Chapter VIII: Appendix: TO THE GROUNDS OF Natural Philosophy

The FIRST PART.

CHAP. I. Whether there can be a Substance, that is not a Body.

What a _Substance_, that is not _Body_, can be, (as I writ in the First Chapter of this Book) I cannot imagine; nor, that there is any thing between _Something_ and _Nothing_.

But, some may say, _That Spiritual Substances are so_. I answer: That Spirits must be either Material, or Immaterial: for, it is impossible for a thing to be between Body and no Body.

Others may say, _There may be a Substance, that is not a Natural Substance; but, some sort of Substance that is far more pure than the purest Natural Substance_.

I answer: Were it never so pure, it would be in the List or Circle of Body: and certainly, the purest Substance, must have the Properties of Body, as, to be divisible, and capable to be united and compounded; and being divisible and compoundable, it would have the same Properties that grosser Parts have: but, if there be any difference, certainly the purest Substance would be more apt to divide and unite, or compound, than the grosser sort. But, as to those sorts of Substance, which some Learned Men have imagined; in my opinion, they are but the same sort of Substance that the Vulgar call, _Thoughts_, and I name, the _Rational Parts_; which, questionless, are as truly Body, as the grossest Parts in Nature: but, most Human Creatures are so troubled with the Thoughts of Dissolving, and Dis-uniting, that they turn Fancies and Imaginations, into Spirits, or Spiritual Substances; as if all the other Parts of their Bodies, should become Rational Parts; that is, that all their Parts should turn into such Parts as Thoughts, which I name, the _Rational Parts_. But that Opinion is impossible: for, Nature cannot alter the nature of any Part; nor can any Part alter its own Nature; neither can the Rational Parts be divided from the Sensitive and Inanimate Parts, by reason those Three sorts constitute but one Body, as being Parts of one Body. But, put the case that the Rational Parts might divide and subsist without the Sensitive and Inanimate Parts; yet, as I said, they must of necessity have the Properties and Nature of a Body, which is, to be divisible, and capable to be united, and so to be Parts: for, it is impossible for a Body, were it the most pure, to be indivisible.

CHAP. II. Of an IMMATERIAL.

I Cannot conceive how an Immaterial can be in Nature: for, first, An Immaterial cannot, in my opinion, be naturally created; nor can I conceive how an Immaterial can produce particular Immaterial Souls, Spirits, or the like. Wherefore, an Immaterial, in my opinion, must be some uncreated Being; which can be no other than GOD alone. Wherefore, Created Spirits, and Spiritual Souls, are some other thing than an Immaterial: for surely, if there were any other Immaterial Beings, besides the Omnipotent God, those would be so near the Divine Essence of God, as to be petty gods; and numerous petty gods, would, almost, make the Power of an Infinite God. But, God is Omnipotent, and only God.

CHAP. III. Whether an Immaterial be Perceivable.

Whatsoever is Corporeal, is Perceivable; that is, may be perceived in some manner or other, by reason it hath a Corporeal Being: but, what Being an Immaterial hath, no Corporeal can perceive. Wherefore, no Part in Nature can perceive an Immaterial, because it is impossible to have a perception of that, which is not to be perceived, as not being an Object fit and proper for Corporeal Perception. In truth, an Immaterial is no Object, because no Body.

But some may say, that, _A Corporeal may have a Conception, although not a Perception, of an Immaterial_.

I answer, That, surely, there is an innate Notion of God, in all the Parts of Nature; but not a perfect knowledg: for if there was, there would not be so many several Opinions, and Religions, amongst one Kind, or rather, sort of Creatures, as Mankind, as there are; insomuch, that there are but few of one and the same Opinion, or Religion: but yet, that Innate Notion of God, being in all the Parts of Nature, God is infinitely and eternally worshipped and adored, although after several manners and ways; yet, all manners and ways, are joyned in one Worship, because the Parts of Nature are joyned into one Body.

CHAP. IV. Of the Differences between God, and Nature.

God is an Eternal Creator; Nature, his Eternal Creature. GOD, an Eternal Master: Nature, GOD's Eternal Servant. GOD is an Infinite and Eternal Immaterial Being: Nature, an Infinite Corporeal Being. GOD is Immovable, and Immutable: Nature, Moving, and Mutable. GOD is Eternal, Indivisible, and of an Incompoundable Being: Nature, Eternally Divisible and Compoundable. GOD, Eternally Perfect: Nature, Eternally Imperfect. GOD, Eternally Inalterable: Nature Eternally Alterable. GOD, without Error: Nature, full of Irregularities. GOD knows exactly, or perfectly, Nature: Nature doth not perfectly know GOD. GOD is Infinitely and Eternally worshipped: Nature is the Eternal and Infinite Worshipper.

CHAP. V. All the Parts of Nature worship God.

All Creatures (as I have said) have an Innate Notion of GOD; and as they have a Notion of God, so they have a Notion to worship GOD: but, by reason Nature is composed of Parts; so is the Infinite Worship to God: and, as several Parts are dividing and uniting after several kinds, sorts, manners and ways; so is their Worship to GOD: but, the several manners and ways of Worship, make not the Worship to GOD less: for certainly, all Creatures Worship and Adore GOD; as we may perceive by the Holy Scripture, where it says, _Let the Heavens, Earth, and all that therein is, praise God._ But 'tis probable, that some of the Parts being Creatures of Nature, may have a fuller Notion of GOD than others; which may cause some Creatures to be more Pious and Devout, than others: but, the Irregularity of Nature, is the cause of Sin.

CHAP. VI. Whether GOD's Decrees are limited.

In my opinion, though God is Inalterable, yet no ways bounded or limited: for, though GOD's Decrees are fixt, yet, they are not bound: but, as GOD hath an Infinite Knowledg, He hath also an Infinite Fore-knowledg; and so, fore-knows Nature's Actions, and what He will please to decree Nature to do: so that, GOD knows what Nature can act, and what she will act; as also, what He will decree: and this is the cause, that some of the Creature's or Parts of Nature, especially Man, do believe _Predestination_. But surely, GOD hath an Omnipotent Divine Power, which is no ways limited: for GOD, being above the nature of Nature, cannot have the Actions of Nature, because GOD cannot make Himself no GOD; neither can He make Himself more than what he is, He being the All-powerful, Omnipotent, Infinite, and Everlasting Being.

CHAP. VII. Of GOD's Decrees concerning the particular Parts of Nature.

