Chapter XXXIII: Continuation of the Siege (2)

Messengers had been sent to the allies far and wide to encourage them with the news of the non-fulfilment of the oracle. Ojeda and Marquez went in person to Tlascala, partly also with the object of procuring certain supplies. They left Alvarado’s camp at midnight with only a few natives, and when about half-way to Tepeyacac they perceived a train of men descending from the hills with heavy burdens, which they deposited in a number of canoes. Information was at once sent to Alvarado, who placed a guard along the shore to check this smuggling that had evidently escaped the cruisers.[1186] Ojeda’s party proceeded to Tlascala and brought a large train of provisions.[1187] In addition to this the camps were cheered by the arrival of a party of recruits with quite a mass of war material, chiefly powder and cross-bows, relics of Ponce de Leon’s Florida expedition.[1188] The war stores were particularly valuable; so low had run the actual stock that Cortés was preparing more Chinantec pikes to cover the deficiency in weapons.

Everything was again ready for a serious revival of hostilities. Over six weeks had passed since the siege began, and the end seemed little nearer than before. On the day of the defeat three fourths of the city might be said to have been reduced; but nearly all this advantage had been lost, owing chiefly to the narrow streets, encompassed by houses which served both for attack and retreat, and the numerous traps in the form of canals and channels. So long as these obstacles remained the progress must not only be slow, ever slower as advance was made, but the troops would be constantly exposed to fresh disaster. One more defeat might ruin all, and Cortés resolved to avoid risks. He would tear down every building as he advanced on both sides of the streets, and fill up every channel; “not take one step in advance without leaving all desolated behind, and convert water into firm land, regardless of the delay.” So writes the general, and yet he expresses regret for this destruction of the city, “the most beautiful in the world.”[1189] In pursuance of this plan he asked the allied chiefs to summon additional forces of laborers with the necessary implements. They eagerly consented, and within a few days the men stood prepared.

FOOTNOTES

[1143] ‘Eran esclavos del señor de Tenuxtitan,’ is Cortés’
definition of their vassalage to Mexico. _Cartas_, 220.

[1144] A service which employed 20,000 carriers, 1000
canoes, and 32,000 convoy warriors, all at the expense of
Tezcuco, says Ixtlilxochitl, _Relaciones_, 314.

[1145] His biographer admits to a certain extent the truth
of the invectives, but eager to please his Spanish masters
he seeks rather to extol the self-sacrifice and loyalty
of his kinsman. He claims that with this reënforcement the
Tezcucan auxiliaries reached the improbable number of 250,000
men, of whom 5000 wounded were now sent home. ‘Next to God,
Cortés owed to Tezcucan aid the conquest and the planting
of the faith.’ He further assumes that Ixtlilxochitl was
already king, and had been with Cortés since the fleet
set sail, while his brother Ahuaxpictzoctzin remained at
Tezcuco to provide supplies. _Hor. Crueldades_, 21-33. He
contradicts himself on several points in his _Relaciones_,
314 et seq. Duran also, as may be expected from a compiler
of native records, extols the hero, ‘à quien dió una espada
dorada que Don Hernando Cortes traia y una rodela.’ _Hist.
Ind._, MS., ii. 493. With Ixtlilxochitl came half a dozen
out of his hundred brothers. _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 198;
_Chimalpain_, _Hist. Conq._, ii. 55. Torquemada, i. 548,
sends Cohuanacoch as general of the forces, while Clavigero
allows King Fernando Ixtlilxochitl to send his brother Cárlos
Ixtlilxochitl. _Storia Mess._, iii. 202. He is evidently
confused with respect to the surname.

[1146] _Sahagun_, _Hist. Conq._ (ed. 1840), 177-8. Torquemada
places the incident earlier, i. 547. Cortés admits no losses
of Spaniards this day.

[1147] _Cartas_, 222-3. ‘Los combidauan a çena, mostrando
les piernas y braços.’ _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 199.

[1148] Bernal Diaz speaks of a bridge attack which cost the
lives of four Spaniards, besides numerous wounded. _Hist.
Verdad._, 145.

[1149] He enumerates also the cities of Mexicalcinco and
Vitzilopuchtli. _Hist. Mex._, 202. Herrera adds Mizquic.
dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xix.

