Chapter XVI: Front Matter (16)

Napoleon was now safe in his "natural" position, and barred one of the two main lines of retreat open to the Austrians. But his ambitions went further, and he intended to cross the Po and to establish himself on the other likewise, thus establishing across the plain a complete barrage between Melas and Mantua. Here his end outranged his means, as we shall see. But he gave himself every chance that rapidity could afford him, and the moment that some sort of a "zone of manoeuvre" had been secured between the Ticino and the Oglio, he pushed on his main body--or rather what was left after the protective system had been provided for--to the Po. He would not wait even for his guns, which had at last emerged from the Bard defile and were ordered to come to Milan by a safe and circuitous route along the foot of the Alps.

Melas's movements.

At this point the action of the enemy began to make itself felt. Melas had not gained the successes that he had expected in Piedmont and on the Riviera, thanks to Massena's obstinacy and to Suchet's brilliant defence of the Var. These operations had led him very far afield, and the protection of his over-long line of communications had caused him to weaken his large army by throwing off many detachments to watch the Alpine valleys on his right rear. One of these successfully opposed Turreau in the valley of the Dora Riparia, but another had been severely handled by Lannes at Chivasso, and a third (Vukassovich) found itself, as we know, directly in the path of the French as they moved from Ivrea to Milan, and was driven far to the eastward. He was further handicapped by the necessity of supporting Ott before Genoa and Elsnitz on the Var, and hearing of Lannes's bold advance on Chivasso and of the presence of a French column with artillery (Turreau) west of Turin, he assumed that the latter represented the main body of the Army of Reserve--in so far indeed as he believed in the existence of that army at all.[20] Next, when Lannes moved away towards Pavia, Melas thought for a moment that fate had delivered his enemy into his hands, and began to collect such troops as were at hand at Turin with a view to cutting off the retreat of the French on Ivrea while Vukassovich held them in front. It was only when news came of Moncey's arrival in Italy and of Vukassovich's fighting retreat on Brescia that the magnitude and purpose of the French column that had penetrated by Ivrea became evident. Melas promptly decided to give up his western enterprises, and to concentrate at Alessandria, preparatory to breaking his way through the network of small columns--as the disseminated Army of Reserve still appeared to be--which threatened to bar his retreat. But orders circulated so slowly that he had to wait in Turin till the 8th of June for Elsnitz, whose retreat was, moreover, sharply followed up and made exceedingly costly by the enterprising Suchet. Ott, too, in spite of orders to give up the siege of Genoa at once and to march with all speed to hold the Alessandria-Piacenza road, waited two days to secure the prize, and agreed (June 4) to allow Massena's army to go free and to join Suchet. And lastly, the cavalry of O'Reilly, sent on ahead from Alessandria to the Stradella defile, reached that point only to encounter the French. The barrage was complete, and it remained for Melas to break it with the mass that he was assembling, with all these misfortunes and delays, about Alessandria. His chances of doing so were anything but desperate.

On the 5th of June Murat, with his own corps and part of Duhesme's, had moved on Piacenza, and stormed the bridge-head there. Duhesme with one of his divisions pushed out on Crema and Orzinovi and also towards Pizzighetone. Moncey's leading regiments approached Milan, and Berthier thereupon sent on Victor's corps to support Murat and Lannes. Meantime the half abandoned line of operations, Ivrea-Vercelli, was briskly attacked by the Austrians, who had still detachments on the side of Turin, waiting for Elsnitz to rejoin, and the French artillery train was once more checked. On the 6th Lannes from Pavia, crossing the Po at San Cipriano, encountered and defeated a large force, (O'Reilly's column), and barred the Alessandria-Parma main road. Opposite Piacenza Murat had to spend the day in gathering material for his passage, as the pontoon bridge had been cut by the retreating garrison of the bridge-head. On the eastern border of the "zone of manoeuvre" Duhesme's various columns moved out towards Brescia and Cremona, pushing back Vukassovich. Meantime the last divisions of the Army of Reserve (two of Moncey's excepted) were hurried towards Lannes's point of passage, as Murat had not yet secured Piacenza. On the 7th, while Duhesme continued to push back Vukassovich and seized Cremona, Murat at last captured Piacenza, finding there immense magazines. Meantime the army, division by division, passed over, slowly owing to a sudden flood, near Belgiojoso, and Lannes's advanced guard was ordered to open communication with Murat along the main road Stradella-Piacenza. "Moments are precious" said the First Consul. He was aware that Elsnitz was retreating before Suchet, that Melas had left Turin for Alessandria, and that heavy forces of the enemy were at or east of Tortona. He knew, too, that Murat had been engaged with certain regiments recently before Genoa and (wrongly) assumed O'Reilly's column, beaten by Lannes at San Cipriano, to have come from the same quarter. Whether this meant the deliverance or the surrender of Genoa he did not yet know, but it was certain that Massena's holding action was over, and that Melas was gathering up his forces to recover his communications. Hence Napoleon's great object was concentration. "Twenty thousand men at Stradella," in his own words, was the goal of his efforts, and with the accomplishment of this purpose the campaign enters on a new phase.

Napoleon's dispositions.

Montebello.

