Chapter I: Part 1

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.

Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been
placed at the end of the book.

All changes noted in the ERRATA on page 68 have been applied to the
etext. The erratum for p. 21 should have said l. 34, not l. 3.

Some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book.

CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

PRESENT PEACE,

As far as it is relative to the

COLONIES,

AND THE

AFRICAN TRADE.

_Magna est veritas & prævalebit._

LONDON:
Printed for W. BRISTOW, at the West End of St. Paul’s
Church-yard. MDCCLXIII.

[Price One Shilling.]

TO THE

BRITISH PLANTERS.

GENTLEMEN,

An uninterested desire of rendering service to the public, and not an idle whim, or vanity to appear in print, has induced the editors of the following facts to publish them. Author is a title they lay no claim to.

By their unornamented energy alone is meant to gain the reader’s attention, and to enforce the facts advanced; therefore, without further apology, they are presented to you in a plain dress, to point out some measures that were taken to mislead the legislature, whereby the African trade, in the year 1750, was put upon such a plan, as, by the event, has proved extreamly detrimental to the British colonies. On that account, the following sheets can be addressed to none so properly as to you.

We flatter ourselves it will evidently appear by the contents of the following pamphlet, that the forts on the coast of Africa, are by no means upon a proper establishment; likewise that the present method of carrying on the African trade to those parts where the forts are situated, by the very high price given for Negroes there, which occasions the profit arising to be divided between the _European_ merchants and the _African_ traders, but must become extreamly burthensome and disadvantageous to you, we believe every _real planter_ will allow.

We cannot admit certain individuals to be esteemed _real planters_, notwithstanding they may have _one_ or _more plantations_, when at the same time they are concerned as merchants in the colonies, who procure the ships from the coast of Africa to be consigned to them; of which it is conjectured (and not without foundation) many of them are part owners; for these apparent reasons, it being their interest to keep up the price of Negroes so consigned to them, as all such advance encreases their commissions. Therefore, in our humble opinion, no attention ought to be paid to any remonstrance from people so much interested, or from those merchants who reside in Europe, that are connected with them, against any proposals that may be offered for the general utility of the colonies, which has been the case; and in consequence, very detrimental measures have been pursued through the misrepresentation of such opponents.

Should such destructive measures be continued, an absolute diminution of the annual income from your estates in the colonies must inevitably ensue, whether from the want of Negroes, or your purchasing them at too high a rate. In either case, it will prevent your being able to raise as much sugar, and other plantation-product you would otherwise do, or to take off as great a quantity of the manufactures of the mother-country, as were you to have a sufficient number of Negroes at reasonable prices. Relying upon the above allegations, with those you will find in the course of the following pamphlet, the editors presume you will think it most expedient and conducive for your interests, without loss of time, to apply to the legislative power, in order that some speedy and effectual measures be taken and carried into execution for _retrieving_, better _regulating_ and _extending_ that valuable branch of the _British_ commerce, the _African trade_.

The present seems the most proper time for so great a national purpose, in order to prevent the _French_ getting the start of you, which they will exert all their _power_ and _abilities_ to _effect_; for they are now not only making great preparations to carry on that trade themselves, but they have already made several _contracts_ with _British_ merchants to supply them with _Negroes_. So intent are they to secure, by every method they can contrive, as great a number as possible of those useful people, on which the prosperity of the _French_ colonies depend: besides, as _peace_ is concluded, his majesty’s ministers, in whose department it is, will have leisure to examine minutely into the reasons that induced you to make such application. Therefore there cannot be a doubt from their known _abilities_, and willingness to promote the _public good_ by their care of the _trade_ and _commerce_ of these _kingdoms_, but they will give their most serious attention to any proposal you may lay before them for so good a purpose, as the _extending_ and _preserving_ the _African trade_; and will be as desirous as yourselves to pursue such plan as appears to them most reasonable for promoting the general advantage of the _British colonies_, and consequently the _mother-country_. The editors will not intrude farther on your time, than to hope something will be done to secure that valuable branch of commerce to the _British subjects_, they being very desirous to promote the prosperity of the _British colonies_, and to assure you that they are with great respect,

Gentlemen,

Your most obedient, and most

Humble servants,

London,
11 April, 1763.

The EDITORS.

Considerations on the Peace,

As far as it is relative to the

Colonies, and the African Trade.

Since the preliminary articles of peace were published by authority, we have heard many persons in coffee-houses and other places, censure and blame our negotiators, for their not having obtained better terms.

They say, that our acquisitions in North America are of little consequence: yet when these acquisitions were in possession of our enemies, they thought them of inestimable value. Can the mere alienation of any property cause so sudden a diminution of its original worth? Surely then pique or dislike to some of our peace-makers, or private interest to have the war continued, must have hurried these men beyond the bounds of reason. For if they would give themselves the least time to reflect seriously, and judge dispassionately, they would find, that by retaining our conquests in North America (which are extended beyond our most sanguine expectations) the greatest benefit and utility must arise to this the mother-country; inasmuch as we have put ourselves in such a situation not only in the north, but also in the southern parts, that it is to be hoped our inland settlers will live in a perfect state of tranquillity; and his majesty’s subjects carry on and cultivate that great branch of the British commerce, without dread of the Indians, or interruption from the subjects of any foreign nation. This good effect surely must be allowed to be of immense importance and advantage to Great Britain; and would not have been the case if we had kept the sugar colonies ceded to France, instead of part of our continental conquests.

