unless he found the way that evening. In this he succeeded, and accordingly the afternoon of July 4 found the party within three miles of the goal.

Clark halted his little army until nightfall, when he advanced to a farmhouse a mile from the town, and seizing the family secured information of the conditions that prevailed there. Thus armed, the party moved forward in two divisions and surrounded the place. We may safely dismiss to the limbo of myth the romantic story of Clark's appearance, alone, at the ball where garrison and villagers were disporting themselves, and his dramatic announcement to the merrymakers that the dance might go on, but it must be under the banner of Virginia.[185] The story betrays too conspicuously the handiwork of the romancer. It is clear, however, that garrison and townsmen were completely surprised, and surrendered without a blow being struck or a gun fired. By a judicious mixture of bluster and leniency Clark soon succeeded in gaining the hearty support of the villagers. One of his most effective allies was the priest. Father Gibault, who assured Clark that although, by reason of his calling, he had "nothing to do with temporal business, that he would give them such hints in the Spiritual way, that would be very conducive to the business."[186]

[Footnote 185: On this see Thwaites, _op. cit._ , 28-31. I have drawn freely on this reference and on Winsor, _Westward Movement_, for the facts concerning Clark's expedition.]

[Footnote 186: Thwaites, _op. cit._, 33. That he kept his promise is sufficiently attested by Hamilton, who describes him as a "wretch," "who absolved the French inhabitants from their allegiance to the King of Great Britain," and "an active agent for the rebels & whose vicious & immoral conduct was sufficient to do infinite mischief in a country where ignorance & bigotry give full scope to the depravity of a licentious ecclesiastic."--_Michigan Pioneer Collections_, XIX, 487.]

The Cahokians readily followed the lead of the Kaskaskians in submitting to Clark's rule; so, too, did the inhabitants of Vincennes, to whom Father Gibault went as an emissary of Clark. Thus far Clark's success had been unchecked; as far as the French settlers were concerned, the British power had crumbled. But the Indians were still to be reckoned with, and the British at Detroit to be heard from, and Clark's resources were pitifully inadequate for the task in hand. Even a large part of his Virginia troops abandoned him on the expiration of their term of enlistment. With such as consented to remain, augmented by enlistments on the part of the French whom he had come to conquer, Clark maintained his position throughout the winter. None knew better than he how to combine in the right proportions terrible energy, braggadocio, tact, and cajolery. Friendly relations were established with De Leyba, the Spanish commander at St. Louis. The Indians were handled so adroitly that an "Amazeing number" flocked in from five hundred miles around to treat for peace and learn the will of the Big Knife Chief.

Meanwhile on August 6, 1778, the news had come to Hamilton at Detroit of the capture of Kaskaskia, and he promptly began preparations for the recovery of the posts that had been lost.[187] On October 7 he set out from Detroit by boat with nearly two hundred whites, chiefly volunteers, and three hundred Indians. The destination was Vincennes, and the route followed led up the Maumee and down the Wabash River. Although expedition was all-important, the progress made was tedious and slow. Not until December 17 was Vincennes reached. On the news of Hamilton's approach the French militia of Captain Helm, Clark's representative, deserted him. Again, as in the case of the capture of Kaskaskia by Clark, a melodramatic tale is told of the capture of the fort. Helm, with his garrison dwindled to a single man, is represented as standing, lighted match in hand, by a well-charged cannon which he has placed in the fort gate, halting the British force, and surrendering with the honors of war. The story is without adequate historical foundation and may properly be dismissed as a pleasing bit of fiction.

[Footnote 187: For Hamilton's own narrative of his course see _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, IX, 489 ff. His correspondence is printed in _Illinois Historical Collections_, I, 330 ff.]

Although Vincennes surrendered without resistance, the delays which had been encountered proved fatal to Hamilton's project. If he had pushed on to Kaskaskia at once it seems certain that Clark must have succumbed. But winter having now arrived, Hamilton decided to remain at Vincennes until spring, when he would not only retake the Illinois settlements but turn the tables on the invaders by sweeping the Americans from Kentucky.

