Chapter II: Part 2

[-27-] "A standing army should be supported, drawn from the citizens, the subject nations, and the allies, in one case more, in another less, province by province, as the necessities of the case demand; and they ought to be always under arms and make a practice of warfare continually. They must have secured winter-quarters at the most opportune points, and serve for a definite time, so that a certain period of active life may remain for them before old age. For, separated so far as we are from the frontiers of the empire, with enemies living near us on every side, we should otherwise no longer be able to count on auxiliaries in the case of emergencies. Again, if we allow all those of military age to have arms and to practice warlike pursuits, quarrels and civil wars will always be arising among them. However, if we prevent them from doing this and then need their assistance at all in battle, we shall always have to face danger with inexperienced and untrained soldiers at our back. For this reason I submit the proposition that most of them live without arms and away from forts; but that the hardiest and those most in need of a livelihood be registered and kept in practice. They themselves will fight better by devoting their leisure to this single business; and the rest will the more easily farm, manage ships, and attend to the other pursuits of peace, if they are not forced to be called out for service, but have others to stand as their guardians. The most active and vigorous element, that is, which is oftenest obliged to live by robbery, will be supported without harming others, and all the rest of the population will lead a life free from danger.

[-28-] "From what source, then, will the money come for these warriors and for the other expenses that will be found necessary? I shall make this point clear, with only the short preliminary statement that even were we under a democracy, we should in any case need money. We can not survive without soldiers, and without pay none of them will serve. Hence let us not feel downhearted in the belief that the compulsory collection of money appertains only to monarchy, and let us not turn away from the system for that reason, but conduct our deliberations with a full knowledge of the fact that in any case it is necessary for us to obtain funds, whatsoever form of government we may adopt. Consequently, I maintain that you should first of all sell the goods which are in the public treasury,--and I notice that these have become numerous on account of the wars,--except a few which are exceedingly useful and necessary to you: and you should loan all this money at some moderate rate of interest. In this way the land will be worked, being delivered to men who will cultivate it themselves, and the latter will obtain a starting-point and so grow more prosperous, while the treasury will have a sufficient and perpetual revenue. This amount should be computed together with all the rest of the revenue that can be derived from the mines and with certainty from any other source; and after that we ought to reckon on not only the military service but everything else which contributes to the successful life of a city, and further how much it will be necessary to lay out in campaigns at short notice and other critical occurrences which are wont to take place. Then, to make up the deficiency in income, we ought to levy upon absolutely all instruments which produce any profit for the men who possess them, and we should exact taxes from all whom we rule. It is both just and proper that no one of them should be exempt from taxation,--individual or people,--because they are destined to enjoy the benefit of the taxes in common with the rest. We should set over them tax-collectors in every case to manage the business, so that they may levy from all sources of revenue everything that falls due during their term of management. The following plan will render it easier for the officers to gather the taxes and will be of no little service to those who contribute them. I mean that they will bring in whatever they owe in an appointed order and little by little, instead of remaining idle a short time and then having the entire sum demanded of them in one payment.

[-29-] "I am not unaware that some of the incomes and taxes established will be disliked. But I know this, too,--that if the peoples secure immunity from any further abuse and believe in reality that they will be contributing all of this for their own safety and for reaping subsidiary benefits in abundance and that most of it will be obtained by no others than men of their own district, some by governing, others by managing, others by army service, they will be very grateful to you, giving as they do a small portion of large possessions, the profits of which they enjoy without oppression. Especially will this be true if they see that you live temperately and spend nothing foolishly. Who, if he saw you very economical of your own means and very lavish of the public funds, would not willingly contribute, and deem your possession of wealth to constitute his safety and prosperity? By these means a very large amount of money would be on hand.

[-30-] "The rest I urge you to arrange in the following way. Adorn this city in the most expensive manner possible and add brilliance by every form of festival. It is fitting that we who rule many people should surpass all in everything, and such spectacles tend in a way to promote respect on the part of our allies and alarm on the part of enemies. The affairs of other nations you should order in this fashion. First, let the various tribes have no power in any matter nor meet in assemblies at all. They would decide nothing good and would always be creating more or less turmoil. Hence I say that even our own populace ought not to gather at court or for elections or for any other such meeting where any business is to be transacted. Next, they should not indulge in numbers of houses of great size and beyond what is necessary, and they should not expend money upon many and all kinds of contests: so they will neither be worn out by vain zeal nor become hostile through unreasonable rivalries. They ought, however, to have certain festivals and spectacles, (apart from the horse-race held among us), but not to such an extent that the treasury or private estates will be injured, or any stranger be compelled to spend anything whatever in their midst, or food for a lifetime be furnished to all who have merely won in some contest. It is unreasonable that the well-to-do should submit to compulsory expenditures outside their own countries; and for the athletes the prizes for each event are sufficient. This ruling does not apply to any one of them who might come out victor in the Olympian or Pythian games, or some contest here at Rome.[12] Such are the only persons who ought to be fed, and then the cities will not exhaust themselves without avail nor anybody practice save those who have a chance of winning, since one can follow some other pursuit that is more advantageous both to one's self and to one's country. "This is my decision about these matters.--Now to the horse-races which are held without gymnastic contests, I think that no other city but ours should be allowed to hold them, so that vast sums of money may not be dissipated recklessly nor men go miserably frantic,--and most of all that the soldiers may have a plentiful supply of the best horses. This, therefore, I would forbid altogether, that those races should take place anywhere else than here. The other amusements I have determined to moderate so that all organizations should make the enjoyment of entertainments for eye and ear inexpensive, and men thereby live more temperately and free from discontent.

