Chapter IV: Part 4

THE BATTALION COMMANDER.--"The powers of personal control of a battalion commander upon the field of battle are limited, and success will depend, in a great measure, on the clearness of the orders which commit his leading companies to the Attack" ("Infantry Training, 1921"). The battalion commander should be supplied with any details concerning the enemy and of co-operating troops. He must understand his objective, the limits of his frontage, and the extent of help which he will receive from the other arms. In addition to such information as is supplied regarding the enemy's strength and dispositions, particularly with regard to wire (or other obstacles) and machine guns, he must ascertain the best positions of assembly for his companies, the best lines of approach to the objective, the most covered line of advance for his supports and reserves, and the best position for his own headquarters during each stage of the Attack. In his orders for the Attack he will reveal all information concerning the movements and dispositions of the enemy and of co-operating troops and arms; he will allot tasks to the companies and to the machine-gun platoon (if not brigaded) and will define the frontage of the forward companies; he will also detail the assembly positions, give compass-bearings for the advance, describe the action of other arms in support, make the necessary signalling arrangements, notify the zero hour, arrange for the synchronisation of watches, notify his own position before, during, and after the Attack, and indicate the point to which reports are to be sent, notify the medical arrangements, and issue instructions as to the collection of stragglers, the escort and destination of prisoners, the supply of ammunition, and the equipment to be worn. The quartermaster will receive orders as to the bringing up of rations during the battle. Before issuing to the Attack a proportion of officers and other ranks will be detailed to remain behind, to replace casualties when the engagement is over.

{75}

The position of the battalion commander will be chosen with a view to keeping in touch with the progress of the Attack in all its stages and of influencing the fight by means of the reserves. Personal control is difficult to exercise once troops are committed to the fight, but opportunities for rapid decision were frequently offered to battalion commanders in the Great War, and seized with a success which transformed a check into a victory. In 1916 a battalion commander of the Coldstream Guards, seeing his command disorganised by fire and resistance, by personal example rallied and reorganised the waves of the Attack and added the necessary momentum to the assault, which then reached its objective. On April 14, 1917, the commander of a battalion of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment witnessed the launching of a local counter-attack by the Germans on the village of _Monchy-le-Preux_, and by a rapid advance with the fighting portion of his headquarters, staved off the attack until the arrival of reinforcements from the 88th Brigade enabled it to be driven back in disorder. On November 30, 1917, during the German counter-attack from Fontaine Notre Dame to Tadpole Copse, in the Northern Sector of the _Cambrai_ zone, the Germans forced their way into our foremost positions, and opened a gap between the 1/6th and 1/15th London Regiments. Local counter-attacks led by the two battalion commanders with all available men, including the personnel of their respective headquarters, once more restored the situation. In March, 1918, during the most critical period of the German thrust at Amiens, a battalion commander of the Border Regiment again and again, on horseback and on foot, personally restored the situation.

{76}

DEFENSIVE ACTION

"The soul of the Defence is the Counter-Attack."--MARSHAL FOCH.

Defensive action may be initiated by a commander in the field, or it may be imposed upon him by the enemy, and a commander may rely upon fortification to assist him in defeating the enemy, or he may employ manoeuvre to effect or to postpone a decision.

A commander may desire to pin the enemy to an attack upon a fortified position, garrisoned by a portion only of his force, while he detaches another (and probably greater) portion to attack the enemy from an unexpected quarter. An outstanding example of this form of action is exhibited in the _Battle of Chancellorsville_ (May 2-3, 1863), where Lee kept at bay Hooker's army of 90,000 with one-third of his force and detached Stonewall Jackson with 30,000 men to attack the Federal rear. Action of this kind is peculiarly effective, but it requires a secrecy which modern aircraft would almost certainly unveil, and if the manoeuvre failed to escape observation it would probably result in disaster both to the retaining force and to the detached troops.

A different form of the combination of defence with manoeuvre is the Defensive-Offensive battle, with examples of which the history of Warfare is amply supplied--Marengo, Austerlitz, and Waterloo being typical battles of this nature. In this form of defensive action a commander invites the enemy to attack a well-chosen position, and after exhausting the enemy's strength and holding up the assault, the commander passes from the guard to the thrust and overwhelms {77} the exhausted foe by an irresistible and sustained counter-attack with all the means at his disposal.

