Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, "French Literature" to "Frost, William"

Chapter XI: Front Matter (11)

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Among later works based on these original materials the first place
belongs to general histories. In French Louis Blanc's _Histoire de la
Revolution_ (12 vols., Paris, 1847-1862), and Michelet's _Histoire de
la Revolution Francaise_ (9 vols., Paris, 1847-1853), are the most
elaborate of the older works. Michelet's book is marked by great
eloquence and power. In H. Taine's _Origines de la France
contemporaine_ (Paris, 1876-1894) three volumes are devoted to the
Revolution. They show exceptional talent and industry, but their value
is impaired by the spirit of system and by strong prepossessions. F.
A. M. Mignet's _Histoire de la Revolution Francaise_ (2 vols., Paris,
1861), short and devoid of literary charm, has the merits of learning
and judgment and is still useful. F. A. Aulard's _Histoire politique
de la Revolution Francaise_ (Paris, 1901) is a most valuable precis of
political history, based on deep knowledge and lucidly set forth,
although not free from bias. The volume on the Revolution in Lavisse
and Rambaud's _Histoire generale de l'Europe_ (Paris, 1896) is the
work of distinguished scholars using the latest information. In
English, general histories of the Revolution are few. Carlyle's famous
work, published in 1837, is more of a prose epic than a history,
omitting all detail which would not heighten the imaginative effect
and tinged by all the favourite ideas of the author. Some fifty years
later H. M. Stephens published the first (1886) and second (1892)
volumes of a _History of the French Revolution_. They are marked by
solid learning and contain much information. Volume viii. of the
_Cambridge Modern History_, published in 1904, contains a general
survey of the Revolution.

The most notable German work is H. von Sybel's _Geschichte der
Revolutionszeit_ (5 vols., Stuttgart, 1853-1879). It is strongest in
those carts which relate to international affairs and foreign policy.
There is an English translation.

None of the general histories of the Revolution above named is really
satisfactory. The immense mass of material has not yet been thoroughly
sifted; and the passions of that age still disturb the judgment of the
historian. More successful have been the attempts to treat particular
aspects of the Revolution.

The foreign relations of France during the Revolution have been most
ably unravelled by A. Sorel in _L'Europe et la Revolution Francaise_
(8 vols., Paris, 1885-1904) carrying the story down to the settlement
of Vienna. Five volumes cover the years 1789-1799.

The financial history of the Revolution has been traced by C. Gomel,
_Histoire financiere de l'Assemblee Constituante_ (2 vols., Paris,
1897), and R. Stourm, _Les Finances de l'Ancien Regime et de la
Revolution_ (2 vols., Paris, 1885).

The relations of Church and State are sketched in E. Pressense's
_L'Eglise et la Revolution Francaise_ (Paris, 1889).

The general legislation of the period has been discussed by Ph.
Sagnac, _La Legislation civile de la Revolution Francaise_ (Paris,
1898). The best work upon the social life of the period is the
_Histoire de la societe francaise sous la Revolution_, by E. and J. de
Goncourt (Paris, 1889). For military history see A. Duruy, _L'Armee
royale en 1789_ (Paris, 1888); E. de Hauterive, _L'Armee sous la
Revolution, 1789-1794_ (Paris, 1894); A. Chuquet, _Les Guerres de la
Revolution_ (Paris, 1886, &c.). See also the memoirs and biographies
of the distinguished soldiers of the Republic and Empire, too numerous
for citation here.

Modern lives of the principal actors in the Revolution are numerous.
Among the most important are _Memoires de Mirabeau_, by L. de Montigny
(Paris, 1834); _Les Mirabeau_, by L. de Lomenie (Paris, 1889-1891); H.
L. de Lanzac de Laborie's _Jean Joseph Mounier_ (Paris, 1889); B.
Mallet's _Mallet du Pan and the French Revolution_ (London, 1902);
Robinet's _Danton_ (Paris, 1889); Hamel's _Histoire de Robespierre_
(Paris, 1865-1867) and _Histoire de St-Just_ (2 vols., Brussels,
1860); A. Bigeon, _Sieyes_ (Paris, 1893); _Memoirs of Carnot_, by his
son (2 vols., Paris, 1861-1864).

For fuller information see M. Tourneux, _Les Sources bibliographiques
de l'histoire de la Revolution Francaise_ (Paris, 1898, etc.), and
_Bibliographie de l'histoire de Paris pendant la Revolution_ (Paris,
1890, etc.). (F. C. M.)

_French Republican Calendar._--Among the changes made during the Revolution was the substitution of a new calendar, usually called the revolutionary or republican calendar, for the prevailing Gregorian system. Something of the sort had been suggested in 1785 by a certain Riboud, and a definite scheme had been promulgated by Pierre Sylvain Marechal (1750-1803) in his _Almanach des honnetes gens_ (1788). The objects which the advocates of a new calendar had in view were to strike a blow at the clergy and to divorce all calculations of time from the Christian associations with which they were loaded, in short, to abolish the Christian year; and enthusiasts were already speaking of "the first year of liberty" and "the first year of the republic" when the national convention took up the matter in 1793. The business of drawing up the new calendar was entrusted to the president of the committee of public instruction, Charles Gilbert Romme (1750-1795), who was aided in the work by the mathematicians Gaspard Monge and Joseph Louis Lagrange, the poet Fabre d'Eglantine and others. The result of their labours was submitted to the convention in September; it was accepted, and the new calendar became law on the 5th of October 1793. The new arrangement was regarded as beginning on the 22nd of September 1792, this day being chosen because on it the republic was proclaimed and because it was in this year the day of the autumnal equinox.

