Chapter XXVI: Front Matter (26)

Nature thus presented itself to Bacon's mind as a huge congeries of phenomena, the manifestations of some simple and primitive qualities, which were hid from us by the complexity of the things themselves. The world was a vast labyrinth, amid the windings of which we require some clue or thread whereby we may track our way to knowledge and thence to power. This thread, the _filum labyrinthi_, is the new method of _induction_. But, as has been frequently pointed out, the new method could not be applied until facts had been observed and collected. This is an indispensable preliminary. "Man, the servant and interpreter of nature, can do and understand so much, and so much only, as he has observed in fact or in thought of the course of nature; beyond this he neither knows anything nor can do anything." The proposition that our knowledge of nature necessarily begins with observation and experience, is common to Bacon and many contemporary reformers of science, but he laid peculiar stress upon it, and gave it a new meaning. What he really meant by observation was a competent natural history or collection of facts. "The firm foundations of a purer natural philosophy are laid in natural history."[75] "First of all we must prepare a _natural and experimental history_, sufficient and good; and this is the foundation of all."[76] The senses and the memory, which collect and store up facts, must be assisted; there must be a _ministration_ of the senses and another of the memory. For not only are instances required, but these must be arranged in such a manner as not to distract or confuse the mind, _i.e._ tables and arrangements of instances must be constructed. In the preliminary collection the greatest care must be taken that the mind be absolutely free from preconceived ideas; nature is only to be conquered by obedience; man must be merely receptive. "All depends on keeping the eye steadily fixed upon the facts of nature, and so receiving their images simply as they are; for God forbid that we should give out a dream of our own imagination for a pattern of the world; rather may He graciously grant to us to write an apocalypse or true vision of the footsteps of the Creator imprinted on his creatures."[77] Concealed among the facts presented to sense are the causes or forms, and the problem therefore is so to analyse experience[78], so to break it up into pieces, that we shall with certainty and mechanical ease arrive at a true conclusion. This process, which forms the essence of the new method, may in its entirety, as a ministration to the reason, be called a logic; but it differs widely from the ordinary or school logic in end, method and form. Its aim is to acquire command over nature by knowledge, and to invent new arts, whereas the old logic strove only after dialectic victories and the discovery of new arguments. In method the difference is even more fundamental. Hitherto the mode of demonstration had been by the syllogism; but the syllogism is, in many respects, an incompetent weapon. It is compelled to accept its first principles on trust from the science in which it is employed; it cannot cope with the subtlety of nature; and it is radically vitiated by being founded on hastily and inaccurately abstracted notions of things. For a syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of words, and words are the symbols of notions. Now the first step in accurate progress from sense to reason, or true philosophy, is to frame a _bona notio_ or accurate conception of the thing; but the received logic never does this. It flies off at once from experience and particulars to the highest and most general propositions, and from these descends, by the use of middle terms, to axioms of lower generality. Such a mode of procedure may be called _anticipatio naturae_ (for in it reason is allowed to prescribe to things), and is opposed to the true method, the _interpretatio naturae_, in which reason follows and obeys nature, discovering her secrets by obedience and submission to rule. Lastly, the very form of induction that has been used by logicians in the collection of their instances is a weak and useless thing. It is a mere enumeration of a few known facts, makes no use of exclusions or rejections, concludes precariously, and is always liable to be overthrown by a negative instance.[79] In radical opposition to this method the Baconian induction begins by supplying helps and guides to the senses, whose unassisted information could not be relied on. Notions were formed carefully, and not till after a certain process of induction was completed.[80] The formation of axioms was to be carried on by a gradually ascending scale. "Then and only then may we hope well of the sciences, when in a just scale of ascent and by successive steps, not interrupted or broken, we rise from particulars to lesser axioms; and then to middle axioms, one above the other; and last of all to the most general."[81] Finally the very form of induction itself must be new. "The induction which is to be available for the discovery and demonstration of sciences and arts must analyse nature by proper rejections and exclusions; and then, after a sufficient number of negatives, come to a conclusion on the affirmative instances, which has not yet been done, or even attempted, save only by Plato.[82] ... And this induction must be used not only to discover axioms, but also in the formation of notions."[83] This view of the function of exclusion is closely connected with Bacon's doctrine of forms, [v.03 p.0149] and is in fact dependent upon that theory. But induction is neither the whole of the new method, nor is it applicable to forms only. There are two other grand objects of inquiry: the one, the transformation of concrete bodies; the other, the investigation of the latent powers and the latent schematism or configuration. With regard to the first, in ultimate result it depends upon the theory of forms; for whenever the compound body can be regarded as the sum of certain simple natures, then our knowledge of the forms of these natures gives us the power of superinducing a new nature on the concrete body. As regards the latent process (_latens processus_) which goes on in all cases of generation and continuous development or motion, we examine carefully, and by quantitative measurements, the gradual growth and change from the first elements to the completed thing. The same kind of investigation may be extended to many cases of natural motion, such as voluntary action or nutrition; and though inquiry is here directed towards concrete bodies, and does not therefore penetrate so deeply into reality as in research for forms, yet great results may be looked for with more confidence. It is to be regretted that Bacon did not complete this portion of his work, in which for the first time he approaches modern conceptions of change. The latent configuration (_latens schematismus_) or inward structure of the parts of a body must be known before we can hope to superinduce a new nature upon it. This can only be discovered by analysis, which will disclose the ultimate constituents (natural particles, not atoms) of bodies, and lead back the discussion to forms or simple natures, whereby alone can true light be thrown on these obscure questions. Thus, in all cases, scientific explanation depends upon knowledge of forms; all phenomena or secondary qualities are accounted for by being referred to the primary qualities of matter.

