Chapter II: Part 2

COLONEL HENDERSON.--Military writers in the United Kingdom had also considered the possibility of a conflict with the armed forces of Germany, and in all their treatises the moral of the nation was passed under review. Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, in "The Science of War," had even envisaged a struggle in which not only the troops of Britain and the Overseas Dominions but those of the United States would take part, and his estimate of the moral of the race on both sides of the Atlantic, and in both hemispheres, was fully justified by the events of the War. Colonel Henderson found in the race something more than toughness in its moral fibre, for he adds, "Tactical ability is the birthright of {18} our race. . . . In a conflict on the vastest scale (the American Civil War) the tactics of the American troops, at a very early period, were superior to those of the Prussians in 1866. In Strategy, controlled as it was on both sides by the civil governments and not by the military chiefs, grave errors were committed, but on the field of battle the racial instinct asserted itself. Nor were the larger tactical manoeuvres even of 1870 an improvement on those of the American campaigns. . . . But in 1878, Skobeleff, the first of European generals to master the problem of the offensive, knew the American War 'by heart,' and in his successful assaults on the Turkish redoubts he followed the plan of the American generals on both sides, when attempting to carry such positions; to follow up the assaulting columns with fresh troops, without waiting for the first column to be repulsed." After the Civil War, General Forrest, a cavalry leader of the Confederate States Army, was asked to what he attributed his success in so many actions. He replied: "Well, I reckon I got there first with the most men," thereby stating in a nutshell the key to the Art of War. "At Nachod, the Austrian commander had numbers on his side, yet he sent into action part only of his forces, and it was by numbers that he was beaten" (Marshal Foch). With regard to the moral of the race Colonel Henderson makes this emphatic statement: "In the last nine months of the American Civil War, time and again, according to all precedent, one side or the other ought to have been whipped, but it declined to be anything of the sort. The losses show this. This was due in no small measure to the quality which the troops on both sides inherited from the stock that furnished his infantry to the Duke of Wellington. Never to know when they were beaten was a characteristic of both North and South."

THE CONTEMPTIBLE LITTLE ARMY.--In place of the general decadence of the British race, upon which the German Staff appear to have relied, this characteristic {19} quality of endurance was exhibited by French's "Contemptible Little Army" during the _Retreat from Mons_ in August, 1914, at the _First Battle of Ypres_ (October 20, 1914), and at the _Second Battle of Ypres_ (April 22, 1915). Of his "Contemptible Little Army" Marshal French writes in his book, "1914": "The British Army had indeed suffered severely, and had performed a herculean task in reaching its present position in such fighting form, and its _moral_ had withstood the ordeal. I think the Germans were probably justified in doubting our offensive powers, but the thing they forgot was the nation from which we spring."

THE NEW ARMIES.--From 1915 to 1918 the New Armies, raised, equipped, and trained during the War, and representing the Empire in arms, displayed the same inherent quality, and disproved for ever the charge of decadence that had been brought against the British race. "That these troops should have accomplished so much under such conditions, and against an army and a nation whose chief concern for so many years had been preparation for war, constitutes a feat of which the history of our nation records no equal. . . . Troops from every part of the British Isles and from every Dominion and quarter of the Empire, whether Regulars, Territorials, or men of the New Armies, have borne a share in the battle. . . . Among all the long roll of victories borne on the colours of our regiments, there has never been a higher test of the endurance and resolution of our Infantry. They have shown themselves worthy of the highest traditions of our race, and of the proud records of former wars" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatch, December 23, 1916).

"Our new and hastily trained armies have shown once again that they are capable of meeting and beating the enemy's best troops, even under conditions which favoured his defence to a degree which it required the greatest endurance, determination, and heroism to {20} overcome" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatch, December 25, 1917). "It is no disparagement of the gallant deeds performed on other fronts to say that, in the stubborn struggle for the line of hills which stretches from Wytschaete to Passchendaele, the great armies that to-day are shouldering the burden of our Empire have shown themselves worthy of the regiments which, in October and November of 1914, made Ypres take rank for ever amongst the most glorious of British battles" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatch, December 25, 1917). "The British infantryman has always had the reputation of fighting his best in an uphill battle, and time and again in the history of our country, by sheer tenacity and determination of purpose, has won victory from a numerically superior foe. Thrown once more upon the defensive by circumstances over which he had no control, but which will not persist, he has shown himself to possess in full measure the traditional qualities of his race" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatch, July 20, 1918). "Throughout this long period of incessant fighting against greatly superior numbers the behaviour of all arms of the British forces engaged was magnificent. What they achieved is best described in the words of the French General (Maistre) under whose orders they came, who wrote of them: 'They have enabled us to establish a barrier against which the hostile waves have beaten and shattered themselves. Cela aucun des témoins français ne l'oubliera'" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatch, December 21, 1918).

After four years of fighting, at the close of a defensive campaign of the utmost severity, protracted by the efforts of the enemy from March 21-July 17, 1918, the New Armies passed from the guard to the thrust. They were everywhere victorious, and in nine pitched battles they captured upwards of 175,000 prisoners and 2,600 guns.

"In order to estimate the ardour and endurance of these troops during this final stage, it will be enough to mention the dates and importance of the main events--

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"_Battle of Amiens_ (Aug. 8-13) in which the IV. Army took 22,000 prisoners and more than 400 guns.

