Chapter XIV: Front Matter (14)

It was not, in fact, to gain a position on interior lines--with
respect to _two_ opponents--that Napoleon pushed his army to Carcare.
Before the campaign began he hoped by using the "cannon-road" to
destroy the Piedmontese _before the Austrians were in existence at
all_ as an army. But on the news from Voltri and Monte Legino he
swiftly "concentrated fire, made the breach, and broke the
equilibrium" at the spot where the interests and forces of the two
Allies converged and diverged. The hypothesis in the first case was
that the Austrians were practically non-existent, and the whole object
in the second was to breach the now connected front of the Allies
("strategic penetration") and to cause them to break up into two
separate systems. More, having made the breach, he had the choice
(which he had not before) of attacking _either_ the Austrians or the
Sardinians, as every critic has pointed out. Indeed the Austrians
offered by far the better target. But he neither wanted nor used the
new alternative. His purpose was to crush Piedmont. "My enemies saw
too much at once," said Napoleon. Singleness of aim and of purpose,
the product of clear thinking and of "personality," was the
foundation-stone of the new form of strategy.

Relative superiority.

In the course of subduing the Sardinians, Napoleon found himself
placed on interior lines between two hostile masses, and another new
idea, that of "relative superiority." reveals itself. Whereas Souham
had been in superior force (90,000 against 70,000), Napoleon (40,000
against 50,000) was not, and yet the Army of Italy was always placed
in a position of relative superiority (at first about 3 to 2 and
ultimately 2 to 1) to the immediate antagonist. "The essence of
strategy," said Napoleon in 1797, "is, with a weaker army, always to
have more force at the crucial point than the enemy. But this art is
taught neither by books nor by practice; it is a matter of tact." In
this he expressed the result of his victories on his own mind rather
than a preconceived formula which produced those victories. But the
idea, though undefined, and the method of practice, though imperfectly
worked out, were in his mind from the first. As soon as he had made
the breach, he widened it by pushing out Massena and Laharpe on the
one hand and Augereau on the other. This is mere common sense. But
immediately afterwards, though preparing to throw all available forces
against Colli, he posted Massena and Laharpe at Dego to guard, not
like Vandamme on the Lys against a real and pressing enemy, but
against a _possibility_, and he only diminished the strength and
altered the position of this containing detachment in proportion as
the Austrian danger dwindled. Later in his career he defined this
offensive-defensive system as "having all possible strength at the
decisive point," and "being nowhere vulnerable," and the art of
reconciling these two requirements, in each case as it arose, was
always the principal secret of his generalship. At first his
precautions (judged by events and not by the probabilities of the
moment) were excessive, and the offensive mass small. But the latter
was handled by a general untroubled by multiple aims and anxieties,
and if such self-confidence was equivalent to 10,000 men on the
battlefield, it was legitimate to detach 10,000 men to secure it.
These 10,000 were posted 8 m. out on the dangerous flank, not almost
back to back with the main body as Vandamme had been,[9] and although
this distance was but little compared to those of his later campaigns,
when he employed small armies for the same purpose, it sufficed in
this difficult mountain country, where the covering force enjoyed the
advantage of strong positions. Of course, if Colli had been better
concentrated, or if Beaulieu had been more active, the calculated
proportions between covering force and main body might have proved
fallacious, and the system on which Napoleon's relative superiority
rested might have broken down. But the point is that such a system,
however rough its first model, had been imagined and put into
practice.

This was Napoleon's individual art of war, as raiding bakeries and
cutting communications were Beaulieu's speciality. Napoleon made the
art into a science, and in our own time, with modern conditions of
effective, armament and communications, it is more than possible that
Moreaus and Jourdans will prove able to practise it with success. But
in the old conditions it required a Napoleon. "Strategy," said Moltke,
"is a system of expedients." But it was the intense personal force, as
well as the genius, of Napoleon that forged these expedients into a
_system_.

The first phase of the campaign satisfactorily settled, Napoleon was free to turn his attention to the "arch-enemy" to whom he was now considerably superior in numbers (35,000 to 25,000). The day after the signature of the armistice of Cherasco he began preparing for a new advance and also for the role of arbiter of the destinies of Italy. Many whispers there were, even in his own army, as to the dangers of passing on without "revolutionizing" aristocratic Genoa and monarchical Piedmont, and of bringing Venice, the pope and the Italian princes into the field against the French. But Bonaparte, flushed with victory, and better informed than the malcontents of the real condition of Italy, never hesitated. His first object was to drive out Beaulieu, his second to push through Tirol, and his only serious restriction the chance that the armistice with Piedmont would not result in a definitive treaty. Beaulieu had fallen back into Lombardy, and now bordered the Po right and left of Valenza. To achieve further progress, Napoleon had first to cross that river, and the point and method of crossing was the immediate problem, a problem the more difficult as Napoleon had no bridge train and could only make use of such existing bridges as he could seize intact.[10] If he crossed above Valenza, he would be confronted by one river-line after another, on one of which at least Beaulieu would probably stand to fight. But quite apart from the immediate problem, Napoleon's intention was less to beat the Austrians than to dislodge them. He needed a foothold in Lombardy which would make him independent of, and even a menace to, Piedmont. If this were assured, he could for a few weeks entirely ignore his communications with France and strike out against Beaulieu, dethrone the king of Sardinia, or revolutionize Parma, Modena and the papal states according to circumstances.