A position is sometimes occupied as a matter of necessity, sometimes merely as a matter of tactical prudence. At _Nachod_ (June 27, 1866) the Prussian Advanced Guard hurriedly established a defensive position and kept at bay the whole Austrian Army, while the Prussian Army emerged in security from a defile and manoeuvred into battle array. The _Pass of Thermopylae_ was occupied in B.C. 480 by 1,400 Greeks under Leonidas, King of Sparta, to withstand the Persian hosts of Xerxes, and although the Greek force was destroyed by an attack from the rear (through the disclosure of a secret path by a renegade in the Persian service), the resistance offered to the "invincible" Persians emboldened the Greeks in their future encounters, and led to the ultimate defeat of the invaders. According to the legendary history of Rome, Horatius Cocles and two companions defended the _Sublician Bridge_ over the Tiber against Lars Porsena and the whole army of the Etruscans. This legendary heroism was equalled or surpassed during the _Second Battle of the Somme_ (March 21, 1918). "The bridges across the Crozat and Somme Canals were destroyed, though in some cases not with entire success, it being probable that certain of them were still practicable for infantry. Instances of great bravery occurred in the destruction of these bridges. In one case, when the electrical connection for firing the demolition charge had failed, the officer responsible for the destruction of the bridge personally lit the instantaneous fuse and blew up the bridge. By extraordinary good fortune he was not killed" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches). At _Rorke's Drift_ (January 22, 1879) a force of 80 other ranks of the 24th Regiment, under Lieutenants Chard and Bromhead, with about 40 hospital cases, drove off the repeated attacks of 4,000 Zulus, part of Cetewayo's army which had surprised and annihilated the garrison {78} at _Isandhlwana_ earlier the same day. An astounding feat of arms was performed by a small body of troops during the withdrawal of the British Army in face of the overwhelming German attack at the _Second Battle of the Somme_. A detachment of about 100 officers and men of the 61st Brigade, 20th Division, was detailed to cover the withdrawal of their division at _Le Quesnoy_ (March 27,1918). Under the command of their Brigade-Major (Captain E. P. Combe, M.C.) the detachment successfully held the enemy at bay from early morning until 6 p.m., when the eleven survivors withdrew under orders, having accomplished their task.

There are many instances of the occupation of an area for an actual or potential tactical purpose. Before the _Battle of Salamanca_ (July 22, 1812) a Spanish force had been detached by Wellington to cover a ford of the River Tormes by occupying the castle of Alba de Tormes, but the force was withdrawn without Wellington's knowledge, and Marmont's defeated army retired unmolested over the ford to the fortress of Valladolid. In the campaign of 1814, Napoleon placed a garrison of 1,200 in the _Fortress of Soissons_, but on March 3,1814, the garrison capitulated without exhausting all the means of defence as the regulations of War ordain, and the bridge at Soissons enabled Blücher and Bülow to unite their forces across the River Aisne. In the Waterloo campaign, Wellington stationed 17,000 men at _Hal_ and _Tubize_, 8 miles from his right on the field of battle at Waterloo, to repel a possible turning movement and to form a rallying point if his centre was broken, and with 67,000 men took up a position astride the Nivelle-Brussels and Charleroi-Brussels roads which met at Mont St. Jean. He was deprived of the services of this detachment and modern criticism has been directed against this disposition of his forces. It is, however, permissible to suggest that the security of his right flank, and the possession of a rallying point, inspired him with the confidence which enabled him to {79} withstand the sustained attacks of Napoleon until the arrival of Blücher's corps permitted him to overwhelm his adversary.

A further form of defensive action is the occupation of a series of extemporised positions and the orderly withdrawal to a further series before the actual assault of the enemy, resistance being combined with manoeuvre for the purpose of delaying the enemy's advance or of holding up his pursuit. Delaying action of this kind is commonly employed in rearguard fighting, when the object to be gained is time rather than position, and the offensive action of the defender is limited to local counter-attacks at favourable or desperate moments. But the guiding principle in all defensive operations, including delaying action, must be that "when an enemy has liberty of manoeuvre, the passive occupation of a position, however strong, can rarely be justified, and always involves the risk of crushing defeat" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1920)).

THE OFFENSIVE SPIRIT.--Although there are many forms of defensive action the soul of the Defence in every case is a vigorous offensive spirit. In the Active Defence, the Decisive Counter-Attack, ending in the overthrow of the enemy, is the manoeuvre originally in view when the defensive _rôle_ is adopted. In the Passive Defence against superior numbers. Local Counter-Attacks end with the recapture of a tactical point or the repulse of a determined assault, and in the Delaying Action they overwhelm by surprise fire or assault a detached force which has advanced with such rapidity as to enable the defenders, without undue risk, to cut off and annihilate the isolated enemy body. Whatever the tactical situation, it is by the vigour of the offensive spirit alone that success may be achieved in the face of a determined enemy.

