Chapter XIV: Section 4: , of article IV. says, The United States shall guarantee to every (6)

TO THE RHODE ISLAND FRIENDS OF PAPER MONEY, TENDER ACTS AND ANTI-FEDERALISM.

The singular system of policy adopted by your state, no longer excites either the surprise or indignation of mankind. There are certain extremes of iniquity, which are beheld with patience, from a fixed conviction that the transgressor is inveterate, and that his example from its great injustice hath no longer a seducing influence. Milton’s lapse of the angels and their expulsion from Heaven, produces deeper regret in a benevolent mind than all the evil tricks they have played or torments they have suffered since the bottomless pit became their proper home. Something similar to this is excited in beholding the progress of human depravity. Our minds cannot bear to be always pained; the Creator hath, therefore wisely provided that our tender sentiments should subside, in those desperate cases where there is no longer a probability that any effort to which we may be excited, will have a power to reclaim. But though our benevolence is no longer distressed with the injustice of your measures, as philosophers above the feelings of passion, we can speculate on them to our advantage. The sentiment thrown out by some of our adventurous divines, that the permission of sin is the highest display of supreme wisdom, and the greatest blessing to the universe, is most successfully illustrated by the effects of your general policy.

In point of magnitude, your little state bears much the same proportion to the united American empire, as the little world doth to the immense intelligent universe; and if the apostacy of man hath conveyed such solemn warning and instruction to the whole, as your councils have to every part of the union, no one will doubt the usefulness of Adam’s fall. At the commencement of peace, America was placed in a singular situation. Fear of a common danger could no longer bind us together; patriotism had done its best and was wearied with exertion rewarded only by ingratitude—our federal system was inadequate for national government and justice, and from inexperience the great body of the people were ignorant what consequences should flow from the want of them. Experiments in public credit, though ruinous to thousands, and a disregard to the promises of government had been pardoned in the moment of extreme necessity, and many honest men did not realize that a repetition of them in an hour less critical would shake the existence of society. Men full of evil and desperate fortune were ready to propose every method of public fraud that can be effected by a violation of public faith and depreciating promises. This poison of the community was their only preservation from deferred poverty, and from prisons appointed to be the reward of indolence and knavery. An easement of the poor and necessitous was plead as a reason for measures which have reduced them to more extreme necessity. Most of the states have had their prejudices against an efficient and just government, and have made their experiments in a false policy; but it was done with a timorous mind, and seeing the evil they have receded. A sense of subordination and moral right was their check. Most of the people were convinced, and but few remained who wished to establish iniquity by law. To silence such opposition as might be made to the new constitution, it was fit that public injustice should be exhibited in its greatest degree and most extreme effects. For this end Heaven permitted your apostacy from all the principles of good and just government. By your system we see unrighteousness in the essence, in effects, and in its native miseries. The rogues of every other state blush at the exhibition, and say you have betrayed them by carrying the matter too far. The very naming of your measures is a complete refutation of anti-federalism, paper money and tender acts, for no man chooses such company in argument.

The distress to which many of your best citizens are reduced—the groans of ruined creditors, of widows and orphans, demonstrates that unhappiness follows vice by the unalterable laws of nature and society. I did not mention the stings of conscience, but the authors of public distress ought to remember that there is a world where conscience will not sleep.

Is it now at length time to consider. The great end for which your infatuation was permitted is now become complete. The whole union has seen and fears, and while history gives true information, no other people will ever repeat the studied process of fraud. You may again shew the distorted features of injustice, but never in more lively colors, or by more able hands than has been done already. As virtue and good government has derived all possible advantage from your experiment, and every other state thanks you for putting their own rogues and fools out of countenance, begin to have mercy on yourselves. You may not expect to exist in this course any longer than is necessary for public good; and there is no need that such a kind of warning as you set before us should be eternal. Secure as you may feel in prosecuting what all the rest of mankind condemn, the hour of your political revolution is at hand. The cause is within to yourselves, and needs but the permission of your neighbors to take its full effect. Every moral and social law calls for a review, and a volume of penal statutes cannot prevent it. They are in the first instance nullified by injustice, and five years hence not a man in your territories will presume their vindication. Passion and obstinacy, which were called in to aid injustice, have had their reign, and can support you no longer. By a change of policy give us evidence that you are returned to manhood and honour. The inventors of such councils can never be forgiven in this world, but the people at large who acted by their guidance may break from the connection and restore themselves to virtue.

