Chapter IV: , VII (72)

"The nearest troops of the allies were the Prussian army in
the Rhenish provinces, and the army of British, Dutch,
Belgians, Bunswickers, and Hanoverians, occupying Belgium.
Napoleon's scheme, the best in his desperate circumstances,
was to expel the British and Prussians, who were moving west,
from Belgium, win the Rhine frontier--to arouse the enthusiasm
of all France--before the Austrians were ready, and carry the
war out of France. The Duke of Wellington proceeded to
Belgium, for the first and last time to measure his skill with
Napoleon's, and Marshal Blücher took over from Kleist the
command of the Prussians. The two armies, the Prussian and the
British, took up a line extending from Liege to the sea. The
country on this line was open along the west, affording by
nature little means of resisting an invasion, but most of the
fortresses commanding the roads had been put in a state of
moderate repair. The Prussians held the line of the Meuse and
Sambre to beyond Charleroi, the head-quarters being at Namur.
They numbered about 117,000 men ... with 312 guns. ... The
motley mass of the British and their allies numbered 106,000
men ... with 196 guns. ... So entirely ignorant were the
allies of Napoleon's movements, that on the very day on which
he burst across the frontier, Wellington wrote to the Czar,
who was at Vienna, respecting the general invasion of France.
At that time the frontier of France approached within six
miles of Charleroi (which is itself but 34 miles by the main
road from Brussels). The Charleroi road was not only the most
direct to Brussels, but was unprotected by fortresses; and the
line of the allied armies was weakest here at the point of
junction between them. ... It was against the central weak
point that Napoleon resolved to move, down the basins of the
Sambre and the Meuse. ... The mass of the troops was being
assembled within a league of the frontier, but behind some
small hills which completely screened them from the enemy's
outposts. To conceal his designs to the last moment, the line
of sentries along the frontier was tripled, and any attempt to
pass the line was forbidden under pain of death. The
arrangements were being carried out by Soult, who on the 2nd
June had been appointed chief of the staff. ... The army
concentrated on the frontier consisted (according to Colonel
Chesney) of 90,000 infantry and 22,000 cavalry--in all 112,000
men--344 guns. ... Napoleon, accompanied by his brother
Jerome, arrived in the camp, and in the evening of the 14th
his soldiers, already elated by his presence, were excited to
the highest pitch of enthusiasm by an address from Napoleon.
... A general order fixed the attack upon the allies' position
for three o'clock in the following morning (15th)." At the
appointed time "the French left was in motion, Reille
proceeding from Solre down the right bank of the Sambre. He
was soon brought into collision with the Prussian outposts
near Thuin: he drove them back and secured at ten o'clock the
bridge of Marchiennes." The movements of other corps were
delayed by various causes. Nevertheless, "of the Prussians
only Ziethen's corps, and of Wellington's army only
Perponcher's Dutch-Belgians, were as yet near the menaced
position; while 40,000 French had passed the Sambre at
Marchiennes and 70,000 more were entering Charleroi. When
Reille deployed in front of Gosselies, the Prussians called in
their detachments and retired from it, upon Fleurus, ...
leaving open the road through Quatre Bras to Brussels.
{1362}
Ney, who had just come up, then took command of the left, ...
which was now directed upon Quatre Bras; and Napoleon galloped
off to the road between Charleroi and Fleurus, where the
retiring Prussians were concentrating. ... At dark Ziethen
[with the First Prussian corps] still held Fleurus with his
advanced guard, and the wood on its south, the bulk of his
troops lay for the night upon the hill of Ligny, above the
village of Bry. His loss during the day's manœuvring has been
estimated at 2,000. On the French left, Ney... had come in
contact with the advance guard of Wellington's army, a
battalion of Nassauers and a light battery, in front of the
village of Frasnes, two miles from Quatre Bras, the name
applied to the farm-buildings at the intersection of the four
main roads,--Brussels, Nivelles, Charleroi, Namur. ... After a
few cannon-shots the outpost fell back from Frasnes to Quatre
Bras." Ney, after a reconnoissance, postponed attack until
morning. "It had been intended by Napoleon that the whole army
should have crossed the Sambre before noon; but from the
several delays ... when night fell on the 15th, half of the
cavalry of the guard, two of Grouchy's reserve divisions,
Lobau's corps, and one-half of Gérard's corps were still on
the south of the river. Apparently relying on secret
information from Paris--which contradicted the rumours that
Napoleon was about to join the army--Wellington had been
lulled into a false security, and the reports as to the
concentration had been neglected. News of the enemy's advance
across the Sambre did not reach him till three o'clock in the