On the 8th of June, Lannes's corps was across, Victor following as quickly as the flood would allow. Murat was at Piacenza, but the road between Lannes and Murat was not known to be clear, and the First Consul made the establishment of the connexion, and the construction of a third point of passage midway between the other two, the principal objects of the day's work. The army now being disseminated between the Alps, the Apennines, the Ticino and the Chiese, it was of vital importance to connect up the various parts into a well-balanced system. But the Napoleon of 1800 solved the problem that lay at the root of his strategy, "concentrate, but be vulnerable nowhere," in a way that compares unfavourably indeed with the methods of the Napoleon of 1806. Duhesme was still absent at Cremona. Lechi was far away in the Brescia country, Bethencourt detained at Arona. Moncey with about 15,000 men had to cover an area of 40 m. square around Milan, which constituted the original zone of manoeuvre, and if Melas chose to break through the flimsy cordon of outposts on this side (the risk of which was the motive for detaching Moncey at all) instead of at the Stradella, it would take Moncey two days to concentrate his force on any battlefield within the area named, and even then he would be outnumbered by two to one. As for the main body at the Stradella, its position was wisely chosen, for the ground was too cramped for the deployment of the superior force that Melas might bring up, but the strategy that set before itself as an object 20,000 men at the decisive point out of 50,000 available, is, to say the least, imperfect. The most serious feature in all this was the injudicious order to Lannes to send forward his advanced guard, and to attack whatever enemy he met with on the road to Voghera. The First Consul, in fact, calculated that Melas could not assemble 20,000 men at Alessandria before the 12th of June, and he told Lannes that if he met the Austrians towards Voghera, they could not be more than 10,000 strong. A later order betrays some anxiety as to the exactitude of these assumptions, warns Lannes not to let himself be surprised, indicates his line of retreat, and, instead of ordering him to advance on Voghera, authorizes him to attack any corps that presented itself at Stradella. But all this came too late. Acting on the earlier order Lannes fought the battle of Montebello on the 9th. This was a very severe running fight, beginning east of Casteggio and ending at Montebello, in which the French drove the Austrians from several successive positions, and which culminated in a savage fight at close quarters about Montebello itself. The singular feature of the battle is the disproportion between the losses on either side--French, 500 out of 12,000 engaged; Austrians, 2100 killed and wounded and 2100 prisoners out of 14,000. These figures are most conclusive evidence of the intensity of the French military spirit in those days. One of the two divisions (Watrin's) was indeed a veteran organization, but the other, Chambarlhac's, was formed of young troops and was the same that, in the march to Dijon, had congratulated itself that only 5% of its men had deserted. On the other side the soldiers fought for "the honour of their arms"--not even with the courage of despair, for they were ignorant of the "strategic barrage" set in front of them by Napoleon, and the loss of their communications had not as yet lessened their daily rations by an ounce.

Meanwhile, Napoleon had issued orders for the main body to stand fast, and for the detachments to take up their definitive covering positions. Duhesme's corps was directed, from its eastern foray, to Piacenza, to join the main body. Moncey was to provide for the defence of the Ticino line, Lechi to form a "flying camp" in the region of Orzinovi-Brescia and Cremona, and another mixed brigade was to control the Austrians in Pizzighetone and in the citadel of Piacenza. On the other side of the Po, between Piacenza and Montebello, was the main body (Lannes, Murat and part of Victor's and Duhesme's corps), and a flank guard was stationed near Pavia, with orders to keep on the right of the army as it advanced (this is the first and only hint of any intention to go westward) and to fall back fighting should Melas come on by the left bank. One division was to be always a day's march behind the army on the right bank, and a flotilla was to ascend the Po, to facilitate the speedy reinforcement of the flank guard. Farther to the north was a small column on the road Milan-Vercelli. All the protective troops, except the division of the main body detailed as an eventual support for the flank guard, was to be found by Moncey's corps (which had besides to watch the Austrians in the citadel of Milan) and Chabran's and Lechi's weak commands. On this same day Bonaparte tells the Minister of War, Carnot, that Moncey has only brought half the expected reinforcements and that half of these are unreliable. As to the result of the impending contest Napoleon counts greatly upon the union of 18,000 men under Massena and Suchet to crush Melas against the "strategic barrage" of the Army of Reserve, by one or other bank of the Po, and he seems equally confident of the result in either case. If Genoa had held out three days more, he says, it would have been easy to count the number of Melas's men who escaped. The exact significance of this last notion is difficult to establish, and all that could be written about it would be merely conjectural. But it is interesting to note that, without admitting it, Napoleon felt that his "barrage" might not stand before the flood. The details of the orders of the 9th to the main body (written before the news of Montebello arrived at headquarters) tend to the closest possible concentration of the main body towards Casteggio, in view of a decisive battle on the 12th or 13th.

Napoleon's advance.

But another idea had begun to form itself in his mind. Still believing that Melas would attack him on the Stradella side, and hastening his preparations to meet this, he began to allow for the contingency of Melas giving up or failing in his attempt to re-establish his communication with the Mantovese, and retiring on Genoa, which was now in his hands and could be provisioned and reinforced by sea. On the 10th Napoleon ordered reserve ammunition to be sent from Pavia, giving Serravalle, which is south of Novi, as its probable destination. But this was surmise, and of the facts he knew nothing. Would the enemy move east on the Stradella, north-east on the Ticino or south on Genoa? Such reports as were available indicated no important movements whatever, which happened to be true, but could hardly appear so to the French headquarters. On the 11th, though he thereby forfeited the reinforcements coming up from Duhesme's corps at Cremona, Napoleon ordered the main body to advance to the Scrivia. Lapoype's division (the right flank guard), which was observing the Austrian posts towards Casale, was called to the south bank of the Po, the zone around Milan was stripped so bare of troops that there was no escort for the prisoners taken at Montebello, while information sent by Chabran (now moving up from Ivrea) as to the construction of bridges at Casale (this was a feint made by Melas on the 10th) passed unheeded. The crisis was at hand, and, clutching at the reports collected by Lapoype as to the quietude of the Austrians toward Valenza and Casale, Bonaparte and Berthier strained every nerve to bring up more men to the Voghera side in the hope of preventing the prey from slipping away to Genoa.

