Chapter XVII: Section 4: , of article IV. says, The United States shall guarantee to every (9)

It was again an infringement of the 13th article in the confederation, for Congress, on the 28th of September, not to arrest and prevent its being transmitted to the several legislatures; nor was the legislature of this state less culpable, in the beginning of February, 1788, who, in the course of three hours, took up and concluded the measure of calling a convention without apprising their constituents of the danger.

It is notorious that the right of regulating Indian affairs, especially with the five nations, has been in the colony of New York since the year 1664, and before that period, from the year 1614, whilst it was called New Nederland under the Dutch. That by the confederation, although Congress are invested with the power of regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, that they are restricted to those Indians “not members of any of the states, and a special proviso that the legislative rights of any state within its own limits be not infringed or violated.” It therefore was a violation of the confederation and of the rights of the state for the congressional commissioners of Indian affairs to treat, at fort Stanwix, with and thereat to make a purchase from the five nations without the authority or consent of the legislature of this state. It was an infraction of the rights of the citizens of this state, and an insult on their government, for those commissioners to wrest private property from individuals, imprison their persons, set at defiance the civil authority of the county of Montgomery, and violently to resist the execution of legal process. Nor was the ordinance of the 7th of August, 1786, for the regulation of Indian affairs, less so, namely, that “the Indian department be divided into two districts, viz.: the southern, which shall comprehend within its limits all the nations in the territory of the United States, who reside to the southward of the Ohio; and the northern, which shall comprehend all the nations within the said territory, and westward, not of lake Ontario, but of Hudson’s river; that a superintendent for the northern districts shall have authority to appoint two deputies to reside in such places as shall best facilitate the regulation of the Indian trade; that no person, citizen or other, under the penalty of five hundred dollars, shall reside among or trade with any Indian or Indian nations within the territory of the United States, without a licence for that purpose first obtained from the superintendent of the district, or of one of the deputies, who is hereby directed to give such licence to every person who shall produce from the supreme executive of any state a certificate under the seal of the state, that he is of good character and suitably qualified and provided for that employment, for which licence he shall pay for one year the sum of fifty dollars to the said superintendent for the use of the United States.” If this was the conduct of Congress and their officers, when possessed of powers which were declared by them to be insufficient for the purposes of government, what have we reasonably to expect will be their conduct when possessed of the powers “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes,” when they are armed with legislative, executive and judicial powers, and their laws the supreme laws of the land—and when the states are prohibited, without the consent of Congress, to lay any “imposts or duties on imports,” and if they do they shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States—and all such laws subject to the revision and controul of Congress.

It is therefore evident that this state, by adopting the new government, will enervate their legislative rights, and totally surrender into the hands of Congress the management and regulation of the Indian trade to an improper government, and the traders to be fleeced by iniquitous impositions, operating at one and the same time as a monopoly and a poll-tax. The deputy by the above ordinance, has a right to exact yearly fifty dollars from every trader, which Congress may increase to any amount, and give it all the operation of a monopoly; fifty dollars on a cargo of 10,000 dollars’ value will be inconsiderable, on a cargo of 1000 dollars burthensome, but on a cargo of 100 dollars will be intolerable, and amount to a total prohibition, as to small adventurers.

II, III, IX, XII, AND XXXI.

The second paragraph provides “that the supreme legislative power within this state shall be vested in two separate and distinct bodies of men, the one to be called the assembly, and the other to be called the senate of the state of New York, who together shall form the legislature.”

The ninth provides “that the assembly shall be the judge of their own members, and enjoy the same privileges, and proceed in doing business in like manner as the assembly of the colony of New York of right formerly did.”

The twelfth paragraph provides “that the senate shall, in like manner, be judges of their own members,” etc.

The 31st describes even the stile of laws—that the stile of all laws shall be as follows: “Be it enacted by the people of the state of New York represented in senate and assembly,” and that all writs and proceedings shall run in the name of the people of the state of New York, and tested in the name of the chancellor or the chief judge from whence they shall issue.

The third provides against laws that may be hastily and inadvertently passed, inconsistent with the spirit of the constitution and the public good, and that “the governor, the chancellor and judges of the supreme court, shall revise all bills about to be passed into laws, by the legislature.”

The powers vested in the legislature of this state by these paragraphs will be weakened, for the proposed new government declares that “all legislative powers therein granted shall be vested in a congress of the United States, which shall consist of a senate and a house of representatives,” and it further prescribes, that “this constitution and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding; and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this constitution.”

Those who are full of faith, suppose that the words in pursuance thereof are restrictive, but if they reflect a moment and take into consideration the comprehensive expressions of the instrument, they will find that their restrictive construction is unavailing, and this is evinced by 1st art., 8 sect., where this government has a power “to lay and collect all taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States,” and also “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or office thereof.”