MODERN WARFARE.--In modern warfare the defensive position plays a part of increasing importance, owing {80} to the great power conferred on the defence by modern armaments. "Machine guns and barbed wire permit the rapid organisation of defensive points of a value which cannot be disputed. In particular, they have given to a trench, or to a natural obstacle, a solidity which permits a front to be extended in a manner unsuspected before this war; they permit the prompt consolidation of a large system that is easy to hold" (Marshal Foch). "The modern rifle and machine gun add tenfold to the relative power of the Defence as against the Attack. It has thus become a practical operation to place the heaviest artillery in position close behind the infantry fighting line, not only owing to the mobility afforded by motor traction but also because the old dread of losing the guns before they could be got away no longer exists" (Marshal French). It is thus possible to hold the forward positions of a highly organised defensive system with a minimum of exposure to loss, the extra strength of the position counterbalancing the reduction in numbers, but a preference for defensive action of this kind may generally be regarded as an admission that a victorious outcome of the campaign is not anticipated at the time of its adoption in the theatre in which it is employed. "It is of paramount importance that in those parts of a theatre of operations where a commander aims at decision a war of movement must never be allowed to lapse into position warfare so long as a further advance is possible. Position warfare can never of itself achieve victory" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1920)). However strong entrenchments may be they will not defeat the adversary's main armies, nor can they withstand indefinitely the attacks of a determined and well-armed enemy. It is scarcely even probable that an army behind entrenchments can by that means alone inflict such losses on its assailants as will enable the initiative, or liberty of manoeuvre, to be regained and the assailant's main armies to be defeated. The operations on both sides {81} are in the nature of a siege, and however prolonged the siege, the advantage will be gained in the long run by superiority of aggressive action in the air and over and under the ground. In addition to the absence of opportunity for the grand offensive there are two further points of difference between defensive action in Position Warfare and the defence in a War of Manoeuvre. The first of these is the inevitable absence of flanks to be assailed, as the operations necessitate a connected line of strong points from sea to sea, or from the sea to the impassable barrier of neutral territory. Mounted troops are therefore doomed to inaction in their most important sphere, until the lines have been breached and the enemy is forced to retreat, and the opportunities for delivering flank attacks are meanwhile confined to the infantry, and will be due to irregularities in the alignment of the strong points, upon which enfilade fire may be brought to bear. The second point of difference is the abundance of time at the disposal of commanders for developing and rehearsing elaborate systems of attack and defence, and for obtaining detailed plans of the hostile works, through continuous reconnaissance by the Air Service. In most countries there must be, of necessity, a prolonged period of inactivity on both sides in a Position War, owing to the severity of winter conditions, or to the occurrence of the rainy season, and during that period it will seldom be possible to penetrate the enemy's main defences on such a scale as to bring about the grand offensive. But this is a period of inactivity in appearance rather than in fact, for no defensive system is ever perfect, no strong point but needs further consolidation, new trenches are constantly constructed or improved, and fresh areas are covered with wire entanglements. Guns of all calibres, underground mines and light mortars are ever at work, demolishing, wounding, and killing, while lachrymatory and asphyxiating shell-fire is to be expected at all times. On a smaller scale, snipers on both sides have a daily bag, and {82} observers are ever at their posts noting every change, however insignificant, and every new piece of work; "listening posts" are detecting hostile plans, while patrols are collecting information and raiding parties are reconnoitring, destroying defences, and inflicting losses, it being the first principle of a raid that it should result in greater losses to the enemy than to the troops which carry it out.

ENTRENCHMENTS.--Entrenchments have been employed in the defence from the earliest times. The Roman walls in Britain, the Great Wall of China, the earthworks in the Russian War of 1854-1855, in the American Civil War of 1861-1864, in the Russo-Turkish War of 1878, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 are notable examples. But in no war previous to that of 1914-1918 have they played so important a part.

One of the most famous series of entrenchments in previous wars were those constructed in 1810 by Colonel R. Fletcher, of the Royal Engineers, at _Torres Vedras_. These fortifications extended for 50 miles and contained 126 closed works, mounting 247 guns, and behind these lines Wellington amassed stores and reinforcements until the retreat of Masséna enabled him to resume the initiative. In front of these lines everything that could support the French armies had been removed; behind them Wellington's forces were well provided in every respect. On October 10, 1810, Masséna was confronted by the entrenchments, the existence of which had been kept a profound secret, while their strength prevented them from being carried by assault. Before the end of October a Portuguese spy wrote to Wellington: "Heaven forgive me if I wrong the French in believing they have eaten my cat" (Napier). During the night of November 14-15, Masséna broke up his camp and withdrew. But it was not the lines of Torres Vedras which won back the Peninsula. Spain and Portugal were saved by the bold march northwards {83} to Vittoria. "In six weeks Wellington marched, with 100,000 men, 600 miles, passed six great rivers, gained one decisive battle, invested two fortresses, and drove 120,000 veteran French troops from Spain" (Napier).

DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS.--"Whether it is the intention of the commander to resume the offensive at an early date or whether it is likely that the defensive system will be occupied for a considerable period, the principles on which the construction of all defences should be undertaken are the same. All defensive systems should be planned from the outset in such a way that they can easily be adapted to the requirements of a prolonged defence. The ground must be thoroughly reconnoitred and should at the first be divided into a series of tactical posts and defended localities. These posts should be self-supporting, but should be so sited that the garrisons mutually support each other by fire. The gaps between the posts must be covered by the fire of the garrison of the posts, and machine guns may also be sited to bring fire to bear from positions in rear and to the flanks" ("Infantry Training, 1921"). This principle must govern the choice of the position to be defended as well as the organisation of the position for defence, and troops detailed for the defence of an area must continue to improve the defensive arrangements in that area until such time as the offensive is resumed.

CHOOSING A POSITION.--The framework of the modern defence consists of artillery and machine guns; into this framework are fitted the defence posts or defended localities garrisoned by infantry, who are responsible for holding their ground at all costs and for inflicting the greatest possible loss on the enemy. A commander will require a position which affords elasticity for increasing the resistance as the attackers penetrate the defences, and depth will thus be essential. He will require a position wide enough to prevent the whole of his front being masked by a retaining attack of a part of the {84} enemy's forces while a strong flank attack is simultaneously delivered; and in a War of Manoeuvre he will require facilities for the Decisive Counter-Attack.

