Chapter VII: Part 7

THE ATTACK ON WOODS.--The opening stages of the attack on a wood resemble those in the attack on any other position, but once the outer fringe is gained the potential advantages offered by the narrow field of view and fire must be exploited to the full and surprise at weak points must be achieved. Flank attacks are exceptionally deadly under these circumstances, as they may succeed before the other defending troops are aware of the threatened attack, but the utmost precaution is necessary to avoid traps, and scouts must precede all movement, while advances must be made by rapid bounds to avoid aimed fire at close range. Supports and reserves must follow close to the forward troops in order to preserve cohesion and to afford immediate help. Machine guns and light mortars are of very great value to give close support, the latter taking the place of artillery and inflicting losses on {160} stockaded defenders. Small woods should usually be attacked from the flanks under heavy fire from artillery until the attack turns inwards, while machine guns and Lewis guns are posted to prevent reinforcements reaching the wood and to cut off the retreat of the defenders. During the German counter-attacks at Cambrai (November 30-December 4, 1917) _Tanks_ were effectively employed in wood and village fighting, and were in a great measure responsible for the capture of _Gauche Wood_, acting in co-operation with dismounted Indian cavalry of the 5th Cavalry Division and with the Guards' Division; but although they reached the outskirts of _Villers Guislain_ they were forced to withdraw, as the supporting infantry were unable to co-operate owing to the fire of the enemy's machine guns. At the _Battle of Messines_ (June 7, 1917) a tank enabled the infantry to proceed with the advance by overcoming the machine guns posted in Fanny's Farm. Generally speaking, however, tanks are unable to manoeuvre in woods, owing to the many insuperable obstructions, and their sphere of usefulness is limited by the availability of rides or other cleared avenues of approach. During the fighting for the interior of the wood "reconnaissance during battle" is of the highest importance, and the flanks of the attacking force will need to be specially guarded, on account of the liability to counter-attack. Touch must also be kept, to avoid loss of direction. In the _advance from the captured position_ great tactical skill is required, and if the defenders have established a fire position within close range it may only be possible to issue from the wood when co-operating troops have cleared or neutralised that position. It may even be necessary to hold the rear edge against counter-attack and to debouch, after reorganisation, from both flanks or from the opposite edge, to advance in two bodies against the flanks of the fire position under harassing fire from the troops in the further edge. If the fire position is to be carried by direct assault, or if {161} it can be got under control and the advance is to be continued, the successful troops must be reorganised within the wood (care being taken to avoid concentration in salients) and must deploy before advancing, to bound forward in one rush until clear of the wood.

DEFENCE OF A WOOD.--The outer edge of a wood is particularly vulnerable, but some portions of it must of necessity be occupied for purposes of observation and resistance (particularly at night), while the unoccupied portions are heavily entangled and made subject to enfilade fire from the occupied positions, machine and Lewis guns being particularly suitable for the defensive positions, in concealed and strengthened emplacements. The perimeter should be divided into sections garrisoned by complete units under definite commanders. Lines of defence must also be established in the interior, and lateral communications opened up through the trees, with easily distinguished marks to direct troops issuing to counter-attacks, and time will be saved by making several tracks rather than one wide road. The second line of defence should contain an all-round defensive position from which all avenues of approach can be swept by machine and Lewis guns, and this position should also provide facilities for sorties to counter-attack. If the wood is too far from the Outpost Zone of the defence to serve as a factor in the scheme steps must be taken to neutralise the advantages offered to an attacking force in a concealed avenue of approach, either by the use of gas, or by bringing such a fire on the exits from the wood that a debouching enemy may suffer heavy loss or annihilation. In most cases, an attacking force will be harassed, and a show of opposition will be made, in such a wood by _fighting patrols_, and obstacles can be placed in the near edge, with entanglements outside, so planned as to induce the attacking force to collect in lanes enfiladed by machine guns.

{162}

THE ATTACK ON VILLAGES.--There are three phases in the attack on a village as in the attack on a wood. In the fight for the outer edge, the front will probably be harassed by a fire attack, while one or both flanks are assaulted by all four sections of the platoon, under cover of fire from machine guns and Lewis guns.

The second phase may require reorganisation before the attack on the village itself, during which, reconnaissance, co-operation, and dispatch of information, are of the highest importance. All captured points must be immediately consolidated and the attack must be prosecuted with the utmost vigour. Troops must be trained to enter buildings from the rear, and to advance along the right edge of roads, close to the walls and buildings there, to make hostile fire difficult without undue exposure. Light mortars and rifle bombs, which can be fired into windows partially barricaded, or to fall behind street barricades, are an important adjunct to the rifle and bayonet, and machine guns and Lewis guns will have many opportunities in assisting or repelling a counter-attack and of keeping down the enemy's fire from a commanding position at the end of a street. _The Tank_ is at its best in this form of warfare, as it can surmount or demolish almost any street barricade, and can be followed up at once by the infantry, but it must always be regarded as an auxiliary to the infantry, and not as a principal.

In the third phase, the advance from the captured village, while the supports are "mopping up" such of the garrison as have survived the capture, previous reorganisation and deployment will probably be as essential as in wood fighting, and during all the phases of the struggle in woods and villages sudden counter-attacks must always be expected and local reserves to repel them must be provided. In issuing from the village, rapid bounds to points from which the fire positions in rear can be brought under control will also be required.

{163}

DEFENCE OF A VILLAGE.--It is difficult to avoid the inclusion of villages in a scheme of defence on account of the facilities afforded for water, cover, and shelter, but while villages assist in the Delaying Action they are liable to become "shell traps" in a prolonged defence, unless there is good cellarage accommodation, while the local effect of a bursting shell is also increased.

There are certain principles common to all defensive action in village fighting:--

(1) The garrison should consist of a definite unit or formation under a definite commander.

(2) The forward troops should be posted in front of the edge of the village, partly because of the vulnerability of the actual edge to artillery fire but mainly to prevent the attack from establishing itself in the forward buildings. In the case of a small village it will often be advantageous to occupy positions on the flanks commanding the edge by fire, with a view to enticing the attack into the "funnel" thus provided.

(3) Supports and Reserves must be centralised in order that they may be readily available for instantaneous local counter-attacks, by which means alone a village can be defended against a determined enemy.

(4) Houses should be loopholed and windows sand-bagged, while house-to-house communication must be improvised to increase the defenders' power of manoeuvre.

(5) The interior of the village should be defended by the cross fire of machine guns and Lewis guns, but while churches and halls, and the inner edge of village greens and of squares, should be prepared for determined resistance, such places should not be occupied as billets, owing to the risk of loss from artillery bombardment.

(6) The natural difficulties of maintaining control in village fighting require to be counteracted by increased effort and vigilance on the part of all leaders, and special arrangements must be made for collecting information in report centres, the position of which must be made known to all ranks in the defending force.