Art. 1st, sect. 7, provides a qualified negative, that is, that “every bill which shall be passed [by] the house of representatives and the senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the president of the United States.”

To conclude my observations on this head, it appears to me as impossible that these powers in the state constitution and those in the general government can exist and operate together, as it would be for a man to serve two masters whose interests clash, and secure the approbation of both. Can there at the same time and place be and operate two supreme legislatures, executives, and judicials? Will a “guarantee of a republican form of government to every state in the union” be of any avail, or secure the establishment and retention of state rights?

If this guarantee had remained, as it was first reported by the committee of the whole house, to wit, ... “that a republican constitution, and its existing laws, ought to be guaranteed to each state by the United States,” it would have been substantial; but the changing the word _constitution_ into the word _form_ bears no favorable appearance.

IV, V, XII, XVI.

The fourth provides, “that the assembly of the state of New York shall consist of at least seventy members, to be annually chosen in the several counties in certain proportions.” The 5th, 12th and 16th, declare that a census shall be taken every seven years, to regulate the augmentation of the number seventy, so as not to exceed three hundred. Here seventy members are divided among the several counties, and consequently into at least as many poles and sets of members to be annually chosen. If this is contrasted with the constitution for the federal government—the constitutional assembly or house of representatives will be found to consist of sixty-five members divided among thirteen states, to be chosen every second year. Six for the state of New York; not distributed among the counties, but by all the counties. And, although “the times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof,” yet, as it provides that “Congress may at any time by law, make or alter those regulations, except as to places of chusing senators”—the power in the state government to prescribe rules in those cases will be superseded by the executive of the general government, perhaps to the great inconvenience of the people.

FROM THE VITH TO THE XIITH.

The sixth paragraph recites that an opinion hath long prevailed among divers of the good people of this state that the voting at the election by ballot would tend more to preserve the liberty and equal freedom of the people than voting viva voce; to the end, therefore, that a fair experiment be made which of these two methods of voting is to be preferred, it declares that after the war elections shall be by ballot.

The seventh and eighth regulate the freeholds, and what property shall entitle a man to vote; the ninth, the mode of conducting business in the assembly, and their privileges; the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth, the number of the senate, and how and by whom they shall be elected.

As these clauses regulate the mode of elections and qualifications of the voters of senate and assembly, a relation of what gave rise to the provisions for voting by ballot and that of the value of the freehold, will help to unravel what otherwise may appear mysterious.

In respect to the first it may be necessary to observe that under the colonial government there existed violent parties, not known by the name of whig or tory—republicans and aristocrats. Those who were in the employments of government, or the _ins_, were for extending the prerogative of the crown, while the _outs_ were checks to it. Many of the leaders on both sides were under strong expectations that sooner or later that branch of colonial government called the king’s council would be erected into a hereditary house of lords. The _ins_ being nearest to the disposition of the offices of honor and profit, and in the way of obtaining patents for vacant lands, and being from time to time joined by other crown officers and dependents, who flocked to and settled in this colony since the year 1763, had the means of making use of undue influence to retain their situations, which made the _outs_ at last dispair of ever having a turn, unless the elections were by ballot. This opinion was propagated in every part of the colony before and at the time of the revolution, and so strongly did it operate upon the committee that were ordered to consider of and report the constitution, that at one time they had the whole system interwoven in the draft; but either because it would have made it too lengthy, or that one of the parties were then reduced, and not likely to rise again into importance, about the time the draft was reported, it was struck out and was left by the constitution to the legislature to decide, as experience on the exercise of both principles should suggest.

SYDNEY.

Sydney, II.

The New York Journal, (Number 2321)

SATURDAY, JUNE 14, 1788.

For the Daily Patriotic Register.

TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

(Concluded from yesterday’s paper.)

As to the value of the freeholds, there has been great diversity of opinions, for notwithstanding all agreed that the rights and liberties of a country were ever in danger from the rich and poor, and their safety in the middle sort or yeomanry of the country, still the difficulty occurred in establishing the mean.

While the convention, in 1776, was setting at Harlem, the outlines of a constitution were handed about, to try, it was supposed, the temper of the members, in which it was proposed to have a governor, lieutenant governor, senate, and assembly; the qualification of the governor, lieutenant governor, and senate, to be that each should possess real estate to the value of 10,000 pounds, and to be elected by freeholders possessing freeholds to the value of 1,000 pounds. Although this was not attended with bad effects, yet the qualifications of the electors gave rise to various arguments, and, among others, that as taxation and representation ought to go together, so the right of electing shall be in proportion to the value of each man’s estate. To exemplify this, a man of £100 estate had one vote; a man of £1000 should have ten, and a man of ten thousand pounds a hundred, and so on in the same ratio. Others on the contrary supposed that there ought to be no other criterion than the age of twenty-one, a citizen born and resident in this country; out of the two extremes was produced the present system of election and qualification, both admitted to be as secure and consistent rights as any that have been contrived.

