Chapter II: Appendix: The First Part (1)

I. Whether there can be a Substance that is not a Body

II. Of an Immaterial

III. Whether an Immaterial be perceivable

IV. Of the Difference between GOD and Nature

V. All the Parts of Nature, worship GOD, ibid.

VI. Whether GOD's Decrees are limited

VII. Of GOD's Decrees concerning the particular Parts of Nature

VIII. Of the Ten Commandments

IX. Of several Religions

X. Of Rules and Prescriptions

XI. Sins and Punishments are material

XII. Of human Conscience

The Second Part.

I. Whether it is possible there could be Worlds consisting only of the Rational parts, and others only of the Sensitive parts

II. Of Irregular and Regular Worlds

III. Whether there be Egress and Regress between the Parts of several Worlds

IV. Whether the Parts of one and the same Society, could (after their dissolution, meet and unite

V. Whether, if a Creature being dissolved, if it could unite again, would be the same

VI. Of the Resurrection of Human-kind

VII. Of the dissolution of a World

VIII. Of a new Heaven, and a new Earth

IX. Whether there shall be a Material Heaven and Hell, ibid.

X. Concerning the Joys or Torments of the Blessed and Cursed, after they are in Heaven or Hell

The Third Part.

The Preamble.

I. Of the Happy and Miserable Worlds

II. Whether there be such kinds and sorts of Creatures in the Happy and Blessed World, as in this World

III. Of the Births and Deaths of the Heavenly World, ibid.

IV. Whether those Creatures could be named Blessed, that are subject to dye

V. Of the Productions of the Creatures of the Regular World

VI. Whether the Creatures in the Blessed World, do feed and evacuate

VII. Of the Animals, and of the food of the Humans of the Happy World

VIII. Whether it is not irregular for one Creature to feed on another

IX. Of the continuance of life in the Regular World

X. Of the Excellency and Happiness of the Creatures of the Regular World

XI. Of Human Creatures in the Regular World

XII. Of the happiness of human Creatures in the Material World, ibid.

The Fourth Part.

I. Of the Irregular World

II. Of the Productions and Dissolutions of the Creatures of the irregular World

III. Of Animals, and of Humans in the irregular World

IV. Of Objects and Perceptions

V. The Description of the Globe of the irregular World, ibid.

VI. Of the Elemental Air, and Light of the irregular World

VII. Of Storms and Tempests in the irregular World

VIII. Of the several Seasons; or rather, of the several Tempers in the irregular World, ibid.

IX. The Conclusion of the irregular and unhappy, or cursed World

The Fifth Part.

Fifteen Sections concerning Restoring-Beds, or Wombs

The Conclusion

GROUNDS OF Natural Philosophy.

The First Part.

CHAP. I. Of MATTER.

Matter is that we name Body; which Matter cannot be less, or more, than Body: Yet some Learned Persons are of opinion, That there are Substances that are not Material Bodies. But how they can prove any sort of Substance to be no Body, I cannot tell: neither can any of Nature's Parts express it, because a Corporeal Part cannot have an Incorporeal Perception. But as for Matter, there may be degrees, as, _more pure_, or _less pure_; but there cannot be any Substances in Nature, that are between Body, and no Body: Also, Matter cannot be figureless, neither can Matter be without Parts. Likewise, there cannot be Matter without Place, nor Place without Matter; so that Matter, Figure, or Place, is but one thing: for, it is as impossible for One Body to have Two Places, as for One Place to have Two Bodies; neither can there be Place, without Body.

CHAP. II. Of MOTION.

Though Matter might be without Motion, yet Motion cannot be without Matter; for it is impossible (in my opinion) that there should be an Immaterial Motion in Nature: and if Motion is corporeal, then Matter, Figure, Place, and Motion, is but one thing, _viz_. a corporeal figurative Motion. As for a First Motion, I cannot conceive how it can be, or what that First Motion should be: for, an Immaterial cannot have a Material Motion; or, so strong a Motion, as to set all the Material Parts in Nature, or this World, a-moving; but (in my opinion) every particular part moves by its own Motion: If so, then all the Actions in Nature are self-corporeal, figurative Motions. But this is to be noted, That as there is but one Matter, so there is but one Motion; and as there are several Parts of Matter, so there are several Changes of Motion: for, as Matter, of what degree soever it is, or can be, is but Matter; so Motion, although it make Infinite Changes, can be but Motion.

CHAP. III. Of the degrees of MATTER.

Though Matter can be neither more nor less than Matter; yet there may be degrees of Matter, as _more pure_, or _less pure_; and yet the purest Parts are as much material, in relation to the nature of Matter, as the grossest: Neither can there be more than two sorts of Matter, namely, that sort which is Self-moving, and that which is not Self-moving. Also, there can be but two sorts of the Self-moving Parts; as, that sort that moves intirely without Burdens, and that sort that moves with the Burdens of those Parts that are not Self-moving: So that there can be but these three sorts; Those parts that are not moving, those that move free, and those that move with those parts that are not moving of themselves: Which degrees are (in my opinion) the Rational Parts, the Sensitive Parts, and the Inanimate Parts; which three sorts of Parts are so join'd, that they are but as one Body; for, it is impossible that those three sorts of Parts should subsist single, by reason Nature is but one united material Body.

CHAP. IV. Of VACUUM.

In my opinion, there cannot possibly be any _Vacuum_: for, though Nature, as being material, is divisible and compoundable; and, having Self-motion, is in perpetual action: yet Nature cannot divide or compose _from_ her self, although she may move, divide, and compose in her self: But, were it possible Nature's Parts could wander and stray in, and out of _Vacuum_, there would be a Confusion; for, where Unity is not, Order cannot be: Wherefore, by the Order and Method of Nature's corporeal Actions, we may perceive, there is no _Vacuum_: For, what needs a _Vacuum_, when as Body and Place is but one thing; and as the Body alters, so doth the Place?

