Chapter XI: Section 4: , of article IV. says, The United States shall guarantee to every (3)

Our present system is attended with the inestimable advantage of preventing unnecessary wars. Foreign influence is assuredly smaller in our publick councils, in proportion as the members are subject to be recalled. At present, their right to sit continues no longer than their endeavours to secure the publick interest. It is therefore not an object for any foreign power to give a large price for the friendship of a delegate in Congress. If we adopt the new system, every member will depend upon thirty thousand people, mostly scattered over a large extent of country, for his election. Their distance from the seat of government will make it extremely difficult for the electors to get information of his conduct. If he is faithful to his constituents, his conduct will be misrepresented, in order to defeat his influence at home. Of this we have a recent instance, in the treatment of the dissenting members of the late federal convention.(26) Their fidelity to their constituents was their whole fault. We may reasonably expect similar conduct to be adopted, when we shall have rendered the friendship of the members valuable to foreign powers, by giving them a secure seat in Congress. We shall too have all the intrigues, cabals and bribery practiced, which are usual at elections in Great Britain. We shall see and lament the want of publick virtue; and we shall see ourselves bought at a publick market, in order to be sold again to the highest bidder. We must be involved in all the quarrels of European powers, and oppressed with expense, merely for the sake of being like the nations round about us. Let us then, with the spirit of freemen, reject the offered system, and treat as it deserves the proposition of men who have departed from their commission; and let us deliver to the rising generation the liberty purchased with our blood.

AGRIPPA.

Agrippa, XV.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 402)

TUESDAY, JANUARY 22, 1788.

TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION.

_Gentlemen_,

Truly deplorable, in point of argument, must be that cause, in whose defence persons of acknowledged learning and ability can say nothing pertinent. When they undertake to prove that the person elected is the safest person in the world to control the exercise of the elective powers of his constituents, we know what dependence is to be had upon their reasonings. Yet we have seen attempts to shew, that the fourth section of the proposed constitution is an additional security to our rights. It may be such in the view of a Rhode Island family (I think that state is quoted) who have been of some time in the minority: but it is extraordinary that an enlightened character(27) in the Massachusetts [convention] should undertake to prove, that, from a single instance of abuse in one state, another state ought to resign its liberty. Can an [sic] man, in the free exercise of his reason, suppose, that he is perfectly represented in the legislature, when that legislature may at pleasure alter the time, manner and place of election? By altering the time they may continue a representive during his whole life; by altering the manner, they may fill up the vacancies by their own votes without the consent of the people; and by altering the place, all the elections may be made at the seat of the federal government. Of all the powers of government perhaps this is the most improper to be surrendered. Such an article at once destroys the whole check which the constituents have upon their rulers. I should be less zealous upon this subject, if the power had not been often abused. The senate of Venice, the regencies of Holland, and the British Parliament have all abused it. The last have not yet perpetuated themselves; but they have availed themselves repeatedly of popular commotions to continue in power. Even at this day we find attempts to vindicate the usurpation by which they continued themselves from three to seven years. All the attempts, and many have been made, to return to triennial elections, have proved abortive. These instances are abundantly sufficient to shew with what jealousy this right ought to be guarded. No sovereign on earth need be afraid to declare his crown elective, while the possessor has the right to regulate the time, manner, and place of election.

It is vain to tell us, that the proposed government guarantees to each state a republican form. Republicks are divided into democraticks, and aristocraticks. The establishment of an order of nobles, in whom should reside all the power of the state, would be an aristocratick republick. Such has been for five centuries the government of Venice, in which all the energies of government, as well as of individuals, have been cramped by a distressing jealousy that the rulers have of each other. There is nothing of that generous, manly confidence that we see in the democratick republicks of our own country. It is a government of force, attended with perpetual fear of that force. In Great Britain, since the lengthening of parliaments, all our accounts agree, that their elections are a continued scene of bribery, riot and tumult; often a scene of murder. These are the consequences of choosing seldom, and or extensive districts. When the term is short nobody will give an high price for a seat. It is an insufficient answer to these objections to say, that there is no power of government but may sometimes be applied to bad purposes. Such a power is of no value unless it is applied to a bad purpose. It ought always to remain with the people. The framers of our state constitution were so jealous of this right, that they fixed the days for election, meeting and dissolving of the legislature, and of the other officers of government. In the proposed constitution not one of these points is guarded, though more numerous and extensive powers are given them than to any state legislature upon the continent. For Congress is at present possessed of the direction of the national force, and most other national powers, and in addition to them are to be vested with all the powers of the individual states, unrestrained by any declarations of right. If these things are for the security of our constitutional liberty, I trust we shall soon see an attempt to prove that the government by an army will be more friendly to liberty than a system founded in consent, and that five states will make a majority of thirteen. The powers of controuling elections, of creating exclusive companies in trade, of internal legislation and taxations ought, upon no account, to be surrendered. I know it is a common complaint, that Congress want more power. But where is the limited government that does not want it? Ambition is in a governour what money is to a misar [sic]—.... he can never accumulate enough. But it is as true in politicks as in morals, he that is unfaithful in little, will be unfaithful also in much. He who will not exercise the powers he has, will never properly use more extensive powers. The framing entirely new systems, is a work that requires vast attention; and it is much easier to guard an old one. It is infinitely better to reject one that is unfriendly to liberty, and rest for a while satisfied with a system that is in some measure defective, than to set up a government unfriendly to the rights of states, and to the rights of individuals—one that is undefined in its powers and operations. Such is the government proposed by the federal convention, and such, we trust, you will have the wisdom and firmness to reject.