{164}

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VARIOUS ARMS

"The full power of an army can be exerted only when all its parts act in close combination, and this is not possible unless the members of each arm understand the characteristics of the other arms. Each has its special characteristics and functions, and is dependent on the co-operation of the others" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)).

"An intelligent understanding of 'the other man's job' is the first essential of successful co-operation."--MARSHAL HAIG.

INFANTRY

"Infantry is the arm which in the end wins battles" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)). The speed with which infantry can advance, and the distance which can be covered in one day, are the only limits to the striking power of well-trained infantry. In the Great War these limits were largely removed by the use of Mechanical Transport, and this means of transportation will be used increasingly in Modern Warfare, in order to bring fresh troops into or near the scene of action, or to expedite the removal of exhausted troops from the battlefield. Against these natural limits to mobility are the compensating advantages of the power of infantry to move into and over almost any ground by day or by night, and the rapidity with which trained infantrymen can find or improvise cover.

The main object of battle is to close with the enemy and to destroy him by killing or capture, and it is this power to close with the enemy which makes infantry the decisive arm in battle.

THE RIFLE AND BAYONET.--The rifle is the principal infantry weapon, and the British "Short-magazine {165} Lee-Enfield" rifle is the best rifle in action. A trained rifleman can fire 15 aimed shots in a minute, reloading with the butt in the shoulder and eyes on the mark. With the bayonet affixed the rifle is the principal weapon of close combat for delivering or repelling an assault, and in Night Assaults infantry depend entirely upon the bayonet.

THE ENTRENCHING TOOL, carried by all other ranks, is an invaluable adjunct to the rifle bullet and to the bayonet. In a War of Manoeuvre, when infantry are frequently compelled to improvise defences on the field of battle, by night as well as by day, the value of the Entrenching Tool can scarcely be exaggerated. In Position Warfare, and in the organisation of an area for prolonged defence in a War of Manoeuvre, heavier tools and materials of all kinds are available for the consolidation of the defences, but for the rapid construction of temporary defences by day or by night the Entrenching Tool alone has been proved to be highly effective. When troops are "digging themselves in" at night with this weapon care must be taken that some system is adopted to obtain a more or less regular line facing in the right direction. By the extension of the men of an infantry section at arm's length facing the enemy, and by moving the two men on each flank two paces outwards, and the two centre men two paces backwards, and then causing the section to dig "on the line of their toes," there will result (even on the darkest night) a short fire trench with a central traverse. This sectional trench can be connected at the first opportunity with trenches dug by other sections similarly extended. During the _Retreat from Mons_ (August-September, 1914) the "Contemptible Little Army," under Marshal French, frequently obtained, by means of the Entrenching Tool alone, shelter from bullets, and a system of fire trenches which cost the pursuing Germans hundreds of lives and materially delayed their movements.

{166}

THE LEWIS GUN.--The Lewis gun is an automatic rifle, firing the same ammunition as the S.-M.-L.-E. rifle, and two Lewis-gun sections are included in each infantry platoon. The rate of fire is increased by the automatic action of the gun, the maximum rate permitting a drum of 47 rounds to be fired in less than ten seconds, while one or two rounds only may be fired if so required. The mobility of the Lewis-gun sections is the same as that of other sections of the infantry platoon.

RANGES OF RIFLES AND MACHINE GUNS

_Close_ range. Up to 800 yards.
_Effective_ range. Over 800 yards up to 2,000 yards.
_Long_ range. Over 2,000 yards up to 2,900 yards.

GRENADES.--Hand grenades and rifle grenades are adjuncts to the rifle and bayonet and the Lewis gun. Their principal use is in clearing fortified posts, especially in Position Warfare. The _hand grenade_, or bomb thrown by hand, is limited in range by the skill and strength of the thrower, and 30 to 40 yards may be regarded as the maximum distance. The _rifle grenade_ is effective up to about 400 yards, and is generally employed to provide a local barrage or to search cover. In the latter case, a high angle of descent is used as with mortars or howitzers.

LIGHT MORTARS.--The _Light Mortar Section_ is an integral part of every infantry battalion, and although sometimes brigaded for special purposes the sections normally work with their own battalions. A section of 2 light mortars, firing 11-lb. bombs, consists of 1 officer and 20 other ranks, and requires 2 horses and 1 G.S. limbered wagon. Owing to the high angle of descent the bombs can be fired behind, and can search, high cover, while the mortars themselves are not very conspicuous objects and can be {167} readily moved for short distances, while they "come into action" in 30 seconds. The comparatively slow flight of the bombs, however, enables the enemy to discover the location of the mortars, and necessitates the use of expedients to avoid counter-artillery fire. A maximum rate of 30 to 40 rounds a minute can be maintained for two or three minutes, if ammunition is available, and at an angle of 45 degrees a range of 700 yards can be obtained.

MACHINE GUNS.--"The principal characteristic of the machine gun is its power of delivering a concentrated volume of fire which can be sustained almost indefinitely, subject to limitations of ammunition supply. The ease with which the gun can be concealed in action and its fire controlled enable advantage to be taken of surprise effect" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)). The _Machine-gun Platoon_ is an integral part of every infantry battalion, but in Attack machine guns are frequently grouped for the purpose of providing overhead or other covering fire, while in Defence they form, with the artillery, the framework into which the defensive dispositions are fitted, and by reason of their fire-power machine guns enable a commander to economise in the number of infantry allotted to a purely defensive _rôle_. The ranges are those given above for rifles and Lewis guns, and the rate of fire is about 20 times that of a rifle, while 1,500 to 2,000 rounds may be fired continuously at a moment of need.

MOUNTED TROOPS

CAVALRY.--The principal characteristic of cavalry is its mobility. This enables it to attack unexpectedly; to defend with determination while retaining the power to break off an action more easily than infantry; to gain information and to afford protection at a considerable distance from the force protected; and to confirm {168} and exploit the success obtained in battle. "Cavalry is capable, if required, of undertaking most operations for which infantry would usually be employed, but the demands made by the care of horses reduce the number of rifles which can actually be placed in action; and it therefore lacks depth in comparison with similar infantry formations" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)). The cavalry arms are the lance and sword for mounted action; horse artillery usually work with cavalry, and the arms employed by cavalry for dismounted action are the rifle, the machine gun, and the Hotchkiss rifle. Examples of the employment of cavalry in modern warfare are given throughout the "Lectures."

MOUNTED RIFLES.--The characteristics and methods of employment of mounted rifles are similar to those of cavalry, with the exception that they are not equipped for mounted action. Mounted rifles, like cavalry, enable a commander to extend his attack or defence in a manner that is most bewildering to infantry, and attempts by infantry to outflank a defending force of mounted rifles are generally frustrated by the mobility of the defending force, as was exemplified in the South African War of 1899-1902.