"Let none of the foreigners employ their own coinage or weights or measures, but let them all use ours. And they should send no embassy to you, unless it involve a point for decision. Let them instead present to their governor whatever they please and through him forward to you all such requests of theirs as he may approve. In this way they will neither spend anything nor effect their object by crooked practices, but receive their answers at first hand without any expenditure or intrigue.

[-31-] "Moreover, in respect to other matters, you would seem to be ordering things in the best way if you should, in the first place, introduce before the senate the embassies which come from the enemy and from those under truce, both kings and peoples. For it is awe-inspiring and impressive to let the senate appear to be master of all situations and to exhibit many adversaries prepared for petitioners who are guilty of double dealing. Next, have all the laws enacted by the senators, and do not impose a single one upon all the people alike, except the decrees of that body. In this way the dignity of the empire would be the more confirmed and the decisions made in accordance with the laws would prove indisputable and evident to all alike. Thirdly, it would be well in case the senators who are serving in the city, their children or their wives, are ever charged with any serious crime, so that a person convicted would receive a penalty of disenfranchisement or exile or even death, that you should set the situation before the senate, without any previous condemnation, and commit to that body the entire decision at first hand regarding it. Thus those guilty of any crime would be tried before all their peers and punished without any ill-feeling against you. The rest, seeing this, would improve in character for fear of being themselves publicly apprehended. I am speaking here about those offences regarding which laws are established, and judgments are rendered according to the laws.

"As for talk that some one has abused you or spoken in an unfitting way about you, do not listen to any one who brings such an accusation nor investigate it. It is disgraceful to believe that any one has wantonly insulted you who are doing no wrong and benefiting all. Only those who rule badly will credit these reports. Because of their own conscience they surmise that the matter has been stated truthfully. It is a shame to be angry at complaints for which, if true, one had better not have been responsible, and about which, if false, one ought not to pretend to care. Many in times past by angry behavior have caused more things and worse to be said against them. This is my opinion about those accused of uttering some insult. Your personality should be too strong and too lofty to be assailed by any insolence, and you should never allow yourself to think nor lead others into thinking that any person can be indecent toward you. Thus they will think of you as of the gods, that you are sacrosanct. If any one should be accused of plotting against you (such a thing might happen), do not yourself sit as judge on a single detail of the case nor reach any decision in advance,--for it is absurd that the same man should be made both accuser and judge,--but take him to the senate and make him plead his defence. If he be convicted, punish him, though moderating the sentence so far as is feasible, in order that belief in his guilt may be fostered. It is very difficult to make most men believe that any unarmed person will plot against him who is armed. And the only way you could gain credence would be by punishing him not in anger nor overwhelmingly, if it be possible.--This is aside from the case of one who had an army and should revolt directly against you. It is not fitting that such an one be tried, but that he be chastised as an enemy.

"In this way refer to the senate these matters and [-32-] most of the highly important affairs that concern the commonwealth. Public interests you must administer publicly. It is also an inbred trait of human nature for individuals to delight in marks of esteem from a superior, which seem to raise one to equality with him, and to approve everything which the superior has determined after consulting them, as if it were their own proposal, and to cherish it, as if it were their own choice. Consequently I affirm that such business ought to be brought before the senate.--In regard to most cases all those senators present ought equally to state their opinions: but when one of their number is accused, not all of them should do so, unless it be some one who is not yet a senator or is not yet in the ranks of the ex-quæstors that is being tried. And, indeed, it is absurd that one who has not yet been a tribune or an ædile should cast a vote against such as have already filled these offices, or, by Jupiter, that any one of the latter should vote against the ex-prætors or they against the ex-consuls. Let the last named have authority to render a decision in all cases, but the rest only in the cases of their peers and their subordinates.

