Chapter IX: Part 9

And the reason of this is, because as the Sea Coast, which encompasses the Ecclesiastick State, is subject to the usual Tempests of the Ocean; so the _Roman_ Havens are very subject to their sudden variations and changes: From whence it happens, that both without and within _Rome_ is so subject to perils and ship-wracks. They therefore who go for succour to that Climate, that is not understood by those themselves that are born under it, cannot but meet with storms and tempests. Where affairs put on every day a several face and shape, the difficulty must needs be very great; And many Ministers lose themselves in the Court of _Rome_ by this means. For when they believe they Negotiate with a Monarchy, they find they have to do with a Republick; and when they think they treat with a Commonwealth, they find they are ingaged with a Monarchy full of Monarchs, whilst there is not one of the Papal Nephews that doth not expect to be treated, with as a Soveraign.

Yet because the _Pope_ is chosen by the Cardinals, many would believe that these have the same Authority with the _Pope_, not only to treat, but conclude; as the Electors have with the Emperour in Affairs of great importance. And indeed, to hear his Holiness call them Fellows, Companions, and Brethren, makes a strange impression in the Citizens, Strangers, Subjects, and Princes, of I know not what greatness in favour of the Cardinals, every one imagining that they cannot chuse but have a share in the privatest concerns of the Government of the Church.

But for all that things appear quite otherwise, and the _Pope’s_ become absolute Soveraign over those who chuse him; who never know any thing in any affairs untill they are concluded on: He sends Embassadours at his will, treats both of Peace and War at his own pleasure, and in fine, doth whatsoever he hath a mind to, without participating it to any, but those to whom he is guided to by his particular inclinations.

But that, which makes the treating with the Court of _Rome_ more difficult, is, That for the most part the _Pope_ himself neither understands the Negotiations, nor Negotiators of them. And the Ministers of Princes sometimes as little know which is the _Pope_, for frequently he treats as Nephew, and the Nephews treat as _Pope_. A thing indeed enough to confound any ones understanding, to have the Pontificacy so promiscuously made up of _Pope_ and Nephews; He for the Exteriour, and they for the Interiour part of it.

For the _Nipotismo_, which manageth publick affairs, at whose Girdle the Keys of business are tied, Resolves, Negotiates, and concludes any thing without acquainting either the _Pope_ or Consistory.

Let any one judge, how it was possible for any Embassadour to make any honourable result in the management of the interests of his Prince at _Rome_ in the time of _Gregory_ the fifteenth; since he himself was so fearful to displease Cardinal _Ludovisi_, his Nephew, that he suffered him to do whatever he had a mind to: who, finding the power he had over him, did every thing without his knowledge.

There were some Embassadours who in their ordinary Visits would in general terms touch upon business, only to feel his Holiness his Pulse, which way he was enclined. But so soon as ever he perceived them to begin to ask Questions, he would immediately make this Answer; _You speak with us_, _and our Nephew doth all things without either us or you_; _speak with him_, _and what he doth_, _that we do_. And with such like answers he usually entertained those Embassadors that came to him.

From hence it came to pass, that most of the Treaties did not only confound those who managed them; but also the Ministers found themselves obliged to put all their affairs upon Chance, Fineness and Policy standing them in little stead, who were necessitated, as a Ship in an unruly storm, to give themselves up altogether to Fortune.

It was a thing worth the observing, to see how the Embassadours laboured both with bodies and mind, sometimes on this, sometimes on that side; now with the Nephews, then with the _Pope_; from one drawing this Answer, _Speak to our Uncle_: From the other, _Go to our Nephew_. So that very often when they concluded any thing with the Nephew, they were in doubt whether or no the Uncle would be contented: And so it hapned on the other side, if they treated any thing with the Uncle, they were ever fearful least the other, being displeased at it, should cross the whole design; so that though matters were concluded by either of these, they were still uncertain whether the result would be for good or evil.

This Nephew, who did every thing without the knowledge of his Uncle, gave out, he could do nothing without participating to others; and particularly in the beginning the Papacy he alwaies answered, in affairs of greatest concernment, _We will see_, _We will do_, _We will speak_, _We will procure_, _We will consent_, and such like dilatory expressions.

And the Embassadours were most mortified with this manner of proceedings of the _Pope_ and his Nephews, who knew very well how to agree amongst themselves to the prejudice of those who treated with them. And when things did not go on according to their pleasures, or they found themselves unable to resist the perswasions and arguments of the Embassadours, they would both sing in the same tune: The holy Colledge of Cardinals must be acquainted with the affair, without whom there was never any thing concluded.

And yet those Ministers themselves knew very well, that was but a false pretext; for although the Cardinals were in _Rome_, yet they were not in the Court, and never knew of the designs of the _Pope_, nor the Treaties of his Nephew.

In _Urban’s_ time there were other Labyrinths in the Court, although this _Pope_ was a far greater Politician than _Gregory_, and the _Barbarins_ much more expert in Government than the abovesaid Cardinal _Ludovisio_.

At that time, before any thing could be done, all the Nephews favours must be purchased; for he was resolved not to treat with any that was not dependent on his Family. And not only _Francesco_, the Cardinal _Patrone_, was to be courted, but Cardinal _Antonio_, and _Don Tadeo_, and his Wife likewise, who so aspired at the Visits of the Ministers of Princes, that the _Pope_ would not give Audience to any that had not first paid his devoir to that Lady: which was the Reason, why the Duke of _Parma_ had such ill success in all his business.

