Chapter V: Book XX: Chap. I (1)

Political affairs—Their influence on the war—Napoleon’s invasion
of Russia—Its influence on the contest in the Peninsula—State
of feeling in England—Lord Wellesley charges the ministers and
especially Mr. Perceval with imbecility—His proofs thereof—Ability
and zeal of lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart shewn—Absurd plans of
the count of Funchal—Mr. Villiers and Mr. Vansittart—The English
ministers propose to sell the Portuguese crown and church lands—The
folly and injustice of these, and other schemes, exposed by lord
Wellington—He goes to Cadiz—His reception there—New organization
of the Spanish armies—Wellington goes to Lisbon where he is
enthusiastically received—His departure from Cadiz the signal for
renewed dissensions—Carlotta’s intrigues—Decree to abolish the
Inquisition opposed by the clergy—The regency aid the clergy—Are
displaced by the Cortez—New regency appointed—The American party in
the Cortez adopt Carlotta’s cause—Fail from fear of the people—Many
bishops and church dignitaries are arrested and others fly into
Portugal—The pope’s nuncio Gravina opposes the cortez—His benefices
sequestered—He flies to Portugal—His intrigues there—Secret
overtures made to Joseph by some of the Spanish armies 379

CHAP. II.

Political state of Portugal—Wellington’s difficulties—Improper
conduct of some English ships of war—Piratical violence of a
Scotch merchantman—Disorders in the military system—Irritation of
the people—Misconduct of the magistrates—Wellington and Stuart
grapple with the disorders of the administration—The latter calls
for the interference of the British government—Wellington writes a
remarkable letter to the prince regent and requests him to return
to Portugal—Partial amendment—The efficiency of the army restored,
but the country remains in an unsettled state—The prince unable
to quit the Brazils—Carlotta prepares to come alone—Is stopped by
the interference of the British government—An auxiliary Russian
force is offered to lord Wellington by admiral Greig—The Russian
ambassador in London disavows the offer—The emperor Alexander
proposes to mediate between England and America—The emperor of
Austria offers to mediate for a general peace—Both offers are
refused 409

CHAP. III.

Napoleon’s embarrassed position—His wonderful activity—His designs
explained—The war in Spain becomes secondary—Many thousand old
soldiers withdrawn from the armies—The Partidas become more
disciplined and dangerous—New bands are raised in Biscay and
Guipuscoa and the insurrection of the northern provinces creeps
on—Napoleon orders the king to fix his quarters at Valladolid, to
menace Portugal, and to reinforce the army of the north—Joseph
complains of his generals, and especially of Soult—Napoleon’s
magnanimity—Joseph’s complaints not altogether without foundation 430

CHAP. IV.

Operations south of the Tagus—Eroles and Codrington seek to entrap
the governor of Taragona—They fail—Sarzfield and Villa Campa unite
but disperse at the approach of Pannetier and Severoli—Suchet’s
position—Great force of the allies in his front—The younger
Soult engages the Spanish cavalry in La Mancha—General Daricau
marches with a column towards Valencia—Receives a large convoy and
returns to La Mancha—Absurd rumours about the English army rife
in the French camp—Some of lord Wellington’s spies detected—Soult
is recalled—Gazan assumes the command of the army of the
south—Suchet’s position described—Sir John Murray takes the command
of the Anglo-Sicilian troops at Alicant—Attacks the French post at
Alcoy—His want of vigour—He projects a maritime attack on the city
of Valencia, but drops the design because lord William Bentinck
recals some of his troops—Remarks upon his proceedings—Suchet
surprises a Spanish division at Yecla, and then advances against
Murray—Takes a thousand Spanish prisoners in Villena—Murray takes
a position at Castalla—His advanced guard driven from Biar—Second
battle of Castalla—Remarks 446

CHAP. V.

Operations north of the Tagus—Position of the French
armies—Palombini marches from Madrid to join the army of the
north—Various combats take place with the Partidas—Foy fails
to surprise the British post at Bejar—Caffarelli demands
reinforcements—Joseph misconceives the emperor’s plans—Wellington’s
plans vindicated against French writers—Soult advises Joseph to
hold Madrid and the mountains of Avila—Indecision of the king—He
goes to Valladolid—Concentrates the French armies in Old Castile—A
division under Leval remains at Madrid—Reille sends reinforcements
to the army of the north—Various skirmishes with the Partidas—Leval
deceived by false rumours at Madrid—Joseph wishes to abandon that
capital—Northern insurrection—Operations of Caffarelli, Palombini,
Mendizabel, Longa, and Mina—Napoleon recals Caffarelli—Clauzel
takes the command of the army of the north—Assaults Castro but
fails—Palombini skirmishes with Mendizabel—Introduces a convoy into
Santona—Marches to succour Bilbao—His operations in Guipuscoa—The
insurrection gains strength—Clauzel marches into Navarre—Defeats
Mina in the valley of Roncal and pursues him into Arragon—Foy acts
on the coast—Takes Castro—Returns to Bilbao—Defeats the Biscayen
volunteers under Mugartegui at Villaro, and those of Guipuscoa
under Artola at Lequitio—The insurrectional junta flies—Bermeo and
Isaro are taken—Operations of the Partidas on the great line of
communication 470

CHAP. VI.

Wellington restores the discipline of the allied army—Relative
strength of the belligerent forces—Wellington’s plans
described—Lord W. Bentinck again proposes to invade
Italy—Wellington opposes it—The opening of the campaign delayed by
the weather—State of the French army—Its movements previous to the
opening of the campaign 503

CHAP. VII.