The several steps in the inductive investigation of the form of any nature flow readily from the definition of the form itself. For that is always and necessarily present when the nature is present, absent when it is absent, decreases and increases according as the nature decreases and increases. It is therefore requisite for the inquiry to have before us instances in which the nature is present. The list of these is called the table of _Essence and Presence_. Secondly, we must have instances in which the nature is absent; only as such cases might be infinite, attention should be limited to such of them as are most akin to the instances of presence.[84] The list in this case is called table of _Absence in Proximity_. Thirdly, we must have a number of instances in which the nature is present in different degrees, either increasing or decreasing in the same subject, or variously present in different subjects. This is the table of _Degrees_, or _Comparison_. After the formation of these tables, we proceed to apply what is perhaps the most valuable part of the Baconian method, and that in which the author took most pride, the process of exclusion or rejection. This elimination of the non-essential, grounded on the fundamental propositions with regard to forms, is the most important of Bacon's contributions to the logic of induction, and that in which, as he repeatedly says, his method differs from all previous philosophies. It is evident that if the tables were complete, and our notions of the respective phenomena clear, the process of exclusion would be a merely mechanical _counting out_, and would _infallibly_ lead to the detection of the cause or form. But it is just as evident that these conditions can never be adequately fulfilled. Bacon saw that his method was impracticable (though he seems to have thought the difficulties not insuperable), and therefore set to work to devise new helps, _adminicula_. These he enumerates in ii., _Aph._ 21:--_Prerogative Instances, Supports of Induction, Rectification of Induction, Varying the Investigation according to the Nature of the Subject, Prerogative Natures, Limits of Investigation, Application to Practice, Preparations for Investigation, the Ascending and Descending Scale of Axioms_. The remainder of the _Organum_ is devoted to a consideration of the twenty-seven classes of Prerogative Instances, and though it contains much that is both luminous and helpful, it adds little to our knowledge of what constitutes the Baconian method. On the other heads we have but a few scattered hints. But although the rigorous requirements of science could only be fulfilled by the employment of all these means, yet in their absence it was permissible to draw from the tables and the exclusion a hypothetical conclusion, the truth of which might be verified by the use of the other processes; such an hypothesis is called fantastically the First Vintage (_Vindemiatio_). The inductive method, so far as exhibited in the _Organum_, is exemplified by an investigation into the nature of heat.

Such was the method devised by Bacon, and to which he ascribed the qualities of absolute certainty and mechanical simplicity. But even supposing that this method were accurate and completely unfolded, it is evident that it could only be made applicable and produce fruit when the phenomena of the universe have been very completely tabulated and arranged. In this demand for a complete natural history, Bacon also felt that he was original, and he was deeply impressed with the necessity for it;[85] in fact, he seems occasionally to place an even higher value upon it than upon his _Organum_. Thus, in the preface to his series of works forming the third part of the _Instauratio_, he says: "It comes, therefore, to this, that my _Organum_, even if it were completed, would not without the _Natural History_ much advance the _Instauration of the Sciences_, whereas the _Natural History_ without the _Organum_ would advance it not a little."[86] But a complete natural history is evidently a thing impossible, and in fact a history can only be collected by attending to the requirements of the _Organum_. This was seen by Bacon, and what may be regarded as his final opinion on the question is given in the important letter to Jean Antoine Baranzano[87] ("Redemptus": 1590-1622):--"With regard to the multitude of instances by which men may be deterred from the attempt, here is my answer. First, what need to dissemble? Either store of instances must be procured, or the business must be given up. All other ways, however enticing, are impassable. Secondly, the prerogatives of instances, and the mode of experimenting upon experiments of light (which I shall hereafter explain), will diminish the multitude of them very much. Thirdly, what matter, I ask, if the description of the instances should fill six times as many volumes as Pliny's _History_? ... For the true natural history is to take nothing except instances, connections, observations and canons."[88] The _Organum_ and the _History_ are thus correlative, and form the two equally necessary sides of a true philosophy; by their union the new philosophy is produced.

_Summary._--Two questions may be put to any doctrine which professes to effect a radical change in philosophy or science. Is it original? Is it valuable? With regard to the first, it has been already pointed out that Bacon's induction or inductive method is distinctly his own, though it cannot and need not be maintained that the general spirit of his philosophy was entirely new.[89]

The value of the method is the separate and more difficult question. It has been assailed on the most opposite grounds. Macaulay, while admitting the accuracy of the process, denied its efficiency, on the ground that an operation performed naturally was not rendered more easy or efficacious by being subjected to analysis.[90] This objection is curious when confronted with Bacon's reiterated assertion that the _natural_ method pursued by the unassisted human reason is distinctly opposed to his; and it is besides an argument that tells so strongly against many sciences, as to be comparatively worthless when applied to any one. There are, however, more formidable objections against the method. It has been pointed out,[91] and with perfect justice, [v.03 p.0150] that science in its progress has not followed the Baconian method, that no one discovery can be pointed to which can be definitely ascribed to the use of his rules, and that men the most celebrated for their scientific acquirements, while paying homage to the name of Bacon, practically set at naught his most cherished precepts. The reason of this is not far to seek, and has been pointed out by logicians of the most diametrically opposed schools. The mechanical character both of the natural history and of the logical method applied to it resulted necessarily from Bacon's radically false conception of the nature of cause and of the causal relation. The whole logical or scientific problem is treated as if it were one of co-existence, to which in truth the method of exclusion is scarcely applicable, and the assumption is constantly made that each phenomenon has one and only one cause.[92] The inductive formation of axioms by a gradually ascending scale is a route which no science has ever followed, and by which no science could ever make progress. The true scientific procedure is by hypothesis followed up and tested by verification; the most powerful instrument is the deductive method, which Bacon can hardly be said to have recognized. The power of framing hypothesis points to another want in the Baconian doctrine. If that power form part of the true method, then the mind is not wholly passive or recipient; it anticipates nature, and moulds the experience received by it in accordance with its own constructive ideas or conceptions; and yet further, the minds of various investigators can never be reduced to the same dead mechanical level.[93] There will still be room for the scientific use of the imagination and for the creative flashes of genius.[94]

