Chapter VII: Employment of Artillery in War (1)

=140.= _General instructions._

1. F.S. Regs., Part I, lay down certain principles for the guidance of commanders in the combined employment of the various arms. A knowledge of these principles by artillery commanders is essential for effective co-operation.

2. The instructions contained in this chapter are based on those principles, and are intended further to assist artillery commanders in the solution of problems which will confront them on the field of battle and in training their commands on a uniform system.

=These principles are generally applicable to any force of artillery acting under an independent commander, whether his command is of a temporary nature or not.=

CHARACTERISTICS OF FIELD ARTILLERY.

=141.= _Field guns._

1. The principal characteristics of modern field guns are the flatness of the trajectory of their shell, the rapidity and accuracy of their fire and their power to deliver effective fire from concealed positions as well as from those in the open. Other characteristics are mobility, increased power of concealment, owing to the use of smokeless powder, and decreased vulnerability, due to the adoption of shields.

2. The effect of field guns is most fully developed against troops in the open, either in movement or stationary.

They may be used effectively against personnel in entrenchments, in buildings or behind gun shields. Against personnel protected by entrenchments the effect will be slight unless the defenders are compelled to man their entrenchments by the action of the other arms. Against buildings the effect is usually limited to the rooms facing the guns, as the projectiles are arrested by a second wall, and their destructive and incendiary effect is not great. The destructive effect of direct hits on artillery _matériel_ is considerable, but at long ranges this would entail a great expenditure of ammunition. (_See_ Sec. =114= (6).)

=142.= _Field howitzers._

1. Field howitzers by reason of their high explosive shell and the steep angle of descent of their shrapnel bullets are specially suited:--

i. To attack artillery personnel protected by shields.
ii. To destroy artillery _matériel_.
iii. To attack the defenders of entrenchments.
iv. To destroy defended localities such as villages, farms,
or the strongly entrenched portions of a position.
v. To support an attack up to the moment of assault.

2. Their wide field of fire enables howitzers to cover a zone of considerable extent, and they are particularly adapted to the support of infantry in the later stages of an attack, owing to the steep angle of descent of their projectiles. (_See_ Sec. =157=.)

Troops in movement or other targets presenting only a fleeting opportunity do not come within the normal rôle of howitzers, which, however, should be prepared to engage such objectives, if circumstances make such action advisable.

3. The chief conditions for effective howitzer fire are good gun platforms, and facilities for both observation of fire and the exercise of command. A position behind natural cover is obviously preferable, provided these conditions are fulfilled.

=143.= _Heavy artillery._

1. The special characteristics of heavy artillery are accurate long-range fire and great shell power, but these advantages are to a certain extent discounted by a limited mobility. The long-range fire of guns of this nature should be utilized to bring enfilade and cross fire to bear on the enemy’s positions. The sites chosen for them should be such as to facilitate fire being brought to bear on as much of the ground occupied by the enemy as possible. In normal circumstances these conditions are most likely to be obtained by dispersion.

The fire of guns of this nature is of special value against shielded guns, fortified localities and buildings.

2. Owing to the limited mobility of these guns and the fact that they are unprovided with shields, considerable risk may be incurred without adequate compensation, if they are placed too far forward, or exposed on a flank.

Occasions may, however, occur, when to gain decisive results, it will be necessary to use them in line with those of lighter calibre.

3. If well protected and placed on the flanks of a defensive position in an open country, their long-range fire may compel a turning movement to be made on so wide an arc, that time, valuable to the defenders, may be gained.

=144.= _Mountain artillery._

1. In country where wheeled traffic is impracticable, light guns carried on pack animals are the only substitute for field artillery, but the use of mountain artillery is not restricted to such country. Infantry requires effective support throughout the attack, and as pack animals can go practically anywhere that an infantry soldier can go without using his hands, batteries of mountain artillery are peculiarly suited to work with infantry in difficult country of any kind.

2. Hills, woods, and broken or enclosed country, which might be impassable to wheeled artillery, present little difficulty to pack animals, and, as cover, which will conceal a man standing upright is sufficient for them also, batteries of mountain artillery will often be able to work their way forward on a battlefield without attracting attention, where the movement of wheeled artillery could not escape detection.

Moreover, the utility of mountain artillery is not confined to supporting the infantry in the various forms an attack may assume, for in the defence of woods, in temporary forward positions occupied by the defence, and in rearguard action, its mobility and easy concealment will often enable it to render valuable service.

In short, mountain batteries are capable of being of great value on many occasions when circumstances are unfavourable to the use of wheeled artillery, with which, however, they compare unfavourably in respect of shell power.

PRINCIPLES OR EMPLOYMENT.

=145.= _Objects of fire._

=1. Artillery cannot ensure decisive success in battle by its own destructive action.= It is the advance of the infantry that alone is capable of producing this result.

=To help the infantry to maintain its mobility and offensive power by all the means at its disposal should be the underlying principle of all artillery tactics.=

The primary objects of artillery fire should therefore be:--

i. To assist the movements of its own infantry.
ii. To prevent the movements of the enemy’s infantry.

