Chapter III: Herakleitos of Ephesos (1)

[Sidenote: Life of Herakleitos.]

63. Herakleitos of Ephesos, son of Blyson, is said to have “flourished” in Ol. LXIX. (504/3-501/0 B.C.);[319] that is to say, just in the middle of the reign of Dareios, with whom several traditions connected him.[320] We shall see that Parmenides was assigned to the same Olympiad, though for another reason (§ 84). It is more important, however, for our purpose to notice that, while Herakleitos refers to Pythagoras and Xenophanes by name and in the past tense (fr. 16), he is in turn referred to by Parmenides (fr. 6). These references are sufficient to mark his proper place in the history of philosophy. Zeller holds, indeed, that he cannot have published his work till after 478 B.C., on the ground that the expulsion of his friend Hermodoros, alluded to in fr. 114, could not have taken place before the downfall of Persian rule. If that were so, it might be hard to see how Parmenides could have known the views of Herakleitos; but there is surely no difficulty in supposing that the Ephesians may have sent one of their foremost citizens into banishment at a time when they were still paying tribute to the Great King. The Persians never took their internal self-government from the Ionian cities, and the spurious _Letters_ of Herakleitos show the accepted view was that the expulsion of Hermodoros took place during the reign of Dareios.[321]

Footnote 319:

Diog. ix. 1 (R. P. 29), no doubt from Apollodoros through some
intermediate authority. Jacoby, pp. 227 sqq.

Footnote 320:

Bernays, _Die Heraklitischen Briefe_, pp. 13 sqq.

Footnote 321:

Bernays, _op. cit._ pp. 20 sqq.

Sotion said that Herakleitos was a disciple of Xenophanes,[322] which is not probable; for Xenophanes seems to have left Ionia for ever before Herakleitos was born. More likely he was not a disciple of any one; but it is clear, at the same time, that he was acquainted both with the Milesian cosmology and with the poems of Xenophanes. He also knew something of the theories taught by Pythagoras (fr. 17).

Footnote 322:

Sotion _ap._ Diog. ix. 5 (R. P. 29 c).

Of the life of Herakleitos we really know nothing, except, perhaps, that he belonged to the ancient royal house and resigned the nominal position of Basileus in favour of his brother.[323] The origin of the other statements bearing on it is quite transparent.[324]

Footnote 323:

Diog. ix. 6 (R. P. 31).

Footnote 324:

See Patin, _Heraklits Einheitslehre_, pp. 3 sqq. Herakleitos said (fr.
68) that it was death to souls to become water; and we are told
accordingly that he died of dropsy. He said (fr. 114) that the
Ephesians should leave their city to their children, and (fr. 79) that
Time was a child playing draughts. We are therefore told that he
refused to take any part in public life, and went to play with the
children in the temple of Artemis. He said (fr. 85) that corpses were
more fit to be cast out than dung; and we are told that he covered
himself with dung when attacked with dropsy. Lastly, he is said to
have argued at great length with his doctors because of fr. 58. For
these tales see Diog. ix. 3-5, and compare the stories about
Empedokles discussed in Chap. V. § 100.

[Sidenote: His book.]

64. We do not know the title of the work of Herakleitos[325]—if, indeed, it had one at all—and it is not very easy to form a clear idea of its contents. We are told that it was divided into three discourses: one dealing with the universe, one political, and one theological.[326] It is not likely that this division is due to Herakleitos himself; all we can infer from the statement is that the work fell naturally into these three parts when the Stoic commentators took their editions of it in hand.

Footnote 325:

The variety of titles enumerated in Diog. ix. 12 (R. P. 30 b) seems to
show that none was authentically known. That of “Muses” comes from
Plato, _Soph._ 242 d 7. The others are mere “mottoes” (Schuster)
prefixed by Stoic editors, and intended to emphasise their view that
the subject of the work was ethical or political (Diog. ix. 15; R. P.
30 c).

Footnote 326:

Diog. ix. 5 (R. P. 30). Bywater has followed this hint in his
arrangement of the fragments. The three sections are 1-90, 91-97,
98-130.

The style of Herakleitos is proverbially obscure, and, at a later date, got him the nickname of “the Dark.”[327] Now the fragments about the Delphic god and the Sibyl (frs. 11 and 12) seem to show that he was quite conscious of writing an oracular style, and we have to ask why he did so. In the first place, it was the manner of the time.[328] The stirring events of the age, and the influence of the religious revival, gave something of a prophetic tone to all the leaders of thought. Pindar and Aischylos have it too. They all feel that they are in some measure inspired. It is also the age of great individualities, who are apt to be solitary and disdainful. Herakleitos at least was so. If men cared to dig for the gold they might find it (fr. 8); if not, they must be content with straw (fr. 51). This seems to have been the view taken by Theophrastos, who said that the headstrong temperament of Herakleitos sometimes led him into incompleteness and inconsistencies of statement.[329] But that is a very different thing from studied obscurity and the _disciplina arcani_ sometimes attributed to him; if Herakleitos does not go out of his way to make his meaning clear, neither does he hide it (fr. 11).

Footnote 327:

R. P. 30 a. The epithet ὁ σκοτεινός is of late date, but Timon of
Phleious already called him αἰνικτής (fr. 43, Diels).

Footnote 328:

See the valuable observations of Diels in the Introduction to his
_Herakleitos von Ephesos_, pp. iv. sqq.

Footnote 329:

Cf. Diog. ix. 6 (R. P. 31).

[Sidenote: The fragments.]