If, then, Bacon himself made no contributions to science, if no discovery can be shown to be due to the use of his rules, if his method be logically defective, and the problem to which it was applied one from its nature incapable of adequate solution, it may not unreasonably be asked, How has he come to be looked upon as the great leader in the reformation of modern science? How is it that he shares with Descartes the honour of inaugurating modern philosophy? To this the true answer seems to be that Bacon owes his position not only to the general spirit of his philosophy, but to the manner in which he worked into a connected system the new mode of thinking, and to the incomparable power and eloquence with which he expounded and enforced it. Like all epoch-making works, the _Novum Organum_ gave expression to ideas which were already beginning to be in the air. The time was ripe for a great change; scholasticism, long decaying, had begun to fall; the authority not only of school doctrines but of the church had been discarded; while here and there a few devoted experimenters were turning with fresh zeal to the unwithered face of nature. The fruitful thoughts which lay under and gave rise to these scattered efforts of the human mind, were gathered up into unity, and reduced to system in the new philosophy of Bacon.[95] It is assuredly little matter for wonder that this philosophy should contain much that is now inapplicable, and that in many respects it should be vitiated by radical errors. The details of the logical method on which its author laid the greatest stress have not been found of practical service;[96] yet the fundamental ideas on which the theory rested, the need for rejecting rash generalization, and the necessity for a critical analysis of experience, are as true and valuable now as they were then. Progress in scientific discovery is made mainly, if not solely, by the employment of hypothesis, and for that no code of rules can be laid down such as Bacon had devised. Yet the framing of hypothesis is no mere random guesswork; it is left not to the imagination alone, but to the _scientific imagination_. There is required in the process not merely a preliminary critical induction, but a subsequent experimental comparison, verification or proof, the canons of which can be laid down with precision. To formulate and show grounds for these laws is to construct a philosophy of induction, and it must not be forgotten that the first step towards the accomplishment of the task was made by Bacon when he introduced and gave prominence to the powerful logical instrument of exclusion or elimination.

It is curious and significant that in the domain of the moral and metaphysical sciences his influence has been perhaps more powerful, and his authority has been more frequently appealed to, than in that of the physical. This is due, not so much to his expressed opinion that the inductive method was applicable to all the sciences,[97] as to the generally practical, or, one may say, [v.03 p.0151] _positive_ spirit of his system. Theological questions, which had tortured the minds of generations, are by him relegated from the province of reason to that of faith. Even reason must be restrained from striving after ultimate truth; it is one of the errors of the human intellect that it will not rest in general principles, but must push its investigations deeper. Experience and observation are the only remedies against prejudice and error. Into questions of metaphysics, as commonly understood, Bacon can hardly be said to have entered, but a long line of thinkers have drawn inspiration from him, and it is not without justice that he has been looked upon as the originator and guiding spirit of what is known as the empirical school.

_Bacon's Influence._--It is impossible within our limits to do more than indicate the influence which Bacon's views have had on subsequent thinkers. The most valuable and complete discussion of the subject is contained in T. Fowler's edition of the _Novum Organum_ (introd. s. 14). It is there argued that, both in philosophy and in natural science, Bacon's influence was immediate and lasting. Under the former head it is pointed out (i.) that the fundamental principle of Locke's _Essay_, that all our ideas are product of sensation and reflection, is briefly stated in the first aphorism of the _Novum Organum_, and (ii.) that the whole atmosphere of that treatise is characteristic of the _Essay_. Bacon is, therefore, regarded by many as the father of what is most characteristic in English psychological speculation. As he himself said, he "rang the bell which called the wits together." In the sphere of ethics he is similarly regarded as a forerunner of the empirical method. The spirit of the _De Augmentis_ (bk. vii.) and the inductive method which is discussed in the _Novum Organum_ are at the root of all theories which have constructed a moral code by an inductive examination of human consciousness and the results of actions. Among such theories utilitarianism especially is the natural result of the application to the phenomenon of conduct of the Baconian experimental method. In this connexion, however, it is important to notice that Hobbes, who had been Bacon's secretary, makes no mention of Baconian induction, nor does he in any of his works make any critical reference to Bacon himself. It would, therefore, appear that Bacon's influence was not immediate.