There are among you legislators eminent, through the union for their wisdom and integrity. Penetrated with grief and astonishment they stand in silence, waiting the return of your reason. They are the only men who can remove the impassable gulph that is between you and the rest of mankind. In your situation there must be some sacrifice. It is required by the necessity of the case, and for the dignity of government. You have guilty victims enough for whom even benevolence will not plead; let them make the atonement and save your state. The large body of a people are rarely guilty of any crime greater than indiscretion, in following those who have no qualification to lead but an unblushing assurance infraud. Acknowledge the indiscretion, and leave those whom you have followed into the quicksands of death to the infamy prepared for them, and from which they cannot be reserved. Your situation admits no compounding of opposite systems, or halving with justice, but to make the cure there must be an entire change of measures. The Creator of nature and its laws made justice as necessary for nations as for individuals, and this necessity hath been sealed by the fate of all obstinate offenders. If you will not hear your own groans, nor feel the pangs of your own torture, it must continue until removed by a political annihilation. Such as do not pity themselves cannot be long be pitied.

Determined that our feelings shall be no longer wounded by any thing to which despair may lead you, with philosophic coolness we wait to continue our speculations on the event.

A LANDHOLDER.

The Landholder, XIII.

The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1209)

MONDAY, MARCH 24, 1788.

The attempt to amend our federal Constitution, which for some time past hath engrossed the public regard, is doubtless become an old and unwelcome topic to many readers, whose opinions are fixed, or who are concerned for the event. There are other subjects which claim a share of attention, both from the public and from private citizens. It is good government which secures the fruits of industry and virtue; but the best system of government cannot produce general happiness unless the people are virtuous, industrious and economical.

The love of wealth is a passion common to men, and when justly regulated it is conducive to human happiness. Industry may be encouraged by good laws; wealth may be protected by civil regulations; but we are not to depend on these to create it for us, while we are indolent and luxurious. Industry is most favourable to the moral virtue of the world; it is therefore wisely ordered by the Author of Nature, that the blessings of this world should be acquired by our own application in some business useful to society; so that we have no reason to expect any climate or soil will be found, or any age take place, in which plenty and wealth will be spontaneously produced. The industry and labour of a people furnish a general rule to measure their wealth, and if we use the means we may promise ourselves the reward. The present state of America will limit the greatest part of its inhabitants to agriculture; for as the art of tilling the earth is easily acquired, the price of land low, and the produce immediately necessary for life, greater encouragement to this is offered here than in any country on earth. But still suffer me to enquire whether we are not happily circumstanced and actually able to manage some principal manufactories with success, and increase our wealth by increasing the labour of the people, and saving the surplus of our earnings for a better purpose than to purchase the labour of the European nations. It is a remark often made, and generally believed, that in a country so new as this, where the price of land is low and the price of labour high, manufactories cannot be conducted with profit. This may be true of some manufactures, but of others it is grossly false. It is now in the power of New England to make itself more formidable to Great Britain by rivaling some of her principal manufactures, than ever it was by separating from her government. Woolen cloaths, the principal English manufacture, may more easily be rivaled than any other. Purchasing all the materials and labour at the common price of the country, cloths of three-quarters width, may be fabricated for six shillings per yard, of fineness and beauty equal to English cloths of six quarters width, which fell at twenty shillings. The cost of our own manufacture is little more than half of the imported, and for service it is allowed to be much preferable. It is found that our wool is of equal quality with the English, and that what we once supposed the defect in our wool, is only a deficiency in cleaning, sorting and dressing it.

It gives me pleasure to hear that a number of gentlemen in Hartford and the neighboring towns are forming a fund for the establishment of a great woolen manufactory. The plan will doubtless succeed; and be more profitable to the stockholders that money deposited in trade. As the manufacture of cloths is introduced, the raising of wool and flax, the raw materials, will become an object of the farmer’s attention.

Sheep are the most profitable part of our stock, and the breed is much sooner multiplied than horses or cattle. Why do not our opulent farmers avail themselves of the profit? An experience would soon convince them there is no better method of advancing property, and their country would thank them for the trial. Sheep are found to thrive and the wool to be of good quality in every part of New England, but as this animal delights in grazing, and is made healthy by coming often to the earth, our sea-coasts with the adjacent country, where snow is of short continuance, are particularly favourable to their propagation. Our hilly coasts were designed by nature for this, and every part of the country that abounds in hills ought to make an experiment by which they will be enriched.

In Connecticut, the eastern and southern counties, with the highlands on Connecticut river towards the sea, ought to produce more wool than would cloath the inhabitants of the state. At present the quantity falls short of what is needed by our own consumption; if a surplusage could be produced, it would find a ready market and the best pay.

The culture of flax, another principal material for manufacturing, affords great profit to the farmer. The seed of this crop when it succeeds will pay the husbandman for his labour, and return a better ground-rent than many other crops which are cultivated. The seed is one of our best articles for remittance and exportation abroad. Dressing and preparing the flax for use is done in the most leisure part of the year, when labour is cheap, and we had better work for sixpence a day and become wealthy, than to be idle and poor.