Though Nature's Parts have Free-will, of Self-motion; yet, they have not Free-will to oppose _GOD's Decrees_: for, if some Parts cannot oppose other Parts, being over-power'd, it is probable, that the Parts of Nature cannot oppose the All-powerful Decrees of _GOD_. But, if it please the All-powerful _GOD_ to permit the Parts of Nature to act as they please, according to their own natural Will; and, upon condition, if they act so, they shall have such Rewards as Nature may be capable to receive; or such Punishments as Nature is capable of; then the Omnipotent _GOD_ doth not predestinate those Rewards, or Punishments, any otherwise than the Parts of Nature do cause by their own Actions. Thus all Corporeal Actions, belong to Corporeal Parts; but, the Rewards and Punishments, to _GOD_ alone: but, what those Punishments and Blessings are, no particular Creature is capable to know: for, though a particular Creature knows there is a _GOD_; yet, not what _GOD_ is: so, although particular Creatures know there are Rewards and Punishments; yet, not what those Rewards and Punishments are. But mistake me not; for I mean the general Rewards and Punishments to all Creatures: but 'tis probable, that _GOD_ might decree Nature, and her Parts, to make other sorts of Worlds, besides this World; of which Worlds, this may be as ignorant, as a particular Human Creature is of _GOD_. And therefore, it is not probable (since we cannot possibly know all the Parts of Nature, of which we are parts) that we should know the Decrees of _GOD_, or the manners and ways of Worship, amongst all kinds and sorts of Creatures.

CHAP. VIII. Of the Ten Commandments.

In my opinion, the Notions Man hath of _GOD's Commands_ concerning their Behaviour and Actions to Himself, and their Fellow-Creatures, is the very same that Moses writ, and presented to all those of whom he was Head and Governour. But, mistake me not, I mean only the _Ten Commandments_; which Commandments are a sufficient Rule for all Human Creatures: and certainly, _GOD_ had decreed, that Moses should be a wise Man, and should publish these wise Commands. But, the Interpretation of the Law must be such, as not to make it no such Law: but, by reason Nature is as much Irregular, as Regular, Human Notions are also Irregular, as much as Regular; which causes great variety of Religions: and their Actions being also Irregular, is the cause that the practise of Human Creatures is Irregular; and that occasions Irregular Devotions, and is the cause of SIN.

CHAP. IX. Of Several RELIGIONS.

Concerning _the several Religions_, and several Opinions in Religions, which are like several Kinds and Sorts; the Question is,

_Whether all Mankind could be perswaded to be of one Religion, or Opinion?_

The opinion of the Minor part of my Thoughts, was, That all men might be perswaded.

And, the opinion of the Major part of my Thoughts, was, That Nature, being divisible and compoundable, and having Free-will, as well as Self-motion; and being Irregular, as well as Regular; as also, Variable, taking delight in variety; it was impossible for all Mankind to be of one _Religion_, or _Opinion_.

The opinion of the Minor part of my Thoughts, 246,$ was, That the Grace of GOD could perswade all Men to one Opinion.

The Major part of my Thoughts was of opinion, That GOD might decree or command Nature: but, to alter Nature's nature, could not be done, unless GOD, by his Decree, would annihilate this Nature, and create another Nature, and such a Nature as was not like this Nature: for, it is the nature of this Material Nature, to be Alterable; as also, to be Irregular, as well as Regular; and, being Regular, and Irregular, was a fit and proper Subject for GOD's Justice, and Mercies; Punishments, and Rewards.

CHAP. X. Of Rules and Prescriptions.

As Saint Paul said, _We could not know Sin, but by the Law_; so, we could not know what Punishment we could or should suffer, but by the Law; not only Moral, but Divine Law.

But, some may ask, _What is Law?_

I answer: Law is, Limited Prescriptions and Rules.

But, some may ask, _Whether all Creatures in Nature, have Prescriptions and Rules?_

I answer: That, for any thing Man can know to the contrary, all Creatures may have some Natural Rules: but, every Creature may chuse whether they will follow those Rules; I mean, such Rules as they are capable to follow or practise: for, several kinds and sorts of Creatures, cannot possibly follow one and the same Prescription and Rule. Wherefore, Divine Prescriptions and Rules, must be, according to the sorts and kinds of Creatures; and yet, all Creatures may have a Notion, and so an Adoration of God, by reason all the Parts in Nature, have Notions of God. But, concerning particular Worships, those must be Prescriptions and Rules; or else, they are according to every particular Creature's conception or choice.

CHAP. XI. Sins and Punishments, are Material.

As all Sins are Material, so are Punishments: for, Material Creatures, cannot have Immaterial Sins; nor can Material Creatures be capable of Immaterial Punishments; which may be proved out of the Sacred Scripture: for, all the Punishments that are declared to be in Hell, are Material Tortures: nay, Hell it self is described to be Material; and not only Hell, but Heaven, is described to be Material. But, whether Angels, and Devils, are Material, that is not declared: for, though they are named Spirits, yet we know not whether those Spirits be Immaterial. But, considering that Hell and Heaven is described to be

Material, it is probable, Spirits are also Material: nay, our blessed Saviour Christ, who is in Heaven, with God the Father, hath a Material Body; and in that Body will come attended by all the Hosts of Heaven, to judg the quick and the dead; which quick and dead, are the Material Parts of Nature: which could not be actually judged and punished, but by a Material Body, as Christ hath. But, pray mistake me not; I say, They could not be actually judged and punished; that is, not according to Nature, as Material Actions: for, I do not mean here, Divine and Immaterial Decrees. But Christ, being partly Divine, and partly Natural; may be both a Divine and Natural Judg.

CHAP. XII. Of Human Conscience.

The Human Notions of GOD, Man calls _Conscience_: but, by reason that Nature is full of Varieties, as having Self-moving Parts; Human Creatures have different Notions, and so different Consciences, which cause different Opinions and Devotions: but, Nature being as much compoundable as dividable, it causes unity of some, as also, divisions of other Opinions, which is the cause of several Religions: which Religions, are several Communities and Divisions. But, as for Conscience, and holy Notions, they being Natural, cannot be altered by force, without a Free-will: so that the several Societies, or Communicants, commit an Error, if not a Sin, to endeavour to compel their Brethren to any particular Opinion: and, to prove it is an Error, or Sin, the more earnest the _Compellers_ are, the more do the _Compelled_ resist; which hath been the cause of many Martyrs. But surely, all Christians should follow the Example of Christ, who was like a meek Lamb, not a raging Lyon: neither did Christ command his Apostles to Persecute; but, to suffer Persecution patiently. Wherefore, _Liberty of Conscience_ may be allowed, conditionally, it be no ways a prejudice to the Peaceable Government of the State or Kingdom.