It is apprehended, from the duplicity in the wording of 1st art., 4th sec., that seemingly to leave in the power of the respective legislatures to regulate the elections, and still, that Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations; and the undesigned wording of the sixth article, that the constitution and laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof shall be the law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding, will render the whole system ineffectual, if not nugatory, and a new system as destructive to the liberties of the citizens as that of the ratio of voices to the ratio of property introduced. Besides being liable to have the whole State erected into one district, and consequently may give rise to the inconveniences I mentioned before.

VII, SEC. 6; VIII, SEC. 6; IX, SEC. 6; X, SECTION 6; XI, SEC. 6; XII, SEC. 2, 6; XVI, SEC. 6; XIII, XXXV, XLI.

By the 13th paragraph “no member of this State shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to the subjects of the State by this constitution, unless by the law of the land, or judgment of its peers.”

The 35th adopts, under certain exceptions and modifications, the common law of England, the statute law of England and Great Britain, and the acts of the legislature of the colony, which together formed the law on the 19th of April, 1775.

The 41st provides that the trial by jury remain inviolate forever; that no acts of attainder shall be passed by the legislature of this State for crimes other than those committed before the termination of the present war. And that the legislature shall at no time hereafter institute any new courts but such as shall proceed according to the course of the common law.

There can be no doubt that if the new government be adopted in all its latitude, every one of these paragraphs will become a dead letter: nor will it solve any difficulties, if the United States guarantee “to every state in the union a republican form of government;” we may be allowed the form and not the substance, and that it was so intended will appear from the changing the word _constitution_ to the word _form_ and the omission of the words, _and its existing laws_. And I do not even think it uncharitable to suppose that it was designedly done; but whether it was so or not, by leaving out these words the jurisprudence of each state is left to the mercy of the new government. By 1st art., 8th sec., 1st clause, “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States.”

By the 9th clause of the same section, “To constitute tribunals inferior to the court.”

By the 18th clause, “To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department thereof.”

The 3d art., 1st sec., “The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”

By sec. 2nd, “The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity.” To have in various instances an original and exclusive, in others a concurrent jurisdiction, and the supreme court in many cases an appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact. It provides, indeed, that the trial for crimes shall be by jury, but has left the trial in civil matters to the mercy of construction and their own legislative sovereign will and pleasure.

By the 3d art., 3d sec., “The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder shall work a corruption of blood or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.” By 1st art., 9th sec., 3d clause, “No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.”

XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXIII, XL.

The 17th orders “That the supreme executive power and authority of this State shall be vested in a governor.” By the 18th he is commander-in-chief of the militia and admiral of the navy of the State; may grant pardons to all persons convicted of crimes; he may suspend the execution of the sentence in treason or murder.

By the 19th paragraph he is to see that the laws and resolutions of the legislature be faithfully executed.

By the 27th he is president of the council of appointment, and has a casting vote and the commissioning of all officers.

The 20th and 21st paragraphs give the lieutenant-governor, on the death, resignation, removal from office, or impeachment of the governor, all the powers of a governor.

The 40th paragraph orders that the militia at all times, both in peace and war, shall be armed and disciplined, and kept in readiness; in what manner the Quakers shall be excused; and that a magazine of warlike stores be forever kept at the expence of the State, and by act of the legislature, established, maintained, and continued in every county in the State.

Whoever considers the following powers vested in the government, and compares them with the above, must readily perceive they are either all enervated or annihilated.

By the 1st art., 8th sec., 15th, 16th and 17th clauses, Congress will be empowered to call forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions; to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, for the governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, and for the erection of forts, magazines, etc.

And by the 2nd art., 2d sec., “The president shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into actual service of the United States, except in cases of impeachment.”

And by the 6th art., “The members of the several state legislatures, and all the executive and judicial officers; both of the United States, and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support the constitution.” Can this oath be taken by those who have already taken one under the constitution of this state?

XVIII, SEC. 17; XIX, SEC. 17; XX SEC. 17; XXI, SEC. 17; XXIII, SEC. 17; XXII TO XXX INCLUSIVE.

These paragraphs regulate the election, appointment, construction and duration of all the state, county and district officers, including the delegates to Congress, and how they severally are to be created and commissioned.

The 22d directs that the treasurer shall be appointed by act of the legislature to originate with the assembly. The 23d establishes a council to appoint the officers.

The 24th directs that the military officers shall be, during the pleasure of the council, the chancellor, judges of the supreme court, the first judge in every county until the age of 60.

Twenty-five and 28, which offices are incompatible, and the tenure and duration of such officers.

Twenty-six, that sheriffs and coroners be annually appointed, and shall not continue more than four years.

Twenty-seven, that the officers of the court be appointed by the respective courts, except the attorneys, by the first judge of every court.