It is not probable the market can be overstocked, or if it should chance for a single season to be the case, no article is more meliorated by time, or will better pay for keeping by an increase of quality. A large flax crop is one most certain sign of a thrifty husbandman. The present method of agriculture in a course of different crops is well calculated to give the husbandman a sufficiency of flax ground, as it is well known that this vegetable will not thrive when sown successively in the same place.

The nail manufacture might be another source of wealth to the northern states. Why should we twice transport our own iron, and pay other nations for labour which our boys might perform as well? The art of nail-making is easily acquired. Remittances have actually been made from some parts of the state in this article; the example is laudable, and ought to be imitated. The sources of wealth are open to us, and there needs but industry to become as rich as we are free.

A LANDHOLDER.

A LETTER TO THE LANDHOLDER. BY WILLIAM WILLIAMS.

Printed In The American Mercury, February 1788.

Note.

This letter was occasioned by the following communication, which was printed in the _Connecticut Courant_ for Monday, February 4, 1788, (number 1202):

TO THE HON. WILLIAM WILLIAMS, ESQ.

_Sir_:—Whenever one man makes a charge against another, reason and justice require that he should be able to support the charge. In some late publications, I have offered my sentiments on the new constitution, have adduced some arguments in favour of it, and answered objections to it. I did not wish to enter into a controversy with any man. But I am unwilling to have accusations publickly thrown out against me, without an opportunity to answer them. In the late convention, when a _religious test_ was the subject of debate, you took the liberty of saying _that the Landholder_ (in treating of the same subject) _had missed the point; that he had raised up a man of straw, and kicked it over again_. Now, Sir, I wish this matter may be fairly cleared up. I wish to know, what is the real point? Who and what the _real_ man is? Or in other words, what a religious test is? I certainly have a right to expect that you will answer these questions, and let me know wherein I am in the wrong. Perhaps you may show that my ideas on the subject are erroneous. In order to do this, it would not be amiss to offer a few reasons and arguments. You doubtless had such as were convincing, at least to yourself, though you happen to omit them at the time of the debate. If you will shew that I am in the wrong, I will candidly acknowledge my mistake. If on the contrary you should be unable to prove your assertions, the public will judge, whether _you or I have missed the point_; and which of us has _committed the crime of making a man of straw_.

Not doubting but you will have the candour to come to an explanation on this subject,

I am, Sir, your humble servant,

THE LANDHOLDER.

From The Landholder’s statement printed at page 195 of this volume, it appears that this signature was employed by another man, in this instance.

Letter Of William Williams.

The American Mercury, (Number 88)

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 11TH, 1788.

MR. BABCOCK:

Since the Federal Constitution has had so calm, dispassionate and so happy an issue, in the late worthy Convention of this State; I did not expect any members of that hon. body to be challenged in a News-paper, and especially by name, and by anonymous writers, on account of their opinion, or decently expressing their sentiments relative to the great subject then under consideration, or any part of it. Nor do I yet see the propriety, or happy issue of such a proceeding. However as a gentleman in your Paper feels uneasy, that every sentiment contained in his publications, (tho’ in general they are well written) is not received with perfect acquiescence and submission, I will endeavour to satisfy him, or the candid reader, by the same channel, that I am not so reprehensible as he supposes, in the matter refer’d to. When the clause in the 6th article, which provides that “no religious test should ever be required as a qualification to any office or trust, &c.” came under consideration, I observed I should have chose that sentence and anything relating to a religious test, had been totally omitted rather than stand as it did, but still more wished something of the kind should have been inserted, but with a reverse sense, so far as to require an explicit acknowledgment of the being of a God, his perfections and his providence, and to have been prefixed to, and stand as, the first introductory words of the Constitution, in the following or similar terms, viz. _We the people of the United States, in a firm belief of the being and perfections of the one living and true God, the creator and supreme Governour of the world, in his universal providence and the authority of his laws; that he will require of all moral agents an account of their conduct; that all rightful powers among men are ordained of, and mediately derived from God; therefore in a dependence on his blessing and acknowledgment of his efficient protection in establishing our Independence, whereby it is become necessary to agree upon and settle a Constitution of federal government for ourselves_, and in order to form a more perfect union &c., as it is expressed in the present introduction, do ordain &c., and instead of none, that no other religious test should ever be required &c., and that supposing, but not granting, this would _be no security at all_, that it would make hypocrites, &c. yet this would not be a sufficient reason against it; as it would be a public declaration against, and disapprobation of men, who did not, even with sincerity, make such a profession, and they must be left to the searcher of hearts; that it would however, be the voice of the great body of the people, and an acknowledgment proper and highly becoming them to express on this great and only occasion, and according to the course of Providence, one mean of obtaining blessings from the most high. But that since it was not, and so difficult and dubious to get inserted, I would not wish to make it a capital objection; that I had no more idea of a religious test, which should restrain offices to any particular sect, class, or denomination of men or Christians in the long list of diversity, than to regulate their bestowments by the stature or dress of the candidate, nor did I believe one sensible catholic man in the state wished for such a limitation; and that therefore the News-Paper observations, and reasonings (I named no author) against a test, in favour of any one denomination of Christians, and the sacrilegious injunctions of the test laws of England &c., combatted objections which did not exist, and _was building up a man of straw and knocking him down again_. These are the same and only ideas and sentiments I endeavoured to communicate on that subject, tho’ perhaps not precisely in the same terms; as I had not written, nor preconceived them, except the proposed test, and whether there is any reason in them or not, I submit to the public.

