Chapter XXIV (2)

Having after great difficulty--greater than was
anticipated--brought relief to you, I am constrained to officially
demand from you receipts for the above goods and relief brought to
you, and also a definite answer to the question if you propose to
accept our escort and assistance to reach Zanzibar, or if Signor
Casati proposes to do so, or whether there are any officers or men
disposed to accept of our safe conduct to the sea. In the latter
event, I would be obliged to you if you would kindly state how
those persons desirous of leaving Africa can be communicated with.
I would respectfully suggest that all persons desirous of leaving
with me should proceed to and form camp either at Nsabé or at Kyya
Nkondo’s on the Lake, with sufficient stores of grain, &c., to
support them one month, and that a note should be sent to me
informing me of the same _viâ_ Kavalli, whence I soon may receive
it. The person in charge of the people at this camp will inform me
definitely whether the people are ready to accept of our safe
conduct, and, upon being thus informed, I shall be pleased to
assume all further charge of them.

If, at the end of twenty days, no news has been heard from you or
Mr. Jephson, I cannot hold myself responsible for what may happen.
We should be glad to stay at Kavalli’s if we were assured of food,
but a large following cannot be maintained there except by exacting
contributions by force, which would entirely close our intercourse
with the natives, and prevent us from being able to communicate
with you.

If grain could be landed at Kyya Nkondo’s by steamer, and left in
charge of six or seven of your men, I could, upon being informed of
the fact, send a detachment of men to convey it to the plateau. It
is only the question of food that creates anxiety. Hence you will
perceive that I am under the necessity of requesting you to be very
definite and prompt, if you have the power.

If within this period of twenty days you will be able to
communicate with me, and inform or suggest to me any way I can make
myself useful, or lend effective aid, I promise to strain every
effort to perform service to you. Meantime, awaiting your steamer
with great anxiety,[4]

I am, your obedient servant, (Signed) HENRY M. STANLEY, Commanding Relief Expedition.

The second day after reaching Kavalli’s, thirty rifles were despatched to the Lake shore with my replies to Emin Pasha and Mr. Jephson. The men delivered the letters to Chief Mogo, and on their return to our camp reported that the chief had departed from Nsabé for Mswa station. During these few days we had received five beeves, six goats, and five days’ rations of Indian corn, beans, sweet potatoes and millet, and further contributions were on the way to camp from the surrounding chiefs.

On the evening of the 21st, notice was brought to me that the Balegga were collecting to attack us, and early the following morning sixty rifles, with 1,500 Bavira and Wahuma were sent to meet them. The forces met on the crest of the mountains overlooking the Lake, and the Balegga, after a sharp resistance, were driven to their countrymen among the subjects of Melindwa, who was the ally of Kabba Rega.

[Sidenote: 1889.

Jan. 23.

Nyanza.]

The 23rd was spent by all the people of the plain country as a thanksgiving day, and the Bavira women met at the camp to relieve their joy at their deliverance from their inveterate enemy, with dancing and singing, which lasted from 9 A.M. until 3 P.M. Each woman and child in the dance circles was decked with bunches of green leaves in front and rear and was painted with red clay, while their bodies were well smeared with butter. The dance was excellent and exciting and not ungraceful, but the healthy vocal harmony was better. The young warriors circled around the female dancers, and exhibited their dexterity with the spear.

During the following days we had rest and quiet. Contributions of cattle, sheep, goats, fowls and provisions were supplied daily with great regularity, but on the 5th of February a note came from Jephson, stating that he had arrived on the Lake shore, and a detachment of Zanzibaris was at once sent to escort him to the plateau, the distance being about thirteen miles.

The next day Mr. Jephson himself arrived, and after dinner, in conversing about the Pasha, he summed up, after nine months’ residence with him, all he had learned, in the following words:--

“Sentiment is the Pasha’s worst enemy. No one keeps Emin Pasha back but Emin Pasha himself.” He further said, “I know no more about Emin Pasha’s intentions this minute than you do yourself, and yet we have talked together every day during your absence.” I then asked him to write me a full report of what had taken place, bearing upon the revolt of the troops of Equatoria, and his views respecting the invasion of the Province by the Mahdists, and its results. Mr. Jephson readily complied, and wrote the following:--

Kavalli’s Village, Albert Nyanza, _February 7th, 1889._

DEAR SIR,

I have the honour to submit to you the following report of my stay,
from May 24th, 1888, up to the present time, with his Excellency
Emin Pacha, Mudir of the Equatorial Province.