afternoon of the 15th, when the Prince of Orange in person
reported the skirmish at Thuin. As he did not yet know the
point of concentration, the British general, 'never
precipitate or nervous' (Hooper), merely issued orders for all
the troops to be in readiness. ... At night intelligence was
received from Mons that the French concentration was at
Charleroi, and orders were issued for the immediate movement
of the troops. ... Wellington and the Prince of Orange, with
several of the staff' officers, went--it is said, to prevent a
panic in Brussels--to the Duchess of Richmond's ball, where
'Belgium's capital had gathered then her beauty and her
chivalry,' and, 'while all went merry as a marriage bell,' the
staff officers stole away one by one. The Duke himself,
'throwing away golden minutes' (Hamley), as if to show his
confidence in his fortunes, remained to a late hour to return
thanks after supper for the health of the Prince Regent of
Great Britain, which the Prince of Orange proposed. ...
Blücher had received, at his head-quarters at Namur, news on
the morning of the 14th of the French concentration, and he
had ordered forward the corps of Pirch and Thielemann. ...
Napoleon did not foresee Blücher's promptitude, and nothing
was done in the early morning of the 16th to proceed with the
execution of the intended surprise. . . .... No orders were
issued by the Emperor till eight, when Napoleon's resolution
was taken,--to strike at the Prussians, who would, he
believed, if defeated, retire upon their natural base of
communications, through Namur and Liege, and he would thus be
left to deal separately with the British, who could not move
from their base, the sea. The French army was to advance in
two wings, the left under Ney, the right under Grouchy, with
the reserve under the Emperor himself. Ney was to capture
Quatre Bras, reconnoitre the Brussels road, and hold himself
in readiness to march to Brussels, which Napoleon hoped to be
able to enter the following morning. ... Napoleon had 64,000
men to attack the position at Ligny; Ney on the left wing had
45,000 for Quatre Bras; Lobau had 10,000 to support either
wing of the Grand Army; 5,000 troops were in the rear; and the
victorious wing, whether Ney's or Grouchy's, was to wheel
round and manœuvre in the direction of the other. Thielemann
having come up before the French delivered their attack,
Blücher had 85,000 men on the field. Wellington arrived at
Quatre Bras (which is 20 miles from Brussels) at 11 o'clock in
the forenoon. As Marshal Ney gave no sign of an imminent
attack, Wellington galloped over, about seven miles, to confer
with Blücher. ... Wellington, after some discussion, in which
he expressed his disapproval of Blücher's position, agreed to
move to the rear of the Prussians, to act as a reserve, if his
own position at Quatre Bras were not attacked. ... He reached
Quatre Bras when his own position was being assailed, and no
help could be sent to Blücher. ... At about three o'clock,
when the heavy cannonade a few miles to the west intimated
that a desperate battle was in progress at Quatre Bras, the
signal for attack [on the Prussians, at Ligny] was given. The
French left sped forward with impetuosity; the resistance was
vigorous but futile, and the enemy streamed through the
village. Blücher immediately moved forward fresh troops and
re-took the village, but was unable to retain it. ... Thrice
the Grenadiers forced their way into and through the village,
but only to be driven back again." But "Blücher gradually
exhausted his reserves, and when, in the dusk, Napoleon saw
the last battalion moved forward and the ground behind Ligny
vacant, he exclaimed, 'they are lost!' The Guards and the
Cuirassiers were immediately ordered to attack," and the
wearied Prussian infantry were broken by their onset. "The
fugitives led precipitately over the fields and along the
roads to the east, and the order for the whole to retire was
immediately given. ... Blücher himself gathered a few of his
squadrons to check the hot pursuit near Sombreffe, and thrice
led them to the charge. His squadrons were broken, and after
the last charge his horse fell dead, and the veteran marshal
lay under it. His aid-de-camp, Nostitz, stood by him, and
covered him with a cloak; the Cuirassiers galloped past
without noticing him. ... Gneisenau, who took temporary
command from the accident to Blücher, ordered a retreat upon
Wavre, with the view of joining Bülow's corps and keeping open
the communications with Wellington. ... The loss on each side
has been very variously estimated. Napoleon put his own loss
at 7,000 men, Charras puts it at 11,000, and the loss of the
Prussians at 18,000. The retreat upon Wavre abandoned the
communications with Namur and Liege, through which the
Prussian supplies came from the lower Rhine, for a new line by
Louvain, but it kept the Prussians on a line parallel to the
road on which Wellington must retreat, and thus still enabled
the two armies to aid each other. 'This noble daring at once
snatched from Napoleon the hoped-for fruits of his victory,
and the danger Ligny had for a few hours averted was left
impending over him' (Chesney)."