[1150] Mazeoatzi, as Sahagun calls the cacique, sacrificed
four chiefs, Quauhtemotzin four more; the rest fell by the
hands of priests. _Hist. Conq._ (ed. 1840), 187. He does
not speak of a premeditated plan like Torquemada, i. 551-2,
and since the account comes from native sources it may be
merely an exaggerated version of a flotilla raid.

[1151] This was the lieutenant of Velazquez at Habana, who
joined Cortés during the Tepeaca campaign. Portillo was a
soldier from the Italian wars. Bernal Diaz adds that one
brig was captured, but this is doubtful. _Hist. Verdad._,
143; _Clavigero_, _Storia Mess._, iii. 214; _Sahagun_,
_Hist. Conq._, 46.

[1152] _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 144-5.

[1153] Cortés exultantly claims that three fourths of the
city is now captured. _Cartas_, 227; _Sahagun_, _Hist.
Conq._ (ed. 1840), 181; _Torquemada_, i. 550.

[1154] ‘No se hartauan de pescado, que tuuierõ pocos dias:
y demas de la hambre con q̄ peleauan, el sol, y el frio
no les dio pequeño trabajo.’ _Herrera_, dec. iii. lib. i.
cap. xix.

[1155] ‘Soliti sunt hostes in prælio cadentes intra suos
ventres sepelire,’ explains Peter Martyr, dec. v. cap.
viii., and with some truth.

[1156] Forty soldiers watched till midnight, when a similar
number relieved them, and they again were relieved two hours
before dawn; all three divisions camping on the spot. Often
every man was kept awake by alarms. _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist.
Verdad._, 142-3. The old soldier waxes eloquent over the
hardships, for he served at this camp.

[1157] The Spaniards tried in vain to despatch him.
Sahagun states that during these attacks fifteen soldiers
were captured, and shortly after eighteen more, who were
sacrificed in a temple of Tlacuchcalco ward, ‘donde agora
es la iglesia de Santa Ana.’ _Hist. Conq._, 183, ed.
1840, 188-9. One repulse took place in Coyonacazco ward.
_Torquemada_, i. 550-2. Spanish versions indicate no such
losses, and they may probably belong to the later great
defeat.

[1158] Such is in main the version of Bernal Diaz; the
other accounts differ greatly. This author states that five
Spaniards were captured, nearly all the men wounded, and
two rowers killed, for the brigantines in seeking to aid
had become fast on stakes and exposed to attack. Had the
Mexicans not been so frightened by the horsemen the loss
would have been very great. _Hist. Verdad._, 143-4. Cortés
allows three or four captured. _Cartas_, 228; _Clavigero_,
_Storia Mess._, iii. 196. Duran places the scene where rose
afterward the San Hipólito hermitage. _Hist. Ind._, MS.,
ii. 500. But for Quauhtlizcatzin, the prince who led the
Tezcucan auxiliaries, all the Spaniards would have been
lost, exclaims Ixtlilxochitl, _Hor. Crueldades_, 36. Herrera
assumes that the fault lay with Alvarado for neglecting to
fill the channel. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xx.

[1159] ‘No solo no le culpo, mas loole.’ _Gomara_, _Hist.
Mex._, 203.

[1160] The most serious attacks took place on June 24th and
25th, as if oracles had impelled the Mexicans to seek the
destruction of the Spaniards on the anniversary of their
reëntry into the city after the Alvarado massacre. The
Tlacopan camp lost ten soldiers and had a dozen severely
wounded, including Alvarado. _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._,
142, 145.

[1161] Bernal Diaz seeks to convey the idea that he or his
camp were opposed to the attempt, _Id._, 146, but had it
succeeded, he would probably have declared the truth, that
Cortés was urged on all sides to make the effort, as stated
in _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 203, _Herrera_, dec. iii. lib.
i. cap. xx., and _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 228-9. Perhaps the
general made objections chiefly to cover his responsibility
in case of failure.