Piacenza.

Milan, therefore, was his objective, and Tortona-Piacenza his route thither. To give himself every chance, he had stipulated with the Piedmontese authorities for the right of passing at Valenza, and he had the satisfaction of seeing Beaulieu fall into the trap and concentrate opposite that part of the river. The French meantime had moved to the region Alessandria-Tortona. Thence on the 6th of May Bonaparte, with a picked body of troops, set out for a forced march on Piacenza, and that night the advanced guard was 30 m. on the way, at Castel San Giovanni, and Laharpe's and the cavalry divisions at Stradella, 10 m. behind them. Augereau was at Broni, Massena at Sale and Serurier near Valenza, the whole forming a rapidly extending fan, 50 m. from point to point. If the Piacenza detachment succeeded in crossing, the army was to follow rapidly in its track. If, on the other hand, Beaulieu fell back to oppose the advanced guard, the Valenza divisions would take advantage of his absence to cross there. In either case, be it observed, the Austrians were to be _evaded_, not brought to action.

On the morning of the 7th, the swift advanced guard under General Dallemagne crossed at Piacenza,[11] and, hearing of this, Bonaparte ordered every division except Serurier's thither with all possible speed. In the exultation of the moment he mocked at Beaulieu's incapacity, but the old Austrian was already on the alert. This game of manoeuvres he understood; already one of his divisions had arrived in close proximity to Dallemagne and the others were marching eastward by all available roads. It was not until the 8th that the French, after a series of partial encounters, were securely established on the left bank of the Po, and Beaulieu had given up the idea of forcing their most advanced troops to accept battle at a disadvantage. The success of the French was due less to their plan than to their mobility, which enabled them first to pass the river before the Austrians (who had actually started a day in advance of them) put in an appearance, and afterwards to be in superior numbers at each point of contact. But the episode was destined after all to culminate in a great event, which Napoleon himself indicated as the turning-point of his life. "Vendemiaire and even Montenotte did not make me think myself a superior being. It was after Lodi that the idea came to me.... That first kindled the spark of boundless ambition."

Lodi.

The idea of a battle having been given up, Beaulieu retired to the Adda, and most of his troops were safely beyond it before the French arrived near Lodi, but he felt it necessary to leave a strong rearguard on the river opposite that place to cover the reassembly of his columns after their scattered march. On the afternoon of the 10th of May, Bonaparte, with Dallemagne, Massena and Augereau, came up and seized the town. But 200 yds. of open ground had to be passed from the town gate to the bridge, and the bridge itself was another 250 in length. A few hundred yards beyond it stood the Austrians, 9000 strong with 14 guns. Napoleon brought up all his guns to prevent the enemy from destroying the bridge. Then sending all his cavalry to turn the enemy's right by a ford above the town, he waited two hours, employing the time in cannonading the Austrian lines, resting his advanced infantry and closing up Massena's and Augereau's divisions. Finally he gave the order to Dallemagne's 4000 grenadiers, who were drawn up under cover of the town wall, to rush the bridge. As the column, not more than thirty men broad, made its appearance, it was met by the concentrated fire of the Austrian guns, and half way across the bridge it checked, but Bonaparte himself and Massena rushed forward, the courage of the soldiers revived, and, while some jumped off the bridge and scrambled forward in the shallow water, the remainder stormed on, passed through the guns and drove back the infantry. This was, in bare outline, the astounding passage of the Bridge of Lodi. It was not till after the battle that Napoleon realized that only a rearguard was in front of him. When he launched his 4000 grenadiers he thought that on the other side there were four or five times that number of the enemy. No wonder, then, that after the event he recognized in himself the flash of genius, the courage to risk everything, and the "tact" which, independent of, and indeed contrary to all reasoned calculations, told him that the moment had come for "breaking the equilibrium." Lodi was a tactical success in the highest sense, in that the principles of his tactics rested on psychology--on the "sublime" part of the art of war as Saxe had called it long ago. The spirit produced the form, and Lodi was the prototype of the Napoleonic battle--contact, manoeuvre, preparation, and finally the well-timed, massed and unhesitating assault. The absence of strategical results mattered little. Many months elapsed before this bold assertion of superiority ceased to decide the battles of France and Austria.

Milan.

Next day, still under the vivid tactical impressions of the Bridge of Lodi, he postponed his occupation of the Milanese and set off in pursuit of Beaulieu, but the latter was now out of reach, and during the next few days the French divisions were installed at various points in the area Pavia-Milan-Pizzighetone, facing outwards in all dangerous directions, with a central reserve at Milan. Thus secured, Bonaparte turned his attention to political and military administration. This took the form of exacting from the neighbouring princes money, supplies and objects of art, and the once famished Army of Italy revelled in its opportunity. Now, however, the Directory, suspicious of the too successful and too sanguine young general, ordered him to turn over the command in Upper Italy to Kellermann, and to take an expeditionary corps himself into the heart of the Peninsula, there to preach the Republic and the overthrow of princes. Napoleon absolutely refused, and offered his resignation. In the end (partly by bribery) he prevailed, but the incident reawakened his desire to close with Beaulieu. This indeed he could now do with a free hand, since not only had the Milanese been effectively occupied, but also the treaty with Sardinia had been ratified.