In the beginning of his Reign the _Pope_, in a manner alone, manag’d all the most important affairs of Christendom, with no small ardency and zeal. But wot you what? The things which he did in the day he undid in the night; for coming to consult with his Nephews, who alwaies found their Uncle’s Opinion contrary to their own, they oftentimes brought him to contradict himself, and reverse what he had formerly granted and concluded.

’Tis true, he did this with great subtlety, not failing to find out some fair and specious excuses wherewith to colour their pretexts, and clear the _Pope_ of levity; by which means Embassadours were perpetually deluded, even when they thought they had the Fish in their hands, which on a sudden slipt away from between their fingers, beyond possibility of recovery.

Hence affairs were protracted _in infinitum_; So that though in _Urban’s_ time many Princes treated of a League with the Church and the _Pope_ himself, nevertheless there was not any considerable one concluded in a Reign of twenty three years; during which time divers Princes concluded a League offensive and defensive against the _Barbarini_.

The reason of this was, for that the _Pope_ was too hard towards others, and too soft towards his own Relations; Cardinal _Francesco_ too soft towards others, (but dissemblingly) and hard towards his Uncle; Cardinal _Antonio_ hard towards _Francesco_, and soft towards the _Pope_; and _Don Thadeo_, who knew not how to do better, was hard towards the soft, and soft towards the hard.

Cardinal _Francesco_ fear’d to disgust _Antonio_, and delighted to displease the _Pope_; Cardinal _Antonio_ fear’d the _Pope_, but caus’d _Francesco_ fear himself; _Don Thadeo_ sided with him that was most obstinate in his opinion; And the _Pope_ deny’d to one what he could not grant to the other, granted to this what the other desired, becoming obstinate where there was need of pliableness, and pliable where it behoved him to be obstinate.

Now a Court of this humour afforded work enough to the Ministers of Princes, who were alwaies receiv’d by the _Pope_ with ambiguous expressions, by Cardinal _Francesco_ with abundance of faire promises, and by Cardinal _Antonio_ with a long train of exquisite complements. But when the Ministers press’d to come to a conclusion of any important business, Cardinal _Antonio_ sent them to his brother _Francesco_, who at the appointed hour of Audience us’d to go his visits to the seven Churches, and the _Pope_ himself pretended indisposition of body. And thus the effecting of all urgent business was rendred impossible.

In _Urban’s_ time ’twas hard for Princes Ministers to find the streight gate to enter into publick Negotiations, and when they were in, they found themselves in a Labyrinth, out of which they could scarce extricate themselves after a thousand turnings and windings.

_Monsieur de Lionne_, a person of great Abilities, being employ’d Embassadour to _Rome_ by the most Christian Crown, one day ask’d a familiar friend of his (pleasantly) _What kind of person himself had_? To which his Friend answered. _That he had the person of a man worthy of this Age_. Monsieur _de Lionne_ reply’d to him, _That he took himself to be like a Tennis-ball bandi’d to and fro by foul-players_; alluding hereby to the Artifices and tricks put upon him by the _Barbarini_ in his negotiating with them concerning the affair of _Castro_.

The truth is, any other Minister but Monsieur _de Lionne_ would have shewed much anger in _Rome_, in the time of the War of the Duke of _Parma_ with the confederate Princes. This great Man, who was dispatch’d on purpose to procure the appeasing of the rising tumults, knew not which way to turn his wits to invent projects and artifices enough to oppose those of the _Barbarini_, who continually promis’d what they never intended to perform.

He was sent from _Herod_ to _Pilate_, and from _Pilate_ to _Caiphas_: The one answer’d, _Yea_: The other, _No_. But what was most important, the _Pope_ had granted him leave to treat with the two Cardinals his Nephews, with a promise to confirm what should be by them concluded. Hereupon having one day by the power of perswasions reduc’d the said two Lords to reason, he repair’d to the _Pope_ to beseech him to confirm the Treaties agreed upon with his Nephews; but he receiv’d for answer, _That ’twas expedient to consider upon the matter_; which consideration never had an end.

All the Policy of the _Barbarini_ lay in drawing out affairs in length, and concluding nothing; so that when ever these Nephews concluded any thing with the Ministers of Princes, they presently sent word to the _Pope_, that he should deny to confirm what they had done, and at the same time gave out that such denial was contrary to their wills.

The Republick of _Venice_, when they saw that ancient Monument remov’d out of the _Vatican_, which represented the Benefits done by St. _Mark_ to the Church, sent an Express to carry their just complaints to the _Pope_, but he could never obtain any kind of satisfaction, not so much as in words, the _Pope_ turning the matter from himself to his Nephews, and the Nephews from themselves to the _Pope_.

In the mean time great affront was done to the honour of a Republick so well deserving of the Church, without which one may say perhaps there would not be now a _Pope_ in _Rome_, if any where else.

In like manner the Commonwealth of _Lucca_ sent an Embassadour to _Rome_ to complain of the injury done to them by the _Pope’s_ sending to them the Lord _Recagna_ with the title of Commissary, (which was a thing not a little derogatory from the Soveraignty of that State) and the more, in that this good Prelate, sent from the _Barbarini_, had something of the Barbarian.

But this Embassage had no effect, besides a return of Plenary Indulgency, which the Embassadour carried home, who seeing himself so often baffled at the _Vatican_, fell into the humour of negotiating with the Saints, and made his business to receive the Stations sometimes of one Church, and sometimes of another.

The Crown of _Poland_ for six years together solicited by its Embassadour to have a Cardinal’s Hat for the Lord _Visconti_, according to his just Priviledges; but in all that time he not only could not obtain his intent; but moreover the Popish Embassadour at his return knew not what cause to tell his Master of the denial; for they all gave him good words, and bad deeds. Cardinal _Antonio_ excus’d himself by saying, _That he had no authority to effect it_; Cardinal _Francesco_, _That his desire was to serve his Majesty_, _but his Holiness did not think the Person worthy_; And the _Pope_ pretended, _That he could not make a man Cardinal who was an enemy to his Nephews_.