65. I give a version of the fragments according to the arrangement of Mr. Bywater’s exemplary edition.[330]

(1) It is wise to hearken, not to me, but to my Word, and to confess
that all things are one.[331] R. P. 40.

(2) Though this Word[332] is true evermore, yet men are as unable to
understand it when they hear it for the first time as before they have
heard it at all. For, though all things come to pass in accordance
with this Word, men seem as if they had no experience of them, when
they make trial of words and deeds such as I set forth, dividing each
thing according to its nature and showing how it truly is. But other
men know not what they are doing when awake, even as they forget what
they do in sleep. R. P. 32.

(3) Fools when they do hear are like the deaf: of them does the saying
bear witness that they are absent when present. R. P. 31 a.

(4) Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men if they have souls that
understand not their language. R. P. 42.

(5) The many do not take heed of such things as those they meet with,
nor do they mark them when they are taught, though they think they do.

(6) Knowing not how to listen nor how to speak.

(7) If you do not expect the unexpected, you will not find it; for it
is hard to be sought out and difficult.[333]

(8) Those who seek for gold dig up much earth and find a little. R. P.
44 b.

(10) Nature loves to hide. R. P. 34 f.

(11) The lord whose is the oracle at Delphoi neither utters nor hides
his meaning, but shows it by a sign. R. P. 30 a.

(12) And the Sibyl, with raving lips uttering things mirthless,
unbedizened, and unperfumed, reaches over a thousand years with her
voice, thanks to the god in her. R. P. 30 a.

(13) The things that can be seen, heard, and learned are what I prize
the most. R. P. 42.

(14) ... bringing untrustworthy witnesses in support of disputed
points.

(15) The eyes are more exact witnesses than the ears.[334] R. P. 42 c.

(16) The learning of many things teacheth not understanding, else
would it have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and
Hekataios. R. P. 31.

(17) Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchos, practised inquiry beyond all other
men, and choosing out these writings, claimed for his own wisdom what
was but a knowledge of many things and an art of mischief.[335] R. P.
31 a.

(18) Of all whose discourses I have heard, there is not one who
attains to understanding that wisdom is apart from all. R. P. 32 b.

(19) Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by which all
things are steered through all things. R. P. 40.

(20) This world,[336] which is the same for all, no one of gods or men
has made; but it was ever, is now, and ever shall be an ever-living
Fire, with measures kindling, and measures going out. R. P. 35.[337]

(21) The transformations of Fire are, first of all, sea; and half of
the sea is earth, half whirlwind.[338] ... R. P. 35 b.

(22) All things are an exchange for Fire, and Fire for all things,
even as wares for gold and gold for wares. R. P. 35.

(23) It becomes liquid sea, and is measured by the same tale as before
it became earth.[339] R. P. 39.

(24) Fire is want and surfeit. R. P. 36 a.

(25) Fire lives the death of air,[340] and air lives the death of
fire; water lives the death of earth, earth that of water. R. P. 37.

(26) Fire in its advance will judge and convict[341] all things. R. P.
36 a.

(27) How can one hide from that which never sets?

(28) It is the thunderbolt that steers the course of all things. R. P.
35 b.

(29) The sun will not overstep his measures; if he does, the Erinyes,
the handmaids of Justice, will find him out. R. P. 39.

(30) The limit of East and West is the Bear; and opposite the Bear is
the boundary of bright Zeus.[342]

(31) If there were no sun it would be night, for all the other stars
could do.[343]

(32) The sun is new every day.

(33) See above, Chap. I. p. 41, _n._ 62.

(34) ... the seasons that bring all things.

(35) Hesiod is most men’s teacher. Men think he knew very many things,
a man who did not know day or night! They are one.[344] R. P. 39 b.

(36) God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, surfeit
and hunger; but he takes various shapes, just as fire,[345] when it is
mingled with spices, is named according to the savour of each. R. P.
39 b.

(37) If all things were turned to smoke, the nostrils would
distinguish them.

(38) Souls smell in Hades. R. P. 46 d.

(39) Cold things become warm, and what is warm cools; what is wet
dries, and the parched is moisted.

(40) It scatters and it gathers; it advances and retires.

(41, 42) You cannot step twice into the same rivers; for fresh waters
are ever flowing in upon you. R. P. 33.

(43) Homer was wrong in saying: “Would that strife might perish from
among gods and men!” He did not see that he was praying for the
destruction of the universe; for, if his prayer were heard, all things
would pass away.[346]... R. P. 34 d.

(44) War is the father of all and the king of all; and some he has
made gods and some men, some bond and some free. R. P. 34.

(45) Men do not know how what is at variance agrees with itself. It is
an attunement of opposite tensions,[347] like that of the bow and the
lyre. R. P. 34.

(46) It is the opposite which is good for us.[348]

(47) The hidden attunement is better than the open. R. P. 34.

(48) Let us not conjecture at random about the greatest things.

(49) Men that love wisdom must be acquainted with very many things
indeed.

(50) The straight and the crooked path of the fuller’s comb is one and
the same.

(51) Asses would rather have straw than gold. R. P. 31 a.

(51_a_) Oxen are happy when they find bitter vetches to eat.[349] R.
P. 48 b.

(52) The sea is the purest and the impurest water. Fish can drink it,
and it is good for them; to men it is undrinkable and destructive. R.
P. 47 c.

(53) Swine wash in the mire, and barnyard fowls in dust.

(54) ... to delight in the mire.

(55) Every beast is driven to pasture with blows.[350]

(56) Same as 45.

(57) Good and ill are one. R. P. 47 c.