By the new calendar the year of 365 days was divided into twelve months of thirty days each, every month being divided into three periods of ten days, each of which were called _decades_, and the tenth, or last, day of each decade being a day of rest. It was also proposed to divide the day on the decimal system, but this arrangement was found to be highly inconvenient and it was never put into practice. Five days of the 365 still remained to be dealt with, and these were set aside for national festivals and holidays and were called _Sans-culottides_. They were to fall at the end of the year, i.e. on the five days between the 17th and the 21st of September inclusive, and were called the festivals of virtue, of genius, of labour, of opinion and of rewards. A similar course was adopted with regard to the extra day which occurred once in every four years, but the first of these was to fall in the year III., i.e. in 1795, and not in 1796, the leap year in the Gregorian calendar. This day was set apart for the festival of the Revolution and was to be the last of the _Sans-culottides_. Each period of four years was to be called a _Franciade_.

+----------------------------------+----------------+---------------+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+---------------+
| AN II. | AN III. | AN IV. | AN V. | AN VI. | AN VII. | AN VIII. | AN IX. |
| 1793-1794 | 1794-1795. | 1795-1796. | 1796-1797. | 1797-1798. | 1798-1799. | 1799-1800. | 1800-1801. |
+-----------------+----------------+----------------+---------------+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+---------------+
| 1 Vendemiaire | 22 Sept. 1793 | 22 Sept. 1794 | 23 Sept. 1795 | 22 Sept. 1796| 22 Sept. 1797 | 22 Sept. 1798 | 23 Sept. 1799 | 23 Sept. 1800 |
| 1 Brumaire | 22 Oct. " | 22 Oct. " | 23 Oct. " | 22 Oct. " | 22 Oct. " | 22 Oct. " | 23 Oct. " | 23 Oct. " |
| 1 Frimaire | 21 Nov. " | 21 Nov. " | 22 Nov. " | 21 Nov. " | 21 Nov. " | 21 Nov. " | 22 Nov. " | 22 Nov. " |
| 1 Nivose | 21 Dec. " | 21 Dec. " | 22 Dec. " | 21 Dec. " | 21 Dec. " | 21 Dec. " | 22 Dec. " | 22 Dec. " |
| 1 Pluviose | 20 Janv. 1794 | 20 Janv. 1795 | 21 Janv. 1796 | 20 Janv. 1797| 20 Janv. 1798 | 20 Janv. 1799 | 21 Janv. 1800 | 21 Janv. 1801 |
| 1 Ventose | 19 Fevr. " | 19 Fevr. " | 20 Fevr. " | 19 Fevr. " | 19 Fev. " | 19 Fev. " | 20 Fev. " | 20 Fev. " |
| 1 Germinal | 21 Mars " | 21 Mars " | 21 Mars " | 21 Mars " | 1 Mars " | 21 Mars " | 22 Mars " | 22 Mars " |
| 1 Floreal | 20 Avr. " | 20 Avr. " | 20 Avr. " | 20 Avr. " | 20 Avr. " | 20 Avr. " | 21 Avr. " | 21 Avr. " |
| 1 Prairial | 20 Mai " | 20 Mai " | 20 Mai " | 20 Mai " | 20 Mai " | 20 Mai " | 21 Mai " | 21 Mai " |
| 1 Messidor | 19 Juin " | 19 Juin " | 19 Juin " | 19 Juin " | 19 Juin " | 19 Juin " | 20 Juin " | 20 Juin " |
| 1 Thermidor | 19 Juil. " | 19 Juil. " | 19 Juil. " | 19 Juil. " | 19 Juil. " | 19 Juil. " | 20 Juil. " | 20 Juil. " |
| 1 Fructidor | 18 Aout " | 18 Aout " | 18 Aout " | 18 Aout " | 18 Aout " | 18 Aout " | 19 Aout " | 19 Aout " |
+-----------------+----------------+----------------+---------------+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+---------------+
|1 Sans-culottides| 17 Sept. 1794 | 17 Sept. 1795 | 17 Sept. 1796 | 17 Sept. 1797| 17 Sept. 1798 | 17 Sept. 1799 | 18 Sept. 1800 | 18 Sept. 1801 |
|6 " | | 22 " " | | | | 22 " " | | |
+-----------------+----------------+----------------+---------------+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+---------------+

Some discussion took place about the nomenclature of the new divisions of time. Eventually this work was entrusted to Fabre d'Eglantine, who gave to each month a name taken from some seasonal event therein. Beginning with the new year on the 22nd of September the autumn months were _Vendemiaire_, the month of vintage, _Brumaire_, the months of fog, and _Frimaire_, the month of frost. The winter months were _Nivose_, the snowy, _Pluviose_, the rainy, and _Ventose_, the windy month; then followed the spring months, _Germinal_, the month of buds, _Floreal_, the month of flowers, and _Prairial_, the month of meadows; and lastly the summer months, _Messidor_, the month of reaping, _Thermidor_, the month of heat, and _Fructidor_, the month of fruit. To the days Fabre d'Eglantine gave names which retained the idea of their numerical order, calling them Primedi, Duodi, &c., the last day of the ten, the day of rest, being named Decadi. The new order was soon in force in France and the new method was employed in all public documents, but it did not last many years. In September 1805 it was decided to restore the Gregorian calendar, and the republican one was officially discontinued on the 1st of January 1806.