What was the occasion of the war but the negotiators of the last peace not settling the distinct limits and boundaries of the territories we and the French were to have in North America? We rejoice those limits are now settled, and hope so effectually as to prevent future disputes.

Among the many altercations concerning the preliminary articles, and the abilities of our negotiators, it must be allowed, with respect to the commercial interest of this country, there is a noble Lord in high office, and of the cabinet, whole acknowledged capacity, great application, and long experience, at a board where he so judiciously and eminently presided, made him a most competent judge what measures were proper to be taken for the security, improvement, and extension of the trade and commerce of Great-Britain and her colonies. Therefore, we cannot doubt, but his majesty has been well and faithfully advised as to that part of our pacific negotiations; because the patriotic spirit, honour and integrity of that nobleman are universally known and approved. It is not amiss to lay down as a maxim, that in general the information of merchants is not to be depended on by the legislature, with respect to trade and commerce, for many other, besides this principal reason; to wit—A trade may be very profitable to a particular merchant, city or town, and, at the same time, be very pernicious to the general interest of the nation, is a most notorious fact. Have we not heard many falsehoods asserted, and seen many erroneous calculations laid before the public, with an interested view of obtaining such private ends, and of defeating in some very essential points the public welfare?

Whatever self-interested people may clamour to the contrary, there cannot be a doubt but his majesty and his ministers, in their negociations, have given the most serious attention to the universal good of this country, without confining their views, or partially regarding whether _North America_ is more valuable than the _Sugar Islands_, because each merited their notice and care, being both of inestimable value to the mother-country, and reciprocally so to each other; and all three so essentially connected, that whatever happens to the disadvantage of the one, must in proportion affect the other. For the West India islands depend upon _North America_, in a great measure, for provisions, mill, and other timber; as well as for horses, cattle, and many things absolutely necessary for the use of the plantations; which are paid for in _specie_, _sugar_, _rum_, melasses, and other plantation-produce: moreover, the melasses being distilled into rum in _North America_, are of great advantage to the merchants there, in carrying on the African trade directly from thence, which enables them to make returns for those manufactures, _&c._ they receive from hence with greater facility. All possible care should be taken to prevent his majesty’s subjects purchasing sugar, rum, and particularly melasses, in the French islands, by prohibiting their importation into North America, by laying a higher duty upon those articles than that laid by an act, made in the sixth year of his late majesty’s reign, entitled, “An act for the better securing and encouraging the trade of his majesty’s sugar colonies, _&c._” whereby such high duties were laid on all foreign sugars, rums, and melasses, to be imported into any of his majesty’s colonies in America, as, it was thought, would answer all the ends of a prohibition.

But experience has shewn that law, and also those passed in the 12th and 15th _Car._ II. are too weak to answer the purposes for which they were designed; and that some more effectual remedies must be found to prevent the British traders of North America importing foreign sugar, rum, and melasses, which was a great trade carried on by them from the French islands before the war; and by that means the commodities from North America, wanted in the sugar islands, were greatly advanced to the British planters. And as the northern traders often refused to take any thing from them but ready money, which drained them of almost all their gold and silver, for want of which they were often brought into great distress; therefore all the money the North American traders used to receive from the British planters, was carried to foreign sugar colonies, and there laid out in the purchase of sugar, rum, and melasses, which were carried to our northern colonies, and there supplied the place of sugar, rum, and melasses from the British sugar islands; and consequently robbed them not only of the consumption of so much of their product, but also of their gold and silver too.

Whereas if the planters in the foreign colonies were obliged to purchase what they want from the British subjects with ready money only, and not allowed to give their sugar, rum, and melasses in barter for the same, it would make the balance of that trade for the future much more in our favour than it has been against us; because we having so greatly extended the British dominion on the continent of America, the French in their sugar islands cannot be supplied with what they want from thence but by the English; therefore the British traders may chuse to be paid for their merchandizes in such manner as they shall please, which the French will be under a necessity of complying with.

It is well known to those who are acquainted with the sugar islands, that the profits of the planter depend upon the vent he finds for his rum and melasses; for if sugar only, and no rum and melasses could be produced from the sugar cane, it would hardly pay the expence of culture, and manufacturing it into sugar. Therefore as the consumption of rum and melasses is stopped or increased, the sugar colonies (whether English or foreign) must respectively thrive or decline. And as rum is not allowed to be imported into old France, or any of its colonies (because it interferes with brandy, which is the product of the mother-country) this evidently shews how much it is in the power of Great-Britain to check the progress of the French sugar islands, and advance that of her own. For if the bringing French rum and melasses into any of the British dominions, can be effectually stopped, all the profits made by rum and melasses, in the French sugar colonies, would be lost to them; because they could find no vent for it in any other part of the world.