CHAP. V. The difference of the Two Self-moving Parts of Matter.

The Self-moving Parts of Nature seem to be of two sorts, or degrees; one being purer, and so more agil and free than the other; which (in my opinion) are the Rational Parts of Nature. The other sort is not so pure; and are the Architectonical Parts, which are the Labouring Parts, bearing the grosser Materials about them, which are the Inanimate Parts; and this sort (in my opinion) are the Sensitive Parts of Nature; which form, build, or compose themselves with the Inanimate Parts, into all kinds and sorts of Creatures, as Animals, Vegetables, Minerals, Elements, or what Creatures soever there are in Nature: Whereas the Rational are so pure, that they cannot be so strong Labourers, as to move with Burdens of Inanimate Parts, but move freely without Burdens: for, though the Rational and Sensitive, with the Inanimate, move together as one Body; yet the Rational and Sensitive, do not move as one Part, as the sensitive doth with the Inanimate. But, pray mistake me not, when I say, the Inanimate Parts are grosser; as if I meant, they were like some densed Creature; for, those are but Effects, and not Causes: but, I mean gross, dull, heavy Parts, as, that they are not Self-moving; nor do I mean by Purity, Rarity; but Agility: for, Rare or Dense Parts, are Effects, and not Causes: And therefore, if any should ask, Whether the Rational and Sensitive Parts were Rare, or Dense; I answer, They may be Rare or Dense, according as they contract, or dilate their Parts; for there is no such thing as a Single Part in Nature: for Matter, or Body, cannot be so divided, but that it will remain Matter, which is divisible.

CHAP. VI. Of Dividing and Uniting of Parts.

Though every Self-moving Part, or Corporeal Motion, have free-will to move after what manner they please; yet, by reason there can be no Single Parts, several Parts unite in one Action, and so there must be united Actions: for, though every particular Part may divide from particular Parts; yet those that divide from some, are necessitated to join with other Parts, at the same point of time of division; and at that very same time, is their uniting or joining: so that Division, and Composition or Joining, is as one and the same act. Also, every altered Action, is an altered figurative Place, by reason Matter, Figure, Motion, and Place, is but one thing; and, by reason Nature is a perpetual motion, she must of necessity cause infinite Varieties.

CHAP. VII. Of Life and Knowledg.

All the Parts of Nature have Life and Knowledg; but, all the Parts have not Active Life, and a perceptive Knowledg, but onely the Rational and Sensitive: And this is to be noted, That the variousness, or variety of Actions, causes varieties of Lives and Knowledges: For, as the Self-moving parts alter, or vary their Actions; so they alter and vary their Lives and Knowledges; but there cannot be an Infinite particular Knowledg, nor an Infinite particular Life; because Matter is divisible and compoundable.

CHAP. VIII. Of Nature's Knowledg and Perception.

If Nature were not Self-knowing, Self-living, and also Perceptive, she would run into Confusion: for, there could be neither Order, nor Method, in Ignorant motion; neither would there be distinct kinds or sorts of Creatures, nor such exact and methodical Varieties as there are: for, it is impossible to make orderly and methodical Distinctions, or distinct Orders, by Chances: Wherefore, Nature being so exact (as she is) must needs be Self-knowing and Perceptive: And though all her Parts, even the Inanimate Parts, are Self-knowing, and Self-living; yet, onely her Self-moving Parts have an active Life, and a perceptive Knowledg.

CHAP. IX. Of PERCEPTION in general.

_Perception_ is a sort of Knowledg, that hath reference to Objects; that is, Some Parts to know other Parts: But yet Objects are not the cause of Perception; for the cause of Perception is Self-motion. But some would say, _If there were no Object, there could be no Perception_. I answer: It is true; for, that cannot be perceived, that is not: but yet, corporeal motions cannot be without Parts, and so not without Perception. But, put an impossible case, as, That there could be a single Corporeal Motion, and no more in Nature; that Corporeal Motion may make several Changes, somewhat like _Conceptions_, although not _Perceptions_: but, Nature being Corporeal, is composed of Parts, and therefore there cannot be a want of Objects. But there are Infinite several manners and ways of Perception; which proves, That the Objects are not the Cause: for, every several kind and sort of Creatures, have several kinds and sorts of Perception, according to the nature and property of such a kind or sort of Composition, as makes such a kind or sort of Creature; as I shall treat of, more fully, in the following Parts of this Book.

CHAP. X. Of Double PERCEPTION.

There is a _Double Perception_ in Nature, the Rational Perception, and the Sensitive: The Rational Perception is more subtil and penetrating than the Sensitive; also, it is more generally perceptive than the Sensitive; also, it is a more agil Perception than the Sensitive: All which is occasioned not onely through the _purity_ of the Rational parts, but through the _liberty_ of the Rational parts; whereas the Sensitive being incumbred with the Inanimate parts, is obstructed and retarded. Yet all Perceptions, both Sensitive and Rational, are in parts; but, by reason the Rational is freer, (being not a painful Labourer) can more easily make an united Perception, than the Sensitive; which is the reason the Rational parts can make a Whole Perception of a Whole Object: Whereas the Sensitive makes but Perceptions in part, of one and the same Object.

CHAP. XI. Whether the Triumphant Parts can be perceived distinctly from each other.

Some may make this Question,_ Whether the Three sorts of Parts, the Rational, Sensitive, and Inanimate, may be singly perceived?_ I answer, Not unless there were single Parts in Nature; but, though they cannot be singly perceived, yet they singly perceive; because, every Part hath its own motion, and so its own perception. And though those Parts, that have not self-motion, have not perception; yet, being joined, as one Body, to the Sensitive, they may by the Sensitive Motion, have some different sorts of Self-knowledg, caused by the different actions of the Sensitive parts; but that is not _Perception_. But, as I said, the _Triumphant Parts_ cannot be perceived distinctly asunder, though their Actions may be different: for, the joining, or intermixing of Parts, hinders not the several Actions; as for example, A Man is composed of several Parts, or, (as the Learned term them) _Corporeal Motions_; yet, not any of those different Parts, or Corporeal Motions, are a hindrance to each other: The same between the _Sensitive_ and _Rational Parts_.