On the 12th, consequently, the army (the _ordre de bataille_ of which had been considerably modified on the 11th) moved to the Scrivia, Lannes halting at Castelnuovo, Desaix (who had just joined the army from Egypt) at Pontecurone, Victor at Tortona with Murat's cavalry in front towards Alessandria. Lapoype's division, from the left bank of the Po, was marching in all haste to join Desaix. Moncey, Duhesme, Lechi and Chabran were absent. The latter represented almost exactly half of Berthier's command (30,000 out of 58,000), and even the concentration of 28,000 men on the Scrivia had only been obtained by practically giving up the "barrage" on the left bank of the Po. Even now the enemy showed nothing but a rearguard, and the old questions reappeared in a new and acute form. Was Melas still in Alessandria? Was he marching on Valenza and Casale to cross the Po? or to Acqui against Suchet, or to Genoa to base himself on the British fleet? As to the first, why had he given up his chances of fighting on one of the few cavalry battlegrounds in north Italy--the plain of Marengo--since he could not stay in Alessandria for any indefinite time? The second question had been answered in the negative by Lapoype, but his latest information was thirty-six hours old. As for the other questions, no answer whatever was forthcoming, and the only course open was to postpone decisive measures and to send forward the cavalry, supported by infantry, to gain information.

Marengo.

On the 13th, therefore, Murat, Lannes and Victor advanced into the plain of Marengo, traversed it without difficulty and carrying the villages held by the Austrian rearguard, established themselves for the night within a mile of the fortress. But meanwhile Napoleon, informed we may suppose of their progress, had taken a step that was fraught with the gravest consequences. He had, as we know, no intention of forcing on a decision until his reconnaissance produced the information on which to base it, and he had therefore kept back three divisions under Desaix at Pontecurone. But as the day wore on without incident, he began to fear that the reconnaissance would be profitless, and unwilling to give Melas any further start, he sent out these divisions right and left to find and to hold the enemy, whichever way the latter had gone. At noon Desaix with one division was despatched southward to Rivalta to head off Melas from Genoa and at 9 A.M. on the 14th,[21] Lapoype was sent back over the Po to hold the Austrians should they be advancing from Valenza towards the Ticino. Thus there remained in hand only 21,000 men when at last, in the forenoon of the 14th the whole of Melas's army, more than 40,000 strong, moved out of Alessandria, not southward nor northward, but due west into the plain of Marengo (q.v.). The extraordinary battle that followed is described elsewhere. The outline of it is simple enough. The Austrians advanced slowly and in the face of the most resolute opposition, until their attack had gathered weight, and at last they were carrying all before them, when Desaix returned from beyond Rivalta and initiated a series of counterstrokes. These were brilliantly successful, and gave the French not only local victory but the supreme self-confidence that, next day, enabled them to extort from Melas an agreement to evacuate all Lombardy as far as the Mincio. And though in this way the chief prize, Melas's army, escaped after all, Marengo was the birthday of the First Empire.

One more blow, however, was required before the Second Coalition collapsed, and it was delivered by Moreau. We have seen that he had crossed the upper Rhine and defeated Kray at Stokach. This was followed by other partial victories, and Kray then retired to Ulm, where he reassembled his forces, hitherto scattered in a long weak line from the Neckar to Schaffhausen. Moreau continued his advance, extending his forces up to and over the Danube below Ulm, and winning several combats, of which the most important was that of Hochstadt, fought on the famous battlegrounds of 1703 and 1704, and memorable for the death of La Tour d'Auvergne, the "First Grenadier of France" (June 19). Finding himself in danger of envelopment, Kray now retired, swiftly and skilfully, across the front of the advancing French, and reached Ingolstadt in safety. Thence he retreated over the Inn, Moreau following him to the edge of that river, and an armistice put an end for the moment to further operations.

This not resulting in a treaty of peace, the war was resumed both in Italy and in Germany. The Army of Reserve and the Army of Italy, after being fused into one, under Massena's command, were divided again into a fighting army under Brune, who opposed the Austrians (Bellegarde) on the Mincio, and a political army under Murat, which re-established French influence in the Peninsula. The former, extending on a wide front as usual, won a few strategical successes without tactical victory, the only incidents of which worth recording are the gallant fight of Dupont's division, which had become isolated during a manoeuvre, at Pozzolo on the Mincio (December 25) and the descent of a corps under Macdonald from the Grisons by way of the Splugen, an achievement far surpassing Napoleon's and even Suvarov's exploits, in that it was made after the winter snows had set in.

Hohenlinden.

In Germany the war for a moment reached the sublime. Kray had been displaced in command by the young archduke John, who ordered the denunciation of the armistice and a general advance. His plan, or that of his advisers, was to cross the lower Inn, out of reach of Moreau's principal mass, and then to swing round the French flank until a complete chain was drawn across their rear. But during the development of the manoeuvre, Moreau also moved, and by rapid marching made good the time he had lost in concentrating his over-dispersed forces. The weather was appalling, snow and rain succeeding one another until the roads were almost impassable. On the 2nd of December the Austrians were brought to a standstill, but the inherent mobility of the Revolutionary armies enabled them to surmount all difficulties, and thanks to the respite afforded him by the archduke's halt, Moreau was able to see clearly into the enemy's plans and dispositions. On the 3rd of December, while the Austrians in many disconnected columns were struggling through the dark and muddy forest paths about Hohenlinden, Moreau struck the decisive blow. While Ney and Grouchy held fast the head of the Austrian main column at Hohenlinden, Richepanse's corps was directed on its left flank. In the forest Richepanse unexpectedly met a subsidiary Austrian column which actually cut his column in two. But profiting by the momentary confusion he drew off that part of his forces which had passed beyond the point of contact and continued his march, striking the flank of the archduke's main column, most of which had not succeeded in deploying opposite Ney, at the village of Mattempost. First the baggage train and then the artillery park fell into his hands, and lastly he reached the rear of the troops engaged opposite Hohenlinden, whereupon the Austrian main body practically dissolved. The rear of Richepanse's corps, after disengaging itself from the Austrian column it had met in the earlier part of the day, arrived at Mattempost in time to head off thousands of fugitives who had escaped from the carnage at Hohenlinden. The other columns of the unfortunate army were first checked and then driven back by the French divisions they met, which, moving more swiftly and fighting better in the broken ground and the woods, were able to combine two brigades against one wherever a fight developed. On this disastrous day the Austrians lost 20,000 men, 12,000 of them being prisoners, and 90 guns.