The depth of the position will develop automatically in a War of Position, but it must always be sufficient to enable troops to assemble in rear of the forward position before moving up and to afford rest to troops when withdrawn from the front line. The width of the position will generally depend upon the strength of the defending force, the guiding principle being to keep about half the force in General Reserve; if, therefore, the remainder of the force is insufficient for the purpose of holding the defences the position is too wide for the tactical requirements of the Active Defence. In Position Warfare, however, a defensive system must necessarily be extended beyond the limits that are practicable in the Active Defence, and the numbers available for the garrison are supplemented by denying ground to the attack by means of obstacles, the removal of which is prevented by machine-gun and rifle fire.

THE OUTPOST ZONE.--For the Active Defence of a position the defensive system will consist of an Outpost Zone and a Battle Position. The Outpost Zone is garrisoned by a protective force which keeps a constant watch on the enemy and absorbs the first shock of the attack, watch being kept by means of well-concealed sentry posts on the Line of Observation, supported by a chain of small self-contained defensive posts, while resistance is offered by a series of self-contained, mutually supporting defence posts on the Outpost Line of Resistance.

THE BATTLE POSITION.--The Battle Position will be established in the area in which the commander decides to fight out the battle and break the enemy's attack. It therefore forms the keystone of the whole defensive position and must be organised in depth to afford elasticity for defensive action. "In principle, in order to protect {85} the battle position from being obliterated by a preliminary bombardment, it should be beyond effective range of the enemy's mortars" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1920)).

THE SEMI-PERMANENT SYSTEM.--When a campaign is prolonged in any area without decisive results a War of Position may be developed by one or both of the combatants. In such cases the Outpost Zone is developed into an intricate trench system, with protective avenues leading from front to rear and with deep dugouts to protect the garrison from artillery fire. The Battle Position will probably coincide with the Outpost Zone, the trenches being used for the purposes of observation until the fire positions are manned to resist an assault.

In parts of the line on the Western Front of the Great War, "Pill-box" forts, constructed of concrete, took the place of continuous lines of trenches. These machine-gun forts were garrisoned, according to size, by groups from 5 to 50 strong, and were echeloned in plan, to sweep all approaches, and together to command with their mutually supporting fire the whole area over which they were spread, the intervening ground being entangled with wire so placed as to invite attacking troops into places where flanking fire may be poured into them. The advantages of the pill-box system over the continuous line of strong points are principally defensive. Fewer men are required for them than for the trench systems, and there is less liability of loss from artillery fire. But there are certain grave disadvantages. Well-directed artillery fire is liable to destroy some of the pill boxes, and a direct hit from a heavy gun will possibly put a larger fort out of action, thus crippling the defence by the removal of a peg on which the whole scheme depends. Supports and reserves are necessarily far in rear and must be brought up through the open to repel successful attacks, while a defensive scheme {86} composed entirely on the pill-box plan is less suitable for aggressive action than entrenchments, there being fewer facilities for assembling troops prior to the attack.

COMMON CHARACTERISTICS.--Whatever the system of defence or phase of warfare, every commander must guard his flanks and keep in touch with neighbouring units. He must always be ready to assist a neighbouring commander by enfilade fire or by a relieving counter-attack; or to throw back a defensive flank in the event of a neighbouring post being captured by the enemy. Each post, occupied for the Defence (except in Delaying Actions, where manoeuvre takes the place of a settled resistance), forms a self-contained centre of resistance, capable of all-round fire, and the duty of the garrison is to defend the area allotted to it to the last man and the last round.

THE ACTIVE DEFENCE.--The Active Defence may be considered according to the reason which prompted the commander of the force to occupy the position. It may have been deliberately chosen as a position which the enemy must attack, and in the hope of delivering during that attack a crushing and decisive counter-blow; or it may have been chosen of necessity, to meet an attack by deployment on the ground of the encounter, with the same hope of delivering a decisive counter-stroke when the opportunity arrives.

There is little difference in the steps to be taken by the commander, as in the first case a General Reserve is specially detailed for the counter-stroke; and in the second, the position will be held with as few troops as the tactical situation permits, in order to provide as large a General Reserve as possible for the Grand Offensive. A commander will be influenced by many considerations in his choice of a defensive position:--

(i) _The position must suit the plan of operations_; it must be "in the enemy's way," and this the commander must be able to judge from the map. It is {87} to be noted that to bar the enemy's way it is not always essential to get astride his lines of advance, as a position on parallel lines, threatening his flank and rear, cannot be ignored by the enemy, unless he is strong enough to detach a part of his force to mask the defender's position, while he proceeds to his objective with his main army. "It was a mistake to assume that in order to cover Turin one had to stand astride the road leading to that town; the armies united at Dego would have covered Turin, because they would have stood on the flank of the road leading to that town" (Napoleon).

