Chapter VI: Part 6

_Adrian_ the sixth, _Marcel_ the second, _Urban_ the seventh, _Leo_ the tenth, were all _Popes_ very severe to their kindred, having all sworn solemnly at their Election never to admit their Kindred into _Rome_. And _Adrian_ the sixth was so extravagant that he persecuted them: For he refused to give a recompense to one of his Relations who had done the Church very good service, only because he was his Relation.

But Divine Providence, which delights not to see Nature despis’d, reveng’d this indiscreet Zeal upon these _Popes_; for they all liv’d but a very little after their Creation. _Adrian_ liv’d but one year: _Marcello_, _Urban_, and _Leo_ liv’d all three together, not two Months compleat.

So _Innocent_ the Eighth, _Julius_ the Second, _Pius_ the Fifth, and our _Alexander_ that now reigns, were at first strangely averse from their Kindred, which was interpreted by the People for nothing but Hypocrisie and Policy, that they might acquire the Title of Saints and Holy Men; for, a little after they were setled in their Kingdom, and in the Opinion of the Vulgar, they all found out some excuse or another to authorize their change; and particularly our _Alexander_, who is now as kind as he was severe at first. And for my part I must confess, that I always laughed at _Alexander_, for his pretended zeale, in keeping his Relations at a distance; and I never began to have a true respect for him, and believe him really a Saint, till he had brought them to _Rome_.

And if Christ himself has left us written in the Gospel, _That we ought not to despise our own Flesh_, how can any _Pope_ justifie an aversion to his Kindred?

Therefore I do not like that Answer of our _Pope Alexander_ to the Cardinal _Medicis_, who did make it his business to oblige the _Pope_ to call _Don Mario_ to _Rome_; for he answered this Cardinal’s Prayers and Entreaties with these words of Christ, _They are our Brothers and Sisters that do the Will of the Lord_; as if his Brother had done the Will of the Devil. And in the Example of Christ he was mistaken; for he did not despise his Brothers, as having never had any; wherefore his Words were mystical, and contained some more secret sense. But we see that Christ himself did shew particular favour to his Relations, as to the two _Johns_, the _Baptist_, and the _Apostle_; declaring one to be the greatest of Prophets, and giving to the other the liberty of laying his head in his lap. But more than that, he recommended his proper Mother the Blessed Virgin, to the Apostle _John_; and all the Evangelists own, that he was Christ’s Favourite, and his Beloved.

After this Example, we need no other; and no body can be so bold as to pretend, That it is Piety not to own ones Relations, if Christ himself lov’d his so dearly.

But the _Popes_ are not so much to blame, as those that blame the _Popes_ for their affections to their Kindred: For, alas! the _Popes_ are Men, as we are; and, as such, ought to be allowed something of our fragility. But in what a _Labyrinth_ are they engaged? For if they are really averse and cruel to their own Blood, then Nature, Heaven, the Example of Christ, and all the Reason of the World, does condemn them for inhumane, ungrateful, and barbarous.

And if they are kind, and do receive them into _Rome_, advance them, give them Places and Honours, then Pasquins, Murmurs, Raileries, Affronts, and a thousand Tales of them, are the recompense they are to expect from the Vulgar, who send their Cries to Heaven, and their Complaints about the World against them.

Those _Popes_ that first invented the Title of _Cardinal Padrone_, had it may be a mind to imitate our Saviour, who declared _John_ the Evangelist his Cosin, to be his Favorite and beloved Disciple: For _Gregory_ the Fifteenth was wont to call his Nephew _Ludovisio_, his beloved _John_, though his Name was _Lewis_; and he did so to shew, That since Christ declared in favour of his Cosin, the _Popes_ might also declare in favour of their Nephews.

For my part, I am of opinion, that let them do what they will, it is not in their power not to love their Relations, and to abstain from doing of them all the good imaginable. And we have seen the experience of this in _Alexander_ the Seventh, who made as if he had had no affection for them; but Nature soon made him lay aside this Mask, and profess himself a Man, as the rest.

This is then one of the Reasons that move the _Popes_ to be so tender of their Kindreds Advantages: But there is a second, which is not any ways inferiour to this, which is the preservation of their proper Person.

One of the greatest misfortunes of a Princely Life, is the perpetual care and sollicitude they are in, of preserving themselves. Their Goodness is often the subject of their Neighbours Envy. If they be wicked, they are hated by their own Subjects. So that often they are in doubt which they shall chuse to be, Good or Bad.

Was there a greater Prince than _Henry_ the Third of _France_? Was there ever any thing more magnanimous and good, than _Henry_ the Fourth his Successor? And yet their Greatness, their Bounty, and their Generosity, could not preserve their Persons, but saw their blood shed most miserably by the hands of barbarous Murderers.

But was there ever a better Prince in the World than the late King of _England_, _Charles_ the First, who had no fault but that he was too good? And yet such Royal Goodness could not preserve him (I tremble to speak of it) from the barbarous hands of his own Subjects; and upon an ignominious Scaffold, was forced to lose his Life by a fatal Ax.