[1162] Alderete’s party consisted of 70 infantry, 7 or 8
horsemen, and 15,000 to 20,000 allies, besides a force of
laborers to tear down and to fill up; Tápia’s of 80 men and
over 10,000 allies, and Cortés’ of 8 horsemen, 100 infantry,
and an immense number of allies. _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 230-1.
Gomara and Herrera differ slightly. Ixtlilxochitl says
that his namesake followed Cortés with 8000 Tezcucans.
_Hor. Crueldades_, 37. This insignificant number makes it
difficult to account for the 250,000 Tezcucans which he
lately introduced into the camps. Chimalpain names the
three streets Cuahuecatitlan, Tecontlanamacoya, and the
later Santa Ana. _Hist. Conq._, ii. 62.

[1163] See _Native Races_, ii. 303; iii. 293 et seq.

[1164] He crossed the channel with fifteen soldiers to
sustain the fugitives, says Torquemada, i. 554; but this
seems incorrect.

[1165] The claims to the honor of rescuing the general are
conflicting. Gomara, followed by Herrera and Torquemada,
names ‘Francisco’ de Olea. Bernal Diaz, who states that
this soldier slew four of the captains holding Cortés,
lets Lerma dispose of the remainder. After this came other
soldiers and Quiñones. Cristóbal de Olea was quite young, 26
years of age, a native of Medina del Campo, muscular, and
skilled in arms, and a general favorite. Bernal Diaz adds
other particulars. _Hist. Verdad._, 146, 246. Ixtlilxochitl,
on the other hand, claims for his namesake the credit of
having done what Spaniards claim for Olea, aided by his
Tezcucans, who kept the enemy at bay. This, he adds, is
proved by a painting on the gate of the monastery of Santiago
Tlatelulco. _Hor. Crueldades_, 38-9. Herrera briefly alludes
to Ixtlilxochitl as coming up after Olea, and then relates
with some detail that at the same time came the Tlascaltec,
Tamaxautzin he calls him, a native of Hueyotlipan. He was
afterward baptized as Antonio or Bautista, and became a
good Christian, the first native to receive extreme unction.
dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xx. Torquemada, i. 555, copies, but
calls the man Teamacatzin. Both evidently prefer Tlascaltec
to Tezcucan records. In fact, Ixtlilxochitl adds certain
incredible particulars about the prowess of his wounded hero
in pursuing the Mexican general into a temple, although such
pursuit could not have taken place under the circumstances.
See also _Duran_, _Hist. Ind._, MS., ii. 503, and _Camargo_,
_Hist. Tlax._, 130. Cortés writes that he would have been
lost but for Quiñones, and one of his men who lost his life
to save him. _Cartas_, 233. A small chapel was erected in
the convent de la Concepcion to commemorate the escape.
See _Saavedra_, _Indio Peregrino_, canto 20.

[1166] Bernal Diaz assumes that Guzman rode up after Cortés
was mounted, and fell captive into Aztec hands. _Hist.
Verdad._, 147.

[1167] ‘Como lo hallarán pintado en la Yglesia de Tlatilulco,
los cuales Indios confiesan haberle visto.’ _Duran_, _Hist.
Ind._, MS., ii. 512. Why these patrons did not give their aid
before is a question to which Bernal Diaz answers ‘porque
Nuestro Señor Iesu Christo lo permitiò.’ _Hist. Verdad._,
146.

[1168] Herrera relates how two captains, Flores and Mota,
advanced with their vessels up a narrow channel. Flores was
severely pressed at one time, and the latter had to sally
on the street to relieve him and enable the brigantines
to gain more open water. Flores died within a week of his
wounds. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xx. Torquemada says that
Briones’ vessel was lifted through a breach in the causeway.
i. 555. Bernal Diaz speaks of several such narrow escapes.
loc. cit.

[1169] The artillerists being all disabled or dead, Pedro
Moreno de Medrano, afterward a settler at Puebla, took
their place. _Id._

[1170] Bernal Diaz writes as if Sandoval gained the camp
at an early hour, rode over to Fort Xoloc, and came back
in time to aid in Alvarado’s retreat. But he would never
have ventured to leave his command and his comrade in
their danger; nor does it seem likely that he could have
ridden the long distance to Xoloc and back in time to join
in Alvarado’s conflict, even if Cortés’ defeat took place
before ‘misa mayor,’ as he assumes. _Hist. Verdad._, 146-8.
This author is here very confused, assuming, for instance,
that Sandoval was fighting from his own camp instead of
coöperating near Alvarado.