Pending the arrival of spring, the greater part of Hamilton's force was dispersed. Not until the last of January did full news of the situation at Vincennes and the projected vernal attack upon Kaskaskia come to Clark. As soon as he had quelled the panic which the tidings caused among the Kaskaskians, he projected a counter-assault upon Vincennes. An armed galley was sent around by water, down the Mississippi and up the Ohio and the Wabash to a point ten leagues below Vincennes, where it was to await the arrival of Clark, who, meanwhile, would lead a force overland across Illinois. The story of the difficulties encountered and vanquished on the march of this little force across the Illinois swamps and prairies surpasses many a flight of fiction. It was February and a thaw that had set in had flooded the lowlands and driven away the game. To the fatigues and discomforts of wading swollen rivers and marching through boggy and oftentimes "drowned" land in midwinter were added the pangs of hunger. The last stage necessitated the crossing of miles of bottom land overflowed to the depth of three feet and upward by the swollen waters of the rivers. Here the sufferings of the party were such that Clark avers that the bare recital of them would be "too incredible for any Person to believe except those that are well acquainted with me."

It had been Clark's purpose to take the garrison by surprise but on learning from some villagers whom he captured that the force of British and French largely outnumbered his own, and that the villagers were not ill-disposed toward the Americans, he changed his plan. Fearing that in the fight that would doubtless ensue some of the French and Indians would be slain and that this would embitter the rest, he determined to bluff the garrison and the town into a surrender. Halting his little army in sight of the town, but concealed from the view of the garrison, he sent a menacing letter ahead, designed to awe the townsmen into submission. At nightfall, with the garrison still ignorant of his approach, Clark's men moved into the village. The Creoles greeted them with enthusiasm, and the fickle Indians, who made up the larger portion of Hamilton's force, either offered to join Clark or drew aside to await the issue of the contest between the palefaces.

The British had been attracted by the commotion and the discharge of guns, but not until a sergeant received a bullet in the breast did they know whether to attribute the cause to some jollification or to the arrival of the "Virginians." Throughout the night and early morning Clark's riflemen harassed the garrison. About eight o'clock, while his men stopped for breakfast, a summons to surrender was dispatched to Hamilton. It was received by the garrison with mingled feelings of defiance and despair. According to Hamilton, the British assured him they would stick to him "as the shirt to my back," while the French "hung their heads." The firing was resumed, but later in the day Hamilton agreed to surrender. The next morning, February 25, 1779, the fort changed hands and name as well, for the Americans now christened it Fort Patrick Henry, in honor of the governor of Virginia.

Clark's ultimate goal was the capture of Detroit, but with his small force and scanty supplies he could not at once move forward. While waiting for reinforcements he applied himself vigorously to the work of governing his newly won territory, establishing satisfactory relations with the Indians, and preparing the way for the greater exploit which he was destined never to perform. To this work the ensuing spring and summer were devoted.

Meanwhile certain events were taking place in the region west of Lake Michigan and the vicinity of Chicago which now demand our attention. When Hamilton began preparations for his expedition in the autumn of 1778, he sent word to De Peyster, who commanded at Mackinac, to raise the Indians tributary to that post and co-operate with him by an expedition down the Illinois River.[188] Many of the Indians who frequented Mackinac had dispersed, however, and the lateness of the season rendered those who could be reached indisposed to engage in such an enterprise. Nevertheless De Peyster, whom Winsor describes as "a somewhat rattle-brained person, given to writing illiterate letters, but in some ways an enterprising and prudent commander,"[189] did what he could. He sent Langlade, the man who had destroyed Pickawillany in 1752, to the Ottawas and Chippewas in Michigan, and Gautier to the Pottawatomies of St. Joseph, to lead them to Hamilton's assistance. At the same time he suggested to Haldimand the project of sending an Indian party from Green Bay by way of the Fox-Wisconsin route and the Mississippi, directly against the Illinois posts. The Grand River Indians declined to start until spring, and Gautier did not reach St. Joseph until December. What few Pottawatomies could then be raised were taken on by Louis Chevalier, a trader who resided among them; Langlade returned to Green Bay and Gautier to his station on the Mississippi, carrying speeches and belts to exhort the Indians to be ready for an expedition in the spring.[190]

[Footnote 188: _Illinois Historical Collections_, I, 364.]

[Footnote 189: Winsor, _Westward Movement_, 130.]

[Footnote 190: _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XI, 122-23.]