Dangerous discontent of the Portuguese army—Allayed by
Wellington—Noble conduct of the soldiers—The left wing of the
allies under general Graham marches through the Tras os Montes
to the Esla—The right wing under Wellington advances against
Salamanca—Combat there—The allies pass the Tormes—Wellington
goes in person to the Esla—Passage of that river—Cavalry combat
at Morales—The two wings of the allied army unite at Toro on the
Duero—Remarks on that event—Wellington marches in advance—Previous
movements of the French described—They pass the Carion and Pisuerga
in retreat—The allies pass the Carion in pursuit—Joseph takes
post in front of Burgos—Wellington turns the Pisuerga with his
left wing and attacks the enemy with his right wing—Combat on
the Hormaza—The French retreat behind Pancorbo and blow up the
castle of Burgos—Wellington crosses the Upper Ebro and turns the
French line of defence—Santander is adopted as a dépôt station
and the military establishments in Portugal are broken up—Joseph
changes his dispositions of defence—The allies advance—Combat of
Osma—Combat of St. Millan—Combat of Subijana Morillas—The French
armies concentrate in the basin of Vittoria behind the Zadora 520

CHAP. VIII.

Confused state of the French in the basin of Vittoria—Two convoys
are sent to the rear—The king takes up a new order of battle—The
Gallicians march to seize Orduña but are recalled—Graham marches
across the hills to Murguia—Relative strength and position
of the hostile armies—Battle of Vittoria—Joseph retreats by
Salvatierra—Wellington pursues him up the Borundia and Araquil
valleys—Sends Longa and Giron into Guipuscoa—Joseph halts at
Yrursun—Detaches the army of Portugal to the Bidassoa—Retreats
with the army of the centre and the army of the south to
Pampeluna—Wellington detaches Graham through the mountains by
the pass of St. Adrian into Guipuscoa and marches himself to
Pampeluna—Combat with the French rear-guard—Joseph retreats up
the valley of Roncevalles—General Foy rallies the French troops
in Guipuscoa and fights the Spaniards at Montdragon—Retreats to
Bergara and Villa Franca—Graham enters Guipuscoa—Combat on the
Orio river—Foy retires to Tolosa—Combat there—The French posts
on the sea-coast abandoned with exception of Santona and St.
Sebastian—Foy retires behind the Bidassoa—Clauzel advances towards
Vittoria—Retires to Logroño—Wellington endeavours to surround
him—He makes a forced march to Tudela—Is in great danger—Escapes
to Zaragoza—Halts there—Is deceived by Mina and finally marches
to Jacca—Gazan re-enters Spain and occupies the valley of
Bastan—O’Donel reduces the forts of Pancorbo—Hill drives Gazan
from the valley of Bastan—Observations 548

LIST OF APPENDIX.

No. I.

Extracts of letters relating to the battle of Salamanca 585

No. II.

Copies of two despatches from the emperor Napoleon to the minister
at war relative to the duke of Ragusa 587

No. III.

Letter from the duke of Dalmatia to king Joseph, August 12, 1812 588

No. IV.

Letter from the duke of Dalmatia to the minister at war 590

No. V.

Letter from colonel Desprez to king Joseph, Paris, Sept. 22,
1812 593

No. VI. A.

Confidential letter from the duc de Feltre to king Joseph, Paris,
Nov. 10, 1812 595

No. VI. B.

Letter from colonel Desprez to king Joseph, Paris, Jan, 3, 1813 596

No. VII.

Letter from Napoleon to the duc de Feltre, Ghiart, Sept. 2, 1812 600

No. VIII. A.

Extract. General Souham’s despatch to the minister at war 602

No. VIII. B.

Extracts. Two letters from the duc de Feltre to king Joseph 602

No. IX.

Extract. Letter from marshal Jourdan to colonel Napier 603

No. X.

Letter from the duc de Feltre to king Joseph, Jan. 29, 1813 605

No. XI.

Ditto ditto 606

No. XII.

Ditto ditto, Feb. 12, 1813 608

No. XIII.

Ditto ditto, Feb. 12, 1813 609

No. XIV.

Two ditto ditto, March 12 and 18, 1813 611

No. XV.

Letter from Joseph O’Donnel to general Donkin 614

No. XVI.

Letter from the marquis of Wellington to major-general Campbell 616

No. XVII.

Extract. Letter from the marquis of Wellington to lieutenant-general
sir John Murray, April 6, 1813 617

No. XVIII.

General states of the French army, April 15, May 15, 1812, and
March 15, 1813 618

No. XIX.

Especial state of the army of Portugal, June 15, 1812;
loss of ditto 619

No. XX.

Strength of the Anglo-Portuguese army, July, 1812 620

No. XXI.

Losses of the allies, July 18, 1812 621

No. XXII.

Strength of the allies at Vittoria 622

LIST OF THE PLATES,

_To be placed together at Page 582_

No. 1. Explanatory Sketch of the Surprise of Almaraz, 1812.

2. Explanatory Sketch of the Sieges of the Forts and Operations
round Salamanca, 1812.

3. Battle of Salamanca, with a Sketch of Operations before and
after the Action.

4. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege of Burgos, 1812.

5. Sketch of the Retreat from Madrid and Burgos, 1812.

6. Explanatory Sketch of the Position of the Partidas and of
lord Wellington’s March from the Agueda to the Pyrenees,
1813.

7. Battle of Castalla and Operations before the Action.

8. Battle of Vittoria, with Operations before and after the
Action.

NOTICE

1º. In the present volume will be found a plan of the Peninsula on a very small scale, yet sufficient to indicate the general range of operations. A large map would be enormously expensive without any correspondent advantages to the reader; and it would only be a repetition of errors, because there are no materials for an accurate plan. The small one now furnished, together with the sketches which I have drawn and published with each volume, and which are more accurate than might be supposed, will give a clear general notion of the operations. Those who desire to have more detailed information will find it in Lieutenant Godwyn’s fine atlas of the battles in the Peninsula—a work undertaken by that officer with the sole view of forming a record of the glorious actions of the British army.

