Chapter IV: , VII (91)

"The object at which all French politicians had aimed since
the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, the exclusion of both
Austria and Prussia from influence in Western Germany, was now
completely attained. The triumph of French statesmanship, the
consummation of two centuries of German discord, was seen in
the Act of Federation subscribed by the Western German
Sovereigns in the summer of 1806. By this Act the Kings of
Bavaria and Würtemberg, the Elector of Baden, and 13 minor
princes, united themselves, in the League known as the Rhenish
Confederacy, under the protection of the French Emperor, and
undertook to furnish contingents, amounting to 63,000 men, in
all wars in which the French Empire should engage. Their
connection with the ancient Germanic Body was completely
severed; the very town in which the Diet of the Empire had
held its meetings was annexed by one of the members of the
Confederacy. The Confederacy itself, with a population of
8,000,000, became for all purposes of war and foreign policy a
part of France. Its armies were organised by French officers;
its frontiers were fortified by French engineers; its treaties
were made for it at Paris. In the domestic changes which took
place within these States the work of consolidation begun in
1801 was carried forward with increased vigour. Scores of tiny
principalities which had escaped dissolution in the earlier
movement were now absorbed by their stronger neighbours. ...
{1508}
With the establishment of the Rhenish Confederacy and the
conquest of Naples, Napoleon's empire reached, but did not
overpass, the limits within which the sovereignty of France
might probably have been long maintained. ... If we may judge
from the feeling with which Napoleon was regarded in Germany
down to the middle of the year 1806, and in Italy down to a
much later date, the Empire then founded might have been
permanently upheld, if Napoleon had abstained from attacking
other States." During the winter of 1806, Count Haugwitz, the
Prussian minister, had visited Paris "for the purpose of
obtaining some modification in the treaty which he had signed
[at the palace of Schönbrunn, near Vienna] on behalf of
Prussia after the battle of Austerlitz. The principal feature
in that treaty had been the grant of Hanover to Prussia by the
French Emperor in return for its alliance. This was the point
which above all others excited King Frederick William's fears
and scruples; He desired to acquire Hanover, but he also
desired to derive his title rather from its English owner
[King George III., who was also Elector of Hanover] than from
its French invader. It was the object of Haugwitz' visit to
Paris to obtain an alteration in the terms of the treaty which
should make the Prussian occupation of Hanover appear to be
merely provisional, and reserve to the King of England at
least a nominal voice in its ultimate transfer. In full
confidence that Napoleon would agree to such a change, the
King of Prussia, on taking possession of Hanover in January,
1806, concealed the fact of its cession to himself by
Napoleon, and published an untruthful proclamation. ... The
bitter truth that the treaty between France and Prussia
contained no single word reserving the rights of the Elector,
and that the very idea of qualifying the absolute cession of
Hanover was an afterthought, lay hidden in the conscience of
the Prussian Government. Never had a Government more
completely placed itself at the mercy of a pitiless enemy.
Count Haugwitz, on reaching Paris, was received by Napoleon
with a storm of indignation and contempt. Napoleon declared
that the ill-faith of Prussia had made an end even of that
miserable pact which had been extorted after Austerlitz, and
insisted that Prussia should openly defy Great Britain by
closing the ports of Northern Germany to British vessels, and
by declaring itself endowed by Napoleon with Hanover in virtue
of Napoleon's own right of conquest. Haugwitz signed a second
and more humiliating treaty [February 15] embodying these
conditions; and the Prussian Government, now brought into the
depths of contempt, but unready for immediate war, executed
the orders of its master. ... A decree was published excluding
the ships of England from the ports of Prussia and from those
of Hanover itself (March 28, 1806). It was promptly followed
by the seizure of 400 Prussian vessels in British harbours,
and by the total extinction of Prussian maritime commerce by
British privateers. Scarcely was Prussia committed to this
ruinous conflict with Great Britain when Napoleon opened
negotiations for peace with Mr. Fox's Government. The first
condition required by Great Britain was the restitution of
Hanover to King George III. It was unhesitatingly granted by
Napoleon. Thus was Prussia to be mocked of its prey, after it
had been robbed of all its honour. ... There was scarcely a
courtier in Berlin who did not feel that the yoke of the
French had become past endurance; even Haugwitz himself now
considered war as a question of time. The patriotic party in
the capital and the younger officers of the army bitterly
denounced the dishonoured Government, and urged the King to
strike for the credit of his country. ... Brunswick was
summoned to the King's council to form plans of a campaign;
and appeals for help were sent to Vienna, to St. Petersburg,
and even to the hostile Court of London. The condition of
Prussia at this critical moment was one which filled with the
deepest alarm those few patriotic statesmen who were not
blinded by national vanity or by a slavery to routine. ...
Early in the year 1806 a paper was drawn up by Stein,
exposing, in language seldom used by a statesman, the
character of the men by whom Frederick William was surrounded,
and declaring that nothing but a speedy change of system could
save the Prussian State from utter downfall and ruin. Two
measures of immediate necessity were specified by Stein, the
establishment of a responsible council of Ministers, and the
removal of Haugwitz and all his friends from power. ... The
army of Prussia ... was nothing but the army of Frederick the
Great grown twenty years older. ... All Southern Germany was
still in Napoleon's hands. The appearance of a Russian force
in Dalmatia, after that country had been ceded by Austria to
the French Emperor, had given Napoleon an excuse for
maintaining his troops in their positions beyond the Rhine. As
the probability of a war with Prussia became greater and greater,
Napoleon tightened his grasp upon the Confederate States.
Publications originating among the patriotic circles of
Austria were beginning to appeal to the German people to unite
against a foreign oppressor. An anonymous pamphlet, entitled
'Germany in its Deep Humiliation,' was sold by various
booksellers in Bavaria, among others by Palm, a citizen of
Nuremberg. There is no evidence that Palm was even acquainted
with the contents of the pamphlet; but ... Napoleon ...
required a victim to terrify those who, among the German
people, might be inclined to listen to the call of patriotism.
Palm was not too obscure for the new Charlemagne. The innocent
and unoffending man, innocent even of the honourable crime of
attempting to save his country, was dragged before a tribunal
of French soldiers, and executed within twenty-four hours of
his trial, in pursuance of the imperative orders of Napoleon
(August 26). ... Several years later, ... the story of Palm's
death was one of those that kindled the bitterest sense of
wrong; at the time, it exercised no influence upon the course
of political events. Prussia had already resolved upon war."