It will easily be seen that the connecting link between the old and
the new calendars is very slight indeed and that the expression of a
date in one calendar in terms of the other is a matter of some
difficulty. A simple method of doing this, however, is afforded by the
table on the preceding page, which is taken from the article by J.
Dubourdieu in _La Grande Encyclopedie_.

Thus Robespierre was executed on 10 Thermidor An II., i.e. the 28th of
July 1794. The insurrection of 12 Germinal An III. took place on the
1st of April 1795. The famous 18 Brumaire An VIII. fell on the 9th of
November 1799, and the _coup d'etat_ of 18 Fructidor An V. on the 4th
of September 1797.

For a complete concordance of the Gregorian and the republican
calendars see Stokvis, _Manuel d'histoire_, tome iii. (Leiden, 1889);
also G. Villain, "Le Calendrier republicain," in _La Revolution
Francaise_ for 1884-1885. (A. W. H.*)

FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS (1792-1800), the general name for the first part of the series of French wars which went on continuously, except for some local and temporary cessations of hostilities, from the declaration of war against Britain in 1792 to the final overthrow of Napoleon in 1815. The most important of these cessations--viz. the peace of 1801-1803--closes the "Revolutionary" and opens the "Napoleonic" era of land warfare, for which see NAPOLEONIC CAMPAIGNS, PENINSULAR WAR and WATERLOO CAMPAIGN. The naval history of the period is divided somewhat differently; the first period, treated below, is 1792-1799; for the second, 1799-1815, see NAPOLEONIC CAMPAIGNS.

France declared war on Austria on the 20th of April 1792. But Prussia and other powers had allied themselves with Austria in view of war, and it was against a coalition and not a single power that France found herself pitted, at the moment when the "emigration," the ferment of the Revolution, and want of material and of funds had thoroughly disorganized her army. The first engagements were singularly disgraceful. Near Lille the French soldiers fled at sight of the Austrian outposts, crying _Nous sommes trahis_, and murdered their general (April 29). The commanders-in-chief of the armies that were formed became one after another "suspects"; and before a serious action had been fought, the three armies of Rochambeau, Lafayette and Luckner had resolved themselves into two commanded by Dumouriez and Kellermann. Thus the disciplined soldiers of the Allies had apparently good reason to consider the campaign before them a military promenade. On the Rhine, a combined army of Prussians, Austrians, Hessians and _emigres_ under the duke of Brunswick was formed for the invasion of France, flanked by two smaller armies on its right and left, all three being under the supreme command of the king of Prussia. In the Netherlands the Austrians were to besiege Lille, and in the south the Piedmontese also took the field. The first step, taken against Brunswick's advice, was the issue (July 25) of a proclamation which, couched in terms in the last degree offensive to the French nation, generated the spirit that was afterwards to find expression in the "armed nation" of 1793-4, and sealed the fate of Louis XVI. The duke, who was a model sovereign in his own principality, sympathized with the constitutional side of the Revolution, while as a soldier he had no confidence in the success of the enterprise. After completing its preparations in the leisurely manner of the previous generation, his army crossed the French frontier on the 19th of August. Longwy was easily captured; and the Allies slowly marched on to Verdun, which was more indefensible even than Longwy. The commandant, Colonel Beaurepaire, shot himself in despair, and the place surrendered on the 3rd of September. Brunswick now began his march on Paris and approached the defiles of the Argonne. But Dumouriez, who had been training his raw troops at Valenciennes in constant small engagements, with the purpose of invading Belgium, now threw himself into the Argonne by a rapid and daring flank march, almost under the eyes of the Prussian advanced guard, and barred the Paris road, summoning Kellermann to his assistance from Metz. The latter moved but slowly, and before he arrived the northern part of the line of defence had been forced. Dumouriez, undaunted, changed front so as to face north, with his right wing on the Argonne and his left stretching towards Chalons, and in this position Kellermann joined him at St Menehould on the 19th of September.

Valmy.

Brunswick meanwhile had passed the northern defiles and had then swung round to cut off Dumouriez from Chalons. At the moment when the Prussian manoeuvre was nearly completed, Kellermann, commanding in Dumouriez's momentary absence, advanced his left wing and took up a position between St Menehould and Valmy. The result was the world-renowned Cannonade of Valmy (September 20, 1792). Kellermann's infantry, nearly all regulars, stood steady. The French artillery justified its reputation as the best in Europe, and eventually, with no more than a half-hearted infantry attack, the duke broke off the action and retired. This trivial engagement was the turning-point of the campaign and a landmark in the world's history. Ten days later, without firing another shot, the invading army began its retreat. Dumouriez's pursuit was not seriously pressed; he occupied himself chiefly with a series of subtle and curious negotiations which, with the general advance of the French troops, brought about the complete withdrawal of the enemy from the soil of France.

Jemappes.

Meanwhile, the French forces in the south had driven back the Piedmontese and had conquered Savoy and Nice. Another French success was the daring expedition into Germany made by Custine from Alsace. Custine captured Mainz itself on the 21st of October and penetrated as far as Frankfurt. In the north the Austrian siege of Lille had completely failed, and Dumouriez now resumed his interrupted scheme for the invasion of the Netherlands. His forward movement, made as it was late in the season, surprised the Austrians, and he disposed of enormously superior forces. On the 6th of November he won the first great victory of the war at Jemappes near Mons and, this time advancing boldly, he overran the whole country from Namur to Antwerp within a month.