2º. Most of the manuscript authorities consulted for former volumes have been also consulted for this volume, and in addition the official correspondence of Lord William Bentinck; some notes by Lord Hill; the journal and correspondence of sir Rufane Donkin; a journal of Colonel Oglander, twenty-sixth regiment; a memoir by sir George Gipps, royal engineers; and a variety of communications by other officers. Lastly, authenticated copies of the official journals and correspondence of most of the marshals and generals who commanded armies in Spain. These were at my request supplied by the French War-office with a prompt liberality indicative of that military frankness and just pride which ought and does characterize the officers of Napoleon’s army. The publication of this volume also enables me with convenience to produce additional authorities for former statements, while answering, as I now do, the attacks upon my work which have appeared in the “Life of Sir Thomas Picton,” and in the “Quarterly Review.”

“Many there are that trouble me and persecute me; yet do I not
swerve from the testimonies,”—PSALM CXIX.

[Sidenote: Life of Picton, page 31.]

[Sidenote: Page 325.]

_Robinson’s Life of Picton._—This writer of an English general’s life, is so entirely unacquainted with English military customs, that he quotes a common order of the day, accrediting a new staff officer to the army, as a remarkable testimony to that staff officer’s talents. And he is so unacquainted with French military customs, that, treating of the battle of Busaco, he places a French marshal, Marmont, who by the way was not then even in Spain, at the head of a _division_ of Ney’s corps. He dogmatises upon military movements freely, and is yet so incapable of forming a right judgment upon the materials within his reach, as to say, that sir John Moore should not have retreated, because as he was able to beat the French at Coruña, he could also have beaten them in the heart of Spain. Thus setting aside the facts that at Coruña Moore had fifteen thousand men to fight twenty thousand, and in the heart of Spain he had only twenty-three thousand to fight more than three hundred thousand!

And lest this display of incompetency should not be sufficient, he affirms, that the same sir John Moore had, comparatively, greater means at Sahagun to beat the enemy than Lord Wellington had in the lines of Torres Vedras. Now those lines, which Wellington had been fortifying for more than a year, offered three nearly impregnable positions, defended by a hundred thousand men. There was a fortress, that of St. Julian’s, and a fleet, close at hand as a final resource, and only sixty thousand French commanded by Massena were in front. But sir John Moore having only twenty-three thousand men at Sahagun, had no lines, no fortifications for defence, and no time to form them, he was nearly three hundred miles from his fleet, and Napoleon in person had turned one hundred thousand men against him, while two hundred thousand more remained in reserve!

Any lengthened argument in opposition to a writer so totally unqualified to treat of warlike affairs, would be a sinful waste of words; but Mr. Robinson has been at pains to question the accuracy of certain passages of my work, and with what justice the reader shall now learn.[1]

1º. _Combat on the Coa._—The substance of Mr. Robinson’s complaint on this subject is, that I have imputed to general Picton, the odious crime of refusing, from personal animosity, to support general Craufurd;—that such a serious accusation should not be made without ample proof;—that I cannot say whether Picton’s instructions did not forbid him to aid Craufurd;—that the roads were so bad, the distance so great, and the time so short, Picton could not have aided him;—that my account of the action differs from general Craufurd’s;—that I was only a lieutenant of the forty-third, and consequently could know nothing of the matter;—that I have not praised Picton—that he was a Roman hero and so forth. Finally it is denied that Picton ever quarrelled with Craufurd at all; and that, so far from having an altercation with him on the day of the action he did not on that day even quit his own quarters at Pinhel. Something also there is about general Cole’s refusing to quit Guarda.

To all this I reply that I never did accuse general Picton of acting from personal animosity, and neither the letter nor the spirit of my statement will bear out such a meaning, which is a pure hallucination of this author. That the light division was not supported is notorious. The propriety of supporting it I have endeavoured to shew, the cause why it was not so supported I have not attempted to divine; yet it was neither the distance, nor the badness of the roads, nor the want of time; for the action, which took place in July, lasted from day-break until late in the evening, the roads, and there were several, were good at that season, and the distance not more than eight miles.

It is quite true, as Mr. Robinson observes, that I cannot affirm of my own knowledge whether the duke of Wellington forbade Picton to succour Craufurd, but I can certainly affirm that he ordered him to support him because it is so set down in his grace’s despatches, volume 5th, pages 535 and 547; and it is not probable that this order should have been rescinded and one of a contrary tendency substituted, to meet an event, namely the action on the Coa, which Craufurd had been forbidden to fight. Picton acted no doubt upon the dictates of his judgment, but all men are not bound to approve of that judgment; and as to the charge of faintly praising his military talents, a point was forced by me in his favour, when I compared him to general Craufurd of whose ability there was no question; more could not be done in conscience, even under Mr. Robinson’s assurance that he was a Roman hero.

The exact object of Mr. Robinson’s reasoning upon the subject of general Cole’s refusal to quit Guarda it is difficult to discover; but the passage to which it relates, is the simple enunciation of a fact, which is now repeated, namely, that general Cole being requested by general Craufurd to come down with his whole division to the Coa, refused, and that lord Wellington approved of that refusal, though he ordered Cole to support Craufurd under certain circumstances. Such however is Mr. Robinson’s desire to monopolize all correctness, that he will not permit me to know any thing about the action, though I was present, because, as he says, being only a lieutenant, I could not know any thing about it. He is yet abundantly satisfied with the accuracy of his own knowledge, although he was not present, and was neither a captain nor lieutenant. I happened to be a captain of seven years standing, but surely, though we should admit all subalterns to be blind, like young puppies, and that rank in the one case, as age in the other, is absolutely necessary to open their eyes, it might still be asked, why I should not have been able, after having obtained a rank which gave me the right of seeing, to gather information from others as well as Mr. Robinson? Let us to the proof.