"_Battle of Bapaume_ (Aug. 21-Sept. 1) III. Army and Left Wing of IV. Army: 34,000 prisoners, 270 guns.

"_Battle of the Scarpe_ (Aug. 26-Sept. 3) I. Army: 16,000 prisoners, 200 guns.

"_Battle of Haerincourt and Epéhy_ (Sept. 12-18) IV. and III. Armies: 12,000 prisoners, 100 guns.

"_Battle of Cambrai and the Hindenburg Line_ (Sept. 27-Oct. 5) IV., III., and I. Armies. Ended in the breaking of the Hindenburg Line and in the capture of 35,000 prisoners and 380 guns.

"_Battle of Flanders_ (Sept. 28-Oct. 14) II. Army: 5,000 prisoners, 100 guns.

"_Battle of Le Cateau_ (Oct. 6-12) IV., III., and I. Armies: 12,000 prisoners, 250 guns.

"_Battle of the Selle_ (Oct. 17-25) IV. and III. Armies: 20,000 prisoners, 475 guns.

"_Battle of the Sambre_ (Nov. 1-11) IV., III., and I. Armies: 19,000 prisoners, 450 guns."

(Marshal Foch.)

CHANGES IN METHOD.--The principles which underlie the Art of War would thus appear to be based on constant factors, but the methods of their application are susceptible to change, for in their application the principles are subject to the influence of successive inventions. Gunpowder abolished the bow and arrow and the knight in armour; the bayonet affixed to the musket superseded the pike; the rifle outranged the musket; the breech-loader and the magazine attachment progressively increased the rate of fire; smokeless powder rendered a firing line almost invisible; the flat trajectory of the small-arms bullet increased the danger-zone in an advance; the increased power, mobility, and accuracy of the field gun[4] rendered certain {22} formations obsolete in the attack; the general advance in the rate and accuracy of fire from rifles, machine guns, and artillery made attack on a strongly organised position possible only when surprise in the time and place of the thrust neutralises the advantages of the defence, or when an overwhelming barrage of shells and bullets covers the advance and smothers the enemy's resistance. The advent of a third service, by the addition of the Air to the Sea and Land Services, increased the facilities for reconnaissance[5] and added to the difficulties of concealing movement during the hours of daylight. These and similar influences have brought about changes in certain respects, amongst which the most pronounced is the increased use of field entrenchments, and tactical methods have been evolved to meet the necessities of the case, or modified to suit the new requirements.[6]

But no inventions can shift the burden of war from the shoulders of the infantryman. "Despite the enormous development of mechanical invention in every phase of warfare, the place which the infantryman has always held as the main substance and foundation of an army is as secure to-day as in any period of history. The infantryman remains the backbone of defence and the spearhead of the attack. At no time has the reputation of the British infantryman been higher, or his achievement more worthy of his renown. . . . Immense as the influence of mechanical devices may be, they cannot by themselves decide a campaign. Their true _rôle_ is that of assisting the infantryman. . . . They cannot replace him. Only by the rifle and bayonet of the infantryman can the decisive victory be won" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).

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THE TEXT-BOOKS.--Changes in tactical methods are recorded from time to time in circulars issued by the General Staff, to be embodied eventually in the official text-books. These text-books ("Infantry Training" and "Field Service Regulations") are the foundation upon which the study of Infantry Tactics should be based, and of these books Colonel G. F. R. Henderson has left behind him the following opinion: "That portion of our own text-books which refers to Infantry in Attack and Defence is merely the essence of Tactics. There is no single sentence that is not of primary importance, no single principle laid down that can be violated with impunity, no single instruction that should not be practised over and over again." After four years of warfare, in which the principles enunciated in the text-books had been put to the most searching of all tests (_i.e._ practical application in War), the General Staff of the Army was able to preface a list of its recent publications with the following exhortation: "It must be remembered that the principles laid down in Field Service Regulations and in Infantry Training are still the basis of all sound knowledge."

At the close of the final victorious campaign, Marshal Haig emphasised the truth of this claim: "The longer the war lasted the more emphatically has it been realised that our original organisation and training were based on correct principles. The danger of altering them too much, to deal with some temporary phase, has been greater than the risk of adjusting them too little. . . . The experience gained in this war alone, without the study and practice of lessons learned from other campaigns, could not have sufficed to meet the ever-changing tactics which have characterised the fighting. There was required also the sound basis of military knowledge supplied by our Training Manuals and Staff Colleges."

[1] Author of "Ben Hur."

[2] For an example in military fiction, see _The Second Degree_ in "The Green Curve."

[3] "Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem."

[4] The term "field gun" was limited to the 18-pounder until the _Boer War_, when heavy guns were used as mobile artillery. In the Great War, mechanical transport brought into the field of battle guns of the largest calibre. Quick-firing field guns were first used by the Abyssinians against the Italians at the Battle of Adowa (February 29, 1896).

[5] Reconnoitring balloons were first used by the Army of the Potomac at the Battle of Fredericksburg (December 12, 1862). Aeroplanes were used in warfare for the first time in 1911, during the Italo-Turkish campaign in Tripoli, North Africa.

[6] Heavily armoured cars, known as "Tanks," were introduced during the First Battle of the Somme, September 15, 1916.