AGRIPPA.

Agrippa, XV.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 403)

FRIDAY, JANUARY 25, 1788.

TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION.

_Gentlemen_,

That the new system, proposed for your adoption, is not founded in argument, but in party spirit, is evident from the whole behaviour of that party, who favour it. The following is a short, but genuine specimen of their reasoning. The South Carolina legislature have established an unequal representation, and will not alter it: therefore Congress should be invested with an unrestrained power to alter the time, manner and place of electing members into that body. Directly the contrary position should have been inferred. An elected assembly made an improper use of their right to controul elections, therefore such a right ought not to be lodged with them. It will be abused in ten instances, for one in which it will serve any valuable purpose. It is said also that the Rhode Island assembly _intend_ to abuse their power in this respect, therefore we should put Congress in a situation to abuse theirs. Surely this is not a kind of reasoning that, in the opinion of any indifferent person, can vindicate the fourth section. Yet we have heard it publickly advanced as being conclusive.

The unlimited power over trade, domestick as well as foreign, is another power that will more probably be applied to a bad than to a good purpose. That our trade was for the last year much in favour of the commonwealth is agreed by all parties. The freedom that every man, whether his capital is large or small, enjoys of entering into any branch that pleases him, rouses a spirit of industry and exertion, that is friendly to commerce. It prevents that stagnation of business which generally precedes publick commotions. Nothing ought to be done to restrain this spirit. The unlimited power over trade, however, is exceedingly apt to injure it.

In most countries of Europe, trade has been more confined by exclusive charters. Exclusive companies are, in trade, pretty much like an aristocracy in government, and produce nearly as bad effects. An instance of it we have ourselves experienced. Before the Revolution, we carried on no direct trade to India. The goods imported from that country came to us through the medium of an exclusive company. Our trade in that quarter is now respectable, and we receive several kinds of their goods at about half the former price. But the evil of such companies does not terminate there. They always, by the greatness of their capital, have an undue influence on the government.

In a republick, we ought to guard, as much as possible, against the predominance of any particular interest. It is the object of government to protect them all. When commerce is left to take its own course, the advantage of every class will be nearly equal. But when exclusive privileges are given to any class, it will operate to the weakening of some other class connected with them.

AGRIPPA.

(_Remainder next Tuesday._)

Agrippa, XVII.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 404)

TUESDAY, JANUARY 20, 1788.

TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION.

_Gentlemen_,

As it is essentially necessary to the happiness of a free people, that the constitution of government should be established in principles of truth, I have endeavoured, in a series of papers, to discuss the proposed form with that degree of freedom which becomes a faithful citizen of the commonwealth. It must be obvious to the most careless observer that the friends of the new plan appear to have nothing more in view than to establish it by a popular current, without any regard to the truth of its principles. Propositions, novel, erroneous and dangerous, are boldly advanced to support a system, which does not appear to be founded in, but in every instance to contradict, the experience of mankind. We are told that a constitution is in itself a bill of rights; that all power not expressly given, is reserved; that no powers are given to the new government which are not already vested in the state governments, and that it is for the security of liberty that the persons elected should have the absolute controul over the time, manner and place of election. These, and an hundred other things of a like kind, though they have gained the hasty assent of men, respectable for learning and ability, are false in themselves and invented merely to serve a present purpose. This will, I trust, clearly appear from the following considerations:

It is common to consider man at first as in a state of nature, separate from all society. The only historical evidence, that the human species ever actually existed in this state, is derived from the book of Gen. There it is said, that Adam remained a while alone. While the whole species was comprehended in his person was the only instance in which this supposed state of nature really existed. Ever since the completion of the first pair, mankind appear as natural to associate with their own species, as animals of any other kind herd together. Wherever we meet with their settlements, they are found in clans. We are therefore justified in saying, that a state of society is the natural state of man. Wherever we find a settlement of men, we find also some appearance of government. The state of government is therefore as natural to mankind as a state of society. Government and society appear to be co-eval. The most rude and artless form of government is probably the most ancient. This we find to be practised among the Indian tribes in America. With them the whole authority of government is vested in the whole tribe. Individuals depend upon their reputation of valour and wisdom to give them influence. Their government is genuinely democratical. This was probably the first kind of government among mankind, as we meet with no mention of any other kind, till royalty was introduced in the person of Nimrod. Immediately after that time, the Asiatick nations seem to have departed from the simple democracy, which is still retained by their American brethren, and universally adopted the kingly form. We do indeed meet with some vague rumors of an aristocracy in India so late as the time of Alexander the Great. But such stories are altogether uncertain and improbable. For in the time of Abraham, who lived about sixteen hundred years before Alexander, all the little nations mentioned in the Mosaick history appear to be governed by kings. It does not appear from any accounts of the Asiatick kingdoms that they have practised at all upon the idea of a limited monarchy. The whole power of society has been delegated to the kings; and though they may be said to have constitutions of government, because the succession to the crown is limited by certain rules, yet the people are not benefitted by their constitutions, and enjoy no share of civil liberty. The first attempt to reduce republicanism to a system, appears to be made by Moses when he led the Israelites out of Egypt. This government stood a considerable time, about five centuries, till in a frenzy the people demanded a king, that they might resemble the nations about them. They were dissatisfied with their judges, and instead of changing the administration, they madly changed their constitution. However they might flatter themselves with the idea, that an high-spirited people could get the power back again when they pleased; they never did get it back, and they fared like the nations about them. Their kings tyrannized over them for some centuries, till they fell under a foreign yoke. This is the history of that nation. With a change of names, it describes the progress of political changes in other countries. The people are dazzled with the splendour of distant monarchies, and a desire to share their glory induces them to sacrifice their domestick happiness.

From this general view of the state of mankind it appears that all the powers of government originally reside in the body of the people; and that when they appoint certain persons to administer the government, they delegate all the powers of government not expressly reserved. Hence it appears that a constitution does not in itself imply any more than a declaration of the relation which the different parts of the government bear to each other, but does not in any degree imply security to the rights of individuals. This has been the uniform practice. In all doubtful cases the decision is in favour of the government. It is therefore impertinent to ask by what right government exercises powers not expressly delegated. Mr. Wilson, the great oracle of federalism, acknowledges, in his speech to the Philadelphians,(28) the truth of these remarks, as they respect the state governments, but attempts to set up a distinction between them and the continental government. To anybody who will be at the trouble to read the new system, it is evidently in the same situation as the state constitutions now possess. It is a compact among the _people_ for the purposes of government, and not a compact between states. It begins in the name of the people, and not of the states.

It has been shown in the course of this paper, that when people institute government, they of course delegate all rights not expressly reserved. In our state constitution the bill of rights consists of thirty articles. It is evident therefore that the new constitution proposes to delegate greater powers than are granted to our own government, sanguine as the person was who denied it. The complaints against the separate governments, even by the friends of the new plan, are not that they have not power enough, but that they are disposed to make a bad use of what power they have. Surely then they reason badly, when they purpose to set up a government possess’d of much more extensive powers than the present, and subjected to much smaller checks.

Bills of rights, reserved by authority of the people, are, I believe, peculiar to America. A careful observance of the abuse practised in other countries has had its just effect by inducing our people to guard against them. We find the happiest consequences to flow from it. The separate governments know their powers, their objects, and operations. We are therefore not perpetually tormented with new experiments. For a single instance of abuse among us there are thousands in other countries. On the other hand, the people know their rights, and feel happy in the possession of their freedom, both civil and political. Active industry is the consequence of their security, and within one year the circumstances of the state and of individuals have improved to a degree never before known in this commonwealth. Though our bill of rights does not, perhaps, contain all the cases in which power might be safely reserved, yet it affords a protection to the persons and possessions of individuals not known in any foreign country. In some respects the power of government is a little too confined. In many other countries we find the people resisting their governours for exercising their power in an unaccustomed mode. But for want of a bill of rights the resistance is always, by the principles of their government, a rebellion which nothing but success can justify. In our constitution we have aimed at delegating the necessary powers of government and confining their operation to beneficial purposes. At present we appear to have come very near the truth. Let us therefore have wisdom and virtue enough to preserve it inviolate. It is a stale contrivance, to get the people into a passion, in order to make them sacrifice their liberty. Repentance always comes, but it comes too late. Let us not flatter ourselves that we shall always have good men to govern us. If we endeavour to be like other nations we shall have more bad men than good ones to exercise extensive powers. That circumstance alone will corrupt them. While they fancy themselves the viceregents of God, they will resemble him only in power, but will always depart from his wisdom and goodness.

AGRIPPA.

Agrippa, XVIII.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 406)

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1788.

TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION.