In support of his views, he has produced, the rather vague testimony of an anonymous officer, on general Picton’s staff, which he deems conclusive as to the fact, that Picton never quarrelled with Craufurd, that he did not even quit Pinhel on the day of the action, and consequently could not have had any altercation with him on the Coa. But the following letters from officers on Craufurd’s staff, not anonymous, shew that Picton did all these things. In fine that Mr. Robinson has undertaken a task for which he is not qualified.

_Testimony of lieutenant-colonel Shaw Kennedy, who was on general
Craufurd’s staff at the action of the Coa, July 24, 1810._

“_Manchester, 7th November, 1835._

“I have received your letter in which you mention ‘_Robinson’s Life of Picton_;’ that work I have not seen. It surprises me that any one should doubt that Picton and Craufurd met on the day the French army invested Almeida in 1810. I was wounded previously, and did not therefore witness their interview; but I consider it certain that Picton and Craufurd did meet on the 24th July, 1810, on the high ground on the left bank of the Coa during the progress of the action, and that a brisk altercation took place between them. They were primed and ready for such an altercation, as angry communications had passed between them previously regarding the disposal of some sick of the light division. I have heard Craufurd mention in joke his and Picton’s testiness with each other, and I considered that he alluded both to the quarrel as to the sick; and to that which occurred when they met during the action at Almeida.

“J. S. KENNEDY.”

“_Colonel Napier, &c. &c. &c._”

_Testimony of colonel William Campbell, who was on general
Craufurd’s staff at the action on the Coa, July 24, 1810._

“_Esplanade, Dover, 13th Nov. 1835._

“Your letter from Freshford has not been many minutes in my hands; I hasten to reply. General Picton _did_ come out of Pinhel on the day of the Coa combat as you term it. It was in the afternoon of that day when all the regiments were in retreat, and general Craufurd was with his staff and others on the heights above, that, I think, on notice being given of general Picton’s approach, general Craufurd turned and moved to meet him. Slight was the converse, short the interview, for upon Craufurd’s asking enquiringly, whether general Picton did not consider it advisable to move out something from Pinhel in demonstration of support, or to cover the light division, in terms not bland, the general made it understood that ‘he should do no such thing.’ This as you may suppose put an end to the meeting, further than some violent rejoinder on the part of my much-loved friend, and fiery looks returned! We went our several ways, general Picton, I think, proceeding onwards a hundred yards to take a peep at the bridge. This is my testimony.

“Yours truly,
“WILLIAM CAMPBELL.”

“COLONEL NAPIER, &C. &C. &C.”

2º. _Battle of Busaco._—Mr. Robinson upon the authority of one of general Picton’s letters, has endeavoured to show that my description of this battle is a mass of errors; but it shall be proved that his criticism is so, and that general Picton’s letter is very bad authority.

In my work it is said that the allies resisted vigorously, yet the French gained the summit of the ridge, and while the leading battalions established themselves on the crowning rocks, others wheeled to their right, intending to sweep the summit of the Sierra, but were driven down again in a desperate charge made by the left of the third division.

Picton’s letter says, that the head of the enemy’s column got possession of a rocky point on the crest of the position, and that they were followed by the remainder of a large column which was driven down in a desperate charge made by the left of the third division.

So far we are agreed. But Picton gives the merit of the charge to the light companies of the seventy-fourth and eighty-eighth regiments, and a wing of the forty-fifth aided by _the eighth Portuguese regiment, under major Birmingham_, whereas, in the History the whole merit is given to the eighty-eighth and forty-fifth regiments. Lord Wellington’s despatch gives the merit to the forty-fifth, and eighty-eighth, aided by the eighth Portuguese regiment, _under colonel Douglas_. The “_Reminiscences of a Subaltern_,” written by an officer of the eighty-eighth regiment, and published in the United Service Journal, in like manner, gives the merit to the eighty-eighth and forty-fifth British regiments, and the _eighth Portuguese_.

It will presently be seen why I took no notice of the share the eighth Portuguese are said to have had in this brilliant achievement. Meanwhile the reader will observe that Picton’s letter indicates the _centre_ of his division as being forced by the French, and he affirms that he drove them down again with his _left_ wing without aid from the fifth division. But my statement makes both the _right_ and _centre_ of his division to be forced, and gives the fifth division, and especially colonel Cameron and the ninth British regiment, a very large share in the glory, moreover I say that the _eighth Portuguese was broken to pieces_. Mr. Robinson argues that this must be wrong, for, says he, the eighth Portuguese _were not broken_, and if the right of the third division had been forced, the French would have encountered the fifth division. To this he adds, with a confidence singularly rash, his scanty knowledge of facts considered, that colonel Cameron and the ninth regiment would doubtless have made as good a charge as I have described, “_only they were not there_.”

In reply, it is now affirmed distinctly and positively, that the French did break the eighth Portuguese regiment, did gain the rocks on the summit of the position, and on the _right_ of the third division; did ensconce themselves in those rocks, and were going to sweep the summit of the Sierra when the fifth division under general Leith attacked them; and the ninth regiment led by colonel Cameron did form under fire, as described, did charge, and did beat the enemy out of those rocks; and if they had not done so, the third division, then engaged with other troops, would have been in a very critical situation. Not only is all this re-affirmed, but it shall be proved by the most irrefragable testimony. It will then follow that the History is accurate, that general Picton’s letter is inaccurate, and the writer of his life incompetent to censure others.