Twenty-nine, provides that town clerks, supervisors, assessors, constables and collectors, and all other officers heretofore elegible by the people, shall always continue to be so elegible.

Thirty, directs the mode how the delegates to represent this state in the general Congress of the United States shall be elected.

I apprehend that the paragraphs aforesaid will be compleatly rendered unoperative by the following articles in the new constitution:

Second article, second section, second clause, the president “shall have power, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint embassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all officers of the United States where appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law; but the Congress may by law vest the power of such inferior officers as they think proper, in the president alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.” By the 1st art., 8 section, 9, 18 clauses, Congress have power “to constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court, to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.”

By the third article, 2d section, there is an extensive federal power as above-mentioned.

By the 2d article, 2d section, the president “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the United States.”

From these powers lodged in Congress and the powers vested in the states, it is clear that there must be a government within a government, two legislative, executive and judicial powers. The power of raising an army in time of peace, and to command the militia, will give the president ample means to enforce the Supreme laws of the land.

XXIII, SEC. 21; XXIV, SEC. 21; XXV, SEC. 21; XXVI, SEC. 21; XXVII, SEC. 21; XXVIII, SEC. 21; XXIX, SEC. 21; XXX, SEC. 21; XXXI, SEC. 2; XXXII, XXXIII, XXXIV.

The 32d paragraph orders, “That a court shall be instituted for the trial of impeachments and the correction of errors under the regulations which shall be established by the legislature, and to consist of the president of the senate for the time being, and the senators, chancellors and judges of the supreme court.”

The 33d vests the power of impeaching all officers of the state for mal and corrupt practice in the representatives of the people in assembly.

The 34th allows the parties impeached or indicted for crimes and misdemeanors to have counsel.

This system is undermined and rendered nugatory by 1st art., 6th and 7th clauses, where the senate in the new constitution, have the trial and judgment on all impeachments.

By 3d art., 2d sec, 3d clause, the trial of all crimes is regulated.

By the 3d art., 3d sec., it is defined what shall be treason, the proof required, the punishment, and how the judgment in attainder shall operate.

XXXIII, SEC. 32; XXXIV, SEC. 32; XXXV, SEC. 13; XXXVII, SEC. 1; XXXVIII, XXXIX.

The 38th paragraph provides “that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious procession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed within this State to all mankind, provided that the liberty of conscience hereby granted shall not excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State.”

The 39th provides that “no minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination whatsoever, shall at any time hereafter, under any pretence or description whatever, be eligible to or capable of holding any civil or military office or place within this state.”

The first of those articles protects us from persecution in religious matters. The other excludes the clergy from enjoying any office, civil or military. Two provisions passed by in silence by the framers of the new constitution; and although possibly the leaders in both have been equally averse to a democratic system, and have had the same object, the ruin of state government, in view.

XLII.

This paragraph provides “that it shall be in the discretion of the legislature to naturalize all such persons and in such manner as they shall think proper.”

The 1st art., 8 sec., 4th clause, give to the new government power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization.

And by the 4th art., 2d sec., “the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states,” whereby the clause is rendered entirely nugatory.

From this contrast it appears that the general government, when compleatly organized, will absorb all those powers of the state which the framers of its constitution had declared should be only exercised by the representatives of the people of the state; that the burthens and expence of supporting a state establishment will be perpetuated; but its operations to ensure or contribute to any essential measures promotive of the happiness of the people may be totally prostrated, the general government arrogating to itself the right of interfering in the most minute objects of internal police, and the most trifling domestic concerns of every state, by possessing a power of passing laws “to provide for the general welfare of the United States,” which may affect life, liberty and property in every modification they may think expedient, unchecked by cautionary reservations, and unrestrained by a declaration of any of those rights which the wisdom and prudence of America in the year 1776 held ought to be at all events protected from violation.

In a word, the new constitution will prove finally to dissolve all the power of the several state legislatures, and destroy the rights and liberties of the people; for the power of the first will be all in all, and of the latter a mere shadow and form without substance, and if adopted we may (in imitation of the Carthagenians) say, Delenda vit Americæ.

SYDNEY.

CURSORY REMARKS BY HUGH HENRY BRACKENRIDGE.

Printed In The American Museum, April, 1788.

Note.

This article first appeared in _The Pittsburgh Gazette_, but as I have not been able to find a file of that paper, I have been compelled to reprint it from _The American Museum_. It was anonymous, but its authorship is settled by its republication in Brackenridge’s “_Gazette Publications_,” printed in book form in 1806.

Cursory Remarks.

The American Museum, (Number 4)

APRIL, 1788.

It is not my intention to enter largely into a consideration of this plan of government, but to suggest some ideas in addition to, and of the same nature with, those already made, showing the imperfections and the danger of it.

