Chapter V: Empedokles of Akragas (3)

Death was the final separation by Strife of the fire and earth in the body, each of which had all along been striving to “reach its own kind.” Sleep was a temporary separation to a certain extent of the fiery element.[630] At death the animal is resolved into its elements, which perhaps enter into fresh combinations, perhaps become permanently united with “their own kind.” There can be no question here of an immortal soul.

Even in life, we may see the attraction of like to like operating in animals just as it did in the upward and downward growth of plants. Hair is the same thing as foliage (fr. 82); and, generally speaking, the fiery part of animals tends upwards and the earthy part downwards, though there are exceptions, as may be seen in the case of certain shell-fish (fr. 76), where the earthy part is above. These exceptions are only possible because there is still a great deal of Love in the world. We also see the attraction of like for like in the different habits of the various species of animals. Those that have most fire in them fly up into the air; those in which earth preponderates take to the earth, as did the dog which always sat upon a tile.[631] Aquatic animals are those in which water predominates. This does not, however, apply to fishes, which are very fiery, and take to the water to cool themselves.[632]

Footnote 629:

Aet. v. 15, 3; 21, 1 (_Dox._ p. 190).

Footnote 630:

Aet. v. 25, 4 (_Dox._ p. 437).

Footnote 631:

Aet. v. 19, 5 (_Dox._ p. 431). Cf. _Eth. Eud._ Η, 1. 1235 a 11.

Footnote 632:

Arist. _de Respir._ 14. 477 a 32; Theophr. _de causis plant._ i. 21.

Empedokles paid great attention to the subject of respiration, and his very ingenious explanation of it has been preserved in a continuous form (fr. 100). We breathe, he held, through all the pores of the skin, not merely through the organs of respiration. The cause of the alternate inspiration and expiration of the breath was the movement of the blood from the heart to the surface of the body and back again, which was explained by the _klepsydra_.

The nutrition and growth of animals is, of course, to be explained from the attraction of like to like. Each part of the body has pores into which the appropriate food will fit. Pleasure and pain were derived from the absence or presence of like elements, that is, of nourishment which would fit the pores. Tears and sweat arose from a disturbance which curdled the blood; they were, so to say, the whey of the blood.[633]

Footnote 633:

Nutrition, Aet. v. 27, 1; pleasure and pain, Aet. iv. 9, 15; v. 28, 1;
tears and sweat, v. 22, 1.

[Sidenote: Perception.]

118. For the theory of perception held by Empedokles we have the original words of Theophrastos:—

Empedokles speaks in the same way of all the senses, and says that
perception is due to the “effluences” fitting into the passages of
each sense. And that is why one cannot judge the objects of another;
for the passages of some of them are too wide and those of others too
narrow for the sensible object, so that the latter either goes through
without touching or cannot enter at all. R. P. 177 b.

He tries, too, to explain the nature of sight. He says that the
interior of the eye consists of fire, while round about it is earth
and air,[634] through which its rarity enables the fire to pass like
the light in lanterns (fr. 84). The passages of the fire and water are
arranged alternately; through those of the fire we perceive light
objects, through those of the water, dark; each class of objects fits
into each class of passages, and the colours are carried to the sight
by effluence. R. P. _ib._

But eyes are not all composed in the same way; some are composed of
like elements and some of opposite; some have the fire in the centre
and some on the outside. That is why some animals are keen-sighted by
day and others by night. Those which have less fire are keen-sighted
in the daytime, for the fire within is brought up to an equality by
that without; those which have less of the opposite (_i.e._ water), by
night, for then their deficiency is supplemented. But, in the opposite
case, each will behave in the opposite manner. Those eyes in which
fire predominates will be dazzled in the daytime, since the fire being
still further increased will stop up and occupy the pores of the
water. Those in which water predominates will, he says, suffer the
same at night, for the fire will be obstructed by the water. And this
goes on till the water is separated off by the air, for in each case
it is the opposite which is a remedy. The best tempered and the most
excellent vision is one composed of both in equal proportions. This is
practically what he says about sight.