[-33-] "You yourself must try in person the referred and the appealed cases which come to you from the higher officials, from the procurators, from the præfectus urbi, from the sub-censor, and the prefects, both the commissioner of grain[13] and the night-watch.[14] No single one of them should have such absolute powers of decision and such independence that a case can not be appealed from him. You should be the judge, therefore in these instances, and also when knights are concerned and properly enrolled centurions and the foremost private citizens, if the trial involves death or disenfranchisement. Let these be your business alone, and for the reasons mentioned let no one else on his own responsibility render a decision in them. You should always have associated with you for discussion the most honored of the senators and of the knights, and further certain others from the ranks of the ex-consuls and ex-prætors, some at one time and some at another. In this association you will become more accurately acquainted with their characters beforehand, and so be able to put them to the right kind of employment, and they by coming in contact with your habits and wishes will have them in mind on going out to govern the provinces. Do not, however, openly ask their opinions when a rather careful consideration is required, for fear that they, being outside their accustomed sphere, may hesitate to speak freely; but let them record their views on tablets. To these you alone should have access, that they may become known to no one else, and then order the writing to be immediately erased. In this way you may best get at each man's exact opinion, when they believe that it can not be identified among all the rest.

"Moreover for the lawsuits, letters, and decrees of the cities, for the consideration of the demands of individuals and everything else which belongs to the administration of the empire you must have supporters and assistants from among the knights. Everything will move along more easily in this way, and you will neither err through want of fairness nor become exhausted by doing everything yourself. Grant every one who wishes to make any suggestion whatever to you the right of speaking freely and fearlessly. If you approve what he says, it will be of great service: and if you are not persuaded, it will do no harm. Those who obtain your favorable judgment you should both praise and honor, since by their devices you will receive glory: and those who fail of it you should never dishonor or censure. It is proper to look at their intentions, and not to find fault because their plans were unavailable. Guard against this same mistake when war is concerned. Be not enraged at any one for involuntary misfortune nor jealous of his good fortune, to the end that all may zealously and gladly run risks for you, confident that if they make a slip they will not be punished nor if successful become the objects of intrigue. There are many who through fear of jealousy on the part of those in power have chosen to meet reverses rather than to effect anything. As a result they retained their safety, but the loss fell upon their own heads. You, who are sure to reap the principal benefit from both classes alike,--the inferior and the superior,--ought never to choose to become nominally jealous of others, but really of yourself.

[-34-] "Whatever you wish your subjects to think and do _you_ must say and do. You can better educate them in this way than if you should desire to terrify them by the severities of the laws. The former course inspires emulation, the latter fear. And any one can more easily imitate superior conduct, when he actually sees it in some life, than he can guard against low behavior which he merely hears to be prohibited by edict. Act in every way yourself with circumspection, not condoning any mistakes of your own, for be well assured that all will straightway learn everything you say and do. You will live as it were in a kind of theatre, whose audience is the whole world: and it will not be possible for you to escape detection if you commit the very smallest error. No act of yours will ever be in private, but all of them will be performed in the midst of many persons. And all the remainder of mankind somehow take the greatest delight in being officious with respect to what is done by their rulers. Hence, if they once ascertain that you are urging them to one course and following a different one yourself, they will not fear your threats, but will imitate your deeds.

"Have an eye to the lives of others, but do not carry your investigations unpleasantly close. Decide cases which are brought before you by outsiders, but do not pretend to notice conduct that receives no outspoken censure from any one, except irregularities not consonant with public interest. The latter ought to be properly rebuked, even if no one has aught to say against them. Other private failings you ought to know, in order to avoid making a mistake some day by employing an assistant unsuitable for a particular duty: do not, however, take individuals to task. Their natures impel many persons to commit various violations of the law. If you make an unsparing campaign against them, you might leave scarcely one man unpunished. But if you humanely mingle consideration with the strict command of the law, you may perhaps bring them to their senses. For the law, though necessarily severe in its punishments, can not always conquer nature. Some men, if permitted to think they are unobserved, or if moderately admonished, improve, some through shame at being discovered and others through fear of failure the next time. Whereas when they are openly denounced and throw compunction to the winds, or where they are chastised beyond measure, they overturn and trample under foot all law and order and obey slavishly the impulses of their nature. Therefore it is not easy to discipline all of them nor is it fitting to allow some of them to continue publicly their outrageous conduct.

"This is the way I advise you to treat people's offences, except the very desperate cases: and you should honor even beyond the deserts of the deed whatever they do rightly. In this way you can best make them refrain from baser conduct by kindliness and cause them to aim at what is better by liberality. Have no dread that either money or other means of rewarding those who do well will ever fail you. I think those deserving of good treatment will prove far fewer than the rewards, since you are lord of so much land and sea. And fear not that any who are benefited will commit some act of ingratitude. Nothing so captivates and conciliates any one, be he foreigner or be he foe, as freedom from wrongs and likewise kindly treatment.

