Chapter IV: , VII (71)

FRANCE: A. D. 1813 (June-November).
Defeat at Vittoria and in the Pyrenees.
Retreat from Spain.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1812-1814.

FRANCE: A. D. 1813 (November-December).
Dutch independence regained.

See NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND): A. D. 1813.

FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (January).
The Pope set free to return to Rome.

See PAPACY: A. D. 1808-1814.

FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (January-March).
The allied invasion.
Napoleon's campaign of defense.
His cause lost.
Surrender of Paris.

"The battle of Leipzig was the overthrow of the French rule in
Germany; there only remained, as evidence of what they had
lost, 150,000 men, garrisons of the fortresses of the Vistula,
the Oder, and the Elbe. Each success of the allies had been
marked by the desertion of one of the peoples that had
furnished its contingent to the Grand Army of 1812: after
Prussia, Austria; at Leipzig the Saxons: the French had not
been able to regain the Rhine except by passing over the
bodies of the Bavarians at Hanau. Baden, Wurtemberg, Hesse,
and Darmstadt declared their defection at nearly the same
time; the sovereigns were still hesitating whether to separate
themselves from Napoleon, when their people and regiments,
worked upon by the German patriots, had already passed into
the allied camp. Jerome Bonaparte had again quitted Cassel;
Denmark found Itself forced to adhere to the Coalition.
Napoleon had retired to the left bank of the Rhine. Would
Alexander cross this natural frontier of revolutionary France?
'Convinced,' says M. Bogdanovitch, 'by the experience of many
years, that neither losses inflicted on Napoleon, nor treaties
concluded with him, could check his insatiable ambition,
Alexander would not stop at setting free the involuntary
allies of France, and resolved to pursue the war till he had
overthrown his enemy.' The allied sovereigns found themselves
reunited at Frankfort, and an immediate march to Paris was
discussed. Alexander, Stein. Blücher, Gneisenau, and all the
Prussians were on the side of decisive action. The Emperor
Francis and Metternich only desired Napoleon to be weakened,
as his downfall would expose Austria to another danger, the
preponderance of Russia on the Continent. Bernadotte insisted
on Napoleon's dethronement, with the ridiculous design of
appropriating the crown of France, traitor as he was to her
cause. England would have preferred a solid and immediate
peace to a war which would exhaust her in subsidies, and
augment her already enormous debt. These divergencies, these
hesitations, gave Napoleon time to strengthen his position.
{1355}
After Hanau, in the opinion of Ney, 'the allies might have
counted their stages to Paris.' Napoleon had re-opened the
negotiations. The relinquishment of Italy (when Murat on his
side negotiated the preservation of his kingdom of Naples), of
Holland, of Germany, and of Spain, and the confinement of
France between her natural boundaries of the Rhine and the
Alps; such were the 'Conditions of Frankfort.' Napoleon sent
an answer to Metternich, 'that he consented to the opening of
a congress at Mannheim: that the conclusion of a peace which
would insure the independence of all the nations of the earth
had always been the aim of his policy.' This reply seems
evasive, but could the proposals of the allies have been
serious? Encouraged by disloyal Frenchmen, they published the
declaration of Frankfort, by which they affirmed 'that they
did not make war with France, but against the preponderance
which Napoleon had long exercised beyond the limits of his
empire.' Deceitful assurance, too obvious snare, which could
only take in a nation weary of war, enervated by twenty-two
years of sterile victories, and at the end of its resources!
During this time Alexander, with the deputies of the Helvetian
Diet summoned at Frankfort, discussed the basis of a new Swiss
Confederation. Holland was already raised by the partisans of
the house of Orange, and entered by the Prussians. The
campaign of France began. Alexander issued at Freiburg a
proclamation to his troops. ... He refused to receive
Caulaincourt at Freiburg, declaring that he would only treat
in France. 'Let us spare the French negotiator the trouble of
the journey,' he said to Metternich. 'It does not seem to me a
matter of indifference to the allied sovereigns, whether the
peace with France is signed on this side of the Rhine, or on
the other, in the very heart of France. Such an historical
event is well worth a change of quarters.' Without counting
the armies of Italy and the Pyrenees, Napoleon had now a mere
handful of troops, 80,000 men, spread from Nimeguen to Bâle,
to resist 500,000 allies. The army of the North
(Wintzingerode) invaded Holland, Belgium, and the Rhenish
provinces; the army of Silesia (Blücher) crossed the Rhine
between Mannheim and Coblentz and entered Nancy; the army of
Bohemia (Schwartzenberg) passed through Switzerland, and
advanced on Troyes, where the Royalists demanded the
restoration of the Bourbons. Napoleon was still able to bar
for some time the way to his capital. He first attacked the
army of Silesia; he defeated the vanguard, the Russians of
Sacken, at St. Didier, and Blücher at Brienne; but at La
Rothière he encountered the formidable masses of the Silesian
and Bohemian armies, and after a fierce battle (1st February,
1814) had to fall back on Troyes. After this victory had
secured their junction, the two armies separated again, the
one to go down the Marne, the other the Seine, with the
intention of reuniting at Paris. Napoleon profited by this
mistake. He threw himself on the left flank of the army of
Silesia, near Champeaubert, where he dispersed the troops of
Olsoufief and Poltaratski, inflicting on them a loss of 2,500
men, and took the generals prisoners. At Montmirail, in spite
of the heroism of Zigrote and Lapoukhine, he defeated Sacken;
the Russians alone lost 2,800 men and five guns (11th
February). At Château Thierry, he defeated Sacken and York
reunited, and again the Russians lost 1,500 men and five guns.