(58) Physicians who cut, burn, stab, and rack the sick, demand a fee
for it which they do not deserve to get. R. P. 47 c.[351]

(59) Couples are things whole and things not whole, what is drawn
together and what is drawn asunder, the harmonious and the discordant.
The one is made up of all things, and all things issue from the
one.[352]

(60) Men would not have known the name of justice if these things were
not.[353]

(61) To God all things are fair and good and right, but men hold some
things wrong and some right. R. P. 45.

(62) We must know that war is common to all and strife is justice, and
that all things come into being and pass away (?) through strife.

(64) All the things we see when awake are death, even as all we see in
slumber are sleep. R. P. 42 c.[354]

(65) The wise is one only. It is unwilling and willing to be called by
the name of Zeus. R. P. 40.

(66) The bow (βιός) is called life (βίος), but its work is death. R.
P. 49 a.

(67) Mortals are immortals and immortals are mortals, the one living
the others’ death and dying the others’ life. R. P. 46.

(68) For it is death to souls to become water, and death to water to
become earth. But water comes from earth; and from water, soul. R. P.
38.

(69) The way up and the way down is one and the same. R. P. 36 d.

(70) In the circumference of a circle the beginning and end are
common.

(71) You will not find the boundaries of soul by travelling in any
direction, so deep is the measure of it.[355] R. P. 41 d.

(72) It is pleasure to souls to become moist. R. P. 46 c.

(73) A man, when he gets drunk, is led by a beardless lad, tripping,
knowing not where he steps, having his soul moist. R. P. 42.

(74-76) The dry soul is the wisest and best.[356] R. P. 42.

(77) Man is kindled and put out like a light in the night-time.

(78) And it is the same thing in us that is quick and dead, awake and
asleep, young and old; the former are shifted[357] and become the
latter, and the latter in turn are shifted and become the former. R.
P. 47.

(79) Time is a child playing draughts, the kingly power is a child’s.
R. P. 40 a.

(80) I have sought for myself. R. P. 48.

(81) We step and do not step into the same rivers; we are and are not.
R. P. 33 a.

(82) It is a weariness to labour for the same masters and be ruled by
them.

(83) It rests by changing.

(84) Even the posset separates if it is not stirred.

(85) Corpses are more fit to be cast out than dung.

(86) When they are born, they wish to live and to meet with their
dooms—or rather to rest—and they leave children behind them to meet
with their dooms in turn.

(87-89) A man may be a grandfather in thirty years.

(90) Those who are asleep are fellow-workers....

(91_a_) Thought is common to all.

(91_b_) Those who speak with understanding must hold fast to what is
common to all as a city holds fast to its law, and even more strongly.
For all human laws are fed by the one divine law. It prevails as much
as it will, and suffices for all things with something to spare. R. P.
43.

(92) So we must follow the common,[358] yet the many live as if they
had a wisdom of their own. R. P. 44.

(93) They are estranged from that with which they have most constant
intercourse.[359] R. P. 32 b.

(94) It is not meet to act and speak like men asleep.

(95) The waking have one common world, but the sleeping turn aside
each into a world of his own.

(96) The way of man has no wisdom, but that of God has. R. P. 45.

(97) Man is called a baby by God, even as a child by a man. R. P. 45.

(98, 99) The wisest man is an ape compared to God, just as the most
beautiful ape is ugly compared to man.

(100) The people must fight for its law as for its walls. R. P. 43 b.

(101) Greater deaths win greater portions. R. P. 49 a.

(102) Gods and men honour those who are slain in battle. R. P. 49 a.

(103) Wantonness needs putting out, even more than a house on fire. R.
P. 49 a.

(104) It is not good for men to get all they wish to get. It is
sickness that makes health pleasant; evil,[360] good; hunger, plenty;
weariness, rest. R. P. 48 b.

(105-107) It is hard to fight with one’s heart’s desire.[361] Whatever
it wishes to get, it purchases at the cost of soul. R. P. 49 a.

(108, 109) It is best to hide folly; but it is hard in times of
relaxation, over our cups.

(110) And it is law, too, to obey the counsel of one. R. P. 49 a.

(111) For what thought or wisdom have they? They follow the poets and
take the crowd as their teacher, knowing not that there are many bad
and few good. For even the best of them choose one thing above all
others, immortal glory among mortals, while most of them are glutted
like beasts.[362] R. P. 31 a.

(112) In Priene lived Bias, son of Teutamas, who is of more account
than the rest. (He said, “Most men are bad.”)

(113) One is ten thousand to me, if he be the best. R. P. 31 a.

(114) The Ephesians would do well to hang themselves, every grown man
of them, and leave the city to beardless lads; for they have cast out
Hermodoros, the best man among them, saying, “We will have none who is
best among us; if there be any such, let him be so elsewhere and among
others.” R. P. 29 b.

(115) Dogs bark at every one they do not know. R. P. 31 a.

(116) ... (The wise man) is not known because of men’s want of belief.

(117) The fool is fluttered at every word. R. P. 44 b.

(118) The most esteemed of them knows but fancies;[363] yet of a truth
justice shall overtake the artificers of lies and the false witnesses.

(119) Homer should be turned out of the lists and whipped, and
Archilochos likewise. R. P. 31.

(120) One day is like any other.

(121) Man’s character is his fate.[364]

(122) There awaits men when they die such things as they look not for
nor dream of. R. P. 46 d.

(123) ... [365]that they rise up and become the wakeful guardians of
the quick and dead. R. P. 46 d.

(124) Night-walkers, Magians, priests of Bakchos and priestesses of
the wine-vat, mystery-mongers....

(125) The mysteries practised among men are unholy mysteries. R. P.
48.