The Second Part.

CHAP. I. Whether it is possible there could be Worlds consisting only of the Rational Parts, and others only of the Sensitive Parts.

The Parts of my Mind did argue amongst themselves, _Whether there might not be several kinds and sorts of Worlds in Infinite Nature?_

And they all agreed, That probably there might be several kinds and sorts of Worlds.

But afterwards, the Opinion of the Major parts of my Mind, was, That it is not possible: for, though the Rational parts of Nature move free, without Burdens of the Inanimate Parts; yet, being Parts of the same Body, (viz. of the Body of Nature) they could not be divided from the Sensitive and Inanimate Parts; nor the Sensitive and Inanimate Parts, from the Rational.

The Opinion of the Minor Parts of my Mind, was, That a Composed World, of either degree, was not a division from the Infinite Body of Nature, though they might divide so much, as to compose a World meerly of their own Degree.

The Major's Opinion was, That it was impossible; because the three Degrees, Rational, Sensitive, and Inanimate, were naturally joyned as one Body, or Part.

The Minor's Opinion was, That a World might be naturally composed only of Rational Parts, as a Human Mind is only composed of Rational Parts; or, as the Rational Parts of a Human Creature, could compose themselves into several Forms, _viz._ into several sorts and kinds of Worlds, without the assistance of the Sensitive or the Inanimate Parts: for, they fancy Worlds which are composed in Human Minds, without the assistance of the Sensitive.

The Major Part agreed, That the Rational Corporeal Actions, were free; and all their Architectors were of their own Degree: but yet, they were so joyned in every Part and Particle, to the Sensitive and Inanimate, as they could not separate from these two Degrees: for, though they could divide and unite from, and to Particulars, as either of their own Degrees, or the other Degrees; yet, the Three Degrees being but as one united Body, they could not so divide, as not to be joyned to the other Degrees: for, it was impossible for a Body to divide it self from it self.

After this Argument, there followed another; _That, if it were possible there could be a World composed only of the Rational Parts, without the other two Degrees; Whether that World would be a Happy World?_

The Major Part's Opinion was, That, were it possible there could be such unnatural Divisions, those divide Parts would be very unhappy: for, the Rational Parts would be much unsatisfied without the Sensitive; and the Sensitive very dull without the Rational: also, the Sensitive Architectors would be very Irregular, wanting their Designing Parts, which are the Rational Parts.

Upon which Argument, all the Parts of my Mind agreed in this Opinion, That the Sensitive was so Sociable to the Rational, and the Rational so Assisting to the Sensitive, and the Inanimate Parts so necessary to the Sensitive Architectors, that they would not divide from each other, if they could.

CHAP. II. Of Irregular and Regular Worlds.

Some Parts of my Mind were of opinion, _That there might be a World composed only of Irregularities; and another, only of Regularities: and some, that were partly composed of the one, and the other._

The Minor Part's Opinion was, That all Worlds were composed partly of the one, and partly of the other; because all Nature's Actions were poysed with Opposites, or Contraries: wherefore, there could not be a World only of Irregularities, and another of Regularities.

The Major Part's Opinion, was, That Nature's Actions were as much poysed by the contrary Actions of Two Worlds, as by the contrary Actions of the Parts of One World, or one Creature: As for example, The Peace and Trouble, Health and Sickness, Pain and Ease, and the like, of one Human Creature; and so of the contrary Natures of several kinds and sorts of Creatures of one and the same World.

After which Discourse, they generally agreed, There might be Regular and Irregular Worlds; the one sort to be such happy Worlds, as that they might be named Blessed Worlds; the other so miserable Worlds, as might be named Cursed Worlds.

CHAP. III. Whether there be Egress and Regress between the Parts of several Worlds.

There arose a Third Argument, _viz. Whether it was possible for some of the Creatures of several Worlds, to remove, so as to remove out of one World, into another?_

The Major Part's Opinion was, That it was possible for some Creatures: for, if some particular Creatures could move all over the World, of which they were a part, they might divide from the Parts of the World they were of, and joyn with the Parts of another World.

The Minor Part's Opinion was, That they might travel all over the World they were part of, but not to joyn with the Parts of another World, to which they belong not.

The Major's Opinion was, That every Part and Particle, belonged to the Infinite Body of Nature, and therefore not any Part could account it self not of the Infinite Body; and being so, then every Part of Nature may joyn, and divide from and to particular Parts, as they please, if there were not Obstructions and Hindrances, and some Parts did not obstruct other Parts: Wherefore, if there were not Obstructions, there might be Egress and Regress amongst the particular Parts of several Worlds.

The Minor's Opinion was, That if it could be according to the Major's Opinion, it would cause an Infinite Confusion in Infinite Nature: for, every Creature of every World, was composed according to the Nature and Compositions of the World they were of: wherefore, the Products of one kind or sort of Worlds, would not be sutable, agreeable, and Regular, to the productions of another kind.

The Major Part's Opinion was, That it was impossible, since Nature is one united Body, without _Vacuum_, but that the Parts of all Worlds must have Egress and Regress.

CHAP. IV. Whether the Parts of one and the same Society, could, after their Dissolution, meet and unite.

The Fifth Argument, was partly of the same Subject, _viz. Whether the particular Parts of a Creature, (such as a Human Creature is) could travel out of one World into another, after the dissolution of his Human Life?_

The Major Part's Opinion was, That they could.

The Minor's Opinion was, They could not; because the particular Parts so divided and joyned to and from other particular Parts and Societies, as it was impossible, if they would, so to agree, as to divide from those Parts and Societies they are joyned to, and from those they must joyn with, to meet in another World, and joyn as they would, in the same Society they were of, when the whole Society is dissolved. Neither can Parts divide and joyn, as they would: for, though Self-moving Parts have a Free-will to move; yet, being subject to Obstructions, they must move as they can: for, no particular Part hath an absolute Power. Wherefore, the Dispersed Parts of a Dissolved Society, cannot meet and joyn as they would. Besides, every Part is as much affected to one Sort, Kind, or Particular, they are Parts of, as to another. Besides, the Knowledg of every Part alters, according as their Actions alter: so that the Parts of one and the same Society, after division, have no more knowledg of that Society.