At Vauchamp it was the turn of Blücher, who lost 2,000
Russians, 4,000 Prussians, and fifteen guns. The army of
Silesia was in terrible disorder. 'The peasants, exasperated
by the disorder inseparable from a retreat, and excited by
exaggerated rumours of French successes, took up arms, and
refused supplies. The soldiers suffered both from cold and
hunger, Champagne affording no wood for bivouac fires. When
the weather became milder, their shoes wore out, and the men,
obliged to make forced marches with bare feet, were carried by
hundreds into the hospitals of the country' (Bogdanovitch).
Whilst the army of Silesia retreated in disorder on the army
of the North, Napoleon, with 50,000 soldiers full of
enthusiasm, turned on that of Bohemia, crushed the Bavarians
and Russians at Mormans, the Wurtembergers at Montereau, the
Prussians at Méry: these Prussians made part of the army of
Blücher, who had detached a corps to hang on the rear of
Napoleon. This campaign made a profound impression on the
allies. Castlereagh expressed, in Alexander's presence, the
opinion that peace should be made before they were driven
across the Rhine. The military chiefs began to feel uneasy.
Sesslavine sent news from Joigny that Napoleon had 180,000 men
at Troyes. A general insurrection of the eastern provinces was
expected in the rear of the allies. It was the firmness of
Alexander which maintained the Coalition, it was the military
energy of Blücher which saved it. Soon after his disasters he
received reinforcements from the army of the North, and took
the offensive against the marshals; then, hearing of the
arrival of Napoleon at La Ferté Gaucher, he retreated in great
haste, finding an unexpected refuge at Soissons, which had
just been taken by the army of the North. At Craonne (March 7)
and at Laon (10th to 12th March), with 100,000 men against
80,000, and with strong positions, he managed to repulse all
the attacks of Napoleon. At Craonne, however, the Russian loss
amounted to 5,000 men, the third of their effective force. The
battle of Laon cost them 4,000 men. Meanwhile, De Saint
Priest, a general in Alexander's service, had taken Rheims by
assault, but was dislodged by Napoleon after a fierce
struggle, where the émigré commander was badly wounded, and
4,000 of his men were killed (13th, March). The Congress of
Châtillon-sur-Seine was opened on the 28th of February. Russia
was represented by Razoumovski and Nesselrode, Napoleon by
Caulaincourt, Austria by Stadion and Metternich. The
conditions proposed to Napoleon were the reduction of France
to its frontiers of 1792, and the right of the allies to
dispose, without reference to him, of the reconquered
countries. Germany was to be a confederation of independent
States, Italy to be divided into free States, Spain to be
restored to Ferdinand, and Holland to the house of Orange.
Leave France smaller than I found her? Never!' said Napoleon.
Alexander and the Prussians would not hear of a peace which
left Napoleon on the throne. Still, however, they negotiated.
Austria and England were both agreed not to push him to
extremities, and many times proposed to treat. After
Napoleon's great success against Blücher, Castlereagh declared
for peace. 'It would not be a peace,' cried the Emperor of
Russia; 'it would be a truce which would not allow us to
disarm one moment. I cannot come 400 leagues every day to your
assistance.
{1356}
No peace, as long as Napoleon is on the throne.' Napoleon, in
his turn, intoxicated by his success, enjoined Caulaincourt
only to treat on the basis of Frankfort--natural frontiers.
... As fortune returned· to the allies, the congress was
dissolved (19th of March). The Bourbon princes were already in
France; Louis XVIII. was on the point of being proclaimed.
Alexander, tired of seeing the armies of Bohemia and Silesia
fly in turn before thirty or forty thousand French, caused the
allies to adopt the fatal plan of a march on Paris, which was
executed in eight days. Blücher and Schwartzenberg united,
with 200,000 men, were to bear down all opposition on their
passage. The first act in the drama was the battle of
Arcissur-Aube, where the Russians took six guns from Napoleon.
The latter conceived a bold scheme, which perhaps might have
saved him if Paris could have resisted, but which was his
ruin. He threw himself on the rear of the allied army,
abandoning to them the route to Paris, but reckoning on
raising Eastern France, and cutting off their retreat to the
Rhine. The allies, uneasy for one moment, were reassured by an
intercepted letter of Napoleon's, and by the letters of the
Parisian royalists, which revealed to them the weakness of the
capital. 'Dare all!' writes Talleyrand to them. They, in their
turn, deceived Napoleon, by causing him to be followed by a
troop of cavalry, continued their march, defeated Marmont and
Mortier, crushed the National Guards of Pacthod (battle of La
Fère-Champenoise); and arrived in sight of Paris. Barclay de
Tolly, forming the centre, first attacked the plateau of
Romainville, defended by Marmont; on his left, the Prince of
Wurtemberg threatened Vincennes; and on his right, Blücher
deployed before Montmartre, which was defended by Mortier. The
heights of Chaumont and those of Montmartre were taken;
Marmont and Mortier with Moncey were thrown back on the
ramparts. Marmont obtained an armistice from Colonel Orlof, to
treat for the capitulation of Paris. King Joseph, the Empress
Marie-Louise, and all the Imperial Government had already fled
to the Loire. Paris was recommended to the generosity of the
allied monarchs'; the army could retire on the road to
Orleans. Such was the battle of Paris; it had cost, according
to M. Bogdanovitch, 8,400 men to the allies, and 4,000 to the
French (30th March). ... The allied troops maintained a
strict discipline, and were not quartered on the inhabitants.
Alexander had not come as a friend of the Bourbons--the
fiercest enemy of Napoleon, was least bitter against the
French; he intended leaving them the choice of their
government. He had not favoured any of the intrigues of the
émigrés, and had scornfully remarked to Jomini, 'What are the
Bourbons to me?'"