What are Kingdoms and States, to any body, if they must be perpetually from morning to night busied about their own preservation? And what a misfortune to a Man is a Kingdom, if to preserve himself from his own Subjects, he must be fain to raise Cittadels and build Castles in all the places where he goes, that he can never sleep, if Guards and Sentinels do not watch for him? Certainly a Subject’s condition, that takes his rest without fear, is much more to be valued, than the perpetual perplexity of a fearful Prince.

The _Popes_ nevertheless are these unfortunate Men, and are more exposed to the danger of being made away, than all the Princes of _Christendom_. For if any body be so bold and wicked as to wish and desire the death of a Prince whose Crown is Hereditary; yet he stops in his Enterprise, and considers, That he must fear the Sons Vengeance. Those Men who consented to the death, or, to say better, pronounced Sentence upon the late King of _England_, wheresoever they are now, they do without doubt repent their Action; and if they had ever thought of the happy Restauration of _Charles_ the Second, they had dealt otherwise with his Father. So that I must say, by the leave of those _Cromwellian_ Politicians, That they were but pittiful ones that could not foresee that. Wo be to those that offend a Prince, in hopes that his Heir will forget the offence.

This Reason procures some Security to Princes of an Hereditary Kingdom, and makes the _Popes_ endeavour to find out some means also to secure themselves by their Kindred: For it is well known how many _Popes_ have been poysoned and made away, sometimes by Emperours, sometimes by the People, sometimes by particular Persons; and yet no body has ever taken upon them to revenge their death. And why? Because that their Kindred, not being Heirs of their Power, are not in a capacity to shew their resentment; and are much more busied in getting into the next _Pope’s_ favour, who is ordinarily their Enemy, than in revenging their Uncle’s death.

The Cardinals themselves, who for their own Interest are not much concerned in the _Pope’s_ preservation, do not trouble themselves to inquire by what means he came to his end; ’tis enough for them that the Popedom is vacant, and that they have the Authority of chusing a Successor, who must be one of themselves.

The _Popes_ Lives are a perpetual War; for without they are set upon by the Cares and Troubles of their Employment, and within by the fear of death, which is so great in them, that they are afraid of the very Air they breath.

_Sixtus_ the Fifth went one day to the Convent of the Apostles, which was assigned to the Fryars of the Order he had bin of: and coming in of a sudden without giving any warning, met in their Refectory with a Brother who was eating a Mess of Beans very hungrily. The good _Pope_ remembring his ancient condition, sat down by him upon a wooden Form, and fell to eating with as great an appetite as the Brother, and made him fill the Dish up again when they had emptied it.

The _Pope’s_ Followers wondered, and were much surprized at his Phancy, or rather extravagant Appetite; but he taking no notice of them, continued to eat on with his wooden Spoon, the Beans that were very well oyled. At last having emptied the Dish a second time, and thanked the Brother for his kindness, he turned to his Followers and said, _This Dish of Beans will make me live two years longer than I should have done_; _for I have eaten them with pleasure_, _and without fear_. Then lifting up his hands and eyes to Heaven, he blessed God that had given a _Pope_ once in his life an occasion of eating a meals Meat in quiet.

_Pius_ the Fifth, who was very lean, was used to say, _That it was impossible that the_ Popes _should ever grow fat_, _for that Nature in them was never supplied but in fear_. And yet this _Pope_ was one of the holiest and best; though it is true, That Holiness is subject to Envy, and therefore obliged to preserve it self against the malignity of its Enemies.

And indeed the diligence which the _Popes_ use in preserving themselves, is such, that it cannot chuse but communicate to them a continual apprehension of some imminent danger: for they do not only watch what they eat, but they never eat any thing which has not been first tasted by those that dress it, and serve it up; chusing ordinarily upon a sudden, and not bespeaking that which they like.

_Paul_ the Fourth was wont to give the greatest part of his Dinner to those that stood by, and make them eat it in his presence; and then often he would take some of that which they had left: So that the whole Court was in perpetual fear, seeing the _Pope_ so timerous.

But fear is not only inseparable from them at Table, but at the Altar too; where they never eat the consecrated Host, before they have given a part of it to the Sacristan there present, whose care it is to provide them, and to eat that part which he receives from the _Pope_; who having divided it into two parts, gives him sometimes the right side, sometimes the left, as he pleases.

The same precaution is used in the taking of the Cup or Chalice, which the _Pope_ never tastes, till the Sacristan has drunk some of it before him. So that it is evident, That the _Popes_ do use many more preventions than any other Prince.

Now if it be thus with them, can they do better than to call about them their proper Kindred, into whose hands they may commit their Persons? Who will take a greater care of their preservation, than they who hope for Riches and Honour to their Family? And who will take the pains to contribute to the lasting of any Empire, but he that has the greatest share in the enjoyments of it?

Those _Popes_ who at first seemed averse from their Relations, having in a small time come to know the difficulty of their own preservation in the hands of Strangers, have immediately called them to _Rome_, and thrown themselves into their Arms, as a place of Refuge against so many who had an interest to destroy them; and by all sorts of Favours, sought to make it their Kindreds Interest to love and take care of them.

It may be that _Urban_ the Eighth, who lived 23 Years _Pope_, had not attained to half that Age, if the _Barberins_ had not used all imaginable means to prolong his life; which else would have been plotted against by both Princes and private persons. But no body durst undertake that which seemed impossible. And without doubt, the care they took of him, did exceed the desire he had of living; for old age was become a burden to him at last.

