Chapter XXV: Front Matter (25)

It is somewhat hard to understand Bacon's position with regard to the king during these years. He was the first officer of the crown, the most able man in the kingdom, prudent, sagacious and devoted to the royal party. Yet his advice was followed only when it chimed in with James's own will; his influence was of a merely secondary kind; and his great practical skill was employed simply in carrying out the measures of the king in the best mode possible. We know indeed that he sympathized cordially with the home policy of the government; he had no objection to such monopolies or patents as seemed advantageous to the country, and for this he is certainly not to be blamed.[28] The opinion was common at the time, and the error was merely ignorance of the true principles of political economy. But we know also that the patents were so numerous as to be oppressive, and we can scarcely avoid inferring that Bacon more readily saw the advantages to the government than the disadvantages to the people. In November 1620, when a new parliament was summoned to meet on January following, he earnestly pressed that the most obnoxious patents, those of alehouses and inns, and the monopoly of gold and silver thread, should be given up, and wrote to Buckingham, whose brothers were interested, advising him to withdraw them from the impending storm. This prudent advice was unfortunately rejected. But while he went cordially with the king in domestic affairs, he was not quite in harmony with him on questions of foreign policy. Not only was he personally in favour of a war with Spain for the recovery of the Palatinate, but he foresaw in such a course of action the means of drawing together more closely the king and his parliament. He believed that the royal difficulties would be removed if a policy were adopted with which the people could heartily sympathize, and if the king placed himself at the head of his parliament and led them on. But his advice was neglected by the vacillating and peace-loving monarch, his proffered proclamation was put aside, and a weak, featureless production substituted in its place. Nevertheless the new parliament seemed at first more responsive than might have been looked for. A double subsidy was granted, which was expressly stated to be "not on any consideration or condition for or concerning the Palatinate." The session, however, was not far advanced when the question of patents was brought up; a determined attack was made upon the very ones of which Bacon had been in dread, and it was even proposed to proceed against the referees (Bacon and Montagu) who had certified that there was no objection to them in point of law. This proposal, though pressed by Coke, was allowed to drop; while the king and Buckingham, acting under the advice of Williams, afterwards lord keeper, agreed to give up the monopolies. It was evident, however, that a determined attack was about to be made upon Bacon, and that the proceeding against the referees was really directed against him. It is probable that this charge was dropped because a more powerful weapon had in the meantime been placed in his enemies' hands. This was the accusation of bribery and corrupt dealings in chancery suits, an accusation apparently wholly unexpected by Bacon, and the possibility of which he seems never to have contemplated until it was actually brought against him. At the beginning of the session a committee had been appointed for inquiring into abuses in the courts of justice. Some illegal practices of certain chancery officials had been detected and punished by the court itself, and generally there was a disposition to overhaul its affairs, while Coke and Lionel Cranfield, earl of Middlesex (1575-1645) directly attacked some parts of the chancellor's administration. But on the 14th of March one Christopher Aubrey appeared at the bar of the House, and charged Bacon with having received from him a sum of money while his suit was going on, and with having afterwards decided against him. Bacon's letter[29] on this occasion is worthy of serious attention; he evidently thought the charge was but part of the deliberate scheme to ruin him which had already been in progress. A second accusation (Edward Egerton's case) followed immediately after, and was investigated by the House, who, satisfied that they had just matter for reprehension, appointed the 19th for a conference with the Lords. On that day Bacon, as he had feared, was too ill to attend. He wrote[30] to the Lords excusing his absence, requesting them to appoint a convenient time for his defence and cross-examination of witnesses, and imploring them not to allow their minds to be prejudiced against him, at the same time declaring that he would not "trick up an innocency with cavillations, but plainly and ingenuously declare what he knew or remembered." The charges rapidly accumulated, but Bacon still looked upon them as party moves, and was in hopes of defending himself.[31] Nor did he seem to have lost his courage, if we are to believe the common reports of the day,[32] though certainly they do not appear worthy of very much credit.