But no sooner had he resumed the advance than it was interrupted by a rising of the peasantry in his rear. The exactions of the French had in a few days generated sparks of discontent which it was easy for the priests and the nobles to fan into open flames. Milan and Pavia as well as the countryside broke into insurrection, and at the latter place the mob forced the French commandant to surrender. Bonaparte acted swiftly and ruthlessly. Bringing back a small portion of the army with him, he punished Milan on the 25th, sacked and burned Binasco on the 26th, and on the evening of the latter day, while his cavalry swept the open country, he broke his way into Pavia with 1500 men and beat down all resistance. Napoleon's cruelty was never purposeless. He deported several scores of hostages to France, executed most of the mob leaders, and shot the French officer who had surrendered. In addition, he gave his 1500 men three hours' leave to pillage. Then, as swiftly as they had come, they returned to the army on the Oglio. From this river Napoleon advanced to the banks of the Mincio, where the remainder of the Italian campaign was fought out, both sides contemptuously disregarding Venetian neutrality.

It centred on the fortress of Mantua, which Beaulieu, too weak to keep the field, and dislodged from the Mincio in the action of Borghetto (May 30), strongly garrisoned before retiring into Tirol. Beaulieu was soon afterwards replaced by Dagobert Siegmund, count von Wurmser (b. 1724), who brought considerable reinforcements from Germany.

At this point, mindful of the narrow escape he had had of losing his command, Bonaparte thought it well to begin the resettlement of Italy. The scheme for co-operating with Moreau on the Danube was indefinitely postponed, and the Army of Italy (now reinforced from the Army of the Alps and counting 42,000 effectives) was again disposed in a protective "zone of manoeuvre," with a strong central reserve. Over 8000 men, however, garrisoned the fortresses of Piedmont and Lombardy, and the effective blockade of Mantua and political expeditions into the heart of the Peninsula soon used up the whole of this reserve.

Moreover, no siege artillery was available until the Austrians in the citadel of Milan capitulated, and thus it was not till the 18th of July that the first parallel was begun. Almost at the same moment Wurmser began his advance from Trent with 55,000 men to relieve Mantua.

Siege of Mantua.

The protective system on which his attack would fall in the first instance was now as follows:--Augereau (6000) about Legnago, Despinoy (8000) south-east of Verona, Massena (13,000) at Verona and Peschiera, with outposts on the Monte Baldo and at La Corona, Sauret (4500) at Salo and Gavardo. Serurier (12,000) was besieging Mantua, and the only central reserve was the cavalry (2000) under Kilmaine. The main road to Milan passed by Brescia. Sauret's brigade, therefore, was practically a detached post on the line of communication, and on the main defensive front less than 30,000 men were disposed at various points between La Corona and Legnago (30 m. apart), and at a distance of 15 to 20 m. from Mantua. The strength of such a disposition depended on the fighting power and handiness of the troops, who in each case would be called upon to act as a rearguard to gain time. Yet the lie of the country scarcely permitted a closer grouping, unless indeed Bonaparte fell back on the old-time device of a "circumvallation," and shut himself up, with the supplies necessary for the calculated duration of the siege, in an impregnable ring of earthworks round Mantua. This, however, he could not have done even if he had wished, for the wave of revolt radiating from Milan had made accumulations of food impossible, and the lakes above and below the fortress, besides being extremely unhealthy, would have extended the perimeter of the circumvallation so greatly that the available forces would not suffice to man it. It was not in this, but in the absence of an important central reserve that Bonaparte's disposition is open to criticism, which indeed could impugn the scheme in its entirety, as overtaxing the available resources, more easily than it could attack its details.

Positions of the night of 2-3 August 1796 shown approximately.]

If Bonaparte has occasionally been criticized for his defensive
measures, Wurmser's attack procedure has received almost universal
condemnation, as to the justice of which it may be pointed out[12]
that the object of the expedition was not to win a battle by falling
on the disunited French with a well-concentrated army, but to
overpower one, any one, of the corps covering the siege, and to press
straight forward to the relief of Mantua, i.e. to the destruction of
Bonaparte's batteries and the levelling of his trench work. The old
principle that a battle was a grave event of doubtful issue was
reinforced in the actual case by Beaulieu's late experiences of French
elan, and as a temporary victory at one point would suffice for the
purpose in hand, there was every incentive to multiply the points of
contact. The soundness of Wurmser's plan was proved by the event. New
ideas and new forces, undiscernible to a man of seventy-two years of
age, obliterated his achievement by surpassing it, but such as it
was--a limited use of force for a limited object--the venture
undeniably succeeded.

The Austrians formed three corps, one (Quasdanovich, 18,000 men) marching round the west side of the Lake of Garda on Gavardo, Salo and the Brescia road, the second (under Wurmser, about 30,000) moving directly down the Adige, and the third (Davidovich, 6000) making a detour by the Brenta valley and heading for Verona by Vicenza.