_C. A. Fyffe,
History of Modern Europe,
volume 1, chapters 6-7._

ALSO IN:
_Sir W. Scott,
Life of Napoleon,
chapters 51-52._

_J. R. Seeley,
Life and Times of Stein,
part 2, chapters 4-5 (volume 1)._

_P. Lanfrey,
History of Napoleon,
volume 2, chapter 15._

{1509}

GERMANY: A. D. 1806 (October).
Napoleon's sudden invasion of Prussia.
The decisive battle of Jena.
Prostration of the Prussian Kingdom.

"The Emperor of Russia ... visited Berlin, when the feelings
of Prussia, and indeed of all the neighbouring states, were in
this fever of excitement. He again urged Frederick William to
take up arms in the common cause, and offered to back him with
all the forces of his own great empire. The English
government, taking advantage of the same crisis, sent Lord
Morpeth to Berlin, with offers of pecuniary supplies--about
the acceptance of which, however, the anxiety of Prussia on
the subject of Hanover created some difficulty. Lastly,
Buonaparte, well informed of what was passing in Berlin, and
desirous, since war must be, to hurry Frederick into the field
ere the armies of the Czar could be joined with his, now
poured out in the 'Moniteur' such abuse on the persons and
characters of the Queen, Prince Louis, and every illustrious
patriot throughout Prussia, that the general wrath could no
longer be held in check. War-like preparations of every kind
filled the kingdom during August and September. On the 1st of
October the Prussian minister at Paris presented a note to
Talleyrand, demanding, among other things, that the formation
of a confederacy in the north of Germany should no longer be
thwarted by French interference, and that the French troops
within the territories of the Rhenish League should recross
the Rhine into France, by the 8th of the same month of
October. But Napoleon was already in person on the German side
of the Rhine; and his answer to the Prussian note was a
general order to his own troops, in which he called on them to
observe in what manner a German sovereign still dared to
insult the soldiers of Austerlitz. The conduct of Prussia, in
thus rushing into hostilities without waiting for the advance
of the Russians, was as rash as her holding back from Austria
during the campaign of Austerlitz had been cowardly. As if
determined to profit by no lesson, the Prussian council also
directed their army to advance towards the French, instead of
lying on their own frontier--a repetition of the great leading
blunder of the Austrians in the preceding year. The Prussian
army accordingly invaded the Saxon provinces, and the Elector
... was compelled to accept the alliance which the cabinet of
Berlin urged on him, and to join his troops with those of the
power by which he had been thus insulted and wronged. No
sooner did Napoleon know that the Prussians had advanced into
the heart of Saxony, than he formed the plan of his campaign;
and they, persisting in their advance, and taking up their
position finally on the Saale, afforded him, as if studiously,
the means of repeating, at their expense, the very manœvres which
had ruined the Austrians in the preceding campaign." The flank
of the Prussian position was turned,--the bridge across the
Saale, at Saalfield, having been secured, after a hot
engagement with the corps of Prince Louis of Prussia who fell
in the fight,--"the French army passed entirely round them;
Napoleon seized Naumburg and blew up the magazines
there,--announcing, for the first time, by this explosion, to
the King of Prussia and his generalissimo the Duke of
Brunswick, that he was in their rear. From this moment the
Prussians were isolated, and cut off from all their resources,
as completely as the army of Mack was at Ulm, when the French
had passed the Danube and overrun Suabia. The Duke of
Brunswick hastily endeavoured to concentrate his forces for
the purpose of cutting his way back again to the frontier
which he had so rashly abandoned. Napoleon, meantime, had
posted his divisions so as to watch the chief passages of the
Saale, and expected, in confidence, the assault of his
outwitted opponent. It was now that he found leisure to answer
the manifesto of Frederick William. ... His letter, dated at
Gera, is written in the most elaborate style of insult. ...
The Prussian King understood well, on learning the fall of