The notes[33] bearing upon the interview which he obtained with the king show that he had begun to see more clearly the nature and extent of the offences with which he was charged, that he now felt it impossible altogether to exculpate himself, and that his hopes were directed towards obtaining some mitigation of his sentence. The long roll of charges made upon the 19th of April finally decided him; he gave up all idea of defence, and wrote to the king begging him to show him favour in this emergency.[34] The next day he sent in a general confession to the Lords,[35] trusting that this would be considered satisfactory. The Lords, however, decided that it was not sufficient as a ground for their censure, and demanded a detailed and particular confession. A list of twenty-eight charges was then sent him, to which an answer by letter was required. On the 30th of April his "confession and humble submission"[36] was handed in. In it, after going over the several instances, he says, "I do again confess, that on the points charged upon me, although they should be taken as myself have declared them, there is a great deal of corruption and neglect; for which I am heartily and penitently sorry, and submit myself to the judgment, grace, and mercy of the court."[37] On the 3rd of May, after considerable discussion, the Lords decided upon the sentence, which was,[38] That he should undergo fine and ransom of L40,000; that he should be imprisoned in the Tower during the king's pleasure; that he should be for ever incapable of any office, place or employment in the state or commonwealth; that he should never sit in parliament, or come within the verge of the court. This heavy sentence was [v.03 p.0143] only partially executed. The fine was in effect remitted by the king; imprisonment in the Tower lasted for about four days; a general pardon (not of course covering the parliamentary censure) was made out, and though delayed at the seal for a time by Lord Keeper Williams, was passed probably in November 1621. The cause of the delay seems to have lain with Buckingham, whose friendship had cooled, and who had taken offence at the fallen chancellor's unwillingness to part with York House. This difference was finally smoothed over, and it was probably through his influence that Bacon received the much-desired permission to come within the verge of the court. He never again sat in parliament.

So ends this painful episode, which has given rise to the most severe condemnation of Bacon, and which still presents great and perhaps insuperable difficulties. On the whole, the tendency of the most recent and thorough researches has been towards the opinion that Bacon's own account of the matter (from which, indeed, our knowledge of it is chiefly drawn) is substantially correct. He distinguishes three ways in which bribes may be given,[39] and ingenuously confesses that his own acts amounted to corruption and were worthy of condemnation. Now, corruption strictly interpreted would imply the deliberate sale of justice, and this Bacon explicitly denies, affirming that he never "had bribe or reward in his eye or thought when he pronounced any sentence or order." When we analyse the specific charges against him, with his answers to them, we find many that are really of little weight. The twenty-eighth and last, that of negligence in looking after his servants, though it did him much harm, may fairly be said to imply no moral blame. The majority of the others are instances of gratuities given after the decision, and it is to be regretted that the judgment of the peers gives us no means of determining how such gifts were looked upon, whether or not the acceptance of them was regarded as a "corrupt" practice. In four cases specifically, and in some others by implication, Bacon confesses that he had received bribes from suitors _pendente lite_. Yet he affirms, as we said before, that his intention was never swayed by a bribe; and so far as any of these cases can be traced, his decisions, often given in conjunction with some other official, are to all appearance thoroughly just. In several cases his judgment appears to have been given against the party bestowing the bribe, and in at least one instance, that of Lady Wharton, it seems impossible to doubt that he must have known when accepting the present that his opinion would be adverse to her cause. Although, then, he felt that these practices were really corrupt, and even rejoiced that his own fall would tend to purify the courts from them,[40] he did not feel that he was guilty of perverting justice for the sake of reward. How far, then, is such defence or explanation admissible and satisfactory? It is clear that two things are to be considered: the one the guilt of taking bribes or presents on any consideration, the other the moral guilt depending upon the wilful perversion of justice. The attempt has sometimes been made to defend the whole of Bacon's conduct on the ground that he did nothing that was not done by many of his contemporaries. Bacon himself disclaims a defence of this nature, and we really have no direct evidence which shows to what extent the offering and receiving of such bribes then prevailed. That the practice was common is indeed implied by the terms in which Bacon speaks of it, and it is not improbable that the fact of these gifts being taken by officials was a thing fairly well known, although all were aware of their illegal character, and it was plain that any public exposure of such dealings would be fatal to the individual against whom the charge was made out.[41] Bacon knew all this; he was well aware that the practice was in itself indefensible,[42] and that his conduct was therefore corrupt and deserving of censure. So far, then, as the mere taking of bribes is concerned, he would permit no defence, and his own confession and judgment on his action contain as severe a condemnation as has ever been passed upon him. Yet in the face of this he does not hesitate to call himself "the justest chancellor that hath been in the five changes since Sir Nicholas Bacon's time";[43] and this on the plea that his intentions had always been pure, and had never been affected by the presents he received. His justification has been set aside by modern critics, not on the ground that the evidence demonstrates its falsity,[44] but because it is inconceivable or unnatural that any man should receive a present from another, and not suffer his judgment to be swayed thereby. It need hardly be said that such an _a priori_ conviction is not a sufficient basis on which to found a sweeping condemnation of Bacon's integrity as an administrator of justice. On the other hand, even if it be admitted to be possible and conceivable that a present should be given by a suitor simply as seeking favourable consideration of his cause, and not as desirous of obtaining an unjust decree, and should be accepted by the judge on the same understanding, this would not entitle one absolutely to accept Bacon's statement. Further evidence is necessary in order to give foundation to a definite judgment either way; and it is extremely improbable, nay, almost impossible, that such can ever be produced. In these circumstances, due weight should be given to Bacon's own assertions of his perfect innocence and purity of intention; they ought not to be put out of court unless found in actual contradiction to the facts, and the reverse of this is the case, so far as has yet appeared.[45]