During the winter Hamilton sent orders to Langlade at Green Bay requiring him and Gautier to join him early in the spring in an attack upon Kaskaskia.[191] Langlade was to proceed from Green Bay down Lake Michigan, and thence by way of the Illinois River, while Gautier was to gather the Indians from the upper Mississippi and descend that stream. Thus a grand converging attack from three directions would be made on the Illinois settlements. How Hamilton took and then lost Vincennes has already been seen. In ignorance of the latter occurrence, Langlade set out from Green Bay with a band of Indians, and proceeded as far as Milwaukee.[192] Here they learned the news of Hamilton's capture, which so disheartened the Indians that they refused to go farther. Clark's emissaries were in the neighborhood, purchasing horses and threatening to be at "Labaye" soon with three hundred men, but Langlade's Indians were so disaffected that he was unable to capture them.[193]

[Footnote 191: _Illinois Historical Collections_, I, 436-38.]

[Footnote 192: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 193: _Ibid._]

Gautier's experience was even more discouraging. With a party of two hundred Indians, made up of Foxes, Ottawas, and others, he crossed by the Fox and Wisconsin rivers to the Mississippi, and proceeded down that stream as far as the mouth of the Rock.[194] Here a party of Sacs whom he stopped to harangue not only mocked his arguments and threats but had the "insollance" to force him to release one hundred and twenty of his followers. Other bands whom he addressed replied by threatening to carry news of his measures to the "Bostonnais," as the Americans were called. Like Langlade, therefore, he was forced to return to Green Bay.

[Footnote 194: _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XI, 126.]

The news of Hamilton's surrender filled the British at Detroit and Mackinac with forebodings of an immediate attack. Appeals were sent to Haldimand for reinforcements, while the defenses at the two posts were put in readiness to withstand an assault.[195] The Indians reported to De Peyster that the "Virginians" were building boats near Milwaukee, and also that they were near Chicago, but it shortly developed that these statements were the inventions of some "evil minded" Indians.[196] De Peyster professed not to care how soon "Mr. Clark" might appear, provided he "come by Lake Michigan & the Indians prove staunch & above all that the Canadians do not follow the example of their brethren at the Illinois who have joined the Rebels to a man."[197] Since there was little likelihood that these conditions would be realized, it is evident his confidence was not very deep-seated.

[Footnote 195: _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, IX, 387 _et passim_; James, "Some Problems of the Northwest in 1779," in _Essays in American History_, 62.]

[Footnote 196: _Illinois Historical Collections_, I, 436.]

[Footnote 197: _Illinois Historical Collections_, I, 437.]

Meanwhile Clark, as a part of his preparations for the projected attack upon Detroit, dispatched Captain Linctot, a trader who had recently joined the Americans, and who was influential with the Indians, up the Illinois River with a company of forty men to secure the neutrality of the Indians, and to cover the design of his main expedition.[198] On learning this, and that Linctot had reached Lake Peoria, De Peyster sent Gautier with a party of Indians with orders to burn the fort, hoping thus to intimidate the Americans from attempting an expedition by this route.[199] A few days after receiving this information a report came to De Peyster from St. Joseph to the effect that the Americans were about to send seven hundred men against Detroit by way of the Wabash River, and four hundred cavalry under Linctot were to come up the Illinois and thence by St. Joseph to co-operate with them.[200] In consequence of this intelligence he detached Lieutenant Bennett with twenty men from his little force to go, with sixty traders and canoemen and two hundred Indians, to intercept Linctot, or to harass the "Rebels" in any way possible.[201] At the same time Langlade was ordered, July I, 1779, to raise the savages of l'Arbre Croche,[202] Milwaukee, and other places along the shore of Lake Michigan and join Bennett at Chicago, or if he should have passed that point, to hasten to join him before he should reach Peoria.[203]

[Footnote 198: _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, IX, 389; James, "Some Problems of the Northwest in 1779," _op. cit._, 378.]

[Footnote 199: _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, IX, 389.]

[Footnote 200: _Ibid._, 390.]

[Footnote 201: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 202: A mission village on Little Traverse Bay, at this time occupied by a band of Ottawas. See _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 253, 375.]

[Footnote 203: _Ibid._, 375-76.]

Bennett carried a war belt a yard and a half long, containing twelve thousand wampum beads, and early reports received from him were to the effect that the savages were joining it "fast."[204] De Peyster himself accompanied Langlade as far as l'Arbre Croche, where, on July 4, he harangued the assembled Indians. At a later date he gave vent to his poetical propensities by turning this speech into rhymed verses which constitute one of the literary curiosities of the English language.[205] Its chief interest for the history of Chicago consists in the allusion to Baptiste Point Du Sable, who is said to have already established himself here.

[Footnote 204: _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, IX, 391; _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 390.]