I freely confess such a test and acknowledgment would have given me great additional satisfaction; and I conceive the arguments against it, on the score of hypocrisy, would apply with equal force against requiring an oath from any officer of the united or individual states; and with little abatement, to any oath in any case whatever; but divine and human wisdom, with universal experience, have approved and established them as useful, and a security to mankind.

I thought it was my duty to make the observations, in this behalf, which I did, and to bear my testimony for God; and that it was also my duty to say _the Constitution_, with this, and some other faults of another kind, was yet too wise and too necessary to be rejected.

W. WILLIAMS.

P. S.—I could not have suspected the Landholder (if I know him) to be the author of the piece referred to; but if he or any other is pleased to reply, without the signature of his proper name, he will receive no further answer or notice from me.

Feb. 2d, 1788.

THE LETTERS OF A COUNTRYMAN. WRITTEN BY ROGER SHERMAN.

Printed In The New Haven Gazette, November-December, 1787.

Note.

In the file of The New Haven Gazette formerly owned by Simeon Baldwin, an intimate friend, and afterwards executor of Roger Sherman, it is noted by the former that the essays of A Countryman were written by the latter.

Following this series are two essays written by Sherman under a different signature, after the adoption of the Constitution, which are an interesting contrast to these. It will be noted in the first of these, that Sherman alludes to what he “had endeavored to show in a former piece.”

A Countryman, I.

The New Haven Gazette, (Number 39)

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1787.

TO THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT.

You are now called on to make important alterations in your government, by ratifying the new federal constitution.

There are, undoubtedly, such advantages to be expected from this measure, as will be sufficient inducement to adopt the proposal, provided it can be done without sacrificing more important advantages, which we now do or may possess. By a wise provision in the constitution of man, whenever a proposal is made to change any present habit or practice, he much more minutely considers what he is to _lose_ by the alterations, what effect it is to have on what he at present possesses, than what is to be _hoped_ for in the proposed expedient.

Thus people are justly cautious how they exchange present advantages for the hope of others in a system not yet experienced.

Hence all large states have dreaded a division into smaller parts, as being nearly the same thing as ruin; and all smaller states have predicted endless embarrassment from every attempt to unite them into larger. It is no more than probable that if any corner of this State of ten miles square, was now, and long had been independent of the residue of the State, that they would consider a proposal to unite them to the other parts of the State, as a violent attempt to wrest from them the only security for their persons or property. They would lament how little security they should derive from sending one or two members to the legislature at Hartford & New Haven, and all the evils that the Scots predicted from the proposed union with England, in the beginning of the present century, would be thundered with all the vehemence of American politics, from the little ten miles district. But surely no man believes that the inhabitants of this district would be less secure when united to the residue of the State, than when independent. Does any person suppose that the people would be more safe, more happy, or more respectable, if every town in this State was independent, and had no State government?

Is it not certain that government would be weak and irregular, and that the people would be poor and contemptible? And still it must be allowed, that each town would entirely surrender its boasted independence if they should unite in State government, and would retain only about one-eightieth part of the administration of their own affairs.

Has it ever been found, that people’s property or persons were less regarded and less protected in large states than in small?

Have not the Legislature in large states been as careful not to over-burden the people with taxes as in small? But still it must be admitted, that a single town in a small state holds a greater proportion of the authority than in a large.

If the United States were one single government, provided the constitution of this extensive government was as good as the constitution of this State now is, would this part of it be really in greater danger of oppression or tyranny, than at present? It is true that many people who are _great men_ because they go to Hartford to make laws for us once or twice in a year, would then be no greater than their neighbours, as much fewer representatives would be chosen. But would not the people be as safe, governed by their representatives assembled in New York or Philadelphia, as by their representatives assembled in Hartford or New Haven? Many instances can be quoted, where people have been unsafe, poor and contemptible, because they were governed only in small bodies; but can any instance be found where they were less safe for uniting? Has not every instance proved somewhat similar to the so much dreaded union between England and Scotland, where the Scots, instead of becoming a poor, despicable, dependent people, have become much more secure, happy, and respectable? If then, the constitution is a good one, why should we be afraid of uniting, even if the Union was to be much more complete and entire than is proposed?