In the sphere of natural science, Bacon's importance is attested by references to his work in the writings of the principal scientists, not only English, but French, German and Italian. Fowler (_op. cit._) has collected from Descartes, Gassendi, S. Sorbiere, Jean Baptiste du Hamel, quotations which show how highly Bacon was regarded by the leaders of the new scientific movement. Sorbiere, who was by no means partial to things English, definitely speaks of him as "celuy qui a le plus puissamment solicite les interests de la physique, et excite le monde a faire des experiences" (_Relation d'un voyage en Angleterre_, Cologne, 1666, pp. 63-64). It was, however, Voltaire and the encyclopaedists who raised Bacon to the pinnacle of his fame in France, and hailed him as "le pere de la philosophie experimentale" (_Lettres sur les Anglois_). Condillac, in the same spirit, says of him, "personne n'a mieux connu que lui la cause de nos erreurs." So the _Encyclopedie_, besides giving a eulogistic article "Baconisme," speaks of him (in d'Alembert's preliminary discourse) as "le plus grand, le plus universel, et le plus eloquent des philosophes." Among other writers, Leibnitz and Huygens give testimony which is the more valuable as being critical. Leibnitz speaks of Bacon as "divini ingenii vir," and, like several other German authors, classes him with Campanella; Huygens refers to his "bonnes methodes." If, however, we are to attach weight to English writers of the latter half of the 17th century, we shall find that one of Bacon's greatest achievements was the impetus given by his _New Atlantis_ to the foundation of the Royal Society (_q.v._). Dr Thomas Sprat (1635-1713), bishop of Rochester and first historian of the society, says that Bacon of all others "had the true imagination of the whole extent" of the enterprise, and that in his works are to be found the best arguments for the experimental method of natural philosophy (_Hist. of the Royal Society_, pp. 35-36, and Thomas Tenison's _Baconiana_, pp. 264-266). In this connexion reference should be made also to Cowley's _Ode to the Royal Society_, and to Dr John Wallis's remarks in Hearne's _Preface to P. Langtoft's Chronicle_ (appendix, num. xi.). Joseph Glanvill, in his _Scepsis Scientifica_ (dedication) says, "Solomon's house in the _New Atlantis_ was a prophetic scheme of the Royal Society"; and Henry Oldenburg (_c._ 1615-1677), one of the first secretaries of the society, speaks of the new eagerness to obtain scientific data as "a work begun by the single care and conduct of the excellent Lord Verulam." Boyle, in whose works there are frequent eulogistic references to Bacon, regarded himself as a disciple and was indeed known as a second Bacon. The predominating influence of Bacon's philosophy is thus clearly established in the generation which succeeded his own. There is abundant evidence to show that in the universities of Oxford and Cambridge (especially the latter) the new spirit had already modified the old curricula. Bacon has frequently been disparaged on the ground that his name is not mentioned by Sir Isaac Newton. It can be shown, however, that Newton was not ignorant of Bacon's works, and Dr Fowler explains his silence with regard to them on three grounds: (1) that Bacon's reputation was so well established that any definite mention was unnecessary, (2) that it was not customary at the time to acknowledge indebtedness to contemporary and recent writers, and (3) that Newton's genius was so strongly mathematical (whereas Bacon's great weakness was in mathematics) that he had no special reason to refer to Bacon's experimental principles.

If the foregoing examples are held sufficient to establish the influence of Bacon on the intellectual development of his immediate successors, it follows that the whole trend of typically English thought, not only in natural science, but also in mental, moral and political philosophy, is the logical fulfilment of Baconian principles. He argued against the tyranny of authority, the vagaries of unfettered imagination and the academic aims of unpractical dialectic; the vital energy and the reasoned optimism of his language entirely outweigh the fact that his contributions to the stock of actual scientific knowledge were practically inconsiderable. It may be freely admitted that in the domain of logic there is nothing in the _Organum_ that has not been more instructively analysed either by Aristotle himself or in modern works; at the same time, there is probably no work which is a better and more stimulating introduction to logical study. Its terse, epigrammatic phrases sink into the fibre of the mind, and are a healthy warning against crude, immature generalization.

While, therefore, it is a profound mistake to regard Bacon as a great constructive philosopher, or even as a lonely pioneer of modern thought, it is quite unfair to speak of him as a trifler. His great work consists in the fact that he summed up the faults which the widening of knowledge had disclosed in medieval thought, and in this sense he stands high among those who were in many parts of 16th-century Europe striving towards a new intellectual activity.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. _Editions._--The classical edition is that of R. L. Ellis, J. Spedding and D. D. Heath, 1st ed., 1857; 2nd ed., 1870 (vols. i.-iii., philosophical writings; iv.-v., translations; vi.-vii., literary and professional works). B. Montagu's edition (17 vols., 1825-1834) is full but unscholarly. An extremely useful reprint (in one volume) of the philosophical works (with a few not strictly philosophical), based on the first Ellis-Spedding edition, was published by J. M. Robertson (London, 1905); besides the original introductions, it contains a useful summary by the editor of the various problems of Bacon's life and thought. Numerous cheap editions have lately been published, _e.g._ in the "World's Classics" (1901), and "New Universal Library" series (1905); Sidney Lee, _English Works of Francis Bacon_ (London, 1905).

Of particular works there are numerous editions in all the chief languages. The following are the most important:--T. Fowler, _Novum Organum_ (Oxford, 1878; ed. 1889), with notes, full introduction on Bacon's philosophy in all its relations, and a most valuable bibliography. This superseded the edition of G. W. Kitchin (Oxford, 1855). The _Essays_ have been edited more than twenty times since 1870; the following editions may be mentioned:--Archbishop Whately (6th ed., 1864); W. Aldis Wright (Lond., 1862); F. Storr and Gibson (Lond., 1886); E. A. Abbott (Lond., 1879); John Buchan (Lond., 1879); A. S. West (Cambridge, 1897); W. Evans (Edinburgh, 1897). A facsimile reprint of the 1st edition was published in New York (1904). _Advancement of Learning_:--W. Aldis [v.03 p.0152] Wright (Camb., 1866; 5th ed., 1900); F. G. Selby (1892-1895); H. Morley (1905); and, with the _New Atlantis_, in the "World's Classics" series (introduction by Prof. T. Case, Lond., 1906). _Wisdom of the Ancients and New Atlantis_, in "Cassell's National Library" (1886 and 1903). G. C. M. Smith, _New Atlantis_ (1900). J. Fuerstenhagen, _Kleinere Schriften_ (Leipzig, 1884).

_Biography._--J. Spedding, _The Life and Letters of Lord Bacon_ (1861), _Life and Times of Francis Bacon_ (1878); also Dr Rawley's _Life_ in the Ellis-Spedding editions, and J. M. Robertson's reprint (above); W. Hepworth Dixon, _Personal History of Lord Bacon_ (Lond., 1861), and _Story of Lord Bacon's Life_ (ib. 1862); John Campbell, _Lives of the Chancellors_ (Lond., 1845), ii. 51; P. Woodward, _Early Life of Lord Bacon_ (1902); T. Fowler, _Francis Bacon_ in "English Philos." series (Lond., 1881); R. W. Church's _Bacon_, in "Men of Letters" series (1884).