The same was the case of the Citizens of _Bononia_, who dispatch’d an Agent to _Rome_, to supplicate his Holiness, that he would please to remove the Commissary _Della Grascia_, whose being there mightily intrench’d upon their Priviledges, but they receiv’d the same Answer with those of _Lucca_; their Envoy returning laden with fair words, but not with Indulgences, as he of _Lucca_; for out of displeasure to have miss’d his intent he would not visit the holy places, but said to a Friend that moved him to go and receive the Stations of St. _Mary Maggiore_, (rather like a Protestant than a Catholick) _My Friend_, _If there be no treating with the_ Barbarini _who can speak_, _there is less with the Saints who cannot_. _To what purpose is it to solicite the dead_, _if it be so hard to address to the living_?

The two Crowns of _France_ and _Spain_ are manifestly imposed upon every day, the _Spanish_ Policy little availing with the _Barbarini_, whilst they stir not a hairs breadth from their ordinary Maxime, which is to perplex the understanding of Embassadours, one of them denying as much as the other promis’d. Which gave occasion to a certain _Florentine_ of the great Duke’s Court to say, _That the greatest miracle of_ Rome _was to see all the Ministers of Princes tantaliz’d with the ambiguous and confus’d treating of the_ Barbarini, _to so great prejudice of all Christendom_.

But if ever any Prince was tantalized by them, ’twas the King of _Portugal_, who by the advice of _France_, and upon hopes given by the fair words of the _Barbarini_, sent the Bishop of _Lamego_ with the title of Embassadour Royal to _Rome_, where he was receiv’d with great honour and respect. But in substance ’twas all but smoke, the Embassadour being unable to obtain either a favourable Yea, or a flat No; that I say not that he obtain’d sometimes the one, and sometimes the other.

This intricate procedure in so important a matter was the cause of great disorders, the _Spaniards_ distrusting the words of the _Barbarini_, and the _French_ giving little or no credit to the offers made by them. For Cardinal _Antonio_ never ceas’d to assure _France_, _That_ Lamego _should not fail to be receiv’d as a publick Embassadour_; and Cardinal _Francesco_ continually promis’d _Spain_, _That his Holiness would never admit a Portugal Embassadour_.

And accordingly by this course the _Barbarini_ wholly disgusted the _Portugal_, little satisfied the _Spaniard_, and nothing at all the _French_, and brought the City it self into danger by that fray which happen’d between the two Embassadours, with the death of some Courtiers on both sides, and the declaring _Lamego_ irregular and depriv’d of all Ecclesiastical Benefices, according to the usual penalty of Homicide.

A thousand other Examples might be brought of like nature, but I must omit them to pass on to the actions of _Innocent_ the tenth, who had reduc’d the Court to such a confus’d state, that no body knew where, nor how, to begin any Negotiation; whereupon a Minister of the Duke of _Parma_ said one day, _That ’twas easier to make a bed for a dog_, _than to understand the humour of_ Innocent.

The Government of _Urban_ was the best in the World in comparison of that of _Innocent_; for _Urban_ delighted to negotiate with Embassadours, but the other avoided their presence as much as possible he could; and when he receiv’d them, ’twas after so disobliging careless manner, that few car’d to confer with him.

No hours were so tedious to him, as those wherein he was to give Audience to a publick Embassadour; for he little car’d to be troubled with the important affairs of Christendom, or those of the Papacy it self.

His particular Maximes were to deny all favours, to answer all sutes with a Negative, and never to resolve upon any thing that might advantage the Church, or weaken its Enemies.

What others avoided, was in him predominant; that is to say, He lov’d that which was worst. If he possess’d any vertue, he employ’d it not to the benefit of Christendom, but of his own Family; as on the contrary he did his ill qualities to the mischief of the Church and the City.

At first indeed he seem’d so desirous of knowing all affairs both publick and private, that ’twas hoped, his Government would prove the happiest that ever was to the Church. But this vigilance caused no small hurt in general; for when the Subjects of the Ecclesiastical State, Prelates, and forreign Ministers, conceiving the same to proceed from zeal to Justice, had brought and delivered their Memorials, in hopes of a speedy Answer, it prov’d all but loss of time; for they never were call’d, nor admitted to any answer at all. Whence, the _Pope’s_ way, of denying all and resolving nothing, being understood, it became an ungrateful employment to have any thing to do at _Rome_.

And to make the way of arriving at their ends more difficult to Princes Ministers, for a long time together there was no Officer at Court to present the Petitions of Suiters, as formerly, but he declared one of his Nephews to be Cardinal Patron; who was the Cardinal _Astalli_, but with an authority so streight and limited, that he was almost asham’d of it.

By this means the Court became so much the more at a loss; for such as address’d to this Nephew, receiv’d no other comfort, but to behold him shrink up his shoulders, (as young maids do when ask’d by their Fathers whether they will marry) and hear him tell them, _That all should be represented to his Holiness_. And the truth is, as to this point he was very punctual: But he did it after so timerous and indifferent a manner, out of fear to cross the _Pope_, whose answer he knew was alwaies the same, _That the matter shall be taken into consideration_; The plain meaning whereof was, _That nothing at all shall be done in it_.

In this confusion some thought it best to address immediately to the _Pope_; but, besides the difficulty of Access, the Event prov’d alwaies alike; whatever care they took to make their Proposals clear and intelligible, they alwaies hung in the hedge. Yet there were some too that fansied _Innocent_ one of the greatest Politicians of the World, till perceiving by effects the clean contrary, they remain’d as mute as Statues for shame of their mistake.

