Chapter XVI: Part 16

+---------------------+----------------+---+---------+------+---------------------------+----------------------------------------+
| | | O | Sub- | | | |
| | | p | stages | Von | A. de Lapparent, | |
| Stages[1] | Ammonite Zones | p | of | Buch | _Traité_, 5th ed. | Alpine |
| | | e | Quen- | | | |
| | | l | stedt | | | |
+---+---+-------------+----------------+---+---------+------+------------+----------+---+----------------------------------------+
| | U | | Perisphinctes | | | | Purbeckien | | | \ |
| | p | Purbeckian | transitorius | | | U | or | | | | |
| | p | | | | | p | Aquilonien | | | | |
| | e +-------------+ | | | p +------------+ Port- | | | |
| | r | | Perisphinctes | | | e | | landien | N | | |
| | | Portlandian | giganteus | | [zeta] | r | Bononien | | é | | _Diphya_-Kalke |
| | O | | Olcostephanus | | | | | | o | | |
| | o | | gigas | | | o | | | j | | Ammonitico |
| | l +-------------+ | | | r +------------+----------+ u | | rosso of \ _Acanthicus_ |
| | i | | Reineckia | |[epsilon]| | Virgulien | | r | > Tithonien, | Beds |
| | t | Kimeridgian | eudoxus | | [delta] | W | | Kimerid- | a | | southern | |
| | e | | Oppelia | | [gamma] | h +------------+ gien | s | | Alps | |
| | s | | tenuilobata | M | | i | Pteroceran | | s | | | |
| +---+-------------+ | a | | t +------------+----------+ i | | | |
| | M | Corallian | Peltoceras | l | [beta] | e | Astartien | Sequa- | q | | | |
| | i | | bimammatum | m | | | Rauracien | nien | u | | | |
| | d +-------------+ | | | J +------------+----------+ e | | | |
| | d | | Peltoceras | | | u | Argovien | | | | | |
| | l | Oxfordian | transversarium| | [alpha] | r +------------+ Oxfor- | | / | Aptychen- |
| O | e | | Aspidoceras | | | a | Neuvizien | dien | | > Kalke and |
| O | | | perarmatum | | | | | | | | Radiolariengesteine |
| L | O +-------------+ | | +------+------------+----------+ | | |
| I | o | | Peltoceras | | | | | | | | |
| T | l | | athleta | | [zeta] | | Upper | | | | |
| E | i | Callovian | Cosmoceras | | | | Divesien | Callovien| | | |
| S | t | | Jason | | | M | Lower | | | | |
| | e | | Macrocephalites| | | i | Divesien | | | | |
| | s | | macrocephalus | | | d | | | | | |
| +---+-------------+ +---+ | d +------------+----------+ | | Posidonien Beds|
| | | | Oppelia | |[epsilon]| l | | | | (S. Alps) |
| | L | Bathonian | aspidoides | | | e | Bathonien | | | Klauss Beds |
| | o | | Parkinsonia | | | | | | | (N. Alps) |
| | w | | ferruginea | | | o | | | / |
| | e +-------------+ | | | r +------------+ | |
| | r | | Parkinsonia | | | | | M | |
| | | | Parkinsoni | D | | B | | é | |
| | O | | Coeloceras | o | | r | | s | _Sauzei_-Kalke |
| | o | Bajocian | Humphresianus | g | | o | | o | |
| | l | (Inferior | Sphæroceras | g | | w | Bajocien | j | |
| | i | Oolite) | Sauzei | e | | n | | u | |
| | t | | Sonninia | r | [delta] | | | r | |
| | e | | Sowerbyi | | [gamma] | J | | a | |
| | s | | Harpoceras | | [beta] | u | | s | |
| | | | Murchisonae | | | r | | s | Oolite of San |
+---+---+-------------+----------------+ | | a +------------+ | i | Vigilio |
| | | Harpoceras | | [alpha] | | | | q | |
| | (_passage beds_)| (Lioceras) | | | | | | u | |
| | | opalinum | | | | | | e | |
+---+-----------------+----------------+---+---------+------+ | | | |
| | | Lytoceras | | [zeta] | | | | | |
| | Upper Lias | jurense | | | | | | | |
| | | Posidonia | |[epsilon]| | Toarcien | | | |
| | | Bronni | | | | | | | |
| +-----------------+ | | | +------------+ | | \ |
| | | Amaltheus | | [beta] | | | | | \ | |
| | | spinatus | | | | | | | | | |
| | | Amaltheus | | | L | | | | | | |
| | | margaritatus | | | o | | | | | | |
| | Middle Lias | Dactylioceras | | | w | Charmou- | | | | | |
| | | Davoëi | | | e | thien | | | | Adne- | \ |
| | | Phylloceras | | [gamma] | r | | | | > ter | | |
| | | ibex | L | | | | | É | | Kalke| | |
| | | Aegoceras | i | | o | | | o | | | | \ |
| | | Jamesoni | a | | r | | | j | | | Brachio- | Algäu | |
| L +-----------------+ | s | | +------------+ | u | | > pod or > Beds | |
| I | | Arietites | | [beta] | B | | S | r | \ | | Hierlatz| | |
| A | | raricostatus | | | l | | y | a | | / | facies | | |
| S | | Oxynoticeras | | | a | | s | s | | | | | Flec- |
| | | oxynotum | | | c | | t | s | | | / > ken- |
| | | Arietites | | | k | | è | i | | | | mergel|
| | Lower Lias | obtusus | | | | | m | q | | | | |
| | | Arietites | | | J | | e | u | | | | |
| | | Bucklandi | | | u | | | e | | Gres- | | |
| | | Schlotheimia | | | r | | L | | > tener | | |
| | | angulata | | | a | Sine- | i | | | Beds | | |
| | | Psiloceras | | [alpha] | | mourien | a | | | (Coal) | / |
| | | planorbis | | | | Hettangien | s | | | | |
| +-----------------+----------------+---+---------+ | (part) | s | | | / |
| | | | | | | Hettangien | i | | | |
| | | | | | | (part) | q | | | |
| | | | | | | Rhétien | u | | | |
| | | | | | | |Infra- e | | | |
| | | | | | | |Lias | | / |
+---+-----------------+----------------+---+---------+------+------------+----------+---+----------------------------------------+