Naumburg, the imminent danger of his position; and his army
was forthwith set in motion, in two great masses; the former,
where he was in person present, advancing towards Naumburg;
the latter attempting, in like manner, to force their passage
through the French line in the neighbourhood of Jena. The
King's march was arrested at Auerstadt by Davoust, who, after
a severely contested action, at length repelled the assailant.
Napoleon himself, meanwhile, was engaged with the other great
body of the Prussians. Arriving on the evening of the 13th
October at Jena, he perceived that the enemy were ready to
attempt the advance next morning, while his own heavy train
was still six-and-thirty hours' march in his rear. Not
discouraged with this adverse circumstance, the Emperor
laboured all night in directing and encouraging his soldiery
to cut a road through the rocks, and draw up by that means
such light guns as he had at command to a position on a lofty
plateau in front of Jena, where no man could have expected
beforehand that any artillery whatever should be planted. ...
Lannes commanded the centre, Augereau the right, Soult the
left, and Murat the reserve and cavalry. Soult had to sustain
the first assault of the Prussians, which was violent--and
sudden; for the mist lay so thick on the field that the armies
were within half-gunshot of each other ere the sun and wind
rose and discovered them, and on that instant Mollendorf
charged. The battle was contested well for some time on this
point; but at length Ney appeared in the rear of the Emperor
with a fresh division; and then the French centre advanced to
a general charge, before which the Prussians were forced to
retire. They moved for some space in good order; but Murat now
poured his masses of cavalry on them, storm after storm, with
such rapidity and vehemence that their rout became inevitable.
It ended in the complete breaking up of the army--horse and
foot all flying together, in the confusion of panic, upon the
road to Weimar. At that point the fugitives met and mingled
with their brethren flying, as confusedly as themselves, from
Auerstadt. In the course of this disastrous day 20,000
Prussians were killed or taken, 300 guns, 20 generals, and 60
standards. The Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Brunswick,
being wounded in the face with a grape-shot, was carried early
off the field, never to recover. ... The various routed
divisions roamed about the country, seeking separately the
means of escape: they were in consequence destined to fall an
easy prey. ... The Prince of Hohenlohe at length drew together
not less than 50,000 of these wandering soldiers," and retreated
towards the Oder; but was forced, in the end, to lay down his
arms at Prentzlow. "His rear, consisting of about 10,000,
under the command of the celebrated General Blucher, was so
far behind as to render it possible for them to attempt
escape. Their heroic leader traversed the country with them
for some time unbroken, and sustained a variety of assaults,
from far superior numbers, with the most obstinate resolution.
{1510}
By degrees, however, the French, under Soult, hemmed him in on
one side, Murat on the other, and Bernadotte appeared close
behind him. He was thus forced to throw himself into Lubeck,
where a severe action was fought in the streets of the town,
on the 6th of November. The Prussian, in this battle, lost
4,000 prisoners, besides the slain and wounded: he retreated
to Schwerta, and there, it being impossible for him to go
farther without violating the neutrality of Denmark, on the
morning of the 7th, Blucher at length laid down his arms. ...
The strong fortresses of the Prussian monarchy made as
ineffectual resistance as the armies in the field. ...
Buonaparte, in person, entered Berlin on the 25th of October;
and before the end of November, except Konigsberg--where the
King himself had found refuge, and gathered round, him a few
thousand troops ... --and a few less important fortresses, the
whole of the German possessions of the house of Brandenburg
were in the hands of the conqueror. Louis Buonaparte, King of
Holland, meanwhile had advanced into Westphalia and occupied
that territory also, with great part of Hanover, East
Friesland, Embden, and the dominions of Hesse-Cassel."