According to your orders I visited nearly all the stations in the
Province, and read the letters from His Highness the Khedive and
from His Excellency Nubar Pasha, before all the officers, soldiers,
and Egyptian employés in each station and also your own address to
the soldiers. After having read, I spoke to the people, and after
giving them sufficient time to talk it over amongst themselves,
invited them to give me their decision as to whether they elected
to accept our safe-conduct to Egypt, or remain in this country.

In every station, with the exception of Laboré, their unanimous
answer was “We will follow our mudir wherever he goes.” They all
seemed glad that we had come to help them, and said many things
indicating their good opinion of their mudir, and spoke in the
highest terms of his justice and kindness to them, and of his
devotion to them all these years. During the whole of my stay in
his country the Pasha has left me perfect liberty to mix with his
officers and people, and I was free to converse with them as I
pleased.

On reaching Kirri, which is the last station occupied by the
soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, we stayed before going further, to
hear news from Rejaf. The country to the north and west of Kirri is
occupied by the soldiers of the 1st Battalion, who have been in
open rebellion against the Pasha’s authority for nearly four years.
Here the Pasha received a letter from Hamid Aga, the major of the
1st Battalion, begging him not to come on to Rejaf, as the rebels
had formed a plan to seize us and take us down to Khartoum, as
they believed Government still existed there, and that the news
that it had fallen was false. We were therefore obliged to return
without visiting the more northern stations.

On our return, whilst reading the letters before the people at
Laboré, a soldier stepped out of the ranks and exclaimed, “All that
you are saying is a lie, and these letters are forgeries. Khartoum
has not fallen. That is the right road to Egypt. We will go by that
road only, or will stay and die in this country.”

On the Pasha’s ordering him to be put in prison, the soldiers broke
from their ranks and surrounded us, and having loaded their rifles
presented them at us. They were generally excited and the utmost
uproar prevailed, and for some minutes we expected a general
massacre of ourselves and the small number of people with us.
However, they gradually cooled down, and asked me afterwards to
come and speak with them alone, which I did, and they expressed
great regret at what had happened. We have since heard that Surur
Aga, the Chief of the Station, had instigated them to act in this
way.

A few days afterwards, on our return to Dufflé, August 18th, we
found a mutiny had broken out, headed by Fadl el Mulla Aga, the
Chief of Fabbo Station, and that the station was in the hands of
the mutineers--on our entry we were at once made prisoners. It
appears that during our absence certain Egyptians, chief amongst
them Abdul Wahab Effendi and Mustapha Effendi el Adjemi, both of
whom were sent up here for being concerned in Arabi’s rebellion,
together with the clerks Mustapha Effendi Achmet, Achmet Effendi
Mahmoud, Sabri Effendi, Tybe Effendi, and several others had in our
absence been speaking to the people and circulating letters amongst
them, saying it was untrue that Khartoum had fallen, that the
letters we had brought from His Highness the Khedive and his
Excellency Nubar Pasha were forgeries, that you were only an
adventurer and had not come from Egypt, but that you had formed a
plot with the Pasha to take all the people out of the country and
to hand them over, together with their wives and children, as
slaves to the English. They added, in Egypt they had rebelled
against His Highness the Khedive himself, so that it was no great
matter to rebel against Emin Pasha.

These words raised a storm in the country, and though the soldiers
themselves took no active part in the mutiny beyond acting as
sentries over us, they allowed their officers to do as they
pleased. The head mutineers Fadl el Mulla Aga, Achmet Aga Dinkawi,
and Abdul Aga el Opt had them marched to Dufflé and joined the
rebellious Egyptians who had invited him to act as their chief.
They sent letters to all the stations, telling the officers they
had put the mudir and myself in prison, as we had conspired to
betray them, and ordered them to come up to Dufflé and attend a
meeting, when they would decide what further steps should be
taken--they also invited the rebellious officers of the 1st
Battalion to act with them.