On the 29th Quasdanovich attacked Sauret at Salo, drove him towards Desenzano, and pushed on to Gavardo and thence into Brescia. Wurmser expelled Massena's advanced guard from La Corona, and captured in succession the Monte Baldo and Rivoli posts. The Brenta column approached Verona with little or no fighting. News of this column led Napoleon early in the day to close up Despinoy, Massena and Kilmaine at Castelnuovo, and to order Augereau from Legnago to advance on Montebello (19 m. east of Verona) against Davidovich's left rear. But after these orders had been despatched came the news of Sauret's defeat, and this moment was one of the most anxious in Napoleon's career. He could not make up his mind to give up the siege of Mantua, but he hurried Augereau back to the Mincio, and sent order after order to the officers on the lines of communication to send all convoys by the Cremona instead of by the Brescia road. More, he had the baggage, the treasure and the sick set in motion at once for Marcaria, and wrote to Serurier a despatch which included the words "perhaps we shall recover ourselves ... but I must take serious measures for a retreat." On the 30th he wrote: "The enemy have broken through our line in three places ... Sauret has evacuated Salo ... and the enemy has captured Brescia. You see that our communications with Milan and Verona are cut." The reports that came to him during the morning of the 30th enabled him to place the main body of the enemy opposite Massena, and this, without in the least alleviating the gravity of the situation, helped to make his course less doubtful. Augereau was ordered to hold the line of the Molinella, in case Davidovich's attack, the least-known factor, should after all prove to be serious; Massena to reconnoitre a road from Peschiera through Castiglione towards Orzinovi, and to stand fast at Castelnuovo opposite Wurmser as long as he could. Sauret and Despinoy were concentrated at Desenzano with orders on the 31st to clear the main line of retreat and to recapture Brescia. The Austrian movements were merely the continuation of those of the 29th. Quasdanovich wheeled inwards, his right finally resting on Montechiaro and his left on Salo. Wurmser drove back Massena to the west side of the Mincio. Davidovich made a slight advance.

Relief of Mantua.

In the late evening Bonaparte held a council of war at Roverbella. The proceedings of this council are unknown, but it at any rate enabled Napoleon to see clearly and to act. Hitherto he had been covering the siege of Mantua with various detachments, the defeat of any one of which might be fatal to the enterprise. Thus, when he had lost his main line of retreat, he could assemble no more than 8000 men at Desenzano to win it back. Now, however, he made up his mind that the siege could not be continued, and bitter as the decision must have been, it gave him freedom. At this moment of crisis the instincts of the great captain came into play, and showed the way to a victory that would more than counterbalance the now inevitable failure. Serurier was ordered to spike the 140 siege guns that had been so welcome a few days before, and, after sending part of his force to Augereau, to establish himself with the rest at Marcaria on the Cremona road. The field forces were to be used on interior lines. On the 31st Sauret, Despinoy, Augereau and Kilmaine advanced westward against Quasdanovich. The first two found the Austrians at Salo and Lonato and drove them back, while with Augereau and the cavalry Bonaparte himself made a forced march on Brescia, never halting night or day till he reached the town and recovered his depots. Meantime Serurier had retired (night of July 31), Massena had gradually drawn in towards Lonato, and Wurmser's advanced guard triumphantly entered the fortress (August 1).

Lonato and Castiglione.

The Austrian general now formed the plan of crushing Bonaparte between Quasdanovich and his own main body. But meantime Quasdanovich had evacuated Brescia under the threat of Bonaparte's advance and was now fighting a long irregular action with Despinoy and Sauret about Gavardo and Salo, and Bonaparte, having missed his expected target, had brought Augereau by another severe march back to Montechiaro on the Chiese. Massena was now assembled between Lonato and Ponte San Marco, and Serurier was retiring quietly on Marcaria. Wurmser's main body, weakened by the detachment sent to Mantua, crossed the Mincio about Valeggio and Goito on the 2nd, and penetrated as far as Castiglione, whence Massena's rearguard was expelled. But a renewed advance of Quasdanovich, ordered by Wurmser, which drove Sauret and Despinoy back on Brescia and Lonato, in the end only placed a strong detachment of the Austrians within striking distance of Massena, who on the 3rd attacked it, front to front, and by sheer fighting destroyed it, while at the same time Augereau recaptured Castiglione from Wurmser. On the 4th Sauret and Despinoy pressed back Quasdanovich beyond Salo and Gavardo. One of the Austrian columns, finding itself isolated and unable to retreat with the others, turned back to break its way through to Wurmser, and was annihilated by Massena in the neighbourhood of Lonato. On this day Augereau fought his way towards Solferino, and Wurmser, thinking rightly or wrongly that he could not now retire to the Mincio without a battle, drew up his whole force, close on 30,000 men, in the plain between Solferino and Medole. The finale may be described in very few words. Bonaparte, convinced that no more was to be feared from Quasdanovich, and seeing that Wurmser meant to fight, called in Despinoy's division to the main body and sent orders to Serurier, then far distant on the Cremona road, to march against the left flank of the Austrians. On the 5th the battle of Castiglione was fought. Closely contested in the first hours of the frontal attack till Serurier's arrival decided the day, it ended in the retreat of the Austrians over the Mincio and into Tirol whence they had come.

Thus the new way had failed to keep back Wurmser, and the old had
failed to crush Napoleon. Each was the result of its own conditions.
In former wars a commander threatened as Napoleon was, would have
fallen back at once to the Adda, abandoning the siege in such good
time that he would have been able to bring off his siege artillery.
Instead of this Bonaparte hesitated long enough to lose it, which,
according to accepted canons was a waste, and held his ground, which
was, by the same rules, sheer madness. But Revolutionary discipline
was not firm enough to stand a retreat. Once it turned back, the army
would have streamed away to Milan and perhaps to the Alps (cf. 1799),
and the only alternative to complete dissolution therefore was
fighting.

