Chapter XX: Appendix: A

FRAGMENTS OF A PAPER IN HUME'S HANDWRITING, DESCRIBING THE DESCENT ON THE COAST OF BRITTANY, IN 1746, AND THE CAUSES OF ITS FAILURE.[441:1]

The forces under Lieutenant General St. Clair consisted of
five battalions, viz. the first battalion of the 1st Royal,
the 5th Highlanders, 3d Brag's, 4th Richbell's, 2d Harrison's,
together with part of Frampton's, and some companies of
Marines, making in all about 4500 men. The fleet consisted of
__________. Though this army and fleet had been at first
fitted out for entering upon action in summer 1746, and making
conquest of Canada, it was found, after several vain efforts
to get out of the Channel, first under Commodore Cotes, then
under Admiral Listock, that so much time had been unavoidably
lost, from contrary winds and contrary orders, as to render it
dangerous for so large a body of ships to proceed thither. The
middle of May was the last day of rendezvous appointed at
Spithead; and in the latter end of August, the fleet had yet
got no farther than St. Helen's, about a league below it. It
is an observation, that in the latter end of autumn, or
beginning of winter, the north-west winds blow so furiously on
the coast of North America, as to render it always difficult,
and often impossible, for ships that set out late to reach any
harbour in those parts. Instances have been found of vessels
that have been obliged to take shelter from these storms, even
in the Leeward Islands. It was therefore become necessary to
abandon all thoughts of proceeding to America that season; and
as the transports were fitted out and fleet equipped at great
expense, an attempt was hastily made to turn them to some
account in Europe, during the small remainder of the summer.
The distress of the allies in Flanders demanded the more
immediate attention of the English nation and ministry, and
required, if possible, some speedy remedy. 'Twas too late to
think of sending the six battalions under General St. Clair,
to reinforce Prince Charles of Lorraine, who commanded the
armies of the allies; and their number was, besides, too
inconsiderable to hope for any great advantages from that
expedient. 'Twas more to be expected, that falling on the
parts of France, supposed to be defenceless and disarmed, they
might make a diversion, and occasion the sending a
considerable detachment from the enemy's army in Flanders. But
as time pressed, and allowed not leisure to concert and
prepare this measure, the Duke of Newcastle, Secretary of
State, hoped to find that General St. Clair had already
planned and projected some enterprise of this nature. He
formed this presumption on a hint which had been started very
casually, and which had been immediately dropped by the
General.

In the spring, when the obstructions and delays thrown in the
way of the American enterprise were partly felt and partly
foreseen, the Secretary, lamenting the great and, he feared,
useless expense to which the nation had been put by that
undertaking, gave occasion to the General to throw out a
thought, which would naturally occur in such a situation. He
said, "Why may you not send the squadron and troops to some
part of the coast of France, and at least frighten and alarm
them as they have done us; and, as all their troops are on the
Flanders and German frontiers, 'tis most probable that such an
alarm may make them recall some of them?" The subject was then
no farther prosecuted; but the King, being informed of this
casual hint of the General's, asked him if he had formed any
plan or project by which the service above-mentioned might be
effectuated. He assured his majesty that he had never so much
as thought of it; but that, if it was his pleasure, he would
confer with Sir John Ligonier, and endeavour to find other
people in London who could let him into some knowledge of the
coast of France. To this the King replied, "No, no; you need
not give yourself any trouble about it." And accordingly the
General never more thought of it, farther than to inform the
Duke of Newcastle of this conference with his majesty.
However, the Duke being willing that the person who was to
execute the undertaking should also be the projector of it, by
which means both greater success might be hoped from it, and
every body else be screened from reflection in case of its
miscarriage, desired, in his letter of the 22d of August, that
both the Admiral and General should give their opinion of such
an invasion; and particularly the General, who, having, he
said, formed some time ago a project of this nature, might be
the better prepared to give his thoughts with regard to it.
They both jointly replied, that their utter ignorance made
them incapable of delivering their sentiments on so delicate a
subject; and the General, in a separate letter, recalled to
the Duke's memory the circumstances of the story, as above
related.