His suffering _Donna Olympia_ to rule all, his exalting, and abasing his adopted Nephew _Astalli_; his banishing, and recalling _Don Camillo_ his own Nephew; his persecuting, and reingraciating with the _Barbarini_; and in a word, his changing his will and judgment every moment; and his inconstancy in every thing, save granting Sutes, would have imbroiled any Government whatsoever, and much more the Papal, which is naturally full of confusion.

When there happens a _Pope_ like _Innocent_, bent wholly to reject all the instances of Princes; the only remedy is to sow disturbances in the Church, and broyls between the Protestants and Catholicks, thereby to puzzle the _Pope’s_ brain, and frighten him, so that he shall rather seek the friendship of Princes, than they his. Of the success of which course I shall give some Examples.

When the Duke of _Parma’s_ Army took the Field, to get redress concerning the detension of _Castro_, under the Command of _Don Gauffrido_; the _Pope_ extremely affrighted, as one not much accustomed to the Trade of War, caused the Holy Sacrament to be expos’d forty hours, and Processions to be celebrated to all the Churches in _Rome_.

And not knowing what might be the issue of the War undertaken by the said Prince, who breathed nothing but the extremities thereof against his Person, he thought it his best course to gain the Princes of _Christendom_ to his side, and to oblige them to relinquish the Protection of the Duke, by rendring himself extraordinary easie to all Addresses, granting Favours to all Demanders, and receiving Publick Ministers with so much obligingness, that they needed no more but to open their mouths for any Suit or Request, that of the _Pope_ standing always open to accord it.

A certain Embassador, who for three years together could never obtain any other Favour but that of Common Indulgences, finding his desires now satisfied in what ever he demanded, writ to the Prince his Master, _That the_ Pope, _like a Hackney-horse_, _travelled very well with a Spur in his Flank_; _and that he had lately obtained_, _in eight days_, _more than he could do before in three years_: _So that it were to be wish’d that the Duke of_ Parma _would give him a touch or two more of the Spur_.

In the very same manner, at the time that the _French_ had made themselves Masters of _Portolongone_, all sort of Favours ran out with a full torrent, many times preventing Requests: Nor did the _Pope_ suffer any man to depart from his Presence, who was not satisfied to the height of his wishes.

But no sooner was this State of Affairs changed, that is to say, _Portolongone_ recovered by the _Spaniards_, and the Duke disappointed in the War, but Negatives appear’d afresh in the Field with greater peremptoriness than before; and the _Pope_ became as deaf as a Stone to all manner of Supplications or Petitions.

Hence it may be clearly seen, or at least argu’d, That most _Popes_ (if not all) neither grant Favours, nor bear any regard to Princes, save at such time as they stand in need of them.

_Urban_ the Eighth was of this very same humour, denying without exception all sort of Favours, which had not their original from his own or his Nephews inclination, however just Reasons might be alledged for them; and this as well to the _French_, whom he made semblance to love, but really lov’d not; as to the _Spaniards_, whom indeed he affected, though without giving them the satisfaction of seeing any tokens of that affection.

Nevertheless, when he saw _Odoardo Farnese_ Duke of _Parma_ enter victorious with 3000 Horse, for the regaining of _Castro_, most injuriously detained from him, then indeed he began both to humble himself to _Spain_, which he had kept under before, and to gratifie _France_, to which he had on divers occasions shewn himself ungrateful; and also to solicite the Friendship of all sort of Princes, as well small as great; and that not by promising, but by real concession of Favours with a plentiful hand in _Germany_ and _Italy_.

Wherefore seeing the _Popes_ have a particular Method of bearing themselves ruggedly and contemptuously to Princes, when they need them not; ’twere good Policy in Princes to bring it so to pass, that they might always be in a state of Fear, sometimes by threatning neer hand, and at other times by vexing them at distance.

The Indignities which Princes receive often from the Court of _Rome_, proceed not immediately from an evil intention in the _Popes_ towards them, but from the too good inclination of Princes towards the _Popes_; there being some so tender-conscienc’d, that they fear the loss of their Souls in disgusting a rascallion Court-fly that bears the Cassock of a Priest, and serves to sweep the Antichamber of his Holiness or the Cardinal-Nephew.

The Ecclesiasticks have Swords in their Mouths, but no Courage in their Breasts; I mean, they threaten all People, without considering what issue such Menaces may have: But when they see themselves reprov’d or threatned, then their hearts fail them, they fall a trembling, and humble themselves to every body, especially Grandees; although withall, they have the cunning to colour their Fear with the pretext of a religious, pious, and devout Meekness.

The nature of the Ecclesiasticks is to disgust such as comply with them, and fawn on those that disgust them; So that if Princes would advance their Affairs, and bring down the haughtiness of _Rome_, they must endeavour to mortifie the _Pope_.

The Catholick Crown, in testimony of its affection to the _Popes_, admits into its Jurisdiction only the _Roman_ Religion; besides that the _Spaniards_ also shew themselves most concerned in keeping up the _Pope_ the Head of the Church, and enriching the Ecclesiasticks.

However, they have fared little or not at all the better for it, as to their Negotiations at _Rome_, in regard that the Ecclesiasticks (that is, the _Popes_) esteem them not more than others for it; but through fear commonly afford as much or more countenance to the _French_: from whom on the other side they receive greater disgusts, under pretence of the _Gallican_ Priviledges.