The remaining five years of his life, though he was still harassed by want of means, for James was not liberal, were spent in work far more valuable to the world than anything he had accomplished in his high office. In March 1622 he presented to Prince Charles his _History of Henry VII._; and immediately, with unwearied industry, set to work to complete some portions of his great work. In November 1622 appeared the _Historia Ventorum_; in January 1622/3, the _Historia Vitae et Mortis_; and in October of the same year, the _De Augmentis Scientiarum_, a Latin translation, with many additions, of the _Advancement_. Finally, in December 1624, he published his _Apophthegms_, and _Translations of some of the Psalms_, dedicated to George Herbert; and, in 1625, a third and enlarged edition of the _Essays_.

Busily occupied with these labours, his life now drew rapidly to a close. In March 1626 he came to London, and when driving one day near Highgate, was taken with a desire to discover whether snow would act as an antiseptic. He stopped his carriage, got out at a cottage, purchased a fowl, and with his own hands assisted to stuff it with snow. He was seized with a sudden chill, and became so seriously unwell that he had to be conveyed to Lord Arundel's house, which was near at hand. Here his illness increased, the cold and chill brought on bronchitis and he died, after a few days' suffering, on the 9th of April 1626.

[v.03 p.0144] _Bacon's Works and Philosophy._

A complete survey of Bacon's works and an estimate of his place in literature and philosophy are matters for a volume. It is here proposed merely to classify the works, to indicate their general character and to enter somewhat more in detail upon what he himself regarded as his great achievement,--the reorganization of the sciences and the exposition of a new method by which the human mind might proceed with security and certainty towards the true end of all human thought and action.

Putting aside the letters and occasional writings, we may conveniently distribute the other works into three classes, _Professional, Literary, Philosophical_. The Professional works include the _Reading on the Statute of Uses_, the _Maxims of Law_ and the treatise (possibly spurious) on the _Use of the Law_. "I am in good hope," said Bacon himself, "that when Sir Edward Coke's reports and my rules and decisions shall come to posterity, there will be (whatsoever is now thought) question who was the greater lawyer." If Coke's reports show completer mastery of technical details, greater knowledge of precedent, and more of the dogged grasp of the letter than do Bacon's legal writings, there can be no dispute that the latter exhibit an infinitely more comprehensive intelligence of the abstract principles of jurisprudence, with a richness and ethical fulness that more than compensate for their lack of dry legal detail. Bacon seems indeed to have been a lawyer of the first order, with a keen scientific insight into the bearings of isolated facts and a power of generalization which admirably fitted him for the self-imposed task, unfortunately never completed, of digesting or codifying the chaotic mass of the English law.

Among the literary works are included all that he himself designated moral and historical pieces, and to these may be added some theological and minor writings, such as the _Apophthegms_. Of the moral works the most valuable are the _Essays_, which have been so widely read and universally admired. The matter is of the familiar, practical kind, that "comes home to men's bosoms." The thoughts are weighty, and even when not original have acquired a peculiar and unique tone or cast by passing through the crucible of Bacon's mind. A sentence from the _Essays_ can rarely be mistaken for the production of any other writer. The short, pithy sayings have become popular mottoes and household words. The style is quaint, original, abounding in allusions and witticisms, and rich, even to gorgeousness, with piled-up analogies and metaphors.[46] The first edition contained only ten essays, but the number was increased in 1612 to thirty-eight, and in 1625 to fifty-eight. The short tract, _Colours of Good and Evil_, which with the _Meditationes Sacrae_ originally accompanied the Essays, was afterwards incorporated with the _De Augmentis_. Along with these works may be classed the curiously learned piece, _De Sapientia Veterum_, in which he works out a favourite idea, that the mythological fables of the Greeks were allegorical and concealed the deepest truths of their philosophy. As a scientific explanation of the myths the theory is of no value, but it affords fine scope for the exercise of Bacon's unrivalled power of detecting analogies in things apparently most dissimilar. The _Apophthegms_, though hardly deserving Macaulay's praise of being the best collection of jests in the world, contain a number of those significant anecdotes which Bacon used with such effect in his other writings. Of the historical works, besides a few fragments of the projected history of Britain there remains the _History of Henry VII._, a valuable work, giving a clear and animated narrative of the reign, and characterizing Henry with great skill. The style is in harmony with the matter, vigorous and flowing, but naturally with less of the quaintness and richness suitable to more thoughtful and original writings. The series of the literary works is completed by the minor treatises on theological or ecclesiastical questions. Some of the latter, included among the occasional works, are sagacious and prudent and deserve careful study. Of the former, the principal specimens are the _Meditationes Sacrae_ and the _Confession of Faith_. The _Paradoxes_ (Characters of a believing Christian in paradoxes, and seeming contradictions), which was often and justly suspected, has been conclusively proved by Grosart to be the work of another author.