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THE BATTLE

"Theoretically, a well conducted battle is a decisive attack successfully carried out."--MARSHAL FOCH.

"The Art of War, in order to arrive at its aim (which is to impose its will upon the enemy), knows but one means, the destruction of the adversary's organised forces. So we arrive at the battle, the only argument of war, the only proper end that may be given to strategical operations, and we begin by establishing the fact that to accomplish the aim of war the battle cannot be purely defensive. The results of a defensive battle are exclusively negative; it may check the enemy in his march; it may prevent him from achieving his immediate aim; but it never leads to his destruction, and so is powerless to achieve the wished-for victory. Therefore, every defensive battle must terminate with an offensive action or there will be no result" (Marshal Foch).

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BATTLE.--No two battles are precisely similar, but there are certain characteristics common to every battle.

In the first place, the issue is almost always uncertain, for events which no human sagacity could provide against may occur to defeat the wisest plans. The best chances, therefore, are on the side of the commander who is provided with sufficient means to achieve his object, who forms his plans with the greatest sagacity, and executes them with the greatest ability. Decisive success has followed the combinations of great commanders, and in the long run victory pays homage to knowledge of the principles which underlie the art of war. {25}

In the second place, the human factor always plays its part in battle. Troops lacking in discipline are liable to panic in face of a sudden disaster, and even the best troops are liable to become unsteady if their flank is gained.

In the third place, a comparatively small body of fresh troops thrown into action at the right moment against greater numbers, if the latter are exhausted by fighting, may achieve a success out of all proportion to their numbers. For this reason a prudent commander will endeavour to retain under his control some portion of his reserves, to be thrown in after his adversary has exhausted his own reserve power.

To be superior at the point of attack is the Art of Warfare in a nutshell, and for this reason attacks on separate points of a position must be properly synchronised to be effective. The unbeaten enemy will otherwise possess a mobile reserve with which to reinforce threatened points. The attacks must be so timed that he throws them in piecemeal or fails to reach the point mainly threatened.

McClellan's position with the Army of the Potomac on _Malvern Hill_ (July 1, 1862) was a desperate position to attack in front, but it could have been turned on the right. The hill dominated the ground to the north, and also the road on which Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was approaching, and was crowned with numerous heavy guns, against which Lee's artillery was powerless. It was Lee's intention to open with an attack by a division, supported by two brigades, on the right of the position, and when this force was at grips with the Army of the Potomac, to assault the centre with a bayonet charge. About 5 p.m. the sound of cheering was heard near the right of the position, and mistaking this for the signal, General D. H. Hill launched the attack on the centre. The first line of defence was carried, but the Northern Army was unoccupied in the other parts of the line, and reinforcements quickly {26} beat off the attack with heavy loss. After this attack had failed, Magruder's division arrived in position and the attack on the right flank was delivered with similar results. Both attacks were carried out with superb courage, but partial blows of this nature are without the first elements of success, and McClellan's movements were not again molested.

PHASES OF THE BATTLE.--There are three principal phases of every battle. Information must be obtained by observation and by fighting; advantage must be taken of information so obtained to strike where the blow or blows will be most effective; success obtained by fighting must be developed until the enemy is annihilated.

_Information and the Initiative_.--Much work requires to be done in the air and on the land before the rival armies come face to face. Aircraft and the independent cavalry (advanced mounted troops and fast tanks detached from divisions for the purpose), endeavour to ascertain whether, and if so in what locality and in what strength, troops are being concentrated by the enemy. From information so obtained the Headquarters Staff are able to conjecture the intentions and aims of the enemy, and the extent to which their own intentions and aims have been perceived by the enemy. After the enemy is encountered this information is at the service of the Commander of the troops, but it will generally require to be supplemented by fighting. On each side the commander will be striving to obtain the _initiative_, to impose his will upon his opponent, for the commander who loses the initiative is compelled to conform to the plans and movements of his adversary, instead of bringing into operation plans and movements better suited to his own purposes. Each is scheming to obtain or retain the liberty of manoeuvre, in the same way as, in the days of sailing ships, a naval commander strove to get the "weather gauge" in every encounter.

The initiative won by the Strategy of one commander {27} is sometimes wrested from him by the Tactics of his adversary. This was exemplified at the _Battle of Salamanca_ (July 22, 1812). Wellington, the generalissimo of the Anglo-Portuguese forces, had decided to withdraw behind the River Tormes to the stronghold Ciudad Rodrigo, and had dispatched his train to that centre. The French Commander (Marmont), in his eagerness to intercept Wellington's line of retreat, moved part of his force to the Heights of Miranda, thus threatening Wellington's right and rear, but leaving a gap of two miles between the detached force and his main army. Wellington noted the fresh disposition of Marmont's army through his telescope, and exclaiming, "That will do!" he abandoned all idea of the withdrawal which had been forced upon him by Marmont's previous manoeuvres, and hurled part of his force against the detached body (which was defeated before Marmont could send assistance) and at the same time barred the progress of the main army, which was forced to leave the field. Wellington afterwards declared, "I never saw an army receive such a beating." If the Spanish General in alliance with Wellington had not, contrary to the most explicit instructions, evacuated the Castle of Alba de Tormes (which commanded the fords over which the French retreated), "not one-third of Marmont's army would have escaped" (Napier).