_Life in the Jurassic Period._--The expansion of the sea during this
period, with the formation of broad sheets of shallow and probably
warmish water, appears to have been favourable to many forms of marine
life. Under these conditions several groups of organisms developed
rapidly along new directions, so that the Jurassic period as a whole
came to have a fauna differing clearly and distinctly from the
preceding Palaeozoic or succeeding Tertiary faunas. In the seas, all
the main groups were represented as they are to-day. Corals were
abundant, and in later portions of the period covered large areas in
Europe; the modern type of coral became dominant; besides
reef-building forms such as _Thamnastrea_, _Isastrea_, _Thecosmilia_,
there were numerous single forms like _Montivaltia_. Crinoids existed
in great numbers in some of the shallow seas; compared with Palaeozoic
forms there is a marked reduction in the size of the calyx with a
great extension in the number of arms and pinnules; _Pentacrinus_,
_Eugeniacrinus_, _Apiocrinus_ are all well known; Antedon was a
stalkless genus. Echinoids (urchins) were gradually developing the
so-called "irregular" type, _Echinobrissus_, _Holectypus_,
_Collyrites_, _Clypeus_, but the "regular" forms prevailed, _Cidaris_,
_Hemicidaris_, _Acrosalenia_. Sponges were important rock-builders in
Upper Jurassic times (_Spongiten Kalk_); they include lithistids such
as _Cnemediastrum_, _Hyalotragus_, _Peronidella_; hexactinellids,
_Tremadictyon_, _Craticularia_; and horny sponges have been found in
the Lias and Middle Jurassic.

Polyzoa are found abundantly in some of the beds, _Stomatopora_,
_Berenicia_, &c. Brachiopods were represented principally by
terebratulids (_Terebratula_, _Waldheimia_, _Megerlea_), and by
rhynchonellids; _Thecae_, _Lingula_ and _Crania_ were also present.
The Palaeozoic spirifirids and athyrids still lingered into the Lias.
More important than the brachiopods were the pelecypods; _Ostrea_,
_Exogyra_, _Gryphaea_ were very abundant (Gryphite limestone, Gryphite
grit); the genus _Trigonia_, now restricted to Australian waters, was
present in great variety; _Aucella_, _Lima_, _Pecten_, _Pseudomonotis_
_Gervillia_, _Astarte_, _Diceras_, _Isocardia_, _Pleuromya_ may be
mentioned out of many others. Amongst the gasteropods the
_Pleurotomariidae_ and _Turbinidae_ reached their maximum development;
the Palaeozoic _Conularia_ lived to see the beginning of this period
(_Pleurotomaria_, _Nerinea_, _Pteroceras_, _Cerithium_, _Turritella_).

Cephalopods flourished everywhere; first in importance were the
ammonites; the Triassic genera _Phylloceras_ and _Lytoceras_ were
still found in the Jurassic waters, but all the other numerous genera
were new, and their shells are found with every variation of size and
ornamentation. Some are characteristic of the older Jurassic rocks,
_Arietites_, _Aegoceras_, _Amaltheus_, _Harpoceras_, _Oxynoticeras_,
_Stepheoceras_, and the two genera mentioned above; in the middle
stages are found _Cosmoceras_, _Perisphinctes_, _Cardioceras_,
_Kepplerites Aspidoceras_; in the upper stages _Olcostephanus_,
_Perisphinctes_, _Reineckia_, _Oppelia_. So regularly do certain forms
characterize definite horizons in the rocks that some thirty zones
have been distinguished in Europe, and many of them can be traced even
as far as India. Another cephalopod group, the belemnites, that had
been dimly outlined in the preceding Trias, now advanced rapidly in
numbers and in variety of form, and they, like the ammonites, have
proved of great value as zone-indicators. The Sepioids or cuttlefish
made their first appearance in this period (_Beloteuthis_,
_Geoteuthis_,) and their ink-bags can still be traced in examples from
the Lias and lithographic limestone. Nautiloids existed but they were
somewhat rare.

A great change had come over the crustaceans; in place of the
Palaeozoic trilobites we find long-tailed lobster-like forms,
_Penaeus_, _Eryon_, _Magila_, and the broad crab-like type first
appeared in _Prosopon_. Isopods were represented by _Archaeoniscus_
and others. Insects have left fairly abundant remains in the Lias of
England, Schambelen (Switzerland) and Dobbertin (Mecklenburg), and
also in the English Purbeck. Neuropterous forms predominate, but
hemiptera occur from the Lias upwards; the earliest known flies
(Diptera) and ants (Hymenoptera) appeared; orthoptera, cockroaches,
crickets, beetles, &c., are found in the Lias, Stonesfield slate and
Purbeck beds.