This point strictly attended, and invariably adhered to, and the African trade secured to the British subjects, to the extent of their natural and undoubted right, would diminish the growth of sugar in the French islands, and increase it in our own; and might, with the addition of our new acquisitions, very probably in the course of some years, be a means of enabling the English to undersell them at all foreign markets in Europe, and confine them to their own consumption. Therefore it is humbly submitted to the consideration of the legislative power, whether this trade, so apparently hurtful to the national interest of this kingdom, (which will most certainly be carried on in the same manner it was before the war) ought not to be stopped without delay; and the importation of foreign sugar, rum, or melasses, into any of the British colonies in North America, prohibited under such penalties, and with such encouragements to inform and seize, as may be adequate to the crime, in order to put an effectual stop to such a pernicious and destructive commerce.

From what has been before observed, it will, it is presumed, evidently appear how necessary it must be for the advantage of the British sugar colonies, to promote as much as possible the sale and consumption of rum and melasses, upon which, in a great measure, the well-being and prosperity of the planters depend. On that account, and in order to promote such desirable purpose, suppose the duties on melasses, and the excise on rum, were to be lowered, such procedure would favour our plantations in their rivalship with France, and the lessening these duties will, in a great measure, prevent the smuggling of foreign brandy to such a degree, as may probably augment the revenue arising therefrom, by a greater quantity of rum and melasses being disposed of, which consequently must considerably encrease our navigation; and the disadvantage to our rivals in trade will be in proportion to our success. Besides, rum, if it can be got at a reasonable rate, will greatly increase the consumption of malt spirits, by mixing them in such proportion as are suitable to the palate of an infinite variety of people. This is evident from the great quantities, and the various prices that spirits are sold for under the denomination of rum, which are from 5_s._ or 7_s._ to 10_s._ _per_ gallon.

The trade carried on between Great Britain, Ireland, North America, the West India islands and Africa, is of greater advantage to this country, than all our other trades whatsoever, arising from the great exportation of _British_ manufactures, _East India_ goods, provisions as well as _linens_ from _Ireland_, which are paid for with _specie_, _sugar_, _tobacco_, _rice_, _cotton_, and other plantation-produce; and with the commodities of _Africa_, such as _gold dust_, _bees wax_, _elephants teeth_, _gum Senegal_, various sorts of _dying woods_, and particularly _Negroes for the plantations_; whence it manifestly appears, upon the African trade, and the invaluable commerce of our colonies, above two-thirds of the British navigation depends; and for this very obvious reason it may be asserted, that in the vessels employed for said traffic, the most useful sailors for manning his majesty’s navy (the great bulwark of this nation) are bred; because they are inured to the manner of living on board ships, as well in the hot as in the cold climates; which is not the case of sailors taken out of coasting vessels, colliers, and traders to the north seas, as hath been frequently experienced by the many (very useful) lives in our expeditions to the East and West Indies being lost; and that fatality was chiefly owing to their not having been accustomed to live on salt provisions, and to bear the excessive heat of the climate, which they were unacquainted with, and unpractised in.

To prevent the like catastrophes hereafter, when occasion shall require, we would propose the chusing out of the several ships that may lie in the harbours of Great-Britain, such sailors only as shall have been a voyage or more to the hot countries, to man such expedition fleets for those parts of the world, where the sun’s power is strong, as the more probable means of preserving the lives of a great number of those valuable sailors, who may not have had a seasoning, and have been mostly employed in the coasting trade and short voyages.

We have been induced to throw out this hint, in hopes that it may engage the attention of some more able pen, to form a scheme for such a good, humane, and noble end, before the commencement of another war.[1]

It must be allowed by those who have a general knowledge of the trade and commerce of _Great-Britain_ and _Ireland_, that the _Negro-trade_ on the coast of _Africa_, is the chief and fundamental support of the _British colonies_, by supplying them with that race of useful people called Negroes, to be employed in cultivating the lands. But when there is either a deficiency of them, or that they are purchaseable but at high prices, then such checks must greatly impoverish our British planters; and in consequence, considerably diminish the wealth, power, trade and navigation of these kingdoms, the encrease of which has been, in a great measure, owing to the extensive commerce to and from our colonies and plantations: therefore their not being properly supplied with Negroes, must be extremely detrimental to them; which induces us to make some observations upon a memorial taken notice of in the _Public Ledger_, of the third of November last, wherein it was asserted, that sir _William Meredith_, one of the representatives in parliament for the town of _Liverpool_, had presented a memorial to the right honourable the earl of _Egremont_, one of his majesty’s principal secretaries of state, “setting forth the great advantages of the trade of _Guadaloupe, where they received_ 334,605_l._ 11_s._ 2_d._[2] for 12,347 slaves, the cargoes of 41 ships, purchased in Africa with British manufactures; praying that the possession of that island might be thought of in the negotiation for peace, if not incompatible with the general scheme of affairs.” This memorial we could not have expected from that quarter, recollecting that the great _Hardman_ is no more. Had he been living, it would not have been wondered at, as he was noted for his contriving, and being industrious at procuring and presenting, memorials and petitions. He even influenced some _merchants_ of the town of Rippon in Yorkshire, to petition the parliament, when that great and important trade to Africa was under its consideration. He likewise prevailed on many other towns to petition, all as little interested and connected with the trade of Africa, as Rippon; and said Rippon was never famous for any other manufactory, that we could hear of, but that of making spurs; and the cream of the jest is, that not a single pair, as a commercial article, was ever sent to Africa; at the same time many other measures were pursued, very singular methods taken, and absolute untruths asserted as facts, to mislead the legislature, in order, as it is supposed, to prevent the forts and settlements being put upon a proper establishment, that were all as inconsistent as the Rippon petition.