_A. Rambaud,
History of Russia,
volume 2, chapter 12._

ALSO IN:
_C. Joyneville,
Life and Times of Alexander I.,
volume 3, chapter 1._

_M. de Beauchamp,
Narrative of the Invasions of France, 1814-15._

_Duke de Rovigo,
Memoirs,
volume 3, part 2, chapters 20-32._

_J. Philippart,
Campaign in Germany and France, 1818,
volume 1, pages 279 and after, and volume 2._

FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (January-May).
Desertion of Napoleon by Murat.
Murat's treaty with the allies.
French evacuation of Italy.

See ITALY: A. D. 1814.

FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (February-April).
Reverses in the south.
Wellington's invasion.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1812-1814.

FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (March-April).
Friendly reception of the Allies in Paris.
Collapse of the empire.
Abdication of Napoleon.
Treaty of Fontainebleau.

"At an early hour in the morning [of the 31st of March], the
Allied troops had taken possession of the barriers, and
occupied the principal avenues leading to the city. Picquets
of the Cossacks of the Guard were stationed at the corners of
the principal streets. Vast multitudes thronged the
Boulevards, in anxious and silent expectation of pending
events. The royalists alone were active. The leaders, a small
band indeed, had early assembled in the Place Louis XV.,
whence, with Bourbon banners displayed, they proceeded along
the principal streets, haranguing the people and National
Guard; but though not interfered with by the police,--for all
seemed to feel that the Imperial government was at an
end,--they were listened to with such perfect indifference,
that many began to think their cause absolutely hopeless. It
was between ten and eleven o'clock when the procession began
to enter the city. Light horsemen of the Russian Guard opened
the march; at the head of the main column rode the Emperor of
Russia and the King of Prussia. ... Then followed 35,000 men,
cavalry, infantry, and artillery, the elite of the armies, in
all the pride and circumstance of war and conquest. At first
the multitude looked on in silent amazement; but the
affability of the officers, above all, the condescending
manner of the Czar, dispelled any fear they might still
entertain; and shouts of 'Vive Alexander!' began to be heard;
cries of 'Vive le Roi de Prusse!' were soon added. ... The
shouts of welcome increased at every step. The conquerors were
now hailed as liberators; 'Vivent les Allies!' 'Vivent nos
liberateurs!' sounded through the air, mingled at last with
the long-forgotten cry of 'Vive le Roi!' 'Vivent les
Bourbons!' ... The Emperor Alexander had no sooner seen the
troops file past on the Place Louis XV., than he repaired to
the hôtel of Talleyrand, where in the evening, a council was
assembled to deliberate on the important step next to be
taken, and, on the best mode of turning the glorious victories
achieved to an honourable and beneficial account. ... The
points discussed were:

I. The possibility, on sufficient guarantees, of a peace
with Napoleon;

II. The plan of regency under Marie Louise; and,

III. The restoration of the Bourbons.

The choice was not without difficulties. The first plan was
easily dismissed; as the reception of the Allies proved
clearly that the power of Napoleon was broken. The second
seemed more likely to find favour, as promising to please the
Emperor of Austria; but was finally rejected, as being, in
fact, nothing more than a continuance of the Imperial reign
under a different title. Against the restoration of the
Bourbons, it was urged that the nation at large had evinced no
desire for their recall, and seemed to have almost forgotten
them. This, Talleyrand said, was owing entirely to the
Congress of Chatillon, and the negotiations carried on with
Napoleon; introducing at the same time, the Abbé de Pradt and
Baron Louis, who fully confirmed the assertion. On being asked
how he expected to obtain a declaration in favour of the
exiled family, Talleyrand replied, that he was certain of the
Senate; and that their vote would influence Paris, the example
of which would be followed by all France.
{1357}
Alexander having on this assurance taken the opinion of the
King of Prussia and Prince Schwarzenberg, signed a declaration
to the effect that 'the Allies would treat no more with
Napoleon Bonaparte, or with any member of his family.' A
proclamation was issued at the same time, calling on the
conservative Senate to assemble and form a provisional
government, for the purpose of drawing up a constitution
suitable to the wishes of the French people. This the Allies
promised to guarantee; as it was their wish, they said, to see
France 'powerful, happy, and prosperous.' A printer was ready
in attendance; and before dark, this memorable decree was seen
placarded in all the streets of Paris. The inconstant populace
had not even waited for such a sig nal, and had been already
engaged in destroying the emblems of the Imperial government; an
attempt had even been made to pull down the statue of Napoleon
from the summit of the column of Austerlitz, in the Place
Vendome! The decisive impulse thus given, events moved rapidly
forward. Caulaincourt's zealous efforts in favour of his
master could effect nothing after the declaration already
noticed. On the 2d, he took his departure for Fontainbleau;
having, however, received the assurance that Napoleon would be
suitably provided for. ... The funds rose five per cent., and all
other public securities in proportion, on the very day after
the occupation of the capital; and wherever the Allied
Sovereigns appeared in public, they were loudly cheered and
hailed as liberators. From the first, officers of the Allied
armies filled the public walks, theatres, and coffee-houses,
and mixed with the people as welcome guests rather than as
conquering invaders. The press, so long enslaved by Napoleon,
took the most decided part against its oppressor; and from
every quarter injurious pamphlets, epigrams, and satires, now
poured upon the fallen ruler. Madame de Staël had
characterised him as 'Robespierre on horseback'; De Pradt had
more wittily termed him 'Jupiter Scapin'; and these sayings
were not forgotten. But by far the most vivid sensation was
produced by Chateaubriand's tract of 'Bonaparte and the
Bourbons'; 30,000 copies of which are said to have been sold
in two days. In proportion as the popular hatred of the
Emperor evinced itself, grew the boldness of his adversaries.
On the first of April, the Municipal Council of Paris met and
already declared the throne vacant; on the next day, the
Conservative Senate formed a Provisional Government, and
issued a decree, declaring, first,'That Napoleon Bonaparte had
forfeited the throne and the right of inheritance established in
his family; 2d, That the people and army of France were
disengaged and freed from the oath of fidelity which they had
taken to him and his constitution.' ... The members of the
Legislative Assembly who happened to be in Paris, followed the
example of the Senate. The Assembly had been dissolved in
January, and could not meet constitutionally unless summoned
by the Sovereign; this objection was, however, set aside, and
the Assembly having met, ratified the act of deposition passed
by the Senate. All the public functionaries, authorities and
constituted bodies in and near Paris, hastened to send in
their submission to the new powers: it was a general race in
which honour was not always the prize of speed; for every
address, every act of submission sent in to the new
government, teemed with invectives against the deposed ruler.
... It was in the night between the 2d and 3d, that
Caulaincourt returned from his mission, and informed Napoleon
of the events which had passed. ... In what manner the Emperor
received these fatal tidings we are not told. ... At first it
would seem that he entertained, or affected to entertain,
thoughts of resorting to arms; for in the morning he reviewed
his Guard, and addressed them in the following
terms:--'Officers and soldiers of my Old Guard, the enemy has
gained three marches on us, and outstripped us at Paris. Some