CHAP. V. Whether, if a Creature being Dissolved, and could Unite again, would be the same.

The Sixth Argument was, _That, put the case it were possible all the several Parts belonging to one and the same Society; as for example, To one Human Creature, after his Human Life was dissolved, and his Parts dispersed, and afterwards, all those Parts meeting and uniting; Whether that Human Creature would be the same?_

The Minor Part's Opinion was, That it could not be the same Society: for, every Creature was according to the nature of their Kind or Sort; and so according to the Form and Magnitude of one of their Kind or Sort.

The Major Part's Opinion was, That though the Nature of every particular Creature had such Forms, Shapes, and Properties, as was natural to that sort of Creatures they were of; yet, the Magnitude of particular Creatures of one and the same sort, might be very different.

The Minor Part's Opinion was, That if all the Parts of one Society, as for example, a Man, from the first time of his Production, to the time of his Dissolution, should, after division, come to meet and unite; that Man, or any other Creature, would be a Monstrous Creature, as having more Parts than was agreeable to the nature of his Kind.

The Major Part's Opinion was, That though the Society, viz. The MAN, would be a Society of greater Magnitude; yet, not any ways different from the Nature of his Kind.

CHAP. VI. Of the Resurrection of Human Kind.

The Seventh Argument, was, _Whether all the particular Parts of every Human Creature, at the time of the Resurrection, be, to meet and joyn, as being of one and the same Society?_

The Minor Part's Opinion was, They shall not: for, if all those Parts that had been of the same Body and Mind of one Man, from his first Production, to the last of his Dissolution; or, from his Birth, to the time of his Death, (supposing him to have liv'd long) should meet and joyn, as one Society, that is, as one Man; that Man, at the time of his Resurrection, would be a Gyant; and if so, then old Men would be Gyants; and young Children, Dwarfs.

The Major Part's Opinion was, That, if it was not so, then every particular Human Society would be imperfect at the time of their Resurrection: for, if they should only rise with some of their Parts, as (for example) when they were in the strength of their Age, then all those Parts that had been either before, or after that time, would be unjustly dealt with, especially if Man be the best Product in Nature. Besides, if a dead Child did rise a Man, as at his most perfect Age, it could not be said, He rises according to a Natural Man, having more Parts than by Nature he ever had; and an old Man, fewer Parts than naturally he hath had: so, what by Adding and Diminishing the Parts of particular Men, it would not cause only Injustice; but, not any particular Human Creature, would be the same he was.

CHAP. VII. Of the Dissolution of a World.

The Eighth Argument was, _That when all Human Creatures that were dissolved, should rise, Whether the World they were of, should not be dissolved?_

All the Parts of my Mind agreed, That when all the Human Creatures that had been dissolved, should rise, the whole World, besides themselves, must also dissolve, by reason they were Parts of the World: for, when all those numerous dissolved and dispersed Parts, did meet and joyn, the World wanting those Parts, could not subsist: for, the Frame, Form, and Uniformity of the World, consisted of Parts; and those Parts that have been of the Human Kind, are, at several times, of other kinds and sorts of Creatures, as other sorts and kinds are of Human Kind; and all the Sorts and Kinds, are Parts of the World: so that the World cannot subsist, if any kind or sort of Creatures, that had been from the first time of the Creation, should be united; I mean, into one and the same sort or kind of Creatures; as it would be, if all those that are Quick, and those that have been _Dissolved_, (that is, have been dead) should be alive at one time.

CHAP. VIII. Of a New Heaven, and a New Earth.

The Ninth Argument was, _That if a World could be dissolved, and that the Human Creatures should rise, and reunite; what World should they reside in?_

All the Parts of my Thoughts generally agreed, That the Omnipotent GOD would command the Parts of His Servant NATURE, to compose other Worlds for them, into which Worlds they should be separated; the Good should go into a Blessed World; the Bad, into a Cursed World: and the Sacred Scripture declares, That there shall be a _New Heaven_, and a _New Earth_; which, in their opinion, was a Heaven and a Hell, for the Blessed and Cursed Human Kind of this World.

CHAP. IX. Whether there shall be a Material Heaven and Hell.

The Tenth Argument was, _Whether the Heaven and Hell that are to be produced for the Blessed and Cursed, shall be Material?_

The Minor Part's Opinion was, That they shall not be Material.

The Major Parts were of opinion, They shall be Material, by reason all those Creatures that did rise, were Material; and being Material, could not be sensible either of Immaterial Blessings, or Punishments: neither could an Immaterial World, be a fit or proper Residence for Material Bodies, were those Bodies of the purest Substance. But, whether this Material Heaven and Hell, shall be like other Material Worlds, the Parts of my Mind could not agree, and so not give their Judgment. But, in this they all agreed, That the Material Heaven and Hell, shall not have any other Animal Creatures, than those that were of Human kind, and those not produced, but raised from Death.

But when they came to argue, Whether there might be Elements, Minerals, and Vegetables, they could not agree; but some did argue, and offer to make proof, That there might be Mynes of Gold, and Rocks of Diamonds, Rubies, and the like; all which, were Minerals. Also, some were of opinion, there were Elements: for, Darkness and Light, are Elemental Effects: and, if Hell was a World of Darkness; and Heaven, a World of Light; it was probable there were Elements.

CHAP. X. Concerning the Ioys or Torments of the Blessed and Cursed, after they are in Heaven, or Hell.

As for the _Ioys of Heaven_, and the _Torments of Hell_, all the Parts of my Mind agreed, they could not conceive any more probably, than those they had formerly conceived: which former Conceptions they had occasioned the Sensitive Parts to declare; and having been formerly divulged in the Book of my _Orations_, their Opinion was, _That it would be a superfluous Work to cause them to be repeated in this Book._ But, the Ground or Foundation of those Conceptions, is, That God may decree, _That both the Sensitive and Rational Parts of those that are restored to Life, should move in variety of Perceptions, or Conceptions, without variety of Objects: and, that those Creatures_ (viz. _Human Creatures) that are raised from Death to Life, should subsist without any Forrein Matter, but should be always the same in Body and Mind, without any Traffick, Egress, or Regress of Forrein Parts_. And the proof, that the Sensitive and Rational Parts of Human Creatures, may make Perceptions, or rather Conceptions, without Forrein Objects, is, _That many men in this world have had Conceptions, both amongst the Rational and Sensitive, which Man names Visions, or Imaginations; whereof some have been Pleasing and Delightful; others, Displeasing, and Dreadful_.