_Gentlemen_,

In my last address I ascertained, from historical records, the following principles: that, in the original state of government, the whole power resides in the whole body of the nation, that when a people appoint certain persons to govern them, they delegate their whole power; that a constitution is not in itself a bill of rights; and that, whatever is the form of government, a bill of rights is essential to the security of the persons and property of the people. It is an idea favourable to the interest of mankind at large, that government is founded in compact. Several instances may be produced of it, but none is more remarkable than our own. In general, I have chosen to apply to such facts as are in the reach of my readers. For this purpose I have chiefly confined myself to examples drawn from the history of our own country, and to the Old Testament. It is in the power of every reader to verify examples thus substantiated. Even in the remarkable arguments on the fourth section, relative to the power over election I was far from stating the worst of it, as it respects the adverse party. A gentleman, respectable in many points, but more especially for his systematick and perspicuous reasoning in his profession, has repeatedly stated to the Convention, among his reasons in favour of that section, that _the Rhode Island assembly have for a considerable time past had a bill lying on their __ table for altering the manner of elections for representatives in that state_.(29) He has stated it with all the zeal of a person who believed his argument to be a good one. But surely a _bill lying on a table_ can never be considered as any more than an _intention_ to pass it, and nobody pretends that it ever actually did pass. It is in strictness only the intention of a part of the assembly, for nobody can aver that it ever will pass. I write not with an intention to deceive, but that the whole argument may be stated fairly. Much eloquence and ingenuity have been employed in shewing that side of the argument in favor of the proposed constitution, but it ought to be considered that if we accept it upon mere verbal explanations, we shall find ourselves deceived. I appeal to the knowledge of every one, if it does not frequently happen, that a law is interpreted in practice very differently from the intention of the legislature. Hence arises the necessity of acts to amend and explain former acts. This is not an inconvenience in the common and ordinary business of legislation, but is a great one in a constitution. A constitution is a legislative act of the whole people. It is an excellence that it should be permanent, otherwise we are exposed to perpetual insecurity from the fluctuation of government. We should be in the same situation as under absolute government, sometimes exposed to the pressure of greater, and sometimes unprotected by the weaker power in the sovereign.

It is now generally understood that it is for the security of the people that the powers of the government should be lodged in different branches. By this means publick business will go on when they all agree, and stop when they disagree. The advantage of checks in government is thus manifested where the concurrence of different branches is necessary to the same act, but the advantage of a division of business is advantageous in other respects. As in every extensive empire, local laws are necessary to suit the different interests, no single legislature is adequate to the business. All human capacities are limited to a narrow space, and as no individual is capable of practising a great variety of trades, no single legislature is capable of managing all the variety of national and state concerns. Even if a legislature was capable of it, the business of the judicial department must, from the same cause, be slovenly done. Hence arises the necessity of a division of the business into national and local. Each department ought to have all the powers necessary for executing its own business, under such limitations as tend to secure us from any inequality in the operations of government. I know it is often asked against whom in a government by representation is a bill of rights to secure us? I answer, that such a government is indeed a government by ourselves; but as a just government protects all alike, it is necessary that the sober and industrious part of the community should be defended from the rapacity and violence of the vicious and idle. A bill of rights, therefore, ought to set forth the purposes for which the compact is made, and serves to secure the minority against the usurpation and tyranny of the majority. It is a just observation of his excellency, doctor Adams, in his learned defence of the American constitutions that unbridled passions produce the same effect, whether in a king, nobility, or a mob. The experience of all mankind has proved the prevalence of a disposition to use power wantonly. It is therefore as necessary to defend an individual against the majority in a republick as against the king in a monarchy. Our state constitution has wisely guarded this point. The present confederation has also done it.

I confess that I have yet seen no sufficient reason for not amending the confederation, though I have weighed the argument with candour; I think it would be much easier to amend it than the new constitution. But this is a point on which men of very respectable character differ. There is another point in which nearly all agree, and that is, that the new constitution would be better in many respects if it had been differently framed. Here the question is not so much what the amendments ought to be, as in what manner they shall be made; whether they shall be made as conditions of our accepting the constitution, or whether we shall first accept it, and then try to amend it. I can hardly conceive that it should seriously be made a question. If the first question, whether we will receive it as it stands, be negatived, as it undoubtedly ought to be, while the conviction remains that amendments are necessary; the next question will be, what amendments shall be made? Here permit an individual, who glories in being a citizen of Massachusetts, and who is anxious that her character may remain undiminished, to propose such articles as appear to him necessary for preserving the rights of the state. He means not to retract anything with regard to the expediency of amending the old confederation, and rejecting the new one totally; but only to make a proposition which he thinks comprehends the general idea of all parties. If the new constitution means no more than the friends of it acknowledge, they certainly can have no objection to affixing a declaration in favor of the rights of states and of citizens, especially as a majority of the states have not yet voted upon it.