As at Salamanca, where the liberty of manoeuvre which had been won by the Strategy of Marmont was wrested from him by the Tactics of Wellington, so at the final phase of the _First Battle of the Marne_ (September, 1914), the initiative was regained by tactical adroitness. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. To obtain a quick decision the Germans went to every length. Of the main routes for the invasion of France chosen for their armies, two led through the neutral territories of Luxemburg and Belgium, and only one through France, and their advance there broke {28} down, almost at the first, at the only point where it was legitimately conducted, for the German armies failed to pierce the French Front at the Gap of Charmes (Vosges), and their defeat at the _Battle of Baccarat_ (August 25, 1914) led to the decisive defeat at the First Battle of the Marne. They then abandoned, for the moment, all hopes of a quick decision in a war of manoeuvre and retiring to their prepared lines of defence on the Aisne, relied upon methodically prepared and regularly constructed trench systems, and upon the hand grenade, the trench mortar, and the other weapons of close combat, for superiority in a long campaign of trench siege warfare, which endured until the collapse of Russia in 1917 freed for an offensive movement on the requisite scale in 1918 upwards of 1,500,000 men. At the _First Battle of the Marne_, the five German armies, which were following up the Franco-British left and centre, were extended from Amiens to Verdun, but on September 8, 1914, the German I. Army (General von Kluck) was so placed by the impetuosity of the march that a wide gap separated it from the remainder of the German forces. To the north-west of Paris a new French Army, collected from the Metropolitan garrison and from the south-eastern frontier, had been assembled and pushed out in motor transports by the zeal and intelligence of the Military Governor of Paris (General Gallieni); and to avoid this menace to his flank and line of communications, and to regain touch with the other German armies, one of which (under the Crown Prince) was unsuccessfully engaged in battle, General von Kluck adopted the extremely hazardous course of a flank march, across the front of the Franco-British left wing. Upon receiving intelligence of this manoeuvre from the Air Service in Paris, General Joffre, seeing the opportunity of gaining the initiative, ordered an advance to the attack on September 6, and the First Battle of the Marne, which resulted from this order, changed the character of the fighting on the {29} Western Front. The decisive blow was strategical rather than tactical. It was delivered on a battlefield of 6,000 square miles, and involved, throughout that area, a struggle of six great armies, numbering in all 700,000 troops, against a similar number of armies of at least equal strength. No counter-attack on such a scale had previously been delivered in any campaign, and the scarcely interrupted advance of the German armies received a permanent check, while the strategic aim of the German Staff, namely, the speedy annihilation in the field of the Franco-British armies, had to be definitely abandoned.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE BATTLE.--The "atmosphere" of battle is thus depicted in "The Science of War": "When two armies are face to face and one is superior in numbers to the other, the commander of the smaller army is confronted by two problems. If the superior army is not yet concentrated, or is so distributed that the different parts cannot readily support each other, it may be defeated in detail. If the superior army is already concentrated, its commander may be induced, by one means or another, to make detachments, and thus to be weak everywhere. The first problem is solved by rapidity of manoeuvre, surprise marches, secrecy, feints to bewilder the adversary in his concentration, and action on unexpected lines. The second, by skilful threatening of points for the defence of which the adversary will detach forces; by concealment of his dispositions; and by drawing the adversary into terrain where part only of his superior forces can be employed." "The power of striking 'like a bolt from the blue' is of the greatest value in war. Surprise was the foundation of almost all the great strategical combinations of the past, as it will be of those to come. The first thought and the last of the great general is to outwit his adversary and to strike where he is least expected. To what Federal soldier did it occur on the {30} morning of _Chancellorsville_ (May 2-8, 1863) that Lee, confronted by 90,000 Northerners, would detach Stonewall Jackson with more than half his own force of 43,000 to attack his adversary in the rear" ("The Science of War"). Surprise was the chief cause of success in the _First Battle of Cambrai_ (November 20, 1917) when General Sir Julian Byng launched the III. Army at dawn against the highly organised defensive position known as the "Hindenburg Line." The wire entanglements in front of this position were exceptionally deep, and had not been broken by gun-fire. Behind them the Germans were resting in apparent security and such information as they were able to obtain by raiding reconnaissances was not corroborated by the fierce and prolonged artillery bombardment which was at that time regarded as the inseparable prelude to an attack in force. The advance was preceded by battalions of Tanks, with Infantry in close support, and was followed by Cavalry, to round up fugitives and disorganise reinforcements. The artillery had previously been strengthened and was directed against the support and reserve lines, to prevent the Germans from massing for counter-attacks and to break up their formations. Aircraft carried out reconnaissance during the battle from a low altitude and harassed the defenders with fire action. An advance was made into the strongest part of the German defensive system on a twenty-mile front to a depth of five miles, and secured upwards of 11,000 prisoners, 150 guns, and considerable quantities of stores and materials, and although after-events neutralised the initial successes, the advance of November 20, 1917, will ever remain an example of the value of surprise in war. "Surprise strikes with terror even those who are by far the stronger. A new weapon of war may ensure it, or a sudden appearance of a force larger than the adversary's, or a concentration of forces upon a point at which the adversary is not ready instantaneously to parry the blow. But if the methods {31} be various, the aim is always to produce the same moral effect upon the enemy--terror--by creating in him at the swift apparition of unexpected and incontestably powerful means, the sentiment of impotence, the conviction that he cannot conquer--that is to say, that he is conquered. And this supreme blow of unexpected vigour need not be directed upon the whole of the enemy's army. For an army is an animate and organised being, a collection of organs, of which the loss even of a single one leads to death" (Marshal Foch). At almost any period of the battle, and in almost every phase of fighting, surprise can be brought about by a sudden and unexpected outburst of effective machine gun or other form of fire. "A sudden effective fire will have a particularly demoralising effect on the enemy; it is often advantageous, therefore, to seek for surprise effects of this sort by temporarily withholding fire" ("Infantry Training, 1921").