’Tis true, the _Roman_ Court very well perceives, that the _Spaniards_ reverence it as the Sanctuary of their Glory, and the Absolute Mistress of the preservation of their States; and accordingly it treats them familiarly, that is to say, with good words and ill deeds, with fair shews and bad substance.

The _Spaniards_ suffering themselves to be too much domineer’d over in the Court of _Rome_, is not only hurtful to the Government of the _Spaniards_ themselves, but also thereby prejudices the Interests of all those Princes that have concerns either at _Rome_, or with _Rome_; For when any inferiour Prince would with specious Reasons defend his Right over Ecclesiastical Persons, these men presently alledge for their justification the Example of the _Spaniards_, and thereby enforce him not to refuse, what so great and powerful a Monarchy as _Spain_ refuseth not to do. And of these Examples the _Popes_ have the _Vatican_ full, and make use of the same in all Occurrences, to the perpetual nauseating of Princes therewith.

This manner of proceeding between the Ecclesiasticks and the _Spaniards_ cannot last long, because the long languishings of Princes, ensuing thereupon, will enforce them either to yield to some violent Remedy, or to open the gate to death.

Every day, yea, every moment, displeasures arise between the Crown of _Spain_ and _Rome_; which, how-much soever debated, turn always to the satisfaction of the _Pope_, and the disadvantage of the Interests of the Catholick King.

In brief, The Dominion which the Court of _Rome_ hath gotten over the _Spaniards_ is so great, that how many and considerable soever the disgusts be which this Court puts upon them from day to day, nevertheless the _Spaniards_ dare not come to a Rupture with it, being better contented to suffer themselves, than to make others suffer.

The Policy of the _North_, yea and that of _Italy_ too, laughs at this _Spanish_ Zeal, which stoops in so humble sort to the arrogance and insolent Proceedings of the Ecclesiasticks. And indeed What reason is there that such a Monarchy should submit its Empire to a simple Bishoprick? Nevertheless, this is seen done every day in the Ecclesiastick State.

Were it not for the _Spaniards_, I verily believe Affairs at _Rome_ would not be so imbroil’d and perplex’d as they are; for the _Popes_ become so extremely proud towards other Princes, and render all Negotiations so extremely difficult, through the little account they make of Publick Ministers, in regard they see themselves back’d and supported by so potent a Crown in _Italy_.

Nevertheless, I cannot but imagine, That other Princes are for this reason extremely incensed with anger against the _Spaniards_, who to satisfie an apparent out-side Zeal, ruine the Common Cause of the Sovereignty of all other Princes.

If the _Spaniards_ would comply with other Sovereigns, to give the _Popes_ now and then a touch of the Spur, thereby to oblige them to go on in the right way, the management of Affairs at _Rome_ would be very expedite, and the Ministers of Princes would not meet with so many difficulties: Which I leave, with the rest, to the consideration of the _Spaniards_ and other Princes.

Some Ministers there are, who flatter themselves into a belief that they may be able to bring their Negotiations to a prosperous end, by means of the friendship they have with Cardinals, and the great Interest these Cardinals have to defend those Princes of whom they are intitl’d Protectors.

But this Opinion of theirs hath no other effect but to confound their Negotiations so much the more, whilst the Protection of Princes by those Cardinals is only external and nominal: for otherwise Policy obliges them to seek in the first place the advantage of the _Pope_, before the profit of the Princes, whom they serve, or at least seem to serve.

Every blow of mortification which the _Pope_ receives from any Prince, recoils to the damage of the Cardinal Dignity; and therefore the Cardinals labour to bring it about, that the Advantages may be always on the _Popes_ side. Nor is it necessary to believe the Cardinal, who professeth, _That the Interests of his Prince are dearer to him_, _than those of the Scarlet Gown it self_.

But this would be a great failure in Policy and Interest: Whence it was, that when _Innocent_ beheld his Cousin _Olympia_ anxious and troubled lest the Ecclesiastical State should become involv’d in a War, and lest many Cardinals should engage in it on behalf of the Duke of _Parma_, out of spight to the _Pamphilian_ Family, the _Pope_ comforted her with these words; _Cousin_, _fear nothing_, _the Cardinals will be for us in spight of their own teeth_, _and will defend the Ecclesiastical State in consideration of their own Interest_, _though we should go about to ruine it for ours_.

The Grandeur of the Scarlet Gown depends upon the Majesty of the Triple Crown, and the Cardinals are proportionably Great as the _Pope_ is so; whence it is that they strive with all possible ardour to promote the Advantage of the Church, and the Honour of the _Pope_; which failing, their own Reputation and Glory must partake in the Eclipse.

Great undoubtedly is the Magnificence of the Colledge of Cardinals; and greater it would be, if it had not been perverted both from the first Institution thereof, and retrench’d of the Prerogatives wherewith it hath been augmented by divers _Popes_, for the maintenance of its Grandeur and Honour.

But the _Popes_ have corrupted and spoil’d all; inasmuch as into that Colledge, into which the greatest Princes of the World think it a glory to enter, they have introduc’d some, who have received their Original from the vilest Dunghil of the World; and ’tis not many years ago, that one was created Cardinal, who was the Son of a base Catchpole.

Hence it comes to pass, that the _Popes_ seeing the Scarlet Robe upon the Shoulders of so vile and unworthy Persons, they despise it likewise when it is worn on the backs of Great Princes. And ’tis more than true, That good _Popes_ honour the Cardinals, when such Honour brings profit to themselves; otherwise they make a mock both of their Persons, and their Order.

And hence it is, that Princes Ministers find themselves in a wrong Box, when they put any trust even in those Cardinals who seem the greatest Zealots for their Interests.