“Resolved, that the constitution lately proposed for the United States be received only upon the following conditions:

“1. Congress shall have no power to alter the time, place or manner of elections, nor any authority over elections, otherwise than by fining such state as shall neglect to send its representatives or senators, a sum not exceeding the expense of supporting its representatives or senators one year.

“2. Congress shall not have the power of regulating the intercourse between the states, nor to levy any direct tax on polls or estates, or any excise.

“3. Congress shall not have power to try causes between a state and citizens of another state, nor between citizens of different states; nor to make any laws relative to the transfer of property between those parties, nor any other matter which shall originate in the body of any state.

“4. It shall be left to every state to make and execute its own laws, except laws impairing contracts, which shall not be made at all.

“5. Congress shall not incorporate any trading companies, nor alienate the territory of any state. And no treaty, ordinance or law of the United States shall be valid for these purposes.

“6. Each state shall have the command of its own militia.

“7. No continental army shall come within the limits of any state, other than garrison to guard the publick stores, without the consent of such states in time of peace.

“8. The president shall be chosen annually and shall serve but one year, and shall be chosen successively from the different states, changing every year.

“9. The judicial department shall be confined to cases in which ambassadours are concerned, to cases depending upon treaties, to offences committed upon the high seas, to the capture of prizes, and to cases in which a foreigner residing in some foreign country shall be a party, and an American state or citizen shall be the other party, provided no suit shall be brought upon a state note.

“10. Every state may emit bills of credit without making them a tender, and may coin money, of silver, gold or copper, according to the continental standard.

“11. No powers shall be exercised by Congress or the president but such as are expressly given by this constitution and not excepted against by this declaration. And any officer of the United States offending against an individual state shall be held accountable to such state, as any other citizen would be.

“12. No officer of Congress shall be free from arrest for debt [but] by authority of the state in which the debt shall be due.

“13. Nothing in this constitution shall deprive a citizen of any state of the benefit of the bill of rights established by the constitution of the state in which he shall reside, and such bill of rights shall be considered as valid in any court of the United States where they shall be pleaded.

“14. In all those causes which are triable before the continental courts, the trial by jury shall be held sacred.”

These at present appear to me the most important points to be guarded. I have mentioned a reservation of excise to the separate states, because it is necessary, that they should have some way to discharge their own debts, and because it is placing them in an humiliating & disgraceful situation to depute them to transact the business of international government without the means to carry it on. It is necessary also, as a check on the national government, for it has hardly been known that any government having the powers of war, peace, and revenue, has failed to engage in needless and wanton expense. A reservation of this kind is therefore necessary to preserve the importance of the state governments: without this the extremes of the empire will in a very short time sink into the same degradation and contempt with respect to the middle state as Ireland, Scotland, & Wales, are in with regard to England. All the men of genius and wealth will resort to the seat of government, that will be center of revenue, and of business, which the extremes will be drained to supply.

This is not mere vision, it is justified by the whole course of things. We shall, therefore, if we neglect the present opportunity to secure ourselves, only increase the number of proofs already too many, that mankind are incapable of enjoying their liberty. I have been the more particular in stating the amendments to be made, because many gentlemen think it would be preferable to receive the new system with corrections. I have by this means brought the corrections into one view, and shown several of the principal points in which it is unguarded. As it is agreed, at least professedly, on all sides, that those rights should be guarded, it is among the inferior questions in what manner it is done, provided it is absolutely and effectually done. For my own part, I am fully of opinion that it would be best to reject this plan, and pass an explicit resolve, defining the powers of Congress to regulate the intercourse between us and foreign nations, under such restrictions as shall render their regulations equal in all parts of the empire. The impost, if well collected, would be fully equal to the interest of the foreign debt, and the current charges of the national government. It is evidently for our interest that the charges should be as small as possible. It is also for our interest that the western lands should, as fast as possible, be applied to the purpose of paying the home debt. Internal taxation and that fund have already paid two-thirds of the whole debt, notwithstanding the embarrassments usual at the end of a war.

We are now rising fast above our difficulties; everything at home has the appearance of improvement, government is well established, manufactures increasing rapidly, and trade expanding. Till since the peace we never sent a ship to India, and the present year, it is said, sends above a dozen vessels from this state only, to the countries round the Indian ocean. Vast quantities of our produce are exported to those countries. It has been so much the practice of European nations to farm out this branch of trade, that we ought to be exceedingly jealous of our right. The manufactures of the state probably exceed in value one million pounds for the last year. Most of the useful and some ornamental fabricks are established. There is great danger of these improvements being injured unless we practice extreme caution at setting out. It will always be for the interest of the southern states to raise a revenue from the more commercial ones. It is said that the consumer pays it. But does not a commercial state consume more foreign goods than a landed one? The people are more crowded, and of consequence the land is less able to support them. We know it is to be a favourite system to raise the money where it is. But the money is to be expended at another place, and is therefore so much withdrawn annually from our stock. This is a single instance of the difference of interest; it would be very easy to produce others. Innumerable as the differences of manners, and these produce differences in the laws. Uniformity in legislation is of no more importance than in religion. Yet the framers of this new constitution did not even think it necessary that the president should believe that there is a God, although they require an oath of him. It would be easy to shew the propriety of a general declaration upon that subject. But this paper is already extended to so far [sic].