[Footnote 205: Printed in De Peyster's _Miscellanies_; it may also be found, with editorial notes, in _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 377-90.]

From Peoria Linctot and his party crossed the country to Ouiatanon, there to join Clark in his advance. He reached there in August, accompanied by a large concourse of Indians.[206] By this time Clark had abandoned the idea of an immediate advance on Detroit. Linctot, therefore, conceived the idea of attacking St. Joseph, to which place Bennett's party had meanwhile come.[207] He sent a message to Vincennes for reinforcements, but the French refused to respond, and the projected attack was abandoned.[208]

[Footnote 206: Said to have numbered 6,000, but this is obviously a gross exaggeration. (_Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 376.)]

[Footnote 207: _Ibid._, 286, 398.]

[Footnote 208: _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 376; _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, XIX, 467.]

Bennett was sufficiently involved in difficulties, however, without interference from Linctot. On reaching St. Joseph, July 23, he threw up a slight intrenchment and sent out bands of Indians toward Peoria, Ouiatanon, and the Miamis, to learn of his opponents' movements and harass them if practicable.[209] These parties shortly returned in a disaffected state without having seen the enemy. On July 26 Bennett sent a message to Detroit informing Captain Lernault of his movements and offering to co-operate with him in any practicable operation. While awaiting an answer the greater portion of his Indians, having consumed his supplies and rum, deserted. Langlade, meanwhile, arrived with sixty Chippewas, who conducted themselves with even greater insolence than the others. Finding himself helpless to accomplish anything Bennett abandoned St. Joseph about the middle of August and returned to Mackinac.[210]

[Footnote 209: _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 398.]

[Footnote 210: I have drawn this narrative from Bennett's Journal, in _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 398-401, and the other sources cited above.]

Active military operations in the Northwest for the year 1779 were now at an end. Late in the year De Peyster was sent to Detroit to take the place of Hamilton, who had been sent by his captors to languish in a Virginia prison. Lieutenant-governor Patrick Sinclair was sent by Haldimand to succeed De Peyster at Mackinac.[211] On the American side Clark had retired to the Falls of the Ohio, his first base of operations in the Northwest. Upon the declaration of war against Great Britain by Spain in 1779, the British proceeded to plan a comprehensive campaign which would sweep the whole western American frontier from Canada to Florida and result in destroying the power of both Spain and the colonists in the Mississippi Valley.[212] From Pensacola in the South and Detroit in the Northwest as centers of operation, the British forces were to converge upon lower Louisiana, having taken St. Louis en route. Meanwhile, to cover these operations, De Peyster from Detroit was to advance on Clark at the Falls of the Ohio by way of the Maumee and Wabash rivers. The execution of this comprehensive program was rendered impossible, even before its initiation, by the enterprise of Galvez, the Spanish governor at New Orleans. In a series of operations extending over two years of time, he cleared the British out of the lower Mississippi Valley, concluding the process by the capture of Pensacola in May, 1781.[213]

[Footnote 211: Winsor, _Westward Movement_, 142.]

[Footnote 212: For a statement of this project see James, "Significance of the Attack on St. Louis," in _Mississippi Valley Historical Association Proceedings_, II, 199 ff.]

[Footnote 213: _Ibid._, 203-4.]

Meanwhile, ignorant of the successes of Galvez in the South, the British forces stationed in the Northwest began, early in the year 1780, the execution of their part of the general plan of operations. The campaign was initiated by Sinclair, who early in February sent a body of Indians to engage the noted Sioux chief, Wabasha, to descend the Mississippi to Natchez with his two hundred warriors.[214] About the middle of the same month Sinclair ordered Emanuel Hesse, a trader who had formerly served in the British army, to assemble the Sacs, Foxes, and other Wisconsin Indians at the Fox-Wisconsin Portage and proceed with them to the mouth of the Wisconsin, where the Indians from the upper Mississippi would join them in a descent upon St. Louis.[215] The services of Matchekewis, who had massacred the garrison at Mackinac in 1763, but who now was zealously serving the British, were also enlisted,[216] and it was planned that Langlade with a chosen band of Canadians and Indians should join a party gathered at Chicago and lead them down the Illinois River. Another party was to "watch the Plains" between the Wabash and the Mississippi,[217] while still another and larger expedition from Detroit under the command of Captain Henry Bird was to descend the Wabash to "amuse" Clark at the Falls of the Ohio.[218] Sinclair believed St. Louis could easily be surprised and taken, and that the traders who would profit by the English thus gaining control of the rich "furr Trade" of the Missouri River would give their assistance to the enterprise.[219]

[Footnote 214: For a secondary account of this campaign see _ibid._ For the original documents pertaining to it see _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, III, XI, XVIII; _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, IX; _Missouri Historical Collections_, II, No. 6.]