THE DECISIVE BLOW.--The preparatory action and the development usually take the form of a converging movement of separated forces, so timed as to strike the adversary's front and flank simultaneously, in order to threaten the enemy's line of communications, for the line of supply is as vital to the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a human being. "Perhaps no situation is more pitiable than that of a commander who has permitted an enemy to sever his communications. He sees the end of his resources at hand, but not the means to replenish them" (General Sir E. B. Hamley). The decisive blow will be delivered by the General Reserve, which will be secretly concentrated and launched as secretly as possible; and the commander of the whole force will so distribute his troops that about half his available force can be kept in hand for this decisive blow, on a part of the enemy's front if sufficient penetration has been effected, or on a flank. The point chosen becomes the vital {32} point, and success there means success at all points. Once routed, the enemy must be relentlessly pursued and prevented from regaining order and moral.

A battle was fought in the year B.C. 331, nearly 2,300 years ago, at Arbela,[1] in Mesopotamia, the Eastern theatre of operations in the Great War of 1914-18, and it deserves study to show the eternal nature of the main principles which underlie the Art of War. Alexander the Great invaded the territories of Darius, King of the Medes and Persians, with the strategic aim of defeating his adversary's main armies in a decisive battle. The Macedonian forces were preceded by an Advanced Guard of Cavalry, and from information obtained by the Vanguard, Alexander was made aware of the strength and position of the Persian forces. By a careful reconnaissance of the ground in company with his Corps Commanders, Alexander was able to forestall a projected movement, and by advancing in two lines of battle in such a way that his troops could at any moment be thrown into a compact figure fringed with spears, which formed an impenetrable hedge against cavalry, he found a remedy for the disadvantages of the ground, which afforded no protection to either of his flanks. After advancing in these two lines Alexander manoeuvred his troops into a phalanx, or wedge-shaped figure, and this wedge he drove into the masses of the enemy to force the wings asunder. In spite of local reverses in parts of the field, the depth and weight of the main attack carried it through the enemy's forces: the survivors were captured or dispersed, and the victory was complete.

[1] The site of this battle was probably Gaugamela, about 60 miles from the present Arbil, which is 40 miles from Mosul, on the Baghdad road.

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HOW BATTLES ARE INFLUENCED

Once troops are launched in battle their success or failure depends upon such influences as the commander can bring to bear, upon the co-operation of his subordinate commanders, and upon the moral and training of the troops engaged.

THE COMMANDER'S INFLUENCE is shown, first in his orders for the operations, and later by the method in which he employs the forces retained in his hand for the decisive blow. Personal control, by the commander, of troops committed to battle, is not only impossible but should be unnecessary, as such control and leading is the function of his subordinates, who should be fully acquainted with his intentions and must be trusted to carry them into execution. Other, and more important, duties have to be undertaken by the commander, and it is essential that he should not allow his attention to be diverted from his main object by local incidents, which are matters for his subordinates to deal with. "A sound system of command is based upon three facts: an army cannot be effectively controlled by direct orders from headquarters; the man on the spot is the best judge of the situation; intelligent co-operation is of infinitely more value than mechanical obedience" ("The Science of War"). A campaign resolves itself into a struggle between human intelligences. Each commander will endeavour to defeat his adversary in battle, and his principal weapon is his General Reserve. If he can exhaust the reserve power of his adversary, while maintaining his own intact, he can proceed to victory at his own time, and he will endeavour to exhaust the hostile reserves by causing {34} them to be thrown in piecemeal, in ignorance of the spot where the decisive blow is to fall. During the campaign on the Western Front in 1918 the Allies were able to conserve their strength throughout the attacks from March 21 to July 15, and when they passed from the guard to the thrust they extended their front of attack from day to day, calculating correctly that this gradual extension would mislead the enemy as to where the main blow would fall, and would cause him to throw in his reserves piecemeal.

"The subordinate commanders must bring to fruit with all the means at their disposal the scheme of the higher command, therefore they must, above all, understand that thought and then make of their means the use best suited to circumstances--of which, however, they are the only judge. . . . The Commander-in-Chief cannot take the place of his subordinates--he cannot think and decide for them. In order to think straight and to decide rightly it would be necessary for him to see through their eyes, to look at things from the place in which they actually stand, to be everywhere at the same moment" (Marshal Foch). Students of military history will remember that the Prussian Commander-in-Chief and his Chief Staff Officer, during the highly successful campaign of 1870-71, did not come within sound of the guns until five pitched battles had been fought by their subordinate commanders. Outside the fog of battle, with its absorbing interests and distractions, the commander can retain his sense of proportion[1] and can decide where and when he will make his final effort. News of the battle reaches him from his immediate subordinates, and from the accounts of successes and failures he is able to judge the weaknesses and strength of his own and his adversary's dispositions, to use part of his reserves as reinforcements, {35} if he must, or to husband them with confidence in the success of the operations, until the time comes for him to launch them for the final blow.