Such was the prelude of what is called the "Great War" in England and the "Epopee" in France. Before going further it is necessary to summarize the special features of the French army--in leadership, discipline, tactics, organization and movement--which made these campaigns the archetype of modern warfare.

At the outbreak of the Revolution the French army, like other armies
in Europe, was a "voluntary" long-service army, augmented to some
extent in war by drafts of militia.

The French army, 1792-1796.

One of the first problems that the Constituent Assembly took upon
itself to solve was the nationalization of this strictly royal and
professional force, and as early as October 1789 the word
"Conscription" was heard in its debates. But it was decreed
nevertheless that free enlistment alone befitted a free people, and
the regular army was left unaltered in form. However, a National Guard
came into existence side by side with it, and the history of French
army organization in the next few years is the history of the fusion
of these two elements. The first step, as regards the regular army,
was the abolition of proprietary rights, the serial numbering of
regiments throughout the Army, and the disbandment of the _Maison du
roi_. The next was the promotion of deserving soldiers to fill the
numerous vacancies caused by the emigration. Along with these,
however, there came to the surface many incompetent leaders,
favourites in the political clubs of Paris, &c., and the old strict
discipline became impossible owing to the frequent intervention of the
civil authorities in matters affecting it, the denunciation of
generals, and especially the wild words and wild behaviour of
"Volunteer" (embodied national guard) battalions.

When war came, it was soon found that the regulars had fallen too low
in numbers and that the national guard demanded too high pay, to
admit of developing the expected field strength. Arms, discipline,
training alike were wanting to the new levies, and the repulse of
Brunswick was effected by manoeuvring and fighting on the old lines
and chiefly with the old army. The cry of _La patrie en danger_, after
giving, at the crisis, the highest moral support to the troops in the
front, dwindled away after victory, and the French government
contented itself with the half-measures that had, apparently, sufficed
to avert the peril. More, when the armies went into winter quarters,
the Volunteers claimed leave of absence and went home.

But in the spring of 1793, confronted by a far more serious peril, the
government took strong measures. Universal liability was asserted, and
passed into law. Yet even now whole classes obtained exemption and the
right of substitution as usual forced the burden of service on the
poorer classes, so that of the 100,000 men called on for the regular
army and 200,000 for the Volunteers, only some 180,000 were actually
raised. Desertion, generally regarded as the curse of professional
armies, became a conspicuous vice of the defenders of the Republic,
except at moments when a supreme crisis called forth supreme
devotion--moments which naturally were more or less prolonged in
proportion to the gravity of the situation. Thus, while it almost
disappeared in the great effort of 1793-1794, when the armies
sustained bloody reverses in distant wars of conquest, as in 1799, it
promptly rose again to an alarming height.

Universal service of the "Amalgam."

While this unsatisfactory general levy was being made, defeats,
defections and invasion in earnest came in rapid succession, and to
deal with the almost desperate emergency, the ruthless Committee of
Public Safety sprang into existence. "The levy is to be universal.
Unmarried citizens and widowers without children of ages from 18 to 25
are to be called up first," and 450,000 recruits were immediately
obtained by this single act. The complete amalgamation of the regular
and volunteer units was decided upon. The white uniforms of the line
gave place to the blue of the National Guard in all arms and services.
The titles of officers were changed, and in fact every relic of the
old regime, save the inherited solidity of the old regular battalions,
was swept away. This rough combination of line and volunteers
therefore--for the "Amalgam" was not officially begun until 1794--must
be understood when we refer to the French army of Hondschoote or of
Wattignies. It contained, by reason of its universality and also
because men were better off in the army than out of it--if they stayed
at home they went in daily fear of denunciation and the
guillotine--the best elements of the French nation. To some extent at
any rate the political _arrivistes_ had been weeded out, and though
the informer, here as elsewhere, struck unseen blows, the mass of the
army gradually evolved its true leaders and obeyed them. It was,
therefore, an army of individual citizen-soldiers of the best type,
welded by the enemy's fire, and conscious of its own solidarity in the
midst of the Revolutionary chaos.

After 1794 the system underwent but little radical change until the
end of the Revolutionary period. Its regiments grew in military value
month by month and attained their highest level in the great campaign
of 1796. In 1795 the French forces (now all styled National Guard)
consisted of 531,000 men, of whom 323,000 were infantry (100
3-battalion demi-brigades), 97,000 light infantry (30 demi-brigades),
29,000 artillery, 20,000 engineers and 59,000 cavalry. This novel army
developed novel fighting methods, above all in the infantry. This arm
had just received a new drill-book, as the result of a prolonged
controversy (see INFANTRY) between the advocates of "lines" and
"columns," and this drill-book, while retaining the principle of the
line, set controversy at rest by admitting battalion columns of
attack, and movements at the "quick" (100-120 paces to the minute)
instead of at the "slow" march (76). On these two prescriptions,
ignoring the rest, the practical troop leaders built up the new
tactics little by little, and almost unconsciously. The process of
evolution cannot be stated exactly, for the officers learned to use
and even to invent now one form, now another, according to ground and
circumstances. But the main stream of progress is easily
distinguishable.

Tactics.