CHAP. XII. Whether Nature can know her self, or have an Absolute Power of her self, or have an exact Figure.

I was of an opinion, That Nature, because Infinite, could not know her Self; because Infinite hath no limit. Also, That Nature could not have an Absolute Power over her own Parts, because she had Infinite Parts; and, that the Infiniteness did hinder the Absoluteness: But since I have consider'd, That the Infinite Parts must of necessity be Self-knowing; and that those Infinite Self-knowing Parts are united in one Infinite Body, by which Nature must have both an United Knowledg, and an United Power. Also, I questioned, Whether Nature could have an Exact Figure, (but, mistake me not; for I do not mean the Figure of Matter, but a composed Figure of Parts) because Nature was composed of Infinite Variety of Figurative Parts: But considering, that those Infinite Varieties of Infinite Figurative Parts, were united into one Body; I did conclude, That she must needs have an Exact Figure, though she be Infinite: As for example, This World is composed of numerous and several Figurative parts, and yet the World hath an exact Form and Frame, the same which it would have if it were Infinite. But, as for Self-knowledg, and Power, certainly God hath given them to Nature, though her Power be limited: for, she cannot move beyond her Nature; nor hath she power to make her self any otherwise than what she is, since she cannot create, or annihilate any part, or particle: nor can she make any of her Parts, Immaterial; or any Immaterial, Corporeal: Nor can she give to one part, the Nature (_viz_. the Knowledg, Life, Motion, or Perception) of another part; which is the reason one Creature cannot have the properties, or faculties of another; they may have the like, but not the same.

CHAP. XIII. Nature cannot judg her self.

Although Nature knows her self, and hath a free power of her self; (I mean, a natural Knowledg and Power) yet, Nature cannot be an upright, and just Judg of her self, and so not of any of her Parts; because every particular part is a part of her self. Besides, as she is Self-moving, she is Self-changeing, and so she is alterable: Wherefore, nothing can be a perfect, and a just Judg, but something that is Individable, and Unalterable, which is the Infinite GOD, who is Unmoving, Immutable, and so Unalterable; who is the Judg of the Infinite Corporeal Actions of his Servant Nature. And this is the reason that all Nature's Parts appeal to God, as being the only Judg.

CHAP. XIV. Nature Poyses, or Balances her Actions.

Although Nature be Infinite, yet all her Actions seem to be _poysed_, or _balanced_, by Opposition; as for example, As Nature hath dividing, so composing actions: Also, as Nature hath regular, so irregular actions; as Nature hath dilating, so contracting actions: In short, we may perceive amongst the Creatures, or Parts of this World, slow, swift, thick, thin, heavy, leight, rare, dense, little, big, low, high, broad, narrow, light, dark, hot, cold, productions, dissolutions, peace, warr, mirth, sadness, and that we name _Life_, and _Death_; and infinite the like; as also, infinite varieties in every several kind and sort of actions: but, the infinite varieties are made by the Self-moving parts of Nature, which are the Corporeal Figurative Motions of Nature.

CHAP. XV. Whether there be Degrees of Corporeal Strength.

As I have declared, there are (in my Opinion) Two sorts of Self-moving Parts; the one Sensitive, the other Rational. The Rational parts of my Mind, moving in the manner of Conception, or Inspection, did occasion some Disputes, or Arguments, amongst those parts of my Mind. The Arguments were these: _Whether there were degrees of Strength, as there was of Purity, between their own sort, as, the Rational and the Sensitive?_ The Major part of the Argument was,_ That Self-motion could be but Self-motion: for, not any part of Nature could move beyond its power of Self-motion_. But the Minor part argued, _That the Self-motion of the Rational, might be_ _stronger than the Self-motion of the Sensitive._ But the Major part was of the opinion, _That there could be no degrees of the Power of Nature, or the Nature of Nature: for Matter, which was Nature, could be but Self-moving, or not Self-moving; or partly Self-moving, or not Self-moving._ But the Minor argued, _That it was not against the nature of Matter to have degrees of Corporeal Strength, as well as degrees of Purity: for, though there could not be degrees of Purity amongst the Parts of the same sort, as amongst the Parts of the Rational, or amongst the Parts of the Sensitive; yet, if there were degrees of the Rational and Sensitive Parts, there might be degrees of Strength._ The Major part said, _That if there were degrees of Strength, it would make a Confusion, by reason there would be no Agreement; for, the Strongest would be Tyrants to the Weakest, in so much as they would never suffer those Parts to act methodically or regularly._ But the Minor part said, _that they had observed, That there was degrees of Strength amongst the Sensitive Parts._ The Major part argued,_ That they had not degrees of Strength by Nature; but, that the greater Number of Parts were stronger than a less Number of Parts. Also, there were some sorts of Actions, that had advantage of other sorts. Also, some sorts of Compositions are stronger than other; not through the degrees of innate Strength, nor through the number of Parts; but, through the manner and form of their Compositions, or Productions._ Thus my Thoughts argued; but, after many Debates and Disputes, at last my Rational Parts agreed, That, If there were degrees of Strength, it could not be between the Parts of the same degree, or sort; but, between the Rational and Sensitive; and if so, the Sensitive was Stronger, being _less pure_; and the Rational was more Agil, being _more pure_.

CHAP. XVI. Of Effects, and Cause.

To treat of Infinite Effects, produced from an an Infinite Cause, is an endless Work, and impossible to be performed, or effected; only this may be said, That the Effects, though Infinite, are so united to the material Cause, as that not any single effect can be, nor no Effect can be annihilated; by reason all Effects are in the power of the Cause. But this is to be noted, That some Effects producing other Effects, are, in some sort or manner, a Cause.