[1171] So deeply affected was Bernal Diaz, among others, by
the sight, and by the fear of himself falling captive—twice
had he narrowly escaped—that he ever after had an oppressive
feeling before battle. He then had recourse to prayer,
and this invariably fortified him for the fight, so that
he always maintained his reputation as a good soldier. He
enumerates several incidents to prove that he was esteemed
a brave man. _Hist. Verdad._, 157. Oviedo, referring to
human sacrifices among the Romans, observes that they could
not have been half so fearful. iii. 515.

[1172] ‘Sacrificados los Nuestros, en el Momoztli, y Templo
de su Maior Dios,’ observes Torquemada, i. 553, among other
points, though all are not exactly true. Huitzilopochtli’s
image had been brought with the retreating Mexicans to
Tlatelulco. ‘Immediatamente sacrificati,’ says Clavigero,
_Storia Mess._, iii. 212, probably on authority of Gomara;
but Bernal Diaz states that the sacrifices lasted ten days,
_Hist. Verdad._, 150; others write eight; one victim is
said to have been kept eighteen days. See also _Sahagun_,
_Hist. Conq._, 192. Ixtlilxochitl states that three victims
were burned. _Hor. Crueldades_, 39.

[1173] A count revealed the loss of 62 men and 6 horses,
says Bernal Diaz, _Hist. Verdad._, 146, 152, 241, though
he in one place leaves the impression that the men were all
captured alive. This could hardly be the case, for a ‘count’
would reveal only the missing; none could tell how many
fell captive. Yet Prescott boldly assumes this number to
have been taken, besides those who fell. Vetancurt divides
the figures into 40 captives and 20 dead, _Teatro Mex._,
pt. iii. 162, and Clavigero also includes dead and captive
in that number, while raising the dead horses to 7. _Storia
Mess._, iii. 212. Solis writes that over 40 Spaniards were
carried off alive, and that Alvarado and Sandoval lost 20.
_Hist. Mex._, ii. 410. Bernal Diaz acknowledges only a third
of such loss between these two captains. Gomara gives 40
captives, several killed, 3 or 4 horses lost, and over 30
wounded. _Hist. Mex._, 205-6. Ixtlilxochitl raises the allied
loss to over 2000. _Hor. Crueldades_, 37-9. Fifty-three
Spaniards, says Sahagun, _Hist. Conq._, 192. In the cédula
of March 7, 1525, granting a coat-of-arms to Cortés, 50 are
mentioned, but in his letter to the sovereign the general
acknowledges only 35 to 40 and over 1000 allies. Herrera
and Torquemada adopt these figures. Oviedo, iii. 516, lowers
the number to 30. Duran, who confounds the late repulse of
Alvarado with the Sorrowful Night and this defeat, allows
4 banners to be captured. _Hist. Ind._, MS., ii. 501-4,
508.

[1174] Bernal Diaz gives this conversation with some detail,
and names Treasurer Alderete as the guilty officer who
neglected to fill the channel, intimating that Cortés had
been heedlessly allured onward by the Mexicans, leaving
Alderete to attend to the filling. He even allows the
treasurer to retort to the charge, in Sandoval’s presence,
that Cortés’ eagerness had been the cause of the neglect.
This is probably an invented account, based on Gomara’s
statement that the ‘treasurer,’ no name being given,
neglected to fill a channel on his route. Informed of this,
Cortés hastened thither to remedy the fault, only to meet the
fleeing. Herrera adopts this version, as do most writers,
including Prescott; but it is evidently wrong, for Cortés
writes clearly that the misfortune occurred on his own
route, some distance above its junction with the Tlacopan
road, to which they soon retreated. On reaching this road
he sent to recall the ‘treasurer and comptroller,’ who were
leading their division victoriously at the farther end of
it. Owing to their care in filling channels ‘they received
no injury in retreating.’ _Cartas_, 233-4. There can be
little doubt about this statement, since Cortés would have
been only too glad to cast the blame on any other division
than his own. He does not even claim to have been at the
front, but in the rear, and near the spot where the neglect
occurred. The only question then is, who was the guilty
officer? The ‘treasurer’ commanded the centre division,
and although there were several treasurers, the royal,
late and new, and he who acted for the army, yet the new
royal treasurer is undoubtedly meant, and this appears to
have been Alderete, according to the statement of several
authorities. Hence the accusation against Alderete must be
wrong; anything besides this must be conjecture.