Marengo and Hohenlinden decided the war of the Second Coalition as Rivoli had decided that of the First, and the Revolutionary Wars came to an end with the armistice of Steyer (December 25, 1800) and the treaty of Luneville (February 9, 1801). But only the first act of the great drama was accomplished. After a short respite Europe entered upon the Napoleonic Wars.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.--By far the most important modern works are A. Chuquet's
_Guerres de la Revolution_ (11 monographs forming together a complete
history of the campaigns of 1792-93), and the publications of the
French General Staff. The latter appear first, as a rule, in the
official "Revue d'histoire" and are then republished in separate
volumes, of which every year adds to the number. V. Dupuis' _L'Armee
du nord 1793_; Coutanceau's _L'Armee du nord 1794_; J. Colin's
_Education militaire de Napoleon_ and _Campagne de 1793 en Alsace_;
and C. de Cugnac's _Campagne de l'armee de reserve 1800_ may be
specially named. Among other works of importance the principal are C.
von B(inder)-K(rieglstein), _Geist und Stoff im Kriege_ (Vienna,
1896); E. Gachot's works on Massena's career (containing invaluable
evidence though written in a somewhat rhetorical style); Ritter von
Angeli, _Erzherzog Karl_ (Vienna, 1896); F. N. Maude, _Evolution of
Modern Strategy_; G. A. Furse, _Marengo and Hohenlinden_; C. von
Clausewitz, _Feldzug 1796 in Italien_ and _Feldzug 1799_ (French
translations); H. Bonnal, _De Rosbach a Ulm_; Krebs and Moris,
_Campagnes dans les Alpes_ (Paris, 1891-1895); Yorck von Wartenburg,
_Napoleon als Feldherr_ (English and French translations); F. Bouvier,
_Bonaparte en Italie 1796_; Kuhl, _Bonaparte's erster Feldzug_; J. W.
Fortescue, _Hist. of the British Army_, vol. iv.; G. D. v.
Scharnhorst, _Ursache des Glucks der Franzosen 1793-1794_ (reprinted
in A. Weiss's _Short German Military Readings_, London, 1892); E.
D'Hauterive, _L'Armee sous la Revolution_; C. Rousset, _Les
Volontaires_; Max Jahns, _Das franzosische Heer_; Shadwell, _Mountain
Warfare_; works of Colonel Camon (_Guerre Napoleonienne_, &c.);
Austrian War Office, Krieg gegen die franz. Revolution 1792-1797
(Vienna, 1905); Archduke Charles, _Grundsatze der Strategie_ (1796
campaign in Germany), and _Gesch. des Feldzuges 1799 in Deutschl. und
der Schweiz_; v. Zeissberg, _Erzherzog Karl_; the old history called
_Victoires et conquetes des Francais_ (27 volumes, Paris, 1817-1825);
M. Hartmann, _Anteil der Russen am Feldzug 1799 in der Schweiz_
(Zurich, 1892); Danelewski-Miliutin, _Der Krieg Russlands gegen
Frankreich unter Paul I._ (Munich, 1858); German General Staff,
"Napoleons Feldzug 1796-1797" (Suppl. _Mil. Wochenblatt_, 1889), and
_Pirmasens und Kaiserslautern_ ("Kriegsgesch. Einzelschriften," 1893).
(C. F. A.)

NAVAL OPERATIONS

The naval side of the wars arising out of the French Revolution was marked by unity, and even by simplicity. France had but one serious enemy, Great Britain, and Great Britain had but one purpose, to beat down France. Other states were drawn into the strife, but it was as the allies, the enemies and at times the victims, of the two dominating powers. The field of battle was the whole expanse of the ocean and the landlocked seas. The weapons, the methods and the results were the same. When a general survey of the whole struggle is taken, its unity is manifest. The Revolution produced a profound alteration in the government of France, but none in the final purposes of its policy. To secure for France its so-called "natural limits"--the Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees and the ocean; to protect both flanks by reducing Holland on the north and Spain on the south to submission; to confirm the mighty power thus constituted, by the subjugation of Great Britain, were the objects of the Republic and of Napoleon, as they had been of Louis XIV. The naval war, like the war on land, is here considered in the first of its two phases--the Revolutionary (1792-99). (For the Napoleonic phase (1800-15), see NAPOLEONIC CAMPAIGNS.)