Fishes were approaching the modern forms during this period,
heterocercal ganoids becoming scarce (the _Coelacanthidae_ reached
their maximum development), while the homocercal forms were abundant
(_Gyrodus_, _Microdon_, _Lepidosteus_, _Lepidotus_, _Dapedius_). The
Chimaeridae, sea-cats, made their appearance (_Squaloraja_). The
ancestors of the modern sturgeons, garpikes and selachians, _Hybodus_,
_Acrodus_ were numerous. Bony-fish were represented by the small
_Leptolepis_.

So important a place was occupied by reptiles during this period that
it has been well described as the "age of reptiles." In the seas the
fish-shaped Ichthyosaurs and long-necked Plesiosaurs dwelt in great
numbers and reached their maximum development; the latter ranged in
size from 6 to 40 ft. in length. The Pterosaurs, with bat-like wings
and pneumatic bones and keeled breast-bone, flew over the land;
_Pterodactyl_ with short tail and _Rhamphorhyncus_ with long tail are
the best known. Curiously modified crocodilians appeared late in the
period (_Mystriosaurus_, _Geosaurus_, _Steneosaurus_, _Teleosaurus_).
But even more striking than any of the above were the Dinosaurs; these
ranged in size from a creature no larger than a rabbit up to the
gigantic _Atlantosaurus_, 100 ft. long, in the Jurassic of Wyoming.
Both herbivorous and carnivorous forms were present; _Brontosaurus_,
_Megalosaurus_, _Stegosaurus_, _Cetiosaurus_, _Diplodocus_,
_Ceratosaurus_ and _Campsognathus_ are a few of the genera. By
comparison with the Dinosaurs the mammals took a very subordinate
position in Jurassic times; only a few jaws have been found, belonging
to quite small creatures; they appear to have been marsupials and were
probably insectivorous (_Plagiaulax Bolodon_, _Triconodon_,
_Phascolotherium_, _Stylacodon_). Of great interest are the remains of
the earliest known bird (_Archaeopteryx_) from the Solenhofen slates
of Bavaria. Although this was a great advance beyond the Pterodactyls
in avian characters, yet many reptilian features were retained.

Comparatively little change took place in the vegetation in the time
that elapsed between the close of the Triassic and the middle of the
Jurassic periods. Cycads, _Zamites_, _Podozamites_, &c., appeared to
reach their maximum; Equisetums were still found growing to a great
size and Ginkgos occupied a prominent place; ferns were common; so too
were pines, yews, cypresses and other conifers, which while they
outwardly resembled their modern representatives, were quite distinct
in species. No flowering plants had yet appeared, although a primitive
form of angiosperm has been reported from the Upper Jurassic of
Portugal.

The economic products of the Jurassic system are of considerable
importance; the valuable coals have already been noticed; the
well-known iron ores of the Cleveland district in Yorkshire and those
of the Northampton sands occur respectively in the Lias and Inferior
Oolites. Oil shales are found in Germany, and several of the Jurassic
formations in England contain some petroleum. Building stones of great
value are obtained from the Great Oolite, the Portlandian and the
Inferior Oolite; large quantities of hydraulic cement and lime have
been made from the Lias. The celebrated lithographic stone of
Solenhofen in Bavaria belongs to the upper portion of this system.

See D'Orbigny, _Paléontologie française_, _Terrain Jurassique_ (1840,
1846); L. von Buch, "Über den Jura in Deutschland" (_Abhand. d. Berlin
Akad._, 1839); F. A. Quenstedt, _Flötzgebirge Württembergs_ (1843) and
other papers, also _Der Jura_ (1883-1888); A. Oppel, _Die
Juraformation Englands, Frankreichs und s.w. Deutschlands_
(1856-1858). For a good general account of the formations with many
references to original papers, see A. de Lapparent, _Traité de
géologie_, vol. ii. 5th ed. (1906). The standard work for Great
Britain is the series of _Memoirs of the Geological Survey_ entitled
_The Jurassic Rocks of Britain_, i and ii. "Yorkshire" (1892); iii.
"The Lias of England and Wales" (1893); iv. "The Lower Oolite Rocks of
England (Yorkshire excepted)" (1894); v. "The Middle and Upper Oolitic
Rocks of England (Yorkshire excepted)" (1895). The map is after that
of M. Neumayr, "Die geographische Verbreitung der Juraformation,"
_Denkschr. d. k. Akad. d. Wiss., Wien, Math. u. Naturwiss._, cl. L.,
_Abth._ i, _Karte_ 1. (1885). (J. A. H.)

FOOTNOTE:

[1] _Purbeckian_ from the "Isle" of Purbeck. _Aquilonien_ from Aquilo
(Nord). _Bononien_ from Bononia (Boulogne). _Virgulien_ from _Exogyra
virgula_. _Pteroceran_ from _Pteroceras oceani_. _Astartien_ from
_Astarte supracorollina_. _Rauracien_ from Rauracia (Jura).
_Argovien_ from Argovie (Switzerland). _Neuvizien_ from Neuvizy
(Ardennes). _Divesien_ from Dives (Calvados). _Bathonien_ from Bath
(England). _Bajocien_ from Bayeux (Calvados). _Toarcien_ from
Toarcium (Tours). _Charmouthien_ from Charmouth (England).
_Sinemourien_ from Sinemurum, Semur (Côte d'Or). _Hettangien_ from
Hettange (Lorraine).