The Third Part.

The PREAMBLE.

The Parts of my Mind, after some time of respite from _Philosophical Arguments_, delighting in such harmless Pastimes; did begin to argue about a _Regular_ and _Irregular World_; having formerly agreed, there might be such Worlds in Nature; and that the Regular Worlds, were Happy Worlds; the Irregular, Miserable Worlds. But, there was some division amongst the Parts of my Mind, concerning the choice of their Arguments; as, Whether to argue, first, of the particular Parts of the Regular, or of the Irregular World. But, at last, they agreed to argue, first, of the Regular World. But, pray mistake not these Arguments; for they are not Arguments of such Worlds as are for the reception of the Blessed and Cursed Humans, after their Resurrections: but, such as these Worlds we are of, only freely Regular, or Irregular. Also, though I treat but only of one Regular World, and one Irregular World; yet, my opinion is, there may be a great many Irregular Worlds, and a great many Regular Worlds, of several kinds and sorts: but, these I shall treat of, are such as are somewhat like this World we are of.

CHAP. I. Of the Happy and Miserable Worlds.

The First Argument was, _Whether there might not be such Worlds in Nature, as were in no kind or sort like this World we are of?_

They all agreed, That it was probable there was.

The Second Argument was, _Whether it was probable that the Happy and Miserable Worlds were, in any kind, like this we are of._

They all agreed, It was probable that this World was somewhat like both one, and the other; and so, both those were somewhat like this: for, as the _Happy World_ was no ways Irregular; and the _Miserable World_ no ways Regular: so this World we are of, was partly Irregular, and partly Regular; and so it was a _Purgatory World_.

CHAP. II. Whether there be such kinds and sorts of Creatures in the Happy and Blessed World, as in this World.

The Third Argument was, _Whether it was probable, the Happy and Miserable Worlds, had Animal, Vegetable, Mineral, and Elemental Kinds?_

They agreed, It was probable there were such Kinds: but yet, those Kinds, and particular sorts of those Kinds, might be different from those of this World.

The Fourth Argument was, _Whether there was Human sorts of Creatures in those Worlds._

They all agreed, There was.

CHAP. III. Of the Births and Deaths of the Heavenly World.

The Fifth Argument was, _Whether there could be Births and Deaths in the Happy World?_

Some Parts of my Mind were of opinion, That if there was so Regular a World, as that there were no Irregularities in it, there could not be _Deaths_: for, Death was a Dissolution; and if there was no Death, there could be no Birth, or Production: for, if any particular sort of Creatures should Encrease, and never dissolve, they would become Infinite; which every particular kind or sort of Creatures, may be, for time, and be Eternal; as also, be Infinite for Number; because, as some dissolve, others are produced. And so, if particular sorts or kinds of Creatures, be Eternal; the particular Production and Dissolution, is Infinite: but, if any Sort, or Kind, should encrease, without decrease, not any particular World could contain them: As for example, If all the Human Creatures that have been produced from our Father _Adam_, (which hath not been above Six thousand years) should be alive, this World could not contain them; much less, if this World, and the Human sorts of Creatures, had been of a longer date. And besides, if there should be a greater Encrease, by the Number of Human Creatures: in truth, the numerous Encrease, would have caused Mankind, in the space of Six thousand years, to be almost Infinite.

But, the Minor Parts of my Mind was of opinion, That then the _Happy World_ could not be so perfectly Regular, if there was Death.

The Major Part's opinion was, That some sorts of Deaths were as regular, as the most Regular Births: for, though Diseases were caused by Irregular Actions, yet, Death was not: for, as it is not Irregular, to be old; so it is not Irregular, to dye. But, this Argument broke off for that time.

CHAP. IV. Whether those Creatures could be named Blessed, that are subject to dye.

The Sixth Argument was, _Whether those Creatures could be called_ Blessed, _or_ _Happy, that are subject to dye?_

The Major Parts of my Mind was of opinion, That, if Death was as free from Irregularities, as Birth; then it was as happy to Dye, as to be Born.

The Minor Parts were of opinion, That though Dissolution might be as Regular as Composition; yet, it was an Unhappiness for every particular Society, to be dissolved.

The Major Part's Opinion, was, That though the particular Societies were dissolved; yet, by reason the general Society of the Kind, did continue, it was not so much Unhappiness; considering, particular Parts, or Creatures, did make the General Society; and not, the General, the Particular Societies: so that, the Parts of the Particulars, remained in the General, as in the Kind of Sort.

The Minor Parts were of opinion, That the Particulars of the same Kind or Sort, (as _Mankind_) did contribute but little to the General: for, other sorts of Creatures did contribute more than they; only Mankind was the Occasion, or Contributor of the First Foundation, but no more: but, the other Parts or Creatures of the World, did contribute more to their Kind, than the Creatures of the same Kind did: and, as other Kinds, and Sorts, did contribute to Mankind; so Mankind, to other Kinds or Sorts: for, all Kinds and Sorts, did contribute to the Subsistance and Assistance of each other.

The Major Part's Opinion was, That if all the Parts of a World did assist each other, then Death could be no Unhappiness, especially in the Regular World; by reason all Creatures in that World, of what Kind or Sort soever, was Perfect and Regular: so that, though the particular Human Creatures did dissolve from being Humans; yet, their Parts could not be Unhappy, when they did unite into other Kinds, and Sorts, or particular Societies: for, those other sorts and kinds of Creatures, might be as happy as Human Creatures.

CHAP. V. Of the Productions of the Creatures of the Regular World.

The Seventh Argument was, of Productions of the Creatures of the Regular World, _viz. Whether their Productions were frequent, or not?_

The Minor Part's Opinion, was, That they were frequent.

The Major Part's Opinion, was, That they were not _frequent_, or _numerous_, by reason the World was Regular, and so all the Productions or Generations, were Regular; but could not exceed such a Number as was, regularly, sufficient for a World, of such a Dimension as the Regular World; and according to the Dimensions, must the Society or Creatures be, let them be large or little.

CHAP. VI. Whether the Creatures in the Blessed World, do Feed, and Evacuate.

The Eighth Argument, was, _Whether the Blessed Humans, in the Happy World, did Eat, and Evacuate?_

They agreed, That, if they did feed, they must evacuate.