These objects may be attained by--

(_a_) Inflicting losses on the enemy, and breaking down
his fighting spirit.
(_b_) Destroying his _matériel_.
(_c_) Reducing the resisting power of fortified
localities and rendering them more easy of approach.

It is legitimate, therefore, to use artillery fire for any of these purposes, in so far as they contribute towards the end in view.

=146.= _Concealment._

1. The provision of suitable equipment enables batteries to deliver effective fire from positions in which they are completely concealed from the enemy. The batteries may thus be able to retain their mobility, and remain at the disposal of the commander of the force in the event of a change in the situation.

2. =Concealment in action increases the difficulties of the hostile batteries, possibly even to the extent of conferring immunity from their fire, thus enabling the concealed artillery to devote its attention to the support and assistance of its own infantry.=

Although the employment of aircraft for reconnaissance has modified the possibilities of complete concealment to some extent, guns in action may escape observation from the air if they are carefully sited.

Groups of horses and wagons in the open are very easily seen from aircraft and even when the guns are not visible may be an indication of the presence of artillery. Advantage should therefore be taken of woods, avenues of trees, or other features whenever possible to conceal the limbers, first line wagons and horses of artillery.

The power of delivering effective fire from concealed positions is, however, limited. Rapid movement or very fleeting opportunities are difficult to deal with. Distant observing stations involving the passage of orders by mechanical means increase the difficulty. The amount of dead ground which can be left in front of the guns may also be a matter of serious concern.[10]

[10] Supposing that guns and target are on the same level, then to guns 60 yards in rear of a crest and 16 feet below it all ground is dead within 3,000 yards; if 9 feet below it all ground is dead within 2,000 yards; if 3 feet below it all ground is dead within 1,000 yards.

On the other hand batteries exposed to view will usually be compelled to enter into an artillery engagement for their own protection, in which they will start at a disadvantage. This is less likely to occur at the crisis of the fight when the struggle of the infantry at close quarters may monopolize the attention of the combatants.

=3. Concealed manœuvre favours surprise=, and should therefore be sought for up to the moment of opening fire, due regard being had to tactical requirements. Even if the enemy is at once able to locate the flashes the more vulnerable portions of the battery will probably have been safely disposed and some measure of surprise attained. The advantages to be gained from moving batteries into position under cover of darkness have increased owing to the difficulty of evading observation by hostile aircraft.

=4. Concealment, both as regards position and manœuvre, must invariably be foregone for adequate reasons. To support infantry and to enable it to effect its purpose the artillery must willingly sacrifice itself.=

To move in column of route on a road in circumstances where a lucky shot will bring the column to a standstill is to court disaster. On the other hand, when deployed, rapid movement over open ground exposed to fire for a short distance is accompanied by but slight risk; or, when the enemy’s attention is fully occupied elsewhere, movements may become possible which would have no reasonable chance of succeeding if the enemy was on the look out for them.

5. Knowledge of the general tactical situation and discrimination are essential on the part of all who order artillery movements on the battlefield.

=147.= _Economy of force._

1. Artillery, owing to its mobility till subjected to effective fire, its great rapidity of fire and its power to fire effectively while remaining concealed, is able in most situations to conserve its energy, selecting its own time for action and realizing to a great extent the value of surprise effect.

=The principle of economy of force is, therefore, particularly suitable to the tactical employment of the arm, but must always be subordinate to the necessity of employing sufficient force to attain the object in view.=

2. When an encounter with the enemy takes place sufficient artillery should be deployed to support the advanced troops and to cover the deployment of the infantry. The remaining batteries should be assembled in positions of readiness.

As the plan of action develops, tasks will be assigned to the different artillery units, and they will be brought into positions suitable for their purpose. If it is not necessary to open fire immediately they will remain in observation of the zones assigned to them.

3. =Fire will not be opened with more guns than are necessary for the task in hand.= In deciding on the number of guns with which to open fire, the total number available, the frontage that they can conveniently cover with their fire and the extent and tactical importance of the objective must be considered. Efforts must also be made to foresee the course of the action, and to keep a reserve of fire power in hand to meet successive requirements as they arise.

To justify the opening of fire there must be a definite tactical object and a reasonable probability of attaining it. Ineffective fire is not only a waste of ammunition, but affords encouragement to the enemy and gives him information. It should therefore be avoided whenever possible.

4. =Expenditure of ammunition should, as a rule, be proportionate to the tactical importance of the objective and the probability of obtaining results commensurate with the expenditure.= In deciding whether to engage an objective its vulnerability and tactical importance should, therefore, be considered.

When an objective is both vulnerable and tactically important a considerable expenditure of ammunition is obviously justified, but important tactical objectives are frequently invisible or relatively invulnerable. The expenditure of ammunition in such cases must be governed by the urgency of the tactical situation.

5. The objects of keeping artillery in hand are:--

i. To be able to open fire on new objectives that become
menacing without disturbing the allotment of tasks of
that already engaged.
ii. To be in a position to deal with unforeseen
contingencies.
iii. To have guns available for any force detached to a
distance, such as a general reserve employed on a wide
turning movement.