The first thing that strikes a diligent observer, is the want of precaution with regard to the _sex_ of the president. Is it provided that he shall be of the male gender? The Salii, a tribe of the Burgundians, in the 11th century, excluded females from the sovereignty. Without a similar exclusion, what shall we think, if, in progress of time, we should come to have an _old woman_ at the head of our affairs? But what security have we that he shall be a _white man_? What would be the national disgrace if he should be elected from one of the southern states, and a _vile negro_ should come to rule over us? Treaties would then be formed with the tribes of Congo and Loango, instead of the civilized nations of Europe. But is there any security that he shall be a _freeman_? Who knows but the electors at a future period, in days of corruption, may pick up a man-servant, a convict perhaps, and give him the dominion? Is any care taken that he shall be of _perfect parts_? Shall we, in affairs of a civil nature, leave a door open to lame men, bastards, eunuchs, and the devil knows what?

A senate is the next great constituent part of the government; and yet there is not a word said with regard to the ancestry of any of them; whether they should be altogether Irish, or only Scots Irish. If any of them have been in the war of the White Boys, the Heart of Oak, or the like, they may overturn all authority, and make Shilelah the supreme law of the land.

The house of representatives is to be so large, that it can never be built. They may begin it, but it can never be finished. Ten miles square! Babylon itself, unless the suburbs are taken into view, was not of greater extent.

But what avails it to dwell on these things? The want of a _bill of rights_ is the great evil. There was no occasion for a bill of _wrongs_; for there will be wrongs enough. But oh! a _bill of rights_! What is the nature of a bill of rights? “It is a schedule or inventory of those powers which Congress do not possess.” But if it is clearly ascertained what powers they have, what need of a catalogue of those powers they have not? Ah! there is the mistake. A minister preaching, undertook, first, to show what was in his text; second, what was not in it. When it is specified what powers are given, why not also what powers are not given? A bill of rights is wanting, and all those things which are usually secured under it—

1. The _rights of conscience_ are swept away. The Confession of Faith, the Prayer-Book, the Manual and Pilgrim’s Progress are to go. The psalms of Watts, I am told, are the only thing of the kind that is to have any quarter at all.

2. The _liberty of the press_—that is gone at the first stroke. Not so much as an advertisement for a stray horse, or a runaway negro, can be put in any of the gazettes.

3. The _trial by jury_—that is knocked in the head, and all that worthy class of men, the lawyers, who live by haranguing and bending the juries, are demolished.

I would submit it to any candid man, if in this constitution there is the least provision for the privilege of shaving the beard? or is there any mode laid down to take the measure of a pair of breeches? Whence is it then, that men of learning seem so much to approve, while the ignorant are against it? The cause is perfectly apparent, viz., that reason is an erring guide, while instinct, which is the governing principle of the untaught, is certain. Put a pig in a poke, carry it half a day’s journey through woods and by-ways, let it out, and it will run home without deviation. Could Dr. Franklin do this? What reason have we then to suppose that his judgment, or that of Washington, could be equal to that of Mr. Smilie(55) in state affairs?

Were it not on this principle that we are able to account for it, it might be thought strange that old Livingston,(56) of the Jersies, could be so hoodwinked as to give his sanction to such a diabolical scheme of tyranny amongst men—a constitution which may well be called hell-born. For if all the devils in Pandemonium had been employed about it, they could not have made a worse.

Neil MacLaughlin, a neighbor of mine, who has been talking with Mr. Findley, says that under this constitution all weavers are to be put to death. What have these innocent manufacturers done that they should be proscribed?

Let other states think what they will of it, there is one reason why every Pennsylvanian should execrate this imposition upon mankind. It will make his state most probably the seat of government, and bring all the officers, and cause a great part of the revenue to be expended here. This must make the people rich, enable them to pay their debts, and corrupt their morals. Any citizen, therefore, on the Delaware and Susquehannah waters, ought to be hanged and quartered, that would give it countenance.

I shall content myself at present with these strictures, but shall continue them from time to time as occasion may require.

LETTER OF CAUTION, WRITTEN BY SAMUEL CHASE.

Printed In THE MARYLAND JOURNAL, October, 1788.

Note.

The authorship of this essay is fixed upon Chase by a letter of Daniel Carroll, who in writing to Madison, alludes to both this, and his reply, printed _post_. Chase was the leader of the Anti-Federalists in Maryland, but was at first compelled by popular feeling to temporize, as is shown by the following extracts, taken from the Maryland Journal for September 28, 1787:

The following is the conclusion of the speech of Samuel Chase,
Esq., delivered this day, at the Court House, before a numerous
and respectable body of citizens.

(Published by request of many electors of Baltimore Town.)