_H. R. Clinton,
The War in the Peninsula and Wellington's Campaigns
in France and Belgium, chapter 12._

{1363}

On Wellington's return to Quatre Bras from his interview with
Blücher, he found, as stated above, that the Prince of Orange
had already became desperately engaged with the superior
forces of Ney. "The Duke's presence gave new life to the
battle, and when Picton's division, followed by the
Brunswickers and Van Merle's Belgian horse, arrived, he took
the offensive, pushing forward right up to the edge of the
farm of Gemioncourt. Ney, reinforced by the rest of Reille's
corps and part of Kellerman's cavalry, violently retorted, and
in the charge, which partially broke into spray before the
squares, Wellington ran the risk of death or capture. But he
leaped his horse over the 92d Highlanders lining the ditch on
the Namur road, while his gallant pursuers, cut up by the
infantry fire, were killed or driven off. Ney was further
reinforced by more guns and cavalry, and Wellington's brigades
continued to arrive in parcels. The Marshal was always
superior in horsemen and cannon, but after 5 o'clock his
opponent had larger numbers of foot. Holding firmly to the
cross-roads and, the highway to Namur, Wellington became the
stronger as the day waned; and when the Guards emerged from
the Nivelles road and the Allies pressed forward, Ney, who had
no fresh troops, was driven back, and his antagonist remained
at sundown master of the whole field of battle. The position
was maintained, but the cost was great, for there were no
fewer than 4,600 killed and wounded, more than half being
British soldiers. The thunder of cannon to the eastward had
also died away, but none knew as yet at Quatre Bras how
Blücher had fared at the hands of his redoubtable foe.
Wellington, who slept at his head-quarters in Genappe, was on
the field and scrutinising his outposts at daybreak an the
17th. Soon after came a report, confirmed a little later, that
the Prussians had retreated on Wavre. ... Napoleon had a
belief that Blücher would retreat upon Liège, which caused him
at a late hour in the day to despatch Grouchy to that side,
and thus touch was lost. While the French were cooking and
Napoleon was pondering, definite intelligence was brought to
Wellington, who, learning for certain that Blücher was at
Wavre, promised to stand fast himself at Mont St. Jean and
fight, if Blücher would support him with two corps. The
intrepid Marshal replied that he would came with his whole
army, and Wellington got the famous answer before night. Thus
was made, between generals who thoroughly trusted each other,
that combination which led to the Battle of Waterloo. It was
no chance combat, but the result of a deliberate design,
rendered capable of execution, even when Blücher was wounded,
by his resolve to retreat upon Wavre, and by Napoleon, who
acted on conjecture that the Prussians would hurry towards
their base at Liege. The morning at Quatre Bras was peaceful;
the Allies cooked their food before starting rearward.
Wellington, it is said, lay down for a moment, and snatched
perhaps a little sleep. There was no stir in front or on the
exposed left flank; and, covered by a strong display of
horsemen, the Allied divisions tramped steadily towards Mont
St. Jean. ... The retreat continued all day. A thunderstorm,
so often a precursor of Wellington's battles, deluged the
fields with rain, and pursuer and pursued struggling through
the mire, were drenched to the skin by nightfall. ... The
results of two days' warfare may be thus summed up. Napoleon
had inflicted a defeat, yet not a decisive defeat, upon the
Prussians, who escaped from his ken to Wavre. He had then, at
a late hour on the 17th, detached Grouchy with 33,000 men to
follow them, and Grouchy at night from Gembloux reported that
they had retired in three directions. Moving himself in the
afternoon, Napoleon, uniting with Ney, had pursued Wellington
to Mont St. Jean, and slept in the comfortable belief that he
had separated the Allies. At that very time Wellington, who
had assembled his whole force except 17,000 men, ... was in
close communication with Blücher, and intended on the 18th to
stop Napoleon by delivering battle, and to hold him fast until
Blücher could cut in on his right flank and rear. Thus it was
the Allies who were united practically, and the French army
which was separated into two groups unable to support each
other. ... The tempest which burst over the retreating columns
on the 17th followed them to their bivouacs and raged all
night, and did not cease until late on the fateful Sunday.
Wellington, mounting his faithful Copenhagen at break of day,
rode from the village of Waterloo to the field, where the
armies on both sides, protected by watchful sentries, were
still contending with the mischiefs inflicted by the storm.
The position was the crest of a gentle slope stretching from
Smohain to the Nivelles road, having upon and in advance of
its right the château, garden, and wood of Hougoumont, and in
the centre, where the Charleroi road cut through the little
ridge, the farm of La Haye Sainte. Both these posts were
occupied, but the latter, unfortunately, not so solidly as
Hougoumont. ... The position was well filled by the 69,000 men
of all arms and 156 guns which were present that day.
Napoleon, who slept at the farm of Caillou, and who had been
out on foot to the front during the night, was also early in
the field, and glad of the gift which he thought fortune had
placed in his hands. When Reille had joined him from Genappe,
he had 72,000 men, all admirable soldiers, and 240 guns, with
which to engage in combat, and he reckoned that the chances
were ninety to ten in his favour. He mounted his charger,
reconnoitred his opponent's position, and then gave the orders
which, promptly and finely obeyed, disclosed the French array.
... It was now nearly eleven o'clock, and, although his
opponent knew it not, Wellington had got news of the march