_Philosophical Works._--The great mass of Bacon's writings consists of treatises or fragments, which either formed integral parts of his grand comprehensive scheme, or were closely connected with it. More exactly they may be classified under three heads: (A) Writings originally intended to form parts of the _Instauratio_, but which were afterwards superseded or thrown aside; (B) Works connected with the _Instauratio_, but not directly included in its plan; (C) Writings which actually formed part of the _Instauratio Magna_.

(A) This class contains some important tracts, which certainly contain little, if anything, that is not afterwards taken up and expanded in the more elaborate works, but are not undeserving of attention, from the difference in the point of view and method of treatment. The most valuable of them are: (1) _The Advancement of Learning_, of which no detailed account need be given, as it is completely worked up into the _De Augmentis_, and takes its place as the first part of the _Instauratio_. (2) _Valerius Terminus_, a very remarkable piece, composed probably about 1603, though perhaps retouched at a later period. It contains a brief and somewhat obscure outline of the first two parts in the _Instauratio_, and is of importance as affording us some insight into the gradual development of the system in Bacon's own mind. (3) _Temporis Partus Masculus_, another curious fragment, remarkable not only from its contents, but from its style, which is arrogant and offensive, in this respect unlike any other writing of Bacon's. The adjective _masculus_ points to the power of bringing forth fruit possessed by the new philosophy, and perhaps indicates that all previous births of time were to be looked upon as feminine or imperfect; it is used in a somewhat similar sense in _Letters and Life_, vi. 183, "_In verbis masculis_, no flourishing or painted words, but such words as are fit to go before deeds." (4) _Redargutio Philosophiarum_, a highly finished piece in the form of an oration, composed probably about 1608 or 1609, and containing in pretty full detail much of what afterwards appears in connexion with the _Idola Theatri_ in book i. of the _Novum Organum_. (5) _Cogitata et Visa_, perhaps the most important of the minor philosophical writings, dating from 1607 (though possibly the tract in its present form may have been to some extent altered), and containing in weighty and sonorous Latin the substance of the first book of the _Organum_. (6) The _Descriptio Globi Intellectualis_, which is to some extent intermediate between the _Advancement_ and the _De Augmentis_, goes over in detail the general classification of the sciences, and enters particularly on some points of minor interest. (7) The brief tract _De Interpretatione Naturae Sententiae Duodecim_ is evidently a first sketch of part of the _Novum Organum_, and in phraseology is almost identical with it. (8) A few smaller pieces, such as the _Inquisitio de Motu_, the _Calor et Frigus_, the _Historia Soni et Auditus_ and the _Phaenomena Universi_, are early specimens of his _Natural History_, and exhibit the first tentative applications of the new method.

(B) The second group consists of treatises on subjects connected with the _Instauratio_, but not forming part of it. The most interesting, and in many respects the most remarkable, is the philosophic romance, the _New Atlantis_, a description of an ideal state in which the principles of the new philosophy are carried out by political machinery and under state guidance, and where many of the results contemplated by Bacon are in imagination attained. The work was to have been completed by the addition of a second part, treating of the laws of a model commonwealth, which was never written. Another important tract is the _De Principiis atque Originibus secundum Fabulas Cupidinis et Caeli_, where, under the disguise of two old mythological stories, he (in the manner of the _Sapientia Veterum_) finds the deepest truths [v.03 p.0145] concealed. The tract is unusually interesting, for in it he discusses at some length the limits of science, the origin of things and the nature of primitive matter, giving at the same time full notices of Democritus among the ancient philosophers and of Telesio among the modern. Deserving of attention are also the _Cogitationes de Natura Rerum_, probably written early, perhaps in 1605, and the treatise on the theory of the tides, _De Fluxu et Refluxu Maris_, written probably about 1616.

(C) The philosophical works which form part of the _Instauratio_ must of course be classed according to the positions which they respectively hold in that scheme of the sciences.

The great work, the reorganization of the sciences, and the restoration of man to that command over nature which he had lost by the fall, consisted in its final form of six divisions.

I. _Partitiones Scientiarum_, a survey of the sciences, either such as then existed or such as required to be constructed afresh--in fact, an inventory of all the possessions of the human mind. The famous classification[47] on which this survey proceeds is based upon an analysis of the faculties and objects of human knowledge. This division is represented by the _De Augmentis Scientiarum_.