The Constitution proposed by the late Convention, for the United
States, will alter, and in some instances, abolish our Bill of
Rights and Form of Government. The Legislature of this State have
no right to alter our Form of Government, but in the mode
prescribed by the Constitution. The only question for the General
Assembly to determine is this, whether they will recommend to the
people to elect delegates to meet in convention, to consider and
decide on the plan proposed. I have always maintained the Union,
and the increase of powers in Congress. I think the Federal
Government must be greatly altered. I have not formed my opinion,
whether the plan proposed ought to be accepted as it stands,
without any amendment or alteration. The subject is very
momentous, and involves the greatest consequences. If elected, I
will vote for, and use my endeavours to procure a recommendation
by the Legislature to call a convention, as soon as it can
conveniently be done, unless otherways directed by this town.

_September 26, 1787._

Having been informed that my engagements of yesterday, to the
meeting at the Court House, “to vote for, and use my endeavours to
procure a recommendation by the Legislature, to call a convention
as soon as it can conveniently be done,” is not understood; from a
desire, if possible, to remove all misunderstanding, I take the
liberty to declare, that by the promise I meant to engage, and
therefore do promise, if elected, that I will use my endeavours to
procure, at the next session of Assembly, and as soon in the
session as the necessary business of the State will permit, a
recommendation by the General Assembly to call a convention, to
consider and decide on the Constitution proposed by the late
Convention for the United States, and to appoint the election of
delegates to the Convention as soon as the convenience of the
people will permit. I further beg leave to add as my opinion, that
the election of delegates to the Convention ought to be as early
in the spring as may be.

SAMUEL CHASE.

_Baltimore, September 27, 1787._

There are attacks on Chase, by “Steady” in the _Maryland Journal_ of September 28, 1787, and by “Spectator,” in the _Maryland Journal_ of October 9, 1787.

Caution.

The Maryland Journal, (Number 976)

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1787.

TO THE INHABITANTS OF BALTIMORE TOWN,

An attempt to _surprise_ you into any _public_ measure, ought to meet your indignation and contempt. When violence or cunning is substituted for argument and reason, suspicion should take the alarm, and prudence should dictate the propriety of deliberation. Questions of consequence in private life ought not to be _hastily_ decided, and with greater reason, determinations that involve the future felicity of a whole people, ought not to be taken before the most mature and deliberate consideration, and a free and full examination of the subject and all its consequences. These reflections occurred on being informed that some gentlemen of this Town employ themselves in carrying about and soliciting subscribers to a petition, addressed to the General Assembly, requesting them to call a Convention to ratify the new system of government, proposed for the United States by the late Convention at Philadelphia. If this petition contained no more, it would not have been worthy of notice; but it publishes to the world your entire approbation of the New Federal Government, and your desire that it should be adopted and confirmed by this State, as it stands, _without any amendment or alteration_.

The ostensible cause for offering you the petition to sign is, that you may express your sentiments to the legislature, that they ought to call a Convention to ratify the new form of government for the United States; but the real design of the promoters of the petition is to draw you into a declaration in favour of the _whole_ system, and to bind you hereafter to support it, which you must do, or allege deception and surprise, if, on further reflection, you should discover that you rashly gave an opinion against your real interests. If the _real_ intention of the promoters and carriers of this petition was _only_ to obtain your opinion in favour of calling a Convention, it might have been expressed in a _few_ lines; and no one would oppose such a petition, although improper and unnecessary, because your Delegates will certainly move for, and exert themselves to procure, the calling a Convention; and no member of the General Assembly will deny that, in so doing, your Delegates speak your sentiments.

In my opinion, it is not necessary or proper for you, _at this time_, to express your approbation, or disapprobation, of the new constitution for the United States, for the following reasons:

First—because the decision, _for_ or _against_ the plan, is of the greatest consequence, as it involves no less than the happiness or misery of you and all your posterity forever; and therefore, I think, requires your dispassionate and most deliberate consideration. Secondly—because you want information, and have not had time yourselves to examine the proposed system, and to consider the consequences that may flow from rejecting or adopting it. Thirdly—because time is not given for your countrymen in this, and the other States, to consider the subject, and to lay their sentiments and reasons for or against the measure before you. Fourthly—because you ought to hear _both_ sides, as the man who determines on hearing one part only, will almost always be mistaken in his judgment. He may be in the right, but it will be by _chance_ and not by _reason_. Fifthly—because you are not pressed in point of time to determine on the subject; you have at least three months for deliberation; to decide, therefore, in a few days will be rashness and folly. Sixthly—when men urge you to determine in _haste_, on so momentous a subject, it is not _unreasonable_ to require their motives; and it is not _uncharitable_ to suspect that they are improper; and no possible mischief or inconvenience can happen from delay.

_October 11, 1787._

CAUTION.

LETTER OF A FRIEND TO THE CONSTITUTION, WRITTEN BY DANIEL CARROLL.

Printed In The Maryland Journal, October, 1787.