It was at that period boldly advanced at the bar of the house of Commons, and with great industry propagated among the members, that the forts in _Africa_ were only useful, as marks of possession and sovereignty; which, if true, why has 19,565_l._ 14_s._ 2_d._ sterling been expended in building part of a fort at _Anamaboa_, to the 30th June, 1756, as appears by the African committee’s accounts to that time, when the further building of that fort was put under the direction of the board of ordnance[3]? which sum has been since paid by the public more than the annual grant of 10,000_l._ then insisted as sufficient for the support of the forts. But we have been informed, those prevaricating advocates have since altered their opinion, and think it a very inadequate sum for such purpose: and it appears by the votes of the honourable house of Commons, application has been made to parliament to enlarge the annual grant; and there was granted for the year 1761, 13,000_l._ and for the year 1762, the like sum, by which it is conjectured the said advocates have found it absolutely necessary that the forts ought to be kept in a better state than that of marks of _possession_ and _sovereignty_ only.

But that cannot be done, when we consider in what manner the money granted by parliament to the African committee, is appropriated in Africa, which the government never receives any account of.

The great argument made use of to the then ministers[4], to obtain a dissolution of the late African company, by the advocates for the present system, was, that 10,000_l._ was quite adequate and sufficient for the support and maintenance of the forts. This, we believe, was one of the strongest reasons for those ministers adopting their scheme, which had as much truth in it, as many other assertions at that time made use of.

The late company, from their experience, insisted that sum was very insufficient; which it really was, even to give in presents annually to the principal natives, to cultivate such an interest as is not only necessary, but absolutely essential to support and promote the honour, power, jurisdiction, and trade of Great Britain on the coast of Africa. However, there has been granted, since the forts were put under the care of the present Africa committee for their support, from 2d February, 1751, to 2d February, 1763, 136,000_l._ which is 11,333_l._ 6_s._ 8_d._ _per annum_, exclusive of what was expended in building the fort at Annamaboa. Notwithstanding said grants, the forts have not been kept even[5] as marks of possession and sovereignty; which undeniable truth the editors are ready to prove, if called upon.

Mourn! mourn! O _Liverpool_, for the loss of thy great hero and champion, who was at all times ready to enter the lists in defence of thy trade and commerce. But, Britain rejoice; for what may have been for the advantage of the town of _Liverpool_, might be greatly detrimental and prejudicial to the general trade and commerce of this country and its colonies; which surely must clearly appear from the beforementioned memorial. For we believe it will be allowed, if we were to encrease and extend the number of our colonies in North America, and the West Indies, it would be disadvantageous to Great Britain, unless they can be supplied with a sufficient number of people for their defence and cultivation, at as reasonable an expence as possible; without taking the hands that are useful and necessary in husbandry, and the several manufactures of the mother-country.

Then surely, as Guadaloupe was surrendered by capitulation to the British arms, no longer than since the 4th day of May, 1759; and as the merchants of _Liverpool_ had imported 12,347 Negroes into that island some months ago, which must have been the case, or they could not have had so exact an account; we may well conclude that a great number of Negroes have also been carried to _Guadaloupe_, and the other conquered islands, by the merchants of _London_, _Bristol_, and other ports, that carry on a trade to _Africa_, and have been carrying negroes from the time they had the last accounts, which we may suppose to be at least six months preceding the merchants of _Liverpool_’s memorial being presented to lord Egremont.

This must be undoubtedly of great advantage to the _French_ planters, and extremely detrimental to our North American and West India colonies, for want of the _Negroes_ that have been sold to those conquered islands; which must consequently cause a scarcity, and enhance the price of those carried to the real colonies of Great Britain. Because the merchants of _Liverpool_, and others concerned in the _African_ trade, must be truly sensible, that they can find beneficial markets in our colonies for treble the number of Negroes they can purchase with _British_ manufactures. So that the consumption of those manufactures is not encreased, as they would insinuate, by their selling Negroes to the _French islands_ (for so we must call them while they have _French inhabitants_) when the selling such Negroes is so apparently disadvantageous to our colonies that are inhabited by British subjects; on which account we submit, whether as we are to give back to France _Martinico_, _Guadaloupe_, _Marigalante_, _Deserade_, and _St. Lucia_, orders should not be immediately sent to the governors of such islands, to prevent _British_ subjects selling any Negroes to the _French_, which it would be impolitic to do, even were we to have kept possession of them.