_J. G. Lockhart,
Life of Napoleon,
chapter 20._

ALSO IN:
_C. Adams,
Great Campaigns in Europe from 1796 to 1870,
chapter. 4._

_Baron Jomini,
Life of Napoleon,
chapter 9 (volume 2),_

_Memoirs of Napoleon dictated at St. Helena,
volume 6, pages 60-72._

_Sir A. Alison,
History of Europe, 1789-1815,
chapter 43 (volume 10)._

_Duke of Rovigo,
Memoirs,
volume 1, part 2, chapters 21-23._

GERMANY: A. D. 1806 (October-December).
Napoleon's ungenerous use of his victory.
His insults to the Queen of Prussia.
The kingdom governed as conquered territory.
The French advance into Poland, to meet the Russians.
Saxony made a kingdom.

"Napoleon made a severe and ungenerous use of his victory. The
old Duke of Brunswick, respectable from his age, his
achievements under the Great Frederick, and the honourable
wounds he had recently received on the field of battle, and
who had written a letter to Napoleon, after the battle of
Jena, recommending his subjects to his generosity, was in an
especial manner the object of invective. His states were
overrun, and the official bulletins disgraced by a puerile
tirade against a general who had done nothing but discharge
his duty to his sovereign. For this he was punished by the
total confiscation of his dominions. So virulent was the
language employed, and such the apprehensions in consequence
inspired, that the wounded general was compelled, with great
personal suffering, to take refuge in Altona, where he soon
after died. The Queen, whose spirit in prosperous and
constancy in adverse fortune had justly endeared her to her
subjects, and rendered her the admiration of all Europe, was
pursued in successive bulletins with unmanly sarcasms; and a
heroic princess, whose only fault, if fault it was, had been
an excess of patriotic ardour, was compared to Helen, whose
faithless vices had involved her country in the calamities
consequent on the siege of Troy. The whole dominions of the
Elector of Hesse Cassel were next seized; and that prince, who
had not even combated at Jena, but merely permitted, when he
could not prevent, the entry of the Prussians into his
dominions, was dethroned and deprived of all his possessions.
... The Prince of Orange, brother-in-law to the King of
Prussia, ... shared the same fate: while to the nobles of
Berlin he used publicly the cruel expression, more withering
to his own reputation than theirs,--'I will render that
noblesse so poor that they shall be obliged to beg their
bread.' ... Meanwhile the French armies, without any further
resistance, took possession of the whole country between the
Rhine and the Oder; and in the rear of the victorious bands
appeared, in severity unprecedented even in the revolutionary
armies, the dismal scourge of contributions. Resolved to
maintain the war exclusively on the provinces which were to be
its theatre, Napoleon had taken only 24,000 francs in specie
across the Rhine in the military chest of the army. It soon
appeared from whom the deficiency was to be supplied. On the
day after the battle of Jena appeared a proclamation,
directing the levy of an extraordinary war contribution of
159,000,000 francs (£6,300,000) on the countries at war with
France, of which 100,000,000 was to be borne by the Prussian
states to the west of the Vistula, 25,000,000 by the Elector
of Saxony [who had already detached himself from his alliance
with Prussia], and the remainder by the lesser states in the
Prussian confederacy. This enormous burden ... was levied with
unrelenting severity. ... Nor was this all. The whole civil
authorities who remained in the abandoned provinces were
compelled to take an oath of fidelity to the French
Emperor,--an unprecedented step, which clearly indicated the
intention of annexing the Prussian dominions to the great
nation. ... Early in November there appeared an elaborate
ordinance, which provided for the complete civil organisation
and military occupation of the whole country from the Rhine to
the Vistula. By this decree the conquered states were divided
into four departments; those of Berlin, of Magdeburg, of
Stettin, and of Custrin; the military and civil government of
the whole conquered territory was intrusted to a
governor-general at Berlin, having under him eight commanders
of provinces into which it was divided. ... The same system of
government was extended to the duchy of Brunswick, the states
of Hesse and Hanover, the duchy of Mecklenburg, and the Hanse
towns, including Hamburg, which was speedily oppressed by
grievous contributions. ... The Emperor openly announced his
determination to retain possession of all these states till
England consented to his demands on the subject of the liberty
of the seas. ... Meanwhile the negotiations for the conclusion of
a separate peace between France and Prussia were resumed. ...
The severity of the terms demanded, as well as ... express
assurances that no concessions, how great soever, could lead
to a separate accommodation, as Napoleon was resolved to
retain all his conquests until a general peace, led, as might
have been expected, to the rupture of the negotiations.
Desperate as the fortunes of Prussia were, ... the King ...
declared his resolution to stand or fall with the Emperor of
Russia [who was vigorously preparing to fulfil his promise of
help to the stricken nation]. This refusal was anticipated by
Napoleon. It reached him at Posen, whither he had advanced on
his road to the Vistula; and nothing remained but to enter
vigorously on the prosecution of the war in Poland.
{1511}
To this period of the war belongs the famous Berlin decree
[see FRANCE: A. D. 1806-1810] of the 21st November against the
commerce of Great Britain. ... Napoleon ... at Posen, in
Prussian Poland, gave audience to the deputies of that unhappy
kingdom, who came to implore his support to the remains of its
once mighty dominion. His words were calculated to excite
hopes which his subsequent conduct never realised. ... While
the main body of the French army was advancing by rapid
strides from the Oder to the Vistula, Napoleon, ever anxious
to secure his communications, and clear his rear of hostile
bodies, caused two different armies to advance to support the
flanks of the invading force. ... The whole of the north of
Germany was overrun by French troops, while 100,000 were
assembling to meet the formidable legions of Russia in the
heart of Poland. Vast as the forces of Napoleon were, such
prodigious efforts, over so great an extent of surface,
rendered fresh supplies indispensable. The senate at Paris was
ready to furnish them; and on the requisition of the Emperor
80,000 were voted from the youth who were to arrive at the
military age in 1807. ... A treaty, offensive and defensive,
between Saxony and France, was the natural result of these
successes. This convention, arranged by Talleyrand, was signed
at Posen, on the 12th December. It stipulated that the Elector
of Saxony should be elevated to the dignity of king; he was
admitted into the Confederation of the Rhine, and his
contingent fixed at 20,000 men. By a separate article, it was
provided that the passage of foreign troops across the kingdom
of Saxony should take place without the consent of the sovereign:
a provision which sufficiently pointed it out as a military
outpost of the great nation--while, by a subsidiary treaty,
signed at Posen three days afterwards, the whole minor princes
of the House of Saxony were also admitted into the
Confederacy."

_Sir A. Alison,
History of Europe, 1789-1815,
chapter 43, sections 87-99 (volume 10)._

ALSO IN:
_P. Lanfrey,
History of Napoleon,
volume 2, chapter 16._

_Mrs. S. Austin,
Germany from 1760 to 1814,
page 294, and after._

_E. H. Hudson,
Life and Times of Louisa,
Queen of Prussia, volume 2, chapters 8-9._

GERMANY: A. D. 1806-1807.
Opening of Napoleon's campaign against the Russians.
The deluding of the Poles.
indecisive battle of Eylau.