The earlier battles were fought more or less according to the
drill-book, partly in line for fire action, partly in column for the
bayonet attack. But line movements required the most accurate drill,
and what was attainable after years of practice with regulars moving
at the slow march was wholly impossible for new levies moving at 120
paces to the minute. When, therefore, the line marched off, it broke
up into a shapeless swarm of individual firers. This was the form, if
form it can be called, of the tactics of 1793--"horde-tactics," as
they have quite justly been called--and a few such experiences as that
of Hondschoote sufficed to suggest the need of a remedy. This was
found in keeping as many troops as possible out of the firing line.
From 1794 onwards the latter becomes thinner and thinner, and instead
of the drill-book form, with half the army firing in line (practically
in hordes) and the other half in support in columns, we find the rear
lines becoming more and more important and numerous, till at last the
fire of the leading line (skirmishers) becomes insignificant, and the
decision rests with the bayonets of the closed masses in rear. Indeed,
the latter often used mixed line and column formations, which enabled
them not only to charge, but to fire close-order volleys--absolutely
regardless of the skirmishers in front. In other words, the bravest
and coolest marksmen were let loose to do what damage they could, and
the rest, massed in close order, were kept under the control of their
officers and only exposed to the dissolving influence of the fight
when the moment arrived to deliver, whether by fire or by shock, the
decisive blow.

Cavalry. Artillery. Engineers.

The cavalry underwent little change in its organization and tactics,
which remained as in the drill-books founded on Frederick's practice.
But except in the case of the hussars, who were chiefly Alsatians, it
was thoroughly disorganized by the emigration or execution of the
nobles who had officered it, and for long it was incapable of facing
the hostile squadrons in the open. Still, its elements were good, it
was fairly well trained, and mounted, and not overwhelmed with
national guard drafts, and like the other arms it duly evolved and
obeyed new leaders.

In artillery matters this period, 1792-1796, marks an important
progress, due above all to Gribeauval (q.v.) and the two du Teils,
Jean Pierre (1722-1794) and Jean (1733-1820) who were Napoleon's
instructors. The change was chiefly in organization and equipment--the
great tactical development of the arm was not to come until the time
of the _Grande Armee_--and may be summarized as the transition from
battalion guns and reserve artillery to batteries of "horse and
field."

The engineers, like the artillery, were a technical and non-noble
corps. They escaped, therefore, most of the troubles of the
Revolution--indeed the artillery and engineer officers, Napoleon and
Carnot amongst them, were conspicuous in the political regeneration of
France--and the engineers carried on with little change the traditions
of Vauban and Cormontaingne (see FORTIFICATION AND SIEGECRAFT). Both
these corps were, after the Revolution as before it, the best in
Europe, other armies admitting their superiority and following their
precepts.

In all this the army naturally outgrew its old "linear" organization.
Temporary divisions, called for by momentary necessities, placed under
selected generals and released from the detailed supervision of the
commander-in-chief, soon became, though in an irregular and haphazard
fashion, permanent organisms, and by 1796 the divisional system had
become practically universal. The next step, as the armies became
fewer and larger, was the temporary grouping of divisions; this too in
turn became permanent, and bequeathed to the military world of to-day
both the army corps and the capable, self-reliant and enterprising
subordinate generals, for whom the old linear organization had no
room.

The starting point of modern warfare.

This subdivision of forces was intimately connected with the general
method of making war adopted by the "New French," as their enemies
called them. What astonished the Allies most of all was the number and
the velocity of the Republicans. These improvised armies had in fact
nothing to delay them. Tents were unprocurable for want of money,
untransportable for want of the enormous number of wagons that would
have been required, and also unnecessary, for the discomfort that
would have caused wholesale desertion in professional armies was
cheerfully borne by the men of 1793-1794. Supplies for armies of then
unheard-of size could not be carried in convoys, and the French soon
became familiar with "living on the country." Thus 1793 saw the birth
of the modern system of war--rapidity of movement, full development of
national strength, bivouacs and requisitions, and force, as against
cautious manoeuvring, small professional armies, tents and full
rations, and chicane. The first represented the decision-compelling
spirit, the second the spirit of risking little to gain a little.
Above all, the decision-compelling spirit was reinforced by the
presence of the emissaries of the Committee of Public Safety, the
"representatives on mission" who practically controlled the
guillotine. There were civil officials with the armies of the Allies
too, but their chief function was not to infuse desperate energy into
the military operations, but to see that the troops did not maltreat
civilians. Such were the fundamental principles of the "New French"
method of warfare, from which the warfare of to-day descends in the
direct line. But it was only after a painful period of trial and
error, of waste and misdirection, that it became possible for the
French army to have evolved Napoleon, and for Napoleon to evolve the
principles and methods of war that conformed to and profited to the
utmost by the new conditions.

Those campaigns and battles of this army which are described in detail
in the present article have been selected, some on account of their
historical importance--as producing great results; others from their
military interest--as typifying and illustrating the nature of the
revolution undergone by the art of war in these heroic years.

CAMPAIGNS IN THE NETHERLANDS

The year 1793 opened disastrously for the Republic. As a consequence of Jemappes and Valmy, France had taken the offensive both in Belgium, which had been overrun by Dumouriez's army, and in the Rhine countries, where Custine had preached the new gospel to the sentimental and half-discontented Hessians and Mainzers. But the execution of Louis XVI. raised up a host of new and determined enemies. England, Holland, Austria, Prussia, Spain and Sardinia promptly formed the First Coalition. England poured out money in profusion to pay and equip her Allies' land armies, and herself began the great struggle for the command of the sea (see _Naval Operations_, below).

Neerwinden.