from Wavre of Bulow, whose leading troops were actually, at
that time, close to the wood of St. Lambert on the French
right; while Grouchy was at Sart les Walhain, between Gembloux
and Wavre. It is not practicable here to give a full account of
the battle of Waterloo; we can only describe its broad
outlines. The first gun was fired about twenty or thirty
minutes past eleven, and preluded a dashing and sustained
attack an Hougoumont, which failed to carry the house, garden,
or orchard, but did gain the wood. It was probably intended to
divert attention from the attack on the left and centre, which
Ney, massing his guns opposite the British left, was preparing
to execute. Wellington watched and in some measure controlled
the fight for Hougoumont, and then rode off to the centre,
taking post at a solitary tree which grew near the Charleroi
road above La Haye Sainte.
{1364}
Ney at half past one sent forward the whole of D'Erlon's
corps, and although some of them pushed close up to and over
the Wavre road, stormed the orchard of La Haye Sainte and took
the Pappelotte farm, yet at the critical moment Sir William
Ponsonby's Union Brigade of horse charged into the French
infantry, already shattered by the fire of Picton's troops,
and the net result of the combined operation was that two
eagles and 3,000 prisoners were captured, while nearly that
number of killed and wounded remained on the ground. On the
other side of La Haye Sainte the Household Brigade, led by
Lord Anglesea in person, charged in upon and routed a large
body of French cuirassiers. The grand attack thus completely
failed, and the centre, like the right, remained intact. It
was just before this combat began that Napoleon saw something
like troops towards St. Lambert and despatched two brigades of
light cavalry to reconnoitre. A Prussian staff officer was
caught beyond Planchenoit, and from him came the unexpected
and unwelcome information that the whole Prussian army was
approaching. ... The signs of danger on his right flank, the
punishment of D'Erlon's corps, the ineffectual attempt upon
the British Guards in and about Hougoumont, were followed by a
kind of pause and the combat reverted to cannonading and
skirmishing. But towards four o'clock Napoleon, increasing the
fire of his artillery, threw forward a mass of cavalry, forty
squadrons, and then began that series of reiterated onsets of
horse which lasted for two hours. ... Twice they were driven
down the slope, and the third time, when they came on, they
were strengthened by Kellerman and Guyot until they reached a
force of 77 squadrons, or 12,000 men; but these also were
repulsed, the British horse, what remained of them, charging
when the French were entangled among the squares and
disordered by the musketry and guns. Four times these fine
troopers charged, yet utterly failed to penetrate or move a
single foot battalion. But some time before the final effort,
Ney by a fierce attack got possession of La Haye Sainte, and
thus, just as the cavalry were exhausted, the French infantry
were established within sixty yards of the Allied centre. And
although the Emperor was obliged to detach one-half of his
Guard to the right, because Blucher had brought into play
beyond Planchenoit against Lobau nearly 80,000 men, still the
capture of La Haye Sainte was justly regarded as a grave
event. Wellington during the cavalry fight had moved three
brigades on his right nearer to Hougoumont, and had called up
Chassé and his Belgians to support them; and it was a little
before this time that he cried out to Brigadier-General Adam,
'By G--, Adam, I think we shall beat them yet! ... The crisis
of the battle had come for Napoleon. Unable after eight hours'
conflict to do more than capture La Haye Sainte; hardly
pressed by the Prussians, now strong and aggressive; owing
such success as he had obtained to the valour and discipline
of his soldiers--the Emperor delivered his last stroke, not
for victory--he could no longer hope to win--but for safety.
He sent forward the last ten battalions of his Guard to assail
the British right, and directed the whole remaining infantry
force available to attack all along the line. The Guard
marched onward in two columns, which came successively in
contact with their opponents. Napier's guns and the British
Guards, who rising from the ground showed across the head of
the first column, fired heavily and charging drove them in
confusion back towards La Belle Alliance; and the second
column, struck in flank by the musketry of the 52nd and 95th
was next broken by a bayonet charge and pursued by Colonel
Colborne to and beyond the Charleroi road. As Ziethen's
Prussians were falling upon the French near Pappelotte, and
Pirch and Bulow wrestling with the Imperial Guard in
Planchenoit, Wellington ordered the whole of the British line
to advance. The cheers arising on the right where he was,
extended along the front and gave new strength to the wearied
soldiers. He led the way. As he neared the Charleroi road, the
riflemen, full of Peninsular memories, began to cheer him as
he galloped up, but he called out, 'No cheering, my lads;
forward and complete your victory.' He found that good
soldier, Colborne, halted for a moment before three squares of
the rallied Imperial Guard. 'Go on, Colborne,' he said;
'better attack them, they won't stand.' Nor did they.
Wellington then turned to the right, where Vivian's Light
Cavalry were active in the gloom, and we next find him once
more with the 52nd near Rossomme, the farthest point of the
advance, where that regiment halted after its grand march over
the battlefield. Somewhere on the highway he met Blucher, who had
so nobly kept his word, and it was then that Gneisenau
undertook to chase the fugitives over the frontier. The
French, or perhaps we should say the Napoleonic army, was
destroyed, and the power which its mighty leader had built up
on the basis of its astonishing successes was gone for ever."