CHAP. XVII. Of INFLUENCE.

An _Influence_ is this; When as the Corporeal Figurative Motions, in different kinds, and sorts of Creatures, or in one and the same sorts, or kinds, move sympathetically: And though there be antipathetical Motions, as well as sympathetical; yet, all the Infinite parts of Matter, are agreeable in their nature, as being all Material, and Self-moving; and by reason there is no _Vacuum_, there must of necessity be an Influence amongst all the Parts of Nature.

CHAP. XVIII. Of FORTUNE and CHANCE.

_Fortune_, is only various Corporeal Motions of several Creatures, design'd to one Creature, or more Creatures; either to _that_ Creature, or _those_ Creatures Advantage, or Disadvantage: If Advantage, Man names it _Good Fortune_; if Disadvantage, Man names it _Ill Fortune_. As for _Chance_, it is the visible Effects of some hidden Cause; and _Fortune_, a sufficient Cause to produce such Effects: for, the conjunction of sufficient Causes, doth produce such or such Effects; which Effects could not be produced, if any of those Causes were wanting: So that, _Chances_ are but the Effects of Fortune.

CHAP. XIX. Of TIME and ETERNITY.

_Time_ is not a Thing by it self; nor is _Time_ Immaterial: for, _Time_ is only the variations of Corporeal Motions; but Eternity depends not on Motion, but of a Being without Beginning, or Ending.

The Second Part.

CHAP. I. Of CREATURES.

All Creatures are Composed-Figures, by the consent of Associating Parts; by which Association, they joyn into such, or such a figured Creature: And though every Corporeal Motion, or Self-moving Part, hath its own motion; yet, by their Association, they all agree in proper actions, as actions proper to their Compositions: and, if every particular Part, hath not a perception of all the Parts of their Association; yet, every Part knows its own Work.

CHAP. II. Of Knowledg and Perception of different kinds and sorts of Creatures.

There is not any Creature in Nature, that is not composed of Self-moving Parts, (_viz._ both of Rational and Sensitive) as also of the Inanimate Parts, which are Self-knowing: so that all Creatures, being composed of these sorts of Parts, must have a Sensitive, and Rational Knowledg and Perception, as Animals, Vegetables, Minerals, Elements, or what else there is in Nature: But several kinds, and several sorts in these kinds of Creatures, being composed after different manners, and ways, must needs have different Lives, Knowledges, and Perceptions: and not only every several kind, and sort, have such differences; but, every particular Creature, through the variations of their Self-moving Parts, have varieties of Lives, Knowledges, Perceptions, Conceptions, and the like; and not only so, but every particular part of one and the same Creature, have varieties of Knowledges, and Perceptions, because they have varieties of Actions. But, (as I have declared) there is not any different kind of Creature, that can have the like Life, Knowledg, and Perception; not only because they have different Productions, and different Forms; but, different Natures, as being of different kinds.

CHAP. III. Of Perception of Parts, and United Perception.

All the Self-moving Parts are perceptive; and, all Perception is in Parts, and is dividable, and compoundable, as being Material; also, Alterable, as being Self-moving: Wherefore, no Creature that is composed, or consists of many several sorts of Corporeal Figurative Motions, but must have many sorts of Perception; which is the reason that one Creature, as Man, cannot perceive another Man any otherwise but in Parts: for, the Rational, and Sensitive; nay, all the Parts of one and the same Creature, perceive their Adjoining Parts, as they perceive Foreign Parts; only, by their close conjunction and near relation, they unite in one and the same actions. I do not say, they always agree: for, when they move irregularly, they disagree: And some of those United Parts, will move after one manner, and some after another; but, when they move regularly, then they move to one and the same Design, or one and the same United Action. So, although a Creature is composed of several sorts of Corporeal Motions; yet, these several sorts, being properly united in one Creature, move all agreeably to the Property and Nature of the whole Creature; that is, the particular Parts move according to the property of the whole Creature; because the particular Parts, by conjunction, make the Whole: So that, the several Parts make one Whole; by which, a Whole Creature hath both a general Knowledg, and a Knowledg of Parts; whereas, the Perceptions of Foreign Objects, are but in the Parts: and this is the reason why one Creature perceives not the Whole of another Creature, but only some Parts. Yet this is to be noted, That not any Part hath another Part's Nature, or Motion, nor therefore, their Knowledg, or Perception; but, by agreement, and unity of Parts, there is composed Perceptions.

CHAP. IV. Whether the Rational and Sensitive Parts have a Perception of each other.

Some may ask the Question, _Whether the Rational and Sensitive, have Perception of each other?_ I answer: In my Opinion, they have. For, though the Rational and Sensitive Parts, be of two sorts; yet, both sorts have Self-motion; so that they are but as one, as, that they are both Corporeal Motions; and, had not the Sensitive Parts incumbrances, they would be, in a degree, as agil, and as free as the Rational. But, though each sort hath perception of each other, and some may have the like; yet they have not the same: for, not any Part can have another's Perception, or Knowledg; but, by reason the Rational and Sensitive, are both Corporeal Motions, there is a strong sympathy between those sorts, in one Conjunction, or Creature. Indeed, the Rational Parts are the Designing Parts; and the Sensitive, the Labouring Parts; and the Inanimate are as the Material Parts: not but all the three sorts are Material Parts; but the Inanimate, being not Self-moving, are the Burdensome Parts.

CHAP. V. Of Thoughts, and the whole Mind of a Creature.