JURAT (through Fr. from med. Lat. _juratus_, one sworn, Lat. _jurare_, to swear), a name given to the sworn holders of certain offices. Under the _ancien régime_ in France, in several towns, of the south-west, such as Rochelle and Bordeaux, the _jurats_ were members of the municipal body. The title was also borne by officials, corresponding to aldermen, in the Cinque Ports, but is now chiefly used as a title of office in the Channel Islands. There are two bodies, consisting each of twelve jurats, for Jersey and the bailiwick of Guernsey respectively. They are elected for life, in Jersey by the ratepayers, in Guernsey by the elective states. They form, with the bailiff as presiding judge, the royal court of justice, and are a constituent part of the legislative bodies. In English law, the word jurat (_juratum_) is applied to that part of an affidavit which contains the names of the parties swearing the affidavit and the person before whom it was sworn, the date, place and other necessary particulars.

JURIEN DE LA GRAVIÈRE, JEAN BAPTISTE EDMOND (1812-1892), French admiral, son of Admiral Jurien, who served through the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars and was a peer of France under Louis Philippe, was born on the 19th of November 1812. He entered the navy in 1828, was made a commander in 1841, and captain in 1850. During the Russian War he commanded a ship in the Black Sea. He was promoted to be rear-admiral on the 1st of December 1855, and appointed to the command of a squadron in the Adriatic in 1859, when he absolutely sealed the Austrian ports with a close blockade. In October 1861 he was appointed to command the squadron in the Gulf of Mexico, and two months later the expedition against Mexico. On the 15th of January 1862 he was promoted to be vice-admiral. During the Franco-German War of 1870 he had command of the French Mediterranean fleet, and in 1871 he was appointed "director of charts." As having commanded in chief before the enemy, the age-limit was waived in his favour, and he was continued on the active list. Jurien died on the 4th of March 1892. He was a voluminous author of works on naval history and biography, most of which first appeared in the _Revue des deux mondes_. Among the most noteworthy of these are _Guerres maritimes sous la république et l'empire_, which was translated by Lord Dunsany under the title of _Sketches of the Last Naval War_ (1848); _Souvenirs d'un amiral_ (1860), that is, of his father, Admiral Jurien; _La Marine d'autrefois_ (1865), largely autobiographical; and _La Marine d'aujourd'hui_ (1872). In 1866 he was elected a member of the Academy.

JURIEU, PIERRE (1637-1713), French Protestant divine, was born at Mer, in Orléanais, where his father was a Protestant pastor. He studied at Saumur and Sedan under his grandfather, Pierre Dumoulin, and under Leblanc de Beaulieu. After completing his studies in Holland and England, Jurieu received Anglican ordination; returning to France he was ordained again and succeeded his father as pastor of the church at Mer. Soon after this he published his first work, _Examen de livre de la réunion du Christianisme_ (1671). In 1674 his _Traité de la dévotion_ led to his appointment as professor of theology and Hebrew at Sedan, where he soon became also pastor. A year later he published his _Apologie pour la morale des Réformés_. He obtained a high reputation, but his work was impaired by his controversial temper, which frequently developed into an irritated fanaticism, though he was always entirely sincere. He was called by his adversaries "the Goliath of the Protestants." On the suppression of the academy of Sedan in 1681, Jurieu received an invitation to a church at Rouen, but, afraid to remain in France on account of his forthcoming work, _La Politique du clergé de France_, he went to Holland and was pastor of the Walloon church of Rotterdam till his death on the 11th of January 1713. He was also professor at the école illustre. Jurieu did much to help those who suffered by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685). He himself turned for consolation to the Apocalypse, and succeeded in persuading himself (_Accomplissement des prophéties_, 1686) that the overthrow of Antichrist (i.e. the papal church) would take place in 1689. H. M. Baird says that "this persuasion, however fanciful the grounds on which it was based, exercised no small influence in forwarding the success of the designs of William of Orange in the invasion of England." Jurieu defended the doctrines of Protestantism with great ability against the attacks of Antoine Arnauld, Pierre Nicole and Bossuet, but was equally ready to enter into dispute with his fellow Protestant divines (with Louis Du Moulin and Claude Payon, for instance) when their opinions differed from his own even on minor matters. The bitterness and persistency of his attacks on his colleague Pierre Bayle led to the latter being deprived of his chair in 1693.

One of Jurieu's chief works is _Lettres pastorales adressées aux
fidèles de France_ (3 vols., Rotterdam, 1686-1687; Eng. trans., 1689),
which, notwithstanding the vigilance of the police, found its way into
France and produced a deep impression on the Protestant population.
His last important work was the _Histoire critique des dogmes et des
cultes_ (1704; Eng. trans., 1715). He wrote a great number of
controversial works.

See the article in Herzog-Hauck, _Realencyklopädie_; also H. M. Baird,
_The Huguenots and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes_ (1895).

JURIS, a tribe of South American Indians, formerly occupying the country between the rivers Iça (lower Putumayo) and Japura, north-western Brazil. In ancient days they were the most powerful tribe of the district, but in 1820 their numbers did not exceed 2000. Owing to inter-marrying, the Juris are believed to have been extinct for half a century. They were closely related to the Passes, and were like them a fair-skinned, finely built people with quite European features.