In the Low Countries, while Dumouriez was beginning his proposed invasion of Holland, Prince Josias of Saxe-Coburg, the new Austrian commander on the Lower Rhine, advanced with 42,000 men from the region of Cologne, and drove in the various detachments that Dumouriez had posted to cover his right. The French general thereupon abandoned his advance into Holland, and, with what forces he could gather, turned towards the Meuse. The two armies met at Neerwinden (q.v.) on the 18th of March 1793. Dumouriez had only a few thousand men more than his opponent, instead of the enormous superiority he had had at Jemappes. Thus the enveloping attack could not be repeated, and in a battle on equal fronts the old generalship and the old armies had the advantage. Dumouriez was thoroughly defeated, the house of cards collapsed, and the whole of the French forces retreated in confusion to the strong line of border fortresses, created by Louis XIV. and Vauban.[1] Dumouriez, witnessing the failure of his political schemes, declared against the Republic, and after a vain attempt to induce his own army to follow his example, fled (April 5) into the Austrian lines. The leaderless Republicans streamed back to Valenciennes. There, however, they found a general. Picot (comte de) Dampierre was a regimental officer of the old army, who, in spite of his vanity and extravagance, possessed real loyalty to the new order of things, and brilliant personal courage. At the darkest hour he seized the reins without orders and without reference to seniority, and began to reconstruct the force and the spirit of the shattered army by wise administration and dithyrambic proclamations. Moreover, he withdrew it well behind Valenciennes out of reach of a second reverse. The region of Dunkirk and Cassel, the camp of La Madeleine near Lille, and Bouchain were made the rallying points of the various groups, the principal army being at the last-named. But the blow of Neerwinden had struck deep, and the army was for long incapable of service, what with the general distrust, the misconduct of the newer battalions, and the discontent of the old white-coated regiments that were left ragged and shoeless to the profit of the "patriot" corps. "Beware of giving horses to the 'Hussars of Liberty,'" wrote Carnot, "all these new corps are abominable."

Assembly of the Allies.

France was in fact defenceless, and the opportunity existed for the military promenade to Paris that the allied statesmen had imagined in 1792. But Coburg now ceased to be a purely Austrian commander, for one by one allied contingents, with instructions that varied with the political aims of the various governments, began to arrive. Moreover, he had his own views as to the political situation, fearing especially to be the cause of the queen's death as Brunswick had been of the king's, and negotiated for a settlement. The story of these negotiations should be read in Chuquet's _Valenciennes_--it gives the key to many mysteries of the campaign and shows that though the revolutionary spirit had already passed all understanding, enlightened men such as Coburg and his chief-of-staff Mack sympathized with its first efforts and thought the constitution of 1791 a gain to humanity. "If you come to Paris you will find 80,000 patriots ready to die," said the French negotiators. "The patriots could not resist the Austrian regulars," replied Coburg, "but I do not propose to go to Paris. I desire to see a stable government, with a chief, king or other, with whom we can treat." Soon, however, these personal negotiations were stopped by the emperor, and the idea of restoring order in France became little more than a pretext for a general intrigue amongst the confederate powers, each seeking to aggrandize itself at France's expense. "If you wish to deal with the French," observed Dumouriez ironically to Coburg, "talk 'constitution.' You may beat them but you cannot subdue them." And their subjugation was becoming less and less possible as the days went on and men talked of the partition of France as a question of the moment like the partition of Poland--a pretension that even the emigres resented.

Coburg's plan of campaign was limited to the objects acceptable to all the Allies alike. He aimed at the conquest of a first-class fortress--Lille or Valenciennes--and chiefly for this reason. War meant to the burgher of Germany and the Netherlands a special form of _haute politique_ with which it was neither his business nor his inclination to meddle. He had no more compunction, therefore, in selling his worst goods at the best price to the army commissaries than in doing so to his ordinary customers. It followed that, owing to the distance between Vienna and Valenciennes, and the exorbitant prices charged by carters and horse-owners, a mere concentration of Austrian troops at the latter place cost as much as a campaign, and the transport expenses rose to such a figure that Coburg's first duty was to find a strong place to serve as a market for the country-side and a depot for the supplies purchased, and to have it as near as possible to the front to save the hire of vehicles. As for the other governments which Coburg served as best he could, the object of the war was material concessions, and it would be easy to negotiate for the cession of Dunkirk and Valenciennes when the British and Austrian colours already waved there. The Allies, therefore, instead of following up their advantage over the French field army and driving forward on the open Paris road, set their faces westward, intending to capture Valenciennes, Le Quesnoy, Dunkirk and Lille one after the other.

Dampierre at Valenciennes.

Dampierre meanwhile grew less confident as responsibility settled upon his shoulders. Quite unable to believe that Coburg would bury himself in a maze of rivers and fortresses when he could scatter the French army to the winds by a direct advance, he was disquieted and puzzled by the Austrian investment of Conde. This was followed by skirmishes around Valenciennes, so unfavourable to the French that their officers felt it would be madness to venture far beyond the support of the fortress guns. But the representatives on mission ordered Dampierre, who was reorganizing his army at Bouchain, to advance and occupy Famars camp, east of Valenciennes, and soon afterwards, disregarding his protests, bade him relieve Conde at all costs. His skill, though not commensurate with his personal courage and devotion, sufficed to give him the idea of attacking Coburg on the right bank of the Scheldt while Clerfayt, with the corps covering the siege of Conde, was on the left, and then to turn against Clerfayt--in fact, to operate on interior lines--but it was far from being adequate to the task of beating either with the disheartened forces he commanded. On the 1st of May, while Clerfayt was held in check by a very vigorous demonstration, Coburg's positions west of Quievrain were attacked by Dampierre himself. The French won some local successes by force of numbers and surprise, but the Allies recovered themselves, thanks chiefly to the address and skill of Colonel Mack, and drove the Republicans in disorder to their entrenchments. Dampierre's discouragement now became desperation, and, urged on by the representatives (who, be it said, had exposed their own lives freely enough in the action), he attacked Clerfayt on the 8th at Raismes. The troops fought far better in the woods and hamlets west of the Scheldt than they had done in the plains to the east. But in the heat of the action Dampierre, becoming again the brilliant soldier that he had been before responsibility stifled him, risked and lost his life in leading a storming party, and his men retired sullenly, though this time in good order, to Valenciennes. Two days later the French gave up the open field and retired into Valenciennes. Dampierre's remains were by a vote of the Convention ordered to be deposited in the Pantheon. But he was a "ci-devant" noble, the demagogues denounced him as a traitor, and the only honour finally paid to the man who had tided over the weeks of greatest danger was the placing of his bust, in the strange company of those of Brutus and Marat, in the chamber of deputies.