The ships that have been fitted out, and are upon their voyages with an intention to sell Negroes on the _French islands_, may dispose of them in the adjacent _British colonies_, where they will meet with purchasers for any number, at such prices as will make their voyages profitable. Therefore such order will not be hurtful to the merchants, but of great advantage to the _British planters_, and consequently so to this country.

It is for that reason we insist it was our interest to return those islands to France, to whom (if proper steps are pursued by us) they must and will become a continual expence, burthen and incumbrance; nor would our retention of them have been an advantage to us: for as the inhabitants are _French_, we must always have kept a military force there at a very great expence, of which recruiting would be no small part. And one great consideration ought to be, the _number of British subjects that would die in that unhealthy climate_, if they were only the soldiers that must annually be sent to complete the regiments necessary to be kept on that service. That service alone would be productive of a great expence; and the loss of so many subjects would prove very detrimental to _Great Britain_.

Besides, for argument’s sake, let us suppose we had kept _Martinico_, _Guadaloupe_, _St. Lucia_, _Marigalante_ and _Deserade_, it would have been highly disadvantageous to the _British planters_, and must prejudice them much in their circumstances, so as in a short time to reduce the old _British_ sugar islands, now so populous and flourishing, to such a state, that it made us tremble to think of it; because the British _African_ traders would supply those islands taken from the French with Negroes, in preference to the old _British_ colonies; which fully appears by the number they have been supplied with already; and as those islands are now ceded to France, will be of great advantage to the planters therein, by their having been in our possession, on account of the Negroes they have purchased to cultivate their plantations. And had we kept said islands, as soon as they had been sufficiently stock’d, they would have carried on a trade for the redundant Negroes with their countrymen at _St. Domingo_. Hence it appears, that great care must be taken to prevent their having it in their power so to do after those islands are restored to France; as we do not in the least doubt, but from the intercourse our countrymen have had with them for the sake of profit, contracts will be made for such anti-national purpose. And such a commerce would enable them and the planters of _St. Domingo_ to cultivate sugar and other plantation-produce sufficient to supply all Europe; and by such means prevent Great Britain’s reaping the advantage that she derives from the exportation of the produce of her colonies: which is so essential a benefit to her, and is one of the first causes of our receiving a balance of trade from foreign countries, and in which the landed interest, merchants and manufacturers of _Great Britain_ and _Ireland_, as also the _planters_ and _merchants_ in our _colonies_, are so materially concerned and interested. For the lands in Britain must always rise and fall in proportion as our manufactures and navigation prosper or decline, and the national revenue encrease or diminish, as the trade of our colonies is in a more or less flourishing way.

Therefore is it not evident, that there is not a man in this kingdom, who, in proportion to his possession and property in the community, does not partake of the benefits and advantages accruing from the _African_, _North American_, and _West Indian_ trades; and who would not be a sufferer in proportion to his situation in life, should they diminish, by falling into the hands of people belonging to any other nation? where, supposing it to be the case, the profit of those valuable trades must consequently center.

For notwithstanding the advantage the French inhabitants would have had by our retention of those islands, they would take nothing from us for the use of themselves, or their plantations, but what they were obliged to out of the greatest necessity; as we have no wines to supply them with, which are proper for that country: so that they would have their wines, and every thing else they could possibly procure, from France; having been accustomed from their infancy to wear French, which they would ever look on as their own native manufactures. And sorry we are to say, too many of them are used in the British colonies, as well as in this country. For which reason they would always have a dislike to British manufactures, and that would induce them to pursue every measure to smuggle their own into those islands; and for the sake of profit, many English traders would be induced to carry them from the Isle of Man, Guernsey, Jersey, and other places, in preference to those of their own country, which has already been the case. But supposing it not so, the real profits of those islands, while possessed by French inhabitants, would not center in Great Britain, but in France; because, on account of the difference in religion, they would send their children thither for education, and make provision for themselves to retire there, always looking upon it as their home. Even so our planters do in regard to Great Britain; for all those who go to the West Indies, or are born there, have no intention to end their days in that climate, but are always aiming to lay by a sufficiency to go home, as they call it; that is, the _English_ planters to come to _Great Britain_, and the _French_ to _France_.

By what has hitherto been advanced, surely it will evidently appear to every impartial reader, that had we retain’d the French sugar islands, they would not have been of any advantage to this country, but on the contrary. It is not the number of islands, where sugar, tobacco, rice, and other plantation-products are raised, that will be advantageous to this or any other country, without they can be supplied with a sufficient number of Negroes for their cultivation; the land being all tilled by hand-labour with the hoe, as there is no ploughing with oxen and horses in the West Indies, except in Jamaica, where two or three planters have used the plough to some part of their plantations, where the soil was light, and of a sandy nature; and all other work is done by _Negroes_, as Europeans cannot do any laborious work there.