The campaign against the Russians "opened early in the winter.
The 1st of November, the Russians and French marched towards
the Vistula, the former from the Memel, the latter from the
Oder. Fifty thousand Russians pressed forward under General
Benningsen; a second and equal army followed at a distance
with a reserve force. Some of the Russian forces on the
Turkish frontier were recalled, but were still remote. The
first two Russian armies, with the remaining Prussians,
numbered about 120,000. England made many promises and kept
few of them, thinking more of conquering Spanish and Dutch
colonies than of helping her allies. Her aid was limited to a
small reinforcement of the Swedes guarding Swedish Pomerania,
the only portion of Northern Germany not yet in French power.
Gustavus II., the young King of Sweden, weak and impulsive,
rushed headlong, without a motive, into the ... alliance
[against Napoleon], destined to be so fatal to Sweden. ...
Eighty thousand men under Murat crossed the Oder and entered
Prussian Poland, and an equal number stood ready to sustain
them. November 9, Davout's division entered Posen, the
principal town of the Polish provinces still preserving the
national sentiment, and whose people detested Prussian rule
and resented the treachery with which Prussia dismembered
Poland after swearing alliance with her. All along the road,
the peasants hastened to meet the French; and at Posen, Davout
was hailed with an enthusiasm which moved even him, cold and
severe as he was, and he urged Napoleon to justify the hopes
of Poland, who looked to him as her savior. The Russian
vanguard reached Warsaw before the French, but made no effort
to remain there, and recrossed the Vistula. November 28,
Davout and Murat entered the town, and public delight knew no
bounds. It would be a mere illusion to fancy that sentiments
of right and justice had any share in Napoleon's resolve, and
that he was stirred by a desire to repair great wrongs. His
only question was whether the resurrection of Poland would
increase his greatness or not; and if he told the Sultan that
he meant to restore Poland, it was because he thought Turkey
would assist him the more willingly against Russia. He also
offered part of Silesia to Austria, if she would aid him in
the restoration of Poland by the cession of her Polish
provinces; but it was not a sufficient offer, and therefore
not serious. The truth was that he wanted promises from the
Poles before he made any to them. ... Thousands of Poles
enlisted under the French flag and joined the Polish legions
left from the Italian war. Napoleon established a provisional
government of well-known Poles in Warsaw, and required nothing
but volunteers of the country. He had seized without a blow
that line of the Vistula which the Prussian king would not
barter for a truce, and might have gone into winter-quarters
there; but the Russians were close at hand on the opposite
shore, in two great divisions 100,000 strong, in a wooded and
marshy country forming a sort of triangle, whose point touches
the union of the Narew and Ukra rivers with the Vistula, a few
leagues below Warsaw. The Russians communicated with the sea
by a Prussian corps stationed between them and Dantzic.
Napoleon would not permit them to hold this post, and resolved
to strike a blow, before going into winter-quarters, which
should cut them off from the sea and drive them back towards
the Memel and Lithuania. He crossed the Vistula, December 23,
and attacked the Russians between the Narew and the Ukra. A
series of bloody battles followed [the most important being at
Pultusk and Golymin, December 26] in the dense forests and deep
bogs of the thawing land. Napoleon said that he had discovered
a fifth element in Poland,--mud. Men and horses stuck in the
swamp and the cannons could not be extricated. Luckily the
Russians were in the incompetent hands of General Kamenski,
and both parties fought in the dark, the labyrinth of swamps
and woods preventing either army from guessing the other's
movements. The Russians were finally driven, with great loss,
beyond the Narew towards the forests of Belostok, and a
Prussian corps striving to assist them was driven back to the
sea. ... The grand army did not long enjoy the rest it so much
needed; for the Russians, whose losses were more than made up
by the arrival of their reserves, suddenly resumed the
offensive.
{1512}
General Benningsen, who gave a fearful proof of his sinister
energy by the murder of Paul I., had been put in command in
Kamenski's place. Marching round the forests and traversing
the line of lakes which divide the basin of the Narew from
those watercourses flowing directly to the sea, he reached the
maritime part of old Prussia, intending to cross the Vistula
and drive the French from their position in Poland. He had
hoped to surprise the French left wing, lying between the
Passarge and Lower Vistula, but arrived too late. Ney and
Bernadotte rapidly concentrated their forces and fought with a
bravery which arrested the Russians (January 25 and 27).
Napoleon came to the rescue, and having once driven the enemy
into the woods and marshes of the interior, now strove to turn
those who meant to turn him, by an inverse action forcing them
to the sea-coast. ... Benningsen then halted beyond Eylau, and
massed his forces to receive battle next day [February 8]. He
had about 70,000 men, twice the artillery of Napoleon (400
guns against 200), and hoped to be joined betimes by a
Prussian corps. Napoleon could only dispose of 60,000 out of
his 300,000 men,--Ney being some leagues away and Bernadotte
out of reach. ... The battlefield was a fearful sight next
day. Twelve thousand Russians and 10,000 French lay dying and
dead on the vast fields of snow reddened with blood. The
Russians, besides, carried off 15,000 wounded. 'What an
ineffectual massacre" cried Ney, as he traversed the scene of
carnage. This was too true; for although Napoleon drove the
Russians to the sea, it was not in the way he desired.
Benningsen succeeded in reaching Konigsberg, where he could
rest and reinforce his army, and Napoleon was not strong
enough to drive him from this last shelter."

_H. Martin,
Popular History of France from 1789,
volume 2, chapter 11._

ALSO IN:
_Baron Jomini,
Life of Napoleon,
chapter 10 (volume 2)._

_C. Joyneville,
Life and Times of Alexander I.,
volume 1, chapter 8._

_J. C. Ropes,
The First Napoleon,
lecture 3._

_Baron de Marbot,
Memoirs,
volume 1, chapters 29-30._

GERMANY: A. D. 1806-1810.
Commercial blockade by the English Orders in Council and
Napoleon's Decrees.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1806-1810.

GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (February-June).
Closer alliance of Prussia and Russia.
Treaty of Bartenstein.
Napoleon's victory at Friedland.
End of the campaign.

The effect produced in Europe by the doubtful battle of Eylau
"was unlucky for France; in Paris the Funds fell. Bennigsen
boldly ordered the Te Deum to be sung. In order to confirm his
victory, re-organise his army, reassure France, re-establish
the opinion of Europe, encourage the Polish insurrection, and
to curb the ill-will of Germany and Austria, Napoleon remained
a week at Eylau. He negotiated: on one side he caused
Talleyrand to write to Zastrow, the Prussian foreign minister,
to propose peace and his alliance; he sent Bertrand to Memel
to offer to re-establish the King of Prussia, on the condition
of no foreign intervention. He also tried to negotiate with
Bennigsen; to which the latter made answer, 'that his master
had charged him to fight, and not negotiate.' After some
hesitation, Prussia ended by joining her fortunes to those of
Russia. By the convention of Bartenstein (25th April, 1807)
the two sovereigns came to terms on the following points:
1. The re-establishment of Prussia within the limits of 1805.
2. The dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine.
3. The restitution to Austria of the Tyrol and Venice.
4. The accession of England to the coalition, and the
aggrandisement of Hanover.
5. The co-operation of Sweden.
6. The restoration of the house of Orange, and indemnities to
the kings of Naples and Sardinia.