AS for Thoughts, though they are several Corporeal Motions, or Self-moving Parts; yet, being united, by Conjunction in one Creature, into one whole Mind, cannot be perceived by some Parts of another Creature, nor by the same sort of Creature, as by another Man. But some may ask, _Whether the whole Mind of one Creature, as the whole Mind of one Man, may not perceive the whole Mind of another Man_? I answer, That if the Mind was not joyn'd and mix'd with the Sensitive and Inanimate Parts, and had not interior, as well as exterior Parts, the whole Mind of one Man, might perceive the whole Mind of another Man; but, that being not possible, one whole Mind cannot perceive another whole Mind: By which Observation we may perceive, there are no _Platonick Lovers_ in Nature. But some may ask, Whether the Sensitive Parts can perceive the Rational, in one and the same Creature? I answer, They do; for if they did not, it were impossible for the Sensitive Parts to execute the Rational Designs; so that, what the Mind designs, the Sensitive Body doth put in execution, as far as they have Power: But if, through Irregularities, the Body be sick, and weak, or hath some Infirmities, they cannot execute the Designs of the Mind.

CHAP. VI. Whether the Mind of one Creature, can perceive the Mind of another Creature.

Some may ask the reason, _Why one Creature, as Man, cannot perceive the Thoughts of another Man, as well as he perceives his exterior Sensitive Parts?_ I answer, That the Rational Parts of one Man, perceive as much of the Rational Parts of another Man, as the Sensitive Parts of that Man doth of the Sensitive Parts of the other Man; that is, as much as is presented to his Perception: for, all Creatures, and every part and particle, have those three sorts of Matter; and therefore, every part of a Creature is perceiving, and perceived. But, by reason all Creatures are composed of Parts, (_viz._ both of the Rational and Sensitive) all Perceptions are in parts, as well the Rational, as the Sensitive Perception: yet, neither the Rational, nor the Sensitive, can perceive all the Interior Parts or Corporeal Motions, unless they were presented to their perception: Neither can one Part know the Knowledg and Perception of another Part: but, what Parts of one Creature are subject to the perception of another Creature, those are perceived.

CHAP. VII. Of Perception, and Conception.

Although the Exterior Parts of one Creature, can but perceive the Exterior Parts of another Creature; yet, the Rational can make Conceptions of the Interior Parts, but not Perception: for, neither the Sense, nor Reason, can perceive what is not present, but by rote, as after the manner of Conceptions, or Remembrances, as I shall in my following Chapters declare: So that, the Exterior Rational Parts, that are with the Exterior Sensitive Parts of an Object, are as much perceived, the one, as the other: but, those Exterior Parts of an Object, not moving in particular Parties, as in the whole Creature, is the cause that some Parts of one Creature, cannot perceive the whole Composition or Frame of another Creature: that is, some of the Rational Parts of one Creature, cannot perceive the whole Mind of another Creature. The like of the Sensitive Parts.

CHAP. VIII. Of Human Suppositions.

Although Nature hath an Infinite Knowledg and Perception; yet, being a Body, and therefore divisible and compoundable; and having, also, Self-motion, to divide and compound her Infinite Parts, after infinite several manners; is the reason that her finite Parts, or particular Creatures, cannot have a general or infinite Knowledg, being limited, by being finite, to finite Perceptions, or perceptive Knowledg; which is the cause of _Suppositions_, or Imaginations, concerning Forrein Objects: As for example, A Man can but perceive the Exterior Parts of another Man, or any other Creature, that is subject to Human Perception; yet, his Rational Parts may suppose, or presuppose, what another Man thinks, or what he will act: and for other Creatures, a Man may suppose or imagine what the innate nature of such a Vegetable, or Mineral, or Element is; and may imagine or suppose the Moon to be another World, and that all the fixed Starrs are Sunns; which Suppositions, Man names _Conjectures_.

CHAP. IX. Of Information between several Creatures.

No question but there is _Information_ between all Creatures: but, several sorts of Creatures, having several sorts of Informations, it is impossible for any particular sort to know, or have perceptions of the Infinite, or Numberless Informations, between the Infinite and Numberless Parts, or Creatures of Nature: Nay, there are so many several Informations amongst one sort (as of Mankind) that it is impossible for one Man to perceive them all; no, nor can one Man generally perceive the particular Informations that are between the particular Parts of his Sensitive Body; or between the particular Informations of his Rational Body; or between the particular Rational and Sensitive Parts: much less can Man perceive, or know the several Informations of other Creatures.

CHAP. X. The Reason of several kinds and sorts of Creatures.

Some may ask, _Why there are such sorts of Creatures, as we perceive there are, and not other sorts?_ I answer, That, 'tis probable, we do not perceive all the several kinds and sorts of Creatures in Nature: In truth, it is impossible (if Nature be Infinite) for a Finite to perceive the Infinite varieties of Nature._ Also they may ask, Why the Planets are of a Spherical Shape, and Human Creatures are of an Upright shape, and Beasts of a Bending and stooping shape? Also, Why Birds are made to flye, and not Beasts? And for what Cause, or Design, have Animals such and such sorts of shapes and properties? And Vegetables such and such sorts of shapes and properties? And so of Minerals and Elements?_ I answer; That several sorts, kinds, and differences of Particulars, causes Order, by reason it causes Distinctions: for, if all Creatures were alike, it would cause a Confusion.

CHAP. XI. Of the several Properties of several Kinds and sorts of Creatures.

As I have said, There are several kinds, and several sorts, and several particular Creatures of several kinds and sorts; whereof there are some Creatures of a mixt kind, and some of a mixt sort, and some of a mixture of some particulars. Also, there are some kind of Creatures, and sorts of Creatures; as also Particulars of a Dense Nature, others of a Rate Nature; some of a Leight Nature, some of a Heavy Nature; some of a Bright Nature, some of a Dark Nature; some of an Ascending Nature, some of a Descending Nature; some of a Hard Nature, some of a Soft Nature; some of a Loose Nature, and some of a Fixt Nature; some of an Agil Nature, and some of a Slow Nature; some of a Consistent Nature, and some of a Dissolving Nature: All which is according to the Frame and Form of their Society, or Composition.