Their field _labourers_, sugar _boilers_, _distillers_, _coopers_, _mill-wrights_, _carpenters_, _masons_, _builders_, _smiths_, and house _servants_, are _blacks_; therefore it is not the number of islands, but the greatest number of the _best Negroes_ that benefit the mother-country, _which sort_ we can make appear, the French since the year 1729, in times of peace, to the commencement of the present war, have been constantly supplied with. That is one of the true causes why they have produced such quantities of sugar, and other plantation-product; that for several years before the war, they were become our rivals at foreign markets, so far as to draw from thence a great annual balance of trade in favour of France.[6] But this _effect_ would have been prevented, if proper measures had been pursued by us for the preservation of the _African_ trade, to that part of _Africa_ where the hardy Negroes, who are inured to labour in their own country, were to be purchased.

The French, from the year 1729, to the end of the year 1738, carried from the _Gold Coast_, _Popo_ and _Whydah_, _fifteen_ or _seventeen thousand_ of those valuable people annually; when _four thousand_, in any one year during that period, were not carried to the British plantations; which is the truest reason that can be assigned for the prosperity of the French colonies, and the main spring of the great increase of their product. For they do not understand the cultivation and management of a plantation in any degree equal to the British planters: therefore their advantage and success has been owing, in a great measure, to the good and hardy labourers they have had to till their land, and manufacture the product of it.

We doubt not but the merchants trading to Africa will say, they have imported since the year 1729, more Negroes into the _British_ sugar islands, than the _French_ have to theirs in time of peace (to the commencement of the present war). We admit they have, of Negroes from _Gambia_, _Calabar_, _Boney_, _Benin_, the _windward coast_, and _Angola_. But we take upon us to assert, they cannot with truth say, they have imported to the colonies as many Negroes from the _Gold Coast_, _Popo_, and _Whidah_, which are the most valuable for the laborious cultivation of the sugar cane, and other plantation-product, and manufacturing it into sugar and rum, for the following seasons.

The _Gold Coast_, _Popo_, and _Whidah_ Negroes are born in a part of Africa that is very barren; a small bullock carried thither from another part, when fatted, will sell for near 32_l._ a sheep for 20_s._ four small fowls for 4_s._ sterling, and all other provisions in proportion, except fish; and their coarse kind of bread, which is their chief food. On that account, when able to take the hoe in hand, they are obliged to go and cultivate the land for their subsistance. They also live hardily; so that when they are carried to our plantations (as they have been used to hard labour from their infancy) they become a strong, robust people, and can live upon the sort of food the planters allow them; which is, bread made of Indian corn, and fish, such as herrings and pilchards sent from Britain, and dried fish from North America, being such food as they lived upon in their own country. Indeed they live better in general in our plantations; and they are always ready, on their arrival there, to go to the hard work necessary in planting and manufacturing the sugar cane.

On the other hand, the _Gambia_, _Calabar_, _Boney_, and _Angola_ Negroes are brought from those parts of _Africa_, that are extremely fertile, where every thing grows almost spontaneously; and where a bullock may be bought for less than 20_s._ a sheep for 1_s._ and a dozen of fowls for the same. They have every other necessary of life in great plenty. On that account, the men never work, but lead an indolent life, and are in general of a lazy disposition and tender constitution; for the necessary work among them is done by the women, which is little more than fetching wood to dress their victuals: so that when those people are carried to our sugar islands, they are obliged to be nursed, to be taken great care of, and brought to work by degrees.

The planters, when the _Gold Coast_ and _Whidah_ Negroes were carried to the sugar colonies, before the _French_ interfered in that trade, found there was not a sufficient number to extend their cultivation, by carrying on all the different planting business, and therefore were accustomed to purchase those tender (the worst sort of) Negroes, and employ them for household servants, to raise corn, aloes, look after cattle, bring them up to trades and easy labour, knowing them unfit for the hard work necessary in sugar-plantations.

The Negroes of the river _Gambia_ are better than the last-mentioned; both of which are much more proper for the North American planters, as they have plenty of provisions at a small expence, and, on that account, can use them to gentle labour, and inure them, by degrees, to work with the same sort of food they were accustomed to in their own country.

But that is not the case of the planters in the sugar islands; which sufficiently proves how disadvantageous it must be to have such imported there, in preference to those that would be so immediately useful and serviceable, or to let the French purchase the better sort.

Yet such has been the case, it being for the interest of the African merchants to supply the _British_ planters with the inferior sort, as each Negro costs much less on the coast of _Angola_, &c. than those from the _Gold Coast_, &c. which saves a great deal in the outset of the cargoes sent to _Africa_, and consequently greatly encreases the net profit on the voyages, as the tender and worst sort of Negroes will sell in the sugar islands for near as great a price each as the best, provided there is none of the latter at market; and a greater number of the former being subject to die, must encrease the demand.

This we thought proper to take notice of, to shew how necessary it will be for the interest of this country, that the French should not for the future be allowed to trade in _Africa_, at cape _Appollonia_, or between it and the river _Volta_, where, and at _Popo_ and _Whidah_, to the eastward of that river, the valuable Negroes beforementioned, adapted by their natural constitution for cultivating the sugar plantations, are to be purchased; otherwise in times of peace, they will be constantly making encroachments as heretofore; so that when the late company’s governor at _Cape Coast Castle_ saw a _French_ vessel upon the Gold Coast, he used to order an officer to go on board with a message to the following purport.