The methods by which these objects may be attained are:--

(_a_) By bringing batteries into action in concealed
positions, where they can remain in observation, their
fire power being in hand till they are actually ordered
to open fire. A battery need not employ the fire of the
whole of its guns; some may be kept temporarily in hand.

(_b_) By keeping batteries in positions of readiness
in which they retain their mobility and can be moved to
other parts of the field.

(_c_) By keeping batteries actually in reserve, if
their withdrawal from action or from positions in
readiness would cause delay and compromise the success
of any contemplated operation.

It follows as a consequence of the above that the power of the Q.F. gun must be utilized on occasion to its full extent to compensate for the small number of guns employed on a given task.

=148.= _Protection._

1. On the march, artillery, owing to its inability to defend itself, requires protection which is provided by the other arms under the orders of the commander of the force to which the artillery belongs.

2. On the field of battle artillery will generally be protected by the distribution of the other arms. When, however, guns are in an exposed position, an escort should be detailed, and, if this has not been done, it is the duty of the artillery commander concerned to apply to the commander of the nearest troops, who will provide an escort.--(_See_ F.S. Regs., Part I., Sec. =105=). In moving from one part of a battlefield to another artillery commanders must consider, if no escort has been provided, whether one is necessary or whether to avoid delay they should rely on their own patrols.

3. When an escort is provided its commander is responsible for the protection of the artillery. This fact, however, does not absolve the artillery commander from all care for the safety of his guns. He should consult with the escort commander when necessary and should be ready to assist him with any available artillery patrols, when their employment would conduce to greater security.

4. Once in action artillery should be able to protect its own front, provided there is no ground within effective rifle range upon which the fire of the guns cannot rapidly be brought to bear in case of need.

5. Rifles are carried on artillery wagons, except in horse artillery. In action these rifles should, if considered necessary, be distributed to the gunners with the wagon lines, who should assist the escort, if one has been provided, in protecting these vehicles. This precaution is especially desirable in the case of artillery in action on the exposed flank of a force, where hostile cavalry may be operating.

=149.= _Intercommunication._

1. Intelligent co-operation depends largely on the receipt of timely information, and this in turn is dependent on the efficiency of the system of intercommunication.

2. In open country where the features are bold and the field of fire and view extensive, infantry can often be supported more effectively from a flank than by batteries situated in its immediate zone; and the possibility of bringing effective converging fire to bear on a given locality may be capable of realization. For this to be done the divisional artillery commander must have the means of readjusting from time to time the tasks that have been assigned to the artillery brigades in the original dispositions for battle.

In close or intricate country, on the other hand, where the view is restricted, artillery will rarely be able to do more than support the infantry in its own immediate front. In these circumstances the artillery and infantry may be formed temporarily into groups and the units thus associated must co-operate closely with one another. The limitations of central artillery control must then be met by an increased devolution of responsibility to subordinate artillery commanders. (_See_ Sec. =153=, (7).)

Artillery communications therefore involve two distinct ideas, viz., i. communication between the divisional artillery commander and his subordinates; ii. between infantry and artillery subordinate commanders. Both must be kept in view and organized as far as possible, but the relative importance of each varies to a great extent with the nature of the country.

3. The means of communication available are:--

i. Staff or orderly officers.
ii. Mounted orderlies.
iii. Artillery brigade telephones.
iv. Visual signalling.
v. Divisional signal service.

For the purposes of communication between the divisional artillery commander and his subordinates orderlies are probably the most reliable, but the number of officers and men available for the purpose is limited, and moreover their employment involves the expenditure of considerable time and horseflesh.

The telephone equipment with which each artillery brigade is provided is primarily intended to link up the brigade commander with his batteries. But it may also be possible to utilize this equipment for communication with the divisional artillery commander. When it is desired to maintain direct communication with the divisional artillery commander, and the nature of the country makes it possible, the telephone should be employed. It is impossible, however, to trust entirely to this means, and arrangements must be made to supplement it by others that will be available in the event of breakdown.

Visual signalling is apt to disclose positions to the enemy and, except when the use of the heliograph is possible, is slow and uncertain. In any case the number of signallers available make it impossible to trust exclusively to this method of communication. In open country, and for lateral communications, where it is possible to conceal the use of flags, etc., from the enemy’s view visual signalling is valuable as a means of supplementing other methods.

The divisional signal service affords a useful alternative. When it is desired to use this means of communication it will be advantageous if the subordinate artillery commander can station himself near the infantry brigadier with whom he is co-operating, as it is then possible for him to communicate with the divisional artillery commander by using the cable that connects divisional and infantry brigade headquarters. This line, however, cannot be relied on for urgent messages, as it is often very congested.

4. For the purpose of establishing an understanding between infantry and artillery subordinate commanders the most satisfactory results in a combined operation are obtained by a personal exchange of views between the commanders concerned before the operation begins. (_See_ sec. =153=. (7).)

If this is impossible or if the artillery commander is unable to remain in the vicinity of the infantry commander he should be represented by an officer.

5. It is of the utmost importance that communication should be maintained between the artillery and infantry commanders throughout the operation. It is unsafe to rely on one means of communication only, and two, or even more, should usually be arranged for. The mutual adoption of some system of describing the features of the ground, such as squared maps or panorama sketches, will often save delay and misunderstanding.