As to the manner of this fighting, even the principle of "relative
superiority" failed him so long as he was endeavouring to cover the
siege and again when his chief care was to protect his new line of
retreat and to clear his old. In this period, viz. up to his return
from Brescia on the 2nd of August, the only "mass" he collected
delivered a blow in the air, while the covering detachments had to
fight hard for bare existence. Once released from its trammels, the
Napoleonic principle had fair play. He stood between Wurmser and
Quasdanovich, ready to fight either or both. The latter was crushed,
thanks to local superiority and the resolute leading of Massena, but
at Castiglione Wurmser actually outnumbered his opponent till the last
of Napoleon's precautionary dispositions had been given up, and
Serurier brought back from the "alternative line of retreat" to the
battlefield. The moral is, again, that it was not the mere fact of
being on interior lines that gave Napoleon the victory, but his
"tact," his fine appreciation of the chances in his favour, measured
in terms of time, space, attacking force and containing power. All
these factors were greatly influenced by the ground, which favoured
the swarms and columns of the French and deprived the brilliant
Austrian cavalry of its power to act. But of far greater importance
was the mobility that Napoleon's personal force imparted to the
French. Napoleon himself rode five horses to death in three days, and
Augereau's division marched from Roverbella to Brescia and back to
Montechiaro, a total distance of nearly 50 m., in about thirty-six
hours. This indeed was the foundation of his "relative superiority,"
for every hour saved in the time of marching meant more freedom to
destroy one corps before the rest could overwhelm the covering
detachments and come to its assistance.

Wurmser's plan for the relief of Mantua, suited to its purpose,
succeeded. But when he made his objective the French field army, he
had to take his own army as he found it, disposed for an altogether
different purpose. A properly, combined attack of convergent columns
framed _ab initio_ by a good staff officer, such as Mack, might indeed
have given good results. But the success of such a plan depends
principally on the assailant's original possession of the initiative,
and not on the chances of his being able to win it over to his own
side when operations, as here, are already in progress. When the time
came to improvise such a plan, the initiative had passed over to
Napoleon, and the plan was foredoomed.

By the end of the second week in August the blockade of Mantua had been resumed, without siege guns. But still under the impression of a great victory gained, Bonaparte was planning a long forward stride. He thought that by advancing past Mantua directly on Trieste and thence onwards to the Semmering he could impose a peace on the emperor. The Directory, however, which had by now focussed its attention on the German campaign, ordered him to pass through Tirol and to co-operate with Moreau, and this plan, Bonaparte, though protesting against an Alpine venture being made so late in the year, prepared to execute, drawing in reinforcements and collecting great quantities of supplies in boats on the Adige and Lake Garda. Wurmser was thought to have posted his main body near Trent, and to have detached one division to Bassano "to cover Trieste." The French advanced northward on the 2nd, in three disconnected columns (precisely as Wurmser had done in the reverse direction at the end of July)--Massena (13,000) from Rivoli to Ala, Augereau (9000) from Verona by hill roads, keeping on his right rear, Vaubois (11,000) round the Lake of Garda by Riva and Torbole. Sahuguet's division (8000) remained before Mantua. The French divisions successfully combined and drove the enemy before them to Trent.

There, however, they missed their target. Wurmser had already drawn over the bulk of his army (22,000) into the Val Sugana, whence, with the Bassano division as his advanced guard, he intended once more to relieve Mantua, while Davidovich with 13,000 (excluding detachments) was to hold Tirol against any attempt of Bonaparte to join forces with Moreau.

Thus Austria was preparing to hazard a second (as in the event she hazarded a third and a fourth) highly trained and expensive professional army in the struggle for the preservation of a fortress, and we must conclude that there were weighty reasons which actuated so notoriously cautious a body as the Council of War in making this unconditional venture. While Mantua stood, Napoleon, for all his energy and sanguineness, could not press forward into Friuli and Carniola, and immunity from a Republican visitation was above all else important for the Vienna statesmen, governing as they did more or less discontented and heterogeneous populations that had not felt the pressure of war for a century and more. The Austrians, so far as is known, desired no more than to hold their own. They no longer possessed the superiority of _moral_ that guarantees victory to one side when both are materially equal. There was therefore nothing to be gained, commensurate with the risk involved, by fighting a battle in the open field. _In Italien siegt nicht die Kavallerie_ was an old saying in the Austrian army, and therefore the Austrians could not hope to win a victory of the first magnitude. The only practicable alternative was to strengthen Mantua as opportunities offered themselves, and to prolong the passive resistance as much as possible. Napoleon's own practice in providing for secondary theatres of war was to economize forces and to delay a decision, and the fault of the Austrians, viewed from a purely military standpoint, was that they squandered, instead of economizing, their forces to gain time. If we neglect pure theory, and regard strategy as the handmaiden of statesmanship--which fundamentally it is--we cannot condemn the Vienna authorities unless it be first proved that they grossly exaggerated the possible results of Bonaparte's threatened irruption. And if their capacity for judging the political situation be admitted, it naturally follows that their object was to preserve Mantua _at all costs_--which object Wurmser, though invariably defeated in action, did in fact accomplish.