factious men, emigrants whom I had pardoned, have surrounded
the Emperor Alexander; they have mounted the white cockade,
and would force us to do the same. In a few days I shall
attack the enemy, and force them to quit the capital. I rely
on you: am I right?' The troops readily replied with loud
cheers to this address, calling out 'To Paris! 'to Paris!' but
the Marshals and senior officers were by no means so zealous
in the cause. ... The Generals and Marshals ... followed the
Emperor to his apartments after the review; and having advised
him to negotiate with the Allies, on the principle of a
personal abdication, ended by informing him, that they would
not accompany him if he persisted in the proposed attack on
Paris. The scene which followed seems to have been of a very
undignified description. Napoleon was almost convulsed with
rage; he tore and trampled under foot the decree of the
Senate; vowed vengeance against the whole body, who should
yet, he said, be made to pay for their deed of 'felony'; but
ended, nevertheless, by ignobly signing the abdication
demanded of him. We say ignobly; for nothing can be more
debasing in character, than to sink down from a very tempest
of passion to tame submission. ... The act of abdication was
worded in the following terms: 'The Allied powers having
proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon is the sole obstacle to
the re-establishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon,
faithful to his oath, declares that he is ready to descend
from the throne, to quit France, and even to relinquish life,
for the good of the country, which is inseparable from the
rights of his son, from those of the regency in the person of
the Empress, and from the maintenance of the laws of the
empire. Done at our Palace of Fontainbleau, 4th April 1814.
Napoleon.' Caulaincourt, Marshals Ney and M'Donald, were
appointed to carry this conditional abdication to Paris. ...
The commissioners on returning to Fontainbleau found the
Emperor in his cabinet, impatiently awaiting the result of
their mission. Marshal Ney was the first to speak; and in that
abrupt, harsh and not very respectful tone which he had lately
assumed towards his falling sovereign, told him at once, that
'France, the army and the cause of peace, demanded his
unconditional abdication.' Caulaincourt added, that the full
sovereignty of the Isle of Elba, with a suitable
establishment, had been offered by the Emperor Alexander; and
Marshal M'Donald, who had so zealously defended the cause of
his master, confirmed the statement,--declaring also that, 'in
his opinion, the Imperial cause was completely lost, as they
had all three'--the commissioners--'failed against a
resolution irrevocably fixed.' 'What!' exclaimed Napoleon,
'not only my own abdication, but that of Marie Louise, and of
my son? This is rather too much at once.'
{1358}
And with these words he delayed the answer till next day,
intending, he said, to consider the subject, and consult the
army; ... Words ran high between the fallen chieftain and his
former subordinates; there were altercations, recriminations,
and painful scenes, and it was only when Napoleon had signed
the following unconditional abdication that perfect calm was
restored:--'The Allied Sovereigns having declared that the
Emperor Napoleon is the only obstacle to the re-establishment
of a general peace, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his
oath, declares, that he renounces, for himself and his heirs,
the throne of France and Italy; and that there is no personal
sacrifice, not even that of life itself, which he is not
willing to make for the interest of France. Napoleon.
Fontainbleau, 6th April 1814.' This deplorable document is
written in so agitated and faltering a hand as to be almost
illegible. ... According to the treaty signed at Paris on the
10th, and usually called the Treaty of Fontainbleau, Napoleon,
from being Emperor of France and King of Italy, became Emperor
of Elba! He was to have a guard and a navy suited to the
extent of his dominions, and to receive from France a pension
of six millions of francs annually. The Duchies of Parma,
Placentia and Guastala, were to be conferred in sovereignty on
Marie Louise and her heirs. Two millions and a half of francs
were further to be paid annually by the French government to
the Empress Josephine and other members of the Bonaparte
family. Splendid as these terms were for a dethroned and
defenceless monarch, Napoleon ratified the treaty with
reluctance, and delayed the signature as long as possible;
still clinging, it would seem, to some vague hope of returning
fortune. It is even related by Fain, Norvins, Constant, and in
the pretended Memoirs of Caulaincourt, that he attempted to
commit suicide by taking poison, 'and was only saved by the
weakness of the dose, and the remedies administered by his
attendants, who, hearing his groans, hastened to his bedside.
It is certain that he was very unwell on the following
morning, the 18th April, a circumstance easily accounted for
by the anxiety he had undergone; but there can be little
difficulty in rejecting the tale of poison, for, it is
mentioned in none of the St. Helena Memoirs."