This document is important; it nearly reproduces the
conditions offered to Napoleon at the Congress of Prague, in
1813. Russia and Prussia proposed then to make a more pressing
appeal to Austria, Sweden, and England; but the Emperor
Francis was naturally undecided, and the Archduke Charles,
alleging the state of the finances and the army, strongly
advised him against any new intervention. Sweden was too weak;
and notwithstanding his fury against Napoleon, Gustavus III.
had just been forced to treat with Mortier. The English
minister showed a remarkable inability to conceive the
situation; he refused to guarantee the new Russian loan of a
hundred and fifty millions, and would lend himself to no
maritime diversion. Napoleon showed the greatest diplomatic
activity. The Sultan Selim III. declared war against Russia;
General Sebastiani, the envoy at Constantinople, put the
Bosphorus in a state of defence, and repulsed the English
fleet [see TURKS: A. D. 1806-1807]; General Gardane left for
Ispahan, with a mission to cause a Persian outbreak in the
Caucasus. Dantzig had capitulated [May 24, after a long
siege], and Lefèbvre's 40,000 men were therefore ready for
service. Masséna took 36,000 of them into Italy, In the
spring, Bennigsen, who had been reinforced by 10,000 regular
troops, 6,000 Cossacks, and the Imperial Guard, being now at
the head of 100,000 men, took the offensive; Gortchakof
commanding the right and Bagration the left. He tried, as in
the preceding year, to seize Ney's division; but the latter
fought, as he retired, two bloody fights, at Gutstadt and
Ankendorff. Bennigsen, again in danger of being surrounded,
retired on Heilsberg. He defended himself bravely (June 10);
but the French, extending their line on his right, marched on
Eylau, so as to cut him off from Konigsberg. The Russian
generalissimo retreated; but being pressed, he had to draw up
at Friedland, on the Alle. The position he had taken up was
most dangerous. All his army was enclosed in an angle of the
Alle, with the steep bed of the river at their backs, which in
case of misfortune left them only one means of retreat, over
the three bridges of Friedland. ... 'Where are the Russians
concealed?' asked Napoleon when he came up. When he had noted
their situation, he exclaimed, 'It is not every day that one
surprises the enemy in such a fault.' He put Lannes and Victor
in reserve, ordered Mortier to oppose Gortchakof on the left
and to remain still, as the movement which 'would be made by
the right would pivot on the left.' As to Ney, he was to cope
on the right with Bagration, who was shut in by the angle of
the river; he was to meet them 'with his head down,' without
taking any care of his own safety. Ney led the charge with
irresistible fury; the Russians were riddled by his artillery
at 150 paces: he successively crushed the chasseurs of the
Russian Guard, the Ismaïlovski, and the Horse Guards, burnt
Friedland by shells, and cannonaded the bridges which were the
only means of retreat. ... The Russian left wing was almost
thrown into the river; Bagration, with the Semenovski and
other troops, was hardly able to cover the defeat.
{1513}
On the Russian right, Gortchakof, who had advanced to attack
the immovable Mortier, had only time to ford the Alle. Count
Lambert retired with 29 guns by the left bank; the rest fled
by the right bank, closely pursued by the cavalry. Meanwhile
Murat, Davoust, and Soult, who had taken no part in the
battle, arrived before Konigsberg. Lestocq, with 25,000 men,
tried to defend it, but on learning the disaster of Friedland
he hastily evacuated it. Only one fortress now remained to
Frederick William--the little town of Memel. The Russians had
lost at Friedland from 15,000 to 20,000 men, besides 80 guns
(June 14, 1807). ... Alexander had no longer an army. Only one
man, Barclay de Tolly, proposed to continue the war; but in
order to do this it would be necessary to re-enter Russia, to
penetrate into the very heart of the empire, to burn
everything on the way, and only present a desert to the enemy.
Alexander hoped to get off more cheaply. He wrote a severe
letter to Bennigsen, and gave him powers to treat."

_A. Rambaud,
History of Russia,
volume 2, chapter 12._

ALSO IN:
_Duke de Rovigo,
Memoirs,
volume 2, part 1, chapters 4-6._

GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (June-July).
The Treaty of Tilsit.
Its known and its unknown agreements.

"Alexander I. now determined to negotiate in person with the
rival emperor, and on the 25th of June the two sovereigns met
at Tilsit, on a raft which was moored in the middle of the
Niemen. The details of the conference are a secret, as
Napoleon's subsequent account of it is untrustworthy, and no
witnesses were present. All that is certain is that Alexander
I., whose character was a curious mixture of nobility and
weakness, was completely won over by his conqueror. ...
Napoleon, ... instead of attempting to impose extreme terms
upon a country which it was impossible to conquer, ... offered
to share with Russia the supremacy in Europe which had been
won by French arms. The only conditions were the abandonment
of the cause of the old monarchies, which seemed hopeless, and
an alliance with France against England. Alexander had several
grievances against the English government, especially the
lukewarm support that had been given in recent operations, and
made no objection to resume the policy of his predecessors in
this respect. Two interviews sufficed to arrange the basis of
an agreement. Both sovereigns abandoned their allies without
scruple. Alexander gave up Prussia and Sweden, while Napoleon
deserted the cause of the Poles, who had trusted to his zeal
for their independence, and of the Turks, whom his envoy had
recently induced to make war upon Russia. The Treaty of Tilsit
was speedily drawn up; on the 7th of July peace was signed
between France and Russia, on the 9th between France and
Prussia. Frederick William III. had to resign the whole of his
kingdom west of the Elbe, together with all the acquisitions
which Prussia had made in the second and third partitions of
Poland. The provinces that were left, amounting to barely half
of what he had inherited, were burthened with the payment of
an enormous sum as compensation to France. The district west
of the Elbe was united with Hesse-Cassel, Brunswick, and
ultimately with Hanover, to form the kingdom of Westphalia,
which was given to Napoleon's youngest brother, Jerome. Of
Polish Prussia, one province, Bialystock, was added to Russia,
and the rest was made into the grand duchy of Warsaw, and
transferred to Saxony. Danzig, with the surrounding territory,
was declared a free state under Prussian and Saxon protection,
but it was really subject to France, and remained a centre of
French power on the Baltic. All trade between Prussia and
England was cut off. Alexander I., on his side, recognised all
Napoleon's new creations in Europe--the Confederation of the
Rhine, the kingdoms of Italy, Naples, Holland, and Westphalia,
and undertook to mediate between France and England. But the
really important agreement between France and Russia was to be
found, not in the formal treaties, but in the secret
conventions which were arranged by the two emperors. The exact
text of these has never been made public, and it is probable
that some of the terms rested upon verbal rather than on
written understandings, but the general drift of them is
unquestionable. The bribe offered to Alexander was the
aggrandisement of Russia in the East. To make him an
accomplice in the acts of Napoleon, he was to be allowed to
annex Finland from Sweden, and Moldavia and Wallachia from
Turkey. With regard to England, Russia undertook to adopt
Napoleon's blockade-system, and to obtain the adhesion of
those states which still remained open to English
trade--Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal."