(126) And they pray to these images, as if one were to talk with a
man’s house, knowing not what gods or heroes are. R. P. 49 a.

(127) For if it were not to Dionysos that they made a procession and
sang the shameful phallic hymn, they would be acting most shamelessly.
But Hades is the same as Dionysos in whose honour they go mad and keep
the feast of the wine-vat. R. P. 49.

(129, 130) They vainly purify themselves by defiling themselves with
blood, just as if one who had stepped into the mud were to wash his
feet in mud. Any man who marked him doing thus, would deem him mad. R.
P. 49 a.

Footnote 330:

In his edition, Diels has given up all attempt to arrange the
fragments according to subject, and this makes his text unsuitable for
our purpose. I think, too, that he overestimates the difficulty of an
approximate arrangement, and makes too much of the view that the style
of Herakleitos was “aphoristic.” That it was so, is an important and
valuable remark; but it does not follow that Herakleitos wrote like
Nietzsche. For a Greek, however prophetic in his tone, there must
always be a distinction between an aphoristic and an incoherent style.
See the excellent remarks of Lortzing in _Berl. Phil. Wochenschr._
1896, pp. 1 sqq.

Footnote 331:

Both Bywater and Diels accept Bergk’s λόγου for δόγματος and Miller’s
εἶναι for εἰδέναι. Cf. Philo, _leg. all._ iii. c, quoted in Bywater’s
note.

Footnote 332:

The λόγος is simply the discourse of Herakleitos himself; though, as
he is a prophet, we may call it “the Word.” It can neither mean a
discourse addressed to Herakleitos nor yet “reason.” (Cf. Zeller, p.
630, n. 1; Eng. trans. ii. p. 7, n. 2.) A difficulty has been raised
about the words ἐόντας αἰεί. How could Herakleitos say that his
discourse had always existed? The answer is that in Ionic ἐών means
“true” when coupled with words like λόγος. Cf. Herod. i. 30, τῷ ἐόντι
χρησάμενος λέγει; and even Aristoph. _Frogs_, 1052, οὐκ ὄντα λόγον. It
is only by taking the words in this way that we can understand
Aristotle’s hesitation as to the proper punctuation of the fragment
(_Rhet._ Γ 5. 1407 b 15; R. P. 30 a). The Stoic interpretation given
by Marcus Aurelius, iv. 46 (R. P. 32 b), must be rejected altogether.
The word λόγος was never used like that till post-Aristotelian times.

Footnote 333:

I have departed from the punctuation of Bywater here, and supplied a
fresh object to the verb as suggested by Gomperz (_Arch._ i. 100).

Footnote 334:

Cf. Herod, i. 8. The application is, no doubt, the same as that of the
last two fragments. Personal inquiry is better than tradition.

Footnote 335:

See Chap. II. p. 107, _n._ 224. The best attested reading is
ἐποιήσατο, not ἐποίησεν, and ἐποιήσατο ἑαυτοῦ means “claimed as his
own.” The words ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφάς have been doubted
since the time of Schleiermacher, and Diels has now come to regard the
whole fragment as spurious. This is because it was used to prove that
Pythagoras wrote books (cf. Diels, _Arch._ iii. p. 451). As Mr.
Bywater has pointed out, however, the fragment itself makes no such
statement; it only says that he read books, which we may presume he
did. I would further suggest that the old-fashioned συγγραφάς is
rather too good for a forger, and that the omission of the very thing
to be proved is remarkable. The last suggestion of a book by
Pythagoras disappears with the reading ἐποιήσατο for ἐποίησεν. Of
course a late writer who read of Pythagoras making extracts from books
would assume that he put them into a book of his own, just as people
did in his own days. For the rest, I understand ἱστορίη of science,
which is contrasted with the κακοτεχνίη which Pythagoras derived from
the συγγραφαί of men like Pherekydes of Syros.

Footnote 336:

The word κόσμος must mean “world” here, not merely “order;” for only
the world could be identified with fire. This use of the word is
Pythagorean, and there is no reason to doubt that Herakleitos may have
known it.

Footnote 337:

It is important to notice that μέτρα is internal accusative with
ἁπτόμενον, “with its measures kindling and its measures going out.”

Footnote 338:

On the word πρηστήρ, see below, p. 165, _n._ 380.

Footnote 339:

The subject of fr. 23 is γῆ, as we see from Diog. ix. 9 (R. P. 36),
πάλιν τε αὖ τὴν γὴν χεῖσθαι; and Aet. i. 3, 11 (_Dox._ p. 284 a 1; b
5), ἔπειτα ἀναχαλωμένην τὴν γῆν ὑπὸ τοῦ τυρὸς χύσει (Dübner: φύσει,
libri) ὕδωρ ἀποτελεῖσθαι. Herakleitos might quite well say γῆ θάλασσα
διαχέεται, and the context in Clement (_Strom._ v. p. 712) seems to
imply this. The phrase μετρέεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον can only mean
that the proportion of the measures remains constant. So practically
Zeller (p. 690, n. 1), _zu derselben Grösse_.

Footnote 340:

With Diels I adopt the transposition (proposed by Tocco) of ἀέρος and
γῆς.

Footnote 341:

I understand ἐπελθόν of the πυρὸς ἔφοδος, for which see below, p. 168.
Diels has pointed out that καταλαμβάνειν is the old word for “to
convict.” It is, literally, “to overtake,” just as αἱρεῖν is “to
catch.”