_G. Hooper,
Wellington,
chapter 9._

ALSO IN:
_D. Gardner,
Quatre Bras, Ligny, and Waterloo._

_Lieutenant Colonel C. C. Chesney,
Waterloo Lectures._

_W. Siborne,
History of the War in France and Belgium in 1819._

_General Sir J. S. Kennedy,
Notes on the Battle of Waterloo._

_W. H. Maxwell,
Life of Wellington,
volume 8, chapters 28-32._

_G. R. Gleig,
Story of the Battle of Waterloo._

_W. O'C. Morris,
Great Commanders of Modern Times,
and the Campaign of 1815._

FRANCE: A. D. 1815 (June-August).
Napoleon's return to Paris.
His final abdication.
His surrender of himself to the English.
His captivity at St. Helena.

"The vanquished army had lost 200 pieces of ordnance, and
80,000 men hors de combat or prisoners; as many more remained,
independently of Grouchy's 85,000 men; but the difficulty was
to rally them in presence of an enemy, that had taken lessons
in audacity and activity from Napoleon himself. The loss of
the allies was not less considerable, but there remained to
them 150,000 men, the confidence of victory, and the certainty
of being seconded by 300,000 allies, who were crossing the
Rhine from Mentz to Bäle. Such was the issue of this struggle,
commenced under such happy auspices, and which resulted more
fatal to France than the battles of Poitiers and Azincourt. It
must be admitted, that this disaster was the work of a
multitude of unheard-of circumstances: if Napoleon can be
reproached for certain faults, it must be allowed that fortune
dealt cruelly with him in the lesser details, and that his
enemies, in return, were as fortunate as they showed
themselves skillful.
{1365}
However unjust be the spirit of party, we are forced to render
homage to the merits of two generals, who, unexpectedly
attacked in their cantonments extending from Dinant and Liège
to Renaix, near Tournay, had taken such wise measures as to be
in condition next morning for giving battle to equal forces,
and for afterwards conquering by an able concentration of the
two armies. ... In the very battle of Waterloo, the French
might be censured for having attempted the first attack in
masses too deep. This system was never successful against the
murderous fire of English infantry and artillery. ... There
were likewise extraordinary charges of cavalry, which, being
devoid of support, became heroic but useless struggles.
Notwithstanding all this, it is almost certain that Napoleon
would have remained master of the field of battle, but for the
arrival of 65,000 Prussians on his rear; a decisive and
disastrous circumstance, that to prevent was not entirely in
his power. As soon as the enemy led 130,000 men on the
battle-field, with scarcely 50,000 to oppose them, all was
lost. ... Napoleon had but one course left him, which was to
direct Grouchy through the Ardennes on Laon; to collect at
this point all that could be drawn from the interior, from
Metz and from Rapp's corps, leaving but garrisons in Lorraine
and Alsace. The imperial cause was very much shaken, put not
entirely lost; should all Frenchmen determine on opposing
Europe with the courage of the Spartans of Leonidas, the
energy of the Russians in 1812, or of the Spaniards of
Palafox. Unfortunately for them, as·for Napoleon, opinion was
very much divided on this subject, and the majority still
believing that the struggle interested only the power of the
emperor and his family, the fate of the country seemed of
little consequence. Prince Jerome had collected 25,000 men in
rear of Avesnes: he was ordered to lead them to Laon; there
remained 200 pieces of artillery, beside those of Grouchy. ...
Reaching Loon on the 19th, where he had at first resolved to
await the junction of Grouchy and Jerome, the emperor
discussed, with the small number of the trustworthy who had
followed him, the course he should adopt after this frightful
disaster. Should he repair to Paris, and concert with the
chambers and his ministers, or else remain with the army,
demanding of the chambers to invest him with dictatorial power
and an unlimited confidence, under the conviction that he
would obtain from them the most energetic measures, for saving
France and conquering her independence, on heaps of ruins? As
it always happens, his generals were divided in opinion; some
wished him to proceed to Paris, and deposit the crown into the
hands of the nation's delegates, or receive it from them a
second time, with the means of defending it. Others, with a
better appreciation of the views of the deputies, affirmed,
that far from sympathizing with Napoleon, and seconding him,
they would accuse him of having lost France, and would
endeavor to save the country by losing the emperor. ...
Lastly, the most prudent thought that Napoleon should not go
to Paris, but remain at the head of the army, in order to
treat with the sovereigns himself, by offering to abdicate in
favor of his son. It is said, that Napoleon inclined to the
idea of remaining at Laon with the army; but the advice of the
greatest number determined him, and he departed for Paris."