Bassano.

When Massena entered Trent on the morning of the 5th of September, Napoleon became aware that the force in his front was a mere detachment, and news soon came in that Wurmser was in the Val Sugana about Primolano and at Bassano. This move he supposed to be intended to cover Trieste, being influenced by his own hopes of advancing in that direction, and underestimating the importance, to the Austrians, of preserving Mantua. He therefore informed the Directory that he could not proceed with the Tirol scheme, and spent one more day in driving Davidovich well away from Trent. Then, leaving Vaubois to watch him, Napoleon marched Augereau and Massena, with a rapidity he scarcely ever surpassed, into the Val Sugana. Wurmser's rearguard was attacked and defeated again and again, and Wurmser himself felt compelled to stand and fight, in the hope of checking the pursuit before going forward into the plains. Half his army had already reached Montebello on the Verona road, and with the rear half he posted himself at Bassano, where on the 8th he was attacked and defeated with heavy losses. Then began a strategic pursuit or general chase, and in this the mobility of the French should have finished the work so well begun by their tactics.

But Napoleon directed the pursuers so as to cut off Wurmser from Trieste, not from Mantua. Massena followed up the Austrians to Vicenza, while Augereau hurried towards Padua, and it was not until late on the 9th that Bonaparte realized that his opponent was heading for Mantua via Legnago. On the 10th Massena crossed the Adige at Ronco, while Augereau from Padua reached Montagnara. Sahuguet from Mantua and Kilmaine from Verona joined forces at Castellaro on the 11th, with orders to interpose between Wurmser and the fortress. Wurmser meantime had halted for a day at Legnago, to restore order, and had then resumed his march. It was almost too late, for in the evening, after having to push aside the head of Massena's column at Cerea, he had only reached Nogara, some miles short of Castellaro, and close upon his rear was Augereau, who reached Legnago that night. On the 12th, eluding Sahuguet by a detour to the southward, he reached Mantua, with all the columns of the French, weary as most of them were, in hot pursuit. After an attempt to keep the open field, defeated in a general action on the 15th, the relieving force was merged in the garrison, now some 28,000 in all. So ended the episode of Bassano, the most brilliant feature of which as usual was the marching power of the French infantry. This time it sufficed to redeem even strategical misconceptions and misdirections. Between the 5th and the 11th, besides fighting three actions, Massena had marched 100 m. and Augereau 114.

Feldzeugmeister Alvintzi was now appointed to command a new army of relief. This time the mere distribution of the troops imposed a concentric advance of separate columns, for practically the whole of the fresh forces available were in Carniola, the Military Frontier, &c., while Davidovich was still in Tirol. Alvintzi's intention was to assemble his new army (29,000) in Friuli, and to move on Bassano, which was to be occupied on the 4th of November. Meantime Davidovich (18,000) was to capture Trent, and the two columns were to connect by the Val Sugana. All being well, Alvintzi and Davidovich, still separate, were then to converge on the Adige between Verona and Legnago. Wurmser was to co-operate by vigorous sorties. At this time Napoleon's protective system was as follows: Kilmaine (9000) investing Mantua, Vaubois (10,000) at Trent, and Massena (9000) at Bassano and Treviso, Augereau (9000) and Macquard (3000) at Verona and Villafranca constituting, for the first time in these operations, important mobile reserves. Hearing of Alvintzi's approach in good time, he meant first to drive back Davidovich, then with Augereau, Massena, Macquard and 3000 of Vaubois's force to fall upon Alvintzi, who, he calculated, would at this stage have reached Bassano, and finally to send back a large force through the Val Sugana to attack Davidovich. This plan practically failed.

Caldiero.

Instead of advancing, Vaubois was driven steadily backward. By the 6th, Davidovich had fought his way almost to Roveredo, and Alvintzi had reached Bassano and was there successfully repelling the attacks of Massena and Augereau. That night Napoleon drew back to Vicenza. On the 7th Davidovich drove in Vaubois to Corona and Rivoli, and Alvintzi came within 5 m. of Vicenza. Napoleon watched carefully for an opportunity to strike out, and on the 8th massed his troops closely around the central point of Verona. On the 9th, to give himself air, he ordered Massena to join Vaubois, and to drive back Davidovich at all costs. But before this order was executed, reports came in to the effect that Davidovich had suspended his advance. The 10th and 11th were spent by both sides in relative inaction, the French waiting on events and opportunities, the Austrians resting after their prolonged exertions. Then, on the afternoon of the 11th, being informed that Alvintzi was approaching, Napoleon decided to attack him. On the 12th the advanced guard of Alvintzi's army was furiously assailed in the position of Caldiero. But the troops in rear came up rapidly, and by 4 P.M. the French were defeated all along the line and in retreat on Verona. Napoleon's situation was now indeed precarious. He was on "interior lines," it is true, but he had neither the force nor the space necessary for the delivery of rapid radial blows. Alvintzi was in superior numbers, as the battle of Caldiero had proved, and at any moment Davidovich, who had twice Vaubois's force, might advance to the attack of Rivoli. The reserves had proved insufficient, and Kilmaine had to be called up from Mantua, which was thus for the third time freed from the blockaders. Again the alternatives were retreat, in whatever order was possible to Republican armies, and beating the nearest enemy at any sacrifice. Napoleon chose the latter, though it was not until the evening of the 14th that he actually issued the fateful order.