The Revolutionary war began in April 1792. In the September of that year Admiral Truguet sailed from Toulon to co-operate with the French troops operating against the Austrians and their allies in northern Italy. In December Latouche Treville was sent with another squadron to cow the Bourbon rulers of Naples. The extreme feebleness of their opponents alone saved the French from disaster. Mutinies, which began within ten days of the storming of the Bastille (14th of July 1789), had disorganized their navy, and the effects of these disorders continued to be felt so long as the war lasted. In February 1793 war broke out with Great Britain and Holland. In March Spain was added to the list of the powers against which France declared war. Her resources at sea were wholly inadequate to meet the coalition she had provoked. The Convention did indeed order that fifty-two ships of the line should be commissioned in the Channel, but it was not able in fact to do more than send out a few diminutive and ill-appointed squadrons, manned by mutinous crews, which kept close to the coast. The British navy was in excellent order, but the many calls made on it for the protection of world-wide commerce and colonial possessions caused the operations in the Channel to be somewhat languid. Lord Howe cruised in search of the enemy without being able to bring them to action. The severe blockade which in the later stages of the war kept the British fleet permanently outside of Brest was not enforced in the earlier stages. Lord Howe preferred to save his fleet from the wear and tear of perpetual cruising by maintaining his headquarters at St Helens, and keeping watch on the French ports by frigates. The French thus secured a freedom of movement which in the course of 1794 enabled them to cover the arrival of a great convoy laden with food from America (see FIRST OF JUNE, BATTLE OF). This great effort was followed by a long period of languor. Its internal defects compelled the French fleet in the Channel to play a very poor part till the last days of 1796. Squadrons were indeed sent a short way to sea, but their inefficiency was conspicuously displayed when, on the 17th of June 1795, a much superior number of their line of battle ships failed to do any harm to the small force of Cornwallis, and when on the 22nd of the same month they fled in disorder before Lord Bridport at the Isle de Groix.

Operations of a more decisive character had in the meantime taken place both in the Mediterranean and in the West Indies. In April 1793 the first detachment of a British fleet, which was finally raised to a strength of 21 sail of the line, under the command of Lord Hood, sailed for the Mediterranean. By August the admiral was off Toulon, acting in combination with a Spanish naval force. France was torn by the contentions of Jacobins and Girondins, and its dissensions led to the surrender of the great arsenal to the British admiral and his Spanish colleague Don Juan de Langara, on the 27th of August. The allies were joined later by a contingent from Naples. But the military forces were insufficient to hold the land defences against the army collected to expel them. High ground commanding the anchorage was occupied by the besieging force, and on the 18th of December 1793 the allies retired. They carried away or destroyed thirty-three French vessels, of which thirteen were of the line. But partly through the inefficiency and partly through the ill-will of the Spaniards, who were indisposed to cripple the French, whom they considered as their only possible allies against Great Britain, the destruction was not so complete as had been intended. Twenty-five ships, of which eighteen were of the line, were left to serve as the nucleus of an active fleet in later years. Fourteen thousand of the inhabitants fled with the allies to escape the vengeance of the victorious Jacobins. Their sufferings, and the ferocious massacre perpetrated on those who remained behind by the conquerors, form one of the blackest pages of the French Revolution. The Spanish fleet took no further part in the war. Lord Hood now turned to the occupation of Corsica, where the intervention of the British fleet was invited by the patriotic party headed by Pascual Paoli. The French ships left at Toulon were refitted and came to sea in the spring of 1794, but Admiral Martin who commanded them did not feel justified in giving battle, and his sorties were mere demonstrations. From the 25th of January 1794 till November 1796 the British fleet in the Mediterranean was mainly occupied in and about Corsica, securing the island, watching Toulon and co-operating with the allied Austrians and Piedmontese in northern Italy. It did much to hamper the coastwise communications of the French. But neither Lord Hood, who went home at the end of 1794, nor his indolent successor Hotham, was able to deliver an effective blow at the Toulon squadron. The second of these officers fought two confused actions with Admiral Martin in the Gulf of Lyons on the 16th of March and the 12th of July 1795, but though three French ships were cut off and captured, the baffling winds and the placid disposition of Hotham united to prevent decisive results. A new spirit was introduced into the command of the British fleet when Sir John Jervis, afterwards Earl Saint Vincent, succeeded Hotham in November 1795.

Jervis came to the Mediterranean with a high reputation, which had been much enhanced by his recent command in the West Indies. In every war with France it was the natural policy of the British government to seize on its enemy's colonial possessions, not only because of their intrinsic value, but because they were the headquarters of active privateers. The occupation of the little fishing stations of St Pierre and Miquelon (14th May 1793) and of Pondicherry in the East Indies (23rd Aug. 1793) were almost formal measures taken at the beginning of every war. But the French West Indian islands possessed intrinsic strength which rendered their occupation a service of difficulty and hazard. In 1793 they were torn by dissensions, the result of the revolution in the mother country. Tobago was occupied in April, and the French part of the great island of San Domingo was partially thrown into British hands by the Creoles, who were threatened by their insurgent slaves. During 1794 a lively series of operations, in which there were some marked alternations of fortune, took place in and about Martinique and Guadaloupe. The British squadron, and the contingent of troops it carried, after a first repulse, occupied them both in March and April, together with Santa Lucia. A vigorous counter-attack was carried out by the Terrorist Victor Hugues with ability and ferocity. Guadaloupe and Santa Lucia were recovered in August. Yet on the whole the British government was successful in its policy of destroying the French naval power in distant seas. The seaborne commerce of the Republic was destroyed.

The naval supremacy of Great Britain was limited, and was for a time menaced, in consequence of the advance of the French armies on land. The invasion of Holland in 1794 led to the downfall of the house of Orange, and the establishment of the Batavian Republic. War with Great Britain under French dictation followed in January 1795. In that year a British expedition under the command of Admiral Keith Elphinstone (afterwards Lord Keith) occupied the Dutch colony at the Cape (August-September) and their trading station in Malacca. The British colonial empire was again extended, and the command of the sea by its fleet confirmed. But the necessity to maintain a blockading force in the German Ocean imposed a fresh strain on its naval resources, and the hostility of Holland closed a most important route to British commerce in Europe. In 1795 Spain made peace with France at Basel, and in September 1796 re-entered the war as her ally. The Spanish navy was most inefficient, but it required to be watched and therefore increased the heavy strain on the British fleet. At the same time the rapid advance of the French arms in Italy began to close the ports of the peninsula to Great Britain. Its ships were for a time withdrawn from the Mediterranean. Poor as it was in quality, the Spanish fleet was numerous. It was able to facilitate the movements of French squadrons sent to harass British commerce in the Atlantic, and a concentration of forces became necessary.