_Lieutenant-Colonel J. Mitchell,
The Fall of Napoleon,
book 8, chapter 8 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN:
_M. de Bourrienne,
Private Memoirs of Napoleon,
volume 4, chapters 20-23._

_Duke of Rovigo,
Memoirs,
volume 4, part 1, chapters 4-10._

_Prince Talleyrand,
Memoirs,
part 7 (volume 2)._

FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (April-June).
Departure of Napoleon for Elba.
Louis XVIII. called to the throne.
Settlement of the constitution.
Evacuation of France by the Allies.
The Treaty of Paris.
Determination of the new boundaries of the kingdom.

"April 20, everything being ready for Napoleon's journey, and
the commissioners of the four great powers who were to
accompany him having arrived, the former drew up the imperial
guard in the grand courtyard at Fontainebleau to take leave of
them. 'Soldiers,' said he, 'I have one mission left to fulfil
in life,--to recount to posterity the glorious deeds we have
done together.' Would to Heaven he had kept his word and done
nothing else! He kissed the flag, and his brave soldiers, who
only saw the man who so often led them on to victory, burst
into tears. Seven or eight hundred of them were to form the
army left to him who had had a million soldiers at his
command, and they were sent in advance, Napoleon going by
another road, unescorted save by General Drouot, Bertrand, and
the four foreign commissioners with their people. In the first
departments through which they passed ... the people who had
been eye-witnesses of the invasion forgot the evil wrought by
Napoleon, and only saw the defender of his country. They
shouted 'Long live the Emperor! Down with foreigners!' But
beyond Lyons, where the foe never penetrated, the population
became hostile: old royalist and Catholic passions were
revived in proportion as they went farther south; the mob
cried 'Long live the King! down with the tyrant!' and others
howled 'Long live the allies!' At Avignon and Organ a furious
rabble attacked the carriages, demanding that the tyrant
should be handed over to them to be hung or thrown into the
Rhone. The man who braved the storm of shot and shell with
utter indifference gave way before these ignoble perils, and
disguised himself; otherwise the commissioners could scarcely
have saved his life at Orgon. The sad journey closed at the
Gulf of St. Raphael, on the coast of Provence. ... An English
frigate awaited him and bore him to Elba, where he landed at
Porto-Ferraio, May 4. While the Empire was crumbling to dust
... and the fallen Emperor went into exile, the new government
was working hard to hold its own at Paris. The royalists were
at sword's points with the national sovereignty party in the
commission chosen by the senate to draw up a constitution. The
pretender's agent, Abbé de Montesquiou, failed to win
acceptance of the principle that royal right is superior to
the nation's will; and the formula adopted was as follows:
'The French people freely call to the throne of France, Louis
Stanislas Xavier de France, brother of the late king, and,
after him, the other members of the house of Bourbon.' Thus
they did not recognize in the king whom they elected the title
of Louis XVIII., and did not admit that between him and his
brother, Louis XVI., there had been a rightful king, the poor
child who died in the Temple and whom royalists called Louis
XVII. The reign of Louis Stanislas Xavier was to date from the
day when he swore allegiance to the Constitution: the
executive power was vested in the king, who shared the
legislative power with the Senate and a Chamber of Deputies.
The Constitution sanctioned individual liberty, freedom of
worship and the press, the sale of national goods, the public
debt, and proclaimed oblivion of all acts committed since the
beginning of the Revolution. The principles of 1789 were
maintained, and in the sad state of France there was nothing
better to be done than to rally round this Constitution, which
was voted by the Senate, April 6, and accepted by the
Legislature. ... The Senate's lack of popularity gave the
royalist party hope that the act of April 6 might be
retracted, and at this time that party won a faint success in
a matter on which they laid great stress. Count d' Artois was
on his way to Paris, and declared that he would not lay aside
the white cockade on entering. The temporary government
ordered the national guard to assume the white cockade, and
let Count d'Artois in without conditions (April 12), He was
received in solemn state, the marshals marching before him,
still wearing their tri-colored cockades and plumes, which the
government dared not attack.
{1359}
The rabble was cold, but the middle classes received the
prince favorably and he proved gracious to every one. ...
D'Artois ... insisted on being recognized, unconditionally, as
lieutenant-general of the kingdom, as he had entered Paris
without making terms; but this time the Senate and temporary
government did not yield. They intended that the prince should
make a solemn promise, in his brother's name, in regard to the
Constitution. The czar interfered and explained to D' Artois
that the allies were pledged to the Senate and the nation, and
he was forced to submit and receive the lieutenant-generalcy
of the kingdom from the Senate, 'until Louis Stanislas Xavier
of France should accept the Constitutional Charter.' ... The
day after his proclamation as lieutenant-general, the white
cockade was finally adopted, and ... imposed upon the army and
various public buildings, though the national cockade was
still worn by many French soldiers from the Garonne to the
Elbe, and many warlike deeds still signalized the final
efforts of their arms, even after Napoleon had laid aside his
sword. ... By degrees the truce became universal, and the next
question was to fix the terms of peace. ... The enemy held
nothing but Paris and the unfortified towns, French garrisons
still occupying all the strongholds of France, old and new,
and several important places far beyond the Rhine. ... This
was a powerful means of gaining, not the preservation of the
natural frontiers, which could no longer be hoped for, but at
least an important advance on the limits of the ancient
monarchy. Unluckily a movement, natural but hasty, broke out
all over France, to claim the immediate evacuation of her soil
by foreign armies;"--an impatience which allowed no time for
bargaining in the matter, and which precipitated an agreement
(April 23) with the allied powers "to leave the French
dominion as it had been on the 1st of January, 1792, in
proportion as the places still occupied beyond those limits by
French troops should be evacuated and restored to the allies.
... This compact surrendered to the allies, without any
compensation, 58 strongholds, 12,600 pieces of ordnance,
arsenals and magazines filled with vast supplies." The new
king, calling himself Louis XVIII., arrived in Paris on the 3d
of May, from England, where he had latterly resided. He had
offended the czar, ruffled public feeling in France, even
before he arrived, by saying publicly to the English people
that he owed his restoration, under Providence, to them.
Negotiations for a definite treaty of peace were opened at
once. "At Metternich's suggestion, the allies decided to
conclude their arrangements with France in Paris, and to
reserve general arrangements with Europe for a congress at
Vienna.

See VIENNA: THE CONGRESS OF.

Talleyrand did not object, although this plan was evidently
unfavorable to France. ... The royal council directed
Talleyrand to try to win for the northern frontier those
million people promised beyond the old limits; but Louis X
VIII., by angering the czar, completed the sad work of April
23. Alexander thought of renewing with the Bourbons the
alliance that he had planned with Napoleon, and marrying to
the Duke de Berri, Louis's nephew, that one of his sisters to
whom Napoleon preferred Marie Louise. Louis ... responded
churlishly to the czar's advances. Accordingly, when France
demanded a solid frontier, including the South of Belgium, ...
Lord Castlereagh absolutely refused, and was supported by
Prussia, hostile to France, and by Austria, indifferent on
that score, but disposed to follow England in everything.
Russia did not side with France. ... The allies were willing
to grant, in place of the old dominion of the monarchy, on the
Rhine side, the line of the Queich, which opened communication
with Landau, and to the southeast the department of Vaucluse
(once County Venaissin) given up by the Pope, besides Chambéry
and a part of Savoy; finally, in the Jura region, Montbéliard.
This made nearly 600,000 people. As for the colonies, England
reluctantly returned Martinique, Guadeloupe, and the Isle of
Bourbon, but refused to restore the Isle de France [or
Mauritius, captured in 1810], that great military post which
is to the Indian Ocean what Malta is to the Mediterranean.
This island was bravely defended for some years by its
governor. ... The English declared that they would also keep
Malta, taken from France, and the Cape of Good Hope, wrested
from Holland, saying that all these belonged to them, being on
the road to India. ... Secret articles provided that Holland,
under the rule of the House of Orange, should be increased by
the countries ceded by France, between the sea, the French
frontier of 1790, and the Meuse (Austrian Netherlands and
Liége). The countries ceded by France on the left bank of the
Rhine were to be divided as 'compensation' among the German
states. Austria was to have the country bounded by the Po,
Ticino, and Lake Maggiore, that is, the old Venetian states,
Milan, and Mantua. The territory of the former Republic of
Genoa was to be given to the King of Sardinia. Such was the
end of the wars of the Empire. Republican France reached the
goal of the old monarchy, the natural limits of ancient Gaul;
the Empire lost them."