Though they declined proposing a project, they both cheerfully
offered, that if his majesty would honour them with any plan
of operation for a descent, they would do their best to carry
it into execution. They hoped that the Secretary of State,
who, by his office, is led to turn his eyes every where, and
who lives at London, the centre of commerce and intelligence,
could better form and digest such a plan, than they who were
cooped up in their ships, in a remote sea-port town, without
any former acquaintance with the coast of France, and without
any possibility of acquiring new knowledge. They at least
hoped, that so difficult a task would not be required of them
as either to give their sentiments without any materials
afforded them to judge upon, or to collect materials, while
the most inviolable secrecy was strictly enjoined on them. It
is remarkable, that the Duke of Newcastle, among other
advantages proposed by this expedition, mentions the giving
assistance to such Protestants as are already in arms, or may
be disposed to rise on the appearance of the English, as if we
were living in the time of the League, or during the confusion
of Francis the Second's minority.

Full of these reflections, they sailed from St. Helens on the
23d of August, and arrived at Plymouth on the 29th, in
obedience to their orders, which required them to put into
that harbour for farther instructions. They there found
positive orders to sail immediately, with the first fair wind,
to the coast of France, and make an attempt on L'Orient, or
Rochefort, or Rochelle, or sail up the river of Bourdeaux; or,
if they judged any of these enterprises impracticable, to sail
to whatever other place on the western coast they should think
proper. Such unbounded discretionary powers could not but be
agreeable to commanders, had it been accompanied with better,
or indeed with any intelligence. As the wind was then
contrary, they had leisure to reply in their letters of the
29th and 30th. They jointly represented the difficulties, or
rather impossibilities, of any attempt on L'Orient, Rochefort,
and Rochelle, by reason of the real strength of these places,
so far as their imperfect information could reach; or, if that
were erroneous, by reason of their own absolute want of
intelligence, guides, and pilots, which are the soul of all
military operations.

The General, in a separate letter, enforced the same topics,
and added many other reflections of moment. He said, that of
all the places mentioned in his orders, Bourdeaux, if
accessible, appeared to him the properest to be attempted;
both as it is one of the towns of greatest commerce and riches
in France, and as it is the farthest situated from their
Flanders' army, and on these accounts an attack on it would
most probably produce the wished-for alarm and diversion. He
added, that he himself knew the town to be of no strength, and
that the only place there capable of making any defence, is
Chateau Trompette, which serves it as a citadel, and was
intended, as almost all citadels are, more as a curb, than a
defence, on the inhabitants. But though these circumstances
promised some success, he observed that there were many other
difficulties to struggle with, which threw a mighty damp on
these promising expectations. In the first place, he much
questioned if there was in the fleet any one person who had
been ashore on the western coast of France, except himself,
who was once at Bourdeaux; and he, too, was a stranger to all
the country betwixt the town and the sea. He had no single map
of any part of France on board with him; and what intelligence
he may be able to force from the people of the country can be
but little to be depended on, as it must be their interest to
mislead him. And if money prove necessary, either for
obtaining intelligence, carrying on of works, or even
subsisting the officers, he must raise it in the country; for,
except a few chests of Mexican dollars, consigned to other
uses, he carried no money with him. If he advanced any where
into the country, he must be at a very great loss for want of
horses to draw the artillery; as the inhabitants will
undoubtedly carry off as many of them as they could, and he
had neither hussars nor dragoons to force them back again. And
as to the preserving any conquests he might make, (of which
the Duke had dropped some hints,) he observed that every place
which was not impregnable to him, with such small force, must
be untenable by him. On the whole, he engaged for nothing but
obedience; he promised no success; he professed absolute
ignorance with regard to every circumstance of the
undertaking; he even could not fix on any particular
undertaking; and yet he lay under positive orders to sail with
the first fair wind, to approach the unknown coast, march
through the unknown country, and attack the unknown cities of
the most potent nation of the universe.