It was the more important because the cherished French scheme for an attack on the heart of the British empire began to take shape. While Spain occupied one part of the British fleet to the south, and Holland another in the north, a French expedition, which was to have been aided by a Dutch expedition from the Texel, was prepared at Brest. The Dutch were confined to harbour by the vigilant blockade of Admiral Duncan, afterwards Lord Camperdown. But in December 1796 a French fleet commanded by Admiral Morard de Galle, carrying 13,000 troops under General Hoche, was allowed to sail from Brest for Ireland, by the slack management of the blockade under Admiral Colpoys. Being ill-fitted, ill-manned and exposed to constant bad weather the French ships were scattered. Some reached their destination, Bantry Bay, only to be driven out again by north-easterly gales. The expedition finally returned after much suffering, and in fragments, to Brest. Yet the year 1797 was one of extreme trial to Great Britain. The victory of Sir John Jervis over the Spaniards near Cape Saint Vincent on the 14th of February (see SAINT VINCENT, BATTLE OF) disposed of the Spanish fleet. In the autumn of the year the Dutch, having put to sea, were defeated at Camperdown by Admiral Duncan on the 11th of October. Admiral Duncan had the more numerous force, sixteen ships to fifteen, and they were on the average heavier. Attacking from windward he broke through the enemy's line and concentrated on his rear and centre. Eight line of battleships and two frigates were taken, but the good gunnery and steady resistance of the Dutch made the victory costly. Between these two battles the British fleet was for a time menaced in its very existence by a succession of mutinies, the result of much neglect of the undoubted grievances of the sailors. The victory of Camperdown, completing what the victory of Cape Saint Vincent had begun, seemed to put Great Britain beyond fear of invasion. But the government of the Republic was intent on renewing the attempt. The successes of Napoleon at the head of the army of Italy had reduced Austria to sign the peace of Campo Formio, on the 17th of October 1797, and he was appointed commander of the new army of invasion. It was still thought necessary to maintain the bulk of the British fleet in European waters, within call in the ocean. The Mediterranean was left free to the French, whose squadrons cruised in the Levant, where the Republic had become possessed of the Ionian Islands by the plunder of Venice. The absence of a British force in the Mediterranean offered to the government of the French Republic an alternative to an invasion of Great Britain or Ireland, which promised to be less hazardous and equally effective. It was induced largely by the persuasion of Napoleon himself, and the wish of the politicians who were very willing to see him employed at a distance. The expedition to Egypt under his command sailed on the 19th of May 1798, having for its immediate purpose the occupation of the Nile valley, and for its ultimate aim an attack on Great Britain "from behind" in India (see NILE, BATTLE OF THE). The British fleet re-entered the Mediterranean to pursue and baffle Napoleon. The destruction of the French squadron at the anchorage of Aboukir on the 1st of August gave it the complete command of the sea. A second invasion of Ireland on a smaller scale was attempted and to some extent carried out, while the great attack by Egypt was in progress. One French squadron of four frigates carrying 1150 soldiers under General Humbert succeeded in sailing from Rochefort on the 6th of August. On the 22nd Humbert was landed at Killala Bay, but after making a vigorous raid he was compelled to surrender at Ballinamuck on the 8th of September. Eight days after his surrender, another French squadron of one sail of the line and eight frigates carrying 3000 troops, sailed from Brest under Commodore Bompart to support Humbert. It was watched and pursued by frigates, and on the 12th of October was overtaken and destroyed by a superior British force commanded by Sir John Borlase Warren, near Tory Island.

From the close of 1798 till the _coup d'etat_ of the 18th Brumaire (9th November) 1799, which established Napoleon as First Consul and master of France, the French navy had only one object--to reinforce and relieve the army cut off in Egypt by the battle of the Nile. The relief of the French garrison in Malta was a subordinate part of the main purpose. But the supremacy of the British navy was by this time so firmly founded that neither Egypt nor Malta could be reached except by small ships which ran the blockade. On the 25th of April, Admiral Bruix did indeed leave Brest, after baffling the blockading fleet of Lord Bridport, which was sent on a wild-goose chase to the south of Ireland by means of a despatch sent out to be captured and to deceive. Admiral Bruix succeeded in reaching Toulon, and his presence in the Mediterranean caused some disturbance. But, though his twenty-five sail of the line formed the best-manned fleet which the French had sent to sea during the war, and though he escaped being brought to battle, he did not venture to steer for the eastern Mediterranean. On the 13th of August he was back at Brest, bringing with him a Spanish squadron carried off as a hostage for the fidelity of the government at Madrid to its disastrous alliance with France. On the day on which Bruix re-entered Brest, the 13th of August 1799, a combined Russian and British expedition sailed from the Downs to attack the French army of occupation in the Batavian Republic. The military operations were unsuccessful, and terminated in the withdrawal of the allies. But the naval part was well executed. Vice-admiral Mitchell forced the entrance to the Texel, and on the 30th of August received the surrender of the remainder of the Dutch fleet--thirteen vessels in the Nieuwe Diep--the sailors having refused to fight for the republic. In spite of the failure on land, the expedition did much to confirm the naval supremacy of Great Britain by the entire suppression of the most seamanlike of the forces opposed to it.