Then there was a Dispute, _Whether those Happy Creatures did eat?_

They all agreed, That, if they were Natural Human Creatures, they had Natural Appetites: but, by reason there were no Irregularities in this World, the Human Creatures had not any Irregular Appetites, nor Irregular Digestions; Irregular Passions, or Irregular Pastimes.

Then there arose a Dispute, _Whether those Blessed Creatures did sleep?_

Some were of opinion, They did not sleep: for, Sleep was occasioned through a weariness of the Sensitive Organs, making perceptions of Forrein Objects; and all Weariness, or Tiredness, was Irregular.

The Major part of my Mind, was of a contrary Opinion; because the delight of Nature, is in Variety: and therefore, Regular Sleeps were delightful.

The Minor was of opinion, That Sleep was like Death, and therefore it could not be Happy.

But, at last, they did conclude, That Sleep, being a soft and quiet Repose, (as being retired from all Actions concerning Forrein Parts, and had only Actions at Home, and of private Affairs; and that all the Parts of Body and Mind, were then most sociable amongst themselves) that the Blessed Humans did sleep.

CHAP. VII. Of the Animals, and of the Food of the Humans of the Happy World.

The Ninth Argument, was, _Whether there were all sorts of Animals in the Regular World?_ All the Parts of my Mind agreed, That if there were such Creatures as Human Creatures, it was probable there was other Animal Creatures: but, by reason there was no Irregularities, there could not be Cruel or Ravenous Animal Creatures: for, a Lyon, Leopard, or Wolf, in that World, would be as harmless as a Sheep in this; and all Kites, Hawks, and the like ravenous Birds, would be as harmless as those Birds that only feed on the Berries, and Fruit of the Earth.

CHAP. VIII. Whether it is not Irregular, for one Creature to feed on another.

The Tenth Argument was, _Whether it was not Irregular, for one Creature to feed on another?_

Some were of opinion, That it was natural for one Creature to subsist by another, and to assist each other; but not cruelly to destroy each other.

Upon this Argument, the Parts of my Mind divided into a Minor and a Major part.

The Minor Part's opinion, was, That, since all the Creatures in Nature, had Life; then, all Creatures that did feed, did destroy each other's Life.

The Major Part's Opinion, was, That they might be assisted by the Lives of other Creatures, and not destroy their Lives: for, Life could not be destroyed, though Lives might be occasionally alter'd: but, some Creatures may assist other Creatures, without destruction or dissolution of their Society: as for example, The Fruits and Leaves of Vegetables, are but the Humorous Parts of Vegetables, because they are divisible, and can encrease and decrease, without any dissolution of their Society; that is, without the dissolution of the Plant. Also, Milk of Animals, is a superfluous Humor of Animals: and, to prove it to be a superfluous Humor, I alledg, That much of it oppresses an Animal. The same I say of the Fruits and Leaves of many sorts of Vegetable Creatures. Besides, it is natural for such sorts of Creatures to have their Fruits and Leaves to divide from the Stock.

The Minor Part's Opinion, was, That the Milk of Animals, and the Fruits of Vegetables, and the Herbs of the Earth, had as much Life as their Producers.

The Major Part's Opinion, was, That though they had as much Life as their Producers; yet, it was natural for such off-springs to change and alter their Lives, by being united to other sorts of Creatures: as for example, An Animal eats Fruit and Herbs; and those Fruits and Herbs convert themselves into the nature of those Animals that feed of them. The same is of Milk, Eggs, and the like; out of which, a condition of Life is endeavoured for: and, for proof, such sorts of Creatures account an Animal Life the best; and therefore, all such superfluous Parts of Creatures, endeavour to unite into an Animal Society; as we may perceive, that Fruits and Herbs, are apt to turn into Worms, and Flies; and some Parts of Milk, as Cheese, will turn into Maggots; so that when Animals feed of such Meats, they occasion those Parts they feed on, to a more easie Transformation; and not only such Creatures, but Humans also, desire a better Change: for, what Human would not be a glorious Sun, or Starr?

After which Discourse, all the Parts of my Mind agreed unanimously, That Animals, and so Human Creatures, might feed on such sorts of Food, as aforesaid; but not on such Food as is an united Society: for, the Root and Foundation of any kind and sort of Creature, ought not to be destroyed.

CHAP. IX. Of the Continuance of Life in the Regular World.

The Opinion of the Parts of my Mind, was, That, it was probable, that all Societies in the Regular World, (that is, all such Parts of Nature as are united into particular Creatures) are of long life, by reason there are no Irregularities to destroy them, before their natural time.

But then a Dispute was raised amongst the Parts of my Mind, concerning the natural time, that is, the proper time of the Lives of those Creatures: for, all Creatures were not of the same time of Production; nor, after their Production, of the same time of Continuance. But the Parts of my Mind concluded, That though they could not judg by observation of any Creature, no, not of their own Sort; yet, they did

believe they could judg better of Human Creatures, as being, at that time, of a Human Society, than of any other: but, by reason they were of this World (that is, Irregular in part) they did believe they might very much err in their Judgment, concerning the continuance of Human Lives, in the _Happy World_. But, after much debate, they concluded, That a Human Creature, in the Regular World, might last as long as the Productions did not oppress or burden that World, (for that would be irregular) but how long a time that might be, they could not possibly conceive or imagine.

CHAP. IX. Of the Excellency and Happiness of the Creatures of the Regular World.

The Parts of my Mind could not possibly, being Parts of a Purgatory World, conceive the happy condition of all Creatures in the Regular World; but only, conceiving there was no Irregularities, they did also conceive, that all Creatures there, must be in perfection; and that the Elemental Creatures were purer, without drossie mixtures; so that their Earth must needs be so fruitful, that it produces all sorts of excellent Vegetables, without the help of Art; and their Minerals as pure, as all sorts of Stone that are transparent, and as hard as Diamonds; the Gold and Silver, more pure than that which is refined in our World. The truth is, that, in their Opinions, the meanest sorts of Metal in the Regular World, were more pure than the richest sort in this World: so that then, their richest Metal must be as far beyond ours, as our Gold is beyond our Iron, or Lead. As for the Elemental Waters in the Regular World, they must be extraordinary smooth, clear, flowing, fresh, and sweet; and the Elemental Air only, a most pure, clear, and glorious Light; so that there could be no need of a Sun: and, by reason all the Air was a Light, there could be no Darkness; and so, no need of a Moon, or Starrs. The Elemental Fire, although it was Hot, yet it was not Burning. Also, there could neither be scorching Heats, nor freezing Colds, Storms, nor Tempest: for, all Excess is irregular. Neither could there be Clouds, because no Vapours. But, not to be tedious; it was my Mind's Opinion, That all the Parts of the Happy World, being Regular, they could not obstruct each other's Designs or Actions; which might be a cause, that both the Sensitive and Rational Parts may not only make their Societies more curious, and their Perceptions more perfect; but their Perceptions more subtile: for, all the actions of that World being Regular, must needs be exact and perfect; in so much, that every Creature is a perfect Object to each other; and so every Creature must have, in some sort, a perfect Knowledg of each other.