CO-OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT WITH ARTILLERY.

=150.= _Employment of aircraft._

1. Both during the period of tactical reconnaissance which precedes the battle, and in the battle itself, the employment of aircraft may assist the artillery.

2. If it is possible before a battle to ascertain the general position and number of the hostile batteries by reconnaissances from aircraft, a valuable clue to the probable grouping of the hostile artillery may be obtained and the allotment of tasks to his artillery by the divisional commander facilitated.

3. During the battle aircraft can assist artillery as follows:--

i. By the indication of concealed targets.
ii. By observation of fire.

Aeroplanes may be used for both these objects, but kites are of value chiefly for observation of fire. The latter, however, can only operate in a wind of from 20 to 40 miles an hour. They can lift an observer to a height of 1,500 to 2,000 feet and can keep in telephonic communication with the ground. They cannot easily be damaged by fire.

=151.= _Signalling from aircraft._

1. The means of communication from aircraft are:--

i. Wireless telegraphy.
ii. Visual signals.
iii. Sound signals.
iv. Dropping written messages.

Wireless telegraphy, in its present state of development, can be used only in a limited number of aircraft and will not generally be provided in aeroplanes allotted for work with artillery.

Visual signals can be made by means of Very’s signal lights, coloured flags or weighted streamers. Electric lamps may also prove of value. Very’s lights are used in three colours; white, red and green. The distance at which they can be seen and distinguished varies with atmospheric conditions, but on a clear day they are easily distinguishable at 3,000 feet overhead, and if the sun is not very bright and in the eyes of the observer at a distance of 2 miles with the naked eye. On a clear evening they can be seen and distinguished as far as 6 miles. Specially prepared lights can be seen at greater distances. Red, yellow, or blue flags, 18 inches square, held out by an observer can be seen with field glasses at a distance of 1 mile with the aeroplane at a height of 2,000 feet. Dark and light streamers can be distinguished with the naked eye at a distance of 1 mile.

A Klaxon horn in an aeroplane can be heard on the ground from a height of 2,000 feet and a distance of 1 mile.

Messages may be written on special weighted message blocks and thrown over, or written on an ordinary form and placed in a weighted bag with streamers, or in a parachute.

=152.= _Signalling from the ground to aircraft._

Any place where it is desired to have messages dropped will be marked by a cross on the ground, made of two strips of white cloth about 15 feet by 3 feet.

White strips on the ground, 6 feet by 1 foot, can be seen from a height of 3,000 feet, and a prearranged code of signals can be made by this means. (_See_ Sec. =205=.)

On a clear evening Very’s lights fired from the ground can be seen from aircraft at a height of 2,000 feet and a distance of 6 miles, and the different colours distinguished.

DUTIES OF THE DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY COMMANDER.

=153.= _General instructions._

1. The divisional commander is at all times responsible for the tactical employment of the artillery under his command. The divisional artillery commander is responsible for the execution of his orders so far as they affect the artillery.

2. When a force is marching towards the enemy and an encounter is anticipated, the divisional artillery commander will detail officers’ patrols (_See_ Sec. =240=) to accompany the advanced troops. These patrols will be found by the artillery brigades of the division, their number depending on the nature of the country and the front occupied by the division when on the march. As soon as an action appears likely these officers’ patrols will rapidly reconnoitre the ground on which it is probable that the force will deploy, and send information as soon as possible to the divisional artillery commander as to the nature and extent of the available artillery positions. A brief report received at the right time will be of greater value than a more elaborate and detailed report which is received too late to be acted upon.

3. The divisional artillery commander will usually accompany the divisional commander on the march. He must be careful to let all concerned, particularly his patrols, know where reports can reach him, both on the march and in action.

4. Should time be of importance and a rapid deployment essential there may be no opportunity for a detailed reconnaissance by either the divisional or the artillery commander. If time permits, however, it is advisable for the divisional artillery commander to make a personal reconnaissance and report the result to the divisional commander before the manner of the deployment is settled, stating how best in his opinion the artillery can be utilized to further the object in view.

5. In forming a plan of action the manner in which the artillery and infantry will co-operate should be clearly defined, and will depend, as a rule, on the character of the country. If the country is such that the task assigned to the division can be carried out by the troops of the division acting in combination under the immediate control of the divisional commander, it will, generally, be inadvisable to delegate the command of portions of the divisional artillery to subordinate commanders.

Batteries may be able by crossing their fire to afford effective support to infantry other than that operating in their immediate front. To tie them down to limited tasks might reduce the fighting capacity of the division as a whole. In such circumstances, the bulk of the artillery will deploy and occupy positions under the orders of the divisional artillery commander, who will allot tasks to each brigade commander or zones in which he thinks their fire can be employed most effectively.

6. The country may, however, be such as to necessitate the employment of the division on more than one tactical operation, in such a manner that their efforts cannot be directly combined. In such cases it will be advisable that the artillery and infantry should be formed temporarily into groups. =The units of the two arms thus associated for a distinct tactical operation should be under one commander.= It is the function of the divisional commander to organize these temporary groups. It is then the function of the divisional artillery commander to convey the necessary orders to the subordinate artillery commanders, placing them at the disposal of the group commanders.