_H. Lodge,
History of Modern Europe,
chapter 24, section 25._

"'I thought,' said Napoleon at St. Helena, 'it would benefit
the world to drive these brutes, the Turks, out of Europe. But
when I reflected what power it would give to Russia, from the
number of Greeks in the Turkish dominions who may be
considered Russians, I refused to consent to it, especially as
Alexander wanted Constantinople, which would have destroyed
the equilibrium of power in Europe. France would gain Egypt,
Syria, and the islands; but those were nothing to what Russia
would have obtained.' This coincides with Savary's [Duke de
Rovigo's] statement, that Alexander told him Napoleon said he
was under no engagements to the new Sultan, and that changes
in the world inevitably changed the relations of states to one
another; and again, Alexander said that, in their
conversations at Tilsit, Napoleon often told him he did not
require the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia; he would
place things in a train to dispense with it, and it was not
possible to suffer longer the presence of the Turks in Europe.
'He even left me,' said Alexander, 'to entertain the project
of driving them back into Asia. It is only since that he has
returned to the idea of leaving Constantinople to them, and
some surrounding provinces.' Due day, when Napoleon was
talking to Alexander, he asked his secretary, M. Meneval, for
the map of Turkey, opened it, then renewed the conversation;
and placing his finger on Constantinople said several times to
the secretary, though not loud enough to be heard by
Alexander, 'Constantinople, Constantinople, never. It is the
capital of the world.' ... It is very evident in their
conversations that Napoleon agreed to his [Alexander's]
possessing himself of the Turkish Empire up to the Balkan, if
not beyond; though Bignon denies that any plan for the actual
partition of Turkey was embodied in the treaty of Tilsit.
Hardenberg, not always well informed, asserts that it was.
{1514}
Savary says he could not believe that Napoleon would have
abandoned the Turks without a compensation in some other
quarter; and he felt certain Alexander had agreed in return to
Napoleon's project for the conquest of Spain, 'which the
Emperor had very much at heart'"

_C. Joyneville,
Life and Times of Alexander I.,
volume 1, chapter 8._

ALSO IN:
_Sir A. Alison,
History of Europe, 1789-1815,
chapter 46 (volume 10)._

_Count Miot de Melito,
Memoirs,
chapter 24._

_P. Lanfrey,
History of Napoleon,
chapters 3-4._

_Prince de Talleyrand,
Memoirs,
part 3 (volume 1)._

_A. Thiers,
History of the Consulate and the Empire,
book 27 (volume 2)._

GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (July).
The collapse of Prussia and its Causes.

"For the five years that followed, Prussia is to be conceived,
in addition to all her other humiliations, as in the hands of
a remorseless creditor whose claims are decided by himself
without appeal, and who wants more than all he can get. She is
to be thought of as supporting for more than a year after the
conclusion of the Treaty a French army of more than 150,000
men, then as supporting a French garrison in three principal
fortresses, and finally, just before the period ends, as
having to support the huge Russian expedition in its passage
through the country. ... It was not in fact from the Treaty of
Tilsit, but from the systematic breach of it, that the
sufferings of Prussia between 1807 and 1813 arose. It is
indeed hardly too much to say that the advantage of the Treaty
was received only by France, and that the only object Napoleon
can have had in signing it was to inflict more harm on Prussia
than he could inflict by simply continuing the war. Such was
the downfall of Prussia. The tremendousness of the catastrophe
strikes us less because we know that it was soon retrieved,
and that Prussia rose again and became greater than ever. But
could this recovery be anticipated? A great nation, we say,
cannot be dissolved by a few disasters; patriotism and energy
will retrieve everything. But precisely these seemed wanting.
The State seemed to have fallen in pieces because it had no
principle of cohesion, and was only held together by an
artificial bureaucracy. It had been created by the energy of
its government and the efficiency of its soldiers, and now it
appeared to come to an end because its government had ceased
to be energetic and its soldiers to be efficient. The
catastrophe could not but seem as irremediable as it was
sudden and complete." There may be discerned "three distinct
causes for it. First, the undecided and pusillanimous policy
pursued by the Prussian government since 1803 had an evident
influence upon the result by making the great Powers,
particularly England and Austria, slow to render it
assistance, and also by making the commanders, especially
Brunswick, irresolute in action because they could not, even
at the last moment, believe the war to be serious. This
indecision we have observed to have been connected with a
mal-organisation of the Foreign Department. Secondly, the
corruption of the military system, which led to the surrender
of the fortresses. Thirdly, a misfortune for which Prussia was
not responsible, its desertion by Russia at a critical moment,
and the formation of a close alliance between Russia and
France."

_J. R. Seeley,
Life and Times of Stein,
part 2, chapter 5 (volume 1)._

GERMANY: A. D. 1807-1808.
The great Revolutionary Reforms of Hardenberg, Stein and
Scharnhorst.
Edict of Emancipation.
Military reorganization.
Beginning of local self-government.
Seeds of a new national life.