Hearing, he holds, is produced by sound outside, when the air moved by
the voice sounds inside the ear; for the sense of hearing is a sort of
bell sounding inside the ear, which he calls a “fleshy sprout.” When
the air is set in motion it strikes upon the solid parts and produces
a sound.[635] Smell, he holds, arises from respiration, and that is
why those smell most keenly whose breath has the most violent motion,
and why most smell comes from subtle and light bodies.[636] As to
touch and taste, he does not lay down how nor by means of what they
arise, except that he gives us an explanation applicable to all, that
sensation is produced by adaptation to the pores. Pleasure is produced
by what is like in its elements and their mixture; pain, by what is
opposite. R. P. _ib._

And he gives a precisely similar account of thought and ignorance.
Thought arises from what is like and ignorance from what is unlike,
thus implying that thought is the same, or nearly the same, as
perception. For after enumerating how we know each thing by means of
itself, he adds, “for all things are fashioned and fitted together out
of these, and it is by these men think and feel pleasure and pain”
(fr. 107). And for this reason we think chiefly with our blood, for in
it of all parts of the body all the elements are most completely
mingled. R. P. 178.

All, then, in whom the mixture is equal or nearly so, and in whom the
elements are neither at too great intervals nor too small or too
large, are the wisest and have the most exact perceptions; and those
who come next to them are wise in proportion. Those who are in the
opposite condition are the most foolish. Those whose elements are
separated by intervals and rare are dull and laborious; those in whom
they are closely packed and broken into minute particles are
impulsive, they attempt many things and finish few because of the
rapidity with which their blood moves. Those who have a
well-proportioned mixture in some one part of their bodies will be
clever in that respect. That is why some are good orators and some
good artificers. The latter have a good mixture in their hands, and
the former in their tongues, and so with all other special capacities.
R. P. _ib._

Footnote 634:

That is, watery vapour, not the elemental air or αἰθήρ (§ 107). It is
identical with the “water” mentioned below. It is unnecessary,
therefore, to insert καὶ ὕδωρ after πῦρ with Karsten and Diels.

Footnote 635:

Beare, p. 96, n. 1.

Footnote 636:

_Ibid._ p. 133.

Perception, then, is due to the meeting of an element in us with the same element outside. This takes place when the pores of the organ of sense are neither too large nor too small for the “effluences” which all things are constantly giving off (fr. 89). Smell was explained by respiration. The breath drew in along with it the small particles which fit into the pores. From Aetios[637] we learn that Empedokles proved this by the example of people with a cold in their head, who cannot smell, just because they have a difficulty in breathing. We also see from fr. 101 that the scent of dogs was referred to in support of the theory. Empedokles seems to have given no detailed account of smell, and did not refer to touch at all.[638] Hearing was explained by the motion of the air which struck upon the cartilage inside the ear and made it swing and sound like a bell.[639]

Footnote 637:

Aet. iv. 17, 2 (_Dox._ p. 407). Beare, p. 133.

Footnote 638:

Beare, pp. 161-3, 180-81.

Footnote 639:

_Ibid._ pp. 95 sqq.

The theory of vision[640] is more complicated; and, as Plato adopted most of it, it is of great importance in the history of philosophy. The eye was conceived, as by Alkmaion (§ 96),[641] to be composed of fire and water. Just as in a lantern the flame is protected from the wind by horn (fr. 84), so the fire in the iris is protected from the water which surrounds it in the pupil by membranes with very fine pores, so that, while the fire can pass out, the water cannot get in. Sight is produced by the fire inside the eye going forth to meet the object. This seems strange to us, because we are accustomed to the idea of images being impressed upon the retina. But _looking_ at a thing no doubt seemed much more like an action proceeding from the eye than a mere passive state.

Footnote 640:

_Ibid._ pp. 14 sqq.