_Innocent_ the Tenth, after the Design of getting the Kingdom of _Naples_ from the _Spaniard_ was discovered, stood in perpetual fear, lest, to be revenged, they should plot his death; which it may be they had done, if _Donna Olympia_ had not taken the care to dress his Meat, and feed him with her own hands: and in acknowledgment of her kindness, he would often say to her, _Sister_, _do you take care of me_, _and I’le take care that the Popedom shall be yours_.

_Pius_ the Third, of the Family of _Picolomini_ of _Siena_, had not died by poyson, procured him by _Pandolfo Petruccii_ Tyrant of the said place, if he had had some of his Relations neer him; whereupon he was forced to trust his life in Strangers hands, and lose it miserably, before he could see any of his Kindred about him.

But here some body will say, _That indeed it would not be amiss that the_ Pope _should resign the care of his Person to his Kindred_, _but not give them an unlimited Power over Church and State_; _That it is fit they do not want necessaries_, _but that he should not go about to content their insatiability_. To this we will answer in time and Place; it is enough for the present to have proved, That they are the most necessary Instruments of the _Popes_ preservation. And because the obligation of him that receives his life from another is infinite, therefore the _Popes_ do think, that they cannot repay but by infinite Gifts and Favours. Now we will pass to the third Reason, which is, The Reason of State.

The State or Politick Government of the Church, is the most unfortunate and miserable in the World; for it is neither Commonwealth nor Monarchy: and as an ingenious Prelate said, _It is neither from God nor the Devil_. And the causes of its Misery are divers; but particularly one is, Because the Supreme Governour always dying without Heirs, there is no body left to take pity of the grievances which are continually introduc’d by the Governours of Provinces who rule as they please.

Many compare all the Ecclesiastick State to a Town taken by an Enemy, who being out of hopes to keep it any time falls to plundering and destroying it, carrying away all that’s good; and leaving to the poor Citizens nothing but the liberty of venting their complaints: Just so do the Church-men who are in authority in one _Pope’s_ life; for foreseeing that their power is like to expire with him, and be resigned up to his Successor, they make Hay while the Sun shines, and use all manner of Extortions and Violences in their respective places for fear else of departing with their hands empty. And the people are so far from obtaining redress from those that succeed them, that they had rather be under the Government of their old Masters; for the new ones come with intention to do as much, if not worse, than the others.

In the time of _Francesco Maria della Rovere_, last Duke of _Urbin_, his Creatures seeing him past hopes of having any Heirs; and that after his death the Estate was like to fall to the Church, as being a Feife of it, they applyed themselves to make their advantage by all means; that is, they plunder’d and ruin’d it, that they might leave it bare to the Church-men their Successors. Particularly, when they saw the Duke languishing in a decrepit Age, they then bestirr’d themselves, and flew about like so many Bees to suck the rest of the Honey: But he hapning to live longer than they expected they were at a loss, and had drained all the State so dry; that they themselves were fain to sit and look upon the desolate condition of that Dukedom without being able to make it worse.

It came thus lean and impoverished into the Church-mens hands, who, for all they have such good Stomachs, were fain to forbear eating for the first seven years, till it had gathered a little flesh again; and then they fell to devouring of it afresh, and have since continued to do so: no sooner perceiving it to be a little recruited, but they extenuate it with Taxes, Impositions, and Extortions.

That which hapned once to the Dutchy of _Urbin_, happens often to the whole state of the Church; for as soon as the Governours, and other subordinate Officers, see the _Pope_ drawing to his end, and by consequence that their time of getting is also ready to expire, every new _Pope_ advancing new Creatures, there is no sort of Violence, Theft, Robbery, or Extortion that they do not commit in their respective charges: which they no sooner resign to new Officers, but that they who come in poor, and must maintain the _Decorum_ of their places, invent some new way of vexing the poor people, and enriching themselves; giving afterwards a little respite to the people to breath in, and by that time the _Pope_ is a dying, and then they fall on a fresh.

So that it appears that the Popedom being Elective and not Hereditary, causes all these misfortunes to the State and people; for this makes every body think of the present, and none of the future, there being no future amongst Church-men.

But if this inconveniency be great, it would without doubt prove much more intolerable, if the _Pope_ had no Kindred to help them in the Government of the State and Church; For though it seem that a _Nipotismo_ is directly bent upon its own profit and advantage: yet for divers reasons and respects they do preserve many places from ruine, and many Subjects from oppression. Whereas if the _Pope_ were without them, he would be forced to trust to a great number of Governours, who would every one be as greedy, and as absolute as a Nephew; and Lord it as high with the title of _Dominus Dominantium_.

The Nephews, who are few in number, take upon them to be both Shepherds, and Shearers; Treasurers, and Extorters: so that they suffer no body to grow rich but for them, nor to rise but by their means and to their profit, nor to take from others except it be to present them. For woe be to those Ministers of State, or subordinate Officers, that dare contradict a Nephew’s Will; or do any thing without their Order.