(ii) _The position must not be too extensive_ for the troops at the disposal of the commander, and this will be governed by the extent of the line to be actually held. It will consist of a series of mutually supporting tactical points, which can be held as "pivots on which to hinge the defence of the position," and the object must be to obtain the maximum of fire effect on all ground over which the enemy can advance with the minimum of exposure to his fire. A rough-and-ready rule is that unless one rifle per yard of the frontage occupied can be supplied by the "troops to hold the position" (which should not exceed one-half the available force) then the position is too extensive and should be narrowed. On the other hand, too narrow a front may enable the enemy to develop, early in the engagement, strong flank attacks, which may make the position untenable before the time is ripe for the assumption of the offensive. The _Condé-Mons-Binche_ line held on August 22-23, 1914, by Sir J. French's army (I. Corps, General Sir D. Haig; II. Corps, General Sir H. L. Smith-Dorrien) had a total width of 25 miles, and the troops at disposal, including General Sir E. H. H. Allenby's Cavalry Division, consisted of about 75,000 all arms. The frontage actually held did not exhaust half this force at the rate of one rifle per yard, and a position in rear had also been selected, between Jerlain and Maubeuge, with a frontage of 15 miles. The _Retreat from Mons_ was {88} due not to the excessive width of frontage, but to the success of the German attack on the French V. Corps at Charleroi (August 23, 1914), which left the right flank of the British Army "in the air," while two German Corps were working round the left flank. The British III. Corps (General Sir W. P. Pulteney) did not arrive until the retreat was in full swing. At the _First Battle of Ypres_ (October 31, 1914) many parts of the line were held with one rifle for 17 yards, and there were no Supports or Local or General Reserves. Yet the line was not only maintained but a counter-attack at Gheluvelt thrust the attacking Germans behind their entrenchments.

(iii) _There must be a clear field of fire_ to prevent the enemy approaching unmolested within effective range, and particularly within close range, from which the enemy will endeavour to establish an ascendency in the fire-fight.

(iv) _The flanks must be secure_, or at least as strong as possible. A flank resting on a deep river or a marsh may be regarded as secure, and a flank extending to the sea, or to the boundary of a neutral State. A flank on high ground which commands all approaches and provides means of distant observation may be called strong. It is a great advantage if one flank can be posted so strongly as to compel the enemy to make his main attack on the other, as this will enable the defender to forecast the direction of the decisive attack and to dispose his General Reserve to meet and overwhelm it.

(v) _There should be facilities for cover_ on the position and concealed avenues of approach from the rear. A crest affords cover on the reverse slopes and woods provide concealment, while time enables artificial means to be adopted. Tactical cover can be provided by cavalry and advanced troops in the early stages of manoeuvre-battle, and in removing this cover the troops can withdraw in such a way as to lure the enemy on {89} to a false position. They can also induce premature deployments by the enemy, and movements across the front of the real position.

(vi) _There should be good artillery positions_ to provide effective fire on all hostile avenues of approach, and counter-battery work on hostile artillery positions. There should also be firm ground and good roads for the movement of guns, and an absence of landmarks for the enemy to range on. Guns of the heaviest calibre take part in all modern battles, their disposition being settled in conference with the artillery commander. A battery of field artillery requires 100 yards frontage for its six guns, and there is usually an interval of 25 yards between batteries.

(vii) _There must be depth_ to allow for the disposal and movement of the Supports and Reserves, and for manoeuvres to recapture the forward defences, or to issue to the counter-attack.

(viii) _There must be good lateral and frontal communication_ in order that any part of the line can be quickly reinforced. A position astride an unfordable stream, or high ridge or deep ravine should therefore be avoided. At the _Battle of Dresden_ (August 26, 1813) the Allies were encamped on the left bank of the Elbe. Their forces were posted on the heights, but the position was cut transversely by a deep ravine, so that the left wing was isolated from the centre and right. This vicious disposition did not escape the penetrating eye of Napoleon, who attacked their isolated wing with superior forces and routed it completely, with the capture of 10,000 prisoners, before any assistance could arrive. The task of creating lateral communications, if none exist, is of the utmost importance, as they enable a commander to achieve the primary object of every military manoeuvre, to meet the enemy with superior forces at the desired point.

(ix) _There should be good lines of withdrawal_, and these should be horizontal, or only slightly oblique, to {90} the main position, and not parallel with the general alignment. This is a point of the first importance, for if the Lines of Communication lead straight to the rear a force that is overwhelmed by the attack can withdraw to selected positions and towards its base, if it can keep the line intact and prevent its flanks being turned. A wide base, with alternative lines of approach, is of the greatest value, and when there is undue risk of the Lines of Communication to a base being intercepted, an alternative base, with lines of withdrawal thereto from the unexposed flank, is an acceptable safeguard, as the defence can be protracted while the withdrawing force concentrates upon the changed base. Such a change of base was effected by Marshal French during the _Retreat from Mons_, and amongst many historical examples may be quoted General McClellan's transfer of the _Army of the Potomac_ from the York to the James River in July, 1862, during the _Seven Days' Battle around Richmond_. General Grant changed his base no fewer than five times during the _Campaign in the Wilderness_ (May, 1864), from Washington to Orange and Alexandria Railroad, then to Fredericksburg on the Rappahannock, then to Port Royal, further east on that river, then to White House on the Pamunkey (a branch of the York River), and finally to the James River. "His army was always well supplied, even his enormous numbers of wounded were carried straight away to the base and thence to Washington, without any difficulty, and he had no obstacles whatever to fight against as regards either feeding his army or keeping up the supply of ammunition" (Henderson). In withdrawing a defeated wing it may even be advantageous to rally the troops at a point distant from the field of battle, and to cause the pursuer, uncertain as to the direction of the retreat, to make detachments which can be overthrown by sudden counter-attacks, or to lure a pursuer from the field where their presence is required, as Grouchy was lured after Napoleon's defeat of the Prussians at Ligny {91} (June 16, 1815). The object of Napoleon's attack on the Allies was the separation of Wellington's Anglo-Belgian force from the Prussian Army under Blücher, and after the defeat of the latter at Ligny the Emperor directed Marshal Grouchy to pursue the Prussians and to drive them eastwards. Grouchy conducted a leisurely pursuit and engaged an insignificant part of the Prussian Army (_The Battle of Wavre_, June 18-19, 1815), while the main body of the Prussians moved westwards and assisted in the overthrow of Napoleon at Waterloo.