Footnote 342:

In this fragment it is clear that οὖρος = τέρματα, and therefore means
“boundary,” not “hill.” As αἴθριος Ζεύς means the bright blue sky, I
do not think its οὖρος can be the South Pole, as Diels says. It is
more likely the horizon. I am inclined to take the fragment as a
protest against the Pythagorean theory of a southern hemisphere.

Footnote 343:

We learn from Diog. ix. 10 (quoted below, p. 164) that Herakleitos
explained why the sun was warmer and brighter than the moon, and this
is doubtless a fragment of that passage. I now think the words ἕνεκα
τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων are from Herakleitos. So Diels.

Footnote 344:

Hesiod said Day was the child of Night (_Theog._ 124).

Footnote 345:

Reading ὅκωσπερ πῦρ for ὅκωσπερ with Diels.

Footnote 346:

_Il._ xviii. 107. I add the words οἰχήσεσθαι γὰρ πάντα from Simpl. _in
Cat._ (88 b 30 schol. Br.). They seem to me at least to represent
something that was in the original.

Footnote 347:

I cannot think it likely that Herakleitos said both παλίντονος and
παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη, and I prefer Plutarch’s παλίντονος (R. P. 34 b)
to the παλίντροπος of Hippolytos. Diels thinks that the polemic of
Parmenides decides the question in favour of παλίντροπος; but see
below, p. 184, _n._ 415, and Chap. IV. p. 198, _n._ 438.

Footnote 348:

This, I now think, is the medical rule αἱ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων,
_e.g._ βοηθεῖν τῷ θερμῷ ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχρόν (Stewart on Arist. _Eth._ 1104 b
16).

Footnote 349:

Fr. 51_a_ was recovered by Bywater from Albertus Magnus. See _Journ.
Phil._ ix. p. 230.

Footnote 350:

On fr. 55 see Diels in _Berl. Sitzb._ 1901, p. 188.

Footnote 351:

I now read ἐπαιτέονται with Bernays and Diels.

Footnote 352:

On fr. 59 see Diels in _Berl. Sitzb._ 1901, p. 188. The reading
συνάψιες seems to be well attested and gives an excellent sense. It is
not, however, correct to say that the optative could not be used in an
imperative sense.

Footnote 353:

By “these things,” he probably meant all kinds of injustice.

Footnote 354:

Diels supposes that fr. 64 went on ὁκόσα δὲ τεθνηκότες ζωή. “Life,
Sleep, Death is the threefold ladder in psychology, as in physics
Fire, Water, Earth.”

Footnote 355:

I think now with Diels that the words οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει are
probably genuine. They present no difficulty if we remember that λόγος
means “measurement,” as in fr. 23.

Footnote 356:

This fragment is interesting because of the great antiquity of the
corruptions which it has suffered. According to Stephanus, who is
followed by Bywater and Diels, we should read: Αὔη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ
ἀρίστη, ξηρή (or rather ξηρά—the Ionic form would only appear when the
word got into the text) being a mere gloss upon the somewhat unusual
αὔη. When once ξηρή got into the text, αὔη became αὐγή, and we get the
sentence: “the dry light is the wisest soul,” whence the _siccum
lumen_ of Bacon. Now this reading is certainly as old as Plutarch,
who, in his Life of Romulus (c. 28), takes αὐγή to mean lightning, as
it sometimes does, and supposes the idea to be that the wise soul
bursts through the prison of the body like dry lightning (whatever
that may be) through a cloud. I do not think that Clement’s making the
same mistake proves anything at all (Zeller, p. 705, n. 3; Eng. trans.
i. p. 80, n. 2), except that he had read his Plutarch. Lastly, it is
worth noticing that, though Plutarch must have written αὐγή, the MSS.
vary between αὕτη and αὐτή. The next stage is the corruption of the
corrupt αὐγή into οὗ γῆ. This yields the sentiment that “where the
earth is dry, the soul is wisest,” and is as old as Philo (see Mr.
Bywater’s notes).

Footnote 357:

I understand μεταπεσόντα here as meaning “moved” from one γραμμή or
division of the draught-board to another.

Footnote 358:

Sext. _Math._ vii. 133, διὸ δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῷ ξυνῷ. It seems to me that
these words must belong to Herakleitos, though Bywater omits them. On
the other hand, the words τοῦ λόγου δὲ ὄντος ξυνοῦ (so, not δ’ ἐόντος,
the best MSS.) seem clearly to belong to the Stoic interpreter whom
Sextus is following, and who was anxious to connect this fragment with
fr. 2 (ὀλίγα προσδιελθὼν ἐπιφέρει) in order to get the doctrine of the
κοινὸς λόγος. The whole context in Sextus should be read.

Footnote 359:

The words λόγῳ τῳ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι, which Diels prints as part of
this fragment, seem to me to belong to Marcus Aurelius and not to
Herakleitos.

Footnote 360:

Adopting Heitz’s κακὸν for καὶ with Diels.

Footnote 361:

The word θυμός has its Homeric sense. The gratification of desire
implies the exchange of dry soul-fire (fr. 74) for moisture (fr. 72).
Aristotle understood θυμός here as anger (_Eth. Nic._ Β 2, 1105 a 8).

Footnote 362:

This seems to be a clear reference to the “three lives.” See Chap. II.
§ 45, p. 108.

Footnote 363:

Reading δοκέοντα with Schleiermacher (or δοκέοντ’ ὧν with Diels). I
have omitted φυλάσσειν, as I do not know what it means, and none of
the conjectures commends itself.

Footnote 364:

On the meaning of δαίμων here, see my edition of Aristotle’s _Ethics_,
pp. 1 sq. As Professor Gildersleeve puts it, the δαίμων is the
individual form of τύχη, as κήρ is of θάνατος.