II. _Interpretatio Naturae._--After the survey of all that has yet been done in the way of discovery or invention, comes the new method, by which the mind of man is to be trained and directed in its progress towards the renovation of science. This division is represented, though only imperfectly, by the _Novum Organum_, particularly book ii.

III. _Historia Naturalis et Experimentalis._--The new method is valueless, because inapplicable, unless it be supplied with materials duly collected and presented--in fact, unless there be formed a competent natural history of the _Phaenomena Universi_. A short introductory sketch of the requisites of such a natural history, which, according to Bacon, is essential, necessary, the _basis totius negotii_, is given in the tract _Parasceve_, appended to the _Novum Organum_. The principal works intended to form portions of the history, and either published by himself or left in manuscript, are _Historia Ventorum_, _Historia Vitae et Mortis_, _Historia Densi et Rari_, and the extensive collection of facts and observations entitled _Sylva Sylvarum_.

IV. _Scala Intellectus._--It might have been supposed that the new philosophy could now be inaugurated. Materials had been supplied, along with a new method by which they were to be treated, and naturally the next step would be the finished result. But for practical purposes Bacon interposed two divisions between the preliminaries and the philosophy itself. The first was intended to consist of types or examples of investigations conducted by the new method, serviceable for keeping the whole process vividly before the mind, or, as the title indicates, such that the mind could run rapidly up and down the several steps or grades in the process. Of this division there seems to be only one small fragment, the _Filum Labyrinthi_, consisting of but two or three pages.

V. _Prodromi_, forerunners of the new philosophy. This part, strictly speaking, is quite extraneous to the general design. According to the _Distributio Operis_,[48] it was to contain certain speculations of Bacon's own, not formed by the new method, but by the unassisted use of his understanding. These, therefore, form temporary or uncertain anticipations of the new philosophy. There is extant a short preface to this division of the work, and according to Spedding some of the miscellaneous treatises, such as _De Principiis_, _De Fluxu et Refluxu_, _Cogitationes de Natura Rerum_, may probably have been intended to be included under this head. This supposition receives some support from the manner in which the fifth part is spoken of in the _Novum Organum_, i. 116.

VI. The new philosophy, which is the work of future ages, and the result of the new method.

Bacon's grand motive in his attempt to found the sciences anew was the intense conviction that the knowledge man possessed was of little service to him. "The knowledge whereof the world is now possessed, especially that of nature, extendeth not to magnitude and certainty of works."[49] Man's sovereignty over nature, which is founded on knowledge alone, had been lost, and instead of the free relation between things and the human mind, there was nothing but vain notions and blind experiments. To restore the original commerce between man and nature, and to recover the _imperium hominis_, is the grand object of all science. The want of success which had hitherto attended efforts in the same direction had been due to many causes, but chiefly to the want of appreciation of the nature of philosophy and its real aim. Philosophy is not the science of things divine and human; it is not the search after truth. "I find that even those that have sought knowledge for itself, and not for benefit or ostentation, or any practical enablement in the course of their life, have nevertheless propounded to themselves a wrong mark, namely, satisfaction (which men call Truth) and not operation."[50] "Is there any such happiness as for a man's mind to be raised above the confusion of things, where he may have the prospect of the order of nature and error of man? But is this a view of delight only and not of discovery? of contentment and not of benefit? Shall he not as well discern the riches of nature's warehouse as the beauty of her shop? Is truth ever barren? Shall he not be able thereby to produce worthy effects, and to endow the life of man with infinite commodities?"[51] Philosophy is altogether practical; it is of little matter to the fortunes of humanity what abstract notions one may entertain concerning the nature and the principles of things.[52] This truth, however, has never yet been recognized;[53] it has not yet been seen that the true aim of all science is "to endow the condition and life of man with new powers or works,"[54] or "to extend more widely the limits of the power and greatness of man."[55] Nevertheless, it is not to be imagined that by this being proposed as the great object of search there is thereby excluded all that has hitherto been looked upon as the higher aims of human life, such as the contemplation of truth. Not so, but by following the new aim we shall also arrive at a _true_ knowledge of the universe in which we are, for without knowledge there is no power; truth and utility are in ultimate aspect the same; "works themselves are of greater value as pledges of truth than as contributing to the comforts of life."[56] Such was the conception of philosophy with which Bacon started, and in which he felt himself to be thoroughly original. As his object was new and hitherto unproposed, so the method he intended to employ was different from all modes of investigation hitherto attempted. "It would be," as he says, "an unsound fancy and self-contradictory, to expect that things which have never yet been done can be done except by means which have never yet been tried."[57] There were many obstacles in his way, and he seems always to have felt that the first part of the new scheme must be a _pars destruens_, a destructive criticism of all other methods. Opposition was to be expected, not only from previous philosophies, but especially from the human mind itself. In the first place, natural antagonism might be looked for from the two opposed sects, the one of whom, in despair of knowledge, maintained that all science was impossible; while the other, resting on authority and on the learning that had been handed down from the Greeks, declared that science was already completely known, and consequently devoted their energies to methodizing and elaborating it. Secondly, within the domain of science itself, properly so called, there were two "kind of rovers" who must be dismissed. The first were the speculative or logical philosophers, who construe the universe _ex analogia hominis_, and not _ex analogia mundi_, who fashion nature according to preconceived ideas, and who employ in their investigations syllogism and abstract reasoning. The second class, who were equally offensive, consisted of those who practised blind experience, which is mere [v.03 p.0146] groping in the dark (_vaga experientia mera palpatio est_), who occasionally hit upon good works or inventions, which, like Atalanta's apples, distracted them from further steady and gradual progress towards universal truth. In place of these straggling efforts of the unassisted human mind, a graduated system of helps was to be supplied, by the use of which the mind, when placed on the right road, would proceed with unerring and mechanical certainty to the invention of new arts and sciences.