[-35-] "This is the attitude which I urge you to assume toward others. For your own part allow no extraordinary or overweening distinction to be given you through word or deed by the senate or by anybody else. To others honor which you confer lends adornment, but to your own self nothing can be given that is greater than what you already have, and it would arouse no little suspicion of failure in straightforwardness. None of the ordinary people willingly approves of having any such distinction voted to the man in power. As he receives everything of the kind from himself, he not only obtains no praise for it but becomes a laughing-stock instead. Any additional brilliance, then, you must create for yourself by your good deeds. Never permit gold or silver images of yourself to be made; they are not only costly, but they give rise to plots and last but a brief time: you must build in the very hearts of men others out of benefits conferred, which shall be both unalloyed and undying. Again, do not ever allow a temple to be raised to yourself. Large amounts of money are spent uselessly on such objects, which had better be laid out upon necessary improvements. Great wealth is gathered not so much by acquiring a great deal as by not spending a great deal. Nor does a temple contribute anything to any one's glory. Excellence raises many men to the level of the gods, but nobody ever yet was made a god by show of hands. Hence if you are upright and rule well, the whole earth will be your precinct, all cities your temple, all mankind your statues. In their thoughts you will ever be enshrined and surrounded by good repute. Those who administer their power in any other way are not only not magnified by sites and edifices of worship, though these be the choicest in all the cities, but erect for themselves therein mute detractors which become trophies of their baseness, memorials of their injustice. And the longer these last, the more steadfastly does the ill-repute of such sovereigns abide. [-36-] Therefore if you desire to become in very truth immortal, act in this way; and further, reverence the Divine Power yourself everywhere in every way, following our fathers' belief, and compel others to honor it. Those who introduce strange ideas about it you should both hate and punish, not only for the sake of the gods (because if a man despises them he will esteem naught else sacred) but because such persons by bringing in new divinities persuade many to adopt foreign principles of law. As a result conspiracies, factions, and clubs arise which are far from desirable under a monarchy. Accordingly, do not grant any atheist or charlatan the right to be at large. The art of soothsaying is a necessary one and you should by all means appoint some men to be diviners and augurs, to whom people can resort who desire to consult them on any matter; but there ought to be no workers of magic at all. Such men tell partly truth but mostly lies, and frequently inspire many of their followers to rebel. The same thing is true of many who pretend to be philosophers. Hence I urge you to be on your guard against them. Do not, because you have come in contact with such thoroughly admirable men as Areus and Athenodorus, think that all the rest who say they are philosophers are like them. Some use this profession as a screen to work untold harm to both populace and individuals.

[-37-] "Your spirit, then, because you have no desire for anything more than you possess, ought to be most peaceful, whereas your equipment should be most warlike, in order that no one ordinarily may either wish or try to harm you, but if he should, that he may be punished easily and instantly. For these and other reasons it is requisite for some persons to keep their ears and eyes open to everything appertaining to your position of authority, in order that you may not fail to notice anything which needs guarding against or setting right. Remember, however, that you must not trust merely to all they say, but investigate their words carefully. There are many who, some through hatred of certain persons, others out of desire for what they possess, or as a favor to some one, or because they ask money and do not receive it, oppress others under the pretext that the latter are rebellious or are guilty of harboring some design or uttering some statement against the supreme ruler. Therefore it is not right to pay immediate or ready attention to them, but to enquire into absolutely everything. If you are slow in believing anybody, you will suffer no great harm, but if you are hasty, you may make a mistake which can not easily be repaired.

"Now it is both right and necessary for you to honor the excellent both among the freedmen and among the rest of your associates. This will afford you great renown and security. They must, however not have any extraordinary powers but all carefully moderate their conduct, that so you may not be ill spoken of through them. For everything they do, whether well or ill, will be accredited to you, and the estimate of yourself to be made by all men will depend upon what you permit these persons to do.

"Do not, then, allow the influential either to make unjust gains or to concern themselves with blackmail: and let no one be complained of for 'having influence', even if he is otherwise irreproachable. Defend the masses vigorously when they are wronged and do not attend too easily to accusations against them. Examine every deed on its merits, not being suspicious of every one who is prominent nor believing every one who is lower in the social scale. Those who are active and are the authors of any useful device you must honor, but the idle or such as busy themselves with petty foolishness you must hate. Thus your subjects will be inclined to the former conduct because of the benefits attached and will refrain from the latter on account of the penalties, and will become better as individuals and more serviceable for your employment in the public service.

"It is an excellent achievement also to render private disputes as few as possible and their settlement as rapid as may be. But it is best of all to cut short the impetuosity of communities, and, if under guise of some appeals to your sovereignty and safety and good fortune they undertake to use force upon anybody or to undertake exploits or expenditures that are beyond their power, not to permit it. You should abolish altogether their enmities and rivalries among themselves and not authorize them to create any empty titles or anything else which will breed differences between them. All will readily obey you both in this and in every other matter, private and public, if you never permit any one to transgress this rule. Non-enforcement of laws makes null and void even wisely framed precepts. Consequently you should not allow persons to ask for what you are not accustomed to give. Try to compel them to avoid diligently this very practice of petitioning for something prohibited. This is what I have to say on that subject.