_Philosophy._--Beside the introductions in the Ellis-Spedding and T. Fowler editions, and general histories of philosophy, see:--Kuno Fischer, _Fr. Bacon_ (1856, 2nd ed., 1875, Eng. trans. by John Oxenford, Lond., 1857); Ch. de Remusat, _Bacon, sa vie ... et son influence_ (1857, ed. 1858 and 1877); G. L. Craik, _Lord Bacon, his Writings and his Philosophy_ (3 vols., 1846-1847, ed. 1860); A. Dorner, _De Baconis Philosophia_ (Berlin, 1867; London, 1886); J. v. Liebig, _Ueber F. B. v. Verulam_ (Mannheim, 1863); Ad. Lasson, _Ueber B. v. Verulam's wissenschaftliche Principien_ (Berl., 1860); E. H. Boehmer, _Ueber F. B. v. Verulam_ (Erlangen, 1864); Ch. Adam, _Philos. de Francis Bacon_ (Paris, 1890); Barthelemy St Hilaire, _Etude sur Francis Bacon_ (Paris, 1890); R. W. Church, _op. cit._; H. Heussler, _F. Bacon und seine geschichtliche Stellung_ (Breslau, 1889); H. Hoeffding, _History of Modern Philosophy_ (Eng. trans., 1900); J. M. Robertson, _Short History of Freethought_ (Lond., 1906); Sidney Lee, _Great Englishmen of the 16th century_ (Lond., 1904). For the relations between Bacon and Ben Jonson see _The Tale of the Shakespeare Epitaphs by Francis Bacon_ (New York, 1888); for Bacon's poetical gifts see an article in the _Fortnightly Review_ (March 1905).

For the Bacon-Shakespeare controversy see SHAKESPEARE.

(R. AD.; J. M. M.)

[1] See _Nic. Eth._ iv. 3. 3. 1123b.

[2] "I wax now somewhat ancient; one-and-thirty years is a great deal of sand in the hour-glass.... I ever bare a mind (in some middle place that I could discharge) to serve her majesty; not as a man born under Sol, that loveth honour; nor under Jupiter, that loveth business (for the contemplative planet carrieth me away wholly); but as a man born under an excellent sovereign, that deserveth the dedication of all men's abilities.... Again the meanness of my estate doth somewhat move me; for though I cannot accuse myself that I am either prodigal or slothful, yet my health is not to spend, nor my course to get. Lastly, I confess that I have as vast contemplative ends as I have moderate civil ends; for I have taken all knowledge to be my province; and if I could purge it of two sorts of rovers, whereof the one with frivolous disputations, confutations and verbosities, the other with blind experiments and auricular traditions and impostures, hath committed so many spoils, I hope I should bring in industrious observations, grounded conclusions and profitable inventions and discoveries--the best state of that province. This, whether it be curiosity, or vain-glory, or nature, or (if one take it favourably) _philanthropia_, is so fixed in my mind as it cannot be removed. And I do easily see, that place of any reasonable commandment doth bring commandment of more wits than of a man's own.

And if your lordship shall find now, or at any time, that I do seek or affect any place whereunto any that is nearer to your lordship shall be convenient, say then that I am a most dishonest man. And if your lordship will not carry me on,... this I will do, I will sell the inheritance that I have, and purchase some lease of quick revenue, or some office of gain that shall be executed by deputy, and so give over all care of service, and become some sorry bookmaker, or a true pioneer in that mine of truth."--Spedding, _Letters and Life_, i. 108-109.

[3] Spedding, _Letters and Life_, i. 234-235, cf. i. 362. This letter, with those to Puckering or Essex and the queen, i. 240-241, should be compared with what is said of them by Macaulay in his _Essay_ on Bacon, and by Campbell, _Lives_, ii. 287.

[4] See _Letters and Life_, i. 289, ii. 34.

[5] See Macaulay's Essay on Bacon.

[6] The whole story of Essex is given in Spedding's _Letters and Life_. It is vigorously told by J. Bruce in the introduction to his _Correspondence of James VI. with Sir Robert Cecil_ (Camden Society, 1861).

[7] See _Letters and Life_, iv. 177, vi. 38, vii. 116, 117.

[8] In October 1608 he became treasurer of Gray's Inn. The tercentenary was celebrated in 1908.

[9] _Letters and Life_, iv. 380.

[10] _Ibid._ iv. 365-373.

[11] _Ibid._ iv. 375-378.

[12] _Ibid._ v. 81-83.

[13] Not to be confounded with any of those of the same name who held the title of Baron St John of Bletsho (see _Dict. of Nat. Biog._ vol. 1. p. 150 _ad fin._).

[14] _Circa_ 1554-1616; educated at Cambridge; ordained priest 1581; vicar of Ridge, Herts, 1581; rector of Hinton St George, Somerset, 1587; eventually condemned to death at the Taunton Assizes (7th August 1615). The sentence was not carried out, and Peacham is said to have died in gaol (March 1616). See Gardiner's _Hist. of England_, ii. 272-283; _State Trials_, ii. 869; _Calendar of State Papers_ (1603-1606); Hallam's _Constitutional Hist._ i. 343; T. P. Taswell-Langmead, _English Constitutional History_ (5th ed., 1896), p. 425. Nearly all works on constitutional law and history discuss the case.

[15] _Letters and Life_, v. 101

[16] Ibid. v. 121, _n_.

[17] _Ibid_. v. 124.

[18] Macaulay's _Essay_.

[19] Campbell, _Lives_, ii. 344.