I was brought up before the mutineers and questioned about the
Expedition, and the letter from His Highness was examined and
declared by the clerks to be a forgery. The mutineers then proposed
to depose the Pasha, and all those who were averse to such a
measure were by intimidation at last forced to give in. A letter
was handed to him informing him of his deposition, and it was
decided that he should be kept a prisoner at Rejaf. I was declared
to be free, but to all intents and purposes I was a prisoner, as I
was not allowed to leave the station, and all my movements were
closely watched. A plan was also formed to entice you into the
country, and to rob you of all your guns, ammunition, stores, etc.,
and then to turn you adrift.

The mutineers then proceeded to form a new Government, and all
those officers who were suspected of being friendly to the Pasha
were removed from their posts. Soon, however, jealousy and
dissensions began to arise amongst them, and after the Pasha’s
house and the houses of two or three people supposed to be friendly
to him had been looted, things came pretty much to a standstill.

Whilst things were in this state, we suddenly heard, on October
15th, that the Mahdi’s people had arrived in three steamers, and
nine sandals and nuggars, at Lado; and on the 17th three dervishes,
under a flag of truce, brought a letter from Omar Sale, the
commander of the Mahdi’s forces, addressed to the Pasha, promising
him a free pardon should he and his people surrender. The letter
was opened by the mutineers who decided to fight. On October 21st
we heard that the Mahdi’s people, who had been joined by many
negroes of the Bari tribe, had attacked and taken Rejaf, and three
officers, two clerks, and a great many men had been killed, and all
the women and children in the station had been captured. This
created a panic, and the officers and soldiers, together with their
women and children, abandoned the stations of Bidden, Kirri, and
Muggi, and fled in disorder to Laboré; at Kirri they even left the
ammunition behind them.

The mutineers on hearing of this disaster determined to send down
large reinforcements to Muggi, and soldiers were sent down from all
the southern stations to collect there. On October 31st we heard
that there were great dissensions amongst the officers at Muggi,
and the soldiers had declared they would not fight unless their
mudir was set at liberty. On November 15th we heard that the
soldiers had marched down to Rejaf, but that on their approaching
the station the Mahdi’s people had sallied out and attacked them
with a rush; the soldiers made no attempt to fight, but turned at
once and fled, leaving their officers behind them. Six officers,
and the newly-made Governor of the Province, and some of the worst
of the rebels were killed, two more officers were missing, and many
soldiers were killed as they fell down exhausted in the flight.

Upon hearing the news, the officers who were friendly to the Pasha,
at once pressed the rebel officers to set him at liberty; and they
being afraid of the people, set him free and sent us to Wadelai,
where the Pasha was most enthusiastically received by the faithful
part of the population there--he had been a close prisoner just
three months. At last the people believed that Khartoum had fallen
and that we had come from Egypt.

After remaining some days at Wadelai and hearing no news from
Dufflé, people became very uneasy, and messengers were sent down to
Dufflé, on the east bank of the river, to carry letters and to
ascertain the reason of the long silence, as we had heard that a
large body of the Mahdi’s people were advancing from the west on
Wadelai and were only four days distant.

On December 4th, an officer in command of Bora, a small station
between Wadelai and Dufflé, came in with his soldiers in great
haste, saying they had abandoned their post at Dufflé, Fabbo and
all the northern station had fallen, and that the steamers also had
been captured and were in the hands of the Mahdi’s people, the
natives round the stations had all risen and joined the enemy and
had killed our messengers. On hearing this news a council was held,
and the officers and soldiers at once decided to abandon and retire
to Tunguru, from which place they would ascend the mountains and
try to join you at Fort Bodo. I was desired at the council to
destroy our boat the _Advance_, to prevent her falling into the
hands of the Mahdi, and, as there was no prospect of saving her, I
was reluctantly obliged to do so. On the next day, December 5th, we
had all ready for an early start, taking with us only a few bundles
of the most necessary things and abandoning everything else. All
the ammunition in the storehouses was divided among the soldiers,
who at the last moment declared, as they now had plenty of
ammunition, they preferred to retire to their own
countries--Makraka and the countries round--where they would
disperse and live amongst their own people, and that they would
desert the Pasha and their officers.

Things, however, seemed desperate, and we hurried on without
them--a long, straggling procession, consisting chiefly of Egyptian
employés with their wives and families; we were accompanied only by
some seven or eight soldiers who remained faithful. Some of our
servants were armed with percussion-guns, and we may have mustered
some thirty guns amongst us. Immediately on our quitting the
station the soldiers entered the houses and looted them.