Such were to be the peculiar functions of the new method, though it has not definitely appeared what that method was, or to what objects it could be applied. But, before proceeding to unfold his method, Bacon found it necessary to enter in considerable detail upon the general subject of the obstacles to progress, and devoted nearly the whole of the first book of the _Organum_ to the examination of them. This discussion, though strictly speaking extraneous to the scheme, has always been looked upon as a most important part of his philosophy, and his name is perhaps as much associated with the doctrine of Idols (_Idola_) as with the theory of induction or the classification of the sciences.

The doctrine of the kinds of fallacies or general classes of errors into which the human mind is prone to fall, appears in many of the works written before the _Novum Organum_, and the treatment of them varies in some respects. The classification in the _Organum_, however, not only has the author's sanction, but has received the stamp of historical acceptation; and comparison of the earlier notices, though a point of literary interest, has no important philosophic bearing. The _Idola_ (_Nov. Org._ i. 39)[58] false notions of things, or erroneous ways of looking at nature, are of four kinds: the first two innate, pertaining to the very nature of the mind and not to be eradicated; the third creeping insensibly into men's minds, and hence in a sense innate and inseparable; the fourth imposed from without. The first kind are the _Idola Tribus_, idols of the tribe, fallacies incident to humanity or the race in general. Of these, the most prominent are--the proneness to suppose in nature greater order and regularity than there actually is; the tendency to support a preconceived opinion by affirmative instances, neglecting all negative or opposed cases; and the tendency to generalize from few observations, or to give reality to mere abstractions, figments of the mind. Manifold errors also result from the weakness of the senses, which affords scope for mere conjecture; from the influence exercised over the understanding by the will and passions; from the restless desire of the mind to penetrate to the ultimate principles of things; and from the belief that "man is the measure of the universe," whereas, in truth, the world is received by us in a distorted and erroneous manner. The second kind are the _Idola Specus_, idols of the cave, or errors incident to the peculiar mental or bodily constitution of each individual, for according to the state of the individual's mind is his view of things. Errors of this class are innumerable, because there are numberless varieties of disposition; but some very prominent specimens can be indicated. Such are the tendency to make all things subservient to, or take the colour of some favourite subject, the extreme fondness and reverence either for what is ancient or for what is modern, and excess in noting either differences or resemblances amongst things. A practical rule for avoiding these is also given: "In general let every student of nature take this as a rule, that whatever his mind seizes and dwells upon with particular satisfaction is to be held in suspicion."[59] The third class are the _Idola Fori_, idols of the market-place, errors arising from the influence exercised over the mind by mere words. This, according to Bacon, is the most troublesome kind of error, and has been especially fatal in philosophy. For words introduce a fallacious mode of looking at things in two ways: first, there are some words that are really merely names for non-existent things, which are yet supposed to exist simply because they have received a name; secondly, there are names hastily and unskilfully abstracted from a few objects and applied recklessly to all that has the faintest analogy with these objects, thus causing the grossest confusion. The fourth and last class are the _Idola Theatri_, idols of the theatre, _i.e._ fallacious modes of thinking resulting from received systems of philosophy and from erroneous methods of demonstration. The criticism of the demonstrations is introduced later in close connexion with Bacon's new method; they are the rival modes of procedure, to which his own is definitely opposed. The philosophies which are "redargued" are divided into three classes, the sophistical, of which the best example is Aristotle, who, according to Bacon, forces nature into his abstract schemata and thinks to explain by definitions; the empirical, which from few and limited experiments leaps at once to general conclusions; and the superstitious, which corrupts philosophy by the introduction of poetical and theological notions.