INFORMATION.--In order that the commander's influence may be exerted to the best advantage it is essential that all vital information should reach him promptly, and that his orders should be communicated without delay. Subordinate commanders must keep their superiors and commanders of neighbouring units regularly informed as to the progress of the battle, and of important changes in the situation as they occur. Runners, who can be trusted to carry a verbal message or written order, are attached to each unit engaged and to its headquarters. Higher units than battalions can usually depend on the Signal Service for intercommunication, but whenever necessary, a supply of runners and mounted orderlies must be available for their use. This ensures co-operation, and enables mutual support to be rendered. Information received must be transmitted at once to all whom it concerns, and orders received from superiors must be communicated without delay to commanders of all units affected.

CO-OPERATION.--"Co-operation when in contact with the enemy is no easy matter to bring about. There are, however, three means of overcoming the difficulty: constant communication between the units; thorough reconnaissance of the ground over which the movements are to be made; clear and well-considered orders" ("The Science of War"). Each commander who issues orders for Attack or Defence should assemble his subordinate commanders, if possible in view of the ground over which the troops are to operate, explain his orders, and satisfy himself that each subordinate understands his respective task. "Combination depends on the efficiency of the chain of control connecting the brain of the commander through all grades down to the {36} corporal's squad; on the intelligence of subordinate leaders in grasping and applying the commander's plans; on the discipline which ensures intelligent obedience to the directing will; and on the mobility which gives rapid effect to that will, and permits advantage to be taken of fleeting opportunities. Every fresh development in the means of transmitting orders and information rapidly, permits of an extension of the commander's influence, and makes more perfect combination possible and over wider areas" (General Sir E. B. Hamley). Even when, and particularly when, forces are engaged in battle, reconnaissance must be carried on and information gained must be communicated at once. It will frequently happen that a suitable moment for the decisive attack, or decisive counter-stroke, will be found only after long and severe fighting. Systematic arrangements for obtaining, sifting, and transmitting information throughout the battle are therefore of the highest importance. Information must be gained not only by troops and aircraft actually engaged, but by supports and reserves, who will often be able to see what is invisible to the forward troops. In such cases, more than in any other, information must be communicated at once. By intelligent observation superintending commanders can co-operate with one another, can anticipate situations as they develop, and decide at the time what steps will be necessary to meet them. A general reconnaissance will be in progress during every modern battle by observers in aircraft and in observation balloons. In addition, local reconnaissance by means of patrols and scouts will usually discover an opening that might otherwise be lost, and may warn a commander of an intended movement against him, which might otherwise develop into a disagreeable surprise.

Co-operation and Mutual Support were developed in their highest form by the Allied Corps Commanders in the _First Battle of the Marne_ (August-September, 1914). {37} In this campaign close on 1,500,000 troops were engaged on both sides, and the Corps Commanders, particularly those of the French VI. Army (Manoury), III. Army (Sarrail), and the Military Governor of Paris (Gallieni), were continuously in touch with one another, and frequently rendered assistance, unasked, by fire and by movement. Co-operation of a novel kind was exhibited on a minor scale during the First Battle of the Somme. An attack was launched on _Gueudecourt_ (September 26, 1916) by the 21st Division, and a protecting trench was captured as a preliminary to the larger movement. A tank, followed up by infantry bombers, proceeded along the parapet of the trench firing its machine guns, while an aeroplane swooped over the trench firing its Lewis guns. The survivors in the trench surrendered, and the garrison was collected by supporting infantry, who advanced in response to signals from the aeroplane.

FIRE TACTICS.--It has already been noted that the battle is the only argument of war; it is also the final test of training, and on the battlefield no part of the syllabus is more severely tested than that devoted to _musketry_. The fire tactics of an army, its combination of fire and movement, the direction and control by the leaders and the fire discipline of the rank and file, make for success or failure on the field of battle. The fire must be directed by the fire unit commander against an objective chosen with intelligence and accurately defined; it must be controlled by the sub-unit commander, who must be able to recognise the objectives indicated, to regulate the rate of fire, and to keep touch with the state of the ammunition supply. Fire discipline must be maintained, so that there is the strictest compliance with verbal orders and signals, and application on the battlefield of the habits inculcated during the training period. The time when fire is to be opened is often left to the discretion of the fire-unit commander, but, generally speaking, fire should be opened by an {38} attacking force only when a further advance without opening fire is impossible; and even in defence, when access to the ammunition reserve is likely to be far easier than in an attack, withholding fire until close range is reached is generally more effective than opening at a longer range. The tactical value of a withering fire at close range from a hitherto passive defender has again and again been proved in battle. On the _Heights of Abraham_ (September 13, 1759) General Wolfe had assembled his troops and he awaited Montcalm's attack. Not a shot was fired by the defenders until the attacking force was within forty paces, and three minutes later a bayonet charge into the broken foe swept the French helplessly before it. At the _Battle of Bunker Hill_ (June 17, 1775) the American colonists inflicted a loss of 46 per cent. on the assaulting British force, by reserving their fire "until the badges and buttons of the tunics could be clearly identified." At the _Battle of Fredericksburg_ (December 13, 1862) General Meagher's Irish Brigade of the U.S. Army of the Potomac assaulted Marye's Hill, 1,200 strong. The defending Confederates reserved their fire until the assailants were 100 yards from their position and drove them off with a loss of 937 out of the 1,200. In August, 1914, the British Regular Army, during the _Retreat from Mons_, reserved their fire until the Germans arrived at the most deadly point of their rifles' trajectory, and again and again drove off all except the dead and mortally wounded. Throughout the Great War, troops fully trained in the British system of musketry and using the short magazine Lee Enfield rifle, proved beyond dispute the values of the system and of the weapon. In a review of the methods adopted to check the great German offensive in the spring of 1918, a circular issued by the General Staff states: "Rapid rifle fire was the decisive factor in these operations. The men had confidence in their rifles and knew how to use them."