Footnote 365:

I have not ventured to include the words ἔνθα δ’ ἐόντι at the
beginning, as the text seems to me too uncertain. See, however,
Diels’s interesting note.

[Sidenote: The doxographical tradition.]

66. It will be seen that some of these fragments are far from clear, and there are probably not a few of which the meaning will never be recovered. We naturally turn, then, to the doxographers for a clue; but, as ill-luck will have it, they are far less instructive with regard to Herakleitos than we have found them in other cases. We have, in fact, two great difficulties to contend with. The first is the unusual weakness of the doxographical tradition itself. Hippolytos, upon whom we can generally rely for a fairly accurate account of what Theophrastos really said, derived the material for his first four chapters, which treat of Thales, Pythagoras, Herakleitos, and Empedokles, not from the excellent epitome which he afterwards used, but from a biographical compendium,[366] which consisted for the most part of apocryphal anecdotes and apophthegms. It was based, further, on some writer of _Successions_ who regarded Herakleitos and Empedokles as Pythagoreans. They are therefore placed side by side, and their doctrines are hopelessly mixed up together. The link between Herakleitos and the Pythagoreans was Hippasos of Metapontion, in whose system, as we know, fire played an important part. Theophrastos, following Aristotle, had spoken of the two in the same sentence, and this was enough to put the writers of _Successions_ off the track.[367] We are forced, then, to look to the more detailed of the two accounts of the opinions of Herakleitos given in Diogenes,[368] which goes back to the _Vetusta Placita_, and is, fortunately, pretty full and accurate. All our other sources are more or less tainted.

Footnote 366:

On the source used by Hippolytos in the first four chapters of _Ref._
i. see Diels, _Dox._ p. 145. We must carefully distinguish _Ref._ i.
and _Ref._ ix. as sources of information about Herakleitos. The latter
book is an attempt to show that the Monarchian heresy of Noetos was
derived from Herakleitos instead of from the Gospel, and is a rich
mine of Herakleitean fragments.

Footnote 367:

Arist. _Met._ Α, 3. 984 a 7 (R. P. 56 c): Theophr. _ap._ Simpl.
_Phys._ 23, 33 (R. P. 36 c).

Footnote 368:

For these double accounts see _Dox._ pp. 163 sqq. and Appendix, § 15.

The second difficulty which we have to face is even more serious. Most of the commentators on Herakleitos mentioned in Diogenes were Stoics,[369] and it is certain that their paraphrases were sometimes taken for the original. Now, the Stoics held the Ephesian in peculiar veneration, and sought to interpret him as far as possible in accordance with their own system. Further, they were fond of “accommodating”[370] the views of earlier thinkers to their own, and this has had serious consequences. In particular, the Stoic theories of the λόγος and the ἐκπύρωσις are constantly ascribed to Herakleitos by our authorities, and the very fragments are adulterated with scraps of Stoic terminology.

Footnote 369:

Diog. ix. 15 (R. P. 30 c). Schleiermacher rightly insisted upon this.

Footnote 370:

The word συνοικειοῦν is used of the Stoic method of interpretation by
Philodemos (cf. _Dox._ 547 b, n.), and Cicero (_N.D._ i. 41) renders
it by _accommodare_. Chrysippos in particular gave a great impulse to
this sort of thing, as we may best learn from Galen, _de Plac.
Hippocr. et Plat._ Book iii. Good examples are Aet. i. 13, 2; 28, 1;
iv. 3, 12,—where distinctively Stoic doctrines are ascribed to
Herakleitos. What the Stoics were capable of, we see from Kleanthes,
fr. 55, Pearson. He proposed to read Ζεῦ ἀναδωδωναῖε in _Il._ xvi.
233, ὡς τὸν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀναθυμιώμενον ἀέρα διὰ τὴν ἀνάδοσιν
Ἀναδωδωναῖον ὄντα.

[Sidenote: The discovery of Herakleitos.]

67. Herakleitos looks down not only on the mass of men, but on all previous inquirers into nature. This must mean that he believed himself to have attained insight into some truth which had not hitherto been recognised, though it was, as it were, staring men in the face (fr. 93). Clearly, then, if we wish to get at the central thing in his teaching, we must try to find out what he was thinking of when he launched into those denunciations of human dulness and ignorance.[371] The answer seems to be given in two fragments, 18 and 45. From them we gather that the truth hitherto ignored is that the many apparently independent and conflicting things we know are really one, and that, on the other hand, this one is also many. The “strife of opposites” is really an “attunement” (ἁρμονία). From this it follows that wisdom is not a knowledge of many things, but the perception of the underlying unity of the warring opposites. That this really was the fundamental thought of Herakleitos is stated by Philo. He says: “For that which is made up of both the opposites is one; and, when the one is divided, the opposites are disclosed. Is not this just what the Greeks say their great and much belauded Herakleitos put in the forefront of his philosophy as summing it all up, and boasted of as a new discovery?”[372] We shall take the elements of this theory one by one, and see how they are to be understood.

Footnote 371:

See Patin, _Heraklits Einheitslehre_ (1886). To Patin undoubtedly
belongs the credit of showing clearly that the unity of opposites was
the central doctrine of Herakleitos. It is not always easy, however,
to follow him when he comes to details.

Footnote 372:

Philo, _Rer. Div. Her._ 43 (R. P. 34 c).

[Sidenote: The One and the Many.]