Such are the general causes of the errors that infest the human mind; by their exposure the way is cleared for the introduction of the new method. The nature of this method cannot be understood until it is exactly seen to what it is to be applied. What idea had Bacon of science, and how is his method connected with it? Now, the science[60] which was specially and invariably contemplated by him was natural philosophy, the great mother of all the sciences; it was to him the type of scientific knowledge, and its method was the method of all true science. To discover exactly the characteristics and the object of natural philosophy it is necessary to examine the place it holds in the general scheme furnished in the _Advancement_ or _De Augmentis_. All human knowledge, it is there laid down, may be referred to man's memory or imagination or reason. In the first, the bare facts presented to sense are collected and stored up; the exposition of them is _history_, which is either natural or civil. In the second, the materials of sense are separated or divided in ways not corresponding to nature but after the mind's own pleasure, and the result is _poesy_ or feigned history. In the third, the materials are worked up after the model or pattern of nature, though we are prone to err in the progress from sense to reason; the result is _philosophy_, which is concerned either with God, with nature or with man, the second being the most important. Natural philosophy is again divided into speculative or theoretical and operative or practical, according as the end is contemplation or works. Speculative or theoretical natural philosophy has to deal with natural substances and qualities and is subdivided into physics and metaphysics. Physics inquires into the efficient and material causes of things; metaphysics, into the formal and final causes. The principal objects of physics are concrete substances, or abstract though physical qualities. The research into abstract qualities, the fundamental problem of physics, comes near to the metaphysical study of _forms_, which indeed differs from the first only in being more general, and in having as its results a _form_ strictly so called, _i.e._ a nature or quality which is a limitation or specific manifestation of some higher and better-known genus.[61] Natural philosophy is, therefore, in ultimate resort the study of _forms_, and, consequently, the fundamental problem of philosophy in general is the discovery of these _forms_.

"On a given body to generate or superinduce a new nature or natures, is
the work and aim of human power.... Of a given nature to discover the
form or true specific difference, or nature-engendering nature (_natura
naturans_) or source of emanation (for these are the terms which are
nearest to a description of the thing), is the work and aim of human
knowledge."[62]

The questions, then, whose answers give the key to the whole Baconian philosophy, may be put briefly thus--What are [v.03 p.0147] forms? and how is it that knowledge of them solves both the theoretical and the practical problem of science? Bacon himself, as may be seen from the passage quoted above, finds great difficulty in giving an adequate and exact definition of what he means by a form. As a general description, the following passage from the _Novum Organum_, ii. 4, may be cited:--

"The form of a nature is such that given the form the nature infallibly
follows.... Again, the form is such that if it be taken away the nature
infallibly vanishes.... Lastly, the true form is such that it deduces
the given nature from some source of being which is inherent in more
natures, and which is better known in the natural order of things than
the form itself."[63]

From this it would appear that, since by a _nature_ is meant some sensible quality, superinduced upon, or possessed by, a body, so by a form we are to understand the cause of that nature, which cause is itself a determinate case or manifestation of some general or abstract quality inherent in a greater number of objects. But all these are mostly marks by which a form may be recognized, and do not explain what the form really is. A further definition is accordingly attempted in Aph. 13:--

"The form of a thing is the very thing itself, and the thing differs
from the form no otherwise than as the apparent differs from the real,
or the external from the internal, or the thing in reference to the man
from the thing in reference to the universe."

This throws a new light on the question, and from it the inference at once follows, that the forms are the permanent causes or substances underlying all visible phenomena, which are merely manifestations of their activity. Are the forms, then, forces? At times it seems as if Bacon had approximated to this view of the nature of things, for in several passages he identifies forms with laws of activity. Thus, he says--

"When I speak of forms I mean nothing more than those laws and
determinations of absolute actuality which govern and constitute any
simple nature, as heat, light, weight, in every kind of matter and
subject that is susceptible of them. Thus the form of heat or the form
of light is the same thing as the law of heat or the law of light."[64]
"Matter rather than forms should be the object of our attention, its
configurations and changes of configuration, and simple action, and law
of action or motion; for forms are figments of the human mind, unless
you will call those laws of action forms."[65] "Forms or true
differences of things, which are in fact laws of pure act."[66] "For
though in nature nothing really exists besides individual bodies,
performing pure individual acts according to a fixed law, yet in
philosophy this very law, and the investigation, discovery and
explanation of it, is the foundation as well of knowledge as of
operation. And it is this law, with its clauses, that I mean when I
speak of forms."[67]