Now this being so, it is evident that it is more easie to satisfie one mans avidity than a hundreds. If the Nephews were not, every Prelate, every Bishop, every Abbot, every Cardinal, would treat the Church as the Jews did our Saviour’s Garments; that is, divide it amongst them: and it may be, would leave nothing for their Successors; for their Maximes are indeed to live well themselves, but not to provide that others may do so too.

The _Nipotismo_ looks upon the Popedom as their own, and so they have some consideration for a thing in which they pretend a propriety. When once their Purse is full they let it breath, and recover its forces. ’Tis true that that seldom falls out; for we have seen the _Barbarins_, enjoy the state of the Church for three and twenty years: and yet shew as much avidity when they were upon the point to leave it, as when they first entred upon it.

Besides this, if _Rome_ were without a _Nipotismo_, the Government of the City would be every day in new hands; every Church-man’s ambition being to climbe up to the top of the Wheel, and supplant him that stands next to the Soveraign Power. So that the Church would be in one Pontificate, tossed like a ball from one to the other; and that most commonly by very unskilful persons: the mystery of Church-Government being a thing not to be mastered but by those who stay long in it, and acquire great experience in the management of affairs.

Moreover, if the State were governed by different Persons under the Reign of one _Pope_, it would be a very hard matter to find out the Author of the Peoples miseries, every one having his Predecessors actions for an excuse; so that men would also lose that poor consolation of being able to show their Tormenters: But it is not so when a _Nipotismo_ governs, for then as they have the Honour, and Riches; so must they endure the Reproaches, and Complaints made against their Government, which the _Romans_ do without mercy, making the air sound and repeat their murmurs with a thousand Echoes.

These reasons do sometimes prevail upon the _Pope’s_ Kindred to make them abstain from doing all the mischief they would do; or at least they suffer not others to commit crimes and faults which they know will be laid to their charge: and of the imputation of which they shall be sure to be heirs as well as of their Uncle’s riches.

And indeed, how would it be possible for the State of the Church, which is a Monarchy, to be governed well if it were governed as a Republick. For in Commonwealths the Governours are the Citizens and Natives themselves, who being sure that the State they govern, is their own, do administer with Justice and Equity; first, as reaping a benefit by their moderation; And secondly, as being sure to expect a punishment when they are out of their charges: But the _Pope_ having the disposing of all places and charges, does often advance Strangers; who have no design but of making their own Fortune, and who, when once removed from their dignities, may either leave the State, or else procure impunity by a part of those riches which they have extorted from the poor people. It is much better therefore that there should be a _Nipotismo_, into whose hands the _Popes_ may trust their Government and Person; and who by the purchase which they make of great Estates do, as it were, settle themselves within the State: and may fear the being called to an account for their violences, if they exceed measure.

There are three other reasons which seem to conclude very strongly in favour of a _Nipotismo_, which are these:

That the _Pope_ may more easily discover the interests of Foreign Princes; That he may be able to govern with more care and affection; And that he may be able to carry on the Negotiations of his Court with more secrecy.

And indeed, it would not only be difficult, but almost impossible for the _Pope_ to dive into the hidden interests and designs of Foreign Princes without a _Nipotismo_; For how could he trust Strangers with his secrets, if he could not be assured that they would reciprocally reveal to him all theirs. The Ministers of State would be easily corrupted to betray the _Pope_ their Master, and incline much more to oblige Princes, upon whom, because of their hereditary and settled condition, they might relie, than to be faithful to one who might fail every moment; and with him all their hopes and expectations.

Besides, the Princes themselves would hardly condescend to reveal their secrets, and treat of important matters in the Court of _Rome_, when they should know and see that they must confide in strangers, whom another Prince might bribe and corrupt to their disadvantage; For just so far do Soveraigns trust the _Pope_ as they see about him people, in whom he may trust himself.

_Urban_ the eighth deserves no small praises for his Policy, all along his Reign: but particularly, for his method and way of treating with the Soveraigns of _Europe_; whose secrets were all revealed to him, whereas none of his were revealed to them again. For the same means, which he used to discover others designs, help him to conceal his own.

For having created his two Nephews Cardinals, and gave them instructions worthy such a politick head as his was, he made one of them declare for _Spain_, and the other for _France_; each of them making demonstration of an extraordinary kindness for the Crown they protected. Which thing proved most fortunate to the _Pope_, and successful in the design he had, to be Master of the secrets of both Kings.

Now that this was a design of the Uncle, and no particular inclination of the Nephews, appears easily; because that Cardinal _Antonio_, who sided with the French, had never had any communication with this Nation before his being made Cardinal: neither had he received from them any kindness that could endear him to their Party: Nay, indeed he had rather reason to encline to the Spaniards, from whom he had received many courtesies worth acknowledging; but he followed in this his Uncle’s suggestions.

The Cardinal _Francesco_ on the other side who had never any great inclination for _Spain_, and who in the services he did do them, did not appear with that violence that Cardinal _Antonio_ did; for the _French_ would nevertheless in obedience to his Uncle often declare for them: and in some occasions show a great deal of affection and desire to oblige a Crown, which did seek after his protection.