[Footnote 215: _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XI, 147-48.]

[Footnote 216: _Ibid._, 151.]

[Footnote 217: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 218: Winsor. _Westward Movement_, 171; _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, X, 372, 377, 395.]

[Footnote 219: _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XI, 148.]

On May 2, 1780, the force gathered at the mouth of the Wisconsin, consisting of about a thousand men, Indians, traders, and servants, began the descent of the Mississippi.[220] The news of its approach was carried to St. Louis by a trader, and the Spaniards made hasty preparations for defense.[221] De Leyba, the governor, ordered a wooden tower to be erected at one end of the town in which he placed five cannons, and intrenchments were constructed at the other exposed places. To man these defenses he had a force of twenty-nine regular soldiers and two hundred and eighty-one countrymen. On May 26 the hostile forces appeared and a vigorous firing began, to which the besieged replied with their cannon. "Then were to be heard the confusion and the lamentable cries of the women and children who had been shut up in the house of the commandant, ... the dolorous echoes of which seemed to inspire in the besieged an extraordinary valor and spirit."[222] Finally the besiegers abandoned the assault on the town itself, and devoted their attention to ravaging the surrounding country, where they killed or captured a number of farmers and their slaves. The Spaniards reported a loss of twenty-nine dead and wounded and twenty-four prisoners at St. Louis itself, in addition to forty-six taken captive in minor forays which attended the invasion.[223] Sinclair, on the other hand, reported that sixty-eight of the enemy were killed at St. Louis and eighteen taken prisoners.[224]

[Footnote 220: James, "Significance of the Attack on St. Louis," in _Essays in American History_, 205.]

[Footnote 221: _Missouri Historical Collections_, II, No. 6, 45; _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 407.]

[Footnote 222: _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 408.]

[Footnote 223: _Ibid._, 409. The British while proceeding down the Mississippi had captured an armed boat with thirteen men near the mouth of the modern Turkey River, and in a side expedition to the lead mines seventeen more were taken (_Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XI, 151).]

[Footnote 224: _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XI, 156.]

The attack having failed, the British began their retreat. According to Sinclair the defeat was caused by the treachery of the traders and part of the Indians. The attempt to surprise the Spaniards was a failure, and in the actual assault the Sacs and Foxes, led by certain of the traders, proved treacherous.[225] Another, and possibly the chief, reason for the retreat of the British was the arrival of George Rogers Clark at Cahokia with a small body of men shortly before the attack on St. Louis began.[226] Although he took no part in the fight at St. Louis, his presence at Cahokia across the river was probably an important factor in determining the British to give up the enterprise, and he promptly organized an expedition to pursue and punish the retreating forces.

[Footnote 225: _Ibid._, 155-56.]

[Footnote 226: James, _op. cit._, 210-13.]

The British forces retreated in two divisions, one up the Mississippi, the other overland to Lake Michigan and Mackinac.[227] Clark now learned of the advance of the force from Detroit upon Kentucky and made haste to return to its defense, having ordered Colonel Montgomery to follow and harass the forces retreating from St. Louis while the Indians were still demoralized from their recent defeat.[228] Montgomery with three hundred and fifty men advanced up the Illinois River as far as Lake Peoria,[229] and then crossed to Rock River, destroying the crops and villages of the Indians on his way. At this point he was compelled to stop through lack of provisions, and his retreat to the French settlements was attended with great hardship and suffering.

[Footnote 227: _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, IX, 558.]

[Footnote 228: _Virginia State Papers_, III, 443.]

[Footnote 229: Montgomery says he went "to the Lake open on the Illinois River" (_Virginia State Papers_, III, 443). Peoria was variously designated at this time as the Pee, Pey, Opie, etc. This designation is said to have originated as a corruption of the French words _au pied_, used with reference to the foot of the lake. Montgomery's "Lake open" was, apparently, but another variant of the original French form.]