CYCLISTS.--Under favourable conditions cyclists possess greater mobility than cavalry, and they can develop greater fire-power, as no horse-holders are required. They are, however, dependent upon roads, they are vulnerable on the move, they cannot fight without dismounting, and they must return to their bicycles after action; whereas cavalry horse-holders can meet dismounted troopers at a prearranged spot.

ARTILLERY

"The _rôle_ of artillery is to assist the other arms in breaking down opposition, and to afford all possible {169} support to the infantry, with whom the eventual decision rests" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)).

All classes of artillery are included in modern military operations. Motor traction enables the heaviest guns to be brought to the battlefield and to be removed when a commander decides to withdraw from battle, while the increase in the defensive power of obstacles and small arms fire, combined with the increase in mobility afforded by motor traction, enables all but super-heavy artillery (which require a railway mounting) to be placed close behind the infantry in Attack and Defence. It is, however, obvious that the closest support can be given by the guns that are weakest in shell-power, on account of the superiority in mobility possessed by the lighter guns.

In Modern Warfare a great proportion of the work of artillery is carried out, of necessity, in the hours of darkness, owing to the frequency of movement by night to avoid aërial observation, and to the consequent use of indirect artillery fire to inflict losses during such movements. The artillery personnel therefore requires to be relieved with greater frequency than in the days before the use of aircraft.

The growth of artillery during the war was symbolical of the continual changes in the methods of warfare, its numbers and power increasing out of all proportion to the experience of previous wars. "The 486 pieces of light and medium artillery with which we took the field in August, 1914, were represented at the date of the Armistice by 6,437 guns and howitzers of all natures, including pieces of the heaviest calibre" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches). "From the commencement of our offensive in August, 1918, to the conclusion of the Armistice some 700,000 tons of artillery ammunition were expended by the British Armies on the Western Front. For the fortnight from August 21 to September 3, our daily average expenditure exceeded {170} 11,000 tons, while for the three days of the crucial battle on September 27, 28, and 29 (_Second Battle of Cambrai_) nearly 65,000 tons of ammunition were fired by our artillery" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).

In the Table of Artillery Ranges on p. 173, the effective ranges of light artillery firing H.E. shell are based on the use of No. 106 fuse. "The invention of a new fuse known as '106,' which was first used at the _Battle of Arras_ (April 9-June 7, 1917), enabled wire entanglements to be easily and quickly destroyed, and so modified our methods of attacking organised positions. By bursting the shell the instant it touched the ground, and before it had become buried, the destructive effect of the explosion was greatly increased. It became possible to cut wire with a far less expenditure of time and ammunition, and the factor of surprise was given a larger part in operations" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).

Artillery is classed under the designations Light, Medium, Heavy, and Super-Heavy.

LIGHT GUNS.--_Pack Guns_, with a calibre of 2.75 inches, are weakest in shell-power, but they possess a mobility greater than any other artillery and can be moved in country which would present insuperable obstacles to wheeled traffic. _Pack Howitzers_, with a calibre of 3.7 inches, are particularly valuable in close country, the high angle of descent enabling the attack or defence to search the steepest cover. _Horse Artillery Guns_, firing a 13-pound shell, are the most mobile of all wheeled artillery and are normally employed with mounted troops. All ranks of the Royal Horse Artillery are mounted, and its mobility is scarcely less than that of cavalry. _Field Guns_, with a calibre of 3 inches, firing an 18-pound shell, are the principal artillery weapon of a field army. Although inferior in mobility to Pack or Horse Artillery, they have greater shell-power and afford the principal support to infantry in closing with or repelling the enemy. Their power to inflict casualties {171} by enfilade fire with shrapnel makes them specially suitable in the defence, and the accuracy of modern weapons enables them to co-operate in the Attack with covering fire, under the protection of which infantry may advance unimpeded to the assault. In addition to their normal functions, and to their employment in counter-battery work, they can be employed in the reduction of defences by bombardment with High Explosive shells, in neutralising an area by the use of gas shells, or in providing artificial cover by the production of _Smoke_. _Field Howitzers_, with a calibre of 4.5 inches, have increased offensive power and practically the same mobility as field guns.

Light guns are the principal weapons for protection against _Aircraft_ and for defence against _Tanks_. The Tank is powerless against artillery, and its most effective enemy is light artillery. During the _First Battle of the Somme_ a new terror was added to the British attack by the introduction of the Tank, which surmounted inequalities in the ground, crushed the wire defences, and crossed the trenches. Although accompanied by infantry, it was regarded as an all-conquering and decisive factor. At one period of the battle, however, a number of Tanks were placed out of action by a single field gun, manned and fired with the greatest gallantry by a single German artillery officer, who fired point-blank at each Tank as it surmounted the crest of a rise. Infantry were in close support, and a single Lewis-gun section could have prevented the use of the field gun.

MEDIUM GUNS.--Medium guns, firing a 60-pound shell, are principally employed in counter-battery work and in fulfilling the functions of 18-pound field guns at a greater range and with greater force. _Medium Howitzers_ occupy the same relative position, their offensive power being greater than that of the Field Howitzer.

{172}

HEAVY GUNS.--Heavy guns of 6-inch calibre, firing a shell of 100 pounds, are used against targets beyond the range of light and medium guns, and with greater effect. _Heavy Howitzers_, of 8-inch or 9.2-inch calibre, are principally employed against covered batteries and strong defences, or for destroying wire entanglements with instantaneous fuses.

SUPER-HEAVY GUNS.--Super-heavy guns of a calibre of 9.2 inches and upwards are usually carried on railway mountings, and while they possess a high muzzle velocity, considerable shell-power, and a high degree of mobility (which enables them to come into action in any part of the battlefield where suitable rails have been laid), their arc of fire is very restricted and their "life" is short. _Super-Heavy Howitzers_, of 12-inch or 18-inch calibre, possess similar advantages and disadvantages to super-heavy guns. Their normal use is the destruction of permanent defences, the breaking down of bridges, etc. The 12-inch weapon is also used on tractor-drawn mountings and is highly effective in counter-battery work.

The table on p. 173 is based upon particulars given on p. 26 of "Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921).

ROYAL ENGINEERS

"All arms are responsible for the construction of their own works of defence. It is the duty of the Royal Engineers to assist them by engineer reconnaissances, plans, advice, technical supervision, provision of materials and the construction of works requiring special technical skill. . . . Although trained as fighting troops, engineers should be regarded as reserves to be used only as a last resource; casualties in their ranks are not easy to replace, and they may become needlessly involved in the fighting and lost for work which may have an important bearing on the operations" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)).

{173}

TABLE OF ARTILLERY RANGES

Weapon Effective Range (Yds.)