“You are ordered on board the _French_ vessel, to tell the master,
the governor and council do not make trade with the subjects of
_France_,[7] nor do they suffer the natives to trade with them.
But as there subsists a good friendship and alliance between the
king of Great Britain and the French king, if the master should be
distressed for water, or such like necessaries, he might have it
upon application, by admitting an officer on board, to prevent his
having intercourse with the natives, or others, till he should have
received such supplies; but that he should not be allowed to trade
to the westward of the river _Volta_, which if he attempted, proper
measures would be taken to prevent and obstruct his commerce.
Therefore, should he neglect those orders, and receive any damage
thereby, it would be his own fault; as the governor and council
held the trade of the _Gold Coast_, the indubitable right and
property of THE ROYAL AFRICAN COMPANY OF ENGLAND.”

This warning sometimes had the desired effect; at others, the governor and council were obliged to arm vessels to drive them off, which occasioned the masters of French ships to protest against the said governor and council. The protests were sent to them by the chevalier _Glandeuves_, commodore of _le Content_ and _Oriflamme_, two French men of war, in his letters dated _Annamaboa Road_, the 9th and 12th of February, 1751, wherein he insisted that the French had an undoubted right to trade to any part of Africa, out of gun-shot of any European fort.

How far the then governor and council were justifiable, in arming private ships to defend and preserve the trade and commerce under their care in time of peace, or any future council may be for exerting themselves in a like manner, we will not undertake to say; but are fully satisfied the French will go thither, and that the governor of the fort at Annamaboa will not be able to prevent their having intercourse with the natives, but by arming vessels to see them to the eastward of the river _Volta_. For we are of opinion, property and right are not to be tamely given up in that part of the world, in hopes of relief from our administration at home; it being so remote from the giving of immediate redress, and distant from appeal; or at least, it has happened so in all complaints made to former ministers. Many instances thereof can be given, which induced us to lay before the public the foregoing observations, as the present seems the most proper time to have such rights settled, to prevent future disputes between the subjects of both nations, which if not prevented in an effectual manner, by putting the forts upon an establishment, that the officers commanding them may be in such situation, as to protect the trade under their care from the encroachments of any foreigners, will inevitably happen.

It is also necessary to remark, that the French should not be permitted to re-settle a factory they had before the war at _Abreda_, about a league below _James Fort_, in the river _Gambia_, which was destroyed by that gallant sea officer, and brave commander Sir George Pocock, in the year 1744, but settled again after the peace; and again destroyed this war by Capt. Marsh, commander of his majesty’s ship Harwich.

If they are not permitted to re-establish that factory, and the trade of _Gambia_ and _Senegal_ rivers are pursued in a proper manner, _Goree_ will be of no consequence, but an expence to France, for many good reasons we think it improper at present to enlarge upon; knowing there is a work in hand that will soon be published, wherein all the advantages of the _African trade_ are fully considered from the time LETTERS PATENT were granted by king Charles the second, the 27th day of September, 1672, to establish and incorporate the late royal African company of England; shewing how the trade was carried on by that company, and the true cause of their having been rendered unable to support their forts and settlements without the aid of government, with the ill consequences that attended the decay of that valuable branch of British commerce, on which the prosperity of our colonies, and so many branches of our manufactures, depend; followed by observations on the qualities of manufactures sent thither, and the regulations that it is necessary should be made regarding the same. To which will be added, a plan to revive and extend that trade to the inland parts of _Africa_, so as the most valuable Negroes may be secured for the British planters, as the only means to prevent the growth of the French colonies, or at least to make them extremely expensive and burthensome to their mother-country; and, on the contrary, ours to become of the greatest benefit and advantage to Great Britain and Ireland.

Senegal is most certainly a great and valuable acquisition to this country, if put upon a proper establishment, as it will secure to us all the gum trade, so useful in our manufactures, and will greatly encrease the slave, gold and ivory trades in _Gambia_ river. For when Senegal was in possession of the French, by means of a fort they had at _Gallam_, about five hundred miles from the sea up that river (since the decline of the late Africa company, by no factory being kept at _Fatatenda_, about the same distance up _Gambia_ river) intercepted the greatest part of the slave, ivory and gold trades, that came from the several inland countries to the north east of those rivers: therefore, if proper steps are taken, those trades may be greatly encreased and extended at an inconsiderable expence, not having the subjects of any foreign nation to interest themselves against such a scheme.

The African merchants, to vindicate themselves in carrying on the trade for the _worst Negroes_ in preference to the other, give out, that the better sort are not to be come at. But there is no other grounds for such an assertion, than that the roads to those great and populous inland countries lying at the back of the forts and settlements on the _Gold Coast_, have been stopt since the year 1738, which has prevented all intercourse with the natives, except those who live within about fifty miles of the sea-coast; whereby a stop was put to that great trade which came down, when the roads were kept open by the power and influence of the company’s officers, and by their alliance and friendship with the several princes and people in power, living in the different _countries near_, and in the _towns_ on the said _roads_, that were opened and settled by the late company’s officers at a very great expence.