The Third Part.

CHAP. I. Of Productions in general.

The Self-moving Parts, or Corporeal Motions, are the Producers of all Composed Figures, such as we name _Creatures_: for, though all Matter hath Figure, by being Matter; for it were non-sense to say, _Figureless Matter_; since the most pure Parts of Matter, have Figure, as well as the grossest; the rarest, as well as the densed: But, such Composed Figures which we name _Creatures_, are produced by particular Associations of Self-moving Parts, into particular kinds, and sorts; and particular Creatures in every kind, or sort. The particular kinds, that are subject to Human Perceptions, are those we name Animals, Vegetables, Minerals, and Elements; of which kinds, there are numerous sorts; and of every sort, infinite particulars: And though there be Infinite Varieties in Nature, made by the Corporeal Motions, or Self-moving Parts, which might cause a Confusion: Yet, considering Nature is intire in her self, as being only Material, and as being but one United Body; also, poysing all her Actions by Opposites; 'tis impossible to be any ways in Extreams, or to have a Confusion.

CHAP. II. Of Productions in general.

The Sensitive Self-moving Parts, or Corporeal Motions, are the Labouring Parts of all Productions, or Fabricks of all Creatures; but yet, those Corporeal Motions, are parts of the Creature they produce: for, Production is only a Society of particular Parts, that joyn into particular Figures, or Creatures: but, as Parts produce Figures, by Association; so they dissolve those Figures by Division: for, Matter is a perpetual Motion, that is always dividing and composing; so that not any Creature can be eternally one and the same: for, if there were no Dissolvings, and Alterings, there would be no varieties of Particulars; for, though the kinds and sorts may last, yet not the Particulars. But, mistake me not, I do not say those Figures are lost,

or annihilated in Nature; but only, their Society is dissolved, or divided in Nature. But this is to be noted, That some Creatures are sooner produced and perfected, than others; and again, some Creatures are sooner decayed, or dissolved.

CHAP. III. Of Productions in general.

There are so many different composed Parts, and so much of variety of Action in every several Part of one Creature, as 'tis impossible for Human Perception to perceive them; nay, not every Corporeal Motion of one Creature, doth perceive all the varieties of the same Society; and, by the several actions, not only of several Parts, but of one and the same Parts, cause such obscurity, as not any Creature can tell, not only how they were produced, but, not how they consist: But, by reason every Part knows his own Work, there is Order and Method: For example, In a Human Creature, those Parts that produce, or nourish the Bones, those of the Sinews, those of the Veins, those of the Flesh, those of the Brains, and the like, know all their several Works, and consider not each several composed Part, but what belongs to themselves; the like, I believe, in Vegetables, Minerals, or Elements. But mistake me not; for, I do not say, those Corporeal Motions in those particulars, are bound to those particular Works, as, that they cannot change, or alter their actions if they will, and many times do: as some Creatures dissolve before they are perfect, or quite finished; and some as soon as finished; and some after some short time after they are finished; and some continue long, as we may perceive by many Creatures that dye, which I name Dissolving in several Ages; but, untimely Dissolutions, proceed rather from some particular Irregularities of some particular Parts, than by a general Agreement.

CHAP. IV. Of Productions in general.

The Reason that all Creatures are produced by the ways of Production, as one Creature to be composed out of other Creatures, is, That Nature is but one Matter, and that all her Parts are united as one Material Body, having no Additions, or Diminutions; no new Creations, or Annihilations: But, were not Nature one and the same, but that her Parts were of different natures; yet, Creatures must be produced by Creatures, that is, Composed Figures, as a Beast, a Tree, a Stone, Water, &c. must be composed of _Parts_, not a _single Part_: for, a single Part cannot produce composed Figures; nor can a single Part produce another single Part; for, Matter cannot create Matter; nor can one Part produce another Part out of it self: Wherefore, all Natural Creatures are produced by the consent and agreement of many Self-moving Parts, or Corporeal Motions, which work to a particular Design, as to associate into particular kinds and sorts of Creatures.

CHAP. V. Of Productions in general.

As I said in my former Chapter, That all Creatures are produced, or composed by the agreement and consent of particular Parts; yet some Creatures are composed of more, and some of fewer Parts: neither are all Creatures produced, or composed after one and the same manner; but some after one manner, and some after another manner: Indeed, there are divers manners of Productions, both of those we name Natural, and those we name _Artificial_; but I only treat of Natural Productions, which are so various, that it is a wonder if any two Creatures are just alike; by which we may perceive, that not only in several kinds and sorts, but in Particulars of every kind, or sort, there is some difference, so as to be distinguished from each other, and yet the species of some Creatures are like to their kind, and sort, but not all; and the reason that most Creatures are in _Species_, according to their sort, and kind, is not only, that Nature's Wisdom orders and regulates her Corporeal Figurative Motions, into kinds and sorts of Societies and Conjunctions; but, those Societies cause a perceptive Acquaintance, and an united Love, and good liking of the Compositions, or Productions: and not only a love to their Figurative Compositions, but to all that are of the same sort, or kind; and especially, their being accustom'd to actions proper to their Figurative Compositions, is the cause that those Parts, that divide from the Producers, begin a new Society, and, by degrees, produce the like Creature; which is the cause that Animals and Vegetables produce according to their likeness. The same may be amongst Minerals and Elements, for all we can know. But yet, some Creatures of one and the same sort, are not produced after one and the same manner: As for example, One and the same sort of Vegetables, may be produced after several manners, and yet, in the effect, be the same, as when Vegetables are sowed, planted, engrafted; as also, Seeds, Roots, and the like, they are several manners, or ways of Productions, and yet will produce the same sort of Vegetable: but, there will be much alterations in replanting, which is occasioned by the change of associating Parts, and Parties; but as for the several Productions

of several kinds and sorts, they are very different; as for example, Animals are not produced as Vegetables, or Vegetables as Minerals, nor Minerals as any of the rest: Nor are all Animals produced alike, nor Minerals, or Vegetables; but after many different manners, or ways. Neither are all Productions like their Producers; for, some are so far from resembling their Figurative Society, that they produce another kind, or sort of Composed Figures; as for example, Maggots out of Cheese, other Worms out of Roots, Fruits, and the like: but these sorts of Creatures, Man names _Insects_; but yet they are Animal Creatures, as well as others.