[-38-] "I advise you never to make use of your authority against all the citizens at once nor to deem it in any way curtailed if you do not do absolutely everything that is within your power. But in proportion as you are able to carry out all your wishes, you must be anxious to wish only what is proper, make always a self-examination, to see whether what you are doing is right or not, what conduct will cause people to love you, and what not, in order that you may perform the one set of acts and avoid the other. Do not admit the thought that you will sufficiently escape the reputation of acting contrary to this rule, if only you hear no one censuring you; and do not look for any one to be so mad as to reproach you openly for anything. No one would do this, not even if he should be violently wronged. Quite the reverse,--many are compelled in public to praise their oppressors, and while engaged in opposition not to manifest their wrath. The ruler must infer the disposition of people not from what they say but from the way it is natural for them to feel.

[-39-] "This and a similar policy is the one I wish you to pursue. I pass over many matters because it is not feasible to speak of them all at one time and within present limits. One suggestion therefore I will make to sum up both previous remarks and whatever is lacking. If you yourself by your own motion do whatever you would wish some one else who ruled you to do, you will make no mistakes and will be always successful, and consequently your life will be most pleasant and free from danger. How can all fail to regard you and to love you as father and preserver, when they see you are orderly, leading a good life, good at warfare, but a man of peace: when you are not wanton, do not defraud: when you meet them on a footing of equality, and do not yourself grow rich while demanding money from others: are not yourself given to luxury while imposing hardships upon others: are not yourself unbridled while reproving others: when, instead, your life in every way without exception is precisely like theirs? Be of good cheer, for you have in your own hands a great safeguard by never wronging another. And believe me when I tell you that you will never be the object of hatred or plots. Since this is so, you must quite inevitably lead a pleasant life. What is pleasanter, what is more conducive to prosperity, than to enjoy in a rightful way all the blessings among men and to have the power of granting them to others?

[-40-] "With this in mind, together with all the rest that I have told you, heed my advice and let not that fortune slip which has chosen you out of all and set you at the head of all. If you would choose the substance of monarch but fear the name of 'kingdom' as accursed, then refrain from taking possession of the latter and be satisfied to employ merely the title of 'Cæsar.' If you need any further appellations, they will give you that of _Imperator_, as they gave it to your father. They will reverence you also by still another name, so that you may obtain all the advantages of a kingdom without the disfavor that attaches to the term itself."

[-41-] Mæcenas thus brought his speech to an end. Cæsar thanked them both heartily for their many ideas, the exhaustiveness of their exposition, and their frankness. He rather inclined, however, to the proposition of Mæcenas. Yet he did not immediately put into practice all of the other's suggestions, for fear that he might meet with some setback if he wanted to reform men in multitudes. So he made some changes for the better at once and others later. He left some things also for those who should come to the head of the State afterward to do, as might be found more opportune in the progress of time. Agrippa coöperated with him in all his projects quite zealously, in spite of having stated a contrary opinion, just as if he had been the one to propose the plan. Cæsar did this and what I have recorded earlier in the narrative in that year when he was consul for the seventh time, and added the title of _Imperator_. I do not refer to the title anciently granted some persons for victories,--this he received many times before and many times later for his deeds themselves, so that he had the name of imperator twenty-one times,--but to the other one which signifies supreme power, just as they had voted to his father Cæsar and to the children and descendants of the same.

[-42-] After this he entered upon a censorship with Agrippa and besides setting aright some other business he investigated the senate. Many knights and many foot-soldiers, too, who did not deserve it were in the senate as a result of the civil wars, so that the total of that body amounted to a thousand. These he wished to remove, but did not himself erase any of their names, urging them to become their own judges out of the consciousness of their family and their life. So first he persuaded fifty of them to retire voluntarily from the assemblage and then compelled one hundred and forty others to imitate their example. He disenfranchised none of them, but posted the names of the second division. In the case of the first, because they had not delayed but had straightway obeyed him, he remitted the reproach and their identity was not made public. These accordingly returned willingly to private life. He ousted Quintus Statilius, very much against the latter's will, from the tribuneship to which he had been appointed. Some others he made senators, and he counted among the ex-consuls two men of the senatorial class,--a certain Cluvius and Gaius Furnius,--because they had been appointed first, though certain others had taken possession of their offices so that they were unable to become consuls. He added to the class of patricians, the senate allowing him to do this because most of its members had perished. No element is exhausted so fast in civil wars as the nobility or is deemed to be so necessary for the continuance of ancestral customs. In addition to the above measures he forbade all persons in the senate to go outside of Italy, unless he himself should order or permit any one of them to do so. This custom is still kept up at the present day. Except that he may visit Sicily and Gallia Narbonensis no senator is allowed to go anywhere out of the country. As these regions are close at hand and the population is unarmed and peaceful, those who have any possessions there have been granted the right to take trips to them as often as they like, without asking leave.--Since also he saw that many of the senators and of the others who had been devoted to Antony still maintained an attitude of suspicion toward him, and as he was afraid they might cause some uprising, he announced that all the letters found in his rival's chest had been burned. Some of them as a matter of fact had perished, but the majority of them he took pains to preserve and did not even hesitate to use them later.