_Urban_ having thus assigned the care of the interest of these two Potent Princes to his Nephews, could not chuse but be perfectly informed of their designs, and secret intrigues of their Courts; whose Ministers and Ambassadours in order to a further discovery of the _Pope’s_ inclinations, were forced to communicate before hand a great part of their secrets to the Cardinal, Protector of their Kingdom, in hopes by his means of diving further into that which was yet hidden to them: but most commonly they got little light and intelligence by it, for the Nephews following exactly their Uncle’s Instructions, did endeavour to pump every body else, and keep themselves close. Their Uncle in the mean time well informed on both hands, was sure to take just measures; and by an even carriage so to entertain the affections of both Kings, as to make them both his Friends: and really one who could govern a Popedom so well, and easily, betwixt so opposed and different Interests, did deserve to govern as long as _Urban_ did.

_Innocentius_ might have been named for one of the greatest Politicians in the world, if his Sister-in-law had not lead him astray; or rather if he had been guilty of an unparalell’d inconstancy in changing so often his _Nipotismo_.

For they that were disgraced did immediately reveal to Princes all the secrets of his Court, and they who came in their room could never penetrate into the hidden designs of Forreign Courts; for the Princes of those Kingdoms and States durst not trust them with any thing, as being alwayes afraid, lest they should be turned off as the first.

And in effect, as soon as the news of the adoption of Cardinal _Astalli_ was spread abroad, there were many that laid great wagers, that he would not conserve himself in his post long; and the grounds they went upon, was the unconstant humour of the Pope, which no body could trust to.

Cardinal _Mazarine_ himself being weary of so many extravagant changes in the _Nipotismo_ of _Innocentius_, and seeing _Astalli_ fallen out of his favour, and the _Barberins_ in his place, said to one of his Confidents, in the presence of a French Protestant, these words, _I have never relyed much upon the Cardinal_ Astalli; _and I shall now scarce rely upon the Pope himself_. Many Princes both of _Italy_ and _Germany_ were of Cardinal _Mazarine’s_ minde in this, and became very cautious in all their negotiations; avoiding all occasions of treating with his Holiness, as knowing that nothing could be well managed in such divisions, and changes.

Thus we see, that not only the _Popes_ must have near them those that have the title of Nephews; but they must be really such, as by consanguinity may be obliged to the same interest with the _Pope_, if he means that others should trust them. This is the only way to make the _Popes_ appear Sovereigns, as really they desire to be; and any other way they will seem rather to be the Heads of a Commonwealth than absolute Princes.

It is fit therefore, that they should be allowed a _Nipotismo_ for their own and others safety; but it is not just that they should so indulge this _Nipotismo_, as to set it above themselves, and become its slaves. Let them treat with Princes, but let them not become so themselves, and usurp the _Pope’s_ Authority, so far as to use it without his knowledge, and often contrary to the Interests of the Church and State.

Let them not do as _Gregory_ the 15th. who had given to the Cardinal _Ludovisio_ his Nephew, so great an Authority of doing and saying what he pleased, without so much as consulting his Uncle, that he was really become _Pope_, and the _Pope_ as if he had been the Nephew; and if ever he come and give him part of any secret negotiation, it was because the thing was so intricate, that he either could not, or durst not undertake to come to execution, without being first fortified with his Uncle’s advice and approbation.

But the best was, that the _Pope_ himself did not dare to ask him any questions about business, or inform himself otherwise; but sometimes would be whole weeks together without so much as seeing the face of an Ambassadour, or publick Minister: his Nephew in the mean time giving Audience, and concluding all business with them.

And the _Pope_ was so customed to this usage, that it never came into his minde to be offended at it; but would very contentedly make amends for those faults which his Nephew did often commit in his administration: and whensoever he did see his Nephew come into his presence, he would say, _Nephew_, _I am sure ’tis some very hard and intricate business that brings you hither_, _for else we should scarce be repaired to for counsel_. And he had a great deal of reason to say so, for his Nephew did never communicate to him any negotiation, except he had first spoiled it, and brought himself to a _non-plus_; and then the _Pope_ would oblige the Congregations of the Cardinals to take the business into their care, and set right again that which had been spoiled by his inability.

The second reason for the _Nipotismo_ is, that the _Popes_ may be able to govern with more care and affection. There is nothing that forces more a Prince to answer the ends of Government, and to oblige his people, than when he considers that the Government is to descend to his Heirs; for a Prince without a Successor does often dissipate and spoil that which he would preserve, if he had any body to leave it to.

The State of _Venice_ which never established any Law without having first deliberated upon it, and sifted it in their Council of _Pregadi_, does think fit to oblige the kindred of the dead Duke to answer for their Kinsman’s misdemeanours and miscarriages; fining them in great summes of money for a reparation of his faults: so that often they are fain to endure for the dead Duke those punishments, which his Dignity when he was alive, and his death, have preserved him from.

The effect of this is, that the Dukes of _Venice_ do comport themselves with all moderation and equity, following exactly those rules of Government which they receive from the State; And the fear they are in of leaving their Relations engaged in a painful satisfaction for their faults, does oblige them to study night and day how they may serve the publick: in doing which, they do at the same time oblige their Countrey, themselves, and their Kindred; whereas else they might be subject to follow their own private interests, to the prejudice and detriment of all the Commonwealth.

The _Popes_ have almost the same fear upon them, and by consequent the like obligation; for the only consideration of leaving their Relations engaged with too powerful enemies, has often made them desist from enterprizes, which would have proved fatal to their State, and all Christendom.