[1175] ‘Bolviò à la grita, Andrés de Tapia [the captain of
his party] matò mas de sesenta Mexicanos,’ adds Torquemada,
i. 558-9.

[1176] ‘Esto no fue sino cinco dias.’ _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist.
Verdad._, 149.

[1177] Similar women of courage were María de Estrada, the
heroine of Otumba, Beatriz de Escobar, Juana Martin, and
Beatriz de Palacios. _Herrera_, dec. iii. lib. ii. cap. i.

[1178] Oil was the chief remedy. _Torquemada_, i. 558-60.
Bernal Diaz speaks of a soldier named Juan Catalan who
performed cures with the sign of the cross and psalm-singing.
The Tlascaltecs also besieged the man for his attentions.
‘Y verdaderamente digo, que hallauamos que Nuestro Señor
Iesu Christo era servido de darnos esfuerço, ... y de
presto sanauan.’ Not twenty of Alvarado’s men were free
from wounds at this time. _Hist. Verdad._, 142. Solis allows
this wonderful healing power to be attributed to no woman.
_Hist. Mex._, ii. 412. But then he was a strict priest,
who saw woman chiefly as a feeble and adoring supplicant.

[1179] ‘Que de ai a ocho dias no auia de quedar ninguno
de nosotros a vida, porque assi se lo auian prometido la
noche antes sus Dioses.’ _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 149.

[1180] Solis, _Hist. Mex._, ii. 415, states, and Prescott
hastily affirms, that nearly all the allies deserted, and
Bernal Diaz enumerates the mere handful that remained;
but this must be erroneous, as shown by the course of the
narratives in general. Two expeditions were sent forth about
this time, and the large number of allies which joined
therein may account in part for the gaps which gave rise
to the above exaggeration. Cortés, indeed, alludes very
indirectly to any defection.

[1181] Forty thousand, says Ixtlilxochitl, obtained chiefly
from Quauhnahuac and other towns subject to Tezcuco. _Hor.
Crueldades_, 40. Herrera and others mention no auxiliaries
from the camp. Bernal Diaz is confused.

[1182] The Chicuhnauhtla, Ixtlilxochitl calls it.

[1183] ‘Y ellos le siruieron muy biẽ en el cerco.’ _Gomara_,
_Hist. Mex._, 207. Ixtlilxochitl claims of course that his
Tezcucans formed the chief auxiliaries of Sandoval. Bernal
Diaz wrongly gives Tápia this expedition, which Cortés
intimates to have been sent about three days after the
return of the Quauhnahuac party. _Cartas_, 237.

[1184] Farfan and Villareal came, says Bernal Diaz,
and Tecapaneca, cacique of Topeyanco, led the returning
Tlascaltecs. _Hist. Verdad._, 151.

[1185] Cortés leaves the impression that this incident
took place during the days when the Spaniards were making
desultory entries into the city; but since he does not speak
of the oracle or the defection the affair is undecided.
Torquemada, i. 557, intimates that Chichimecatl served
under Sandoval, but this is wrong.

[1186] Ojeda magnifies the train of men to 4000 and the
canoes to 3000. _Herrera_, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xxii.

[1187] Fifteen hundred loads maize, 1000 loads fowl, 300
sides venison, besides other effects, including Xicotencatl’s
confiscated property and women. _Id._

[1188] Herrera intimates that the material may have been
a consignment to Leon, for which the disappointed owner
sought a market. A vessel of Aillon’s fleet, says Bernal
Diaz, _Hist. Verdad._, 153.

[1189] Some time before he had expressed the same intention,
and the fear that little or no treasure would be recovered.
_Cartas_, 222, 241. Ixtlilxochitl claims that his namesake
provided 100,000 men for the task, _Hor. Crueldades_, 42,
and Bernal Diaz states that this prince proposed purely a
strict blockade as a safe and sure plan. _Hist. Verdad._,
150. The result proves that this would have been the best
and as speedy as the one adopted, while the city would
have been saved from destruction. That the plan was ever
seriously suggested among this impatient crew is affirmed
by no other authority.