[-43-] Besides these acts related he also settled Carthage anew, because Lepidus had laid waste a part of it and for that reason he maintained that the colonists' rights of settlement had been abrogated. He summoned Antiochus of Commagene to appear before him because this prince had treacherously slain an envoy despatched to Rome by his brother, who was at variance with him. Cæsar brought him before the senate, where he was condemned and the sentence of death imposed. Capreæ was also obtained from the Neapolitans, to whom it had anciently belonged, in exchange for other land. It lies not far from the mainland opposite Surrentum and is good for nothing but has a name even now on account of Tiberius's sojourn there.--These were the events of that period.

[Footnote 1: Reading [Greek: anagchastae] (Boissevain)]

[Footnote 2: The same Strabo who is mentioned in the early part of chapter 28, Book Forty-four.]

[Footnote 3: There is a gap here in the Greek text. The conclusion of Agrippa'a speech is missing, as is also the earlier portion of Mæcenas's, with some brief preface thereto. In the next chapter we are full in the midst of the opposite argument,--in favor, namely, of the assumption of supreme power by Octavius Cæsar.]

[Footnote 4: Cobet prefers to read "fearlessly" (substituting [Greek: hadeos] for [Greek: aedeos]).]

[Footnote 5: Dio seems here to be imitating, in his phraseology, Thukydides (VII, 25). The proper reading is [Greek: peri herma] (two words), not [Greek: perierma] as in some of the MSS.]

[Footnote 6: Dindorf's reading (Greek: _gunaichon te ton prosaechouson autois_).]

[Footnote 7: Compare Suetonius, _Augustus_, chapter 37. In practice there were six of them,--three to nominate senators, and three to make a review of the knights.]

[Footnote 8: Here some words have evidently fallen out of the text.]

[Footnote 9: Reading [Greek: hapo] with Dindorf.]

[Footnote 10: Reading [Greek: archousi] (MSS. and Boissevain) instead of [Greek: archomenois] (Xylander).]

[Footnote 11: Adopting Boissevain's reading (Greek: diagein estai).]

[Footnote 12: A reference particularly to the ludi Capitolini, founded by Domitian.]

[Footnote 13: Latin, _præfectus annonæ_.]

[Footnote 14: Latin, _præfectus vigilum_.]

DIO'S ROMAN HISTORY

53

The following is contained in the Fifty-third of Dio's Rome:

How the temple of Apollo on the Palatine was consecrated (chapters 1, 2).

How Cæsar delivered in the senate a speech as if retiring from the sovereignty; and thereafter assigned to that body its proper provinces (chapters 3-12).

About the appointment of the governors sent to the provinces (chapters 13-15).

How Cæsar was given the title of Augustus (chapter 16).

About the names which the emperors assume (chapters 17-22).

How the Sæpta were consecrated (chapters 23, 24).

How Cæsar fought against Astures and Cantabri (chapter 25).

How Gaul began to be governed Romans (chapter 26).

How the Portico of Neptune and the Baths of Agrippa were dedicated (chapter 27).

How the Pantheon was dedicated (chapter 27).

How Augustus was released from the obligation of obeying the laws (chapter 28).

How an expedition was made into Arabia Felix (chapters 29-33).

Duration of time six years, in which there were the following magistrates here enumerated.

Cæsar (VI), M. Vipsanius L.F. Agrippa (II). (B.C. 28 = a. u. 726.)

Cæsar (VII), M. Vipsanius L.F. Agrippa (III). (B.C. 27 = a. u. 727.)

Cæsar Augustus (VIII), T. Statilius T.F. Taurus (II). (B.C. 26 = a. u. 728.)

Augustus (IX), M. lunius M.F. Silanus. (B.C. 25 = a. u. 729.)

Augustus (X), C. Norbanus C.F.C.N. Flaccus. (B.C. 24 = a. u. 730.)

Augustus (XI), Cn. Calpurnius Cn.F.Cn.N. Piso. (B.C. 23 = a. u. 731.)