The fortunes of the party led by Langlade by way of Chicago remain to be told. While proceeding down the Illinois it learned of the advance of Montgomery's force and thereupon beat a hasty retreat.[230] At Chicago the party was rescued from threatened destruction at the hands of a band of Indians in the "Rebel" interest by a relieving party which Sinclair had sent down Lake Michigan in two small vessels. Sinclair reported to Haldimand that five days after the vessels left Chicago two hundred Illinois cavalry arrived there,[231] but this was evidently a mistaken rumor caused by the advance of Montgomery's expedition, which, as has been seen, came no farther than Lake Peoria.

[Footnote 230: _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 411; Michigan Pioneer Collections, XI, 558.]

[Footnote 231: _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, XI, 558.]

The fugitives from the St. Louis expedition had no sooner gained shelter at Mackinac than Sinclair began to plan for a new attack on the Illinois settlements[232] the following year. The services of Wabasha were engaged anew, and Sinclair assured Haldimand that one thousand Sioux would be in the field under his leadership by April, 1781.[233] To insure that secrecy the absence of which had proved so disastrous to the expedition of 1780, Wabasha came in person to Mackinac to make the necessary arrangements for the enterprise. But the attempt at secrecy proved futile for in December, Cruzat, the new governor at St. Louis,[234] was reporting to his superiors the news that Wabasha was returning to his tribe from "Michely Makinak" with a great quantity of merchandise to arouse his own and the neighboring tribes.[235] At the same time Cruzat announced that he had decided upon measures for checkmating the British design, but refrained from telling what they were until after they should be executed.

[Footnote 232: The settlements on both sides of the Mississippi were referred to as the settlements of the Illinois. In Navarro's official report concerning the attack on St. Louis in 1780 that place is designated "San Luis de Ylinoises" (_Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 407).]

[Footnote 233: _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, IX, 559.]

[Footnote 234: De Leyba had died shortly after the British attack of 1780 and before the arrival of the news that his government had promoted him for his conduct on that occasion (_Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 410).]

[Footnote 235: _Ibid._, 414.]

Whether Cruzat alluded to the mysterious project of De la Balme against Detroit, which had even then come to an unfortunate end, or to the forthcoming Spanish expedition against St. Joseph must remain a matter of conjecture. De la Balme was a French officer who appeared in the Illinois villages in the summer of 1780, and rousing the villagers with the story that their former king was coming to their assistance, announced his own purpose to lead them in an assault on Detroit and thence on Canada itself.[236] With a little band of French and Indians, about eighty in number, flying the banner of France at its head, he moved upon the British post of Miami near the modern Fort Wayne, and captured and plundered it. The Indians, however, shortly attacked De la Balme's party in turn and defeated it, the commander being numbered among the slain.[237] This occurred at the beginning of November, 1780.

[Footnote 236: On De la Balme's mission see Burton, "Augustin Mottin de la Balme," in _Illinois State Historical Society Transactions_, 1909, 104 ff.; _Illinois Historical Collections_, II, lxviii-xciv; _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 416; _Missouri Historical Review_, II, 202-3.]

[Footnote 237: _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, XIX, 581-82.]

Thus ended De la Balme's projected invasion of Canada. But the episode of his advent in the Northwest was attended by further interesting consequences. Before his departure for Detroit he had sent a detachment from Cahokia under command of Jean Baptiste Hamelin against the post of St. Joseph.[238] There had been no regular garrison here since the massacre of the British soldiers at the time of Pontiac's war; but the post was advantageously located for trading purposes. It possessed a further importance as the gathering-place of the Pottawatomie war parties sent out to harass the Americans, while the fact that a large stock of goods had been stored here by the British traders[239] served to increase the zeal of Hamelin's men for the assault. According to a census that has been preserved, St. Joseph contained in June, 1780, a population of forty-eight French and half-breeds.[240] During the summer some of the inhabitants had been carried off to Mackinac by Sinclair's orders, so that at the time Hamelin fell upon it the post contained a smaller population than it had in June.

[Footnote 238: _Missouri Historical Review_, II, 204.]

[Footnote 239: According to a memoir by the traders to Haldimand for indemnity these amounted to 62,000 livres in value (_Michigan Pioneer Collections_, X, 367).]

[Footnote 240: _Ibid._, 406-7.]