Mr. Robinson may notwithstanding choose to abide by the authority of general Picton’s letter, which he “fortunately found amongst that general’s manuscripts,” but which others less fortunate had found in _print_ many years before; and he is the more likely to do so, because he has asserted that if general Picton’s letters are false, they are wilfully so, an assertion which it is impossible to assent to. It would be hard indeed if a man’s veracity was to be called in question because his letters, written in the hurry of service gave inaccurate details of a battle. General Picton wrote what he believed to be the fact, but to give any historical weight to his letter on this occasion, in opposition to the testimony which shall now be adduced against its accuracy, would be weakness. And with the more reason it is rejected, because Mr. Robinson himself admits that another letter, written by general Picton on this occasion to the duke of Queensbury, was so inaccurate as to give general offence to the army; and because his letters on two other occasions are as incorrect as on this of Busaco.

Thus writing of the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo, Picton says, “about this time, namely, when the third division carried the main breach, the light division which was rather late in their attack, also succeeded in getting possession of the breach they were ordered to attack.” Now it has been proved to demonstration, that the light division carried the small breach, and were actually attacking the flank of the French troops defending the great breach, when the third division carried that point. This indeed is so certain, that Mr. Uniack of the ninety-fifth, and others of the light division, were destroyed on the ramparts close to the great breach by that very explosion which was said to have killed general M’Kinnon; and some have gone so far as to assert that it is doubtful if the great breach would have been carried at all but for the flank attack of the light division.

Again, general Picton writing of the battle of Fuentes Onoro, says “the light division under general Craufurd was rather _roughly handled by the enemy’s cavalry_, and had that arm of the French army been as daring and active upon this occasion, as they were when following us to the lines of Torres Vedras, they would doubtless have cut off the light division to a man.”

Nevertheless as an eye-witness, and, being then a field-officer on the staff, by Mr. Robinson’s rule entitled to see, I declare most solemnly that the French cavalry, though they often menaced to charge, never came within sure shot distance of the light division. The latter, with the exception of the ninety-fifth rifles, who were skirmishing in the wood of Pozo Velho, was formed by regiments in three squares, flanking and protecting each other, they retired over the plain leisurely without the loss of a man, without a sabre-wound being received, without giving or receiving fire; they moved in the most majestic manner secure in their discipline and strength, which was such as would have defied all the cavalry that ever charged under Tamerlane or Genghis.

But it is time to give the proofs relative to Busaco, the reader being requested to compare them with the description of that battle in my History.

_Extracts from major-general sir John Cameron’s letters
to colonel Napier._

“_Government House, Devonport, Aug. 9th_, 1834.

“—I am sorry to perceive in the recent publication of lord Beresford, his ‘_Refutation of your justification of your third volume_,’ some remarks on the battle of Busaco which disfigure, not intentionally I should hope, the operations of the British brigade in major-general Leith’s corps on that occasion, of which I, as commanding officer of one of the regiments composing it, may perhaps be permitted to know something. I shall however content myself at present with giving you a detail of the operations of the British brigade in major-general Leith’s _own words_, extracted from a document in my possession, every syllable of which can be verified by many distinguished officers now living, some of them actors in, all of them eye-witnesses to the affair.

“‘The ground where the British brigade was now moving, was behind a chain of rocky eminences where it had appeared clearly, the enemy was successfully pushing to establish himself and precluded major-general Leith from seeing at that moment the progress the enemy was making, but by the information of staff officers stationed on purpose who communicated his direction and progress. Major-general Leith moved the British brigade so as to endeavour to meet and check the enemy when he had gained the ascendancy. At this time a heavy fire of musketry was kept upon the height, the smoke of which prevented a clear view of the state of things. When however the rock forming the high part of the Sierra became visible, the enemy appeared in full possession of it, and a French officer was in the act of cheering with his hat off, while a continual fire was kept up from thence and along the whole face of the Sierra, in a diagonal direction towards the bottom, by the enemy ascending rapidly from the successive columns formed for the attack, on a mass of soldiers from the eighth and ninth Portuguese regiments, who having been severely pressed had given way and were rapidly retiring in complete confusion and disorder. Major-general Leith on that occasion spoke to Major Birmingham (who was on foot, having had his horse killed), who stated that the fugitives were of the ninth Portuguese as well as the eighth regiment, and that he had ineffectually tried to check their retreat. Major-general Leith addressed and succeeded in stopping them, and they cheered when he ordered them to be collected and formed in the rear. They were passing as they retired diagonally to the right of the ninth British regiment. The face of affairs in this quarter now bore a different aspect, for the enemy who had been the assailant having dispersed or driven every thing opposed to him was in possession of the rocky eminence of the Sierra at this part of major-general Picton’s position without a shot then being fired at him. Not a moment was to be lost. Major-general Leith resolved instantly to attack the enemy with the bayonet. He therefore ordered the ninth British regiment, which had hitherto been moving rapidly by its left in column in order to gain the most advantageous ground for checking the enemy, to form the line, which they did with the greatest promptitude, accuracy, and coolness, under the fire of the enemy, who had just appeared formed on that part of the rocky eminence which overlooks the back of the ridge, and who had then for the first time perceived the British brigade under him. Major-general Leith had intended that the thirty-eighth regiment should have moved on in rear of, and to the left of, the ninth British regiment, to have turned the enemy beyond the rocky eminence which was quite inaccessible towards the rear of the Sierra, while the ninth should have gained the ridge on the right of the rocky height; the royal Scots to have been posted (as they were) in reserve. But the enemy having driven every thing before him in that quarter afforded him the advantage of gaining the top of the rocky ridge, which is accessible in front, before it was possible for the British brigade to have reached that position, although not a moment had been lost in marching to support the point attacked, and for that purpose it had made a rapid movement of more than two miles without halting and frequently in double-quick time. The thirty-eighth regiment was therefore directed to form also and support when major-general Leith led the ninth regiment to attack the enemy on the rocky ridge, which they did without filing a shot. That part which looks behind the Sierra (as already stated) was inaccessible and afforded the enemy the advantage of outflanking the ninth on the left as they advanced, but the order, celerity, and coolness with which they attacked panic-struck the enemy, who immediately gave way on being charged with the bayonet, and the whole was driven down the face of the Sierra in confusion and with immense loss, from a destructive fire which the ninth regiment opened upon him as he fled with precipitation after the charge.’