_H. Martin,
Popular History of France,
volume 2, chapter 17._

"The Peace of Paris [signed May 30] was followed by some
subsidiary treaties. ... By a Convention of June 3rd between
Austria and Bavaria, Maximilian Joseph restored to Austria the
Tyrol with the Vorarlberg, the principality of Salzburg, the
district of the Inn and the Hausrück. During the visit of the
Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia to London in June,
it was agreed that the Article of the Peace of Paris
stipulating the aggrandisement of Holland, should, be carried
out by the annexation of Belgium to that country, an
arrangement which was accepted by the Sovereign of the
Netherlands, July 21st 1814."

_T. H. Dyer,
History of Modern Europe,
book 7, chapter 16._

ALSO IN:
_A. de Lamartine,
History of the Restoration,
books 13-14 and 16 (volumes 1-2)._

_E. E. Crowe,
History of the Reigns of Louis XVIII. and Charles X.,
volume 1, chapter 3._

{1360}

FRANCE: A. D. 1814-1815.
Ten months of Bourbon rule and its follies.
Return of Napoleon from Elba.
Flight of the King.
The Hundred Days.
Preparations for war.

"The peace of Paris did not endure a year. Ten months of
Bourbon rule, vengeful, implacable, stupid; alike violent in
act and in language; sufficed to bring France once more to the
brink of revolution. Two acts alone are sufficient to
demonstrate the folly of the royalists--the resumption of the
white flag, and the changing of the numbers of the regiments.
A prudent king would have adopted the tricolour when he agreed
to a constitutional charter, and would have refrained from
wounding military sensibility by destroying the numbers of the
regiments. But more stupid than these acts was the political
policy pursued, a policy which aroused on all sides suspicions
of what was worse than the grinding but gilded despotism of
Napoleon--namely, that the Government favoured a forcible
resumption of the confiscated lands, the restoration of
tithes, and of the abolished exactions and imposts of
feudalism. It has been surmised, and with much reason, that
had Napoleon not reappeared a popular movement would have
extorted from the king a really constitutional government. In
that case France might have taken some real steps towards a
free government, and the bases of liberty rather than of
equality might have been laid. But while the Powers were
wrangling at Vienna, and the Bourbons were irritating France,
Napoleon was watching from Elba for the opportunity of
resuming empire. It was not in the nature of the man to yield
passively to anything, even to the inevitable. So long as a
chance remained he looked out keenly for the propitious hour.
He selected Elba as a residence because thence 'he could keep
an eye upon France and upon the Bourbons.' It was his duty, he
said, to guard the throne of France for his family and for his
son. Thus, in making peace at Fontainebleau, he only bowed to
a storm he could not then resist, and cherished in his mind
the project of an imperial restoration. The hour for which he
waited came at length. February, 1815, he had arrived at the
conclusion that with the aid of the army he could overthrow
the Bourbons, whose government, he said, was good for priests,
nobles, and countesses of the old time, but worth nothing to
the living generation. The army, he knew, was still, and would
be always, devoted to him. ... He had weighed all the chances
for and against the success of his enterprise, and he had
arrived at the conclusion that he should succeed; for,
'Fortune had never deserted him on great occasions.' It has
been said that his departure was precipitated by a report of
the dissolution of the Congress of Vienna. ... It is possible,
indeed, that the rumour of an intention to confine him upon an
island in the Atlantic may have exercised some influence over
him; but the real reasons for the selection of the 26th of
February were that he was tired of inactivity, and convinced
that the favourable moment had arrived. Therefore, instructing
Murat to second him by assuming a strong position in front of
Ancona, he embarked his faithful Thousand, and set sail for
France. On the 1st of March he landed on the shores of the
Gulf of Juan, and on the 20th he entered the Tuileries. As he
had predicted, the army rallied to the tricolour; the generals
could neither restrain nor guide their soldiers; the Bourbon
dukes and princes, and the brave Duchess of Angoulême--'the
only man of the family'--were utterly powerless before the
universal military disaffection; and one after the other they
were chased out of France. The army had restored Napoleon.
Louis XVIII. drove out of Paris by the road to St. Denis on
the 19th, a few hours before Napoleon, on the 20th, drove in
by the Barrier of Italy; and on the 23rd, after a short stay
at Lille, the King was safe in Ghent. 'The great question is,'
wrote Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington three days
afterwards, while yet in ignorance of the event, 'can the
Bourbons get Frenchmen to fight for them against Frenchmen?'
The result showed that they could not. In the then state of
France the army was master of France. Louis and his ministers
had done nothing to conciliate, and almost everything to
irritate, the people; and even so early as November, 1814,
Wellington did not see what means the King had of resisting
the attack of a few hundred officers determined to risk
everything. During the period occupied by Napoleon in passing
from Elba to Paris, the conduct of' the sovereigns and
diplomatists assembled at Vienna offered a striking contrast
to the weakness and inaptitude of the Bourbons. ... That there
was fear in Vienna is manifest, but the acts of the Allied
Powers show that fear speedily gave place to resolution. For,
as early as the 12th of' March, before the Allies knew where
Napoleon was, or anything about him, except that he was