_Light Artillery_ H.E. Shell Shrapnel
Pack Guns (2.75 in.) 5,800 4,000
Pack Howitzers (3.7 in.) 5,900
Horse Artillery Guns (13 pr.) 8,500 5,000
Field Guns (18 pr.) 9,500 5,500
Field Howitzers (4.5 in.) 7,000

_Medium Artillery_
Medium Guns (60 pr.) 15,500 --
Medium Howitzers (6 in.) 10,000

_Heavy Artillery_
Heavy Guns (6 in.) 19/20,000
Heavy Howitzers (8 in.) 12,300 --
" " (9.2 in) 13,000

_Super-Heavy Artillery_
Super-Heavy Guns (9.2 in.) 24,500 --
" " (12 in.) 28,200 --
" " (14 in.) 35,600 --
Super-Heavy Howitzers (12 in.) 14,300
" " (18 in) 23,000

Weapon Maximum Range (Yds.)

_Light Artillery_ H.E. Shell Shrapnel
Pack Guns (2.75 in.) 5,800 5,500
Pack Howitzers (3.7 in.) 5,900
Horse Artillery Guns (13 pr.) 8,500 6,400
Field Guns (18 pr.) 9,500 6,500
Field Howitzers (4.5 in.) 7,000

_Medium Artillery_
Medium Guns (60 pr.) 15,500 15,300
Medium Howitzers (6 in.) 10,000

_Heavy Artillery_
Heavy Guns (6 in.) 19/20,000 19/20,000
Heavy Howitzers (8 in.) 12,300
" " (9.2 in) 13,000

_Super-Heavy Artillery_
Super-Heavy Guns (9.2 in.) 24,500 24,500
" " (12 in.) 28,200 26,100
" " (14 in.) 35,600 --
Super-Heavy Howitzers (12 in.) 14,300
" " (18 in) 23,000

The maximum range of _Medium Mortars_ is 1,500 yards;
of _Light Mortars_ 700 yards.

{174}

CAREY'S FORCE.--During the _Second Battle of the Somme_ "a mixed force, including details, stragglers, schools personnel, tunnelling companies, army troops companies, field survey companies, and Canadian and American Engineers, had been got together and organised by Major-Gen. P. G. Grant, the Chief Engineer to the V. Army. On March 26 these were posted by General Grant, in accordance with orders given by the V. Army commander, on the line of the old Amiens defences between Mezières, Marcelcave, and Hamel. Subsequently, as General Grant could ill be spared from his proper duties, he was directed to hand over command of his force to Major-Gen. G. G. S. Carey. Except for General Carey's force there were no reinforcements of any kind behind the divisions, which had been fighting for the most part since the opening of the battle. . . . On March 28 our line from Marcelcave to the Somme was manned by Carey's Force, with the 1st Cavalry Division in close support. . . . On March 29 the greater part of the British front south of the Somme was held by Carey's Force, assisted by the 1st Cavalry Division and such troops of the divisions originally engaged as it had not yet been found possible to withdraw. In rear of these troops, a few of the divisions of the V. Army were given a brief opportunity to reassemble" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).

TANKS

Tanks are moving fortresses containing light artillery, machine guns, and rifles, and while capable of inflicting heavy losses by fire they can also destroy obstacles, weapons, and personnel. Their garrisons are protected against the fire of small arms and from shrapnel bullets, but they are very vulnerable to other forms of artillery fire. Their mobility and radius of action are governed by the amount of petrol carried and by the physical endurance of the crew, but except over deep cuttings, {175} broad streams, swamps, very heavily shelled ground, rocky and mountainous country, or in thick woods they can move without difficulty. "The power of delivering successful surprise attacks against almost any type of defences is one of the most important advantages of the use of Tanks in large numbers" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)).

During the _First Battle of the Somme_ (September 1-November 18, 1916) "Our new heavily armoured cars, known as 'Tanks,' now brought into action for the first time, successfully co-operated with the infantry, and coming as a surprise to the enemy rank and file, gave valuable help in breaking down their resistance. . . . These cars proved of great value on various occasions, and the personnel in charge of them performed many deeds of remarkable valour" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).

AIRCRAFT

Two classes of Aircraft are used in the field. Aeroplanes, which are self-propelled and have an almost unlimited radius of action; and Kite Balloons, which, in favourable weather, can be towed by a lorry and can be moved frequently without loss of efficiency.

AEROPLANES are of the greatest value for reconnaissance and inter-communication, and not only obtain, and return to their base with, information of the highest value, but facilitate personal reconnaissance of the battlefield by commanders and staff officers. Their offensive and defensive action is also very great and the moral effect of their offensive action is of the highest value. Although aeroplane squadrons are mobile units they lose efficiency if the units are moved too frequently. The action of aircraft in various phases of fighting is dealt with throughout the Lectures.

KITE BALLOONS carry two observers, who can remain in telephonic communication with the ground up to a {176} height of 5,000 feet. Inflated balloons can be moved in favourable weather at a maximum speed of 8 miles an hour while at a height of about 500 feet. Their extreme vulnerability to artillery fire prevents their use close to the battle front.

GAS

"The advisability of employing gas as a military weapon is a matter for consideration by the authorities concerned before a campaign begins. Once authorised, however, and assuming that weather conditions are favourable, gas may be expected to play a part in every action. . . . The different methods in which gas can be employed make it a weapon which can be used by all arms, thus _Artillery_ deal with gas shells, _Infantry_ with light mortar gas bombs, _Aircraft_ with aërial gas bombs, and _Engineers_ with all methods of use that call for special manipulation" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)).

Gas was introduced by the Germans during the _Second Battle of Ypres_ (April 22-May 18, 1915), and the numerous experiments and trials necessary before gas can be used, and the great preparations which have to be made for its manufacture, show that its employment was not the result of a desperate decision, but had been prepared for deliberately. During the _First Battle of the Somme_ (September 1-November 18, 1916) "the employment by the enemy of gas and liquid flame as weapons of offence compelled us not only to discover ways to protect our troops from their effects, but also to devise means to make use of the same instruments of destruction. . . . Since we have been compelled, in self-defence, to use similar methods, it is satisfactory to be able to record, on the evidence of prisoners, of documents captured, and of our own observation, that the enemy has suffered heavy casualties from our gas attacks, while the means of protection adopted by us {177} have proved thoroughly effective" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).

SMOKE

Smoke can be discharged from _Artillery_ shells, Artillery or _infantry_ mortar bombs, Infantry rifle grenades, smoke candles, _Aircraft_ bombs, _Engineers'_ stationary generators, or the exhaust pipe of _Tanks_. It is used to conceal movement for the purposes of surprise or for reducing casualties, and can be so employed as to impose night conditions on the enemy while one's own troops retain the natural visibility; but while the weight and direction of an intended blow may thus be hidden from the enemy a warning is given of the time of its delivery. It is possible, however, to mystify, as well as to surprise, the enemy by the use of smoke, and its strategical and tactical value will ensure its adoption in Modern Warfare. In the closing battles of the Great War "the use of smoke shells for covering the advance of our infantry and masking the enemy's positions was introduced and employed with increasing frequency and effect" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).