Another reason which I had in stating the amendments to be made, was to shew how nearly those who are for admitting the system with the necessary alterations, agree with those who are for rejecting this system and amending the confederation. In point of convenience, the confederation amended would be infinitely preferable to the proposed constitution. In amending the former, we know the powers granted, and are subject to no perplexity; but in reforming the latter, the business is excessively intricate, and great part of the checks on Congress are lost. It is to be remembered too, that if you are so far charmed with eloquence, and misled by fair representations and charitable constructions, as to adopt an undefined system, there will be no saying afterwards that you were mistaken, and wish to correct it. _It will then be the constitution of our country, and entitled to defence._ If Congress should chuse to avail themselves of a popular commotion to continue in being, as the fourth section justifies, and as the British parliament has repeatedly done, the only answer will be, that it is the constitution of our country, and the people chose it. It is therefore necessary to be exceedingly critical. Whatsoever way shall be chosen to secure our rights, the same resolve ought to contain the whole system of amendment. If it is rejected, the resolve should contain the amendations of the old system; and if accepted, it should contain the corrections of the new one.

AGRIPPA.

‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐

_A writer in the Gazette of 29th January, under the signature of Captain M__c__Daniel, having with civility and apparent candour, called for an explanation of what was said in one of my former papers, I have chosen to mention him with respect, as the only one of my reviewers who deserves an answer._

REPLIES TO THE STRICTURES OF A LANDHOLDER, BY ELBRIDGE GERRY.

Printed In The Massachusetts Centinel, And The American Herald, January-April 1788.

Note.

The refusal of Gerry to sign or support the Constitution, being the only northern member of the federal convention to do so, made him the general target of attack by the federal writers of New England. To most of these Gerry paid no attention, but the charges of “A Landholder” were so positive, and so evidently written by a fellow member of the federal convention, that an answer was necessary.

To neither of the two pieces here printed did Gerry put his name, but the subject and internal evidence are both conclusive that they were written by him. Not being able to find a copy of the _American Herald_, I have been compelled to reprint the second article from the _New York Journal_. For more on this subject see the letters of A Landholder and of Luther Martin in this collection.

Reply To A Landholder, I.

The Massachusetts Centinel, (Number 32 of Volume VIII)

SATURDAY, JANUARY 5, 1788.

MR. RUSSELL:

You are desired to inform the publick from good authority, that Mr. GERRY, by giving his dissent to the proposed Constitution, could have no motives for preserving an office, for he holds none under the United States, or any of them; that he has not, as has been asserted, exchanged Continental for State Securities, and if he had, it would have been for his interest to have supported the new system, because thereby the states are restrained from impairing the obligation of contracts, and by a transfer of such securities, they may be recovered in the new federal court; that he never heard, in the Convention, a motion made, much less did make any, “for the redemption of the old continental money;” but that he proposed the public debt should be made neither better nor worse by the new system, but stand precisely on the same ground by the Articles of Confederation; that had there been such a motion, he was not interested in it, as he did not then, neither does he now, own the value of ten pounds in continental money; that he neither was called on for his reasons for not signing, but stated them fully in the progress of the business. His objections are chiefly contained in his letter to the Legislature; that he believes his colleagues men of too much honour to assert what is not truth; that his reasons in the Convention “were totally different from those which he published,” that his only motive for dissenting from the Constitution, was a firm persuasion that it would endanger the liberties of America; that if the people are of a different opinion, they have a right to adopt; but he was not authorized to an act, which appeared to him was a surrender of their liberties; that a representative of a free state, he was bound in honour to vote according to his idea of her true interest, and that he should do the same in similar circumstances.

_Cambridge, January 3, 1788._

Reply To A Landholder, II.

The New York Journal, (Number 2282)

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30, 1788.

From the American Herald, printed at Boston.

MR. GREENLEAF,

As the Connecticut Landholder’s publications are dispersed throughout the state, it will be useful for the sake of truth to publish the following.

TO THE PUBLIC.