68. Anaximander had taught already that the opposites were separated out from the Boundless, but passed away into it once more, so paying the penalty for their unjust encroachments on one another. It is here implied that there is something wrong in the war of opposites, and that the existence of the Many is a breach in the unity of the One. The truth which Herakleitos proclaimed was that there is no One without the Many, and no Many without the One. The world is at once one and many, and it is just the “opposite tension” of the Many that constitutes the unity of the One.

The credit of having been the first to see this is expressly assigned to Herakleitos by Plato. In the _Sophist_ (242 d), the Eleatic stranger, after explaining how the Eleatics maintained that what we call many is really one, proceeds:—

But certain Ionian and (at a later date) certain Sicilian Muses
remarked that it was safest to unite these two things, and to say that
reality is both many and one, and is kept together by Hate and Love.
“For,” say the more severe Muses, “in its division it is always being
brought together” (cf. fr. 59); while the softer Muses relaxed the
requirement that this should always be so, and said that the All was
alternately one and at peace through the power of Aphrodite, and many
and at war with itself because of something they called Strife.

In this passage the Ionian Muses stand, of course, for Herakleitos, and the Sicilian for Empedokles. We remark also that the differentiation of the one into many, and the integration of the many into one, are both eternal and simultaneous, and that this is the ground upon which the system of Herakleitos is contrasted with that of Empedokles. We shall come back to that point again. Meanwhile we confine ourselves to this, that, according to Plato, Herakleitos taught that reality was at once many and one.

We must be careful, however, not to imagine that what Herakleitos thus discovered was a logical principle. This was the mistake of Lassalle’s book.[373] The identity in and through difference which he proclaimed was purely physical; logic did not yet exist, and as the principle of identity had not been formulated, it would have been impossible to protest against an abstract application of it. The identity which he explains as consisting in difference is simply that of the primary substance in all its manifestations. This identity had been realised already by the Milesians, but they had found a difficulty in the difference. Anaximander had treated the strife of opposites as an “injustice,” and what Herakleitos set himself to show was that, on the contrary, it was the highest justice (fr. 62).

Footnote 373:

The source of his error was Hegel’s remarkable statement that there
was no proposition of Herakleitos that he had not taken up into his
own logic (_Gesch. d. Phil._ i. 328). The example which he cites is
the statement that Being does not exist any more than not-Being, for
which he refers to Arist. _Met._ Α, 4. This, however, is not there
ascribed to Herakleitos at all, but to Leukippos or Demokritos, with
whom it meant that space was as real as matter (§ 175). Aristotle
does, indeed, tell us in the _Metaphysics_ that “some” think
Herakleitos says that the same thing can be and not be; but he adds
that it does not follow that a man thinks what he says (_Met._ Γ 3.
1005 b 24). I take this to mean that, though Herakleitos did make this
assertion in words, he did not mean by it what the same assertion
would naturally have meant at a later date. Herakleitos was speaking
only of nature; the logical meaning of the words never occurred to
him. This is confirmed by Κ, 5. 1062 a 31, where we are told that by
being questioned in a certain manner Herakleitos could be made to
admit the principle of contradiction; as it was, he did not understand
what he said. In other words, he was unconscious of its logical
bearing.

Aristotle was aware, then, that the theories of Herakleitos were not
to be understood in a logical sense. On the other hand, this does not
prevent him from saying that according to the view of Herakleitos,
everything would be true (_Met._ Δ, 7. 1012 a 24). If we remember his
constant attitude to earlier thinkers, this will not lead us to
suspect either his good faith or his intelligence. (See Appendix, §
2.)

[Sidenote: Fire.]

69. All this made it necessary for him to seek out a new primary substance. He wanted not merely something out of which the diversified world we know might conceivably be made, or from which opposites could be “separated out,” but something which of its own nature would pass into everything else, while everything else would pass in turn into it. This he found in Fire, and it is easy to see why, if we consider the phenomenon of combustion, even as it appears to the plain man. The quantity of fire in a flame burning steadily appears to remain the same, the flame seems to be what we call a “thing.” And yet the substance of it is continually changing. It is always passing away in smoke, and its place is always being taken by fresh matter from the fuel that feeds it. This is just what we want. If we regard the world as an “ever-living fire” (fr. 20), we can understand how it is always becoming all things, while all things are always returning to it.[374]

Footnote 374:

That the Fire of Herakleitos was something on the same level as the
“Air” of Anaximenes and not a “symbol,” is clearly implied in such
passages as Arist. _Met._ Α, 3. 984 a 5. In support of the view that
something different from common fire is meant, Plato, _Crat._ 413 b,
is sometimes quoted; but a consideration of the context shows that the
passage will not bear this interpretation. Plato is discussing the
derivation of δίκαιον from δια-ιόν, and certainly δίκη was a prominent
Herakleitean conception, and a good deal that is here said may be the
authentic doctrine of the school. Sokrates goes on to complain that
when he asks what this is which “goes through” everything, he gets
very inconsistent answers. One says it is the sun. Another asks if
there is no justice after sunset, and says it is simply fire. A third
says it is not fire itself, but the heat which is in fire. A fourth
identifies it with Mind. Now all we are entitled to infer from this is
that different accounts were given in the Herakleitean school. These
were a little less crude than the original doctrine of the master, but
for all that not one of them implies anything immaterial or
symbolical. The view that it was not fire itself, but Heat, which
“passed through” all things, is related to the theory of Herakleitos
as Hippo’s Moisture is related to the Water of Thales. It is quite
likely, too, that some Herakleiteans attempted to fuse the system of
Anaxagoras with their own, just as Diogenes of Apollonia tried to fuse
it with that of Anaximenes. We shall see, indeed, that we still have a
work in which this attempt is made (p. 167, _n._ 383).