It is the duty of a group commander to report to divisional headquarters when his special task is accomplished. When the special task has been accomplished, unless a new combined task is then to be allotted, the artillery of that group should be again placed at the disposal of the divisional artillery commander without delay, with a view to the issue of fresh instructions by him for its further employment. The artillery commander of the group is responsible for keeping the divisional artillery commander informed as to the course of the operation in which he is engaged, the general disposition of his batteries and the expenditure of ammunition.

7. =Whenever a subordinate artillery commander is allotted a task necessitating co-operation with a certain force of infantry, whether he is placed under the orders of the commander of that force or not, it becomes his duty to open communication with its commander, reporting to him in person, if possible, in order to obtain full information as to the character of the operation that he is to support and as to the proposed method of its execution.= (_See_ Secs. =149= (4) and =248= (2).)

8. The manner in which the divisional commander’s plan is translated into orders and in which these orders are conveyed to the artillery must depend to a great extent on the nature of the operation. Divisional operation orders lay down what is required of the artillery and contain such information about it as it is necessary for the other arms to know. If infantry and artillery are grouped together temporarily as indicated above, divisional operation orders will give particulars of the grouping, and will also state the task or mission that is assigned to each group. Consequently in cases where divisional operation orders are issued to commanders of artillery brigades the divisional artillery commander will usually only require to supplement them with a few technical instructions.

In his capacity as a subordinate commander (_see_ F.S. Regs., Part II. Sec. 10), however, the divisional artillery commander is responsible that the necessary orders are issued to his own units. When, therefore, divisional orders are not issued to artillery brigades, or when they do not give sufficient information respecting the artillery, it is his duty to issue his own orders, and he is responsible that they convey to the units under his command all the information respecting the intention of the divisional commander and the movements of the other arms which it is desirable for them to know. It will frequently be necessary to give these orders verbally, and for this purpose the divisional artillery commander may find it convenient to assemble his brigade commanders.

It is his duty to make sure that the necessary orders are issued to the divisional ammunition column commander and that the latter is acquainted with the dispositions of the various artillery units.

9. The divisional artillery commander must bear in mind that during the course of an action unexpected developments are always liable to occur and that the artillery must be prepared to deal with them promptly.

Concealed positions have greatly facilitated this task. Batteries that are in action, but have not been located by the enemy, can often be moved rapidly to other parts of the field. The tasks allotted to some of these batteries may have become of minor importance and they will be available if required. Other batteries may have accomplished the tasks assigned to them and thus be at the disposal of the divisional artillery commander. Notwithstanding these possibilities, however, it may often be advisable to keep some guns in hand ready to reinforce guns already in action or to open fire in a new direction.

10. As the action progresses it may be necessary to rearrange the tasks or zones allotted to artillery brigades to meet the changing circumstances, or to order changes of position. The position of the divisional artillery commander during an action should, therefore, be chosen with a view to the facilities it affords for keeping in touch with the divisional commander as well as for observing the progress of events and for communicating with his subordinate artillery commanders. (_See_ Sec. =149= (2).) If the divisional artillery commander cannot find a suitable position in the vicinity of divisional headquarters, he must take steps to keep himself in constant touch therewith, in order that he may learn at once all information reaching the headquarters which might be of use to him.

11. For the purposes of directing and controlling the fire of his batteries the information that is of primary importance to an artillery commander is firstly to know exactly where the infantry that he is supporting is from time to time; secondly, what is its immediate objective; and thirdly, what it is that prevents it from attaining its object.

The comparative effect of fire from different portions of the enemy’s position is, however, difficult to estimate from the artillery positions. The establishment of advanced observation posts may, therefore, be necessary to watch the situation generally, to obtain information from infantry commanders, and to report to the artillery commander concerned. Responsibility for establishing posts for this purpose will rest either with the divisional artillery commander or with the commander of the artillery in a temporary group. (_See_ para. 6.)[11]

[11] This does not preclude subordinate artillery commanders from making the arrangements for observation of fire referred to in Sec. =199=.

12. The task of the artillery is likely to be much facilitated in future by the use of aircraft, by means of which targets may be located and the observation of fire assisted.

The divisional artillery commander should therefore point out to the divisional commander whenever necessary the directions in which aircraft can be usefully employed in obtaining information which would be of value to the artillery.

ARTILLERY IN ATTACK.

=154.= _Action of the advanced guard artillery._

(_See also_ F.S. Regs., Part I, Sec. 68.)

1. The advanced guard affords protection to the main body and obtains information; either function may compel it to fight. When the enemy is encountered, and offensive action is intended, the advanced guard should drive back the enemy’s advanced troops till the dispositions of his main body are disclosed, after which the advanced guard will usually be compelled to limit its action to holding the ground gained until the commander has formed his plan and deployed his force.