The Austrians, too, had selected the 15th as the date of their final advance on Verona, Davidovich from the north, Alvintzi via Zevio from the south. But Napoleon was no longer there; leaving Vaubois to hold Davidovich as best he might, and posting only 3000 men in Verona, he had collected the rest of his small army between Albaro and Ronco. His plan seems to have been to cross the Adige well in rear of the Austrians, to march north on to the Verona-Vicenza highway, and there, supplying himself from their convoys, to fight to the last. On the 15th he had written to the Directory, "The weakness and the exhaustion of the army causes me to fear the worst. We are perhaps on the eve of losing Italy." In this extremity of danger the troops passed the Adige in three columns near Ronco and Albaredo, and marched forward along the dikes, with deep marshes and pools on either hand. If Napoleon's intention was to reach the dry open ground of S. Bonifacio in rear of the Austrians, it was not realized, for the Austrian army, instead of being at the gates of Verona, was still between Caldiero and S. Bonifacio, heading, as we know, for Zevio. Thus Alvintzi was able, easily and swiftly, to wheel to the south.

Arcola.

The battle of Arcola almost defies description. The first day passed in a series of resultless encounters between the heads of the columns as they met on the dikes. In the evening Bonaparte withdrew over the Adige, expecting at every moment to be summoned to Vaubois's aid. But Davidovich remained inactive, and on the 16th the French again crossed the river. Massena from Ronco advanced on Porcile, driving the Austrians along the causeway thither, but on the side of Arcola, Alvintzi had deployed a considerable part of his forces on the edge of the marshes, within musket shot of the causeway by which Bonaparte and Augereau had to pass, along the Austrian front, to reach the bridge of Arcola. In these circumstances the second day's battle was more murderous and no more decisive than the first, and again the French retreated to Ronco. But Davidovich again stood still, and with incredible obstinacy Bonaparte ordered a third assault for the 17th, using indeed more tactical expedients than before, but calculating chiefly on the fighting powers of his men and on the exhaustion of the enemy. Massena again advanced on Porcile, Robert's brigade on Arcola, but the rest, under Augereau, were to pass the Alpone near its confluence with the Adige, and joining various small bodies which passed the main stream lower down, to storm forward on dry ground to Arcola. The Austrians, however, themselves advanced from Arcola, overwhelmed Robert's brigade on the causeway and almost reached Ronco. This was perhaps the crisis of the battle, for Augereau's force was now on the other side of the stream, and Massena, with his back to the new danger, was approaching Porcile. But the fire of a deployed regiment stopped the head of the Austrian column; Massena, turning about, cut into its flank on the dike; and Augereau, gathering force, was approaching Arcola from the south. The bridge and the village were evacuated soon afterwards, and Massena and Augereau began to extend in the plain beyond. But the Austrians still sullenly resisted. It was at this moment that Bonaparte secured victory by a mere ruse, but a ruse which would have been unprofitable and ridiculous had it not been based on his fine sense of the moral conditions. Both sides were nearly fought out, and he sent a few trumpeters to the rear of the Austrian army to sound the charge. They did so, and in a few minutes the Austrians were streaming back to S. Bonifacio. This ended the drama of Arcola, which more than any other episode of these wars, perhaps of any wars in modern history, centres on the personality of the hero. It is said that the French fought without spirit on the first day, and yet on the second and third Bonaparte had so thoroughly imbued them with his own will to conquer that in the end they prevailed over an enemy nearly twice their own strength.

The climax was reached just in time, for on the 17th Vaubois was completely defeated at Rivoli and withdrew to Peschiera, leaving the Verona and Mantua roads completely open to Davidovich. But on the 19th Napoleon turned upon him, and combining the forces of Vaubois, Massena and Augereau against him, drove him back to Trent. Meantime Alvintzi returned from Vicenza to San Bonifacio and Caldiero (November 21st), and Bonaparte at once stopped the pursuit of Davidovich. On the return of the French main body to Verona, Alvintzi finally withdrew, Wurmser, who had emerged from Mantua on the 23rd, was driven in again, and this epilogue of the great struggle came to a feeble end because neither side was now capable of prolonging the crisis.

Alvintzi renewed his advance in January 1797 with all the forces that could be assembled for a last attempt to save Mantua. At this time 8000 men under Serurier blockaded Mantua, Massena (9000) was at Verona, Joubert (Vaubois's successor) at Rivoli with 10,000, Augereau at Legnago with 9000. In reserve were Rey's division (4000) between Brescia and Montechiaro, and Victor's brigade at Goito and Castelnuovo. On the other side, Alvintzi had 9000 men under Provera at Padua, 6000 under Bayalic at Bassano, and he himself with 28,000 men stood in the Tirol about Trent. This time he intended to make his principal effort on the Rivoli side. Provera was to capture Legnago on the 9th of January, and Bayalic Verona on the 12th, while the main army was to deliver its blow against the Rivoli position on the 13th.

Rivoli.