CHAP. VI. Of Productions in general.

All Creatures are Produced, and Producers; and all these Productions partake more or less of the Producers; and are necessitated so to do, because there cannot be any thing New in Nature: for, whatsoever is produced, is of the same Matter; nay, every particular Creature hath its particular Parts: for, not any one Creature can be produced of any other Parts than what produced it; neither can the same Producer produce one and the same double, (as I may say to express my self:) for, though the same Producers may produce the like, yet not the same:

for, every thing produced, hath its own Corporeal Figurative Motions; but this might be, if Nature was not so full of variety: for, if all those Corporeal Motions, or Self-moving Parts, did associate in the like manner, and were the very same Parts, and move in the very same manner; the same Production, or Creature, might be produced after it was dissolved; but, by reason the Self-moving Parts of Nature are always dividing and composing _from_, and _to_ Parts, it would be very difficult, if not impossible.

CHAP. VII. Of Productions in general.

As there are Productions, or Compositions, made by the Sensitive Corporeal Motions, so there are of the Rational Corporeal Motions, which are Composed Figures of the Mind: And the reason the Rational Productions are more various, as also more numerous, is, That the Rational is more loose, free, and so more agil than the Sensitive; which is also the reason that the Rational Productions require not such degrees of Time, as the Sensitive. But I shall treat more upon this Subject, when I treat of that Animal we name _MAN_.

CHAP. VII. _Lastly_, Of Productions in general.

Though all Creatures are made by the several Associations of Self-moving Parts, or (as the Learned name them) _Corporeal Motions_; yet, there are infinite varieties of Corporeal Figurative Motions, and so infinite several manners and ways of Productions; as also, infinite varieties of Figurative Motions in every produced Creature: Also, there is variety in the difference of Time, of several Productions, and of their Consistency and Dissolution: for, some Creatures are produced in few Hours, others not in many Years. Again, some continue not a Day; others, numbers of Years. But this is to be noted, That according to the Regularity, or Irregularity of the Associating Motions, their Productions are more or less perfect. Also, this is to be noted, That there are Rational Productions, as well as Sensitive: for, though all Creatures are composed both of Sensitive and Rational Parts, yet the Rational Parts move after another manner.

CHAP. VIII. Productions must partake of some Parts of their Producers.

No Animal, or Vegetable, could be produced, but by such, or such particular Producers; neither could an Animal, or Vegetable, be produced without some Corporeal Motions of their Producers; that is, some of the Producers Self-moving Parts; otherwise the like Actions might produce, not only the like Creatures, but the same Creatures, which is impossible: Wherefore, the things produced, are part of the Producers; for, no particular Creature could be produced, but by such particular Producers. But this is to be noted, That all sorts of Creatures are produced by more, or fewer, Producers. Also, the first Producers are but the first Founders of the things produced, but not the only Builders: for, there are many several sorts of Corporeal Motions, that are the Builders; for, no Creature can subsist, or consist, by it self, but must assist, and be assisted: Yet, there are some differences in all Productions, although of the same Producers; otherwise all the Off-springs of one and the same Producer, would be alike: And though, sometimes, their several Off-springs may be so alike, as hardly to be distinguished; yet, that is so seldom, as it appears as a wonder; but there is a property in all Productions, as, for the Produced to belong as a Right and Property to the _Producer_.

CHAP. IX. Of Resemblances of several Off-springs, or Producers.

There are numerous kinds and sorts of Productions, and infinite manners and ways, in the actions of Productions; which is the cause that the Off-springs of the same Producers, are not so just alike, but that they are distinguishable; but yet there may not only be resemblances between particular Off-springs of the same Producers, as also of the same sort; but, of different sorts of Creatures: but the Actions of all Productions that are according to their own _Species_, are Imitating Actions, but not Bare Imitations, as by an Incorporeal Motion; for if so, then a covetous Woman, that loves Gold, might produce a Wedg of Gold instead of a Child; also, _Virgins_ might be as Fruitful as _Married Wives_.

CHAP. X. Of the Several Appearances of the Exterior Parts of One Creature.

Every altered Action of the Exterior Parts, causes an altered Appearance: As for example, A Man, or the like Creature, doth not appear when he is old, as when he was young; nor when he is sick, as when he is well in health; no, nor when he is cold, as when he is hot. Nor do they appear in several Passions alike: for, though Man can best perceive the Alteration of his own Kind, or Sort; yet, other Creatures have several Appearances, as well as Man; some of which, Man may perceive, though not all, being of a different sort. And not only Animals, but Vegetables, and Elements, have altered Appearances, and many that are subject to Man's perception.

The Fourth Part.

CHAP. I. Of Animal Productions; and of the Differences between Productions, and Transformations.

I understand Productions to be between Particulars; as, some particular Creatures to produce other particular Creatures; but not to transform from one sort of Creature, into another sort of Creature, as Cheese into Maggots, and Fruit into Worms, &c. which, in some manner, is like Metamorphosing. So by Transformation, the Intellectual Nature, as well as the Exterior Form, is transform'd: Whereas Production transforms only the Exterior Form, but not the Intellectual Nature; which is the cause that such Transformations cannot return into their former state; as a Worm to be a Fruit, or a Maggot a Cheese again, as formerly. Hence I perceive, that all sorts of Fowls are partly Produced, and partly Transformed: for, though an Egg be produced, yet a Chicken is but a Transformed Egg.