Thus I have made a Relation of the manner how things are wont to be negotiated at _Rome_, and shew’d how the great Polititians of _Europe_ may salve their Reputations; as also the Grounds and Causes of those Mischiefs, which break the sleep and make the heads ake of as many Publick Ministers as reside in _Rome_.

When the _Pope_ perceives that Negotiations tend to his own Advantage, he doth things like an absolute Monarch: but when he knows that they are likely to cause any prejudice to him, he lays the cause of not succeeding upon the Congregations of the Cardinals, of which there are infinite at _Rome_.

In this manner he shews himself rather as Head of a Commonwealth, than an absolute Prince: and indeed those Congregations serve more for a pretext and help to the _Pope_ and the Nephews, than for any benefit to the State.

From such a Government little Fruit, and no Satisfaction can be drawn by the Ministers that negotiate at _Rome_; but rather, as accordingly it falls out, disgusts, affronts, and dissatisfactions.

In the _Roman_ Court there passes not a day without reproaches against the _Pope_ and Nephews, as those who study nothing else but to accommodate themselves, and incommodate all others that endeavour the good of the State and the Church.

Greater attendance and application cannot be, than that of _Alexander_ the Seventh both to Civil and Ecclesiastical Affairs; and which is most considerable, he doth all things with such an eagerness, that he appears to take no small glory therein.

He lets not one day pass without giving publick Audience, at least very seldom, unless those Infirmities which are his constant Companions indispose him to follow his good intentions; as it hapned for these days lately passed, wherein for a good while together he was not able to give Audience to the Embassador of _France_.

_Innocent_ undertook things slowly, and this slowness spoil’d all; but _Alexander_, being most contrary to such a nature, enterpriseth every thing with great ardour: and this spoils all too, the Ship being lost oftentimes as well through too little Wind, by falling into the hands of Enemies, as likewise through too great a Wind striking upon Rocks.

The Ministers of Princes even still find very great difficulties in negotiating at _Rome_, and perhaps greater too than those which they found in the time of _Innocent_; who indeed intangled things, because he would not extricate them: but _Alexander_ confounds matters by too great eagerness to rectifie them. _Innocent_ lov’d not to meddle, but with those things whereunto he was enforced; but _Alexander_ thrusts himself upon such as might better be let alone.

Hence ’tis that Ministers seeing the _Pope_ employ his mind on a thousand businesses of Christendom, and but of a weak and infirm constitution, they forbear to trouble him; as Cardinal _Mazarine_ and _Don Lewis d’ Haro_ did, who would not let the _Pope_ have any hand in the Treaty of the last Peace, to the no small displeasure of the poor _Pope_, who was ambitious to receive his part of the glory in a business so important to the Universe.

That which makes publick Agents at _Rome_ thus backward, is the knowledge they have of the _Pope’s_ mind; who is inquisitive and curious to know every thing, to have a hand in every action, to pry into all the affairs of Christendom, and briefly, to lade himself with so many businesses, that he must needs precipitate them all through want of strength to carry them on: whence ’tis that oftentimes he answers one Minister concerning certain matters of which he had conferr’d with another, and so confounds both himself and them that negotiate with him, who for fear of further embarassing the _Pope’s_ understanding are fain to break off their most important Audiences.

In the beginning of his Papacy, being ambitious of glory, he would needs sustain alone the weight of all the world, not only of the State Ecclesiastical, in the middle whereof he lean’d upon others, but did not cast the burden wholly off from himself; and at present now he approaches towards his end, his infirmities enforce him to leave others to do, that which it grieves him that he cannot do for others.

Matters were well believ’d, but ill understood at the first entrance of the Cardinal Patron and _Don Mario_ into _Rome_: and now they are well understood, but ill believ’d. These Lords began to Reign with their Eyes shut, and their Ears open; and at present, the Style being changed, they rule with their Ears shut, and their Eyes open, whence proceeds the multitude of inconveniences to publick Agents.

The Cardinal _Patron_ exercises the Office of his Patronage, in giving himself Patronage for enjoying his pleasures, and avoiding, as much as possible, all hard and knotty affairs; which are wont to perplex the mind, and confound the brain of a Gallant.

Hence it is, that Embassadors, who treat with him, reap no other good but a fardle of Complements, and pleasing Expressions, with no small hope that he will act abundantly; but in reality he doth nothing: so that they depart from his Presence outwardly satisfi’d, with their hands empty of any thing of substance.

I have known some Ministers, who have believ’d they might speed in their publick affairs by the easiness of knowing the secrets of the Court; which is of great use to a publick Agent, namely, to know the actions, treaties, and conveniences of others, and to keep his own, and those of his Prince, secret.

Indeed, the secresie of the Court of _Rome_ seems not to be so great as the subtilty, although Excommunications and Censures make a great noise: For those who are introduc’d into this Court are so only for two ends, either to exalt their Family, and support it from falling, (for the Ecclesiasticks, having no Wives, naturally encline to enrich their own Nephews) or else to aggrandise themselves, out of that ambition which alwaies lies under the Robes of Prelacy.

The Cardinals, however sometimes vertuous and experienced persons, are not exempt from certain imperfections which commonly reign in _Rome_; for they are either oblig’d to Princes by a thousand benefices and gifts, or else are their natural Subjects: and for this reason the Princes who have great concerns with _Rome_, the more they see Authority and Offices of any Cardinal increas’d, the more they study how to oblige him to be at their devotion, and to withdraw him from that of the _Pope_.

Now almost all the Cardinals reveal the things which they pretend to discover, either through the importunity of inquisitive Agents, and not to disoblige those to whom they are oblig’d, or else to put greater obligations upon the Princes to whom they are Pensioners, to the end they may receive gratuity after gratuity both to themselves and their Kindred, and especially that they may be assisted in their Pretensions to the Papacy, when the See Apostolical shall become vacant; which is the greatest spur of all.