Superiority of fire can only be gained by the close {39} co-operation of the artillery and infantry at every stage of the battle, and unless infantry co-operate, the artillery is not likely to produce any decisive effect. Long-range machine-gun fire is an important auxiliary to the artillery in covering and supporting the advance of attacking infantry. Enfilade fire, the most telling of all, is more easily brought to bear than of old owing to the increase in the effective range and in the rate of fire. Supports and local reserves will usually co-operate most effectively with forward troops by bringing fire to bear upon the flank of such bodies of the enemy as are holding up a movement by frontal fire. During the counter-attack for the recapture of _The Bluff_, in the Ypres Salient (March 2, 1916) by troops of the 3rd and 17th Divisions, the right and centre gained their objectives. The left attacking party, at the first attempt, failed to reach the German trenches, but those who had penetrated to the German line on the right realised the situation and brought a Lewis gun to bear on the enemy's line of resistance, completely enfilading his trenches, and thus enabling the left company to reach its goal.

MOVEMENT.--The influence of movement is inseparable from that of fire, as it enables fire to be opened and is a means of escaping the full effects of fire; while it is often possible to move one unit only in conjunction with the fire of another. It can also be used to relieve one unit from the effects of fire concentrated upon it by moving another unit against the enemy. A steady and rapid advance of troops has the twofold effect of closing to a range from which an ascendency in the fire-fight can be secured, and also of reducing the losses of the advancing force, for if the troops remained stationary in the open under heavy fire, at a known range, the losses would clearly be greater than if they advanced, and would be suffered without gaining ground towards the objective, while the closer the {40} assaulting line gets to the objective, and the steadier its advance, the less confidence will the enemy have in their power to stem the advance, and the fewer casualties will be suffered in consequence. No "sealed pattern" is laid down as to the movement and formation of infantry under fire, but certain definite principles are put forward in the text-books. Where security is the first need, as in the case of protecting forces (advanced, flank, or rear guards), movement should be effected by bounds from one tactical position to another under covering fire from supporting troops; where the objective is the primary consideration, security must be subordinated to the need of reaching the objective. Against artillery fire, or long-range infantry fire, the formation recommended by the text-books is small shallow columns, each on a narrow front, such as platoons in fours or sections in file, arranged on an irregular front, so that the range from the enemy's guns to each is different. Troops coming suddenly under such fire will avoid casualties more easily by moving forward and outwards in this way rather than by remaining under such cover as may be improvised in a position the exact range of which is obviously known to the enemy. Against effective machine-gun or rifle fire deployment into line, or into "arrowhead" formation with the flanks thrown well back, is preferable to a single line extended at so many paces interval, as it is scarcely more vulnerable and is infinitely easier to control.