“I shall merely add two observations on what has been asserted in the ‘_Refutation_.’

“First with regard to the confusion and retreat of a portion of the Portuguese troops, I certainly did not know at the moment what Portuguese corps the fugitives were of, but after the action I understood they were belonging to the eighth Portuguese; a very considerable number of them were crossing the front of the British column dispersed in sixes and sevens over the field just before I wheeled the ninth regiment into line for the attack. I pushed on a few yards to entreat them to keep out of our way, which they understood and called out ‘_viva los Ingleses, valerosos Portugueses_.’

“As regards any support which the Portuguese afforded the British brigade in the pursuit, I beg to say that during the charge, while leading the regiment in front of the centre, my horse was killed under me, which for a moment retarded my own personal advance, and on extricating myself from under him, I turned round and saw the thirty-eighth regiment close up with us and the royal Scots appearing over the ridge in support; but did not see any Portuguese join in the pursuit, indeed it would have been imprudent in them to attempt such a thing, for at the time a brisk cannonade was opened upon us from the opposite side of the ravine.

“This, my dear colonel, is, on my honour, an account of the operations of the British brigade in major-general Leith’s corps at Busaco. It will be satisfactory to you to know that the information you received has been correct. The anonymous officer of the ninth regiment I do not know. There were several very capable of furnishing you with good information on the transactions of that day, not only as regarded their own immediate corps, but those around them. Colonel Waller I should consider excellent authority; that gallant officer must have been an eye-witness to all that passed in the divisions of Picton and Leith. I remember on our approach to the scene of confusion he delivered me a message from general Picton, intended for general Leith, at the time reconnoitring, to hasten our advance.”

“_Government House, Devonport, Aug. 21, 1834._

“——The fact really is that both the eighth and ninth Portuguese regiments gave way that morning, and I am positive that I am not far wrong in saying, that there were not of Portuguese troops within my view, at the moment I wheeled the ninth regiment into line, one hundred men prepared either for attack or defence. Sir James Douglas partly admits that his wing was broken when he says that ‘if we were at any time _broken_ it was from the too ardent wish of a corps of boy recruits to close.’ Now it is perfectly clear that the wing of the regiment under Major Birmingham fled, from what that officer said to general Leith. Sir James Douglas states also that ‘no candid man will deny that he supported the royals and ninth regiment, though before that he says, that ‘by an oblique movement he joined in the charge.’ I might safely declare on oath that the Portuguese never shewed themselves beyond the ridge of the Sierra that morning.

“Very faithfully yours,
“JOHN CAMERON.”

As these letters from general Cameron refer to some of marshal Beresford’s errors, as well as Mr. Robinson’s, an extract from a letter of colonel Thorne’s upon the same subject will not be misplaced here.

_Colonel Thorne to colonel Napier._

“_Harborne Lodge, 28th Aug. 1834._

Extract.—“Viscount Beresford in the ‘_Refutation of your Justification of your third volume_,’ has doubted the accuracy of the strength of the third dragoon guards and fourth dragoons on the 20th March 1811, as extracted by you from the journal which I lent to you. As I felt confident I had not inserted any thing therein, which I did not obtain from _official documents_, that were in my possession at the time it was written, I have, since the perusal of the ‘Refutation,’ looked over some of my Peninsula papers, and I am happy to say I have succeeded in finding amongst them, the monthly returns of quarters of the division of cavalry commanded by brigadier-general Long, dated Los Santos, April 20th, 1811, which was then sent to me by the deputy assistant quarter-master general of that division, and which I beg to enclose for your perusal, in order that you may see the statement I have made of the strength of that force in my journal _is to be relied upon, although his lordship insinuates to the contrary_, and that it contains _something more than_ ‘_the depositary of the rumours of a camp_.’”

_Extract from memorandum of the battle of Busaco, by colonel
Waller, assistant quarter-master-general to the second division._

“—The attack commenced on the right wing, consisting of Picton’s division, by the enemy opening a fire of artillery upon the right of the British which did but little injury, the range being too great to prove effective. At this moment were seen the heads of the several attacking columns, THREE, I THINK, in number, and deploying into line with the most beautiful precision, celerity, and gallantry.

“As they formed on the plateau they were cannonaded from our position, and the regiment of Portuguese, either the eighth or the _16th Infantry_, which were formed in advance in _front_ of the _74th regiment_, threw in some volleys of musketry into the enemy’s columns in a flank direction, but the regiment was quickly driven into the position.

“More _undaunted_ courage never was displayed by _French_ troops than on _this_ occasion: it could not have been surpassed, for their columns advanced in despite of a tremendous fire of grape and musketry from our troops in position in the rocks, and overcoming all opposition, although repeatedly charged by Lightburne’s brigade, or rather by the whole of Picton’s division, they advanced, and fairly drove the BRITISH RIGHT wing from the rocky part of the position.

“_Being an eye-witness_ of this critical moment, and seeing that unless the ground was quickly recovered _the right flank_ of the army would _infallibly_ be turned, and the _great road_ to Coimbra _unmasked_, seeing also that heavy columns of the enemy were descending into the valley to operate by the _road_, and to support the attack of the Sierra, and to cut off lord Wellington’s communication with Coimbra, I instantly galloped off to the rear to bring up general Hill’s corps to Picton’s support. Having proceeded about _two_ miles along the upper edge and reverse side of the Sierra, I fell in with the head of general Leith’s column moving _left in front_, at the head of which was colonel Cameron’s brigade, led by the ninth regiment. I immediately rode up to colonel Cameron, and addressed him in an anxious tone as follows.