=It follows that the action of the advanced guard may alternate between the offensive and the defensive. The action of the artillery must conform.=

2. The commander of the artillery of the advanced guard will accompany the advanced guard commander on the march, so that he may receive early instructions as to his action. The artillery will be allotted positions that will enable it to co-operate with the rest of the advanced guard in carrying out the plan of action that the advanced guard commander may decide to adopt.

The occupation of concealed positions, a wide dispersion of the available guns and a liberal expenditure of ammunition will then assist to deceive the enemy as to the strength of the force opposed to him, and may so contribute materially to the success of the operation.

3. If the enemy is in strength the advanced guard will eventually encounter opposition which it is unable to overcome. The artillery should then occupy the best positions available to assist the advanced guard in holding the ground gained and in repelling any attack that may be made upon it, in which case the principles involved are identical with those discussed later under the heading “Artillery in Defence.” (_See_ Sec. =158= _et seq._)

4. As it is impossible to foresee, when an advanced guard action is entered upon, where and when the main battle will be fought, considerations as to possible eventualities should not be allowed to influence the choice of the most suitable positions for the immediate purpose. Any breaking up of units that may result must be rectified later, if possible.

=155.= _Opening phase of the attack._

(_See also_ F.S. Regs., Part I, Sec. 105.)

1. If the divisional commander decides to attack, the first functions of the artillery will be to support the advanced guard against any possible offensive on the part of the enemy in order to cover the deployment of the infantry of the main body. Usually concealed positions will be the best for this purpose.

2. If the infantry deployment takes place successfully and the enemy is definitely thrown on the defensive the next stage will be the advance of the infantry through the zone swept by the hostile artillery fire. The enemy will probably use his artillery to delay this advance and to inflict loss on the infantry whenever opportunity offers. His guns are likely to be concealed. =The task of the artillery at this stage will usually be to locate the enemy’s batteries and, by subduing the fire of those in action, to support the infantry.=

To carry this out observation posts must be established and every effort made to locate the hostile batteries or their observation posts. Valuable help can be rendered by aerial reconnaissance, but artillery officers and look-out men should be trained to detect readily the flashes of guns, the dust thrown up by their discharge and the other indications of the presence of a battery in action or of an observing party. When a hostile battery that is impeding the advance of the infantry has been located, every effort should be made to subdue its fire. The range should be obtained as accurately as circumstances permit, and the battery should be subjected to an accurate, rapid, and intense fire[12] with the object of demoralizing the personnel and driving them temporarily from their guns or compelling them for the time being to cease fire. Should this object be achieved the hostile battery should be closely watched and any further attempt to intervene should be dealt with by a repetition of the same process. (_See_ Sec. =223= (3).)

[12] Should the limits within which the hostile battery is located be wide the fire must be of a searching nature.

3. Unless the enemy’s artillery by exposing itself offers an opportunity for its destruction, commensurate with the expenditure of ammunition involved, fire should be confined to those hostile batteries that can be located, which are impeding the infantry advance. If the hostile batteries cannot be located ammunition should be husbanded and efforts directed towards further reconnaissance. =The primary object being to assist the infantry to close with the enemy, an artillery engagement should not be entered into at this stage for its own sake.=

=156.= _Second phase of the attack._

1. As soon as the infantry reach a point where the effect of the enemy’s rifle fire begins to be seriously felt a fresh stage of the operations is entered upon.

=The forward movement of the infantry is henceforward dependent largely on effective covering fire. To be effective this covering fire must be developed by guns, machine guns and rifles in combination. The artillery commanders must therefore have a thorough grasp of the tactical situation and appreciate fully the needs of the infantry.=

The two arms must communicate freely and the artillery must watch the progress of the infantry closely. The actual method by which this co-operation should be obtained will vary in accordance with the general nature of the operation. (_See_ Sec. =153= (5).)

2. The defence of a position usually takes the form of the occupation of certain localities with unoccupied intervening spaces. If the terrain is suitable to defence these localities will mutually support one another and will each be supported by artillery. It follows that the attack must resolve itself into the attack of these localities, and protracted struggles will take place for their possession. When the country is intricate and enclosed the attacks on localities tend to become isolated actions and the system of temporary groupings referred to in Sec. =153= will be resorted to. The mission assigned to each group will be the capture of a certain locality. When the country is open the attacks on the localities, like the defence, can and should be mutually supporting.

3. The fire which prevents the development of an attack on a defended locality may come from the locality itself, or from other localities which are able to give support, or from supporting artillery. Inasmuch as infantry has difficulty in bringing fire to bear on objectives other than those in its immediate front, it follows that the artillery fire of the attack must be distributed according to requirements on all objectives from which effective fire is being brought to bear on the attacking infantry, if it is to be effective in helping the infantry forward.

Judicious distribution rather than over-concentration of artillery fire is therefore indicated, and to arrange for this distribution, and to allot suitable tasks or zones to each unit, is the function of the divisional artillery commander. (_See_ Sec. =153= (5) and (6).)