_Urban_ the 8th. did often protest, that if it had not been out of a kindeness to his Nephews, he would either have hazarded the Popedom, or have brought Princes to his will.

The _Popes_ know very well by experience, that there is no way to preserve their _Nipotismo_ from the persecution which ordinarily they are to expect from their Successours; whensoever their Successors are such as come with pre-occupation against them, and finde in the Government of the Church and State so many abuses, which do quicken their indignation against the precedent _Nipotismo_.

This is a very great tye upon them in their administration, which appears if once they come to cast it off.

_Paul_ the 4th. who had much of a barbarous and inhumane humour in him, more becoming a Souldier than a Pope; as soon as he had banished his Nephew from _Rome_, did do things with a great deal more resolution and insolence than before: insomuch that it seemed, as if he had a minde to reduce all the world under his Laws, and force Christendom to follow the dictates of his _Capriccio_.

The Ministers of Princes who had to do with him, did extremely complain of this his proceeding; for he did no less than threaten them all upon every occasion: and one day particularly as the Spanish Ambassador was complaining to him of some occasion of disgust which his Holiness had given the Crown of _Spain_, he answered him in a fume, _That he had now no Nephews to care for_; _and that suppos’d_, _That his actions did deserve to be blamed_, _he little cared_: _for with his death all resentments would vanish_: meaning he was no longer concerned for his Relations, for whose sake he had all this while contained himself within the limits of the Papal Dignity.

Some say that _Julius_ the second did bear a great affection to his Kindred, but did forbear any demonstrations of kindeness to them out of a more solid Principle of Love; which was, That they might not receive any reproaches or injuries after his death, for those faults which he might have committed in his life time: for having resolved to do nothing but make War, and lead a Souldiers life, as indeed he did, he would infallibly have drawn the revenge of all his Enemies upon his kindred, to whom therefore he shewed himself averse.

And indeed it was wisely done of him, and kindely; for it was impossible but so warlike a humour as his was, must needs offend many Princes, who all would have been revenged upon his _Nipotismo_, as Authors, and Partakers of their Uncle’s Designs.

If _Urban_ had done the same thing, the persecution of the _Barberins_ had not been at all, or at least had not been so violent; but the great Authority with which they appeared under him, did make Princes believe that all the _Pope’s_ actions were of their plotting and managing.

So, when the Duke of _Parma_, and the Princes his allyes made War against the Church, they declared to all the world that they had no design to offend the _Pope_; but only to be revenged of the _Barberins_, whose ambition they accused as the Motive of the War.

Quite contrary, All the errors and miscarriages of _Innocent_ the 10th. were never imputed to his Nephew the Prince _Pamphilio_; for every body knew well, that he had no share in the administration of the Government, and yet he is in possession of all those riches and vast summes of money which _Donna Olympia_ his Mother had got together: and no doubt if she were now alive, she would certainly be in very great danger, if it were only, because of that opinion which Princes had conceived of the Authority with which she rul’d, and was thought to have a hand in all the transactions of her Brother’s Pontificate.

And on the other side, that tender affection which the Pope did bear to his Sister-in-law, was very useful towards the abating something of the violence of the _Pope’s_ temper, diverting him from all thoughts of War, and keeping him from entring into Leagues and Confederacies with Princes, with whom he desired to live in peace.

When the revolution of _Naples_ happened, which was the greatest occasion that ever any _Pope_ had to possess himself of that Kingdom, he was so far from attempting it, that he would never so much as say a word, or enter into deliberation about it; not that he wanted courage or desire: but only because he would not leave _Donna Olympia_, and his Kindred, involved in an irreconcilable War with _Spain_, and in danger of ruining themselves for ever.

Our _Alexander_ has alwayes used the same precautions, for when _Don Agostino_ in the heighth of his insolence and pride disobliged so openly the Family of _Colonna_, by making his Uncle the Cavalier _De la Ciaia_ take up that place in the Theatre, which the High Constable _Colonna_ had hired for himself.

The _Pope_ was infinitely offended at so rash an action, not out of any consideration for the merit of the Family of the _Colonna_; but because he knew that such an accident could not choose but be followed by an open enmity betwixt the two Families of _Chiggi_ and _Colonna_: therefore without any delay the _Pope_ gave order, that all the means of reconciliation should be sought out. And finding that _Don Agostino_ stood too much upon his terms, and would not be brought to make any satisfaction to the Constable, the _Pope_ grew passionate; and sending for him, forced him to a present complyance, using some reproaches: and amongst others, these words, _You commit extravagant follies_, _and I __must be put to the trouble of making amends for them_, _to free you from the danger of their consequences_. And a little after, _You do nothing but procure mischief to your self and me_, _while I make it my business to do you good_.

I will not say any thing of the business of the Duke of _Crequy_, for it is most certain, that without the consideration of his Kindred, the _Pope_ had never condescended to an agreement so advantageous for _France_.

Witness the _Pope’s_ own expressions to those Ambassadours and Cardinals, who for the quiet of _Italy_ did endeavour to take up the business. The Venetian Ambassadour above all did concern himself very much in the business, following the Orders of his Senate; which does wisely fore-see and endeavour to take away all causes of a War in _Italy_: and as he was pressing the _Pope_ upon the business, his Holiness answered him, _That it was a great affliction to him that he had introduced his Kindred into_ Rome; _for else he would either have broke himself_, _or have made_ France _bend_.