{178}

OPERATION ORDERS

Combatant officers of every rank are required to issue orders of some kind or other, and orders for operations should always be committed to paper when circumstances permit. The object of an operation order is to bring about a course of action in accordance with the intentions of the commander, and with full co-operation between all units.

Operation orders of a complicated nature are unlikely to be required from the pen of infantry officers in the junior ranks, and the rules for drafting orders are stated in detail in the official text-books, for the use of officers of the ranks that will be required to issue them.

The general principles underlying orders of all kinds are that they should be "fool proof," and it has been remarked that the writer of orders should always remember that at least one silly ass will try to misunderstand them. They must, therefore, be void of all ambiguity, and while containing every essential piece of information, and omitting everything that is clearly known already to the recipients, they should be confined to facts, and conjecture should be avoided.

"An operation order must contain just what the recipient requires to know and nothing more. It should tell him nothing which he can and should arrange for himself, and, especially in the case of large forces, will only enter into details when details are absolutely necessary. Any attempt to prescribe to a subordinate at a distance anything which he, with a fuller knowledge of local conditions, should be better able to decide on the spot, is likely to cramp his initiative in dealing with unforeseen developments, and will be avoided. In {179} particular, such expressions as 'Will await further orders' should be avoided" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)).

Apart from the standing rules as to the printing of names of places in block type, including a reference to the map used, dating and signing the orders, numbering the copies, and stating the time and method of issue, etc., the general tenour of all operation orders will always be: _The enemy are. . . . My intention is. . . . You will. . . ._ In other words, all that is known about the enemy, and of our own troops, that is essential for the purposes of the order, should be revealed; then the general intention of the commander who issues the orders; then the part in the operations that is to be played by the recipient. But the method of attaining the object will be left to the utmost extent possible to the recipient, with due regard to his personal characteristics. "It is essential that subordinates should not only be able to work intelligently and resolutely in accordance with brief orders or instructions, but should also be able to take upon themselves, whenever necessary, the responsibility of departing from, or of varying, the orders they may have received" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)).

{181}

INDEX

Active defence, the, 86-91
Adowa, battle of, (_note_) 22
Advanced guard, the, 102-113
distance, 103
information, 107-108
in advances, 103
in retreats, 104-105, 124
main guard, 105-106
Nachod, 77
night, 145
problems, 110-113
strategical, 103
strength of, 102-103
tactical, 103
tactics of, 103-104, 105-113
training, 105
vanguard, 105-106
Advances, night, 147-148
Advancing under fire, 39-44
Aërial observation, (_note_) 22, 98-99
photographs, 99
Aircraft, characteristics of, 169, 171, 175-176
advanced guard, 107
communication by, 37, 107, 115
flank guard, 115
gas, 176
outposts, 129-130, 137
position warfare, 81-82
protection by, 81, 98-99
protection from, 100
pursuit by, 67, 69
rear guard, 20, 120
reconnaissance by, 8, 26, 30, 36, 98-99, 100, 141
smoke, 177
Alexander the Great, 32
Allenby, General Viscount, G.C.B., 87, 96
America and the Great War, 17
American attack at Fossoy, 49
American Civil War, 3, 82
(_See also_ Battles by name.)
Amiens, battle of, 21, 52, 66
Antietam, battle of, 14, 15, 48
Appomattox, battle of, 15, 64
"Appreciation of the Situation," 72
Arabi Pasha, 151
Arbela, battle of, 32
Archangel Province, 66-67
Archduke Charles, 128
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 42-43
Armandvillers-Folie, 63
Armies, the new, 19-22
Arminius, victory of, 156-157
Armistice Day, 1918, 65
Army, Contemptible Little, 18-19
of North Virginia, 25, 65-66
of the Cumberland, 15
of the Potomac, 3, 14-15, 25
Arras, battle of, 170
Art of warfare, 1-5
Artillery, characteristics of, 168-173
barrage, 71
development of, 21-22
effective range, 132
escorts, 63-64
gas shells, 176
growth of, 169-170
heavy, 172, 173
in attack, 62-64,
in defence, 83, 89
in retreat, 120, 123
light, 170-171
medium, 171
mobility of, 63-64
outpost, 131, 134
pack, 170
positions, 94
ranges, 173
smoke shells, 177
super-heavy, 172, 173
Ashby, Gen. Turner, C.S.A., 117
Assaults by night, 148-154
Assembly, position of, 58-59, 147
Attack, the, 51-75
aircraft in, 67
artillery in, 62-64
battalion in, 73-75
cavalry, 64-67
close country, 155-156
company in, 72-73
co-operation, 25-26, 35-37, 39
decisive, 56-57, 60-62
disposition of troops, 55
engineers, 67
fire, 62
flank, 61
formation for, 70-75
forward body, 55-56
frontal, 60-61
general reserve, 56-57
holding, 12, 30, 48, 59, 62, 76, 95, 117
local reserve, 55-56
medical arrangements, 67
methods of, 53
opening fire, 37-38
platoon in, 70-72
reconnaissance for, 141-142
smoke, 177
strength of, 54-55
supply, 67-68
supports, 55-56
two plans of, 54
villages, 162
woods, 159-161
Attacking force, the, 59-60
Austerlitz, battle of, 9-10, 47, 76
Australians at Morlancourt, 149
Avenues, communicating, 143

Baccarat, battle of, 28
Bagdadieh, battle of, 64-65
Balaclava Charge, 96
Balloons, observation by, 22, 175-176
Banks, Gen., U.S.A., 59
Bapaume, battle of, 21
Barrage, the, 71
Base, the, 90, 118
Battalion in attack, 73-75
Battle, the, 24-50
characteristics of, 24-26
decisive blow, 31-32
development of the, 29-31
influences on the, 33-44
information, 26-28
initiative, 26-28
outposts, 138-140
phases of the, 26-29
position, the, 84-85
reports, 68
the defensive, 45-46
the defensive-offensive, 47-49
the encounter, 58
the offensive, 46-47
types of, 45-50
Bavaria, Elector of, 46
Bayonet, the, 164-165
in night operations, 154
Bazaine, Maréchal, 158
Bazeilles, defence of, 159
Benedek, Marshal, 96
Bernadotte, Marshal, 10
Blenheim, battle of, 46-47
Blücher, Marshal, 8, 41, 48, 78
Bluff, the (Ypres), 39
Boer War, (_note_) 21
Bois de Vaux, 158
Bombs, light mortar, 166-167
(_See also_ Grenades.)
Border Regiment, 75
Bourlon Village, 42
Bristow Station, 128
British efforts, 1914-1918, 16-17
moral, 16-22
Broenbeek, 139
Bromhead, Lieut., 77
Bülow, General von, 78
Bunker Hill, battle of, 38
Burnside, Gen., U.S.A., 14, 46, 108, 139-140
Byng of Vimy, Gen. Lord, G.C.B., 7, 52