One great reason for the decline of their power and influence was, by the masters of private trading vessels putting in practice every measure they could invent to vilify and render the company’s officers insignificant and contemptible to the inland people and Negroes under their command.

By which sinister machinations, they lost that weight and authority so necessary for them to act as protectors of the injured, and mediators in adjusting and deciding disputes that frequently happen between _African_ princes; which if the company’s officers cannot accomplish by policy, presents, or amicable measures, they should be maintained in such a respectable situation, as to be able to join the injured party, and to compel the refractory to accommodate matters[8], so as to procure peace, and bring the country to a state of tranquillity.

For it is a mistaken notion, that the company’s officers (during their command) created wars between the _African_ chiefs, in order to purchase the prisoners, which should be made on either side. This falsehood was propagated also at a certain time, to serve particular purposes. On the contrary, slaves are bred in the inland parts of _Africa_, and sent for sale, according to the want those people are in for _European_ manufactures; the same as an ox or horse is taken to market, when a farmer in England wants money to pay his rent, or for other purposes. Every man in Africa is looked upon to be a man of property and power in proportion to the number of Negroes he is possessed of.

When such disputes as above glanced at happen, the consequence is an immediate stoppage of the roads by those people nearest the sea-side, to prevent their adversaries getting guns, powder, or any other necessaries for war; which in 1738 occasioned the king of _Warsaw_, and his allies, to draw a discriminating line along the _Gold Coast_ for that intent; and this hath ever since prevented all intercourse and trade with the inland natives in the direct way; as also any gold or slaves for sale coming from them, except a few stolen away by the king of _Warsaw_’s soldiers, with a little gold; and an inconsiderable number of slaves brought from the great kingdom of _Ashantee_, in a very difficult and dangerous way, by the traders of that country, in order to purchase guns and powder at the _British_, _Dutch_, and _Danish_ forts at _Acra_.

These traders are obliged to come and return in arm’d bodies, many miles round about through strange countries, where they are afraid of being plundered by the natives of their European goods, and are themselves in danger of being seized upon, and sold as slaves, which prevents their bringing the trade down as usual.

Consequently, whenever the proper roads are open, and protection given, there will be a great number of slaves, gold dust and elephants teeth brought down to the sea-side, to purchase British manufactures for supplying the inhabitants of those extensive countries, that have stood in need of them so many years.

The obstructing of such intercourse has occasioned our planters being deprived of fifteen or twenty thousand of the best and most useful Negroes yearly for their plantations,[9] and Great Britain has thereby also been prevented from receiving _fifty or sixty thousand ounces_ of gold dust,[10] besides thirty or forty tons of elephants teeth annually.[11]

It is highly probable that _Africa_ abounds with gold mines, richer than those in the Brazil, or in any other country; for the late African company, in the infancy of their trade, imported from their settlements on that coast, from the year 1675 to the year 1690, as much gold as was coined at the Tower into 400,000 guineas[12], exclusive of what was sent and brought home by their officers and servants, who were always paid their salaries and commissions upon the trade they made in that commodity, which must have been no inconsiderable quantity; because, as the company extended their forts and settlements upon the Gold Coast, their gold trade increased so much, that they were used to take in exchange for British manufactures, and East India goods in _Africa_, upwards of two thousand ounces of gold weekly, which can be proved from authentic vouchers, and continued so to do until such time as the private traders made incroachments upon them, and overstocked the country with goods by their competitions with each other, which the natives took the advantage of, and insisted upon the traders lowering the price of European merchandize, and raising those of Africa, by keeping their slaves, gold and ivory up to an exorbitant price, and thereby getting as great a quantity of goods, for a few slaves, as was sufficient for their consumption; and was the cause of fewer being brought from the inland countries, as by the high prices, before observed, the Negroes got what goods they wanted for the small number sold, which also prevented their bringing gold to market, and by which means that valuable branch of the _African_ trade, of such importance to this country, was in a great measure destroyed, and the profits thereof centered with the natives of _Africa_.

We believe the private traders will admit they have not altogether imported from _Africa_ into these kingdoms two thousand ounces of gold annually[13]; and that since the act of parliament for dissolving the late company, and putting the forts and settlements under the management of the committee of the company of merchants trading to Africa, the officers commanding there, have not taken gold sufficient to pay the annual salaries of their servants, though they are fewer in number than those that were kept by the late company.

From what has been stated, we conjecture it will appear, that the _British_ forts in _Africa_ are not upon a proper plan; if they were, the commanding officers for the committee of the company of merchants trading to _Africa_, would, in eleven years and upwards, have opened those roads (which have been so long stopt) that the colonies and mother-country might receive those great benefits and advantages beforementioned, by having the trade brought down to the forts without interruption, from the remotest parts of _Africa_, as it was in the time of the late company’s prosperity; but that has not been done, and as the British traders declined that trade many years before the _French_ seized the opportunity of stepping in, and reaped so great advantages thereby, as to have carried to their colonies, not fewer than one hundred and fifty thousand of those useful people, from the year 1729 to the year 1739.