“‘Pray, sir, who commands this brigade?’ ‘I do,’ replied the colonel, ‘I am colonel Cameron.’

“‘Then for God’s sake, sir, move off instantly at _double-quick_ with your brigade to Picton’s support; not _one moment_ is to be lost, the enemy in great force are already in possession of the _right of the position_ on the Sierra and have driven Picton’s troops out of it. Move on, and when the rear of your brigade has passed the Coimbra road wheel into line, and you will embrace the point of attack.’ Colonel Cameron did not hesitate _or balance_ an INSTANT, but giving the word ‘double-quick’ to his brigade nobly led them to battle and to victory.

“The brave colonel attacked the enemy with such a gallant and irresistible impetuosity, that after some time fighting he recovered the ground which Picton had lost, inflicting _heavy slaughter_ on the elite of the enemy’s troops. The ninth regiment behaved on this occasion with conspicuous gallantry, as _indeed_ did ALL the REGIMENTS engaged. Great numbers of the enemy had descended low down in the rear of the position towards the Coimbra road, and were killed; the whole position was thickly strewed with their killed and wounded; amongst which _were many of our own troops_. The French were the finest men I ever saw. I spoke to several of the wounded men, light infantry and grenadiers, who were bewailing their unhappy fate on being defeated, assuring me they were the heroes of Austerlitz who had never before met with defeat!

“ROBERT WALLER, _Lieut.-colonel_.”

_Extract of a letter from colonel Taylor, ninth regiment, to
colonel Napier._

“_Fernhill, near Evesham, 26th April, 1832._

“DEAR SIR,

“I have just received a letter from colonel Shaw, in which he quotes a passage from one of yours to him, expressive of your wish, if necessary, to print a passage from a statement which I made respecting the conduct of the ninth regiment at Busaco, and in reference to which, I have alluded to the discomfiture of the eighth Portuguese upon the same occasion. I do not exactly recollect the terms I made use of to colonel Shaw (nor indeed the shape which my communication wore) but, my object was to bring to light the distinguished conduct of the ninth without any wish to, unnecessarily, obscure laurels, which others wore, even at their expense!

“To account for the affair in question, I could not however well omit to state, that it was in consequence of the overthrow of the eighth Portuguese, that sir James Leith’s British brigade was called upon, and it is remarkable, that at the time, there was a considerable force of Portuguese (I think it was the old Lusitanian Legion which had just been modelled into two battalions) _between_ Leith’s British and where the eighth were being engaged, Leith pushed on his brigade double-quick, column of sections left in front, past these Portuguese, nor did he halt until he came in contact with the enemy who had _crowned the heights_ and were firing from behind the rocks, the ninth wheeled up into line, fired and charged, and all of the eighth Portuguese that was to be seen, at least by me, a company officer at the time, was some ten or a dozen men at _the outside_, with their commanding officer, but he and they were amongst the very foremost in the ranks of the ninth British. As an officer in the ranks of course I could not see much of what was going on generally, neither could I well have been mistaken as to what I did see, coming almost within my very contact! Colonel Waller, now, I believe on the Liverpool staff, was the officer who came to sir James Leith for assistance, I presume from Picton.

“Yours, &c.
“J. TAYLOR.”

_Second communication from major-general sir John
Cameron to colonel Napier._

_Stoke Devonport, Nov. 21st, 1835._

“MY DEAR COLONEL,

“Some months ago I took the liberty of pointing out to you certain mis-statements contained in a publication of lord Beresford regarding the operations of the British brigade in major-general Leith’s corps at the battle of Busaco, and as those mis-statements are again brought before the public in Robinson’s Life of sir Thomas Picton I am induced to trouble you with some remarks upon what is therein advanced. A paragraph in major-general Picton’s letter to lord Wellington, dated 10th November, 1810, which I first discovered some years ago in the Appendix No. 12 of Jones’s War in Spain, &c. &c. would appear to be the document upon which Mr. Robinson grounds his contradiction of your statement of the conduct of the ninth regiment at Busaco, but _that_ paragraph, which runs as follows, I am bound to say is _not_ the truth. ‘Major-general Leith’s brigade in consequence marched on, and arrived in time to _join_ the five companies of the forty-fifth regiment under the honourable lieutenant-colonel Meade and the eighth Portuguese regiment under lieutenant-colonel Douglas in repulsing the enemy.’ This assertion of major-general Picton is, I repeat, _not true_, for, in the first place I did not see the forty-fifth regiment on that day, nor was I at any period during the action near them or any other British regiment to my left. In the second, as regards the eighth Portuguese regiment, the ninth British did not most assuredly join _that_ corps in its retrograde movement. That major-general Picton left his right flank exposed, there can be no question, and had not assistance, and _British_ assistance too, come up to his aid as it did I am inclined to believe that sir Thomas would have cut a very different figure in the despatch to what he did!! Having already given you a detail of the defeat of the enemy’s column which was permitted to gain the ascendency in considerable force on the right of the third division, I beg leave to refer you to the gallant officers I mentioned in a former letter, who were not only eye-witnesses to the charge made by the ninth regiment but actually distinguished themselves in front of the regiment at the side of their brave accomplished general during that charge. I believe the whole of sir Rowland Hill’s division from a bend in the Sierra could see the ninth in their pursuit of the enemy, and though last not the least in importance, as a party concerned, I may mention the present major-general sir James T. Barns, who commanded the British brigade under major-general Leith, (I omitted this gallant officer’s name in my former letter) as the major-general took the entire command and from him alone I received all orders during the action.