An elegant writer, under the signature of “A Landholder,” having in a series of publications, with a modesty and delicacy peculiar to himself, undertaken to instruct members of legislatures, executives, and conventions, in their duty respecting the new constitution, is, in stating facts, unfortunate, in being repeatedly detected in errors; but his perseverance therein does honor “to his magnanimity,” and reminds me of Dr. Sangerado (in Gil Blas) who being advised to alter his practice, as it was founded on false principles and destructive to his patients, firmly determined to pursue it, because he had written a book in support of it. Had our learned author, the modern Sangerado, confined himself to facts and to reasoning on the constitution, he might have continued to write without interruption from its opposers, until by instructing others, he had obtained that instruction which he seems to need, or a temporary relief from the inenviable malady, the cacoethes scribendi; but his frequent misrepresentations having exposed him to suspicions that as a disciple of Mandeville he was an advocate for vice, or that to correct his curiosity some humourist has palmed on him a spurious history of the proceedings of the federal convention, and exhibited his credulity as a subject of ridicule, it is proper to set him right in facts, which, in almost every instance he has misstated.

In a late address to the honorable Luther Martin, Esquire, the Landholder has asserted, that Mr. Gerry “uniformly opposed Mr. Martin’s principles,” but this is a circumstance wholly unknown to Mr. Gerry, until he was informed of it by the Connecticut Landholder; indeed Mr. Gerry from the first acquaintance with Mr. Martin, has “uniformly had a friendship for him.”

This writer has also asserted, “that the day Mr. Martin took his seat in convention, without requesting information, or to be let into the reasons of the adoption of what he might not approve, he opened against them in a speech which held during two days.” But the facts are, that Mr. Martin had been a considerable time in convention before he spoke; that when he entered into the debates he appeared not to need “information,” as he was fully possessed of the subject; and that his speech, if published, would do him great honor.

Another assertion of this famous writer is, that Mr. Gerry in “a sarcastical reply, admired the strength of Mr. Martin’s lungs, and his profound knowledge in the first principles of government;” that “this reply” “left him a prey to the most humiliating reflections; but these did not teach him to bound his future speeches by the lines of moderation; for the very next day he exhibited, without a blush, another specimen of eternal volubility.” This is so remote from the truth, that no such reply was made by Mr. Gerry to Mr. Martin, or to any member of the convention; on the contrary, Mr. Martin, on the first day he spoke, about the time of adjournment, signified to the convention that the heat of the season, and his indisposition prevented his proceeding, and the house adjourned without further debate, or a reply to Mr. Martin from any member whatever.

Again, the Landholder has asserted that Mr. Martin voted “an appeal should lay to the supreme judiciary of the United States for the correction of all errors both in law and fact,” and “agreed to the clause that declares nine states to be sufficient to put the government in motion;” and in a note says, “Mr. Gerry agreed with Mr. Martin on these questions.” Whether there is any truth in the assertions as they relate to Mr. Martin, he can best determine; but as they respect Mr. Gerry, they reverse the facts; for he not only voted against the first proposition (which is not stated by the Landholder, with the accuracy requisite for a writer on government) but contended for jury trials in civil cases, and declared his opinion, that a federal judiciary with the powers above mentioned, would be as oppressive and dangerous, as the establishment of a star-chamber, and as to the clause that “declares nine states to be sufficient to put the government in motion,” Mr. Gerry was so much opposed to it, as to vote against it in the first instance, and afterwards to move for a reconsideration of it.

The Landholder having in a former publication asserted “that Mr. Gerry introduced a motion, respecting the redemption of old continental money” and the public having been informed by a paragraph in the Massachusetts Centinel, No. 32, of vol. 8, as well as by the honorable Mr. Martin, that neither Mr. Gerry, or any other member, had introduced such a proposition, the Landholder now says that “out of 126 days, Mr. Martin attended only 66,” and then enquires “whether it is to be presumed that Mr. Martin could have been minutely informed, of all that happened in convention, and committees of convention, during the sixty days of absence?” and “Why is it that we do not see Mr. McHenry’s verification of his assertion, who was of the committee for considering a provision for the debts of the union?” But if these enquiries were intended for subterfuges, unfortunately for the Landholder, they will not avail him: for, had Mr. Martin not been present at the debates on this subject, the fact is, that Mr. Gerry was not on a committee with Mr. McHenry, or with any other person, for considering a provision for the debts of the union, or any provision that related to the subject of old continental money; neither did he make any proposition, in convention, committee, or on any occasion, to any member of convention or other person, respecting the redemption of such money; and the assertions of the Landholder to the contrary, are altogether destitute of the shadow of truth.

The Landholder addressing Mr. Martin, further says, “Your reply to my second charge against Mr. Gerry, may be soon dismissed: compare his letter to the legislature of his state, with your defence, and you will find, that you have put into his mouth, objections different from anything it contains, so that if your representation be true, his must be false.” The objections referred to, are those mentioned by Mr. Martin, as being made by Mr. Gerry, against the supreme power of Congress over the militia. Mr. Gerry, in his letter to the legislature, states as an objection, “That some of the powers of the federal legislature are ambiguous, and others (meaning the unlimited power of Congress, to keep up a standing army, in time of peace, and their entire controul of the militia) are indefinite and dangerous.” Against both these did Mr. Gerry warmly contend, and why his representations must be false, if Mr. Martin’s are true, which particularized what Mr. Gerry’s stated generally, can only be discovered by such a profound reasoner, as the Connecticut Landholder.