Note.

Daniel Carroll wrote Madison that he had replied to Chase’s “Caution,” and as this is the only direct reply to that article I have been able to find, I have ventured to ascribe this to him. The letter is in the Madison Papers in the Department of State, which at present are restricted from use, so I am unable to print it here.

A Friend To The Constitution.

The Maryland Journal, (Number 977)

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1787.

TO THE INHABITANTS OF BALTIMORE TOWN.

You have been addressed in the last Friday’s paper, by a writer under the signature of _Caution_, who would persuade you that you ought to withhold your approbation, at this time, from the Federal Constitution recommended by the Convention.

This writer may have the best intentions in the world towards the _public welfare_, and the _prosperity of Baltimore_; but every one must perceive that he is an enemy to the proposed Constitution, and wishes to prevent you from expressing yourselves in its favour, not only _at this time_, but at any _future time_.

Mr. C—— is said to be the author of this admonition; but that this is a malicious insinuation, aimed at his sincerity, will appear by considering his _recent promise_ on this subject, signed and published by himself, in reference with the resolution of the Convention, upon which that promise is founded. I shall state both the resolution and promise, that you may judge for yourselves.

The resolve of the Convention declares, that the Constitution should be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the people, under the recommendation of its legislature, _for their assent and ratification_.

Mr. C—— being called upon, before his election, to declare himself on this point, promises to the people, “that he will use his endeavours, if elected, to call a Convention.”

I would just observe on this resolve and promise: First—that the resolve makes it an _absolute condition_ that the legislature recommend a Convention _to assent to, and ratify, the Constitution_. Secondly—that the _promise_ made by Mr. C—— is obligatory upon him, to use his endeavors to procure a Convention _for this purpose_.

Another remark, which occurs on this occasion, is, that Mr. C—— could not mean that a Convention ought to be called _for any other purpose_ than to assent to, and ratify, the Constitution; for it is absurd to suppose he meant the Convention should be authorized by the legislature to propose amendments or alterations, that being _contrary_ to the declared intention of the resolution, and the sense which his friends entertained of his engagement at the time he entered into it. Mr. C——, therefore (without presuming him capable of doing the greatest violence to his promise), cannot be considered as the _author of Caution_, who argues strenuously, though indirectly, _against adopting the Constitution_.

From this brief view of the nature and intention of the resolve, I think it is evident that the people ought, _without delay_, to signify their approbation of the Constitution by _a petition to the legislature_, to the end that the legislature, which is called upon by the Convention and Congress to recommend to the people to choose Delegates to ratify it, may have the _authority of the largest and most promising commercial and manufacturing Town in the State_ to countenance so _important a recommendation_. But _Caution_ thinks a petition _improper_ and _unnecessary_; because, says he, “your Delegates will move for, and exert themselves to procure, the calling a Convention.” Admitting your Delegates to move to have a Convention called, does it follow that they will add to their motion these _essential words, to confirm and ratify the Constitution_? Does it not rather appear, from the tenor of this writer’s remarks, that your Delegates ought to leave these words out of their motion? But the _propriety_ and _necessity_ of a petition does not depend on what your Delegates may, or may not do. It is _proper_ at this time, because the Constitution meets your approbation. It is _necessary_ at this time, because wanted as an inducement to the legislature to call upon the people to appoint a Convention to carry into effect the object of the resolution. In other words, as the recommendation for a Convention _involves the legislature in a complete approbation of the Constitution_, there is the greatest _propriety_ and _necessity_ for your telling the legislature _that it meets your approbation_.

I am sorry to find, by _Caution’s_ publication and insinuations, which I am told are circulated with great industry, that an opposition is opened against the Constitution. I did not, I confess, expect to see it adopted without some opposition; but I could not bring myself to believe, that this opposition could have originated in Baltimore, which is _so peculiarly interested in its speedy adoption_. But what I intended to say on this point, is so well expressed in a late speech of Mr. Wilson, to the people of Philadelphia, previous to their election for representatives, that I shall take the liberty of closing with it.

“After all, my fellow-citizens, (says this excellent politician) it is neither extraordinary nor unexpected, that the Constitution offered to your consideration should meet with opposition. It is the nature of man to pursue his own interest in preference to the _public good_; and I do not mean to make any personal reflection, when I add, that it is _the interest of a very numerous, powerful and respectable body to counteract and destroy the excellent work produced by the late Convention_. All the offices of government, and all the appointments for the administration of justice, and the collection of the public revenue, which are transferred from the individual to the aggregate sovereignty of the States, will necessarily turn the stream of influence and emolument into a new channel. _Every person, therefore, who either enjoys, or expects to enjoy, a place of profit under the present establishment, will object to the proposed innovations, not, in truth, because it is injurious to the liberties of his country; but because it affects his schemes of wealth and consequence._ I will confess, indeed, that I am not a blind admirer of this plan of government, and _that there are some parts of it_, which, if my wish had prevailed, would certainly have been altered. But, when I reflect how widely men differ in their opinions, and that every man (and the observation applies likewise to every state) has an equal pretension to assert his own, I am satisfied that anything _nearer to perfection_ could not have been accomplished. If there are errors, _it should be remembered_, that the seeds of reformation are sown in the work itself, and the concurrence of two-thirds of the Congress may, at any time, introduce _alterations and amendments_. Regarding it, then, in every point of view, with a candid and disinterested mind, I am bold to assert, that is the _best form of government which has ever been offered to the world_.”