On December 6th a steamer was seen coming up the river after us,
and our people prepared to fire on her; but it turned out that
there were some of our own people from Dufflé on board with letters
from the Pasha. The letters contained the news that Fabbo had been
evacuated, and that the refugees had been able to reach Dufflé in
spite of the negroes who had attacked them. Dufflé had been
besieged by the Mahdi’s people for four days, and the station
itself had been taken and held for some time by a small body of the
enemy, who had entered it at night and they had also captured the
steamers. They had driven the soldiers, of whom there were some
500, actually out of the station; but they, finding themselves
between two fires, had with the energy of despair responded to the
entreaties of their officers. Selim Aga Mator, Bellal Aga, Bachil
Aga, Burgont, and Suleiman Aga, had re-entered the station and
retaken it, and after making a sally, had so punished the enemy
that they retired to Rejaf and sent down two steamers to Khartoum
for reinforcements.

From all accounts we have since heard the soldiers acted with great
cowardice, except at last when they were rendered desperate. In
this affray at Dufflé, fourteen officers and a large number of
soldiers were killed, and Suleiman Aga was shot by his own men, and
has since died. The losses of the enemy were estimated at 250, but
probably a third of that number would be nearer the mark, even
though the Mahdi’s people fought almost entirely with spears and
swords, and the soldiers were armed with Remingtons, and fought
behind a ditch and earthworks, but they are such bad shots that
their shooting had not much effect.

The officers and soldiers at Wadelai were anxious for the Pasha to
return, but after the faithless example the soldiers had shown,
when he believed things to be desperate, he preferred to proceed to
Tunguru. After this retreat from Wadelai, lasting only two days, I
am better able to understand what a difficult and almost impossible
task getting the people to Zanzibar will be, should they elect to
go with us.

After this retreat from Wadelai, the party against the Pasha, which
is again in the ascendant, now that the immediate fear of the
Mahdi’s people is removed, have accused him of having invented the
whole story of the fall of Dufflé, in order to cut off their
retreat and hand them over to the Mahdi, whilst he and the people
with him escaped from the country and joined you. They sentenced
the Pasha, Casati and myself to death for treachery.

During the Council held eventually at Wadelai by all the officers
and soldiers, there was a great amount of quarrelling and
discussion, some wishing to stay in the country, and some wishing
to follow the Pasha, words ran high, and the contending parties
even came to blows. Fadl el Mulla Aga and his party wished to take
the Pasha and myself prisoners, and the other party, headed by
Selim Aga Mator, wished to join the Pasha and leave the country
with him; but though they profess to wish to leave the country,
they make no effort whatever to get things ready for the start. If
you intend to take them with you, you will have to wait many months
before they are ready. Meanwhile the Pasha, Signor Casati and I
were waiting at Tunguru, the mutineers having given strict
injunctions to the chief of the station to detain us there until
further orders.

On January the 26th the Pasha and I got letters from you, dated
January 17th and 18th, and obeying the strict order you give me in
your letters to start for Kavalli’s immediately on receipt of them,
I got ready to start the next day, bringing with me the Pasha’s
answer to your letter. Owing to the treachery of some of the
Pasha’s people, I was delayed two days in the earlier stage of my
journey; but thanks to Shukri Agha, the Chief of Mswa Station, who
has remained faithful to the Pasha, and of whose conduct throughout
the whole of the last unfortunate five months I cannot speak too
highly, I was enabled to induce the natives to bring me in a canoe
to Nyamsassi, but as the Lake is so rough and dangerous at this
time of the year, it has taken me five days from Mswa to Nyamsassi.

It is impossible to give you any true idea of the state of the
country at the present. Sometimes the mutineers are in the
ascendant, and sometimes the party for the Pasha. One steamer full
of reinforcements for the Mahdi’s people has already arrived at
Rejaf, and two more steamers full are shortly expected,
reinforcements will also probably soon come in from Bahr el Ghazal,
when the Mahdi’s people, turning to revenge their defeat at Dufflé,
will most certainly descend on Wadelai with an overpowering force,
and will surprise the people in the midst of their quarrels and
uncertainty. Tunguru is but two days distant from Wadelai, and the
Pasha’s position there, surrounded by people in whom he can place
no trust, is dangerous in the extreme, and it is of the utmost
importance that he should be relieved with as little delay as
possible.