(x) _There should be favourable ground and a good line of advance for the Decisive Counter-Attack_. In order, therefore, to overthrow the enemy, a position should not be chosen behind an impassable feature which neither side can cross. At _Ramillies_ (May 23, 1706), one wing of the enemy was posted behind a marsh, where it was both unassailable and unable to attack. Marlborough, therefore, ignored that wing entirely, and bringing his whole force against the remaining wing, won easily a decisive victory. The only occasions when an impassable feature is welcome are in the Passive Defence of a small force against overwhelming odds (as was seen in August, 1914, when the Belgians occupied a position behind the _River Gette_), and in the Delaying Action of a Rear-guard fighting for time for the Main Body to get away. In such cases a Decisive Counter-Attack is not contemplated.

OCCUPATION OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION.--The framework of the _defence_ is provided by artillery and machine-gun fire; the backbone of the _offence_ is the infantry. The Commander will _divide the troops_ into (a) _Troops to hold the position_, and (b) _General Reserve_, the golden rule being to make (a) as small as the tactical situation permits in order that (b) may be as large as possible, and its work absolutely decisive. Under no circumstances {92} should the General Reserve be much below half the available force.

Of these two portions, the _Troops to hold the position_ consist of infantry occupying a series of mutually supporting tactical strong points, not necessarily continuous, and of irregular alignment so as to cover with the defender's fire not only the ground over which the enemy can advance, but the front and flanks of neighbouring strong points. This line will be strengthened, as and when necessary, by throwing in the supports, and it will be assisted at critical moments by the local reserves, which, coming up unseen, will deliver local counter-attacks on the assaulting enemy, and will thus restore the battle at threatened points by relieving the pressure on the front line. Their work completed they will be rallied and withdrawn again into local reserve, and it is highly important that they should be kept well under control, or their successful efforts may be neutralised by local reserves of the attacking force. At _Talavera_ (July 27, 1809) a portion of the British force followed up the repulsed French columns too far, and being in turn broken and driven back, was pursued closely by the enemy and retired in disorder to the position. At the battle of _Fredericksburg_ (December 13, 1862) two brigades emerged from the Confederate position and drove Meade's division of the Army of the Potomac out of their lines. But they rushed on with reckless impetuosity and were finally driven back with heavy loss. Local counter-attacks keep alive an offensive spirit in the defenders, exhaust the enemy's powers, draw his reserves into the battle, and thus prepare the opportunity for the Decisive Counter-Attack. The local reserves of flank sections should usually be echeloned in rear of the flank, which can thus be protected at need by determined counter-attacks on the flank of the enveloping force.

_The General Reserve is for the Decisive Counter-Attack_ and is held for this purpose in the hands of the {93} commander of the whole force, in order that it may be used to crush and overthrow the enemy's main attack. The opportunity for this effort is generally obtained only when the enemy has thrown into action his own General Reserve for the decisive attack, and has received a check. A bold and resolute counter-attack at that moment is bound to achieve a decisive success. But the assumption of the _grand offensive should not be confined to the General Reserve alone_. Commanders of sections of the defence who are permitted by the local situation to do so, must at once join in the decisive counter-attack, unless express orders to the contrary have been received; and any definite success obtained must be the signal for the whole force to press the enemy with the utmost vigour. This opportunity will be fleeting, and there must be no delay in seizing it. Every preparation must therefore be made in anticipation of the opportunity so that a pre-arranged plan may be put into execution. "To initiate a counter-attack on a large scale without due time for preparation, co-ordination, and movement of troops is to court failure, with heavy casualties and resulting demoralisation" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1920)).

That the soul of the defence is the counter-attack was shown at the battle of _Spottsylvania_ (May 12, 1864). General Hancock's Corps (from Grant's combined armies) had assaulted and captured part of Lee's entrenchments in the Wilderness of Virginia; 20,000 men had assaulted and captured the Salient, taking 4,000 prisoners; they then pressed forward, and sweeping everything before them, drove a wedge right into the Confederate position. "But Lee, recognising the weakness of the Salient, had caused another line of entrenchments to be constructed about half a mile in rear. By this second line the Federals were suddenly brought up. The confusion was very great, the battalions had intermingled in the excitement of the charge, and the officers could neither make their orders {94} heard nor form their men for another rush. Lee threw in his reserves. He made a tremendous counter-attack. Every single battalion he could collect was ordered to attack, and the vigour of the blow was such that the whole of these 20,000 men were driven back beyond the first line of entrenchments, and the Confederates recaptured their first position" (Henderson).