Several important conclusions may be drawn from these passages. In the first place, it is evident that Bacon, like the Atomical school, of whom he highly approved, had a clear perception and a firm grasp of the _physical_ character of natural principles; his _forms_ are no ideas or abstractions, but highly general physical properties. Further, it is hinted that these general qualities may be looked upon as the modes of action of simple bodies. This fruitful conception, however, Bacon does not work out; and though he uses the word _cause_, and identifies _form_ with _formal cause_, yet it is perfectly apparent that the modern notions of cause as dynamical, and of nature as in a process of flow or development, are foreign to him, and that in his view of the ultimate problem of science, cause meant _causa immanens_, or underlying substance, effects were not consequents but manifestations, and nature was regarded in a purely statical aspect. That this is so appears even more clearly when we examine his general conception of the unity, gradation and function of the sciences. That the sciences are organically connected is a thought common to him and to his distinguished predecessor Roger Bacon. "I that hold it for a great impediment towards the advancement and further invention of knowledge, that particular arts and sciences have been disincorporated from general knowledge, do not understand one and the same thing which Cicero's discourse and the note and conceit of the Grecians in their word _circle learning_ do intend. For I mean not that use which one science hath of another for ornament or help in practice; but I mean it directly of that use by way of supply of light and information, which the particulars and instances of one science do yield and present for the framing or correcting of the axioms of another science in their very truth and notion."[68] In accordance with this, Bacon placed at the basis of the particular sciences which treat of God, nature and man, one fundamental doctrine, the _Prima Philosophia_, or first philosophy, the function of which was to display the unity of nature by connecting into one body of truth such of the highest axioms of the subordinate sciences as were not special to one science, but common to several.[69] This first philosophy had also to investigate what are called the adventitious or transcendental conditions of essences, such as Much, Little, Like, Unlike, Possible, Impossible, Being, Nothing, the logical discussion of which certainly belonged rather to the laws of reasoning than to the existence of things, but the physical or real treatment of which might be expected to yield answers to such questions as, why certain substances are numerous, others scarce; or why, if like attracts like, iron does not attract iron. Following this summary philosophy come the sciences proper, rising like a pyramid in successive stages, the lowest floor being occupied by natural history or experience, the second by physics, the third, which is next the peak of unity, by metaphysics.[70] The knowledge of the peak, or of the one law which binds nature together, is perhaps denied to man. Of the sciences, physics, as has been already seen, deals with the efficient and material, _i.e._ with the variable and transient, causes of things. But its inquiries may be directed either towards concrete bodies or towards abstract qualities. The first kind of investigation rises little above mere natural history; but the other is more important and paves the way for metaphysics. It handles the configurations and the appetites or motions of matter. The configurations, or inner structure of bodies, include dense, rare, heavy, light, hot, cold, &c.,--in fact, what are elsewhere called simple natures. Motions[71] are either simple or compound, the latter being the sum of a number of the former. In physics, however, these matters are treated only as regards their material or efficient causes, and the result of inquiry into any one case gives no general rule, but only facilitates invention in some similar instance. Metaphysics, on the other hand, treats of the formal or final cause of[72] these same substances and qualities, and results in a general rule. With regard to forms, the investigation may be directed either towards concrete bodies or towards qualities. But the forms of substances "are so perplexed and complicated, that it is either vain to inquire into them at all, or such inquiry as is possible should be put off for a time, and not entered upon till forms of a more simple nature have been rightly investigated and discussed."[73] "To inquire into the form of a lion, of an oak, or gold, nay, even of water or air, is a vain pursuit; but to inquire the _form_ of dense, rare, hot, cold, &c., as well configurations as motions, which in treating of physic I have in [v.03 p.0148] great part enumerated (I call them forms of the first class), and which (like the letters of the alphabet) are not many, and yet make up and sustain the essences and forms of all substances--this, I say, it is which I am attempting, and which constitutes and defines that part of metaphysic of which we are now inquiring." Physics inquires into the same qualities, but does not push its investigations into ultimate reality or reach the more general causes. We thus at last attain a definite conclusion with regard to forms, and it appears clear that in Bacon's belief the true function of science was the search for a few fundamental physical qualities, highly abstract and general, the combinations of which give rise to the simple natures and complex phenomena around us. His general conception of the universe may therefore be called mechanical or statical; the cause of each phenomenon is supposed to be actually contained in the phenomenon itself, and by a sufficiently accurate process could be sifted out and brought to light. As soon as the causes are known man regains his power over nature, for "whosoever knows any form, knows also the utmost possibility of superinducing that nature upon every variety of matter, and so is less restrained and tied in operation either to the basis of the matter or to the condition of the efficients."[74]