CHAP. XI. Of Human Creatures in the Regular World.

The Opinion of my Mind, was, That the _Happy World_, having no Irregularities, all Creatures must needs be Excellent, and most Perfect, according to their Kind and Sort; amongst which, are Human Creatures, whose Kinds, or Sorts, being of the Best, must be more excellent than the rest, being Exactly formed, and Beautifully produced: there being, also, no Irregularities, Human Creatures cannot be subject to Pains, Sickness, Aversions, or the like; or, to Trepidations, or Troubles; neither can their Appetites, or Passions, be irregular: wherefore, their Understanding is more clear, their Judgments more poysed: and by reason their Food is Pure, it must be Delicious, as being most tastable: also, it must be wholsome, and nourishing; which occasions the Parts of Body and Mind, to be more Lively and Pleasant.

CHAP. XII. Of the Happiness of Human Creatures in the Material World.

The Happiness that Human Creatures have in the _Regular World_, is, That they are free from any kind or sort of Disturbance, by reason there are

no Irregular Actions; and so, no Pride, Ambition, Faction, Malice, Envy, Suspition, Jealousie, Spight, Anger, Covetousness, Hatred, or the like; all which, are Irregular Actions among the Rational Parts: which occasions Treachery, Slander, false Accusations, Quarrels, Divisions, Warr, and Destruction; which proceeds from the Irregularities of the Sensitive Parts, occasioned by the Rational, by reason the Sense executes the Mind's Designs: but, there are no Plots or Intrigues, neither in their State, nor upon their Stage; because, though they may act the parts of Harmless Pleasures; yet, not of Deceitful Designs: for, all Human Creatures, live in the Regular World, so united, that all the particular Human Societies, (which are particular Human Creatures) live as if they were but one Soul, and Body; that is, as if they were but one Part, or particular Creature. As for their pleasures, and pleasant Pastimes; in my opinion, they are such, as not any Creature can express, unless they were of that World, or Heaven: for, all kinds and sorts of Creatures, and all their Properties or Associations, in this World we are of, are mixt; as, partly Irregular; and partly, Regular; and so it is but a _Purgatory-World_. But surely, all Human Creatures of that World, are so pleasant and delightful to each other, as to cause a general Happiness.

The Fourth Part.

CHAP. I. Of the Irregular World.

After the Arguments and Opinions amongst the Parts of my Mind, concerning a Regular World; their Discourse was, of an _Irregular World_: Upon which they all agreed, That if there was a World that was not in any kind or sort, Irregular; there must be a World that was not in any kind or sort, Regular. But, to conceive those Irregularities that are in the Irregular World, is impossible; much less, to express them: for, it is more difficult to express Irregularities, than Regularities: and what Human Creature of this World, can express a particular Confusion, much less a World of Confusions?

Which I will, however, endeavour to declare, according to the Philosophical Opinions of the Parts of my Mind.

CHAP. II. Of the Productions and Dissolutions of the Creatures of the Irregular World.

According to the Actions of Nature, all Creatures are produced by the Associations of Parts, into particular Societies, which we name, _Particular Creatures_: but, the Productions of the Parts of the Irregular World, are so Irregular, that all Creatures of that World are Monstrous: neither can there be any orderly or distinct kinds and sorts; by reason that Order and Distinction, are Regularities. Wherefore, every particular Creature of that World, hath a monstrous and different Form; insomuch, that all the several Particulars are affrighted at the Perception of each other: yet, being Parts of Nature, they must associate; but, their Associations are after a confused and perturbed manner, much after the manner of Whirlwinds, or _Aetherial Globes_, wherein can neither be Order, nor Method: and, after the same manner as they are produced, so are they dissolved: so that, their _Births_ and _Deaths_ are _Storms_, and their _Lives_ are _Torments_.

CHAP. III. Of Animals, and of Humans, in the Irregular World.

It has been declared in the former Chapter, _That there was not any perfect Kind or Sort of Creatures in the Irregular World_: for, though there be such Creatures as we name Animals; and amongst Animals, Humans: yet, they are so Monstrous, that, being of confused Shapes, or Forms, none of those Animal Creatures can be said to be of such, or such a sort; because they are of different disordered Forms. Also, they cannot be said to be of a perfect Animal-kind, or any Kind; by reason of the variety of their Forms: for, those that are of the nature of Animals, especially of Humans, are the most miserable and unhappy of all the Creatures of that World; and the Misery is, That Death doth not help them: for, Nature being a perpetual Motion, there is no rest either alive or dead. In this World, it's true, some Societies (_viz._ some Creatures) may, sometimes, after their Dissolutions, be united into more Happy Societies, or Forms; which, in the Irregular World, is impossible; because all Forms, Creatures, or Societies, are miserable: so that, after dissolution, those dispersed Parts cannot joyn to any other Society, but what is as bad as the former; and so those Creatures may dissolve out of one Misery, and unite into another; but cannot be released from Misery. Page 284

CHAP. IV. Of Objects, and Perceptions.

The Opinions amongst the Parts of my Mind, were, That in the Unhappy, or Miserable World, all the actions of that World, being irregular, it must needs be, that all sorts of Perceptions of that World, must also be irregular: not only because the Objects are all irregular; but, the perceptive actions are so too; in such manner, that, what with the irregularity of the Objects, and the irregularity of the Perceptions, it must, of necessity, cause a horrid confusion, both of the Sensitive and Rational Parts of all Creatures of that World, in so much, that not only several Creatures may appear as several Devils to each other; but, one and the same Creature may appear, both to the Sense and Reason, like several Devils, at several times.

CHAP. V. The Description of the Globe of the Irregular World.