To this Embassadours trust, and alwaies treat with the Cardinals who are adherents to their Masters, to discover the Counsels by their means. But indeed, they deceive themselves; for the Cardinals being as much concern’d as the _Pope_ in the defense of the Church, the State, and the publick good, in regard all are in capacity to be _Popes_, they will never reveal any thing which may prejudice that Papacy which makes them great, and which they aim one day to govern.

The Cardinals are not so indiscreet as to reveal any thing that may in any wise prejudice the Interests of the Papacy and Ecclesiastick State; they reveal such things as may be of prejudice to the single person of the _Pope_, or rather of his Nephews, whom commonly they hate through envy.

The effect hereof is, that most _Popes_ put little trust in the Cardinals when any matter relating to their own House is in agitation, but they do all _motu proprio_: for themselves having, whilst they were Cardinals, revealed what they ought to have kept secret, they doubt, being afterwards _Popes_, that others do the like by them; and for this cause they secure themselves, as much as possible, from such dangers.

The Papal Excommunications, which are great against those that reveal the secrets of the _Roman_ Court, as well Temporal persons as Spiritual, have no other effect but to put all into confusion, and to cause ambiguities on all sides. Hence such things as are revealed, seem not really to be so, but only intimated; and consequently no small prudence is requisite to understand what is spoken, because the revealers fearing the sting of the Excommunication within their breasts, utter only doubtful, perplex’d, and ambiguous words; by which means such Agents, as think themselves illuminated by such revelations, soon after find themselves puzzled and confounded.

The cause hereof is the fear, which Excommunication begets in the breasts of the scrupulous. But it is true in general, that to mingle things certain with doubtful, is proper to the _Roman_ Court; and things true with false, to the Ecclesiasticks.

But the Ecclesiasticks being less guilty of valour then fear, (for oftentimes they fear even their own shadows) the more important things are, the more they consult about them; which the _Popes_ do, not because the good of the State requires it, or the care of their Pastoral charge urges their consciences thereunto; but only to take from their successors the occasion to charge the blame of mischief upon their Nephews. And this is the cause that Negotiations are prolonged, publick Ministers confounded, and poor Christendom so embroiled, as it is at this day.

Ambassadors at _Rome_, especially in the beginning of a Pontificate, think they treat with the new _Pope_ as a person disinteressed, and the Universal Father, not only in reference to things pertaining to the Church, but also to the civil Interests of Princes, and affairs most important to the Universe.

But they deceive themselves, and this Error confounds their Treaties; whilst the _Popes_ have nothing but the bare Title and outward shew of Universal Father, acting all things according to the dictates of their own will and interest.

Were the _Popes_ really Universal Fathers, they would love all alike, and deal with all without affection or hatred: But truly, I know not how they dare assume that Title, especially those _Popes_, who, without any need of the Church, have made it lawful to themselves to begin Wars, hinder Peaces, persecute Nations, and make Leagues against Crowns, Commonwealths, and Princes, perhaps (nay without perhaps) better deserving of the Church, and affected to the publick and universal tranquillity.

I know that if the _Popes_ would deserve the Title of _Universal Father_, they out to be Universal towards all; and if at any time to be particular, it should be either out of absolute necessity of Reason of State, or some great importance to the honour of the Church. Thus did the Primitive _Popes_, but within these last hundred years things are altogether transform’d; for the waies of the _Popes_ are directed to the advancement of their Families; whence every _Pope_ has often chang’d his thoughts and purposes, and made shew of one thing outwardly, and meant another inwardly; not for that reasons of State (but the reasons of their own Families) so requir’d: which latter are commonly more dear to the _Popes_ than the former. The Ministers of Princes understand what I mean.

’Tis not possible for the most expert Minister at _Rome_ to succeed well, and with his Master’s satisfaction, in the things which he negotiates there. Before I give a reason whereof, I will relate what I read three daies ago in a little book, whether Historical or Fabulous I know not, but much to the purpose.

They say, _Pope Paschal_ the second took a conceit to have an Astrologer divine his thoughts. To which end he sent for an Abbot very intelligent in the Art of Astrology, and demanded of him, _What himself thought_?

The Abbot surpris’d at this odd-proposal, desir’d time to answer, and returning home fell to study an Answer; but, not being able to find one fit and proper to the Question, he remain’d much troubled and melancholy.

His Cook observing it, and understanding the cause, bid his Master take courage, and leave the business to him; for he would effect it with reputation to them both. The Abbot was well pleas’d with this discourse, and being desir’d by the Cook to let him have his Gown and other Habit, gave him it: wherewith the Cook being cloath’d, repair’d to the _Pope’s_ presence, and that with the more confidence, for that he was in person and voyce very like the Abbot.

The _Pope_ no sooner beheld him, but taking him for the Abbot, _Well_, (said he) _What do I think_? The bold Cook answer’d without delay, _Your Holiness thinks you speak with the Abbot_, _but ’tis with the Abbots Cook_.

Not much different is that which befals Embassadours of Princes who negotiate at _Rome_; where the _Popes_ are wont to do like the _Jackpuddings_ of a Play, who change themselves in a moment from Man to Woman, and from a Physician to a Muleter.

When an Embassadour thinks he treats with a Temporal Prince, and about Civil matters, ’tis with a Spiritual Bishop, and about matters Ecclesiastical. Religion serves the _Pope_ to disguise Temporal Dominion, and Temporal Dominion to disguise Religion. Religion precedes Policy, if the Affairs of Embassadours be contrary to the Policy, which the _Popes_ have in their heads: Policy precedes Religion, if the Embassadours Strengthen and confirm the particular Policy of the Popes.