Cambrai, first battle of, 7, 30-31, 52, 66, 75, 160
second battle of, 21, 170
Camouflage, 100
Canadian cavalry, 66
engineers, 174
infantry at Vimy, 149
Canadians at Ypres, 42
Cannae, battle of, 14
Carey, Maj.-Gen. G. G. S., C.B., 174
Carey's force, 174
Cattigny Wood, 66
Cavalry, characteristics of, 167-168
cossack posts, 137
in attack, 64-67
in defence, 95-96
in pursuit, 64-65, 69
in retreat, 95-96, 120, 123-124
Mesopotamian campaign, 64-65
outposts, 137
protection by, 98-99, 110
raids by, 117-118
reconnaissance by, 8, 26, 32, 65-66, 106, 112-113
vedettes, 137
Cetewayo, 77-78
Chambord, Chateau de, 138
Chancellorsville, battle of, 12, 30, 48, 76, 95, 117
Changes in warfare, 21-23
Characteristics of the various arms, 164-177
Chard, Lieut., 77
Charleroi, battle of, 88
Chattanooga, battle of, 61-62
Chemin des Dames, 16
Civilised warfare, 157-158
Clery, Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. F.
(_quoted_): advanced guard tactics, 109-110
Close country, fighting in, 155-163
Coldstream Guards, 75
Colenso, battle of, 63
Colombey, battle of, 109
Combe, Capt. E. P., M.C., 78
Commander, battalion, 74-75
company, 72-73
outpost company, 134-137
piquet, 135-136
platoon, 71-72, 135-136
Commander's influence, 33-35
orders, 178-179
plans, 57-58
position, 68
"Common Sense" fallacy, 1, 3
Communication, 31, 35, 107-108
Communications, lateral, 89
lines of, 116-118
Company in attack, 72-73
outpost, 134-137
Condé-Mons-Binche line, 87
Connection by night, 146
"Contemptible Little Army," the, 18-19, 165
Convoys, 116-118
Co-operation, 35-37, 164
Coruña, 127-128
Cossack posts, 137
Counter attack, 123
decisive, 79, 84, 92-94
local, 56, 75, 79, 161, 163
Cover, 88-89, 155
Covering fire, 43-44
Cronje, Gen. (Paardeberg), 16
Cross Keys, battle of, 117
Crown Prince of Prussia (1870), 109
(1914), 28
Crozat Canal, 77
Cugny, 96
Cumberland, army of the, 15
Cyclists, characteristics of, 168

Davis, Jefferson, 3
Day outposts, 137-138
Daylight and night attacks, 148
Decisive attack, the, 31-32, 60-62
counter attack, 79, 84, 92-94
Defence in close country, 155-156
of villages, 163
of woods, 161
Defensive action, 76-97, 163
battle, 45-46
flank, 86
system, 83
Defensive-offensive battle, 47-49
Defiles, 124
Definitions, 6-8
Delaborde, Général, 95, 127
Delaying action, 118, 121-128, 158-159
Deployment, position of, 147-148
Depth of a position, 89
Detached posts, 134, 135
De Wet, 118, 138
Diamond formation, 70
Direction by night, 145
Discipline, value of, 11-12
Dresden, battle of, 47, 89

Early, General., C.S. Army, 7
East Surrey Regiment, 42
Embussing point, 69
Encounter battle, 58, 64
Engineers, Royal, characteristics, 172
gas, 176
smoke, 177
Entrenching tool, 165
Entrenchments, 82-83, 100, 135
Epehy, battle of, 21
Ettlingen, battle of, 128
Eugène of Savoy, 46
Evelington Heights, 112-113

Fabius Maximus, 14, 102
Fallacies exposed, 1-5
Fanny's Farm, 160
Field artillery, characteristics of, 170-171
of battle, 6-7
of fire, 88
Fighting in close country, 155-163
Fire attack, 59-60
and movement, 44
covering, 43-44
opening, 31, 37-38, 146, 154
overhead, 44
tactics, 37-39
Flame projectors, 176
Flanders, battle of, 21
Flank attacks, 61, 114-118
guard tactics, 115
guards, 114-118, 145
scouts, 71
Flanks in defence, 86
security of, 88
Fletcher, Col. Sir R., Bart., 82
Foch, Maréchal, 47, 48-50, 53
(_quoted_):--
advanced guard tactics, 106, 113
art of war, 1
British victories in 1918, 20-21
defence in modern warfare, 80
definitions, 6
fully equipped mind, 2-3
human factor in war, 10-11
moral, 9
Nachod, 18
outflanking a rear guard, 121
principles of war, 1-2
protection by attack, 98
soul of the defence, 76
subordinate commanders, 34
surprise, 30-31, 98
well conducted battle, 24
Fog of battle, 34
Fontenoy-Belleau attack, 49
Formations for the attack, 70-75
Forrest, General, C. S. Army, 18, 59
Fort Garry Horse, 66
Forward body, the, 55-56
Fossoy, American attack at, 49
France, spirit of, 16
Franco-Prussian War, 84, 158-159
(_See also_ Battles by name.)
Frederick the Great, 11, 46, 144
Fredericksburg, battle of, 14, 22, 38, 46, 92, 108, 139
French of Ypres, Field-Marshal Earl, K.P., 15-16, 87-88, 90, 126, 165
(_quoted_):--
"Contemptible Little Army," 19
defence in modern warfare, 80
necessity for study, 2
Frontage of outpost company, 135
Frontal attack, 60-61

Gaines's Mill, battle of, 14, 65
Gallieni, Général, 28, 37
Gas, 42, 81, 100, 176-177
Gatacre, Maj.-Gen. Sir W. F., K.C.B., 152
Gaugamela, (note) 32
General reserve, in attack, 33-34
in defence, 91-92, 94-95
George, Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd-, O.M.
(_quoted_): British efforts, 1914-1918, 16-17
Gette River, 91
Gettysburg, battle of, 15, 45, 61, 65-66, 95-96, 117, 128
Gheluvelt, 42, 88
Gifert Wood, 158
Givenchy, 43
Grant, Maj.-Gen. P. G., C.B., 174
Grant, General U. S., U.S.A., 3, 7, 15, 46, 60-62, 90, 117, 149-150
Gravelotte, battle of, 158
"Green Curve," the, 9, 34
Grenades, hand and rifle, 166
Grenfell, Gen. Sir F. W., K.C.B., 156
Grouchy, Maréchal, 7-8, 90-91
Ground, eye for, 125-126
scouts, 71
Guards' division, 43, 75, 160
Gueudecourt, 37