JURISDICTION, in general, the exercise of lawful authority, especially by a court or a judge; and so the extent or limits within which such authority is exercisable. Thus each court has its appropriate jurisdiction; in the High Court of Justice in England administration actions are brought in the chancery division, salvage actions in the admiralty, &c. The jurisdiction of a particular court is often limited by statute, as that of a county court, which is local and is also limited in amount. In international law jurisdiction has a wider meaning, namely, the rights exercisable by a state within the bounds of a given space. This is frequently referred to as the territorial theory of jurisdiction. (See INTERNATIONAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRIVATE.)

JURISPRUDENCE (Lat. _jurisprudentia_, knowledge of law, from _jus_, right, and _prudentia_, from _providere_, to foresee), the general term for "the formal science of positive law" (T. E. Holland); see LAW. The essential principles involved are discussed below and in JURISPRUDENCE, COMPARATIVE; the details of particular laws or sorts of law (CONTRACT, &c.) and of individual national systems of law (ENGLISH LAW, &c.) being dealt with in separate articles.

The human race may be conceived as parcelled out into a number of distinct groups or societies, differing greatly in size and circumstances, in physical and moral characteristics of all kinds. But they all resemble each other in that they reveal on examination certain rules of conduct in accordance with which the relations of the members _inter se_ are governed. Each society has its own system of laws, and all the systems, so far as they are known, constitute the appropriate subject matter of jurisprudence. The jurist may deal with it in the following ways. He may first of all examine the leading conceptions common to all the systems, or in other words define the leading terms common to them all. Such are the terms _law_ itself, _right_, _duty_, _property_, _crime_, and so forth, which, or their equivalents, may, notwithstanding delicate differences of connotation, be regarded as common terms in all systems. That kind of inquiry is known in England as analytical jurisprudence. It regards the conceptions with which it deals as fixed or stationary, and aims at expressing them distinctly and exhibiting their logical relations with each other. What is really meant by a right and by a duty, and what is the true connexion between a right and a duty, are types of the questions proper to this inquiry. Shifting our point of view, but still regarding systems of law in the mass, we may consider them, not as stationary, but as changeable and changing, we may ask what general features are exhibited by the record of the change. This, somewhat crudely put, may serve to indicate the field of historical or comparative jurisprudence. In its ideal condition it would require an accurate record of the history of all legal systems as its material. But whether the material be abundant or scanty the method is the same. It seeks the explanation of institutions and legal principles in the facts of history. Its aim is to show how a given rule came to be what it is. The legislative source--the emanation of the rule from a sovereign authority--is of no importance here; what is important is the moral source--the connexion of the rule with the ideas prevalent during contemporary periods. This method, it is evident, involves not only a comparison of successive stages in the history of the same system, but a comparison of different systems, of the Roman with the English, of the Hindu with the Irish, and so on. The historical method as applied to law may be regarded as a special example of the method of comparison. The comparative method is really employed in all generalizations about law; for, although the analysis of legal terms might be conducted with exclusive reference to one system, the advantage of testing the result by reference to other systems is obvious. But, besides the use of comparison for purposes of analysis and in tracing the phenomena of the growth of laws, it is evident that for the purposes of practical legislation the comparison of different systems may yield important results. Laws are contrivances for bringing about certain definite ends, the larger of which are identical in all systems. The comparison of these contrivances not only serves to bring their real object, often obscured as it is in details, into clearer view, but enables legislators to see where the contrivances are deficient, and how they may be improved.

The "science of law," as the expression is generally used, means the examination of laws in general in one or other of the ways just indicated. It means an investigation of laws which exist or have existed in some given society in fact--in other words, positive laws; and it means an examination not limited to the exposition of particular systems. Analytical jurisprudence is in England associated chiefly with the name of John Austin (q.v.), whose _Province of Jurisprudence Determined_ systematized and completed the work begun in England by Hobbes, and continued at a later date and from a different point of view by Bentham.

Austin's first position is to distinguish between laws properly so called and laws improperly so called. In any of the older writers on law, we find the various senses in which the word is used grouped together as variations of one common meaning. Thus Blackstone advances to his proper subject, municipal laws, through (1) the laws of inanimate matter, (2) the laws of animal nutrition, digestion, &c., (3) the laws of nature, which are rules imposed by God on men and discoverable by reason alone, and (4) the revealed or divine law which is part of the law of nature directly expounded by God. All of these are connected by this common element that they are "rules of action dictated by some superior being." And some such generalization as this is to be found at the basis of most treatises on jurisprudence which have not been composed under the influence of the analytical school. Austin disposes of it by the distinction that some of those laws are commands, while others are not commands. The so-called laws of nature are not commands; they are uniformities which resemble commands only in so far as they may be supposed to have been ordered by some intelligent being. But they are not commands in the only proper sense of that word--they are not addressed to reasonable beings, who may or may not will obedience to them. Laws of nature are not addressed to anybody, and there is no possible question of obedience or disobedience to them. Austin accordingly pronounces them laws improperly so called, and confines his attention to laws properly so called, which are commands addressed by a human superior to a human inferior.