Meanwhile, Admiral Anson, who had put into Plymouth, and had
been detained there by the same contrary winds, which still
prevailed, had a conversation with the General and Admiral on
the subject of their enterprise. He told them, that he
remembered to have once casually heard from Mr. Hume, member
for Southwark, that he had been at L'Orient, and that, though
it be very strong by sea, it is not so by land. Though Mr.
Hume, the gentleman mentioned, be bred to a mercantile
profession, not to war, and though the intelligence received
from him was only casual, imperfect, and by second-hand, yet
it gave pleasure to the Admiral and General, as it afforded
them a faint glimmering ray in their present obscurity and
ignorance; and they accordingly resolved to follow it. They
wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, September the 3d, that 'twas
to L'Orient they intended to bend their course, as soon as the
wind offered. To remedy the ignorance of the coast and want of
pilots, as far as possible, Commodore Cotes in the Ruby,
together with Captain Stewart in the Hastings, and a sloop and
tender, was immediately despatched by the Admiral to view Port
L'Orient and all the places near it, so far as might regard
the safe approach and anchorage of the ships. The ignorance of
the country, and want of guides, was a desperate evil, for
which the General could provide no remedy. But as the wind
still continued contrary to the fleet and transports, though
single ships of war might work their way against it, the
General had occasion to see farther alterations made by the
ministry in their project of an invasion.

The Duke of Newcastle, who had before informed the General
that, if he could establish himself on any part of the coast
of France, two battalions of the Guards, and General Huske's
regiment, should be despatched after him, now says, (Sept. 3,)
that these three battalions have got immediate orders to
follow him. He farther adds, that if the General finds it
impracticable to make any descent on the coast of Brittany, or
higher up in the Bay of Biscay, he would probably find, on his
return, some intelligence sent him, by the reinforcement, with
regard to the coast of Normandy. Next day the Duke changes his
mind, and sends immediately this intelligence with regard to
the coast of Normandy, and a plan for annoying the French on
that quarter, proposed by Major Macdonald; and to this plan he
seems entirely to give the preference to the other, of making
an attempt on the western coast of France, to which he had
before confined the Admiral and General. They considered the
plan, and conversed with Major Macdonald, who came down to
Plymouth a few days after. They found that this plan had been
given in some years before, and was not in the least
calculated for the present expedition, but required a body of
cavalry as an essential point towards its execution; an
advantage of which the General was entirely destitute. They
found that Major Macdonald had had so few opportunities of
improving himself in the art of war, that it would be
dangerous, without farther information, to follow his plan in
any military operations. They found that he pretended only to
know the strength of the town, and nature of the country, in
that province, but had never acquainted himself with the
sea-coast, or pitched upon any proper place for
disembarkation. They considered that a very considerable step
had been already taken towards the execution of the other
project on the coast of Brittany, viz. the sending Commodore
Cotes to inspect and sound the coast; and that the same step
must now be taken anew, in so late a season, with regard to
the coast of Normandy. They thought that, if their whole
operations were to begin, an attempt on the western coast was
preferable, chiefly because of its remoteness from the
Flanders' army, which must increase and spread the alarm, if
the country were really so defenceless as was believed. They
represented all those reasons to the Secretary; but at the
same time expressed their intentions of remaining at Plymouth
till they should receive his majesty's positive orders with
regard to the enterprise on which they were to engage.