Authorities.--Chevalier, _Histoire de la marine francaise sous la
premiere Republique_ (Paris, 1886); James's _Naval History_ (London,
1837); Captain Mahan, _Influence of Sea Power upon the French
Revolution and the Empire_ (London, 1892). The French schemes of
invasion are exhaustively dealt with in Captain E. Desbriere's
_Projets et tentatives de debarquements aux Iles Britanniques_ (Paris,
1900, &c.). (D. H.)

FOOTNOTES:

[1] For the following operations see map in SPANISH SUCCESSION WAR.

[2] Coburg refrained from a regular siege of Conde. He wished to gain
possession of the fortress in a defensible state, intending to use it
as his own depot later in the year. He therefore reduced it by
famine. During the siege of Valenciennes the Allies appear to have
been supplied from Mons.

[3] Henceforth to the end of 1794 both armies were more or less "in
cordon," the cordon possessing greater or less density at any
particular moment or place, according to the immediate intentions of
the respective commanders and the general military situation.

[4] In the course of this the column from Bouchain, 4500 strong, was
caught in the open at Avesnes-le-Sec by 5 squadrons of the allied
cavalry and literally annihilated.

[5] One of the generals at Maubeuge, Chancel, was guillotined.

[6] Each of the fifteen armies on foot had been allotted certain
departments as supply areas, Jourdan's being of course far away in
Lorraine.

[7] Liguria was not at this period thought of, even by Napoleon, as
anything more than a supply area.

[8] Vukassovich had received Beaulieu's order to demonstrate with two
battalions, and also appeals for help from Argenteau. He therefore
brought most of his troops with him.

[9] We have seen that after Tourcoing, taught by experience, Souham
posted Vandamme's covering force 14 or 15 m. out. But Napoleon's
disposition was in advance of experience.

[10] The proposed alliance with the Sardinians came to nothing. The
kings of Sardinia had always made their alliance with either Austria
or France conditional on cessions of conquered territory. But,
according to Thiers, the Directory only desired to conquer the
Milanese to restore it to Austria in return for the definitive
cession of the Austrian Netherlands. If this be so, Napoleon's
proclamations of "freedom for Italy" were, if not a mere political
expedient, at any rate no more than an expression of his own desires
which he was not powerful enough to enforce.

[11] On entering the territory of the duke of Parma Bonaparte
imposed, besides other contributions, the surrender of twenty famous
pictures, and thus began a practice which for many years enriched the
Louvre and only ceased with the capture of Paris in 1814.

[12] See C. von B.-K., _Geist und Stoff_, pp. 449-451.

[13] The assumption by later critics (Clausewitz even included) that
the "flank position" held by these forces relatively to the main
armies in Italy and Germany was their _raison d'etre_ is unsupported
by contemporary evidence.

[14] For this expedition, which was repulsed by Brune in the battle
of Castricum, see Fortescue's _Hist. of the British Army_, vol. iv.,
and Sachot's _Brune en Hollande_.

[15] He afterwards appointed Berthier to command the Army of Reserve,
but himself accompanied it and directed it, using Berthier as chief
of staff.

[16] Only one division of the main body used the Little St Bernard.

[17] When he made his decision he was unaware that Bethencourt had
been held up at Arona.

[18] This may be accounted for by the fact that Napoleon's mind was
not yet definitively made up when his advanced guard had already
begun to climb the St Bernard (12th). Napoleon's instructions for
Moncey were written on the 14th. The magazines, too, had to be
provided and placed before it was known whether Moreau's detachment
would be forthcoming.

[19] Six guns had by now passed Fort Bard and four of these were with
Murat and Duhesme, two with Lannes.

[20] It is supposed that the foreign spies at Dijon sent word to
their various employers that the Army was a bogy. In fact a great
part of it never entered Dijon at all, and the troops reviewed there
by Bonaparte were only conscripts and details. By the time that the
veteran divisions from the west and Paris arrived, either the spies
had been ejected or their news was sent off too late to be of use.

[21] On the strength of a report, false as it turned out, that the
Austrian rearguard had broken the bridges of the Bormida.

FRENCH WEST AFRICA (_L'Afrique occidentale francaise_), the common designation of the following colonies of France:--(1) Senegal, (2) Upper Senegal and Niger, (3) Guinea, (4) the Ivory Coast, (5) Dahomey; of the territory of Mauretania, and of a large portion of the Sahara. The area is estimated at nearly 2,000,000 sq. m., of which more than half is Saharan territory. The countries thus grouped under the common designation French West Africa comprise the greater part of the continent west of the Niger delta (which is British territory) and south of the tropic of Cancer. It embraces the upper and middle course of the Niger, the whole of the basin of the Senegal and the south-western part of the Sahara. Its most northern point on the coast is Cape Blanco, and it includes Cape Verde, the most westerly point of Africa. Along the Guinea coast the French possessions are separated from one another by colonies of Great Britain and other powers, but in the interior they unite not only with one another but with the hinterlands of Algeria and the French Congo.

In physical characteristics French West Africa presents three types: (1) a dense forest region succeeding a narrow coast belt greatly broken by lagoons; (2) moderately elevated and fertile plateaus, generally below 2000 ft., such as the region enclosed in the great bend of the Niger; (3) north of the Senegal and Niger, the desert lands forming part of the Sahara (q.v.). The most elevated districts are Futa Jallon, whence rise the Senegal, Gambia and Niger, and Gon--both massifs along the south-western edge of the plateau lands, containing heights of 5000 to 6000 ft. or more. Among the chief towns are Timbuktu and Jenne on the Niger, Porto Novo in Dahomey, and St Louis and Dakar in Senegal, Dakar being an important naval and commercial port. The inhabitants are for the most part typical Negroes, with in Senegal and in the Sahara an admixture of Berber and Arab tribes. In the upper Senegal and Futa Jallon large numbers of the inhabitants are Fula. The total population of French West Africa is estimated at about 13,000,000. The European inhabitants number about 12,000.