[20] The mysterious crimes supposed to be concealed under the obscure details of this case have cast a shadow of vague suspicion on all who were concerned in it. The minute examination of the facts by Spedding (_Letters and Life_, v. 208-347) seems to show that these secret crimes exist nowhere but in the heated imaginations of romantic biographers and historians.

[21] A somewhat similar case is that of the writ _De Rege inconsulto_ brought forward by Bacon. See _Letters and Life_, v. 233-236.

[22] _Ibid_. vi. 6, 7, 13-26, 27-56.

[23] Ibid. vi. 33.

[24] A position which Bacon in some respects approved. See _Essays_, "Of Ambition." "It is counted by some a weakness in princes to have favourites; but it is of all others the best remedy against ambitious great ones; for when the way of pleasuring and displeasuring lieth by the favourite, it is impossible any other should be over great."

[25] _Letters and Life_, vi. 278, 294-296, 313.

[26] _Ibid_. vii. 579-588, analysis of the case by D. D. Heath, who expresses a strong opinion against Bacon's action in the matter.

[27] _Ibid_. vi. 444.

[28] For a full discussion of Bacon's connexion with the monopolies, see Gardiner, _Prince Charles_, &c. ii. 355-373. For his opinion of monopolies in general, see _Letters and Life_, vi. 49.

[29] _Letters and Life_, vii. 213: "I know I have clean hands and a clean heart, and I hope a clean house for friends or servants. But Job himself, or whosoever was the justest judge, by such hunting for matters against him as hath been used against me, may for a time seem foul, specially in a time when greatness is the mark and accusation is the game."

[30] _Ibid._ vii. 215-216.

[31] _Ibid._ vii. 225-226. From the letter to the king (March 25, 1621)--"When I enter into myself, I find not the materials of such a tempest as is comen upon me. I have been (as your majesty knoweth best) never author of any immoderate counsel, but always desired to have things carried _suavibus modis_. I have been no avaricious oppressor of the people. I have been no haughty or intolerable or hateful man in my conversation or carriage. I have inherited no hatred from my father, but am a good patriot born. Whence should this be? For these are the things that use to raise dislikes abroad.... And for the briberies and gifts wherewith I am charged, when the book of hearts shall be opened, I hope I shall not be found to have the troubled fountain of a corrupt heart in a depraved habit of taking rewards to pervert justice, howsoever I may be frail, and partake of the abuse of the times."

[32] _Ibid._ vii. 227, and Gardiner, _Prince Charles_, &c. i. 450.

[33] _Letters and Life_, vii. 236, 238.

[34] _Ibid._ vii. 241.

[35] _Ibid._ vii. 242-244; "It resteth therefore that, without fig-leaves, I do ingenuously confess and acknowledge, that having understood the particulars of the charge, not formally from the House but enough to inform my conscience and memory, I find matter sufficient and full, both to move me to desert the defence, and to move your lordships to condemn and censure me."

[36] _Ibid._ vii. 252-262.

[37] _Ibid._ vii. 261.

[38] _Ibid._ vii. 270.

[39] _Letters and Life_, vii. 235-236: "The first, of bargain and contract for reward to pervert justice, _pendente lite_. The second, where the judge conceives the cause to be at an end, by the information of the party or otherwise, and useth not such diligence as he ought to inquire of it. And the third, where the cause is really ended, and it is _sine fraude_ without relation to any precedent promise.... For the first of them I take myself to be as innocent as any born upon St Innocent's Day, in my heart. For the second, I doubt on some particulars I may be faulty. And for the last, I conceived it to be no fault, but therein I desire to be better informed, that I may be twice penitent, once for the fact and again for the error."

[40] _Ibid._ vii. 242.

[41] _Ibid._ vii. 244: "Neither will your lordships forget that there are _vitia temporis_ as well as _vitia hominis_, and that the beginning of reformations hath the contrary power to the pool of Bethesda, for that had strength to cure only him that was first cast in, and this hath commonly strength to hurt him only that is first cast in."

[42] See, among many other passages, _Essays_, "Of Great Place ": "For corruptions do not only bind thine own hands or thy servant's hands from taking, but bind the hands of suitors also from offering; for integrity used doth the one; but integrity professed, and with a manifest detestation of bribery, doth the other; and avoid not only the fault but the suspicion."

[43] Cf. _Letters and Life_, vii. 560: "I was the justest judge that was in England these fifty years; but it was the justest censure in Parliament that was these two hundred years."

[44] Or on the ground that there was a distinct rule forbidding chancellors and the like officials to take presents. This does not seem to have been the case, if we may judge from what Bacon says _Letters and Life_, vii. 233.

[45] Not only do the cases, so far as they are known, support Bacon's plea of innocence, but it is remarkable that no attempt at a reversal of any of his numerous decrees appears to have been successful. Had his decrees been wilful perversions of justice, it is scarcely conceivable that some of them should not have been overturned. See _Letters and Life_, vii. 555-562.

[46] The peculiarities of Bacon's style were noticed very early by his contemporaries. (See _Letters and Life_, i. 268.) Raleigh and Jonson have both recorded their opinions of it, but no one has characterized it more happily than his friend, Sir Tobie Matthews, "A man so rare in knowledge, of so many several kinds, endued with the facility and felicity of expressing it all in so elegant, significant, so abundant, and yet so choice and ravishing a way of words, of metaphors, of allusions, as perhaps the world hath not seen since it was a world."--"Address to the Reader" prefixed to _Collection of English Letters_ (1660).

[47] The division of the sciences adopted in the great French _Encyclopedie_ was founded upon this classification of Bacon's. See Diderot's _Prospectus (Oeuvres_, iii.) and d'Alembert's _Discours (Oeuvres_, i.) The scheme should be compared with later attempts of the same nature by Ampere, Cournot, Comte and Herbert Spencer.