In retiring, losses are generally heavier than in advancing, or in maintaining a fire-fight from the position gained until a diversion by supporting troops enables a further bound to be made. The enemy is generally able to deliver a well-directed stream of lead against retiring troops, mainly because he is less harassed by the return fire. Retirements must therefore be carried out on the principle of alternate bounds under covering fire of co-operating bodies, which withdraw, in their turn, under covering fire from the troops they have protected. {41} Such alternate retirements are the essence of rear-guard tactics, but, although certain other phases of battle action justify the withdrawal of troops, it must always be remembered that a position held against counter-attack is better than a position captured by assault, for it is a position that does not require to be assaulted. It is often impossible to predict the value of resistance at a particular point, and the fate of a nation may depend upon a platoon commander's grit in holding on at all costs. In the campaign of 1814, Brigadier-General Moreau was sent to the _Fortress of Soissons_, with instructions to hold the town. His garrison consisted of about 1,200 all arms, with 20 guns. At 10.30 a.m. on March 2, the fortress was bombarded by Winzingerode's Russians and Bülow's Prussians, and at 8 p.m. an assault was delivered. This was easily repulsed and a counter-attack threw back the assailants to their own lines. The bombardment was resumed until 10 p.m., when the garrison had a total loss of 23 killed and 123 wounded. During the night the besiegers sent a flag of truce to Moreau, and on March 3 that general capitulated with all the honours of war "in order to preserve 1,000 fighting men for the Emperor." His action cost Napoleon his throne, for had Moreau held out the Emperor would have crushed his most implacable foe, Blücher (who escaped from the toils in which he was enmeshed, _viâ_ the bridge at Soissons), and the campaign would have been at an end. If Moreau had exhausted all the means of defence, as the regulations of war ordain, he could certainly have held out for another 48 hours, and as heavy firing was audible in the vicinity it should have been clear to him that help was at hand. At the _First Battle of Ypres_ (October 20-November 20, 1914) the Regular Army of the United Kingdom, at the outset, was filling so extensive a gap in the defensive line, that in many parts there was but one rifle for 17 yards of front, and there were neither local nor general reserves. The {42} assaulting German forces greatly outnumbered the defenders and brought up machine guns and artillery in overpowering strength. The British artillery was not only overweighted but was so short of ammunition that Marshal French was compelled to limit their daily number of rounds. But the line was held, and a counter-attack, headed by the 2nd Battalion of the Worcestershire Regiment, on October 31, with the bayonet, restored the line at _Gheluvelt_, at the most critical moment of the battle, and the Germans did not get through the defences. This stubborn resistance threw the Germans behind their entrenchments, and the "Advance to Calais" was stemmed by French's "Contemptible Little Army." At the _Second Battle of Ypres_ (April 22-May 18, 1915) surprise in the time and nature of the attack, by the secret concentration of forces and the introduction of poison gas, gained an initial advantage for the Germans and left the British flank uncovered. A Canadian division counter-attacked on the German flank, and by May 18 the Allies had regained many of the captured positions. During the First Battle of the Somme troops of the Royal West Kent and the Queen's Regiments effected a lodgment in _Trônes Wood_ (July 14, 1916). They maintained their position all night in the northern corner of the wood, although completely surrounded by the enemy, and assisted in the final capture and clearance of the wood at 8 a.m. the next day. Similar instances occurred in _Bourlon Village_ (November 25-27, 1917) when parties of the 13th East Surrey Regiment held out in the south-east corner of the village, during a German counter-attack, and maintained their position until touch was re-established with them 48 hours later; and in a group of fortified farms south of _Polygon Wood_ (September 26, 1917) during the Third Battle of Ypres, when two companies of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders held out all night, although isolated from the rest of the 33rd and 39th Divisions, until a renewed attack {43} cleared the district of hostile forces. On April 9, 1918, during the Germans' desperate endeavours to break through the investing Allies' lines, the ruins of _Givenchy_ were held by the 55th West Lancashire (Territorial) Division, and the right edge of the neck through which von Arnim and von Quast hoped to extend, in order to widen the wedge into the Valley of the Lys, was firmly held, while the left edge (the Messines Ridge) was recaptured by a counter-attack by the 9th Division. The centre of the line was also stoutly held by the Guards' and other divisions, many of which had suffered heavy losses in the V. Army during the German attack in the last week of March. After 21 days of the most stubborn fighting (March 21-April 11, 1918) of which the _Attack on the Lys_ had formed part, Marshal Sir D. Haig issued an order of the day emphasising the value of holding each position at all costs. "Every position must be held to the last man. There must be no retirement. . . . The safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind depend alike upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment. . . . Victory will belong to the side which holds out longest." Sir D. Haig's after-order, on April 23, 1918 (St. George's Day), awarded special praise to the troops under his command. The number of divisions employed by the Germans from March 21 to April 23, 1918, against the British alone was 102 (approximately 1,500,000 troops), and many of them were thrown in twice or three times. "In resisting the heavy blows which such a concentration of troops has enabled the enemy to direct against the British Army, all ranks, arms, and services have behaved with a gallantry, courage, and resolution for which no praise can be too high" (Haig's Dispatch).

COVERING FIRE.--The energetic and determined support of the infantry by fire is the main duty of machine-gun units throughout the whole course of the battle. In the attack, machine-gun platoons, Lewis gun sections, {44} or rifle sections detailed to give covering fire, must take care to select as targets those bodies of the enemy whose fire is chiefly checking the advance. Machine-gun platoons are sometimes brigaded, and at others left to battalion commanders, and their action after a temporary success in providing covering fire may depend upon their tactical distribution at the time. Infantry platoons detailed to give covering fire must join in the advance as soon as their own fire ceases to be effective in aiding the forward troops, unless definite orders to the contrary have been received.

FIRE AND MOVEMENT.--It is thus seen that Fire and Movement are inseparably associated, and judiciously employed in combination they enable infantry to achieve its object in battle, to bring such a superiority of fire to bear as to make an advance to close quarters possible, so that the enemy may be induced to surrender or may be overwhelmed by a bayonet assault; and to prepare by similar means for further advances, until the enemy is entirely hemmed in or completely routed.

[1] In fiction, this point (that the generalissimo must not allow his sense of proportion to be distorted by local successes or reverses) is clearly brought out in _The Point of View_, a story in "The Green Curve" by Ole-Luk-Oie (General Swinton).

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TYPES OF BATTLE ACTION

A battle must practically always be of the nature of Attack and Defence, but the attitude originally assumed by either of the opposing forces may be reversed during an engagement. A vigorous counter-attack by an army offering battle in a defensive position may throw the adversary on the defensive, while an assailant may fight a delaying action in one part of the field, although in another part his action may be essentially offensive. There are three distinct systems of Battle Action: the entirely defensive; the entirely offensive; and the combined, or defensive-offensive system.