somewhere at large in France, they drew up that famous
declaration, and signed it the next day, in which they
declared that he had broken the sole legal tie to which his
existence was attached, and that it was possible to keep with
him 'neither peace nor truce.' 'The Powers, in consequence,'
so runs this document, 'declare that Napoleon Buonaparte is
placed beyond the pale of civil and social relations, and
that, as a common enemy and disturber of the peace of the
world, he has delivered himself over to public justice.' This
declaration, which has been the subject of vehement criticism,
was the natural consequence of the prevailing and correct
appreciation of Napoleon's character. There was not a nation
in Europe which felt the slightest particle of confidence or
trust in him. Hence this declaration, made so promptly, was
drawn up in ignorance of any professions he might make,
because, beforehand, Europe felt that no professions of his
could be relied on. The news of his success was followed by a
treaty, adopted on the 25th of March, renewing the alliance of
Chaumont, whereby Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia
bound themselves to provide each 150,000 men; to employ, in
addition, all their resources, and to work together for the
common end--the maintenance of the Treaty of Paris, and of the
stipulations determined on and signed at the Congress of
Vienna. Further, they engaged not to lay down their arms but
by common consent; nor before the object of the war should
have been attained; nor, continues the document, 'until
Buonaparte shall have been rendered absolutely unable to
create disturbance, and to renew attempts for possessing
himself of supreme power in France.' All the Powers of Europe
generally, and Louis XVIII. specially, were invited to accede
to the treaty; but, at the instance of Lord Castlereagh, the
Four Great Powers declared in the most solemn manner that,
although they desired to see his Most Christian Majesty
restored to the throne, and also to contribute to that
'auspicious result,' yet that their 'principles' would not
permit them to prosecute the war 'with a view of imposing any
particular Government on France.' With Napoleon they refused
to hold any communication whatever; and when he sent couriers
to announce that he intended to observe existing treaties,
they were stopped on the frontiers. ...
{1361}
Wellington, on his own responsibility, acted for England,
signed treaties, undertook heavy engagements in her name, and
agreed to command an army to be assembled in Belgium; and
having satisfied, as well as he could, the clamour of 'all'
for subsidies from England, he took his departure from Vienna
on the 29th of March, and arrived in Brussels on the 4th of
April. The British Parliament and nation confirmed readily the
proceedings of the Government and of the Duke of Wellington at
Vienna. ... Napoleon had formed a Ministry on the very evening
of his return to the Tuileries. ... He felt certain that war
would ensue. Knowing that at the moment when he returned from
Elba a large part of the best troops of England were in
America, that the German force on the Rhine was weak, and that
the Russian armies were in Poland, he calculated that the
Allied Powers would not be in a position to open the campaign,
at the earliest, until the middle of July; and, for a moment,
he hoped that, by working on the feelings of his
father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria, and by rousing the
anger of the Emperor Alexander against his allies, he would be
able, if not to reduce his enemies to two, England and
Prussia, at least to defer the period of hostilities until the
autumn. ... Before his great schemes of military preparation
were half complete he found himself compelled by events to
begin the war. What he actually did accomplish between March
and June has been the subject of fierce controversy. His
friends exaggerate, his enemies undervalue, his exertions and
their results. But no candid inquirer can fail to see, that if
his energetic activity during this period is far below that of
the Convention when threatened by Europe, it is far above the
standard fixed by his passionate crimes. The real reason why
he failed to raise a larger military force during the hundred
days was that his genius worked upon exhausted materials. The
nation, to use an expressive vulgarism, was 'used up.' ... The
proper conscription for 1815 had been levied in the autumn of
1813. The drafts on the rising generation had been
anticipated, and hence there remained little available except
the old soldiers. ... The result of Napoleon's prodigious
exertions to augment the military force of France appears to
be this: Napoleon found ready to his hand a force of 228,972
men of all arms, officers included, giving a disposable
effective of 155,000 men ready to take the field. By the 18th
of June he had raised this force to 276,982 men, officers
included: that is 247,609 of the line, and 29,373 of the
Imperial Guard. The number disposable for war was 198,180; and
it therefore follows that Napoleon had increased the general
effective by 53,010 men, and that part of it disposable for
war by 48, 180."

_G. Hooper,
Waterloo,
book 1, chapter 1._

ALSO IN:
_Imbert de Saint-Amand,
The Duchess of Angouléme and the two Restorations,
part 1._

_F. P. Guizot,
Memoirs of My Time,
volume 1, chapter 3._

_J. C. Ropes,
The First Napoleon,
lecture 6._

_E. E. Crowe,
History of the Reigns of Louis XVIII. and Charles X.,
volume 1, chapters 4-6._

_R. H. Horne,
Life of Napoleon, chapters 41-42._

_General Sir N. Campbell,
Napoleon at Fontainebleau and Elba._

FRANCE: A. D. 1814-1815.
The Congress of Vienna and the fruits of its labors.

See VIENNA, THE CONGRESS OF.

FRANCE: A. D. 1815 (June).
Napoleon's last campaign.
His final defeat and overthrow at Waterloo.