In your letter to me dated January 17th and 18th, you speak rather
bitterly of the Pasha and myself having failed to carry out our
promises of building a station at Nsabé, garrisoning it and storing
it with provisions ready for you on your return to the Nyanza, of
having failed to relieve Fort Bodo, and to carry the loads and
garrison to the station at Nsabé, and of not having such people as
wished to avail themselves of our escort ready at Nsabé, to start
with you on your return. The reason we were unable to do so was as
follows:--After being away from his country for nearly a month with
you at Nsabé, the Pasha had naturally much business to attend to on
his return to Wadelai, the seat of Government, and I myself was for
nearly a month constantly prostrated by fever, and we were not able
to start from Wadelai to visit the northern stations till July.[5]

Having done our work to the north, we were returning with the
intention of carrying out our promises to you, when on August 18th,
we were taken prisoners, and all authority was taken out of the
Pasha’s hands, and we were rendered absolutely powerless to fulfil
those promises. We had tried before leaving Wadelai, to start a
party to Nsabé to build a station, but the soldiers had refused to
obey the order, until they had heard what their brethren in the
Northern stations had decided to do. It is very lucky that a
station was not built, and the goods and garrison of Fort Bodo
removed there, for the rebels would most certainly have seized all
our goods, and made the Europeans in charge prisoners.

And this leads me now to say a few words concerning the position of
affairs in this country when I entered it on 21st April, 1888. The
first battalion had long been in open rebellion against the Pasha’s
authority, and had twice attempted to make him prisoner; the second
battalion, though professedly loyal, was insubordinate and almost
unmanageable, the Pasha possessed only a semblance, a mere rag of
authority--and if he required anything of importance to be done he
could no longer order, he was obliged to beg his officers to do it.

Now when we were at Nsabé in May ’88, though the Pasha hinted that
things were a little difficult in this country, he never revealed
to us the true state of things, which was actually desperate; and
we had not the slightest idea that any mutiny or discontent was
likely to arise amongst his people. We thought--as we and most
people in Europe and Egypt had been taught to believe, by the
Pasha’s own letters and Dr. Junker’s later information--that all
these difficulties arose from events outside his country, whereas
in point of fact, his real danger arose from internal dissensions.
Thus we were led to place our trust in people who were utterly
unworthy of our confidence and help, and who instead of being
grateful to us for wishing to help them, have from the very first
conspired to plunder the Expedition, and turn us adrift; and had
the mutineers in their highly excited state been able to prove one
single case of injustice, cruelty or neglect of his people against
the Pasha, he would most assuredly have lost his life in this
rebellion.

There are of course some people who have remained faithful to the
Pasha, and many who have remained neutral, and these chiefly are
the people who are willing to come out with us. There are also a
great number of Egyptian clerks, many of whom have behaved very
badly, but the coming of the Mahdi’s people has so frightened them
that they too now wish to come out with us; but in spite of my
constant advice to them to move forward, they seem incapable of
making any effort to leave the country and concentrate at Nsabé, at
which place they would be within our reach--there is absolutely
nothing to prevent their doing so, but their own laziness.

The greater part of the people, a large number of Egyptians and
most of the Soudanese, are decidedly averse to going to Egypt, and
do not wish to leave the country. Most of them have never been to
Egypt, but have been recruited from the countries round here. Here
they can support a large household, many of the officers have as
many as from eighteen to one hundred people, women, children and
servants, in their houses, and it is the great ambition of every
Soudanese to have as many people as possible in his house, but in
Egypt they could only afford to support three or four people on
their pay. These things being considered, it is quite natural that
they should prefer to remain in their own country.

As to the Pasha’s wish to leave the country, I can say decidedly he
is most anxious to go out with us, but under what condition he will
consent to come out I can hardly understand. I do not think he
quite knows himself, his ideas seem to me to vary so much on the
subject; to-day he is ready to start up and go, to-morrow some new
idea holds him back. I have had many conversations with him about
it, but have never been able to get his unchanging opinion on the
subject. After this rebellion I remarked to him, “I presume now
that your people have deposed you and put you aside, you do not
consider that you have any longer any responsibility or obligation
concerning them,” and he answered, “Had they not deposed me I
should have felt bound to stand by them and help them in any way I
could, but now, I consider I am absolutely free to think only of my
personal safety and welfare, and if I get the chance, I shall go
out regardless of everything;” and yet only a few days before I
left him, he said to me, “I know I am not in any way responsible
for these people, but I cannot bear to go out myself first and
leave anyone behind me who is desirous of quitting the country. It
is mere sentiment I know, and perhaps a sentiment you will not
sympathize with, but my enemies at Wadelai would point at me and
say to the people, ‘You see he has deserted you.’” These are merely
two examples of what passed between us on the subject of his going
out with us, but I could quote numbers of things he said, all
equally contradictory. Again, too, being somewhat impatient after
one of these unsatisfactory conversations, I said, “If even the
Expedition does reach any place near you, I shall advise Mr.
Stanley to arrest you and carry you off, whether you will or no;”
to which he replied, “Well, I shall do nothing to prevent his doing
that.” It seems to me, if we are to save him, we must first save
him from himself.