This distinction seems so simple and obvious that the energy and even bitterness with which Austin insists upon it now seem superfluous. But the indiscriminate identification of everything to which common speech gives the name of a law was, and still is, a fruitful source of confusion. Blackstone's statement that when God "put matter into motion He established certain laws of motion, to which all movable matter must conform," and that in those creatures that have neither the power to think nor to will such laws must be invariably obeyed, so long as the creature itself subsists, for its existence depends on that obedience, imputes to the law of gravitation in respect of both its origin and its execution the qualities of an act of parliament. On the other hand the qualities of the law of gravitation are imputed to certain legal principles which, under the name of the law of nature, are asserted to be binding all over the globe, so that "no human laws are of any validity if contrary to this." Austin never fails to stigmatize the use of "natural laws" in the sense of scientific facts as improper, or as metaphorical.

Having eliminated metaphorical or figurative laws, we restrict ourselves to those laws which are commands. This word is the key to the analysis of law, and accordingly a large portion of Austin's work is occupied with the determination of its meaning. A _command_ is an order issued by a superior to an inferior. It is a signification of desire distinguished by this peculiarity that "the party to whom it is directed is liable to evil from the other, in case he comply not with the desire." "If you are able and willing to harm me in case I comply not with your wish, the expression of your wish amounts to a command." Being liable to evil in case I comply not with the wish which you signify, I am _bound_ or obliged by it, or I lie under a _duty_ to obey it. The evil is called a _sanction_, and the command or duty is said to be _sanctioned_ by the chance of incurring the evil. The three terms _command_, _duty_ and _sanction_ are thus inseparably connected. As Austin expresses it in the language of formal logic, "each of the three terms signifies the same notion, but each _denotes_ a different part of that notion and _connotes_ the residue."

All commands, however, are not laws. That term is reserved for those commands which oblige generally to the performance of acts of a class. A command to your servant to rise at such an hour on such a morning is a particular command, but not a law or rule; a command to rise always at that hour is a law or rule. Of this distinction it is sufficient to say in the meantime that it involves, when we come to deal with positive laws, the rejection of particular enactments to which by inveterate usage the term law would certainly be applied. On the other hand it is not, according to Austin, necessary that a true law should bind persons as a class. Obligations imposed on the grantee of an office specially created by parliament would imply a law; a general order to go into mourning addressed to the whole nation for a particular occasion would not be a law.

So far we have arrived at a definition of laws properly so called. Austin holds superiority and inferiority to be necessarily implied in command, and such statements as that "laws emanate from superiors" to be the merest tautology and trifling. Elsewhere he sums up the characteristics of true laws as ascertained by the analysis thus: (1) laws, being commands, emanate from a determinate source; (2) every sanction is an evil annexed to a command; and (3) every duty implies a command, and chiefly means obnoxiousness to the evils annexed to commands.

Of true laws, those only are the subject of jurisprudence which are laws strictly so called, or positive laws. Austin accordingly proceeds to distinguish positive from other true laws, which are either laws set by God to men or laws set by men to men, not, however, as political superiors nor in pursuance of a legal right. The discussion of the first of these true but not positive laws leads Austin to his celebrated discussion of the utilitarian theory. The laws set by God are either revealed or unrevealed, i.e. either expressed in direct command, or made known to men in one or other of the ways denoted by such phrases as the "light of nature," "natural reason," "dictates of nature," and so forth. Austin maintains that the principle of general utility, based ultimately on the assumed benevolence of God, is the true index to such of His commands as He has not chosen to reveal. Austin's exposition of the meaning of the principle is a most valuable contribution to moral science, though he rests its claims ultimately on a basis which many of its supporters would disavow. And the whole discussion is now generally condemned as lying outside the proper scope of the treatise, although the reason for so condemning it is not always correctly stated. It is found in such assumptions of fact as that there is a God, that He has issued commands to men in what Austin calls the "truths of revelation," that He designs the happiness of all His creatures, that there is a predominance of good in the order of the world--which do not now command universal assent. It is impossible to place these propositions on the same scientific footing as the assumptions of fact with reference to human society on which jurisprudence rests. If the "divine laws" were facts like acts of parliament, it is conceived that the discussion of their characteristics would not be out of place in a scheme of jurisprudence.

The second set of laws properly so called, which are not positive laws, consists of three classes: (1) those which are set by men living in a state of nature; (2) those which are set by sovereigns but not as political superiors, e.g. when one sovereign commands another to act according to a principle of international law; and (3) those set by subjects but not in pursuance of legal rights. This group, to which Austin gives the name of positive morality, helps to explain his conception of positive law. Men are living in a state of nature, or a state of anarchy, when they are not living in a state of government or as members of a political society. "Political society" thus becomes the central fact of the theory, and some of the objections that have been urged against it arise from its being applied to conditions of life in which Austin would not have admitted the existence of a political society. Again, the third set in the group is intimately connected with positive laws on the one hand and rules of positive morality which are not even laws properly so called on the other. Thus laws set by subjects in consequence of a legal right are clothed with legal sanctions, and are laws positive. A law set by guardian to ward, in pursuance of a right which the guardian is bound to exercise, is a positive law pure and simple; a law set by master to slave, in pursuance of a legal right, which he is not bound to exercise, is, in Austin's phraseology, to be regarded both as a positive moral rule and as a positive law.[1] On the other hand the rules set by a club or society, and enforced upon its members by exclusion from the society, but not in pursuance of any legal right, are laws, but not positive laws. They are imperative and proceed from a determinate source, but they have no legal or political sanction. Closely connected with this positive morality, consisting of true but not positive laws, is the positive morality whose rules are not laws properly so called at all, though they are generally denominated laws. Such are the laws of honour, the laws of fashion, and, most important of all, international law.