A Countryman, II.

The New Haven Gazette, (Number 40)

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1787.

TO THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT.

It is fortunate that you have been but little distressed with that torrent of impertinence and folly, with which the newspaper politicians have over whelmed many parts of our country.

It is enough that you should have heard, that one party has seriously urged, that we should adopt the _New Constitution_ because it has been approved by _Washington_ and _Franklin_: and the other, with all the solemnity of apostolic address to _Men_, _Brethren_, _Fathers_, _Friends and Countryman_, have urged that we should reject, as dangerous, every clause thereof, because that _Washington_ is more used to command as a soldier, than to reason as a politician—_Franklin is old_, others are _young_—and _Wilson_ is _haughty_.(52) You are too well informed to decide by the opinion of others, and too independent to need a caution against undue influence.

Of a very different nature, tho’ only one degree better than the other reasoning, is all that sublimity of _nonsense_ and _alarm_, that has been thundered against it in every shape of _metaphoric terror_, on the subject of a _bill of rights_, the _liberty of the press_, _rights of conscience_, _rights of taxation and election_, _trials in the vicinity_, _freedom of speech_, _trial by jury_, and a _standing army_. These last are undoubtedly important points, much too important to depend on mere paper protection. For, guard such privileges by the strongest expressions, still if you leave the legislative and executive power in the hands of those who are or may be disposed to deprive you of them—you are but slaves. Make an absolute monarch—give him the supreme authority, and guard as much as you will by bills of rights, your liberty of the press, and trial by jury;—he will find means either to take them from you, or to render them useless.

The only real security that you can have for all your important rights must be in the nature of your government. If you suffer any man to govern you who is not strongly interested in supporting your privileges, you will certainly lose them. If you are about to trust your liberties with people whom it is necessary to bind by stipulation, that they shall not keep a standing army, your stipulation is not worth even the trouble of writing. No bill of rights ever yet bound the supreme power longer than the _honeymoon_ of a new married couple, unless the _rulers were interested_ in preserving the rights; and in that case they have always been ready enough to declare the rights, and to preserve them when they were declared.—The famous English _Magna Charta_ is but an act of parliament, which every subsequent parliament has had just as much constitutional power to repeal and annul, as the parliament which made it had to pass it at first. But the security of the nation has always been, that their government was so formed, that at least _one branch_ of their legislature must be strongly interested to preserve the rights of the nation.

You have a bill of rights in Connecticut (i. e.) your legislature many years since enacted that the subjects of this state should enjoy certain privileges. Every assembly since that time, could, by the same authority, enact that the subjects should enjoy none of those privileges; and the only reason that it has not long since been so enacted, is that your legislature were as strongly interested in preserving those rights as any of the subjects; and this is your only security that it shall not be so enacted at the next session of assembly: and it is security enough.

Your General Assembly under your present constitution are supreme. They may keep troops on foot in the most profound peace, if they think proper. They have heretofore abridged the trial by jury in some cases, and they can again in all. They can restrain the press, and may lay the most burdensome taxes if they please, and who can forbid? But still the people are perfectly safe that not one of these events shall take place so long as the members of the General Assembly are as much interested, and interested in the same manner, as the other subjects.

On examining the new proposed constitution, there can be no question but that there is authority enough lodged in the proposed Federal Congress, if abused, to do the greatest injury. And it is perfectly idle to object to it, that there is no bill of rights, or to propose to add to it a provision that a trial by jury shall in no case be omitted, or to patch it up by adding a stipulation in favor of the press, or to guard it by removing the paltry objection to the right of Congress to regulate the time and manner of elections.

If you cannot prove by the best of all evidence, viz., by the _interest of the rulers_, that this authority will not be abused, or at least that those powers are not more likely to be abused by the Congress, than by those who now have the same powers, you must by no means adopt the constitution:—No, not with all the bills of rights and with all the stipulations in favor of the people that can be made.

But if the members of Congress are to be interested just as you and I are, and just as the members of our present legislatures are interested, we shall be just as safe, with even supreme power (if that were granted) in Congress, as in the General Assembly. If the members of Congress can take no improper step which will not affect them as much as it does us, we need not apprehend that they will usurp authorities not given them to injure that society of which they are a part.

The sole question, (so far as any apprehension of tyranny and oppression is concerned) ought to be, how are Congress formed? how far have you a control over them? Decide this, and then all the questions about their power may be dismissed for the amusement of those politicians whose business it is to catch flies, or may occasionally furnish subjects for _George Bryan’s_ Pomposity, or the declamations of _Cato_—_An Old Whig_—_Son of Liberty_—_Brutus_—_Brutus junior_—_An Officer of the Continental Army_,—the more contemptible _Timoleon_, and the residue of that rabble of writers.

A Countryman, III.

