Chapter IV: Part II: Theory of the Moral Life

X. THE MORAL SITUATION 201

Distinguishing marks of the moral situation, 201; Traits of
voluntary activity, 202; The good and bad in non-voluntary
behavior, 203; Indifferent voluntary conduct, 205; The moral
is introduced when ends have conflicting values, 207;
Selection then depends upon, and influences, the nature
of the self, 209.

XI. PROBLEMS OF MORAL THEORY 212

Theory grows from practical problems, 212; Three typical
problems of reflective practice, 213; Corresponding problems
of theory, 214; Their historical sequence, 215; Growth of
individualism, 220; The two types of individualism, 221.

XII. TYPES OF MORAL THEORY 224

Sec. 1. _Typical divisions of theories_:--Teleological and
jural, 224; individual and institutional, 225; empirical and
intuitional, 226. Sec. 2. _Division of voluntary activity into
Inner and Outer_:--The "how" and the "what," 227; attitude
and consequences, 228; different types of each theory, 229;
bearing of each theory upon problems of knowledge and
of control, 231. Sec. 3. _General interpretation of these
theories_:--Ordinary view of disposition and of consequences,
232; advantages claimed for emphasis upon consequences, 234;
for emphasis upon disposition or attitude, 236; necessity of
reconciliation of these theories, 237.

XIII. CONDUCT AND CHARACTER 240

Problem of their relation, 240. Sec. 1. _The good will of
Kant_:--Emphasis upon motive, 241; motive with or without
consequences, 242; necessity of effort, 243; overt action
required to prove motive, 245. Sec. 2. _The "Intention" of the
Utilitarians_:--Emphasis upon consequences, 246; distinction
of intention from motive, 247; they are really identical,
248; motive as blind and as intelligent, 249; practical
importance of insistence upon consequences, 251; foresight
of consequences depends upon motive, 252. Sec. 3. _Conduct and
character_:--The nature of disposition, 254; partial and
complete intention, 256; complexity of motives, 257. Sec. 4.
_Morality of acts and of agents_:--Subjective and objective
morality, 259; the doer and his deed, 260; summary, 261.

XIV. HAPPINESS AND CONDUCT: THE GOOD AND DESIRE 263

Residence and nature of goodness, 263; happiness as the
good, 264; love of happiness as the evil, 265; ambiguity in
conception of happiness, 266. Sec. 1. _The Object of
Desire_:--Is it pleasure? 269; desire presupposes instinctive
appetites, 270; and objects of thought, 271; happiness and
desire, 272; need for standard, 274. Sec. 2. _The Conception
of Happiness as a Standard_:--Utilitarian method, 275;
Difficulty of measuring pleasure, 276; character determines
the value of a pleasure, 277; Mill's introduction of
quality of pleasure, 279. Sec. 3. _The constitution of
happiness_:--Pleasures depend upon objects, 281; they are
qualitative, 282; they vary with disposition, 283; happiness
as the moral good, 284.

XV. HAPPINESS AND SOCIAL ENDS 286

Utilitarianism aims at social welfare, 286; value as a theory
of social reform, 287; its aim conflicts with its hedonistic
theory of motive, 289; Bentham's method of reconciling
personal and general happiness, 291; Mill's method, 293;
sympathy and the social self, 298; the distinctively moral
interest, 300; equation of virtue and happiness, 301; moral
democracy, 303.

XVI. THE PLACE OF REASON IN THE MORAL LIFE: MORAL KNOWLEDGE 306

Sec. 1. _Problem of reason and desire_:--Nature of a reasonable
act, 306; theories about moral knowledge, 307. Sec. 2. _Kant's
theory of practical reason_:--Traits of morality, 309; reason
as _a priori_ and formal, 310; true meaning of generalization,
313; the general and the social, 314. Sec. 3. _Moral sense
intuitionalism_:--Function of reason, 317; habit and sense,
319; invalid intuitions, 321; deliberation and intuition, 322;
the good man's judgment, 324. Sec. 4. _The place of general
rules_:--Their value, 325; casuistry, 326; and its dangers,
327; secondary ends of utilitarianism, 329; empirical rules
and customs, 330; distinction of rules and principles, 333;
sympathy and reasonableness, 334.

XVII. THE PLACE OF DUTY IN THE MORAL LIFE: SUBJECTION TO
AUTHORITY 337

Conflict of the rational with the attractive end, 337. Sec. 1.
_The subjection of desire to law_, 339; cause of conflict of
desire and thought, 342; demand for transformation of desire,
343; social character of duties, 345; the social self is the
"universal" self, 346. Sec. 2. _Kantian theory_:--Accord with
duty versus from duty, 346; the two-fold self of Kant, 347;
criticism of Kant, 348; emphasis falls practically on
political authority, 351; "Duty for duty's sake," 351.
Sec. 3. _The Utilitarian theory of duty_:--The hedonistic
problem, 353; Moral sanctions, 354; they are too external,
355; Bain's account, 356; Spencer's account, 358; such
views set up a fictitious non-social self, 361. Sec. 3. _Final
statement_:--Growth requires disagreeable readjustments, 362.

XVIII. THE PLACE OF THE SELF IN THE MORAL LIFE 364

Problems regarding the self, 364. Sec. 1. _The doctrine of
self-denial_:--Explanation of its origin, 365; four objections
to doctrine, 366. Sec. 2. _Self-assertion_:--Ethical dualism,
369; "naturalistic" ethics, 369; false biological basis, 371;
misinterprets nature of efficiency, 373. Sec. 3. _Self-love
and benevolence; or egoism and altruism_:--The "crux"
of ethical speculation, 375; are all motives selfish? 376;
ambiguity of term selfish, 377; are results selfish? 379;
self-preservation, 380; rational regard for self, 382;
regard for others, 384; the existence of "other-regarding"
impulses, 385; altruism may be immoral, 387; social
justice necessary to moral altruism, 389. Sec. 4. _The
good as self-realization_:--Self-realization an ambiguous
idea, 391; true and false consideration of the self, 393;
equation of personal and general happiness, 395.

XIX. THE VIRTUES 399

Introductory--virtue defined, 399; natural ability and
virtue, 400; evolution of virtues, 401; responsibility
for moral judgment, 402; futility of cataloguing virtues,
402; their cardinal aspects, 403. Sec. 1. _Temperance_:--Greek,
Roman, and Christian conceptions, 405; negative and positive
aspects, 407; pleasure and excitement, 408. Sec. 2. _Courage
or persistent vigor_:--Dislike of the disagreeable, 410;
"dimensions" of courage, 411; optimism and pessimism, 412.
Sec. 3. _Justice_:--Three meanings of, 414; justice and
love, 415; justice and punishment, 416. Sec. 4. _Wisdom or
conscientiousness_:--Importance of intelligent interest, 418;
Greek and modern ideas of moral wisdom, 419; ideals and
thoughtfulness, 420; ideals and progress, 422.