Another pause followed, Coburg awaiting the British contingent under the duke of York, and the Republicans endeavouring to assimilate the reinforcements of conscripts, for the most part "undesirables," who now arrived. Mutiny and denunciations augmented the confusion in the French camp. Plan of campaign there was none, save a resolution to stay at Valenciennes in the hope of finding an opportunity of relieving Conde and to create diversions elsewhere by expeditions from Dunkirk, Lille and Sedan. These of course came to nothing, and before they had even started, Coburg, resuming the offensive, had stormed the lines of Famars (May 24), whereupon the French army retired to Bouchain, leaving not only Conde[2] but also Valenciennes to resist as best they could. The central point of the new positions about Bouchain was called Caesar's Camp. Here, surrounded by streams and marshes, the French generals thought that their troops were secure from the rush of the dreaded Austrian cavalry, and Mack himself shared their opinion.

Fall of Valenciennes.

Custine now took command of the abjectly dispirited army, the fourth change of command within two months. His first task was to institute a severe discipline, and his prestige was so great that his mere threat of death sentences for offenders produced the desired effect. As to operations, he wished for a concentration of all possible forces from other parts of the frontier towards Valenciennes, even if necessary at the cost of sacrificing his own conquest of Mainz. But after he had induced the government to assent to this, the generals of the numerous other armies refused to give up their troops, and on the 17th of June the idea was abandoned in view of the growing seriousness of the Vendean insurrection (see VENDEE). Custine, therefore, could do no more than continue the work of reorganization. Military operations were few. Coburg, who had all this time succeeded in remaining concentrated, now found himself compelled to extend leftwards towards Flanders,[3] for Custine had infused some energy into the scattered groups of the Republicans in the region of Douai, Lille and Dunkirk--and during this respite the Paris Jacobins sent to the guillotine both Custine and his successor La Marliere before July was ended. Both were "ci-devant" nobles and, so far as is ascertainable, neither was guilty of anything worse than attempts to make his orders respected by, and himself popular with, the soldiers. By this time, owing to the innumerable denunciations and arrests, the confusion in the Army of the North was at its height, and no further attempt was made either to relieve Valenciennes and Conde, or to press forward from Lille and Dunkirk. Conde, starved out as Coburg desired, capitulated on the 10th of June, and the Austrians, who had done their work as soldiers, but were filled with pity for their suffering and distracted enemies, marched in with food for the women and children. Valenciennes, under the energetic General Ferrand, held out bravely until the fire of the Allies became intolerable, and then the civil population began to plot treachery, and to wear the Bourbon cockade in the open street. Ferrand and the representatives with him found themselves obliged to surrender to the duke of York, who commanded the siege corps, on the 28th of July, after rejecting the first draft of a capitulation sent in by the duke and threatening to continue the defence to the bitter end. Impossible as this was known to be--for Valenciennes seemed to have become a royalist town--Ferrand's soldierly bearing carried the day, and honourable terms were arranged. The duke even offered to assist the garrison in repressing disorder. Shortly after this the wreck of the field army was forced to evacuate Caesar's Camp after an unimportant action (Aug. 7-8) and retired on Arras. By this they gave up the direct defence of the Paris road, but placed themselves in a "flank position" relatively to it, and secured to themselves the resources and reinforcements available in the region of Dunkirk-Lille. Bouchain and Cambrai, Landrecies and Le Quesnoy, were left to their own garrisons.

With this ended the second episode of the amazing campaign of 1793. Military operations were few and spasmodic, on the one side because the Allied statesmen were less concerned with the nebulous common object of restoring order in France than with their several schemes of aggrandisement, on the other owing to the almost incredible confusion of France under the regime of Danton and Marat. The third episode shows little or no change in the force and direction of the allied efforts, but a very great change in France. Thoroughly roused by disaster and now dominated by the furious and bloodthirsty energy of the terrorists, the French people and armies at last set before themselves clear and definite objects to be pursued at all costs.

Houchard.