_(BOOK 53, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[B.C. 28 (_a. u._ 726)]

[-1-] The following year Cæsar held office for the sixth time and did everything according to the usage approved from very early times, delivering to Agrippa his colleague the bundles of rods which belonged to an incumbent of the consulship, while he himself used the others. On completing his term he had the oath administered according to ancestral custom. Whether he ever did this again I do not know. Agrippa he honored exceedingly, even going so far as to give him his niece in marriage and to provide him with a tent similar to his own whenever they went on a campaign together; and the watchword was given by both of them. At that particular time besides attending to the ordinary run of business he finished the taking of the census, in which he was called _Princeps Senatus_, as had been deemed proper under the real democracy. He further completed and dedicated the temple of Apollo on the Palatine, the precinct surrounding it, and the stores of books. And he celebrated in company with Agrippa the festival in honor of the victory won at Actium, which had been voted: in it he had the horse-race between boys and between men of the nobility. This celebration every five years, as long as it lasted, was in charge of the four priesthoods in succession,--I mean the pontifices and augurs and the so-called septemviri and quindecimviri. A gymnastic contest was also held at that time,--a wooden stadium being built in the Campus Martius,--and there was an armed combat of captives. This continued for several days without a break, in spite of Cæsar's falling sick; for even so Agrippa filled his place.

[-2-] Cæsar spent some of his private means upon the festivals, and when money was needed for the public treasury he borrowed it and supplied the want. For the management of this branch of the service he ordered two annual magistrates to be chosen from among the ex-prætors. To the populace he distributed a quadruple allowance of grain and made a present of money to some of the senators. For many of them had grown so poor as not to be willing to be even ædile on account of the great expenses. Moreover the courts which belonged to the ædileship were to be assigned to the prætors as had been the custom, the more important to the prætor urbanus and the others to the prætor peregrinus. Again, he himself appointed the prætor urbanus, as he often did subsequently. The pledges deposited with the public treasury before the battle of Actium he released, save any that involved house property, and burned the old acknowledgments of those who owed the State anything. Egyptian rites he did not admit within the pomerium, but paid great attention to the temples of Egyptian deities. Such as had been built by private individuals he ordered their children and descendants, if any survived, to repair, and the rest he restored himself. He did not, however, appropriate the credit for their building but allowed it to rest with those who had originally constructed them. And since very many unlawful and unjust ordinances had been passed during the internecine strifes and in the wars, and particularly in the dual reign of Antony and Lepidus, he abolished them all by one promulgation, setting his sixth consulship as the limit of their existence. As he obtained approbation and praise for this act he desired to exhibit another instance of magnanimity, that by such a policy he might be honored the more and that his supremacy might be voluntarily confirmed by the people, which would enable him to avoid the appearance of having forced them against their will. As a consequence, after apprising those senators with whom he was most intimate of his designs, he entered the senatorial body in his seventh consulship and read the following document.

[B.C. 27 (_a. u._ 727)]

[-3-] "I am sure that I shall seem to some of you, Conscript Fathers, to have made an incredible choice. For what each one of my hearers would not wish to do himself, he does not like to believe when another states it as accomplished. This is chiefly because every one is jealous of every one who surpasses him and is more or less inclined to distrust anything said that is higher than his own standard.[1] Moreover I know this, that those who make apparently untrustworthy statements not only persuade nobody but further have the appearance of cheats. And, indeed, if it were a case of announcing something that I was not intending to do immediately, I should hesitate very much about making it public, for fear of obtaining some unworthy charge against me instead of gratitude. But, as it is, when the performance will follow the promise this very day, I feel entirely confident not only of avoiding any shame for prevarication but of surpassing all mankind in good repute. [-4-] You all see that I am so situated that I could rule you perpetually. All the revolutionists either have been disciplined and been made to halt or have had pity shown them and so have come to their senses. My helpers have been made devoted by a recompense of benefits and steadfast by a participation in the government: therefore they do not desire any political innovations, and if anything of the sort should take place, the men to assist me are even more ready for it than the instigators of rebellion. My military is in prime condition, we have good-will, strength, money, and allies, and chiefest of all you and the people are so disposed toward me that you would be quite willing to have me at your head. However, I will lead you no longer, nor shall any one say that all the acts of my previous career have been with the object of sole rulership. I give up the entire domain, and I restore to you absolutely everything,--the arms, the laws, and the provinces,--not only all those which you committed to me but also all that I myself subsequently acquired for you. Thus by my deeds themselves you may ascertain that I did not from the outset desire any position of power, but wished in very truth to avenge my father cruelly murdered and to extricate the city from great and continuous evils. [-5-] I would that I had never taken charge of affairs even to the present extent. That is, I would that the city had never needed me for any such purpose, but that we of this age had from the outset lived in peace and harmony as our fathers once did. But since an inflexible fate, as it seems, brought you to a place where there was need even of me, though I was still young, and I was put to the test, I was always ready to labor zealously at everything even beyond what was expected of my years, so long as the situation demanded my help, and I accomplished everything with good fortune, even surpassing my powers. There was not one consideration out of all that might be cited which could turn me from aiding you when you were in danger, not toil or fear or threats of foes or prayers of friends or the numbers of the confederates or the desperation of our adversaries. I gave myself to you unsparingly for all the tasks that fell to our lot, and my performances and sufferings you know. From it I myself have derived no gain except that I caused my country to survive, but you are both preserved and in your sober senses. Since, then, the gracious act of Fortune has restored to you by my hands peace without treachery and harmony without turmoil, receive back also liberty and democracy. Take possession of the arms and the subject nations, and conduct the government as has been your wont.