_Baron de Jomini,
History of the Campaign of Waterloo,
pages 184-189._

"It was a moment of unrelieved despair for the public men who
gathered round him on his return to Paris, and among these
were several whose fame was of earlier date than his own. La
Fayette, the man of 1789; Carnot, organizer of victory to the
Convention; Lucien, who had decided the revolution of
Brumaire,--all these met in that comfortless deliberation.
Carnot was for a dictatorship of public safety, that is, for
renewing his great days of 1793; Lucien too liked the Roman
sound of the word dictator. 'Dare!' he said to his brother,
but the spring of that terrible will was broken at last. 'I
have dared too much already;' said Napoleon. Meanwhile, in the
Chamber of Representatives the, word was not dictatorship but
liberty. Here La Fayette caused the assembly to vote itself
permanent, and to declare guilty of high treason whoever
should attempt to dissolve it. He hinted that, if the word
abdication were not soon pronounced on the other side, he
would himself pronounce the word 'dechéance.' The second
abdication took place on June 22d. 'I offer myself a sacrifice
to the hatred of the enemies of France. My public life is
finished, and I proclaim my son, under the title of Napoleon
II., Emperor of the French.' On the 25th he retired to
Malmaison, where Josephine had died the year before. He had by
no means yet ceased to hope. When his son was passed over by
the Chamber of Representatives, who named an executive
commission of five, he protested that he had not intended to
make way for a new Directory. ... On the 27th he went so far
as to offer his services once more as general, 'regarding
myself still as the first soldier of the nation;' He was met
by a refusal, and left Malmaison on the 29th for Rochefort,
well furnished with books on the United States. France was by
this time entering upon another Reign of Terror. Massacre had
begun at Marseilles as early as the 25th. What should Napoleon
do? He had been formerly the enemy of every other nation, and
now he was the worst enemy, if not of France, yet of the
triumphant faction in France. He lingered some days at
Rochefort, where he had arrived on July 3d, and then, finding
it impossible to escape the vigilance of the English cruisers,
went on the 15th on board the 'Bellerophon' and surrendered
himself to Captain Maitland. It was explained to him that no
conditions could be accepted, but that he would be 'conveyed
to England to be received in such manner as the Prince Regent
should deem expedient:' He had written at the Île d'Aix the
following characteristic letter to the Prince Regent:--'Royal
Highness,--A prey to the factions which divide my country and
to the enmity of the powers of Europe, I have terminated my
public career, and I come, like Themistocles, to seat myself
at the hearth of the British people. I place myself under the
protection of its laws, which I claim from your Royal Highness
as the most powerful, the most constant, and the most generous
of my enemies.' It was perhaps the only course open to him. In
France his life could scarcely have been spared, and Blücher
talked of executing him on the spot where the Duc d'Enghien
had fallen. He therefore could do nothing but what he did. His
reference to Themistocles shows that he was conscious of
being the worst enemy that England had ever had.
{1366}
Perhaps he remembered that at the rupture of the treaty of
Amiens he had studied to envenom the contest by detaining the
English residents in France. Still he might reflect, on the
other hand, that England was the only great country which had
not been trampled down and covered with massacre by his
soldiers. It would have been inexcusable if the English
Government had given way to vindictive feelings, especially as
they could well afford to be magnanimous, having just won the
greatest of all victories. But it was necessary to deprive him
of the power of exciting new wars, and the experiment of Elba
had shown that this involved depriving him of his liberty. The
frenzy which had cost·the lives of millions must be checked. This
was the principle laid down in the declaration of March 15th,
by which he had been excommunicated as a public enemy. It was
therefore necessary to impose some restraint upon him. He must
be separated from his party and from all the revolutionary
party in Europe. So long as he remained in Europe this would
involve positive imprisonment. The only arrangement therefore
which would allow him tolerable personal comfort and enjoyment
of life, was to send him out of Europe. From these
considerations grew the decision of the Government to send him
to St. Helena. An Act of Parliament was passed 'for the better
detaining in custody Napoleon Bonaparte,' and another Act for
subjecting St. Helena to a special system of government. He
was kept on board the 'Bellerophon' till August 4th, when he
was transferred to the 'Northumberland.' On October 15th he
arrived at St. Helena, accompanied by Counts Montholon, Las
Cases, and Bertrand, with their families, General Gourgaud,
and a number of servants. In April, 1816, arrived Sir Hudson
Lowe, an officer who had been knighted for bringing the news
of the capture of Paris in 1814, as governor. The rest of his
life, which continued till May 5, 1821, was occupied partly in
quarrels with this governor, which have now lost their
interest, partly in the task he had undertaken at the time of
his first abdication, that of relating his past life. He did
not himself write this narrative, nor does it appear that he
even dictated it word for word. It is a report made partly by
General Gourgaud, partly by Count Montholon, of Napoleon's
impassioned recitals; but they assure us that this report, as
published, has been read and corrected throughout by him. It
gives a tolerably complete account of the period between the
siege of Toulon and the battle of Marengo. On the later period
there is little, except a memoir on the campaign of 1815, to
which the editors of the Correspondence have been able to add
another on Elba and the Hundred Days."