"The work of those who resisted Napoleon--even if no one of
them should ever be placed in the highest class of the
benefactors of mankind--has in some cases proved enduring, and
nowhere so much as in Germany. They began two great works--the
reorganisation of Prussia and the revival of the German
nationality, and time has deliberately ratified their views.
Without retrogression, without mistake, except the mistake
which in such matters is the most venial that can be
committed, that, namely, of over-caution, of excessive
hesitation, the edifice which was then founded has been raised
higher and higher till it is near completion. ... Because
Frederick-William III. remains quietly seated on the throne
through the whole period, we remain totally unaware that a
Prussian revolution took place then--a revolution so
comprehensive that the old reign and glories of Frederick may
fairly be said to belong to another world--to an 'ancien
regime' that has utterly passed away. It was a revolution
which, though it did not touch the actual framework of
government in such a way as to substitute one of Aristotle's
forms of government for another, yet went so far beyond
government, and made such a transformation both in industry
and culture, that it deserves the name of revolution far more,
for instance, than our English Revolution of the 17th century.
... In Prussia few of the most distinguished statesmen, few even
of those who took the lead in her liberation from Napoleon,
were Prussians. Blücher himself began life in the service of
Sweden, Scharnhorst was a Hanoverian, so was Hardenberg, and
Stein came from Nassau. Niebuhr was enticed to Berlin from the
Bank of Copenhagen. Hardenberg served George III. and
afterwards the Duke of Brunswick before he entered the service
of Frederick-William II.; and when Stein was dismissed by
Frederick-William III. in the midst of the war of 1806, though
he was a man of property and rank, he took measures to
ascertain whether they were in want of a Finance Minister at
St. Petersburg. ... We misapprehend the nature of what took
place when we say, as we usually do, that some important and
useful reforms were introduced by Stein, Hardenberg, and
Scharnhorst. In the first place, such a word as reform is not
properly applied to changes so vast, and in the second place.
the changes then made or at least commenced, went far beyond
legislation. We want some word stronger than reform which
shall convey that one of the greatest events of modern history
now took place in Prussia. Revolution would convey this, but
unfortunately we appropriate that word to changes in the form
of government, or even mere changes of dynasty, provided they
are violent, though such changes are commonly quite
insignificant compared to what now took place in Prussia. ...
The form of government indeed was not changed. Not merely did
the king continue to reign, but no Parliament was created even
with powers ever so restricted. Another generation had to pass
away before this innovation, which to us seems the beginning
of political life, took place. But a nation must be made
before it can be made free, and, as we have said, in Prussia
there was an administration (in great disorder) and an army,
but no nation.
{1515}
When Stein was placed at the head of affairs in the autumn of
1807, he seems, at first, hardly to have been aware that
anything was called for beyond the reform of the
administration, and the removal of some abuses in the army.
Accordingly he did reform the administration from the top to
the bottom, remodelling the whole machinery both of central
and local government which had come down from the father of
Frederick the Great. But the other work also was forced upon
him, and he began to create the nation by emancipating the
peasantry, while Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were brooding over
the ideas which, five years later, took shape in the Landwehr
of East Prussia. Besides emancipating the peasant he
emancipated industry,--everywhere abolishing that strange
caste system which divided the population rigidly into nobles,
citizens, and peasants, and even stamped every acre of land in
the country with its own unalterable rank as noble, or
citizen, or peasant land. Emancipation, so to speak, had to be
given before enfranchisement. The peasant must have something
to live for; freewill must be awakened in the citizen; and he
must be taught to fight for something before he could receive
political liberty. Of such liberty Stein only provided one
modest germ. By his Städteordnung he introduced popular
election into the towns. Thus Prussia and France set out
towards political liberty by different roads. Prussia began
modestly with local liberties, but did not for a long time
attempt a Parliament. France with her charte, and in imitation
of France many of the small German States, had grand popular
Parliaments, but no local liberties. And so for a long time
Prussia was regarded as a backward State. ... It was only by
accident that Stein stopped short at municipal liberties and
created no Parliament. He would have gone further, and in the
last years of the wartime Hardenberg did summon deliberative
assemblies, which, however, fell into disuse again after the
peace. ... In spite however of all reaction, the change
irrevocably made by the legislation of that time was similar
to that made in France by the Revolution, and caused the age
before Jena to be regarded as an 'ancien regime.' But in
addition to this, a change had been made in men's minds and
thoughts by the shocks of the time, which prepared the way for
legislative changes which have taken place since. How
unprecedented in Prussia, for instance, was the dictatorial
authority wielded by Hardenberg early in 1807, by Stein in the
latter part of that year and in 1808, and by Hardenberg again
from 1810 onwards! Before that time in the history of Prussia
we find no subject eclipsing or even approaching the King in
importance. Prussia had been made what she was almost entirely
by her electors and kings. In war and organisation alike all
had been done by the Great Elector or Frederick-William I., or
Frederick the Great. But now this is suddenly changed. Everything
now turns on the minister. Weak ministers are expelled by
pressure put upon the king, strong ones are forced upon him.
He is compelled to create a new ministerial power much greater
than that of an English Prime Minister, and more like that of
a Grand Vizier, and by these dictators the most comprehensive
innovations are made. The loyalty of the people was not
impaired by this; on the contrary, Stein and Hardenberg saved
the Monarchy; but it evidently transferred the Monarchy,
though safely, to a lower pedestal."

_J. R. Seeley,
Prussian History (Macmillan's Magazine,
volume 36, pages 342-351)._

ALSO IN:
_J. R. Seeley,
Life and Times of Stein,
parts 3-5 (volumes 1-2)._

_R. B. D. Morier,
Agrarian Legislation of Prussia
(Systems of Land Tenure: Cobden Club Essays,
chapter 5)._

GERMANY: A. D. 1808.
The Awakening of the national spirit.
Effects of the Spanish rising, and of Fichte's Addresses.