The Duke immediately despatched a messenger, with full powers
to them to go whithersoever they pleased. During this
interval, the General was obliged, to his great regret, to
remain in a manner wholly inactive. Plymouth was so remote a
place, that it was not to be expected he could there get any
proper intelligence. He was bound up by his orders to such
inviolable secrecy, that he could not make any inquiries for
it, or scarce receive it, if offered. The Secretary had sent
Major Macdonald, and one Cooke, captain of a privateer, who,
'twas found, could be of no manner of service in this
undertaking. These, he said, were the only persons he could
find in London that pretended to know any thing of the coast
of France, as if the question had been with regard to the
coast of Japan or of California. The General desired to have
maps of France, chiefly of Gascony and Brittany. He receives
only a map of Gascony, together with one of Normandy. No map
of Brittany; none of France; he is obliged to set out on so
important an enterprise without intelligence, without pilots,
without guides, without any map of the country to which he was
bound, except a common map, on a small scale, of the kingdom
of France, which his Aid-de-camp had been able to pick up in a
shop at Plymouth. He represented all these difficulties to the
ministry; he begged them not to flatter themselves with any
success from a General who had such obstacles to surmount, and
who must leave his conduct to the government of chance more
than prudence. He was answered, that nothing was expected of
him, but to land any where he pleased in France, to produce an
alarm, and to return safe, with the fleet and transports, to
the British dominions. Though he was sensible that more would
be expected by the people, yet he cheerfully despised their
rash judgments, while he acted in obedience to orders, and in
the prosecution of his duty. The fleet sailed from Plymouth on
the 15th of September, and, after a short voyage of three
days, arrived, in the evening of the 18th, off the island of
Groa, where they found Commodore Cotes and Captain Stuart, who
gave them an account of the success which they had met with in
the survey of the coast near L'Orient. The place they had
pitched on for landing, was ten miles from that town, at the
mouth of the river of Quimperlay. They represented it as a
flat open shore, with deep water: on these accounts a good
landing-place for the troops, but a dangerous place for the
ships to ride in, on account of the rocks with which it was
every where surrounded, and the high swell which was thrown
in, from the Bay of Biscay, by the west and south-west winds.

It was then about eight in the evening, a full moon and a
clear sky, with a gentle breeze blowing in shore. The question
was, whether to sail directly to the landing-place, or hold
off till morning. The two officers who had surveyed the coast
were divided in opinion: one recommended the former measure,
the other suggested some scruples, by representing the
dangerous rocks that lay on every side of them, and the
ignorance of all the pilots with regard to their number and
situation. The Admiral was determined, by these reasons, to
agree to this opinion. The question seemed little important,
as it regarded only a short delay; but really was of the
utmost consequence, and was, indeed, the spring whence all the
ill success in this expedition flowed.

The great age of Admiral Listock, as it increased his
experience, should make us cautious of censuring his opinion
in sea affairs, where he was allowed to have such consummate
knowledge. But at the same time, it may beget a suspicion,
that being now in the decline of life, he was thence naturally
inclined rather to the prudent counsels which suit a concerted
enterprise, than to the bold temerity which belongs to such
hasty and blind undertakings. The unhappy consequences of this
over-cautious measure immediately appeared. The Admiral had
laid his account, that by a delay, which procured a greater
safety to the fleet and transports, only four or five hours
would be lost; but the wind changing in the morning, and
blowing fresh off shore, all next day, and part of next night,
was spent before the ships could reach the landing-place. Some
of them were not able to reach it till two days after.

During this time, the fleet lay full in view of the coast,
and preparations were making in Port Louis, L'Orient, and
over the whole country, for the reception of an enemy, who
threatened them with so unexpected an invasion.

The force of France, either for offence or defence, consists
chiefly in three different bodies of men: first, in a numerous
veteran army, which was then entirely employed in Italy and on
their frontiers, except some shattered regiments, which were
dispersed about the country, for the advantage of recruiting,
and of which there were two regiments of dragoons at that time
in Brittany; secondly, in a regular and disciplined militia,
with which all the fortified cities along the sea-coast were
garrisoned, and many of the frontier towns, that seemed not to
be threatened with any immediate attack. Some bodies of this
militia had also been employed in the field with the regular
troops, and had acquired honour, which gave spirits and
courage to the rest: thirdly, in a numerous body of coast
militia, or gardes-du-cote, amounting to near 200,000, ill
armed and ill disciplined, formidable alone by their numbers;
and in Brittany, by the ferocity of the inhabitants, esteemed
of old and at present, the most warlike and least civilized of
all the French peasants. Regular signals were concerted for
the assembling of these forces, by alarm guns, flags, and
fires; and in the morning of the 20th of September, by break
of day, a considerable body of all these different kinds of
troops, but chiefly of the last, amounting to above 3000 men,
were seen upon the sea-shore to oppose the disembarkation of
the British forces. A disposition, therefore, of ships and
boats must be made for the regular landing of the army; and as
the weather was then very blustering, and the wind blew almost
off shore, this could not be effected till afternoon.