A FRIEND TO THE CONSTITUTION.

_Baltimore, October 13, 1787._

THE LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN.

Printed In The Maryland Journal, January-March, 1788.

Note.

Luther Martin, afterwards nick-named the “bull-dog of federalism,” was at this time the leading Anti-federalist in Maryland. From his pen came the pamphlet entitled _Genuine Information ... Relative to the Proceedings of the General Convention_; and when the “Landholder,” (see _Ante_, page 135), attacked Elbridge Gerry, he began this series of articles in defense of that gentleman, but eventually, by the replies, was compelled to continue the series as a personal vindication. According to a letter of Daniel Carrol, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer replied in the newspapers to Martin, but I have not been able to identify this.

In the _New York Journal_ for June 17, 1788, is a comparison of the constitution as agreed upon early in the convention, with that finally framed, which was probably written by Martin.

Luther Martin, I.

The Maryland Journal, (Number 1004)

FRIDAY, JANUARY 18, 1788.

MR. WILLIAM GODDARD:

_Sir_,

As the Publication under the Signature of the Connecticut Landholder is circulating remote from the place of Mr. Gerry’s residence, and is calculated not only to injure the honourable gentleman in his private character, but also to weaken the effect of his opposition to the government proposed by the late convention, and thereby promote the adoption of a System which I consider destructive of the rights and liberties of the respective states and of their citizens, I beg leave, through the channel of your Paper, to declare to the Public that from the time I took my seat in convention, which was early in June, until the fourth day of September, when I left Philadelphia, I am satisfied I was not ten minutes absent from convention while sitting (excepting only five days in the beginning of August, immediately after the committee of detail had reported, during which but little business was done). That during my attendance I never heard Mr. Gerry or any other member introduce a proposition for the redemption of continental money according to its nominal or any other value, nor did I ever hear that such a proposition had been offered to consideration or had been thought of. I was intimate with Mr. Gerry, and never heard him express, in private conversation or otherwise, a wish for the redemption of continental money, or assign the want of such a provision as a defect. Nor did I ever hear in Convention, or anywhere else, such a motive of conduct attributed to Mr. Gerry. I also declare to the Public that a considerable time before I left the convention Mr. Gerry’s opposition to the System was warm and decided; that in a particular manner he strenuously opposed that provision by which the power and authority over the militia is taken away from the States and given to the general government; that in the debate he declared if that measure was adopted it would be the most convincing proof that the destruction of the State governments and the introduction of a king was designed, and that no declarations to the contrary ought to be credited, since it was giving the states the last coup de grace by taking from them the only means of self preservation. The conduct of the advocates and framers of this system towards the thirteen States, in pretending that it was designed for their advantage, and gradually obtaining power after power to the general government, which could not but end in their slavery, he compared to the conduct of a number of jockeys who had thirteen young colts to break; they begin with the appearance of kindness, giving them a lock of hay, or a handful of oats, and stroaking them while they eat, until being rendered sufficiently gentle they suffer a halter to be put round their necks; obtaining a further degree of their confidence, the jockeys slip a curb bridle on their heads and the bit into their mouths, after which the saddle follows of course, and well booted and spurred, with good whips in their hands, they mount and ride them at their pleasure, and although they may kick and flounce a little at first, nor being able to get rid of their riders, they soon become as tame and passive as their masters could wish them. In the course of public debate in the convention Mr. Gerry applied to the system of government, as then under discussion, the words of Pope with respect to vice, “that it was a monster of such horrid mien, as to be hated need but to be seen.” And some time before I left Philadelphia, he in the same public manner declared in convention that he should consider himself a traitor to his country if he did not oppose the system there, and also when he left the convention. These, sir, are facts which I do not fear being contradicted by any member of the convention, and will, I apprehend, satisfactorily shew that Mr. Gerry’s opposition proceeded from a conviction in his own mind that the government, if adopted, would terminate in the destruction of the States and in the introduction of a kingly government.

I am, sir, your very obedient servant,

LUTHER MARTIN.

_Baltimore, January 13, 1788._

Luther Martin, II.

The Maryland Journal, (Number 1018)

FRIDAY, MARCH 7, 1788.

MR. GODDARD:

_Sir_,