_He will select positions for the Artillery_, in consultation with the commander of that arm, the objects in view being: to command lines of approach so that the assailant may be shelled and forced to deploy early and so to indicate his plan of attack; to delay the advance; to combine with the infantry in the close defence of the main position; to support local counter-attacks; to destroy hostile batteries by counter-battery work; and to combine eventually in the Decisive Counter-Attack. The increased mobility of guns of the heaviest calibre owing to motor traction, and the increased defensive power of the protective quick-firing small arms, enable guns to be placed close behind the infantry firing line without undue risk of capture.

_He will divide the position into sectors_, each garrisoned by a distinct unit, under a definite commander. The mutually supporting tactical points (farmsteads, villages, woods, ridges, knolls, etc.) will usually be held in groups, under group commanders, with definite subordinate commanders, and the group commander will probably control the local reserves of that group, with which he can assist any of the units in times of need. The units from which such groups are formed will usually be complete sections.

_He will decide the position of the General Reserve_. This will be the locality best suited for the advance to the decisive counter-attack, if it is to be delivered from a distance; or near the point where the enemy's decisive attack is expected, if it is intended to hurl the General Reserve into the flank and rear of the enemy's main {95} attack while it is heavily engaged with the troops holding the position. As surprise is essential to success, the position of the General Reserve should be concealed as long as possible. The position of the General Reserve will depend upon the ascertained intentions of the enemy. At the _Second Battle of the Somme_ (March 21, 1918) the intentions of the German commander were ascertained during the first day's fighting. "As by this time (_i.e._ the evening of March 21) it had become clear that practically the whole of the enemy's striking force had been committed to this one battle, my plans already referred to for collecting reserves from other parts of the British front were put into immediate execution. By drawing away local reserves and thinning out the front not attacked, it was possible to reinforce the battle by eight divisions before the end of the month" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).

_He must decide the position_, and to some extent the action, of the Cavalry. Before defensive action in a War of Manoeuvre the cavalry have been out on reconnaissance, and during the early stages they have endeavoured to lure the assailants on to a false position. During the battle they will frustrate the efforts of opposing mounted troops, will protect a vulnerable flank, and will assist generally by dismounted fire action. After the victorious counter-attack they will emerge in pursuit. In case of a reverse they will delay the enemy's victorious advance by fire action and by mounted tactics to protect the withdrawing forces from the depredations of hostile cavalry. A position near a flank will usually be occupied.

There have been many examples of protection by cavalry of a force that has been worsted. After the _Combat of Roliça_ (August 17, 1808) General Delaborde retreated by alternate masses, protecting his movements by short, vigorous charges of cavalry. At _Chancellorsville_ (May 3, 1863), and on the first day of _Gettysburg_ (July 1, 1863), a handful of United States {96} cavalry held up the pursuit and staved off disaster. At _Königgratz_ (_Sadowa_), (July 3, 1866), the charges of the Austrian cavalry drove back the Prussian Horse and enabled Benedek's defeated troops to get back in safety. At _Rezonville_ (August 16, 1870) von Bredow's Cavalry Brigade was ordered to charge the French batteries and their infantry escort, in order to give some breathing time for the hard-pressed Prussian infantry. The charge was successful and the time was gained, but as at _Balaclava_ (October 26, 1854) there were few survivors from "Von Bredow's Todtenritt" (death ride). After the battle of _Le Cateau_ (August 26, 1918) and during the _Retreat from Mons_, the British cavalry, under General Allenby, effectively held off the enemy and enabled the British troops to move unmolested. During the great German offensive in the spring of 1918 the withdrawal of the troops at _Cugny_ (March 24, 1918) was made possible by a brilliant mounted charge by a squadron of the 16th Cavalry Brigade, which broke through the German line, taking over 100 prisoners, and sabring a large number of the enemy. During the retreat in that area units of the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions proved so effective in delaying the enemy's advance that other units were horsed during the progress of the battle in order to increase the supply of cavalry. "Without the assistance of mounted troops, skilfully handled and gallantly led, the enemy could scarcely have been prevented from breaking through the long and thinly held front of broken and wooded ground before the French reinforcements had had time to arrive. . . . The absence of hostile cavalry at this period was a marked feature of the battle. Had the German command had at their disposal even two or three well-trained cavalry divisions, a wedge might have been driven between the French and British Armies. Their presence could not have failed to have added greatly to the difficulties of our task" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).

{97}

_He must select a rallying place_ in rear of the main position from which to recapture the front line, as General Lee recovered the "Salient" in the Wilderness of Virginia.

_He must arrange for the reorganisation_ of his victorious forces and for the pursuit and complete overthrow of the enemy.

{98}

PROTECTION AND RECONNAISSANCE

"Surprise consists in the hard fact that the enemy suddenly appears in considerable numbers without his presence having been known to be so near for want of information; and without it being possible to assemble against him for want of protection."--MARSHAL FOCH.

Every commander of a force, however large or small, is responsible for the protection of his command against surprise, and a force can only be regarded as secure from surprise when protection is furnished in every direction from which interference is possible. Detachments are therefore provided by every commander, their duty being to warn him if hostile forces are discovered in the vicinity of such forces, and to gain time, at all risks and at any sacrifice, for the commander of the troops they protect to carry out his plans unimpeded by the enemy. "A mission of protection does not necessarily imply a defensive attitude, it will often be better performed by an offensive" (Marshal Foch). There is the closest connection between Reconnaissance and Protection. It is only by finding out the location, strength and movements of the enemy that a commander can decide how best to protect his troops, and the forces he employs to protect his troops against surprise will very largely prevent the enemy finding out his own strength and dispositions. Detailed and timely information about the enemy and the theatre of operations is a necessary factor in War and the value of the information depends on whether it can reach the authorities in time to be of use.