There appeared, in view of the fleet, three places which
seemed proper for a disembarkation, and which were separated
from each other either by a rising ground, or by a small arm
of the sea. The French militia had posted themselves in the
two places which lay nearest to L'Orient; and finding that
they were not numerous enough to cover the whole, they left
the third, which lay to the windward, almost wholly
defenceless. The General ordered the boats to rendezvous
opposite to this beach; and he saw the French troops march off
from the next contiguous landing-place, and take post opposite
to him. They placed themselves behind some sandbanks, in such
a manner as to be entirely sheltered from the cannon of those
English ships which covered the landing, while at the same
time they could rush in upon the troops, as soon as their
approach to the shore had obliged the ships to leave off
firing.

The General remarked their plan of defence, and was
determined to disappoint them. He observed, that the next
landing-place to the leeward was now empty; and that, though
the troops which had been posted on the more distant beach had
quitted their station, and were making a circuit round an arm
of the sea, in order to occupy the place deserted by the
others, they had not as yet reached it. He immediately seized
the opportunity. He ordered his boats to row directly forward,
as if he intended to land on the beach opposite to him; but
while the enemy were expecting him to advance, he ordered the
boats to turn, at a signal; and, making all the speed that
both oars and sails could give them, to steer directly to the
place deserted by the enemy. In order to render the
disembarkation more safe, he had previously ordered two
tenders to attack a battery, which had been placed on a mount
towards the right, and which was well situated for annoying
the boats on their approach. The tenders succeeded in chasing
the French from their guns; the boats reached the shore before
any of the French could be opposite to them. The soldiers
landed, to the number of about six hundred men, and formed in
an instant; immediately upon which the whole militia dispersed
and fled up into the country. The English followed them
regularly and in good order; prognosticating success to the
enterprise from such a fortunate beginning.

There was a creek, or arm of the sea, dry at low water, which
lay on the right hand of the landing-place, and through which
ran the nearest road to L'Orient, and the only one fit for the
march of troops, or the draught of cannon and heavy carriages.
As it was then high water, the French runaways were obliged,
by this creek, to make a circuit of some miles; and they
thereby misled the general, who, justly concluding they would
take shelter in that town, and having no other guides to
conduct him, thought that, by following their footsteps, he
would be led the readiest and shortest way to L'Orient. He
detached, therefore, in pursuit of the flying militia, about a
thousand men, under the command of Brigadier O'Farrel; who,
after being harassed by some firing from the hedges, (by which
Lieut.-Col. Erskine, Quarter-Master General, was dangerously
wounded,) arrived that evening at Guidel, a village about a
league distant from the landing-place. The general himself lay
near the sea-shore, to wait for the landing of the rest of the
forces. By break of day he led them up to join the brigadier
at Guidel. He there learned from some peasants, taken
prisoners, and who spoke the French language, (which few of
the common people in Brittany are able to do,) that the road
into which he had been led, by the reasons above specified,
was the longest by four or five miles. He was also informed,
what he had partly seen, that the road was very dangerous and
difficult, running through narrow lanes and defiles, betwixt
high hedges, faced with stone walls, and bordered in many
places with thick woods and brushes, where a very few
disciplined and brave troops might stop a whole army; and
where even a few, without discipline or bravery, might, by
firing suddenly upon the forces, throw them into confusion.