[48] See also "Letter to Fulgentio," _Letters and Life_, vii. 533.

[49] _Fil. Lab._; _Cog. et Visa._ i.; cf. Pref. to _Ins. Mag._

[50] _Val. Ter._ 232; cf. _N. O._ i. 124.

[51] _Letters_, i. 123.

[52] _N. O._ i. 116.

[53] _Fil. Lab._ 5; cf. _N. O._ i. 81; _Val. Ter._ (_Works_, iii. 235); _Advancement_, bk. i. (_Works_, iii. 294).

[54] _Fil. Lab._ 5; cf. _N. O._ i. 81; _Val. Ter._ (_Works_, iii. 222-233); _New Atlantis (Works_, iii. 156).

[55] _N. O._ i. 116.

[56] _Ibid._ i. 124.

[57] _Ibid._ i. 6.

[58] The word _Idola_ is manifestly borrowed from Plato. It is used twice in connexion with the Platonic Ideas (_N. O._ i. 23, 124) and is contrasted with them as the false appearance. The [Greek: eidolon] with Plato is the fleeting, transient image of the real thing, and the passage evidently referred to by Bacon is that in the _Rep._ vii. 516 A, [Greek: kai proton men tas skias an rhaista kathoroie, kai meta touto en tois hudasi ta te ton anthropon kai ta ton allon eidola, husteron de auta]. It is explained well in the _Advancement_, bk. i. (_Works_, iii. 287). (For valuable notes on the _Idola_, see T. Fowler's _Nov. Org._ i. 38 notes; especially for a comparison of the _Idola_ with Roger Bacon's _Offendicula_.)

[59] _N. O._ i. 58.

[60] _N. O._ i. 79, 80, 98, 108.

[61] On the meaning of the word _form_ in Bacon's theory see also Fowler's _N. O._ introd. s. 8.

[62] _N. O._ ii. 1.

[63] This _better known in the order of nature_ is nowhere satisfactorily explained by Bacon. Like his classification of causes, and in some degree his notion of form itself, it comes from Aristotle. See _An. Post._ 71 b 33; _Topic_, 141 b 5; _Eth. Nic._ 1095 a 30. It should be observed that many writers maintain that the phrase should be _notiora natura_; others, _notiora naturae_. See Fowler's _N. O._ p. 199 note.

[64] _N. O._ ii. 17.

[65] _Ibid._ i. 51.

[66] _Ibid._ i. 75.

[67] _Ibid._ ii. 2.

[68] _Valerius Terminus_, iii. 228-229.

[69] Cf. _N. O._ ii. 27. Bacon nowhere enters upon the questions of how such a science is to be constructed, and how it can be expected to possess an independent method while it remains the mere receptacle for the generalizations of the several sciences, and consequently has a content which varies with their progress. His whole conception of _Prima Philosophia_ should be compared with such a modern work as the _First Principles_ of Herbert Spencer.

[70] It is to be noticed that this scale of nature corresponds with the scale of ascending axioms.

[71] Cf. also for motions, _N. O._ ii. 48.

[72] The knowledge of final causes does not lead to works, and the consideration of them must be rigidly excluded from physics. Yet there is no opposition between the physical and final causes; in ultimate resort the mind is compelled to think the universe as the work of reason, to refer facts to God and Providence. The idea of final cause is also fruitful in sciences which have to do with human action. (Cf. _De Aug._ iii. cc. 4, 5; _Nov. Org._ i. 48, ii. 2.)

[73] _De Aug._ iii. 4. In the _Advancement (Works_, iii. 355) it is distinctly said that they are not to be inquired into. One can hardly see how the Baconian method could have applied to concrete substances.

[74] Thus the last step in the theoretical analysis gives the first means for the practical operation. Cf. Aristotle, _Eth. Nic._ iii. 3. 12, [Greek: to eschaton en tei analusei proton einai en tei genesei]. Cf. also _Nov. Org._ i. 103.

[75] _Cogitationes_ (_Works_, iii. 187).

[76] _N. O._ ii. 10.

[77] Pref. to _Instaur._ Cf. _Valerius Term._ (_Works_, iii. 224), and _N. O._ i. 68, 124.

[78] Pref. to _Inst._

[79] Bacon's summary is valuable. "In the whole of the process which leads from the senses and objects to axioms and conclusions, the demonstrations which we use are deceptive and incompetent. The process consists of four parts, and has as many faults. In the first place, the impressions of the sense itself are faulty, for the sense both fails us and deceives us. But its shortcomings are to be supplied and its deceptions to be corrected. Secondly, notions are all drawn from the impressions of the sense, and are indefinite and confused, whereas they should be definite and distinctly bounded. Thirdly, the induction is amiss which infers the principles of sciences by simple enumeration, and does not, as it ought, employ exclusions and solutions (or separations) of nature. Lastly, that method of discovery and proof according to which the most general principles are first established, and then intermediate axioms are tried and proved by them, is the parent of error and the curse of all science."--_N. O._ i. 69.

[80] _N. O._ i. 105.

[81] _Ibid._, i. 104; cf. i. 19-26.

[82] This extract gives an answer to the objection sometimes raised that Bacon is not original in his theory of induction. He certainly admits that Plato has used a method somewhat akin to his own; but it has frequently been contended that his induction is nothing more than the [Greek: epagoge] of Aristotle (see Remusat's _Bacon, &c._, pp. 310-315, and for a criticism, Waddington, _Essais de Logique_, p. 261. sqq.) This seems a mistake. Bacon did not understand by induction the argument from particulars to a general proposition; he looked upon the exclusion and rejection, or upon _elimination_, as the essence of induction. To this process he was led by his doctrine of forms, of which it is the necessary consequence; it is the infallible result of his view of science and its problem, and is as original as that is. Whoever accepts Bacon's doctrine of cause must accept at the same time his theory of the way in which the cause may be sifted out from among the phenomena. It is evident that the Socratic search for the essence by an analysis of instances--an induction ending in a definition--has a strong resemblance to the Baconian inductive method.