Hamelin's foray was so timed as to reach St. Joseph early in December, 1780, when the Indians were absent on their first hunt.[241] The party numbered only seventeen men; but they overpowered the traders, loaded their goods on packhorses, and with twenty-two prisoners beat a hasty retreat around the lake toward Chicago.[242] Their triumph, however, was short lived. In the spring of the year De Peyster, who now commanded at Detroit, had stationed Lieutenant De Quindre at St. Joseph to look after the interests of the British in that region. He was temporarily absent at the time of Hamelin's attack, but, returning shortly afterward, he assembled a party of Pottawatomies and set out to punish the audacious intruders. Hamelin was overtaken on December 5 at a place called Petite Fort, a day's journey beyond the River Chemin,[243] and in the fight that ensued all but three of his party were killed or taken prisoners.

[Footnote 241: _Ibid._, XIX, 591.]

[Footnote 242: _Ibid._; Virginia State Papers, I, 465.]

[Footnote 243: The stream at the mouth of which Michigan City, Indiana, now stands. Petite Fort has been said to have been near the Calumet River. I have not succeeded in locating it more definitely than is indicated above.]

This comparatively insignificant affair, which terminated at Chicago's back door, as it were, was quickly followed by a second attack upon St. Joseph, the echoes of which were heard in distant Europe. The preparations which the English were making for a new descent upon St. Louis in the spring of 1781 excited the genuine alarm of Cruzat, the new Spanish governor.[244] Profiting, possibly, by the example set by George Rogers Clark, in his attack upon Vincennes, Cruzat determined to anticipate the blow. On January 2, 1781, less than a month after the disaster to the Americans at the Petite Fort, a Spanish expedition set out from St. Louis for St. Joseph.[245] It consisted in the beginning of thirty Spaniards from St. Louis and twenty residents of Cahokia. On the way across Illinois these were joined by a dozen Spanish soldiers who had been sent up the Illinois River in the preceding November to serve as an outpost against the British in that direction.[246] In addition to this, and of greater importance doubtless, the party was joined by two hundred Indians. Included in the latter were the "runagates" from Milwaukee under the leadership of Siggenauk and Nakewoin, whose tendency to side with the Americans had long disturbed the British commanders in the Northwest.[247] In 1779 De Peyster, then at Mackinac, had bribed a chief, Chambolee, to capture Siggenauk by fair means or foul and turn him over to the English, promising that in the event of success he would be "weall rewarded."[248] This attempt to secure the obnoxious chieftain proved vain, however. At another time, whether before or after this does not appear, De Peyster tried the plan of buying off the "Runagade chiefs," but this too proved futile.[249] Some time after the St. Joseph expedition, however, Siggenauk turned against the Americans.

[Footnote 244: _Missouri Historical Review_, V, 223.]

[Footnote 245: Three detailed studies of this expedition have been made. The conclusions of the first, by Edward G. Mason, were generally accepted by scholars as valid until Professor Clarence W. Alvord's study appeared. His conclusions differ materially from those reached by Mason. More recently Frederick J. Teggart has challenged Alvord's conclusions. For his study, with references to the earlier studies and the sources, see "The Capture of St. Joseph, Michigan, by the Spaniards in 1781," in _Missouri Historical Review_, V, 214 9.]

[Footnote 246: Teggart, _op. cit._, 216.]

[Footnote 247: De Peyster's characterization of them as "a horrid set of refractory Indians" has already been mentioned (_Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 384). Probably it was this band which had threatened to destroy the British force at Chicago retreating from St. Louis in the preceding summer. For a sketch of Siggenauk's career see _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 384.]

[Footnote 248: _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XI, 210.]

[Footnote 249: _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, X, 454-55.]

From the model owned by the Chicago Historical Society, after Captain Whistler's drawing of January 25, 1808]

The expedition proceeded up the Illinois River as far as Lake Peoria.[250] Here, the river having frozen, it was found necessary to leave the boats behind and continue the journey on foot. It was midwinter, and before the Spaniards lay three hundred miles of wilderness infested with savages, who might at any moment fall upon them. At the end of their march lay the prospect of a hostile force surrounded by savages friendly to it and hostile to them, with their base of supplies, and their refuge in case of defeat, four hundred miles away. Naturally our only knowledge of the experiences of the party on the march comes from the Spaniards themselves. We may well believe, however, that they suffered "the greatest inconveniences from cold and hunger,"[251] not to mention the labor of carrying through the trackless wilderness provisions for themselves and a supply of goods to be used in placating the Indians.

[Footnote 250: _Missouri Historical Review_, V, 216.]