But the Ambassadour who was very ready in all occasions, but particularly prepared upon this, answered him, _If your Holiness had never brought your Kindred into_ Rome, _this accident had not happened_.

To which the _Pope_ replyed suddenly, _Well then_, _we must make all well again_, _to the Churches prejudice_, _and our Kindreds advantage_.

The like discourse he had with _Monsignor Rasponi_ (who now is Cardinal) and was then created Plenipotentiary for the Treaty of _Pisa_, after he had in vain been sent to _Lyons_, to make an agreement; for there the business was crossed with a thousand difficulties, amongst which the precedency was one.

The _Pope_ was brought into such a Labyrinth, that he did almost lose his wits in seeking how to come out of it; for on one side the affection of his Family did continually solicite him to yield to the great pretensions of the French King; on the other, the _Decorum_ and honour of his Pontificate, which would be blurr’d with the infamy of having given away so much of the Dignity and Profits of the Church, did make him resolve to be constant, and bate nothing of that respect and Majesty which the _Popes_ do use to expect from Princes: and the rather, because he had alwayes shewed himself a singular defender of the Pontifical Dignity, and could not endure to be forced to submit to a Crown for which he had never had any great inclination.

For all this, at last, the interest of his Kindred carried it before those of the Church; and after he had worn out all the slights and arts that the Court of _Rome_ could furnish him withal, he was forced at last to come to an agreement, as infamous for the See of _Rome_, as it was honourable for _France_.

Whereupon some of the most zealous Cardinals having vented their complaints in the Consistory it self, blaming _Monsignor Rasponi_ for signing the Treaty, He was obliged to excuse himself to every one of them in a particular Visit, by saying _That he had an express Order from his Holiness for what he had done_; _who had declared his resolution of yielding to any conditions_, _rather than of leaving his Family engaged against so powerful an Enemy as France_. To which purpose he related to some of his particular friends, the very words which the _Pope_ spoke to him when he went to take his leave of him to go to _Pisa_, to treat with the Duke of _Crequy_, which were these, _Be discreet and yield up something of the Popedom_, _to save our Family_; _and not leave them and the Church in an obligation of maintaining a dangerous War in_ Italy.

Thus it appears that it is not so much that universal care of a Father, that makes the _Popes_ maintain a good correspondence with Christian Princes; as the fear of leaving Enemies to their Families, and bringing ruine upon their Relations.

We all know that every _Pope_ either out of envy or some other motive is well pleased to lessen, if not utterly to destroy the Family of his Predecessor; and of this we have had many experiences since two ages. Therefore also the _Popes_, to prevent this misfortune, do ordinarily endeavour to get, while they are alive, the protection of some eminent Christian Prince, for their Family; under whose wings they may shelter themselves in a time of calamity.

And if this be, we may conclude, that all the affection, the care, and the desire which the _Popes_ have of advancing their Kindred, does at last turn to a general benefit and profit for Christendom; and if you except one inconvenience, which is, that they impoverish the Church, and carry away all its treasure, it were and is better for all other considerations, that the _Popes_ do govern conjoyntly with their _Nipotismo_, than without it: which is proved by a third reason; which is, that without a _Nipotismo_ the Negotiations and business of the Court could never be carried with secresie enough.

I am in doubt whether it be harder to keep a thing secret in the Court of a Prince, than in the Council of a Commonwealth; for in the Commonwealth the great number of Counsellors make the keeping of a Secret a very difficult thing: and in the Court of Princes, the envy of those Courtiers, who are excluded from the management of Affairs, is so sharp-sighted, and does so pry and penetrate into the most hidden Mysteries of the Court, to the end they may either hurt the Prince through his Counsellors, or the Counsellors through the Prince, that it is almost impossible to keep any thing hidden from them.

I am of opinion, that for one reason the Secrets of a Commonwealth are better concealed, which is; because that those that are conscious to them, are themselves the Princes and Masters of the State: but in a Monarchy, the Prince being forced to trust some of his Subjects, it is much more dangerous for him and for his business; for he becomes slave and dependent of those who should be his. Divers Histories will furnish us with examples to prove what we say; and if that be true, and that yet nevertheless it is very hard to keep counsel in a Commonwealth, it is easily inferr’d, how difficult a thing it is to do it in a Monarchy.

But what shall we say then of the state of the Church, of which no body can tell whether it be Commonwealth, or Monarchy, the _Popes_ appearing sometimes absolute like Princes, and other while dependent like Dukes of Commonwealths; and without doubt the _Popes_ could never be able to conceal so many private and publick interests without that trust and relyance, which they have in their _Nipotismo_: and this particularly for two reasons. The first is thus.

The Court of _Rome_ taken in all its latitude, is without doubt the greatest of _Europe_, and the most magnificent of Christendom; for it yields to no other in the great number of Ambassadours, and publick Ministers which reside in it.