Nowhere does Austin's phraseology come more bluntly into conflict with common usage than in pronouncing the law of nations (which in substance is a compact body of well-defined rules resembling nothing so much as the ordinary rules of law) to be not laws at all, even in the wider sense of the term. That the rules of a private club should be law properly so called, while the whole mass of international jurisprudence is mere opinion, shocks our sense of the proprieties of expression. Yet no man was more careful than Austin to observe these properties. He recognizes fully the futility of definitions which involve a painful struggle with the current of ordinary speech. But in the present instance the apparent paralogism cannot be avoided if we accept the limitation of laws properly so called to commands proceeding from a determinate source. And that limitation is so generally present in our conception of law that to ignore it would be a worse anomaly than this. No one finds fault with the statement that the so-called code of honour or the dictates of fashion are not, properly speaking, laws. We repel the same statement applied to the law of nature, because it resembles in so many of its most striking features--in the certainty of a large portion of it, in its terminology, in its substantial principles--the most universal elements of actual systems of law, and because, moreover, the assumption that brought it into existence was nothing else than this, that it consisted of those abiding portions of legal systems which prevail everywhere by their own authority. But, though "positive morality" may not be the best phrase to describe such a code of rules, the distinction insisted on by Austin is unimpeachable.

The elimination of those laws properly and improperly so called which are not positive laws brings us to the definition of positive law, which is the keystone of the system. Every positive law is "set by a sovereign person, or sovereign body of persons, to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that person or body is sovereign or superior." Though possibly sprung directly from another source, it is a positive law, by the institution of that present sovereign in the character of a political superior. The question is not as to the historical origin of the principle, but as to its present authority. "The legislator is he, not by whose authority the law was first made, but by whose authority it continues to be law." This definition involves the analysis of the connected expressions _sovereignty_, _subjection_ and _independent political society_, and of _determinate body_--which last analysis Austin performs in connexion with that of commands. These are all excellent examples of the logical method of which he was so great a master. The broad results alone need be noticed here. In order that a given society may form a society political and independent, the _generality or bulk_ of its members must be in a _habit_ of obedience to a certain and common superior; whilst that certain person or body of persons must not be _habitually_ obedient to a certain person or body. All the italicized words point to circumstances in which it might be difficult to say whether a given society is political and independent or not. Several of these Austin has discussed--e.g. the state of things in which a political society yields obedience which may or may not be called habitual to some external power, and the state of things in which a political society is divided between contending claimants for sovereign power, and it is uncertain which shall prevail, and over how much of the society. So long as that uncertainty remains we have a state of _anarchy_. Further, an independent society to be political must not fall below a number which can only be called considerable. Neither then in a state of anarchy, nor in inconsiderable communities, nor among men living in a state of nature, have we the proper phenomena of a political society. The last limitation goes some way to meet the most serious criticism to which Austin's system has been exposed, and it ought to be stated in his own words. He supposes a society which may be styled independent, which is considerable in numbers, and which is in a savage or extremely barbarous condition. In such a society, "the bulk of its members is not in the habit of obedience to one and the same superior. For the purpose of attacking an external enemy, or for the purpose of repelling an attack, the bulk of its members who are capable of bearing arms submits to one leader or one body of leaders. But as soon as that emergency passes the transient submission ceases, and the society reverts to the state which may be deemed its ordinary state. The bulk of each of the families which compose the given society renders habitual obedience to its own peculiar chief, but those domestic societies are themselves independent societies, or are not united and compacted into one political society by habitual and general obedience to one common superior, and there is no law (simply or strictly so styled) which can be called the law of that society. The so-called laws which are common to the bulk of the community are purely and properly customary laws--that is to say, laws which are set or imposed by the general opinion of the community, but are not enforced by legal or political sanctions." Such, he says, are the savage societies of hunters and fishers in North America, and such were the Germans as described by Tacitus. He takes no account of societies in an intermediate stage between this and the condition which constitutes political society.

We need not follow the analysis in detail. Much ingenuity is displayed in grouping the various kinds of government, in detecting the sovereign authority under the disguises which it wears in the complicated state system of the United States or under the fictions of English law, in elucidating the precise meaning of abstract political terms. Incidentally the source of many celebrated fallacies in political thought is laid bare. That the question who is sovereign in a given state is a question of fact and not of law or morals or religion, that the sovereign is incapable of legal limitation, that law is such by the sovereign's command, that no real or assumed compact can limit his action--are positions which Austin has been accused of enforcing with needless iteration. He cleared them, however, from the air of paradox with which they had been previously encumbered, and his influence was in no direction more widely felt than in making them the commonplaces of educated opinion in this generation.

Passing from these, we may now consider what has been said against the theory, which may be summed up in the following terms. Laws, no matter in what form they be expressed, are in the last resort reducible to commands set by the person or body of persons who are in fact sovereigns in any independent political society. The sovereign is the person or persons whose commands are habitually obeyed by the great bulk of the community; and by an independent society we mean that such sovereign head is not himself habitually obedient to any other determinate body of persons. The society must be sufficiently numerous to be considerable before we can speak of it as a political society. From command, with its inseparable incident of sanction, come the duties and rights in terms of which laws are for the most part expressed. Duty means that the person of whom it is predicated is liable to the sanction in case he fails to obey the command. Right means that the person of whom it is predicated may set the sanction in operation in case the command be disobeyed.