The Opinion of my Mind was, That the Globe of the Irregular World was so irregular, that it was a Horrid World: for though, being a World, it might be somewhat like other Worlds, both Globous, and a Society of it self, by its own Parts; and therefore

might have that which we name _Earth, Air, Water_, and _Fire_: but, for Sun-light, Moon-light, Starr-light, and the like, they are not parts of the World they appear to; and are Worlds of themselves. But, there can be no such Appearances in the Irregular World: for, the Irregularities do obstruct all such Appearances; and the Elemental Parts (if I may name them so) are as irregular, and therefore as horrid as can be: so that it is probable, that the Elemental Fire is not a bright shining Fire, but a dull, dead Fire, which hath the Effects of a strong Corrosive Fire, which never actually Heats, but actually Burns; so that some Creatures may both freeze and burn at once. As for the Earth of that World, it is probable that it is like corrupted Sores, by reason all Corruptions are produced by Irregular Motions; from which Corruptions, may proceed such stinking Foggs, as may be as far beyond the scent of Brimstone, or any the worst of Scents that are in this World, as _Spanish_ or _Roman_ Perfumes, or Essences, are beyond the scent of Carion, or _Assafoetida_; which causes all Creatures (of Airy Substances) that breathe, to be so infected, as to appear like Poysoned Bodies. As for their Elemental Water, 'tis probable, that it is as black as Ink, as bitter as Gaul, as sharp as _Aquafortis_, and as Salt as Brine, mixt irregularly together, by reason the Waters there, must needs be very troubled Waters. As for the Elemental Air, I shall declare the Opinion of my Rational Parts, in the following Chapter.

CHAP. VI. Of the Elemental Air, and Light of the Irregular WORLD.

'Tis probable, that the Elemental Air of the Irregular World, is neither perfectly Dark, nor perfectly Light; for, either would be, in some part or kind, a Perfection or Regularity: but, being irregular, it must be a perturbed Air; and, being perturbed, it is probable it produces several Colours. But, mistake me not, I do not mean such Colours as are made by perturbed Light; but, such as are made by perturbed Air: and, through the Excess of Irregularities, may be Horrid Colours; and, by reason of the _Aetherial_ whirling Motions, which are Circular Motions, the Air may be of the colour of Blood, a very horrid Colour to some sorts of Creatures: but 'tis probable, this Bloody Colour is not of a pure Bloody Colour, but of a corrupted Bloody Colour: and so the Light of the Irregular World, may, probably, be of a corrupt Bloody Colour: but, by the several Irregular Motions, it may be, at several times, of several corrupted Bloody Colours: and by reason there are no intermissions of _Air_, there can be no intermissions of this _Light_, in the Irregular World. Page 287

CHAP. VII. Of Storms, and Tempests, in the Irregular World.

As for _Storms_, and _Tempests_, and such irregular Weather, 'tis probable there are continual Winds and Thunders, caused by the disturbance of the Air; and those Storms and Tempests, being irregular, must needs be violent, and therefore very horrid. There may also be Lightnings, but they are not such as those that are of a fiery colour; but such as are like the colour of Fire and Blood mixt together. As for Rain, being occasioned by the Vapours from the Earth and Waters, it is according as those Vapours gather into Clouds: but, when there is Thunder, it must needs be violent.

CHAP. VIII. Of the several Seasons, or rather, of the several Tempers in the Irregular World.

As for _several Seasons_; there can be no constant Season, because there is no Regularity; but rather, a great Irregularity, and Violence, in all Tempers and Seasons; for there is no mean Degree: and surely, their Freezing is as sharp and corroding, as their Corrosive-Burnings; and it is probable, that the Ice and Snow in that world, are not as in this world, _viz._ the Ice to be clear, and the Snow white; because there the water is a troubled, and black water; so that the Snow is black, and the Ice also black; not clear, or like black polished Marble; but 'tis probable, that the Snow is like black Wool; and the Ice, like unpolished black Stone; not for Solidity, but for Colour and Roughness.

CHAP. IX. The Conclusion of the Irregular and Unhappy or Cursed World.

I have declared in my former Chapter, concerning the _Irregular World_, That there could not be any exact, or perfect kind or sort, because of the Irregularities; not that there is not Animal, Vegetable, Mineral, and Elemental Actions, and so not such Creatures; but, by reason of the Irregularities, they are strangely mixt and disordered, so that every Particular seems to be of a different Kind, or sort, being not any ways like each other; and yet, may have the nature of such Kinds, and Sorts, by reason they are Natural Creatures, although irregularly Natural: but, those irregular Natural Creatures, cannot chuse, by the former Descriptions, but be Unhappy, having, in no sort or kind, Pleasure, or Ease: and for such Creatures that have such Perceptions as are any way like ours, they are most Miserable: for, by the Sense of

Touch, they freeze and burn: by the sense of Tast, they have Nauseousness, and Hunger, being not satisfied: by the sense of Scent, they are suffocated, by reason of irregular Respiration: by the sense of Hearing, and sense of Seeing, they have all the horrid Sounds and Sights, that can be in Nature: the Rational Parts are, as if they were all distracted or mad; and the Sensitive Parts tormented with Pains, Aversions, Sicknesses, and Deformities; all which is caused through the Irregular Actions of the Parts of the Irregular World; so that the Actions of all sorts of Creatures, are Violent, and Irregular.

But, to conclude: As all the Creatures of our World, were made for the Benefit of Human Creatures; so, 'tis probable, all the Creatures of the Irregular World, were produced for the Torment and Confusion of Human Creatures in that World.

The Fifth Part, Being divided into FIFTEEN SECTIONS.

Concerning Restoring-Beds, or Wombs. I.

At the latter end of my _Philosophical Conceptions_, the Parts of my Mind grew sad, to think of the dissolving of their Society: for, the Parts of my Mind are so friendly, that although they do often Dispute and Argue for Recreation and Delight-sake; yet, they were never so irregular, as to divide into Parties, like Factious Fellows, or Unnatural Brethren: which was the reason that they were sad, to think their kind Society should dissolve, and that their Parts should be dispersed and united to other Societies, which might not be so friendly as they were. And, after many several Thoughts, (which are several Rational Discourses: for, Thoughts are the Language of the Mind) they fell into a Discourse of _Restoring Beds_, or _Wombs_, viz. _Whether there might not be Restoring Beds, as well as Producing Beds, or Breeding Beds_. And, to argue the case, they agreed to divide into Minor and Major Parts.