[83] _N. O._ i. 105.

[84] That is to say, differing in nothing save the absence of the nature under investigation.

[85] _Distrib. Op._ (_Works_, iv. 28); _Parasceve_ (_ibid._ 251, 252, 255-256); _Descrip. Glob. Intel._ ch. 3.

[86] _Works_, ii. 16; cf. _N. O._ i. 130.

[87] A Barnabite monk, professor of mathematics and philosophy at Annecy.

[88] _Letters and Life_, vii. 377.

[89] For a full discussion of Bacon's relation to his predecessors and contemporaries, see Fowler's _N. O._ introd. s. 13.

[90] Cf. what Bacon says, _N. O._ i. 130.

[91] Brewster, _Life of Newton_ (1855) (see particularly vol. ii. 403, 405); Lasson, _Ueber Bacon von Verulam's wissenschaftliche Principien_ (1860); Liebig, _Ueber Francis Bacon von Verulam_, &c. (1863). Although Liebig points out how little science proceeds according to Bacon's rules, yet his other criticisms seem of extremely little value. In a very offensive and quite unjustifiable tone, which is severely commented on by Sigwart and Fischer, he attacks the Baconian methods and its results. These results he claims to find in the _Sylva Sylvarum_, entirely ignoring what Bacon himself has said of the nature of that work (_N. O._ i. 117; cf. Rawley's Pref. to the _S. S._), and thus putting a false interpretation on the experiments there noted. It is not surprising that he should detect many flaws, but he never fails to exaggerate an error, and seems sometimes completely to miss the point of what Bacon says. (See particularly his remarks on _S. S._ 33, 336.) The method he explains in such a way as to show he has not a glimpse of its true nature. He brings against Bacon, of all men, the accusations of making induction start from the undetermined perceptions of the senses, of using imagination, and of putting a quite arbitrary interpretation on phenomena. He crowns his criticism by expounding what he considers to be the true scientific method, which, as has been pointed put by Fischer, is simply that Baconian doctrine against which his attack ought to have been directed. (See his account of the method, _Ueber Bacon_, 47-49; K. Fischer, _Bacon_, pp. 499-502.)

[92] Mill, _Logic_, ii. pp. 115, 116, 329, 330.

[93] Whewell, _Phil. of Ind. Sc._ ii. 399, 402-403; Ellis, _Int. to Bacon's Works_, i. 39, 61; Brewster, _Newton_, ii. 404; Jevons, _Princ. of Science_ ii. 220. A severe judgment on Bacon's method is given in Duehring's able but one-sided _Kritische Gesch. d. Phil._, in which the merits of Roger Bacon are brought prominently forward.

[94] Although it must be admitted that the Baconian method is fairly open to the above-mentioned objections, it is curious and significant that Bacon was not thoroughly ignorant of them, but with deliberate consciousness preferred his own method. We do not think, indeed, that the _notiones_ of which he speaks in any way correspond to what Whewell and Ellis would call "conceptions or ideas furnished by the mind of the thinker"; nor do we imagine that Bacon would have admitted these as necessary elements in the inductive process. But he was certainly not ignorant of what may be called a deductive method, and of a kind of hypothesis. This is clear from the use he makes of the _Vindemiatio_, from certain hints as to the testing of axioms, from his admission of the syllogism into physical reasoning, and from what he calls _Experientia Literata_. The function of the _Vindemiatio_ has been already pointed out; with regard to axioms, he says (_N. O._ i. 106), "In establishing axioms by this kind of induction, we must also examine and try whether the axiom so established be framed to the measure of these particulars, from which it is derived, or whether it be larger or wider. And if it be larger and wider, we must observe whether, by indicating to us new particulars, it confirm that wideness and largeness as by a collateral security, that we may not either stick fast in things already known, or loosely grasp at shadows and abstract forms, not at things solid and realized in matter." (Cf. also the passage from _Valerius Terminus_, quoted in Ellis's note on the above aphorism.) Of the syllogism he says, "I do not propose to give up the syllogism altogether. S. is incompetent for the principal things rather than useless for the generality. In the mathematics there is no reason why it should not be employed. It is the flux of matter and the inconstancy of the physical body which requires induction, that thereby it may be fixed as it were, and allow the formation of notions well defined. In physics you wisely note, and therein I agree with you, that after the notions of the first class and the axioms concerning them have been by induction well made out and defined, syllogism may be applied safely; only it must be restrained from leaping at once to the most general notions, and progress must be made through a fit succession of steps."--("Letter to Baranzano," _Letters and Life_, vii. 377). And with this may be compared what he says of mathematics (_Nov. Org._ ii. 8; _Parasceve_, vii.). In his account of _Experientia Literata_ (_De Aug._ v. 2) he comes very near to the modern mode of experimental research. It is, he says, the procedure from one experiment to another, and it is not a science but an art or learned sagacity (resembling in this Aristotle's [Greek: anchinoia]), which may, however, be enlightened by the precepts of the _Interpretatio_. Eight varieties of such experiments are enumerated, and a comparison is drawn between this and the inductive method; "though the rational method of inquiry by the Organon promises far greater things in the end, yet this sagacity, proceeding by learned experience, will in the meantime present mankind with a number of inventions which lie near at hand." (Cf. _N. O._ i. 103.)

[95] See the vigorous passage in Herschel, _Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy_, s. 105; cf. s. 96 of the same work.

[96] Bacon himself seems to anticipate that the progress of science would of itself render his method antiquated (_Nov. Org._ i. 130).

[97] _Nov. Org._ i. 127.