[Footnote 251: _Madrid Gazette_, March 12, 1782, quoted in _Missouri Historical Review_, II, 195. For further details of the march see Teggart, _op. cit._]

Three weeks were consumed in the march from Lake Peoria to St. Joseph. On February 11 at nightfall the party was within two leagues of its destination. It had had the good fortune to secure the assistance of Louis Chevalier, who was intimately acquainted with the St. Joseph Indians, his father having been the principal trader and resident of St. Joseph for many years, until his arrest and removal by Sinclair's order in the summer of 1781.[252] While the party halted an emissary was sent on to the Indians at the post, and by promises of sharing the booty with them a pledge of neutrality on their part was secured. Early the next morning, February 12, the Spaniards crossed the river on the ice and made themselves masters of the post without a blow being struck. De Quindre was absent at the time, and all circumstances conspired to render the traders an easy prey to the invaders. The goods were divided between the St. Joseph Indians and those accompanying the expedition, and a supply of corn, gathered in expectation of the coming attack upon St. Louis, was destroyed. The party remained at St. Joseph only twenty-four hours, but during this time the Spanish flag was kept flying and formal possession was taken of the country in the name of the king of Spain. A hasty retreat was then begun, and the party arrived at St. Louis early in March without the loss of a man. On the day after its departure from St. Joseph De Quindre returned to that place. He sought to rouse the Indians, as he had done on the former occasion, to pursue the invaders, but this time without success. Their zeal for such exploits had evaporated, and they insisted on being led in the opposite direction to Detroit, to make their excuses to De Peyster for having allowed their traders to be carried off.

[Footnote 252: For the elder Chevalier see _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 372.]

The importance which later came to be attached to this expedition was due to its bearing upon the political rather than upon the military situation. It has generally been supposed by historians that the expedition was inspired by the Spanish Court to furnish the basis for laying claim in the peace negotiations to the British Northwest. The latest student of the subject rejects this supposition,[253] as also the further one that when the news of the successful termination of the exploit became known in Spain the Court proceeded to turn it to political advantage by founding extravagant claims upon it. That Vergennes, the French minister, and Aranda, the representative of Spain in the negotiations for the treaty, made such use of it is admitted. In 1780, the year before the expedition against St. Joseph occurred, the French minister, Luzerne, announced to Congress the view of the Spanish king that the territory east of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio belonged to Great Britain and was a proper object of Spanish conquest. Two years later, in the summer of 1782, in discussing with Jay the boundary between the possessions of Spain and the United States, the Spanish representative argued that the western country had belonged to Great Britain until by conquest during the Revolution it came into the possession of Spain. The contention was not established, but the evident design of France and Spain to advance the interests of the latter in America at the expense of the United States induced the American negotiators to conclude a separate treaty with England, in violation not only of their instructions but also of the treaty of alliance between the United States and France in 1778.

[Footnote 253: Teggart, in _Missouri Historical Review_, V, 220-23.]

The remainder of the story of the Revolution in the Northwest can quickly be told. Clark still dreamed of an expedition against Detroit, and both Jefferson, governor of Virginia, and General Washington looked with favor upon the project and held out promises of the necessary assistance.[254] For the year 1781 a force of two thousand men was promised Clark, and Colonel Brodhead at Fort Pitt was ordered by Washington to assist him with troops and supplies. But Clark was doomed again to disappointment. Jefferson resigned the gubernatorial office, and Washington was engrossed in his contest with Clinton and Cornwallis which was to end in the capture of the latter at York town. The British on their part manifested great activity during 1781 in raiding the settlements along the Ohio River. The harassed settlers, less far-sighted than Clark, were little disposed to engage in a distant expedition; a force of over one hundred men descending the Ohio to join Clark was cut to pieces in August by a combined British and Indian force sent out from Detroit by De Peyster, every man being killed or captured. The victors even considered the project of attacking Clark, who was now in his stockade fort at the Falls of the Ohio, impatiently awaiting the assembling of the forces for his projected expedition. By order of the Virginia Assembly this was again postponed. Clark's disappointment was keen, for as far as any positive action was concerned, his projects for the year had completely failed. From another point of view, however, the prospect was less dismal. If he had failed to take Detroit, the failure of the British plans for ousting the Americans from the Northwest had been no less signal. And the sequel proved that Clark's stubborn retention of the grip on this region, which he had gained in 1779, was the principal factor in securing it to the United States in the negotiations which resulted in the treaty of 1783.

[Footnote 254: Winsor, _Westward Movement_, chap, xi; James, "George Rogers Clark and Detroit, 1780-1781," in _Mississippi Valley Historical Association_, _Proceedings_, III, 291 ff.]