The French possessions in West Africa have grown by the extension inland of coast colonies, each having an independent origin. They were first brought under one general government in 1895, when they were placed under the supervision of the governor of Senegal, whose title was altered to meet the new situation. Between that date and 1905 various changes in the areas and administrations of the different colonies were made, involving the disappearance of the protectorates and military territories known as French Sudan and dependent on Senegal. These were partly absorbed in the coast colonies, whilst the central portion became the colony of Upper Senegal and Niger. At the same time the central government was freed from the direct administration of the Senegal and Niger countries (Decrees of Oct. 1902 and Oct. 1904). Over the whole of French West Africa is a governor-general, whose headquarters are at Dakar.[1] He is assisted by a government council, composed of high functionaries, including the lieutenant-governors of all colonies under his control. The central government, like all other French colonial administrations, is responsible, not to the colonists, but to the home government, and its constitution is alterable at will by presidential decree save in matters on which the chambers have expressly legislated. To it is confided financial control over the colonies, responsibility for the public debt, the direction of the departments of education and agriculture, and the carrying out of works of general utility. It alone communicates with the home authorities. Its expenses are met by the duties levied on goods and vessels entering and leaving any port of French West Africa. It may make advances to the colonies under its care, and may, in case of need, demand from them contributions to the central exchequer. The administration of justice is centralized and uniform for all French West Africa. The court of appeal sits at Dakar. There is also a uniform system of land registration adopted in 1906 and based on that in force in Australia. Subject to the limitations indicated the five colonies enjoy autonomy. The territory of Mauretania is administered by a civil commissioner under the direct control of the governor-general. The colony of Senegal is represented in the French parliament by one deputy.

Since the changes in administration effected in 1895 the commerce of French West Africa has shown a steady growth, the volume of external trade increasing in the ten years 1895-1904 from L3,151,094 to L6,238,091. In 1907 the value of the trade was L7,097,000; of this 53% was with France. Apart from military expenditure, about L600,000 a year, which is borne by France, French West Africa is self-supporting. The general budget for 1906 balanced at L1,356,000. There is a public debt of some L11,000,000, mainly incurred for works of general utility.

See SENEGAL, FRENCH GUINEA, IVORY COAST and DAHOMEY. For Anglo-French
boundaries east of the Niger see SAHARA and NIGERIA. For the
constitutional connexion between the colonies and France see FRANCE:
_Colonies_. An account of the economic situation of the colonies is
given by G. Francois in _Le Gouvernement general de l'Afrique
occidentale francaise_ (Paris, 1908). Consult also the annual _Report
on the Trade, Agriculture, &c. of French West Africa_ issued by the
British foreign office. A map of French West Africa by A. Meunier and
E. Barralier (6 sheets on the scale 1:2,000,000) was published in
Paris, 1903.

FOOTNOTE:

[1] The organization of the new government was largely the work of E.
N. Roume (b. 1858), governor-general 1902-1907, an able and energetic
official, formerly director of Asian affairs at the colonial
ministry.

FRENTANI, one of the ancient Samnite tribes which formed an independent community on the east coast of Italy. They entered the Roman alliance after their capital, Frentrum, was taken by the Romans in 305 or 304 B.C. (Livy ix. 16. 45). This town either changed its name or perished some time after the middle of the 3rd century B.C., when it was issuing coins of its own with an Oscan legend. The town Larinum, which belonged to the same people (Pliny, _Nat. Hist._ iii. 103), became latinized before 200 B.C., as its coins of that epoch bear a legend--LARINOR(VM)--which cannot reasonably be treated as anything but Latin. Several Oscan inscriptions survive from the neighbourhood of Vasto (anc. _Histonium_), which was in the Frentane area.

On the forms of the name, and for further details see R. S. Conway,
_Italic Dialects_, p. 206 ff and p. 212: for the coins id. No.
195-196.

FREPPEL, CHARLES EMILE (1827-1891), French bishop and politician, was born at Oberehnheim (Obernai), Alsace, on the 1st of June 1827. He was ordained priest in 1849 and for a short time taught history at the seminary of Strassburg, where he had previously received his clerical training. In 1854 he was appointed professor of theology at the Sorbonne, and became known as a successful preacher. He went to Rome in 1869, at the instance of Pius IX., to assist in the steps preparatory to the promulgation of the dogma of papal infallibility. He was consecrated bishop of Angers in 1870. During the Franco-German war Freppel organized a body of priests to minister to the French prisoners in Germany, and penned an eloquent protest to the emperor William I. against the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. In 1880 he was elected deputy for Brest and continued to represent it until his death. Being the only priest in the Chamber of Deputies since the death of Dupanloup, he became the chief parliamentary champion of the Church, and, though no orator, was a frequent speaker. On all ecclesiastical affairs Freppel voted with the Royalist and Catholic party, yet on questions in which French colonial prestige was involved, such as the expedition to Tunis, Tong-King, Madagascar (1881, 1883-85), he supported the government of the day. He always remained a staunch Royalist and went so far as to oppose Leo XIII.'s policy of conciliating the Republic. He died at Angers on the 12th of December 1891. Freppel's historical and theological works form 30 vols., the best known of which are: _Les Peres apostoliques et leur epoque_ (1859); _Les Apologistes chretiens au II^e siecle_ (2 vols., 1860); _Saint Irenee et l'eloquence chretienne dans la Gaule aux deux premiers siecles_ (1861); _Tertullien_ (2 vols., 1863); _Saint Cyprien et l'Eglise d'Afrique_ (1864); _Clement d'Alexandrie_ (1865); _Origene_ (2 vols., 1867).

There are interesting lives by E. Cornut (Paris, 1893) and F.
Charpentier (Angers, 1904).