The New Haven Gazette, (Number 41)

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1787.

TO THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT.

The same thing once more—I am a plain man, of few words; for this reason perhaps it is, that when I have said a thing I love to repeat it. Last week I endeavored to evince, that the only surety you could have for your liberties must be in the nature of your government; that you could derive no security from bills of rights, or stipulations, on the subject of a standing army, the liberty of the press, trial by jury, or on any other subject. Did you ever hear of an absolute monarchy, where those rights which are proposed by the pigmy politicians of this day, to be secured by stipulation, were ever preserved? Would it not be mere trifling to make any such stipulations, in any absolute monarchy?

On the other hand, if your interest and that of your rulers are the same, your liberties are abundantly secure. Perhaps the most secure when their power is most complete. Perhaps a provision that they should never raise troops in time of peace, might at some period embarrass the public concerns and endanger the liberties of the people. It is possible that in the infinite variety of events, it might become improper strictly to adhere to any one provision that has ever been proposed to be stipulated. At all events, the people have always been perfectly safe without any stipulation of the kind, when the rulers were interested to make them safe; and never otherwise.

No people can be more secure against any oppression in their rulers than you are at present; and no rulers can have more supreme and unlimited authority than your general assembly have.

When you consult on the subject of adopting the new constitution, you do not enquire whether the powers therein contained can be safely lodged in any hands whatever. For not only those very powers, but all other powers, are already in the general assembly.—The enquiry is, whether Congress is by this new constitution so formed that a part of the power now in the general assembly would be as well lodged in Congress. Or, as was before said, it depends on how far the members are under your control; and how far their interest and yours are the same; to which careful attention must be given.

A Countryman, IV.

The New Haven Gazette, (Number 42)

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1787.

TO THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT.

If the propriety of trusting your government in the hands of your representatives was now a perfectly new question, the expediency of the measure might be doubted. A very great portion of the objections which we daily find made against adopting the new constitution (and which are just as weighty objections against our present government, or against any government in existence) would doubtless have their influence; and perhaps would determine you against trusting the powers of sovereignty out of your own hands.

The best theory, the best philosophy on the subject, would be too uncertain for you to hazard your freedom upon.

But your freedom, in that sense of the expression (if it could be called sense), is already totally gone. Your Legislature is not only supreme in the usual sense of the word, but they have _literally, all the powers of society_. Can you—can you _possibly_ grant anything new? Have you any power which is not already granted to your General Assembly? You are indeed called on to say whether a part of the powers now exercised by the General Assembly, shall not, in future, be exercised by Congress. And it is clearly much better for your interest, that Congress should experience those powers than that they should continue in the General Assembly, provided you can trust Congress as safely as the General Assembly.

What forms your security under the General Assembly? Nothing save that the interest of the members is the same as yours. Will it be the same with Congress? There are essentially only two differences between the formation of Congress and of your General Assembly. One is,—that Congress are to govern a much larger tract of country, and a much greater number of people, consequently your proportion of the government will be much smaller than at present. The other difference is—that the members of Congress when elected, hold their places for two, four and six years, and the members of Assembly only six and twelve months.

The first of these differences was discussed pretty fully in the first number, (when there was no idea of proceeding thus far on the subject), and has all the force as an objection against the powers of Congress, that it would have if applied to a proposal to give up the sovereignty of the several towns of the state, (if such sovereignty had existed,) and unite in state government.

It would be only a repetition to enter into a consideration of this difference between Congress and your Assembly.

It has been suggested that the six or eight members which we shall send to Congress will be men of property, who can little feel any burthens they may lay on society. How far is this idea supported by experience? As the members are to pay their proportion, will they not be as careful of laying too great burthens as poorer people? Are they less careful of their money than the poor? This objection would be much stronger against trusting the power out of your hands at all. If the several towns were now independent, this objection would be much more forcible against uniting in state government, and sending one or two of your most wealthy men to Hartford or New Haven, to vote away your money. But this you have tried, and found that assemblies of representatives are less willing to vote away money than even their constituents. An individual of any tolerable economy, pays all his debts, and perhaps has money beforehand. A small school district, or a small parish, will see what sum they want, and usually provide sufficiently for their wants, and often have a little money at interest.

Town voters are partly representatives, i. e. many people pay town taxes who have no right to vote, but the money they vote away is principally their own. The towns in this state tax themselves less willingly than smaller bodies. They generally however tax themselves sufficiently to nearly pay the demands against them within the year, very seldom raise money beforehand by taxes. The General Assembly of this state could never be induced to _attempt_ to do more than pay the annual interest of what they owe, and occasionally sink very small parts of the principal, and they never in fact did thus much, and we are all witnesses that they are full as careful of the public money as we can wish. It never was a complaint that they were too ready to allow individuals large sums. A man who has a claim against a town, and applies to a town-meeting, is very likely to obtain justice: but he who has a claim against the state, and applies to the General Assembly, stands but a poor chance to obtain justice. Some rule will be found to exclude his claim,—or to lessen it,—or he will be paid in a security—not worth half the money.