_J. R. Seeley,
Short History of Napoleon I.,
chapter 6, section 5._

ALSO IN:
_Count de Las Cases,
Life, Exile and Conversations of Napoleon._

_General Count Montholon,
History of the Captivity of Napoleon._

_W. Forsyth,
History of the Captivity of Napoleon._

_B. E. O'Meara,
Napoleon in Exile._

_Sir W. Scott,
Life of Napoleon,
volume 2, chapters 49-56._

_A. Thiers,
History of the Consulate and the Empire,
chapters 61-62 (volume 5)._

FRANCE: A. D. 1815 (July-November).
English and Prussian armies in Paris.
Return of Louis XVIII.
Restoration of the art-spoils or Napoleon.
Indemnities demanded.
Russian, Austrian and Spanish armies on French soil.
The second Treaty or Paris.

"The 7th of July was the proudest day in the annals of
England. On that day her victorious army, beaded by
Wellington, made their public entry, along with the Prussians,
into Paris, where an English drum had not been heard for
nearly four hundred years. ... The French regarded them with
melancholy hearts and anxious looks. Few persons were to be
seen in the streets. ... The English established themselves in
the Bois de Boulogne in a regular camp; the Prussians
bivouacked in the churches, on the quays, and in the principal
streets. On the following day Louis, who had followed in the
rear of the English army from Ghent, made his public entrance,
escorted by the national guard. But his entry was attended by
still more melancholy circumstances, and of sinister augury to
the future stability of his dynasty. Even the royalists were
downcast; their patriotic feelings were deeply wounded by the
defeat of France. ... There was something in the restoration
of the monarch by the arms of the old rivals and enemies of
France which added inexpressibly to its bitterness. ... The
reality of subjugation was before their eyes. Blucher kept
aloof from all intercourse with the court, and haughtily
demanded a contribution of 100,000,000 francs ... for the pay
of his troops, as Napoleon had done from the Prussians at
Berlin. Already the Prussian soldiers insisted with loud cries
that the pillar of Austerlitz should be pulled down, as
Napoleon had destroyed the pillar of Rosbach; and Blucher was
so resolute to destroy the bridge of Jena, that he had
actually begun operations by running mines under the arches
for blowing it up. ... Wellington as steadily resisted the
ruthless act, but he had great difficulty in maintaining his
point; and it was only by his placing a sentinel on the
bridge, and repeated and earnest remonstrances, that the
destruction of that beautiful monument was prevented. ... A
still more melancholy humiliation than they had yet
experienced ere long befell the French nation. The Allied
sovereigns now arrived in Paris, and insisted upon the
restoration of the objects of art in the museum of the Louvre,
which had been pillaged from their respective states by the
orders of Napoleon. The justice of this demand could not be
contested: it was only wresting the prey from the robber. ...
Nothing wounded the French so profoundly as this breaking up
of the trophies of the war. It told them, in language not to
be misunderstood, that conquest had now reached their doors:
the iron went into the soul of the nation. A memorial from all
the artists of Europe at Rome claimed for the Eternal City the
entire restoration of the immortal works of art which had once
adorned it. The Allied sovereigns acceded to the just demand;
and Canova, impassioned for the arts and the city of his
choice, hastened to Paris to superintend the removal. It was
most effectually done. The bronze horses ... [from Venice]
were restored to their old station in front of the Church of
St. Mark. The Transfiguration and the Last Communion of St.
Jerome resumed their place in the halls of the Vatican; the
Apollo and the Laocoon again adorned the precincts of St.
Peter's; the Venus was enshrined anew amidst beauty in the
Tribune of Florence; and the Descent from the Cross by Rubens
was restored to the devout worship of the Flemings in the
cathedral of Antwerp. ...
{1367}
The claims preferred by the different Allied powers for
restitution not merely of celebrated objects of art, but of
curiosities and valuable articles of all kinds, which had been
carried off by the French during their occupation of the
different countries of Europe, especially under Napoleon, were
immense, and demonstrated at once the almost incredible length
to which the system of spoliation and robbery had been carried
by the republican and imperial authorities. Their amount may
be estimated by one instance from an official list, prepared
by the Prussian authorities in 1815, It appears that, during
the years 1806 and 1807, there had been violently taken from
the Prussian states, on the requisition of M. Donore, and
brought to Paris,--statues, paintings, antiquities, cameos,
manuscripts, maps, gems, antiques, rarities, and other
valuable articles, the catalogue of which occupies 53 closely
printed pages of M. Schoell's valuable Recueil. Among them are
127 paintings, many of them of the very highest value, taken from
the palaces of Berlin and Potsdam alone; 187 statues, chiefly
antique, taken from the same palaces during the same period;
and 86 valuable manuscripts and documents seized in the city
of Aix-la-Chapelle, on the occupation of that city, then a
neutral power, in 1803, by the armies of the First Consul on
the invasion of Hanover. The total articles reclaimed by the
Prussians exceeded two thousand. ... The claims of states and
cities for indemnity on account of' the enormous exactions
made from them by the French generals, under the authority of