Before closing this report, I must bear witness to the fact that in
my frequent conversations with all sorts and conditions of the
Pasha’s people, most of them spoke of his justice and generosity to
them, but they also said, and what I have seen confirms it, that he
did not hold his people with a sufficiently firm hand.

The three Soudanese soldiers you left with me as orderlies and my
servant Binza return with me, but Mabruki Kassim, the man who was
wounded by the buffalo at Nsabé, died two days after you left for
Fort Bodo.

I am, dear Sir, Your obedient servant, (Signed) A. J. MOUNTENEY JEPHSON.

To H. M. STANLEY, Esq., Commanding the Relief Expedition.

Mr. Jephson also handed me an official receipt to my formal letter of January 18th, written by Emin Pasha.

Tunguru, _January 27th, 1889_.

To H. M. STANLEY, Esq., Commanding the Relief Expedition.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note of January
14th, Camp Undussuma, and of your official letter of January 17th,
which came to hand yesterday afternoon. I beg at the same time to
be allowed to express my sincere congratulations to you and to your
party for the work you performed.

I take note of your offer to deliver to me, or any person appointed
by me, the second instalment of goods brought by you, consisting of
sixty-three cases of Remington cartridges, twenty-six cases of
gunpowder, each 45 lbs. weight, four cases percussion caps, four
bales of goods, one bale of goods for Signor Casati--a gift from
yourself; two pieces of serge, writing-paper, envelopes,
blank-books, &c. As soon as the officers I am awaiting from Wadelai
come here, I shall appoint one of them to take charge of these
goods, and I shall at the same time instruct him to give you formal
receipt for them.

The thirty-one cases of Remington cartridges, which formed the
first instalment of goods, have been duly deposited in Government
stores.

Concerning your question if Signor Casati and myself propose to
accept your escort and assistance to reach Zanzibar, and if there
are any officers and men disposed to accept of your safe-conduct to
the sea, I have to state that not only Signor Casati and myself
would gladly avail us of your help, but that there are lots of
people desirous of going out from the far Egypt, as well as for any
other convenient place. As these people have been delayed by the
deplorable events which have happened during your absence, and as
only from a few days they begin to come in, I should entreat you to
kindly assist them. I propose to send them to Nyamsassi, and a
first party start to-day with Mr. Jephson. Every one of them has
provisions enough to last at least for a month.

I beg to tender my thanks for the statement of your movements. As
from the day you fixed your movements until the arrival of your
letter elapsed nine days; the remainder of the time you kindly gave
us, viz., eleven days, will scarcely be sufficient. I cannot,
therefore, but thank you for your good intentions, and those of the
people who sent you, and I must leave it to you if you can await
us, and prefer to start after the twenty days have elapsed.

I fully understand the difficulties of getting food and provisions
for your people, and I am very sorry that the short time you have
to give me will not be sufficient to send you stores from here.

As Mr. Jephson starts by this steamer, and has kindly promised to
hand you this note, I avail myself of the occasion to bear witness
to the great help and assistance his presence afforded to me. Under
the most trying circumstances he has shown so splendid courage,
such unfaltering kindness and patience, that I cannot but wish him
every success in life, and thank him for all his forbearance. As
probably I shall not see you any more,[6] you will be pleased to
inform his relations of my thanks to him and them.

Before concluding, I beg to be permitted to tender anew my most
heartfelt thanks to you and to your officers and men, and to ask
you to transmit my everlasting gratitude to the kind people who
sent you to help us. May God protect you and your party, and give
you a happy and speedy homeward march.

I am, Sir, Your obedient servant, (Signed) Dr. EMIN PASHA.