CHAP. II. Of different Figurative Motions in MAN's Production.

All Creatures are produced by Degrees; which proves, That not any Creature is produced, in perfection, by one Act, or Figurative Motion: for, though the Producers are the first Founders, yet not the Builders. But, as for Animal Creatures, there be some sorts that are composed of many different Figurative Motions; amongst which sorts, is Mankind, who has very different Figurative Parts, as Bones, Sinews, Nerves, Muscles, Veins, Flesh, Skin, and Marrow, Blood, Choler, Flegm, Melancholy, and the like; also, Head, Breast, Neck, Arms, Hands, Body, Belly, Thighs, Leggs, Feet, &c. also, Brains, Lungs, Stomack, Heart, Liver, Midriff, Kidnies, Bladder, Guts, and the like; and all these have several actions, yet all agree as one, according to the property of that sort of Creature named MAN.

CHAP. III. Of the Quickning of a Child, or any other sort of Animal Creatures.

The Reason that a Woman, or such like Animal, doth not feel her Child so soon as it is produced, is, That the Child cannot have an Animal Motion, until it hath an Animal Nature, that is, until it be perfectly an Animal Creature; and as soon as it is a perfect Child, she feels it to move, according to its nature: but it is only the Sensitive Parts of the Child that are felt by the Mother, not the Rational; because those Parts are as the Designers, not the Builders; and therefore, being not the Labouring Parts, are not the Sensible Parts. But it is to be noted, That, according to the Regularity, or Irregularity of the Figurative Motions, the Child is _well shaped_, or <strong>mishaped</strong>.

CHAP. IV. Of the Birth of a Child.

The reason why a Child, or such like Animal Creature, stays no longer in the Mother's Body, than to such a certain Time, is, That a Child is not Perfect before that time, and would be too big after that time; and so big, that it would not have room enough; and therefore it strives and labours for liberty.

CHAP. V. Of Mischances, or Miscarriages of Breeding Creatures.

When a Mare, Doe, Hind, or the like Animal, cast their Young, or a Woman miscarries of her Child, the Mischance proceeds either through the Irregularities of the Corporeal Motions, or Parts of the Child; or through some Irregularity of the Parts of the Mother; or else of both Mother and Child. If the Irregularities be of the Parts of the Child, those Parts divide from the Mother, through their Irregularity: but, if the Irregularity be in the Parts of the Mother, then the Mother divides in some manner from the Child; and if there be a distemper in both of them, the Child and Mother divide from each other: but, such Mischances are at different times, some sooner, and some later. As for false Conceptions, they are occasioned through the Irregularities of Conception.

CHAP. VI. Of the Encrease of Growth, and Strength of Mankind, or such like Creatures.

The reason most Animals, especially Human Creatures, are weak whilst they are Infants, and that their Strength and Growth encreases by degrees, is, That a Child hath not so many Parts, as when he is a Youth; nor so many Parts when he is a Youth, as when he is a Man: for, after the Child is parted from the Mother, it is nourished by other Creatures, as the Mother was, and the Child by the Mother; and according as the nourishing Parts be Regular, or Irregular, so is the Child, Youth, or Man, weaker, or stronger; healthful, or diseased; and when the Figurative Motions move (as I may say for expression sake) curiously, the Body is neatly shaped, and is, as we say, beautiful. But this is to be noted, That 'tis not Greatness, or Bulk of Body, makes a Body perfect; for, there are several sizes of every sort, or kind of Creatures; as also, in every particular kind, or sort; and every several size may be as perfect, one, as the other: But, I mean the Number of Parts, according to the proper size.

CHAP. VII. Of the several Properties of the several Exterior Shapes of several sorts of Animals.

The several Exterior Shapes of Creatures, cause several Properties, as Running, Jumping, Hopping, Leaping, Climbing, Galloping, Trotting, Ambling, Turning, Winding, and Rowling; also Creeping, Crawling, Flying, Soaring or Towring; Swimming, Diving, Digging, Stinging or Piercing; Pressing, Spinning, Weaving, Twisting, Printing, Carving, Breaking, Drawing, Driving, Bearing, Carrying, Holding, Griping or Grasping, Infolding, and Millions of the like. Also, the Exterior Shapes cause Defences, as Horns, Claws, Teeth, Bills, Talons, Finns, _&c._ Likewise, the Exterior Shapes cause Offences, and give Offences: As also, the different sorts of Exterior Shapes, cause different Exterior Perceptions.

CHAP. VIII. Of the Dividing and Uniting Parts of a particular Creature.

Those Parts (as I have said) that were the First Founders of an Animal, or other sort of Creature, may not be constant Inhabitants: for, though

the Society may remain, the particular Parts may remove: Also, all particular Societies of one kind, or sort, may not continue the like time; but some may dissolve sooner than others. Also, some alter by degrees, others of a sudden; but, of those Societies that continue, the particular Parts remove, and other particular Parts unite; so, as some Parts _were_ of the Society, so some other Parts are of the Society, and _will be_ of the Society: But, when the Form, Frame, and Order of the Society begins to alter, then that particular Creature begins to decay. But this is to be noted, That those particular Creatures that dye in their Childhood, or Youth, were never a full and regular Society; and the dissolving of a Society, whether it be a Full, or but a Forming Society, Man names _DEATH_. Also, this is to be noted, That the Nourishing Motion of Food, is the Uniting Motion; and the Cleansing, or Evacuating Motions, are the Dividing Corporeal Motions. Likewise it is to be noted, That a Society requires a longer time of uniting than of dividing; by reason uniting requires assistance of Foreign Parts, whereas dividings are only a dividing of home-Parts. Also, a particular Creature, or Society, is longer in dividing its Parts, than in altering its Actions; because a Dispersing Action is required in Division, but not in Alteration of Actions.

The Fifth Part.

CHAP. I. Of MAN.