the Convention and the Emperor, were still more extraordinary.
... The vast amount of these claims for indemnities in money
or territories, and the angry feelings with which they were
urged, were of sinister augury to the French nation, and
augmented, in a most serious degree, the difficulties
experienced by those who were intrusted with the conduct of
the negotiations. But, be they what they may, the French had
no means of resisting them; all they could trust to was the
moderation or jealousies of their conquerors. The force which,
during the months of July and August, advanced from all
quarters into their devoted territory, was immense, and such
as demonstrated that, if Napoleon had not succeeded in
dissolving the alliance by an early victory in the
Netherlands, the contest, even without the battle of Waterloo,
would have been hopeless. The united armies of Russians and
Austrians, 350,000 strong, under Schwartzenberg and Barclay de
Tolly, crossed the Rhine in various places from Bâle to
Coblentz, and, pressing rapidly forward, soon occupied the
whole eastern provinces of France. The Austrians and
Piedmontese, a hundred thousand more; passed Mont Cenis, or
descended the Rhone, from Geneva to Lyons. The Spaniards made
their appearance in Bearn or Roussillon. The armies of Blucher
and Wellington, now reinforced to 200,000 effective men,
occupied Paris, its environs, Normandy, and Picardy. Eighty
thousand Prussians and Germans, in addition, were advancing
through the Rhenish provinces and Belgium. Before the Allied
sovereigns returned to Paris, in the middle of July, the
French territory was occupied by 800,000 men, to oppose which
no considerable force remained but the army beyond the Loire,
which mustered 65,000 combatants. ... Austria insisted upon
getting back Lorraine and Alsace; Spain put in a claim to the
Basque provinces; Prussia alleged that her security would be
incomplete unless Mayence, Luxembourg, and all the frontier
provinces of France adjoining her territory, were ceded to
her; and the King of the Netherlands claimed the whole of the
French fortresses of the Flemish barrier. The monarchy of
Louis seemed on the eve of dissolution; and so complete was
the prostration of the vanquished, that there appeared no
power capable of preventing it. It was with no small
difficulty, and more from the mutual jealousies of the
different powers than any other cause, that these natural
reprisals for French rapacity were prevented from taking
place. The negotiation was protracted at Paris till late in
autumn; Russia, which had nothing to gain by the proposed
partition, took part with France throughout its whole
continuance; and the different powers, to support their
pretensions in this debate, maintained their armies, who had
entered on all sides, on the French soil; so that above
800,000 foreign troops were quartered on its inhabitants for
several months. At length, however, by the persevering efforts
of Lord Castlereagh, M. Nesselrode, and M. Talleyrand, all
difficulties were adjusted, and the second treaty of Paris was
concluded in November 1815, between France and the whole
Allied powers. By this treaty, and the relative conventions
which were signed the same day, conditions of a very onerous
kind were imposed upon the restored government. The French
frontier was restored to the state in which it stood in 1790,
by which means the whole of the territory, far from
inconsiderable, gained by the treaty of 1814, was resumed by
the Allies. In consequence of this, France lost the fortresses
of Landau, Sarre-Louis, Philipville, and Marienburg, with the
adjacent territory of each. Versoix, with a small district
round it, was ceded to the canton of Geneva; the fortress of
Huningen was to be demolished; but the little country of the
Venaisin, the first conquest of the Revolution, was preserved
to France. Seven hundred millions of francs (£28,000,000
sterling) were to be paid to the Allied powers for the
expenses of the war; in addition to which it was stipulated
that an army of 150,000 men, composed of 80,000 from each of
the great powers of England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, and
the lesser powers of Germany, was to occupy, for a period not
less than three, or more than five years, the whole frontier
fortresses of France; ... and this large force was to be
maintained entirely at the expense of the French government.
In addition to this, the different powers obtained indemnities
for the spoliations inflicted on them by France during the
Revolution, which amounted to the enormous sum of 735,000,000
of francs more (£29,400,000 sterling). A hundred millions of
francs were also provided to the smaller powers as an
indemnity for the expenses of the war; so that the total sums
which France had to pay, besides maintaining the army of
occupation, amounted to no less than fifteen hundred and
thirty-five millions of francs, or £61,400,000 sterling. ...
Great Britain, in a worthy spirit, surrendered the whole sum
falling to her out of the indemnity for the war, amounting to
nearly £5,000,000 sterling, to the King of the Netherlands, to
restore the famous barrier against France which Joseph II. had
so insanely demolished."

_Sir A. Alison,
History of Europe, 1789-1815,
chapter 95 (volume 20)._

ALSO IN:
_Prince de Talleyrand,
Memoirs,
part 9 (volume 8)._

_E. Hertslet,
The Map of Europe by Treaty,
Number 40 (volume 1)._

{1368}

FRANCE: A. D. 1815 (September).
The Holy Alliance.

See HOLY ALLIANCE.

FRANCE: A. D. 1815-1830.
The restored monarchy.
Louis XVIII. and Charles X.
Career of the Reactionaries.
Conquest of Algiers.
Ordinances of July.
Revolution.
Abdication and exile of the king.