Jean Nicolas Houchard, the next officer appointed to command, had been a heavy cavalry trooper in the Seven Years' War. His face bore the scars of wounds received at Minden, and his bravery, his stature, his bold and fierce manner, his want of education, seemed to all to betoken the ideal sans-culotte general. But he was nevertheless incapable of leading an army, and knowing this, carefully conformed to the advice of his staff officers Berthelmy and Gay-Vernon, the latter of whom, an exceptionally capable officer, had been Custine's chief of staff and was consequently under suspicion. At one moment, indeed, operations had to be suspended altogether because his papers were seized by the civil authorities, and amongst them were all the confidential memoranda and maps required for the business of headquarters. It was the darkest hour. The Vendeans, the people of Lyons, Marseilles and Toulon, were in open and hitherto successful revolt. Valenciennes had fallen and Coburg's hussar parties pressed forward into the Somme valley. Again the Allies had the decision of the war in their own hands. Coburg, indeed, was still afraid, on Marie Antoinette's account, of forcing the Republicans to extremities, and on military grounds too he thought an advance on Paris hazardous. But, hazardous or not, it would have been attempted but for the English. The duke of York had definite orders from his government to capture Dunkirk--at present a nest of corsairs which interfered with the Channel trade, and in the future, it was hoped, a second Gibraltar--and after the fall of Valenciennes and the capture of Caesar's Camp the English and Hanoverians marched away, via Tournai and Ypres, to besiege the coast fortress. Thereupon the king of Prussia in turn called off his contingent for operations on the middle Rhine. Holland, too, though she maintained her contingent in face of Lille (where it covered Flanders), was not disposed to send it to join the imperialists in an adventure in the heart of France. Coburg, therefore, was brought to a complete standstill, and the scene of the decision was shifted to the district between Lille and the coast.

Dunkirk.

Thither came Carnot, the engineer officer who was in charge of military affairs In the Committee of Public Safety and is known to history as the "Organizer of Victory." His views of the strategy to be pursued indicate either a purely geographical idea of war, which does not square with his later principles and practice, or, as is far more likely, a profound disbelief in the capacity of the Army of the North, as it then stood, to fight a battle, and they went no further than to recommend an inroad into Flanders on the ground that no enemy would be encountered there. This, however, in the event developed into an operation of almost decisive importance, for at the moment of its inception the duke of York was already on the march. Fighting _en route_ a very severe but successful action (Lincelles, Aug. 18) with the French troops encamped near Lille, the Anglo-Hanoverians entered the district--densely intersected with canals and morasses--around Dunkirk and Bergues on the 21st and 22nd. On the right, by way of Furnes, the British moved towards Dunkirk and invested the east front of the weak fortress, while on the left the Hanoverian field marshal v. Freytag moved via Poperinghe on Bergues. The French had a chain of outposts between Furnes and Bergues, but Freytag attacked them resolutely, and the defenders, except a brave handful who stood to cross bayonets, fled in all directions. The east front of Bergues was invested on the 23rd, and Freytag spread out his forces to cover the duke of York's attack on Dunkirk, his right being opposite Bergues and his centre at Bambeke, while his left covered the space between Roosbrugge and Ypres with a cordon of posts. Houchard was in despair at the bad conduct of his troops. But one young general, Jourdan, anticipating Houchard's orders, had already brought a strong force from Lille to Cassel, whence he incessantly harried Freytag's posts. Carnot encouraged the garrisons of Dunkirk and Bergues, and caused the sluices to be opened. The _moral_ of the defenders rose rapidly. Houchard prepared to bring up every available man of the Army of the North, and only waited to make up his mind as to the direction in which his attack should be made. The Allies themselves recognized the extreme danger of their position. It was cut in half by the Great Morass, stretches of which extended even to Furnes. Neither Dunkirk nor Bergues could be completely invested owing to the inundations, and Freytag sent a message to King George III. to the effect that if Dunkirk did not surrender in a few days the expedition would be a complete failure.

As for the French, they could hardly believe their good fortune. Generals, staff officers and representatives on mission alike were eager for a swift and crushing offensive. "'Attack' and 'attack in mass' became the shibboleth and the catch-phrase of the camps" (Chuquet), and fortresses and armies on other parts of the frontier were imperiously called upon to supply large drafts for the Army of the North. Gay-Vernon's strategical instinct found expression in a wide-ranging movement designed to secure the absolute annihilation of the duke of York's forces. Beginning with an attack on the Dutch posts north and east of Lille, the army was then to press forward towards Furnes, the left wing holding Freytag's left wing in check, and the right swinging inwards and across the line of retreat of both allied corps. At that moment all men were daring, and the scheme was adopted with enthusiasm. On the 28th of August, consequently, the Dutch posts were attacked and driven away by the mobile forces at Lille, aided by parts of the main army from Arras. But even before they had fired their last shot the Republicans dispersed to plunder and compromised their success. Houchard and Gay-Vernon began to fear that their army would not emerge successfully from the supreme test they were about to impose on it, and from this moment the scheme of destroying the English began to give way to the simpler and safer idea of relieving Dunkirk. The place was so ill-equipped that after a few days' siege it was _in extremis_, and the political importance of its preservation led not merely the civilian representatives, but even Carnot, to implore Houchard to put an end to the crisis at once. On the 30th, Cassel, instead of Ypres, was designated as the point of concentration for the "mass of attack." This surprised the representatives and Carnot as much as it surprised the subordinate generals, all of whom thought that there would still be time to make the detour through Ypres and to cut off the Allies' retreat before Dunkirk fell. But Houchard and Gay-Vernon were no longer under any illusions as to the manoeuvring power of their forces, and the government agents wisely left them to execute their own plans. Thirty-seven thousand men were left to watch Coburg and to secure Arras and Douai, and the rest, 50,000 strong, assembled at Cassel. Everything was in Houchard's favour could he but overcome the indiscipline of his own army. The duke of York was more dangerous in appearance than in reality--as the result must infallibly have shown had Houchard and Gay-Vernon possessed the courage to execute the original plan--and Freytag's covering army extended in a line of disconnected posts from Bergues to Ypres.

Hondschoote.

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