Footnote 641:

Theophr. _de sens._ 26.

He was quite aware, too, that “effluences,” as he called them, came from things to the eyes as well; for he defined colours as “effluences from forms (or ‘things’) fitting into the pores and perceived.”[642] It is not quite clear how these two accounts of vision were reconciled, or how far we are entitled to credit Empedokles with the Platonic theory. The statements which have been quoted seem to imply something very like it.[643]

Footnote 642:

The definition is quoted from Gorgias in Plato, _Men._ 76 d 4. All our
MSS. have ἀπορραοὶ σχημάτων, but Ven. T has in the margin γρ.
χρημάτων, which may well be an old tradition. The Ionic for “things”
is χρήματα. See Diels, _Empedokles und Gorgias_, p. 439.

Footnote 643:

See Beare, _Elementary Cognition_, p. 18.

Theophrastos tells us that Empedokles made no distinction between thought and perception, a remark already made by Aristotle.[644] The chief seat of perception was the blood, in which the four elements are most evenly mixed, and especially the blood near the heart (fr. 105).[645] This does not, however, exclude the idea that other parts of the body may perceive also; indeed, Empedokles held that all things have their share of thought (fr. 103). But the blood was specially sensitive because of its finer mixture.[646] From this it naturally follows that Empedokles adopted the view, already maintained in the Second Part of the poem of Parmenides (fr. 16), that our knowledge varies with the varying constitution of our bodies (fr. 106). This consideration became very important later on as one of the foundations of scepticism; but Empedokles himself only drew from it the conclusion that we must make the best use we can of our senses, and check one by the other (fr. 4).

Footnote 644:

Arist. _de An._ Γ, 3. 427 a 21.

Footnote 645:

R. P. 178 a. This was the characteristic doctrine of the Sicilian
school, from whom it passed to Aristotle and the Stoics. Plato and
Hippokrates, on the other hand, adopted the view of Alkmaion (§ 97)
that the brain was the seat of consciousness. Kritias (Arist. _de An._
Α, 2. 405 b 6) probably got the Sicilian doctrine from Gorgias. At a
later date, Philistion of Syracuse, Plato’s friend, substituted the
ψυχικὸν πνεῦμα (“animal spirits”) which circulated along with the
blood.

Footnote 646:

Beare, p. 253.

[Sidenote: Theology and religion.]

119. The theoretical theology of Empedokles reminds us of Xenophanes, his practical religious teaching of Pythagoras and the Orphics. We are told in the earlier part of the poem that certain “gods” are composed of the elements; and that therefore though they “live long lives” they must pass away (fr. 21). We have seen that the elements and the Sphere are also called gods, but that is in quite another sense of the word.

If we turn to the religious teaching of the _Purifications_, we find that everything turns on the doctrine of transmigration. On the general significance of this enough has been said above (§ 42); the details given by Empedokles are peculiar. According to a decree of Necessity, “daemons” who have sinned are forced to wander from their home in heaven for three times ten thousand seasons (fr. 115). He himself is such an exiled divinity, and has fallen from his high estate because he put his trust in raving Strife. The four elements toss him from one to the other with loathing; and so he has not only been a human being and a plant, but even a fish. The only way to purify oneself from the taint of original sin was by the cultivation of ceremonial holiness, by purifications, and abstinence from animal flesh. For the animals are our kinsmen (fr. 137), and it is parricide to lay hands on them. In all this there are, no doubt, certain points of contact with the cosmology. We have the “mighty oath” (fr. 115; cf. fr. 30), the four elements, Hate as the source of original sin, and Kypris as queen in the Golden Age (fr. 128). But these points are neither fundamental nor of great importance. And it cannot be denied that there are really contradictions between the two poems. That, however, is just what we should expect to find. All through this period, there seems to have been a gulf between men’s religious beliefs, if they had any, and their cosmological views. The few points of contact which we have mentioned may have been sufficient to hide this from Empedokles himself.