The vanity of this writer, in supposing that his charges would be the subject of constitutional investigation, can only be equalled by his impertinence, in interfering with the politics of other states, or by his ignorance, in supposing a state convention could take cognizance of such matters as he calls charges, and that Mr. Gerry required a formal defence, or the assistance of his colleagues, to defeat the unprovoked and libellous attacks of the Landholder, or any other unprincipled reviler.

The landholder says: “That Mr. Martin thought the deputy attorney-general of the United States, for the state of Maryland, destined for a different character, and that inspired him with the hope that he might derive from a desperate opposition, what he saw no prospect of gaining by a contrary conduct;” but the landholder ventures to predict, “that though Mr. Martin was to double his efforts he would fail in his object.” By this we may form some estimate of the patriotism of the landholder, for, whilst he so readily resolves Mr. Martin’s conduct into a manœuvre for office, he gives too much reason to suppose, that he himself has no idea of any other motive in conducting politicks. But how can the landholder ascertain, that “Mr. Martin thought” the office mentioned “destined for a different character?” Was the landholder present at the destination? If so, it was natural for him, knowing there was a combination against Mr. Martin (however remote this gentleman was from discovering it) to suppose his accidental opposition to the complotters, proceeded from a discovery of the plot. Surely the landholder must have some reason for his conjecture respecting the motives of Mr. Martin’s conduct, or to be subject to the charge of publishing calumny, knowing it to be such. If then, this great statesman was in a secret, which has been long impenetrable, he is now entitled to the honor of giving the public the most important information they have received, concerning the origin of the new constitution, and having candidly informed them who is not, he ought to inform who is to fill that office, and all others of the new federal government. It may then, in some measure be ascertained, what individuals have supported the constitution on principles of patriotism, and who under this guise have been only squabbling for office. Perhaps we shall find that the landholder is to have the contract for supplying the standing army under the new government, and that many others, who have recurred to abuse on this occasion, have some such happy prospects; indeed the landholder puts it beyond a doubt, if we can believe him, that it was determined in the privy council of this federal convention, that however Mr. Martin might advocate the new constitution, he should not have the office mentioned; for if this was not the case, how can the landholder so roundly assert that Mr. Martin could have no prospect by a contrary conduct of gaining the office, and so remarkably sanguine is the landholder, that the members of the privy council would be senators of the new Congress, in which case the elections would undoubtedly be made according to the conventional list of nominations, as that he ventures to predict, though Mr. Martin was to double his efforts, he would fail in his object. Thus whilst this blazing star of federalism is taking great pains to hold up Mr. Gerry and Mr. Mason, as having held private meetings “to aggrandize old Massachusetts and the antient dominion” he has confessed enough to shew that his private meetings were solely to aggrandize himself.

THE LETTERS OF A LANDHOLDER, WRITTEN BY OLIVER ELLSWORTH.

Printed In The Connecticut Courant And The American Mercury, November, 1787-March, 1788.

Note.

The letters of a Landholder were so obviously written by a a member of the federal convention, that their authorship could not long remain a secret. They were published simultaneously in the _Connecticut Courant_ at Hartford and the _American Mercury_ at Litchfield, and this so clearly indicated Oliver Ellsworth as the writer that they were at once credited to his pen.

The letters had a very wide circulation, numbers being reprinted as far north as New Hampshire, and as far south as Maryland. They called out several replies, three of which, by Gerry, Williams and Martin, are printed in this collection.

A Landholder, I.

The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1189)

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1787.

TO THE HOLDERS AND TILLERS OF LAND.

The writer of the following passed the first part of his life in mercantile employments, and by industry and economy acquired a sufficient sum on retiring from trade to purchase and stock a decent plantation, on which he now lives in the state of a farmer. By his present employment he is interested in the prosperity of agriculture, and those who derive a support from cultivating the earth. An acquaintance with business has freed him from many prejudices and jealousies, which he sees in his neighbors, who have not intermingled with mankind, nor learned by experience the method of managing an extensive circulating property. Conscious of an honest intention he wishes to address his brethren on some political subjects which now engage the public attention, and will in the sequel greatly influence the value of landed property. The new constitution for the United States is now before the public, the people are to determine, and the people at large generally determine right, when they have had means of information.

It proves the honesty and patriotism of the gentlemen who composed the general Convention, that they chose to submit their system to the people rather than the legislatures, whose decisions are often influenced by men in the higher departments of government, who have provided well for themselves and dread any change least they should be injured by its operation. I would not wish to exclude from a State Convention those gentlemen who compose the higher branches of the assemblies in the several states, but choose to see them stand on an even floor with their brethren, where the artifice of a small number cannot negative a vast majority of the people.