Facilities for reconnaissance have been enormously increased by the introduction of man-carrying, self-propelled Aircraft. Before their introduction reconnaissance {99} at a distance from the forward troops was limited by the speed and endurance of the cavalryman's horse, and by the skill of the cavalry scout in penetrating the preventive screen of hostile cavalry, and in escaping the net spread out to catch him on the return journey. His radius of operations was comparatively small, that of the aërial observer is practically unlimited, as his machine will carry him over the hostile area, and unless he is driven down by opposing aircraft, or crippled by defensive fire from the ground, he returns in a comparatively short space of time to his base, with his budget of news, and may bring with him a series of photographs.

POSITION WARFARE.--When opposing forces are entrenched at no great distance from one another, photographs taken from the air lead to the discovery of new works from which the intentions of the enemy can be predicted. On the Western Front in the Great War, photographs taken from the air revealed the construction in the German training area of actual sectors of British trenches in facsimile, thus indicating the rehearsal of an attack on a definite part of the line. Hostile aircraft are prevented from carrying out similar observational journeys, the resistance of defending squadrons is overcome, and whenever a favourable target is presented, casualties are caused by bullets and bombs. Observers report all suspicious movements and changes in trench construction, and from photographs taken at daily intervals maps of hostile trenches are constructed and revised. Infantry patrols and raiding parties are sent out by night and by day, and information is gleaned from the uniforms and badges of captured prisoners as to the distribution of hostile troops, while changes in the plan of trenches, in the siting of wire entanglements, or in the emplacements of guns and mortars are duly noted. In addition, troops in observation posts, in or ahead of the front line, in favourable and unsuspected {100} localities, are constantly observing the enemy, and sentries over all posts containing troops are ready at all times of the day and night to alarm the local garrisons. Resistance is afforded by a series of mutually supporting strong points, sufficiently garrisoned by troops who guard against surprise and hold their ground against attack. Entrenchments, with dug-outs and shelters, provide protection from fire, and barbed wire entanglements prevent unbroken rushes by the enemy, and entice him into openings that are swept by rifle and machine-gun fire. Box respirators and other appliances nullify the effects of gas, and camouflage disguises the position of trenches, troops, guns, and dumps, and so screens them from observation and direct bombardment, while it provides unsuspected means of observing the enemy's movements.

MANOEUVRE WARFARE.--In a War of Manoeuvre the steps taken to obtain security against surprise vary with the situation of the troops. Hostile aircraft flying high from the ground are dealt with by counter-attack by armed aeroplanes, but as aërial fighting requires space for manoeuvre hostile machines flying within 3,000 feet of the ground must be dealt with by machine gun, Lewis gun, or concentrated rifle fire, except in cases where it is essential to conceal from the enemy that a certain position or locality is occupied, and where the troops are so well hidden as to escape detection unless they open fire. Movement is easily detected by low-flying aeroplanes, and in fair weather troops can be recognised as hostile or friendly by an observer at 500 feet, while movements of formed bodies on a road are visible at 5,000 feet. Troops remaining stationary in shaded places may easily escape observation, and if small bodies in irregular formation lie face downwards they are difficult to detect, even in the open. When a force is in movement, detachments move with it to afford protection in every direction from which interference {101} is possible; and when a force is at rest, detachments with similar duties secure it from disturbance and keep off attack until it can be met or developed without disadvantage. These phases are dealt with under the headings of "THE ADVANCED GUARD," "FLANK ATTACKS AND FLANK GUARDS," "THE REAR GUARD," and "OUTPOSTS."

{102}

THE ADVANCED GUARD

"Fabius, the saviour of Rome, used to say that a commander could not make a more disgraceful excuse than to plead, 'I never expected it.' It is, in truth, a most shameful reason for any soldier to urge. Imagine everything, expect everything."--SENECA, "_De Ira._"

Every moving body of troops must be protected by detachments, the force detached to precede the advance being known as an Advanced Guard, and when a body of troops so protected halts, the responsibility for protection during the halts remains with the troops which have been protecting the march until they are relieved, the commander of the Advanced Guard exercising his discretion as to halting at once or moving forward to occupy a position which may be of more tactical advantage.

STRENGTH.--The strength of this Guard depends on the proximity of the enemy, but it must always be strong enough to brush aside slight opposition, so that the advance of the force it is covering may not be delayed by small hostile forces, and to resist the enemy, when encountered in strength, for such time as will enable the force it is covering to prepare to meet or deliver an attack. No general rule as to the numerical strength of an Advanced Guard can be given, as the number of troops required depends almost entirely upon the tactical situation and the country through which the protected force is passing. It should, however, whenever possible be composed of a complete unit or formation under its own commander, and it is found in practice that an Advanced Guard will seldom be less than one-eighth or more than a quarter of the whole {103} force. When a large force is advancing in several columns on parallel roads it will be preceded by a "Strategical Advanced Guard," which protects the front and flanks of all the columns. The "Tactical Advanced Guard" provided by each column may then be reduced in strength.