You have uniformly experienced that your representatives are as careful, if not more so, of your money, than you yourselves are in your town-meetings; but still your representatives are generally men of property, and those of them who are most independent, and those whom you have sent to Congress, have not been by any means the least careful.

A Countryman, V.

The New Haven Gazette, (Number 44)

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1787.

TO THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT.

You do not hate to read Newspaper Essays on the new constitution, more than I hate to write them. Then _we will be short_—which I have often found the _best_ expression in a dull sermon, except the _last_.

Whether the mode of election pointed out in the proposed constitution is well calculated to support the principles which were designed to be established in the different branches of the legislature, may perhaps be justly doubted:—and may perhaps in some future day be discussed.

The design undoubtedly was, that the house of representatives should be a _popular_ assembly,—that the senate should, in its nature, be somewhat more permanent, and that the two houses should be completely independent of each other. These _principles_ are right—for the present we will suppose they will be supported—there then remains to be considered no considerable difference between the constitutional government which is proposed, and your present government, except that the time for which you choose your present rulers is only for six and twelve months, and the time for which you are to choose your continental rulers is for two, four and six years.

The convention were mistaken if they supposed they should lessen the evils of tumultuous elections by making elections less frequent. But are your liberties endangered by this measure? Philosophy may mislead you. Ask experience. Are not the liberties of the people of England as safe as yours?—They are not as free as yours, because much of their government is in the hands of _hereditary majesty_ and _nobility_. But is not that part of the government which is under the control of the commons exceedingly well guarded? But still the house of commons is only a third branch—the _only_ branch who are appointed by the people—and they are chosen but once in _seven years_. Is there then any danger to be apprehended from the length of time that your rulers are to serve? when none are to serve more than six years—one whole house but two years, and your President but four.

The great power and influence of an hereditary monarch of Britain has spread many alarms, from an apprehension that the commons would sacrifice the liberties of the people to the money or influence of the crown: but the influence of a powerful _hereditary_ monarch, with the national Treasury—Army—and fleet at his command—and the whole executive government—and one-third of the legislative in his hands constantly operating on a house of commons, whose duration is never less than _seven years_, unless this same monarch should _end_ it, (which he can do in an hour,) has never yet been sufficient to obtain one vote of the house of commons which has taken from the people the _liberty of the press_,—_trial by jury_,—_the rights of conscience, or of private property_.

Can you then apprehend danger of oppression and tyranny from the too great duration of the power of _your_ rulers?

THE LETTERS OF A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN, WRITTEN BY ROGER SHERMAN.

Printed In The New Haven Gazette, December, 1789.

Note.

These letters are ascribed to Sherman on the authority mentioned at page 213.

In a letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph, (_Correspondence_, 1, 63), he says:

On the subject of amendments, nothing has been publickly, and very little privately, said. Such as I am known to have espoused will, as far as I can gather, be attainable from the federalists, who sufficiently predominate in both branches, though with some the concurrence will proceed from a spirit of conciliation rather than conviction. Connecticut is least inclined, though I presume not inflexibly opposed, to a moderate revision. A paper, which will probably be republished in the Virginia gazettes, under the signature of a citizen of New Haven, unfolds Mr. Sherman’s opinions.

In the _Writings of John Adams_, (VI, 427), is a correspondence between Adams and Sherman, produced by these articles, which should be studied in connection with them.

A Citizen Of New Haven, I.

The New Haven Gazette, (Number 48)

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1788.

_Observations on the Alterations Proposed as Amendments to the new Federal Constitution._

Six of the states have adopted the new constitution without proposing any alteration, and the most of those proposed by the conventions of other states may be provided for by congress in a code of laws without altering the constitution. If congress may be safely trusted with the affairs of the Union, and have sufficient powers for that purpose, and possess no powers but such as respect the common interest of the states (as I have endeavored to show in a former piece), then all the matters that can be regulated by law may safely be left to their discretion, and those will include all that I have noticed except the following, which I think on due consideration will appear to be improper or unnecessary.

1. It is proposed that the consent of two-thirds or three-fourths of the members present in this branch of the congress shall be required for passing certain acts.

On which I would observe, that this would give a minority in congress power to controul the majority, joined with the concurrent voice of the president, for if the president dissents, no act can pass without the consent of two-thirds of the members in each branch of congress; and would not that be contrary to the general principles of republican government?

2. That impeachments ought not to be tried by the senate, or not by the senate alone.

But what good reason can be assigned why the senate is not the most proper tribunal for that purpose? The members are to be chosen by the legislatures of the several states, who will doubtless appoint persons of wisdom and probity, and from their office can have no interested motives to partiality. The house of peers in Great Britain try impeachments and are also a branch of the legislature.