If perchance a publick Agent treats a League offensive or defensive with the _Pope_, he finds greater difficulties therein than he imagin’d; for if the _Pope_ see that the League brings much more profit to himself than to the Prince that desires it, he concludes as a Temporal Prince, without derogating from the Authority Spiritual: That is, he reserves a secret clause in his mind to break, the League when he will, under colour of Religion: But if he know that the League is likely to bring much more advantage to the interest of the Prince than to his own Family, and to Religion than to his own Purse; excuses are immediately in the field, and the _Pope_, of a Sacred High Priest, becomes a secular Prince, denying to do any thing, for fear of hazarding the State.

The Ministers of the Emperour and the King of _Poland_ can witness what I say, for one of them hath often sworn to me, That the _Popes_ do in businesses so confound the Sacred with the Profane, and Religion with Policy, that it is not possible to know whether it be better, to treat with them as Temporal Princes, or as Secular Lords.

Amongst all the difficulties which Embassadours meet with at _Rome_, this is the greatest and most deserving to be mentioned.

They that enter upon the Government at _Rome_, are ordinarily at their entrance destitute of all vertue, much more of Political skill; and no sooner begin to be a little acquainted therewith, but they must go off, and give place to others, that enter with like qualifications.

The _Burgheses_ had never manag’d any kind of publike affair: nevertheless as soon as _Paul_ was made _Pope_, they became Masters without having ever been at School, and undertook to weild a Scepter, before they had passed the Ferula.

Cardinal _Ludovisio_ had never gone out of his little _Podere_, where he entertain’d himself from morning to night amongst those Peasants, sometimes in playing at Hazard, and sometimes in dancing Country Jigs, till, his Uncle being become _Pope_, (_Gregory_) he left _Podere_ for the _Vatican_, the Dance for the Court, hazard for fortune, and the Peasants for Princes; passing in a moment from the command of a Cottage to the Empire of the Church, and from small affairs to the great interests of the World.

Of the _Barbarini_, one was fetcht from the bottom of a Cloister, where he had scarce learnt to command a Butler to lay the cloath; another was taken from the Colledge of the Jesuites, where he had practised only to run up and down the stairs of the Oratory; a third was taken from the cure of a small Benefice; and the forth from a state of Domestick peace to command Armies. A fair turn indeed, no less wonderful than unexcted: yet these Lords have had this particularity, that though they entred upon the government of the Church extremely ignorant, nevertheless in a few daies they became Masters of Masters, and seem’d old, although but boys, in the subtleties of this Court.

Of the two Nephews of _Innocent_ the tenth, the one legitimate, the other adopted, we have spoken sufficiently, and need not rub the sore again; in regard they manifested themselves altogether unexpert, the one by renouncing the Hat, as unable to bear the weight of command; and the other by being expell’d the City, for venturing to command beyond his understanding. For all this _Innocent_ introduced them to a vast Government, and laid upon their backs that world which the most expert are hardly able to sustain.

What shall we say of _Don Mario_, _Don Augustino_, and Cardinal _Flavio_? What Governments, Employments, and Charges had they ever possess’d in their lives? Was it not a fine sight to see _Don Mario_, who had never worn a Sword in his life, declared _Generalissimo_ of the Holy Church, receiving at the same time, with the General’s Truncheon, a Licence to keep the Sword alwaies in the Scabbard? For when he offered to draw it, and swore to defend the Church with it, the _Pope_ dispens’d with him; saying, _Brother_, _put thy Sword up into thy Scabbard_, _if thou wilt have part in my Kingdom_. To which Command _Don Mario_ hath been alwaies obedient.

When the Cardinal was called to the Government, he was reading the Fables of _Æsop_, and _Don Augustino_ was making love to a little Courtisan of _Siena_: and yet on a sudden the latter was called from the arms of a base Strumpet, and made worthy of the Marriage of a great Princess; and the other from his Pastime of _Æsop_, was admitted to the management of the greatest Affairs, not of _Rome_ only, but of the whole World.

Now what prosperous issue can Negotiations have with such a Race of Politicians? Where shall Embassadors begin, at the Head or the Tail? What devices shall they have to unfold their meaning to such as want sense? Unless all _Popes_ should imitate _Gregory_ the Fifteenth, who in the beginning of his _Papacy_ would not treat of any important matter with any Minister, but excused it by saying, _That he would stay till his Nephews were a little instructed in Political Negotiations_: And he had reason to stay, for in a short time one of them had an ambitious Whimsey came into his Crown, that he understood more than all the Cardinals, and his Uncle to boot; and accordingly he acted and commanded, without communicating with either.

’Tis a tedious thing to Princes Ministers, who are old Stagers in Councils and Affairs, to have to do with raw, unexperienced Persons, and such as are much different from the Primitive Governours of the Church; who, though introduc’d barefoot, and ill clad, and void of all experience, yet their native simplicity serv’d them very well for the preserving a virtuous Life, far from Political cunning: whereas the Nephews of the present _Pope_ enter simple, not to edifie the People, and adorn the Church with good Lives; but to Lord it over Princes by Policy not comprehensible.

Most Agents lose their time in learning the nature of those that bear sway at _Rome_, who are indeed unknown to all. They study in what manner to treat with such Persons. They strive to gain the affection of those Governours, who are without any, unless we will say, That they have given up all their affection to heap up Money. They labour to ingratiate with those Nephews who possess all the Grace of the _Pope_: And in a word, Night and day they contrive to know and be known to the Nephews at _Rome_, in order to their better success there.