Haerincourt and Epehy, battle of, 21
Haig of Bemersyde, Field-Marshal Earl, K.T., 53
(_quoted_):--
artillery, 169-170
canal bridges, 77
Carey's force, 174
cavalry in defence, 96
cavalry in the war, 66-67
fuse No. 106, 170
gas, 176-177
hang on! 43
health and moral, 13
infantry the backbone, 22
New Armies, 19-22
"Other Man's Job," 164
principles of war, 2
rearward services, 13
reserves in 1918, 95
rifle and bayonet, 70
smoke, 177
surprise, 7
tanks, 175
Haking, Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. C. B., G.B.E. (_quoted_):--
advanced guards, 104
rear guards, 123
Hal and Tubize, 78
Hamley, Gen. Sir E. B., K.C.B. (_quoted_):--
communications, 31
co-operation, 35-36
courage, 14
definitions, 6
"Higher Ranks" fallacy, 4
mobility, 11
study required, 2
Hancock, Gen., U.S.A., 93
Hand grenades, 166
Hannibal, 47
Harold II., king, 11-12
Harrison's Landing, 65
Hastings, battle of, 11-12
Health and moral, 13
Heavy artillery, 172, 173
Heights of Abraham, 38
Henderson, Col. G. F. R., C.B. (_quoted_):--
Abraham Lincoln, 14
atmosphere of battle, 29-30
British and American troops, 17-18
cavalry, 64
"Common Sense" fallacy, 3
co-operation, 35-37
discipline, 11
eye for ground, 125-126
flank attacks, 114
Grant's bases, 90
soldiers' battles, 9
sound system of command, 33
Spottsylvania, 93-94
study necessary, 4-5
value of text-books, 23
Hennechy, 66
"Higher Ranks" fallacy, 4
Hill, Gen. D. H., C.S. Army, 25-26
Hindenburg, Marshal von, 52
Hindenburg Line, battle of the, 21, 30
Hohenlinden, battle of, 128
Hood, Gen. J. B., C.S. Army, 45
Hooker, Gen., U.S.A., 3, 48, 76, 117
Horatius Cocles, 77
Horse artillery, characteristics of, 168, 170
Hotchkiss rifles, 168
Howitzers, 170, 171, 172, 173
Human nature in war, 13-16
Hunter, Gen., U.S.A., 7

Infantry, characteristics of, 164-167
Information in battle, 26-28, 35, 107-108
Initiative, the, 26-28, 178-179
Intelligence officers, 141-142
Isandhlwana, 77-78, 156
Italo-Turkish campaign, (_note_) 22

Jackson, Gen. T. J., C.S. Army, ("Stonewall" Jackson), 4, 10,
12, 69, 76, 117
Joffre, Maréchal, 28, 108
Jourdan, Maréchal, 128

Kimberley, relief of, 6
Kite balloons, 175-176
Königgratz, battle of, 96
Koorn Spruit, 118, 124

Ladysmith, relief of, 6
La Fère, 52
Lancashire territorials, 43
Le Cateau, first battle of, 96, 126
second battle of, 21, 66
Lee, General R. E., C.S. Army, 10, 45, 46, 48, 61, 65, 76,
93-94, 97, 108, 113, 117, 125-126, 128, 139-140, 149-150
Leonidas, 77
Le Quesnoy, 78
Les Boeufs, 126-127
Leuthen, battle of, 46
Lewis guns, characteristics of, 166
Liberty of manoeuvre, 26-28, 39, 43-44, 71, 126-127, 132, 139
Light Mortars, 166-167, 173
Ligny, battle of, 8, 47, 90-91
Lincoln, Abraham, 3, 10, 14
Lines of communications, 116-118
of observation, 130, 133
of resistance, 84, 134
Local reserves, attack, 55-56
defence, 92, 95
outposts, 130, 134
rear guards, 125
Logan, Gen. J. A., U.S.A., 15
London Regiment, 75
Longstreet, Gen. J., C.S. Army, 45
Losses reduced by movement, 39-40
Ludendorff, 52
Lys, attack on the, 43, 56

McClellan, Gen. J. B., U.S.A., 14-15, 25-26, 48, 65, 90, 112
Machine guns, characteristics of, 167
in attack, 43-44, 56
in close country, 159-160
in defence, 55-56, 83
in outposts, 131, 134
in retreats, 126-127
range of, 132
McNeill, Maj.-Gen. Sir J., K.C.B., 156
Madritov, Colonel, 117-118
Magersfontein, battle of, 152
Mahdist Arabs, 156
Main guard (advanced guard), 105
(rear guard), 120-121
Maistre, General (_quoted_):--
British valour, 20
Malplaquet, battle of, 46
Malvern Hill, battle of, 15, 25-26, 65, 112-113, 117
Manassas, battles of, 12
Manoeuvre, liberty of, 25-28
Manoury, Général, 37
Map reading, 124, 135, 136
Marches, night, 144-147
Marching power of troops, 11-12
Marengo, battle of, 47, 76
Marlborough, Duke of, 46-47, 91
Marmont, Maréchal, 27, 78
Marne, first battle of the, 27-29, 36-37, 52, 53, 108
second battle of the, 49-50
Marshall, Gen. Sir W. R., K.C.B., 64-65
Marye's Hill, 38
Masséna, Maréchal, 82
Maude, Gen. Sir S., K.C.B., 64
McDowell, battle of, 12
Meade, Gen., U.S.A., 15, 45, 46, 61, 92, 128
Meagher's Irish brigade, 38
Mechanical transport, 21-22, 69, 164
Medical arrangements (attack), 67
Mesopotamia, 32, 64-65
Message cards, 68
Messines, battle of, 149, 160
Methods of attack, 53
Methuen, Field-Marshal Lord, G.C.B., 152
Mobility, value of, 11-12, 168
Monchy-le-Preux, 75
Monocacy, battle of, 7
Mons, retreat from, 19, 38, 87-88, 90, 96, 126-128, 165
Moore, Gen. Sir J., K.C.B., 127-128
Moral, 8-22
Moreau, Brig.-Gen., 41
Général J. V., 128
Morlancourt, 149
Mortars, 85, 159, 166-167, 173
Mounted troops, characteristics of, 167-168
Movement and fire, 39-44
in close country, 155
Murat, Maréchal, 10
Musketry, 37-39, 126-128

Nachod, battle of, 77, 110
Napier, Sir W. F. P. (_quoted_):--
rear guards, 127-128
Torres Vedras, 82-83
Napoleon, Emperor, 5, 8, 9-10, 46, 47, 89, 91, 109, 125, 127
(_quoted_):--
Caesar and Turenne, 9
C'est les Prussiens, 8
moral force, 8-9
read and re-read, 3
to cover Turin, 87
Nashville, battle of, 15
National moral, 10-11
New Armies, the, 19-22
Newfoundland Regiment, the Royal, 75, 139
Niederwald, 158-159
Night advances, 147-148
assaults, 148-154
entrenching, 165
marches, 144-147
operations, 144-154
outposts, 137-138
Nile valley, 151
Noisseville, 159
Norman conquest, 11-12