In order to acquire a more thorough knowledge of the country,
of which he and the whole army were utterly ignorant, he here
divided the troops into two equal bodies, and marched them up
to L'Orient, by two different roads, which were pointed out to
him. The one part, which he himself conducted, passed without
much molestation. The other, under Brigadier O'Farrel, was not
so fortunate. Two battalions of that detachment, Richbell's
and Frampton's, partly from their want of experience, and
partly from the terror naturally inspired into soldiers by
finding themselves in a difficult country unknown both to
themselves and leaders, and partly, perhaps, from accident, to
which the courage of men is extremely liable, fell into
confusion, before a handful of French peasants who fired at
them from behind the hedges. Notwithstanding all the
endeavours of the Brigadier, many of them threw down their
arms, and ran away; others fired in confusion, and wounded
each other; and if any regular forces had been present to take
advantage of this disorder, the most fatal consequences might
have ensued. And though they were at last led on, and joined
the general that evening before L'Orient, the panic still
remained in these two battalions afterwards, and communicated
itself to others; kept the whole army in anxiety, even when
they were not in danger, and threw a mighty damp on the
expectations of success, conceived from this undertaking.
L'Orient, lately a small village, now a considerable town, on
the coast of Brittany, lies in the extremity of a fine bay,
the mouth of which is very narrow, and guarded by the strong
citadel of Port Louis. This town has become the centre of the
French East India trade, the seat of the company established
for that commerce, and the magazine whence they distribute the
East India commodities. The great prizes made upon them by the
English, during the course of the war, had given a check to
this growing commerce; yet still the town was esteemed a
valuable acquisition, were it only on account of the wealth it
contained, and the store-houses of the company, a range of
stately buildings, erected at public charge, both for use and
ornament. The town itself is far from being strong. Two sides
of it, which are not protected with water, are defended only
with a plain wall, near thirty feet high, of no great
thickness, and without any fosse or parapet. But the water
which covers the other two sides, rendered it impossible to
be invested, and gave an opportunity for multitudes of people
to throw themselves into it from every corner of that populous
country. And though these, for want of discipline, could not
be trusted in the field against regular forces, yet became
they of great use in a defence behind walls, by throwing up
works, erecting batteries, and digging trenches, to secure
(what was sufficient) for a few days, a weak town against a
small and ill-provided army. The East India Company had
numbers of cannon in their magazines, and had there erected a
school of engineers, for the service of their ships and
settlements; the vessels in the harbour supplied them with
more cannon, and with seamen accustomed to their management
and use; and whatever was wanting, either in artillery or
warlike stores, could easily be brought by water from Port
Louis, with which the town of L'Orient kept always an open
communication.

But as these advantages, though great, require both a
sufficient presence of mind, and some time, to be employed
against an enemy, 'tis not improbable, that if the admiral had
been supplied with proper pilots, and the general with proper
guides, which could have led the English immediately upon the
coast, and to the town, the very terror of so unexpected an
invasion would have rendered the inhabitants incapable of
resistance, and made them surrender at discretion. The want of
these advantages had already lost two days; and more time must
yet be consumed, before they could so much as make the
appearance of an attack. Cannon was wanting, and the road by
which the army had marched, was absolutely unfit for the
conveyance of them. The general, therefore, having first
despatched an officer and a party to reconnoitre the country,
and find a nearer and better road, September 22d, went himself
next day to the sea-shore, for the same purpose, and also in
order to concert with the admiral the proper method of
bringing up cannon; as almost all the horses in the country,
which are extremely weak and of a diminutive size, had been
driven away by the peasants. Accordingly, a road was found,
much nearer, though still ten miles of length; and much
better, though easily rendered impassable by rainy weather, as
was afterwards experienced.

A council of war was held on board the Princessa, consisting
of the admiral and general, Brigadier O'Farrel and Commodore
Cotes. The engineers, Director-General Armstrong, and Captain
Watson, who had surveyed the town of L'Orient, being called
in, were asked their opinion with regard to the practicability
of an attempt on it, together with the time, and artillery,
and ammunition, requisite for that purpose. Their answer was,
that with two twelve pounders, and a ten inch mortar, planted
on the spot which they had pitched on for erecting a battery,
they engaged either to make a practicable breach in the walls,
or with cartridges, bombs, and red-hot balls, destroy the
town, by laying it in ashes in twenty-four hours. Captain
Chalmers, the captain of the artillery, who had not then seen
the town, was of the same opinion, from their description of
it, provided the battery was within the proper distance. Had
the king's orders been less positive for making an attempt on
some part of the coast of France, yet such flattering views
offered by men who promised what lay within the sphere of
their own profession, must have engaged the attention of the
admiral and general, and induced them to venture on a much
more hazardous and difficult undertaking. 'Twas accordingly
agreed that four twelve pounders, and a ten inch mortar,
together with three field-pieces, should be drawn up to the
camp by sailors, in order to make, with still greater
assurance, the attempt, whose success seemed so certain to the
engineers. These pieces of artillery, with the stores
demanded, notwithstanding all difficulties, were drawn to the
camp in two days, except two twelve pounders, which arrived
not till the day afterwards. A third part of the sailors of
the whole fleet, together with all the marines, were employed
in this drudgery; the admiral gave all assistance in his power
to the general; and the public, in one instance, saw that it
was not impossible for land and sea officers to live in
harmony together, and concur in promoting the success of an
enterprise.