“I have now done with Mr. Robinson and his work which was perhaps hardly worth my notice.

“I am, my dear Colonel,
“Very sincerely yours,
“J. CAMERON.”

Having now sufficiently exposed the weakness of Mr. Robinson’s attack upon me, it would be well perhaps to say with sir J. Cameron “I have done with his work,” but I am tempted to notice two points more.

Treating of the storming of Badajos, Mr. Robinson says,

“Near the appointed time while the men were waiting with increased anxiety Picton with his staff came up. The troops fell in, all were in a moment silent until the general in his calm and impressive manner addressed a few words to each regiment. The signal was not yet given, but the enemy by means of lighted carcasses discovered the position of Picton’s soldiers; to delay longer would only have been to expose his men unnecessarily; he therefore gave the word to march.”——“Picton’s soldiers set up a loud shout and rushed forward up the steep _to the ditch at the foot of the castle walls_.—General Kempt who had thus far been with Picton at the head of the division was here badly wounded and carried to the rear. Picton was therefore left alone to conduct the assault.”

Now strange to say Picton was not present when the signal was given, and consequently could neither address his men in his “usual calm impressive manner,” nor give them the word to march. There was no ditch at the foot of the castle walls to rush up to, and, as the following letter proves, general Kempt alone led the division to the attack.

_Extract of a letter from lieutenant-general sir James
Kempt, K. C. B., master-general of the Ordnance, &c. &c._

_Pall Mall, 10th May, 1833._

“According to the first arrangement made by lord Wellington, my brigade only of the third division was destined to attack the castle by escalade. The two other brigades were to have attacked the bastion adjoining the castle, and to open a communication with it. _On the day, however, before the assault_ took place, this arrangement was changed by lord Wellington, a French deserter from the castle (a serjeant of sappers) gave information that no communication could be established between the castle and the adjoining bastion, there being (he stated) only one communication between the castle and the town, and upon learning this, the whole of the third division were ordered by lord Wellington to attack the castle. But as my brigade only was originally destined for the service, and was to lead the attack, the arrangements for the escalade were in a great measure confided to me by general Picton.

“The division had to _file_ across a very narrow bridge to the attack under a fire from the castle and the troops in the covered way. It was ordered to commence at ten o’clock, but by means of fire-balls the formation of our troops at the head of the trench was discovered by the French, who opened a heavy fire on them, and the attack was commenced _from necessity_ nearly half an hour before the time ordered. I was severely wounded in the foot on the glacis after passing the Rivillas almost at the commencement of the attack _in the trenches_, and met Picton coming to the front on my being carried to the rear. If the attack had not commenced till the hour ordered, he, I have no doubt, would have been on the spot to direct in person the commencement of the operations. I have no _personal_ knowledge of what took place afterwards, but I was informed that after surmounting the most formidable difficulties, the escalade was effected by means of _two_ ladders only in the first instance in the middle of the night, and there can be no question that Picton was present in the assault. In giving an account of this operation, pray bear in mind that _he_ commanded the division, and to _him_ and the enthusiastic valour and determination of the troops ought its success alone to be attributed.

“Yours, &c.
“JAMES KEMPT.”

“_Colonel Napier, &c._”

The other point to which I would allude is the battle of Salamanca. Mr. Robinson, with his baton of military criticism, belabours the unfortunate Marmont unmercifully, and with an unhappy minuteness of detail, first places general Foy’s troops on the _left_ of the French army and then destroys them by the bayonets of the third division, although the poor man and his unlucky soldiers were all the time on the _right_ of the French army, and were never engaged with the third division at all. This is however but a slight blemish for Mr. Robinson’s book, and his competence to criticise Marmont’s movements is no whit impaired thereby. I wish however to assure him that the expression put into the mouth of the late sir Edward Pakenham is “_né vero né ben trovato_.” Vulgar swaggering was no part of that amiable man’s character, which was composed of as much gentleness, as much generosity, as much frankness, and as much spirit as ever commingled in a noble mind. Alas! that he should have fallen so soon and so sadly!! His answer to lord Wellington, when the latter ordered him to attack, was not, “I will, my lord, by God!” With the bearing of a gallant gentleman who had resolved to win or perish, he replied, “Yes, if you will give me one grasp of that conquering right hand.” But these finer lines do not suit Mr. Robinson’s carving of a hero; his manner is more after the coarse menacing idols of the South-Sea Islands, than the delicate gracious forms of Greece.

Advice to authors is generally thrown away, yet Mr. Robinson would do well to rewrite his book with fewer inaccuracies, and fewer military disquisitions, avoiding to swell its bulk with such long extracts from my work, and remembering also that English commissaries are not “_feræ naturæ_” to be hanged, or otherwise destroyed at the pleasure of divisional generals. This will save him the trouble of attributing to sir Thomas Picton all the standard jokes and smart sayings, for the scaring of those gentry, which have been current ever since the American war, and which have probably come down to us from the Greeks. The reduction of bulk, which an attention to these matters will produce, may be compensated by giving us more information of Picton’s real services, towards which I contribute the following information. Picton in his youth served as a marine, troops being then used in that capacity, and it is believed he was in one of the great naval victories. Mr. Robinson has not mentioned this, and it would be well also, if he were to learn and set forth some of the general’s generous actions towards the widows of officers who fell under his command: they are to be discovered, and would do more honour to his memory than a thousand blustering anecdotes. With these changes and improvements, the life of sir Thomas Picton may perhaps, in future, escape the equivocal compliment of the newspaper puffers, namely, that it is “a military romance.”

_Quarterly Review._—This is but a sorry attack to repel. “_Le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle_,” but “rats and mice and such small deer have been Tom’s food for many a year.”