3. It is said that the president ought not to have power to grant pardons in cases of high treason, but the congress.

It does not appear that any great mischief can arise from the exercise of this power by the president (though perhaps it might as well have been lodged in congress). The president cannot pardon in case of impeachment, so that such offenders may be excluded from office notwithstanding his pardon.

4. It is proposed that members of congress be rendered ineligible to any other office during the time for which they are elected members of that body.

This is an objection that will admit of something plausible to be said on both sides, and it was settled in convention on full discussion and deliberation. There are some offices which a member of congress may be best qualified to fill, from his knowledge of public affairs acquired by being a member, such as minister to foreign courts, &c., and on accepting any other office his seat in congress will be vacated, and no member is eligible to any office that shall have been instituted or the emoluments increased while he was a member.

5. It is proposed to make the president and senators ineligible after certain periods.

But this would abridge the privilege of the people, and remove one great motive to fidelity in office, and render persons incapable of serving in offices, on account of their experience, which would best qualify them for usefulness in office—but if their services are not acceptable they may be left out at any new election.

6. It is proposed that no commercial treaty should be made without the consent of two-thirds of the senators, nor any cession of territory, right of navigation or fishery, without the consent of three-fourths of the members present in each branch of congress.

It is provided by the constitution that no commercial treaty shall be made by the president without the consent of two-thirds of the senators present, and as each state has an equal representation and suffrage in the senate, the rights of the state will be as well secured under the new constitution as under the old; and it is not probable that they would ever make a cession of territory or any important national right without the consent of congress. The king of Great Britain has by the constitution a power to make treaties, yet in matters of great importance he consults the parliament.

7. There is one amendment proposed by the convention of South Carolina respecting religious tests, by inserting the word _other_, between the words _no_ and _religious_ in that article, which is an ingenious thought, and had that word been inserted, it would probably have prevented any objection on that head. But it may be considered as a clerical omission and be inserted without calling a convention; as it now stands the effect will be the same.

On the whole it is hoped that all the states will consent to make a fair trial of the constitution before they attempt to alter it; experience will best show whether it is deficient or not, on trial it may appear that the alterations that have been proposed are not necessary, or that others not yet thought of may be necessary; everything that tends to disunion ought to be avoided. Instability in government and laws tends to weaken a state and render the rights of the people precarious.

If another convention should be called to revise the constitution, ’tis not likely they would be more unanimous than the former; they might judge differently in some things, but is it certain that they would judge better? When experience has convinced the states and people in general that alterations are necessary, they may be easily made, but attempting it at present may be detrimental if not fatal to the union of the states.

The judiciary department is perhaps the most difficult to be precisely limited by the constitution, but congress have full power to regulate it by law, and it may be found necessary to vary the regulations at different times as circumstances may differ.

Congress may make requisitions for supplies previous to direct taxation, if it should be thought to be expedient, but if requisitions be made and some states comply and others not, the non-complying states must be considered and treated as delinquents, which will tend to excite disaffection and disunion among the states, besides occasioning delay; but if congress lay the taxes in the first instance these evils will be prevented, and they will doubtless accommodate the taxes to the customs and convenience of the several states.

Some suppose that the representation will be too small, but I think it is in the power of congress to make it too large, but I believe that it may be safely trusted with them. Great Britain contains about three times the number of the inhabitants in the United States, and according to Burgh’s account in his political disquisitions, the members of parliament in that kingdom do not exceed 131, and if 69 more be added from the principal cities and towns the number would be 200; and strike off those who are elected by the small boroughs, which are called the rotten part of the constitution by their best patriots and politicians, that nation would be more equally and better represented than at present; and if that would be a sufficient number for their national legislature, one-third of that number will be more than sufficient for our federal legislature who will have few general matters to transact. But these and other objections have been considered in a former paper, before referred to. I shall therefore conclude this with my best wishes for the continuance of the peace, liberty and union of these states.

A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN.

A Citizen Of New Haven, II.

The New Haven Gazette, (Number 51)

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 25, 1788.

_Observations on the New Federal Constitution._

In order to form a good Constitution of Government, the legislature should be properly organized, and be vested with plenary powers for all the purposes for which the government was instituted, to be exercised for the public good as occasion may require.

The greatest security that a people can have for the enjoyment of their rights and liberties, is that no laws can be made to bind them nor any taxes imposed upon them, without their consent by representatives of their own chusing, who will participate with them in the public burthens and benefits; this was the great point contended for in our controversy with Great Britain, and this will be fully secured to us by the new constitution. The rights of the people will be secured by a representation in proportion to their numbers in one branch of the legislature, and the rights of the particular states by their equal representation in the other branch.