The general, on his arrival in the camp, found the officer
returned whom he had sent to summon the town of L'Orient. By
his information, it appeared that the inhabitants were so much
alarmed by the suddenness of this incursion, and the terror of
a force, which their fears magnified, as to think of
surrendering, though upon conditions, which would have
rendered the conquest of no avail to their enemies. The
inhabitants insisted upon an absolute security to their houses
and goods; the East India Company to their magazines and
store-houses; and the garrison, consisting of about seven
hundred regular militia and troops, besides a great number of
irregulars, demanded a liberty of marching out with all the
honours of war. A weak town that opened its gates on such
conditions was not worth the entering; since it must
immediately be abandoned, leaving only to its conquerors the
shame of their own folly, and perhaps the reproach of
treachery. The general, therefore, partly trusting to the
promise of the engineers, and partly desirous of improving the
advantages gained by the present danger, when the deputies
arrived next day, September 23d, from the governor, from the
town, and from the East India Company, refused to receive any
articles but those from the governor, who commanded in the
name of his most Christian majesty. He even refused liberty to
the garrison to march out; well knowing that, as the town was
not invested, they could take that liberty whenever they
pleased.

Meanwhile, every accident concurred to render the enterprise
of the English abortive. Some deserters got into the town, who
informed the garrison of the true force of the English, which,
conjecturing from the greatness and number of the ships, they
had much magnified. Even this small body diminished daily,
from the fatigue of excessive duty, and from the great rains
that began to fall. Scarce three thousand were left to do
duty, which still augmented the fatigue to the few that
remained; especially when joined to the frequent alarms, that
the unaccountable panic they were struck with made but too
frequent. Rains had so spoilt the roads as to render it
impracticable to bring up any heavier cannon, or more of the
same calibre, so long a way, by the mere force of seamen. But
what, above all things, made the enterprise appear desperate,
was the discovery of the ignorance of the engineers, chiefly
of the director-general, who in the whole course of his
proceedings appeared neither to have skill in contrivance, nor
order and diligence in execution. His own want of capacity and
experience, made his projects of no use; his blind obstinacy
rendered him incapable of making use of the capacity of
others. Though the general offered to place and support the
battery wherever the engineer thought proper, he chose to set
it above six hundred yards from the wall, where such small
cannon could do no manner of execution. He planted it at so
oblique an angle to the wall that the ball thrown from the
largest cannon must have recoiled, without making any
impression. He trusted much to the red-hot balls, with which
he promised to lay the town in ashes in twenty-four hours;
yet, by his negligence, or that of others, the furnace with
which these balls were to be heated, was forgot. After the
furnace was brought, he found that the bellows, and other
implements necessary for the execution of that work, were also
left on board the store-ships. With great difficulty, and
infinite pains, ammunition and artillery stores were drawn up
from the sea-shore in tumbrels. He was totally ignorant, till
some days after, that he had along with him ammunition wagons,
which would have much facilitated this labour. His orders to
the officers of the train were so confused, or so ill obeyed,
that no ammunition came regularly up to the camp, to serve the
few cannon and the mortars that played upon the town. Not only
fascines, piquets, and every thing necessary for the battery,
were supplied him beyond his demand; but even workmen,
notwithstanding the great fatigue and small numbers of the
army. These workmen found no addition to their fatigue in
obeying his orders. He left them often unemployed, for want of
knowing in what business he should occupy them.