The method of fire to be employed by each unit will depend on the nature of the actual target that it is engaging. A battery engaging hostile artillery which is seriously impeding the advance of the infantry by its fire should endeavour to overwhelm the hostile artillery as described in Sec. =223=. A battery engaging infantry should, by bursts of fire, endeavour temporarily to disturb the enemy’s aim and reduce the volume and effect of his fire so as to afford its own infantry an opportunity of gaining ground. These bursts of fire should become more frequent and intense as the infantry approaches the enemy’s position and the further advance becomes more difficult. (_See_ Sec. =224=.) Covered in this manner by the fire of the artillery the infantry approaches nearer and nearer to the enemy till it reaches a point from which it is possible to assault.

4. During the progress of the fight it will usually become necessary for the artillery to move forward to positions from which it will have a clearer view of the infantry fight and thus be able to afford to the infantry more effective support, especially against local counter-attacks. For this forward movement to be carried out with success and to attain its object certain conditions are necessary, namely:--

i. A line of advance that is either protected from fire or
over which the guns can move deployed and at speed, so
as to avoid the risk of columns of guns and wagons being
brought to a standstill under fire.

ii. The possibility of reasonable protection from fire
during deployment and up to the moment of opening fire.

These conditions may be found to obtain for small forces of artillery such as sections or single guns, when they do not obtain for a large number of batteries moving simultaneously. In such cases guns should be dribbled forward a few at a time as may be found practicable. The advancing batteries should, when necessary, be supported by the fire of those in action. In cases of extreme difficulty it may be necessary for the forward movement to take place under cover of darkness.

5. To support an attack with success a battery commander must be able to see the ground over which the infantry is advancing and also be able to control the fire of his battery rapidly and effectively, but the more cover that can be obtained compatible with control by voice the better.

6. Artillery as at present equipped has certain limitations as regards dealing with rapid movement from under cover, such as might be the case if a counter-attack were made unexpectedly, and must reach the crest to develop the full effect of its fire against such targets. Its conduct in such cases must be guided by the principle laid down in Sec. =146= (4).

=157.= _Third phase of the attack._

1. The infantry covered by the fire of the artillery will endeavour to reach a position from which it will be possible to deliver the assault. The distance between this position and the enemy must depend upon the ground and the resisting power of the enemy.

2. The bursts of artillery fire should become frequent and intense at this period, the object of the artillery being to demoralise the defenders and reduce the volume and effect of their fire so as to afford to the infantry the opportunity to assault.

3. =Every effort should be made to bring a converging fire to bear on the immediate objective of the attack, such fire being by far the most demoralizing and decisive in its effect.=

At the same time no portion of the enemy’s position from which effective fire is being brought to bear on the attackers should be ignored.

4. The number of batteries employed should be limited to the number that can be effectively controlled, and should be proportionate to the extent of the objectives that it is necessary to engage. Provided sufficient batteries are in action for the extent of the objectives a greater volume of fire, if required, should be obtained by an increased rapidity of fire from those batteries that have got the range, rather than by engaging fresh batteries.

5. The losses that may be inflicted by wild artillery fire at this period may imperil the success of the whole operation, and unless the infantry has confidence in the artillery the effect of the covering fire of the latter may be to delay and hamper rather than facilitate the delivery of the assault.[13]

[13] The distance at which artillery other than howitzers can with safety fire over the heads of its own troops varies. At ranges under 1,500 yards _on the level_ it would be dangerous to fire over friendly troops; at longer ranges infantry should be sufficiently safe at 500 yards (with heavy artillery 800 yards is necessary) from the guns.

=Battery commanders must, therefore, do all in their power to improve their facilities for observing closely the course of the action and must keep the most complete control over the fire of their batteries that it is possible for them to exert.=

6. Whether the artillery can continue its fire until the assaulting infantry is actually on the point of closing with the enemy, or whether it should increase its range on the first signs of the commencement of the assault, must depend on the circumstances of each case. The distance between the combatants just prior to the assault and the slope of the ground are important factors. Where the ground in front of the enemy’s position is steep and broken this distance will probably be short, but a steep slope gives a better view to the artillery and small errors in elevation will not be so dangerous to the infantry as on flat ground. If the ground is flat and exposed the infantry may be compelled to assault from further off, while the artillery will experience increased difficulties in estimating the relative positions of the combatants, and errors in elevation and fuze setting will be more dangerous to the attacking infantry.

The advantages of artillery support at this period are, however, so great that the danger from a few shells falling short must not be allowed to prevent the artillery from continuing their fire till the latest possible moment. (_See_ F.S. Regs., Part I., Sec. =106=.)

By changing from time shrapnel to percussion shrapnel it may be possible to defer the moment when the artillery must cease firing at the immediate objective of the infantry. When it is no longer possible to continue firing at that objective the range of the artillery should be increased so as to search the rear of the position, but no considerable amount of ammunition should be devoted to this object.

7. If the assault is seen to succeed, it is more important to move some batteries forward to pursue the enemy with fire or to support the successful infantry in holding the ground gained against a possible counter-attack than to continue firing over the position. The flanks of the locality that has been captured will often prove the best positions for support against counter-attack.

ARTILLERY IN DEFENCE.

(_See also_ F.S. Regs., Part I, Secs. 107-109.)