The first marches of this scheme were duly carried out, and several days elapsed before Napoleon was able to discern the direction of the real attack. Augereau fell back, skirmishing a little, as Provera's and Bayalic's advance developed. On the 11th, when the latter was nearing Verona, Alvintzi's leading troops appeared in front of the Rivoli position. On the 12th Bayalic with a weak force (he had sent reinforcements to Alvintzi by the Val Pantena) made an unsuccessful attack on Verona, Provera, farther south, remaining inactive. On the 13th Napoleon, still in doubt, launched Massena's division against Bayalic, who was driven back to San Bonifacio; but at the same time definite news came from Joubert that Alvintzi's main army was in front of La Corona. From this point begins the decisive, though by no means the most intense or dramatic, struggle of the campaign. Once he felt sure of the situation Napoleon acted promptly. Joubert was ordered to hold on to Rivoli at all costs. Rey was brought up by a forced march to Castelnuovo, where Victor joined him, and ahead of them both Massena was hurried on to Rivoli. Napoleon himself joined Joubert on the night of the 13th. There he saw the watch-fires of the enemy in a semicircle around him, for Alvintzi, thinking that he had only to deal with one division, had begun a widespread enveloping attack. The horns of this attack were as yet so far distant that Napoleon, instead of extending on an equal front, only spread out a few regiments to gain an hour or two and to keep the ground for Massena and Rey, and on the morning of January 14th, with 10,000 men in hand against 26,000, he fell upon the central columns of the enemy as they advanced up the steep broken slopes of the foreground. The fighting was severe, but Bonaparte had the advantage. Massena arrived at 9 A.M., and a little later the column of Quasdanovich, which had moved along the Adige and was now attempting to gain a foothold on the plateau in rear of Joubert, was crushed by the converging fire of Joubert's right brigade and by Massena's guns, their rout being completed by the charge of a handful of cavalry under Lasalle. The right horn of Alvintzi's attack, when at last it swung in upon Napoleon's rear, was caught between Massena and the advancing troops of Rey and annihilated, and even before this the dispirited Austrians were in full retreat. A last alarm, caused by the appearance of a French infantry regiment in their rear (this had crossed the lake in boats from Salo), completed their demoralization, and though less than 2000 had been killed and wounded, some 12,000 Austrian prisoners were left in the hands of the victors. Rivoli was indeed a moral triumph. After the ordeal of Arcola, the victory of the French was a foregone conclusion at each point of contact. Napoleon hesitated, or rather refrained from striking, so long as his information was incomplete, but he knew now from experience that his covering detachment, if well led, could not only hold its own without assistance until it had gained the necessary information, but could still give the rest of the army time to act upon it. Then, when the centre of gravity had been ascertained, the French divisions hurried thither, caught the enemy in the act of manoeuvring and broke them up. And if that confidence in success which made all this possible needs a special illustration, it may be found in Napoleon's sending Murat's regiment over the lake to place a mere two thousand bayonets across the line of retreat of a whole army. Alvintzi's manoeuvre was faulty neither strategically in the first instance nor tactically as regards the project of enveloping Joubert on the 14th. It failed because Joubert and his men were better soldiers than his own, and because a French division could move twice as fast as an Austrian, and from these two factors a new form of war was evolved, the essence of which was that, for a given time and in a given area, a small force of the French should engage and hold a much larger force of the enemy.

The remaining operations can be very briefly summarized. Provera,
still advancing on Mantua, joined hands there with Wurmser, and for a
time held Serurier at a disadvantage. But hearing of this, Napoleon
sent back Massena from the field of Rivoli, and that general, with
Augereau and Serurier, not only forced Wurmser to retire again into
the fortress, but compelled Provera to lay down his arms. On the 2nd
of February 1797, after a long and honourable defence, Mantua, and
with it what was left of Wurmser's army, surrendered.

Leoben.

The campaign of 1797, which ended the war of the First Coalition, was
the brilliant sequel of these hard-won victories. Austria had decided
to save Mantua at all costs, and had lost her armies in the attempt, a
loss which was not compensated by the "strategic" victories of the
archduke. Thus the Republican "visitation" of Carinthia and Carniola
was one swift march--politically glorious, if dangerous from a purely
military standpoint--of Napoleon's army to the Semmering. The
archduke, who was called thither from Germany, could do no more than
fight a few rearguard actions, and make threats against Napoleon's
rear, which the latter, with his usual "tact," ignored. On the Rhine,
as in 1795 and 1796, the armies of the Sambre-and-Meuse (Hoche) and
the Rhine-and-Moselle (Moreau) were opposed by the armies of the Lower
Rhine (Werneck) and of the Upper Rhine (Latour). Moreau crossed the
river near Strassburg and fought a series of minor actions. Hoche,
like his predecessors, crossed at Dusseldorf and Neuwied and fought
his way to the Lahn, where for the last time in the history of these
wars, there was an irregular widespread battle. But Hoche, in this his
last campaign, displayed the brilliant energy of his first, and
delivered the "series of incessant blows" that Carnot had urged upon
Jourdan the year before. Werneck was driven with ever-increasing
losses from the lower Lahn to Wetzlar and Giessen. Thence, pressed
hard by the French left wing under Championnet, he retired on the
Nidda, only to find that Hoche's right had swung completely round him.
Nothing but the news of the armistice of Leoben saved him from
envelopment and surrender. This general armistice was signed by
Bonaparte, on his own authority and to the intense chagrin of the
Directory and of Hoche, on the 18th of April, and was the basis of the
peace of Campo Formio.

NAPOLEON IN EGYPT