[-6-] "You should not be surprised at my attitude when you see my right conduct in other ways, my mildness and freedom from meddling, and reflect moreover that I have never accepted any extraordinary privilege, beyond what the majority might gain, though you have often voted many of them to me. Do not, again, condemn me for folly because, when it is in my power to rule over you and hold so great a sovereignty over this great world, I am unwilling. Examining the merits of the situation I deem it most just for you to manage your own affairs: examining the advantages, I regard it as most advantageous to myself to be free from trouble, from jealousy, from plots, and for you to conduct a free government with moderation and love: examining where the glory lies (for the sake of which men often choose to enter war and danger), will it not add most to my reputation to resign so great a dominion? Will it not be most glorious to leave so exalted a sovereignty and voluntarily become a plain citizen? So if any one of you doubts that any one else could show true moderation in this and bring himself to speak out, let him at all events believe me. For, though I could recite many great benefits which have been conferred upon you by me and by my father for which you would naturally love and honor us above all the rest, I could say nothing greater and I should take pride in nothing else more than this, that he would not accept the monarchy which you strove to give him, and that I, holding it, lay it aside.

[-7-] "What need to set side by side his separate exploits,--the conquest of Gaul, the subduing of Moesia, the subjugation of Egypt, the enslaving of Pannonia? Or again Pharnaces, Juba, Phraates, the campaign against the Britons, the crossing of the Rhine? Yet these are greater and more important deeds than all our forefathers performed in all previous time. Still, any of these accomplishments scarcely deserves a place beside my present act, nor yet, indeed, does the fact that the civil wars, the greatest and most diverse that have occurred in the history of man, we fought to a successful finish, and that we made humane terms, overcoming all who withstood us, as enemies, and saving alive all who yielded, as friends; (so that if our city should ever again be fated to suffer from disaffection, we might pray that the quarrel should follow this same course). For that in spite of our possessing such great power and standing at the summit of excellence and good fortune so that we might govern you willing or unwilling, we should neither lose our heads nor desire sole supremacy, but that instead he should reject it when offered and I return it when given is a superhuman achievement. I speak in this way not for idle boasting,--I should not have said it at all if I were to derive any advantage whatever from it,--but in order that you may see that whereas there are many public benefits to our credit and we have in private many lofty titles, we take greatest pride in this, that what others desire to gain even by doing violence to their neighbors we surrender without any compulsion.

[-8-] Who could be found more magnanimous than I (not to mention again my father deceased) or whose conduct more godlike? With so many fine soldiers at my back and citizens and allies (O Jupiter and Hercules!), that love me, supreme over the entire sea within the Pillars of Hercules except a very few tribes, possessing both cities and provinces on all the continents, at a time when there is no longer any foreign enemy opposing me and there is no disturbance at home, but you all are at peace, harmonious and strong, and greatest of all are willingly obedient,--under such conditions I voluntarily, of my own motion, resign so great a dominion and alienate so vast a property. For if Horatius, Mucius, Curtius, Regulus, the Decii wished to encounter danger and death with the object of seeming to have done a great and noble deed, why should I not even more desire to do this as a result of which I shall while alive excel both them and all the rest of mankind in glory? No one of you should think that whereas the ancient Romans pursued excellence and good repute, all manliness has now become extinct in the city. Again, do not entertain a suspicion that I wish to betray you and confide you to any base fellows or expose you to mob rule, from which nothing good but all the most terrible evils always result to mankind. Upon you, upon you, the most excellent and prudent, I lay all public interests. The other course I should never have followed, had it been necessary for me to die or even to become monarch ten thousand times. This policy I adopt for my own good and for that of the city. I myself have undergone both labors and hardships and I can no longer hold out either in mind or in body. Furthermore I foresee the jealousy and hatred which rises in the breasts of some against the best men, and the plots which result from those feelings; and for that reason I choose rather to be a private citizen with glory than to be a monarch in danger. And the public business would be managed much better if carried on publicly and by many people at once than if it were dependent upon any one man.