We may here interpolate a doubt whether the condition of independence
on the part of the head of a community is essential to the legal
analysis. It seems to us that we have all the elements of a true law
present when we point to a community habitually obedient to the
authority of a person or determinate body of persons, no matter what
the relations of that superior may be to any external or superior
power. Provided that in fact the commands of the lawgiver are those
beyond which the community never looks, it seems immaterial to inquire
whether this lawgiver in turn takes his orders from somebody else or
is habitually obedient to such orders when given. One may imagine a
community governed by a dependent legislatorial body or person, while
the supreme sovereign whose representative and nominee such body or
person may be never directly addresses the community at all. We do not
see that in such a case anything is gained in clearness by
representing the law of the community as set by the suzerain, rather
than the dependent legislator. Nor is the ascertainment of the
ultimate seat of power necessary to define political societies. That
we get when we suppose a community to be in the habit of obedience to
a single person or to a determinate combination of persons.

The use of the word "command" is not unlikely to lead to a
misconception of Austin's meaning. When we say that a law is a command
of the sovereign, we are apt to think of the sovereign as enunciating
the rule in question for the first time. Many laws are not traceable
to the sovereign at all in this sense. Some are based upon immemorial
practices, some can be traced to the influence of private citizens,
whether practising lawyers or writers on law, and in most countries a
vast body of law owes its existence as such to the fact that it has
been observed as law in some other society. The great bulk of modern
law owes its existence and its shape ultimately to the labours of the
Roman lawyers of the empire. Austin's definition has nothing to do
with this, the historical origin of laws. Most books dealing with law
in the abstract generalize the modes in which laws may be originated
under the name of the "sources" of law, and one of these is
legislation, or the direct command of the sovereign body. The
connexion of laws with each other as principles is properly the
subject matter of historical jurisprudence, the ideal perfection of
which would be the establishment of the general laws governing the
evolution of law in the technical sense. Austin's definition looks,
not to the authorship of the law as a principle, not to its inventor
or originator, but to the person or persons who in the last resort
cause it to be obeyed. If a given rule is enforced by the sovereign it
is a law.

It may be convenient to notice here what is usually said about the
sources of law, as the expression sometimes proves a stumbling-block
to the appreciation of Austin's system. In the _corpus juris_ of any
given country only a portion of the laws is traceable to the direct
expression of his commands by the sovereign. Legislation is one, but
only one, of the sources of law. Other portions of the law may be
traceable to other sources, which may vary in effect in different
systems. The list given in the _Institutes_ of Justinian of the ways
in which law may be made--_lex_, _plebiscitum_, _principis placita_,
_edicta magistratuum_, and so on--is a list of sources. Among the
sources of law other than legislation which are most commonly
exemplified are the laws made by judges in the course of judicial
decisions, and law originating as custom. The source of the law in the
one case is the judicial decision, in the other the custom. In
consequence of the decisions and in consequence of the custom the rule
has prevailed. English law is largely made up of principles derived in
each of those ways, while it is deficient in principles derived from
the writings of independent teachers, such as have in other systems
exercised a powerful influence on the development of law. The
_responsa prudentum_, the opinions of learned men, published as such,
did undoubtedly originate an immense portion of Roman law. No such
influence has affected English law to any appreciable extent--a result
owing to the activity of the courts of the legislature. This
difference has profoundly affected the form of English law as compared
with that of systems which have been developed by the play of free
discussion. These are the most definite of the influences to which the
beginning of laws may be traced. The law once established, no matter
how, is nevertheless law in the sense of Austin's definition. It is
enforced by the sovereign authority. It was originated by something
very different. But when we speak of it as a command we think only of
the way in which it is to-day presented to the subject. The newest
order of an act of parliament is not more positively presented to the
people as a command to be obeyed than are the elementary rules of the
common law for which no legislative origin can be traced. It is not
even necessary to resort to the figure of speech by which alone,
according to Sir Henry Maine (_Early History of Institutions_, p.
314), the common law can be regarded as the commands of the
government. "The common law," he says, "consists of their commands
because they can repeal or alter or restate it at pleasure." "They
command because, being by the assumption possessed of uncontrollable
force, they could innovate without limit at any moment." On the
contrary, it may be said that they command because they do as a matter
of fact enforce the rules laid down in the common law. It is not
because they could innovate if they pleased in the common law that
they are said to command it, but because it is known that they will
enforce it as it stands.

The criticism of Austin's analysis resolved itself into two different sets of objections. One relates to the theory of sovereignty which underlies it; the other to its alleged failure to include rules which in common parlance are laws, and which it is felt ought to be included in any satisfactory definition of law. As the latter is to some extent anticipated and admitted by Austin himself, we may deal with it first.

Frederic Harrison (_Fortnightly Review_, vols. xxx., xxxi.) was at great pains to collect a number of laws or rules of law which do not square with the Austinian definition of law as a command creating rights and duties. Take the rule that "every will must be in writing." It is a very circuitous way of looking at things, according to Harrison, to say that such a rule creates a specific right in any determinate person of a definite description. So, again, the rule that "a legacy to the witness of a will is void." Such a rule is not "designed to give any one any rights, but simply to protect the public against wills made under undue influence." Again, the technical rule in Shelley's case that a gift to A for life, followed by a gift to the heirs of A, is a gift to A in fee simple, is pronounced to be inconsistent with the definition. It is an idle waste of ingenuity to force any of these rules into a form in which they might be said to create rights.