=158.= _General instructions and preliminary measures._

1. When an encounter takes place a force may be thrown temporarily on the defensive by the numerical superiority of the enemy or by his more rapid deployment and greater readiness for action. In such a case time may be required in which to deploy or to bring up reinforcements, or possibly it may be desired to extricate the troops that are engaged and break off the action.

2. If it is desired to gain time for deployment, or to bring up reinforcements, it is usually gained by the action of advanced troops or the occupation of advanced posts. The artillery plays an important part in the support of these troops and in covering their withdrawal later. To give effective support an early deployment of a sufficient force of artillery for the purpose is necessary.

A commander may, however, deliberately assume a defensive attitude in one part of the field in order to exhaust the enemy’s powers, while he prepares an offensive stroke elsewhere. In such a case he will occupy a position with a portion of his force; strengthening it artificially if time permits, in order to reduce as much as possible the force to be locked up in its defence and to free as many as possible for the subsequent offensive. It is the action of the artillery in the defence of a position of this kind that is considered in the following sections.

3. The defence of a position usually takes the form of the occupation of certain localities with unoccupied intervening spaces. (_See_ Sec. =156= (2).) The troops holding these localities are supported by local reserves, whose functions include the attack of any hostile force penetrating between the localities and the recapture at once of any locality that may be successfully assaulted by the enemy.

In order to carry out this general scheme of defence the position to be defended is divided into sections each comprising one or more of these localities. Commanders are appointed to the sections and troops allotted for their defence, including the local reserves. The remainder of the force forms the general reserve, which is kept in hand for the decisive counter-attack. The artillery allotted to the position will be distributed, in accordance with the general scheme of defence, by the divisional commander after a careful reconnaissance of the ground, in which the divisional artillery commander will take part.

4. The tasks which the artillery allotted to the defence of the position may be called upon to perform are:--

i. To make the enemy’s infantry deploy at a distance, to
delay the advance through the zone in which the hostile
infantry is exposed to artillery fire only, and to make
this advance as laborious and as costly as possible.
ii. To prevent the hostile artillery obtaining the mastery
in such a way as to facilitate the advance of its
infantry.
iii. To combine with the infantry in the close defence of
each defended locality so that if possible there is
no line of approach by which the enemy can move without
being subject to the fire of the two arms in combination.
iv. To support local counter-attacks and, if possible, the
decisive counter-attack. (_See_ Secs. =162=, =163=.)

=The distribution of the artillery will be settled in accordance with the relative importance of each of the above tasks in the general plan of battle and with due regard to the nature of the ground.=

5. When the country is enclosed and the field of fire restricted it will usually be desirable to distribute a large proportion of the artillery to the sections of the defence and to form temporary groups of the two arms as has been advocated in the case of the attack. (_See_ Sec. =153= (5), (6), (7).) In such country the close defence of each defended locality is the chief requirement, and the other tasks assume a minor importance.

When the country is open with bold features and a good field of fire it will often be found that the defended localities can be made mutually supporting, and that artillery posted in one section of the defence can assist the defence of a locality in another section better than the batteries actually posted in that section. In this case the formation of more or less independent groups should seldom be necessary, and the positions will be selected and tasks allotted to the artillery by the divisional artillery commander under instructions from the divisional commander.

In either case it is inadvisable to commit many guns to action until the direction of the enemy’s attack is definitely ascertained.

=6. At the commencement of the action it is advisable that the artillery should be concealed as much as possible.=

If the intricacies of the ground make such a course desirable, it is permissible to post guns in open positions for the close defence of a locality and to reserve the fire of these guns for the crisis of the fight. If this is done great care should be taken to conceal the emplacements.

A ridge in rear of the main position and dominating it will facilitate the co-operation of the artillery with the infantry defence, provided the distance between the two is not too great.

Positions where the defender receives the support of his artillery, while the attacker does not, are usually strong for defence.

=159.= _Opening phase of the defence._

1. The use to be made of the artillery fire of the defence during the opening phase of the attack must depend on the general plan for the conduct of the action. A commander may desire to draw the enemy on and induce him to commit himself in a certain direction so as to offer a favourable opportunity for early counter-attack, or he may desire to delay the enemy’s advance and make the progress of his attack as slow, laborious and costly as possible.

In the former case he will reserve his artillery fire and will rely largely on surprise effect when he eventually decides to open fire. Communication must be established throughout the position and control must be rigidly maintained.

In the latter case the artillery of the defence will endeavour to make the enemy deploy at a distance and to delay the advance of his infantry. The enemy will make use of covered approaches and will cross open spaces as rapidly as possible when exposed to view, adopting formations that are the least vulnerable to artillery fire.

2. Searching the covered approaches when the effect of the fire cannot be observed is not likely to have the desired result, and will lead to the waste of valuable ammunition.

The limits of the open spaces over which the enemy is likely to attempt to move and, if necessary, the range of any prominent objects within those limits should be registered (_See_ Sec. =219=), and all arrangements made to establish a belt of fire through which the enemy must pass (_see_ Sec. =224= (4)). =The fire should be of such a nature as to impress upon the enemy the certainty of loss if he attempts to cross open spaces without deploying.= The result will be to instil caution, cause deployment to take place at a distance, and make the advance slow and difficult.