For the _Popes_, that they may the better conserve the title of Universal Father, which they affect, do by all means procure to have as many Ambassadors of Christian Princes near them as they can. But that very thing by which this Court seems to be most honoured, does also carry with it an evident danger; for these Ambassadours and Residents being unwilling to stay in _Rome_, without procuring some considerable advantage to the Princes that send them, are perpetually watching for occasions to discover the _Popes_ most secret designs: so that they are in effect so many spyes, who the more they are in number, the more do they encrease the difficulty of preserving and concealing the Secrets of the Court.

Before I speak of the second Reason, which makes the Court of _Rome_ so suspicious a place for Secrets, I must say something about the Cardinals, and their Office, and Employment.

The Cardinals are the _Pope’s_ Counsellors, who by the Dignity of their place, and the Majesty of their Habit, do much augment the pomp and splendor of the Court. The _Popes_ do every day give them new Priviledges and Prerogatives, by the means of which they are respected like so many Kings.

This makes Forreign Princes endeavour to get their friendship by all means, giving them both secret and publick allowances and Pensions, in consideration of these Prerogatives, and of the power which they have to chuse the _Pope_; who must necessarily be one of their number.

But if Princes shew a promptitude and readiness to win the Cardinals affections, they are themselves reciprocally courted by the Cardinals for divers reasons; As first, for the Emolument of their Pensions; Next, that they may not obstruct their way to the Popedom by an open Exclusion in the Conclave; And last of all, that they may live in greater reputation and esteem in _Rome_, Where those Cardinals are most valued that entertain an exact correspondence with Princes: particularly if it be with any of the two Crowns of _Europe_, that is, _France_, or _Spain_; upon whose Brigues and Interests does ordinarily depend the election of the _Pope_.

Now it is to be believed, that these Princes do not prodigally spend their Treasure without receiving a continual Interest for it; which Interest is an exact information of all that is done, treated, and managed in the Court of _Rome_: And of this the Cardinals acquit themselves with great industry and diligence.

So we see, how intricate and troublesome the Government of _Rome_ would become to the _Popes_; if they had not Confidents, that is, Nephews, on whom they might relie; and to whom they might trust their secrets without fear.

For indeed, a _Pope_ without Kindred must renounce Monarchy, and resolve to be only as the Head of a Commonwealth; which would be just to give himself up into the hands of the Cardinals, and be at their discretion: Which if it were, every body may easily infer how dangerous it would prove to the _Pope’s_ Authority, and how unbeseeming the greatness and _decorum_ of his place and dignity. Besides that, probably things would fall into confusion and disorder, while every Cardinal would be more intent to satisfie his own ends; and, as they say, draw the water to his Mill, than to mind the necessities of the State and Church.

If the _Pope_ could do nothing without the counsel and assent of the Cardinals, How would he be able to treat any Leagues, make Wars, or Peace? Which are things so incident to the nature of a great State, such as the _Pope’s_ is, that it can seldom be without them. There would be framed a thousand difficulties in the very beginnings of Negotiations; and the Enemy would know all before you had resolved any thing. Every Cardinal would support his Prince and Country, and at last they would all be so embarassed and confounded, that they would either be in danger of losing themselves for the Church, or of exposing the Church to mischief to save themselves.

How would it be fit, that the _Pope_ should advise with the Senate of Cardinals, if they themselves are his and the Churches greatest enemies, If they have not only promised, but sworn fidelity to the Party of those Princes that give them Pensions and Revenues? How then can they follow the _Pope’s_ directions, or consent to his designs? Certainly they must either cheat the Prince, that they may be true to the Church; or be false to the Church, that they may not be ungrateful to those Princes, whose money they have taken.

There are some Cardinals that would not care, if all were lost, so they did but save their Family, which is under the protection of some Prince; and avoid themselves the reproach of ingratitude from their Benefactors.

The greatest part of the Cardinals are either of the _French_ or _Spanish_ Faction, and each of them makes it his greatest glory to defend the Pretensions of the Crown he protects, whether just or unjust; so that often between them they neglect and ruine the Interests of the Church and _Pope_. How were it possible then for the _Pope_ either to preserve himself or the Church in its Prerogatives, if he would take and follow the counsel of those whose interest makes them the Enemies to both; though they pretend, that what they do is only out of a tender consideration of the publick good.

To this purpose I remember that a certain _Italian_ Cardinal, being weary of holding for many years on the _Spaniards_ side, gave himself to the _French_ by the mediation of a better Pension which they promised him. And indeed the Cardinals, whatsoever they pretend, have no other inclination to either party than what their Interest leads them to; For he that gives highest Pensions, and the best Benefices, is sure to have them.

This Cardinal, having thus renounced the _Spaniard_, did go about to take away the imputation of inconstancy and self-interest; and would say in all companies, _That he had no other end in doing so_, _but a desire to be able to serve the Church and_ Pope _the better_.

But another Cardinal, of great experience and prudence, hearing him one day discourse after this rate, could not forbear saying these words to him, _I wish to __God that your Eminence_, _that have never been able to do the Church any service while you were a true_ Spaniard, _may do her some now you are a counterfeit_ Frenchman. And this he said in the presence of divers Cardinals and Embassadours.

Let us then conclude, that the State and Church can never be well governed, as to the point in hand, if the _Popes_ be without Nephews to relye on, and in whose secrecy they may confide.