[Sidenote: Flux.]

70. This necessarily brings with it a certain way of looking at the change and movement of the world. Fire burns continuously and without interruption. It is therefore always consuming fuel and always liberating smoke. Everything is either mounting upwards to serve as fuel, or sinking downwards after having nourished the flame. It follows that the whole of reality is like an ever-flowing stream, and that nothing is ever at rest for a moment. The substance of the things we see is in constant change. Even as we look at them, some of the matter of which they are composed has already passed into something else, while fresh matter has come into them from another source. This theory is usually summed up, appropriately enough, in the phrase “All things are flowing” (πάντα ῥεῖ), though, as it happens, it cannot be proved that this is a quotation from Herakleitos. Plato, however, expresses the idea quite clearly. “Nothing ever is, everything is becoming”; “All things are in motion like streams”; “All things are passing, and nothing abides”; “Herakleitos says somewhere that all things pass and naught abides; and, comparing things to the current of a river, he says that you cannot step twice into the same stream” (cf. fr. 41)—these are the terms in which he describes the system. And Aristotle says the same thing, “All things are in motion,” “nothing steadfastly is.”[375] Herakleitos held, in fact, that any given thing, however stable in appearance, was merely a section in the stream, and that the matter composing it was never the same in any two consecutive moments of time. We shall see presently how he conceived this process to operate; meanwhile we remark that the idea was not altogether novel, and that it is hardly the central point in the system of Herakleitos. The Milesians held a similar view. The flux of Herakleitos was at most more unceasing and universal.

Footnote 375:

Plato, _Tht._ 152 e 1; _Crat._ 401 d 5, 402 a 8; Arist. _Top._ Α, 11.
104 b 22; _de Caelo_, Γ, 1. 298 b 30; _Phys._ Θ, 3. 253 b 2.

[Sidenote: The Upward and Downward path.]

71. Herakleitos appears to have worked out the details of the perpetual flux with reference to the theories of Anaximenes.[376] It is unlikely, however, that he explained the transformations of matter by means of rarefaction and condensation.[377] Theophrastos, it appears, suggested that he did; but he allowed it was by no means clear. The passage from Diogenes which we are about to quote has faithfully preserved this touch.[378] In the fragments, at any rate, we find nothing about rarefaction and condensation. The expression used is “exchange” (fr. 22); and this is certainly a very good name for what happens when fire gives out smoke and takes in fuel instead.

Footnote 376:

See above, Chap. I. § 29.

Footnote 377:

See, however, the remark of Diels quoted R. P. 36 c.

Footnote 378:

Diog. ix. 8, σαφῶς δ’ οὐθὲν ἐκτίθεται.

It has been pointed out that, in default of Hippolytos, our best account of the Theophrastean doxography of Herakleitos is the fuller of the two accounts given in Laertios Diogenes. It is as follows:—

His opinions on particular points are these:—

He held that Fire was the element, and that all things were an
exchange for fire, produced by condensation and rarefaction. But he
explains nothing clearly. All things were produced in opposition, and
all things were in flux like a river.

The all is finite and the world is one. It arises from fire, and is
consumed again by fire alternately through all eternity in certain
cycles. This happens according to fate. That which leads to the
becoming of the opposites is called War and Strife; that which leads
to the final conflagration is Concord and Peace.

He called change the upward and the downward path, and held that the
world comes into being in virtue of this. When fire is condensed it
becomes moist, and when compressed it turns to water; water being
congealed turns to earth, and this he calls the downward path. And,
again, the earth is in turn liquefied, and from it water arises, and
from that everything else; for he refers almost everything to the
evaporation from the sea. This is the path upwards. R. P. 36.

He held, too, that exhalations arose both from the sea and the land;
some bright and pure, others dark. Fire was nourished by the bright
ones, and moisture by the others.

He does not make it clear what is the nature of that which surrounds
the world. He held, however, that there were bowls in it with the
concave sides turned towards us, in which the bright exhalations were
collected and produced flames. These were the heavenly bodies.

The flame of the sun was the brightest and warmest; for the other
heavenly bodies were more distant from the earth; and for that reason
gave less light and heat. The moon, on the other hand, was nearer the
earth; but it moved through an impure region. The sun moved in a
bright and unmixed region, and at the same time was at just the right
distance from us. That is why it gives more heat and light. The
eclipses of the sun and moon were due to the turning of the bowls
upwards, while the monthly phases of the moon were produced by a
gradual turning of its bowl.

Day and night, months and seasons and years, rains and winds, and
things like these, were due to the different exhalations. The bright
exhalation, when ignited in the circle of the sun, produced day, and
the preponderance of the opposite exhalations produced night. The
increase of warmth proceeding from the bright exhalation produced
summer, and the preponderance of moisture from the dark exhalation
produced winter. He assigns the causes of other things in conformity
with this.

As to the earth, he makes no clear statement about its nature, any
more than he does about that of the bowls.

These, then, were his opinions. R. P. 39 b.

It is obvious that, if we can trust this passage, it is of the greatest possible value; and that, upon the whole, we can trust it is shown by the fact that it follows the exact order of topics to which all the doxographies derived from the great work of Theophrastos adhere. First we have the primary substance, then the world, then the heavenly bodies, and lastly, meteorological phenomena. We conclude, then, that it may be accepted with the exceptions, firstly, of the probably erroneous conjecture of Theophrastos as to rarefaction and condensation mentioned above; and secondly, of some pieces of Stoical interpretation which come from the _Vetusta Placita_.