Observation, line of, 84, 130
posts, 99
Obstacles, 80
Offensive battle, the, 46-47
spirit, 79
Operation orders, 178-179
Orders, 178-179
Orthez, battle of, 47
Osman Pasha, 60
Outpost zone, the, 84, 134
Outposts, 129-140
aircraft, 137
artillery, 131
battle outposts, 138-140
cavalry, 130, 137
commander, 132-134
company, 134-137
day, 137-138
distance, 131
frontage, 135
information, 133-134
line of observation, 84, 130
line of resistance, 84, 134
machine guns, 131, 132
night, 137-138
observation by, 84, 130
orders, 133-134
outpost company, 134-137
outpost zone, 134
patrols, 130, 137-138
piquets, 131
position warfare, 134, 138
reconnaissance by, 130
reserves, 131
resistance by, 84, 131
sentry groups, 136-137
strength, 130
withdrawal of, 146

Paardeberg, battle of, 16, 64
Pack artillery, characteristics of, 170, 173
Passive defence, 79
Patrols, fighting, 161
from outposts, 130, 137-138
raiding, 99
Peiwar Kotal, battle of, 151
Penetration by attack, 51-52
Pétain, Maréchal, 53
Pfaffen Wood, 158
Phalanx, the, 32
Photographs, aërial, 99
Piave line, the, 7
Pill-box forts, 85-86
Pioneer infantry, 153
Piquets, 131
Platoon in attack, 70-72
in defence, 131
Pleasant Hill, 59
Plevna, battle of, 60
Plumer, Field-Marshal Lord, G.C.B., 149
Polygon Wood, 42-43
Position, choice of a, 83-84
defensive, 86-91
warfare, 79-82, 99-100, 134, 138, 141-142, 165, 166
Potomac, Army of the, 14-15, 25-26, 45, 46
Principles of warfare, 1-5
Protection and reconnaissance, 98-101
by night, 145
Pulteney, Gen. Sir W. P., K.C.B., 88
Pursuit, 64, 69

Quatre Bras, battle of, 48
Quebec, 38
Queen's Regiment, 42

Raids, 82, 141, 142
Rallying place, 97
Ramadie, battle of, 64
Ramdam, 118
Ramillies, battle of, 46, 91
Range cards, 135
Ranges of artillery, 173
of small arms, 166
of mortars, 173
Rappahannock Station, 161
Rastatt, 128
Rear guard, 119-128
aircraft, 120
artillery, 120
cavalry, 120
composition, 120
distance, 121
distribution, 120-121
examples, 126-128
infantry, 120
main guard, 120-121
machine guns, 120
mechanical transport, 120
medical arrangements, 120
night, 145
positions, 121-124
rear party, 120-121
Royal Engineers, 120
strength, 119-120
tactics, 79, 119, 121-128
training, 124-125
Reconnaissance and protection, 98-101, 175
by raids, 142
during battle, 36
for attack, 141-142
for defence, 142-143
intelligence officers, 141-142
tactical, 141-143
Reorganisation after attack, 97
and pursuit, 69
Report centres, 163
Reports, battle, 68
on positions, 141-143
Reserve, general, in attack, 56-57
in defence, 94-95
outposts, 131
local, 55-56, 92, 95, 125, 130, 134
Resistance, line of, 84, 134
Retiring under fire, 40-41
Retreat from Mons, 38, 87-88, 90, 96, 126-128, 165
lines of, 89-90
tactics in, 104-105
Reumont, 66
Rezonville, 96
Rifle, the British, 38, 164-165
Rifle grenade, the, 166
Roberts, Field-Marshal Earl, K.G., 15-16, 151 (_quoted_):--
"Germany Strikes," 17
Roliça, combat at, 95, 127
Roman walls, 82
Rorke's Drift, 77-78, 156
Royal Engineers, characteristics of, 172, 174
defence, 172
Horse Artillery, 170
in attack, 67, 153
outposts, 137
retreats, 120
West Kent Regiment, 42
Runners, 35
Russia, collapse of, 52
North (Campaign), 66-67
Russian War of 1854-1855, 82
Russo-Japanese War, 82, 117-118
Russo-Turkish War, 18, 82

Sadowa, battle of, 96
St. Privat, battle of, 60
Salamanca, battle of, 27, 78
Salient, the (1864), 97, 149
(Ypres), 39
Sambre, battle of the, 21
Sannah's Post, 118, 124
Sarrail, Général, 37
Sauroren, battle of, 10
Savage warfare, 156-157
Scarpe, battle of the, 21
Scouts (platoon), 71
Secrecy, 25, 29-31, 51, 102, 144, 145-146, 153-154
Sectors of defence, 94
Sedan, battle of, 159
Selle, battle of the, 21
Semi-permanent defences, 85-86
Seneca _quoted_: (Surprise), 102
Sentry groups, 131, 136-137
Serre Hill, 148-149
Seven Days' Battle, the, 14, 90
Sharpsburg, battle of, 14, 15, 48
Shenandoah Valley campaign, 4, 7, 12, 117
Signals, 35, 107
"Silence is golden," 113
Skobeleff, General Michael Dimitrievitch, 18
Smith-Dorrien, Gen. Sir H. L., G.C.B., 87, 126
Smoke, 56, 150-151, 171, 177
Snipers, 81
Soissons, Fortress of, 41, 78
Soldiers' battles, 9
Somme, first battle of the, 7, 13, 37, 42-43, 148, 171, 176-177
second battle of the, 33-34, 43, 51-52, 56, 66, 77, 78, 126-127, 174
Soult, Maréchal, 10, 127
South African War, 6-7.
(_See also_ Battles by name.)
Spicheren, battle of, 108-109, 158
Spottsylvania, battle of, 93-94, 117, 149-150
Square formation in attack, 70
Stafford Heights, 139
Stamford Bridge, battle of, 12
Stormberg, 152
Strategical advanced guard, 103
Strategy defined, 6, 8
and tactics, 6-23
Stuart, Gen. J. E. B., C.S. Army ("Jeb" Stuart), 65, 112-113,
117, 128.
Study, necessity for, 1-3, 4-5
Sublician Bridge, 77
Sulphur Springs, 108
Super-heavy artillery, 172, 173
Supply, 13, 67
Supports in attack, 55-56, 169
in close country, 159
defence, 92
outposts, 134-137
Surprise, value of, 25, 29-31, 51, 175
fire, 31, 38
historical examples, 12, 30, 63, 77-78, 118, 124, 138