Meanwhile the French garrison, being so weakly attacked, had
leisure to prepare for a defence, and make proper use of their
great number of workmen, if not of soldiers, and the nearness
and plenty of their military stores. By throwing up earth in
the inside of the wall, they had planted a great many cannon,
some of a large calibre, and opened six batteries against one
that played upon them from the English. The distance alone of
the besiegers' battery, made these cannon of the enemy do less
execution; but that same distance rendered the attack
absolutely ineffectual. Were the battery brought nearer, to a
hundred paces for instance, 'twould be requisite to make it
communicate with the camp by trenches and a covered way, to
dig which was the work of some days for so small an army.
During this time, the besieged, foreseeing the place to which
the attack must be directed, could easily fortify it by
retrenchments in the inside of the wall; and planting ten
cannon to one, could silence the besiegers' feeble battery in
a few hours. They would not even have had leisure to make a
breach in the thin wall, which first discovered itself; and
that breach, if made, could not possibly serve to any purpose.
Above fifteen thousand men, completely armed by the East India
Company, and brave while protected by cannon and ramparts,
still stood in opposition to three thousand, discouraged with
fatigue, with sickness, and with despair of ever succeeding in
so unequal a contest.

* * * * *

A certain foreign writer, more anxious to tell his stories in
an entertaining manner than to assure himself of their
reality, has endeavoured to put this expedition in a
ridiculous light; but as there is not one circumstance of his
narration, which has truth in it, or even the least appearance
of truth, it would be needless to lose time in refuting it.
With regard to the prejudices of the public, a few questions
may suffice.

Was the attempt altogether impracticable from the beginning?
The general neither proposed it, nor planned it, nor approved
it, nor answered for its success. Did the disappointment
proceed from want of expedition? He had no pilots, guides, nor
intelligence, afforded him; and could not possibly provide
himself in any of these advantages, so necessary to all
military operations. Were the engineers blamable? This has
always been considered as a branch of military knowledge,
distinct from that of a commander, and which is altogether
intrusted to those to whose profession it peculiarly belongs.
By his vigour in combating the vain terrors spread amongst the
troops, and by his prudence in timely desisting from a
fruitless enterprise, the misfortune was confined merely to a
disappointment, without any loss or any dishonour to the
British arms. Commanders, from the situation of affairs, have
had opportunities of acquiring more honour; yet there is no
one whose conduct, in every circumstance, could be more free
from reproach. On the first of October, the fleet sailed out
of Quimperlay Road, from one of the most dangerous situations
that so large a fleet had ever lain in, at so late a season,
and in so stormy a sea as the Bay of Biscay. The reflection on
this danger had been no inconsiderable cause of hastening the
re-embarkation of the troops. And the more so, that the
secretary had given express orders to the admiral not to bring
the fleet into any hazard. The prudence of the hasty departure
appeared the more visibly the very day the fleet sailed, when
a violent storm arising from the south west, it was concluded,
that if the ships had been lying at anchor on the coast, many
of them must have necessarily been driven ashore, and wrecked
on the rocks that surrounded them. The fleet was dispersed,
and six transports being separated from the rest, went
immediately for England, carrying with them about eight
hundred of the forces. The rest put into Quiberon Bay, and the
general landed his small body on the peninsula of that name.
By erecting a battery of some guns on the narrow neck of land,
which joins the peninsula to the continent, he rendered his
situation almost impregnable, while he saw the fleet riding
secure in his neighbourhood, in one of the finest bays in the
world.

The industry and spirit of the general supported both himself
and the army against all these disadvantages, while there was
the smallest prospect of success. But his prudence determined
him to abandon it, when it appeared altogether desperate.

The engineers, seeing no manner of effect from their shells
and red-hot balls, and sensible that 'twas impossible either
to make a breach from a battery, erected at so great a
distance, or to place the battery nearer, under such a
superiority of French cannon, at last unanimously brought a
report to the general, that they had no longer any hope of
success; and that even all the ammunition, which, with
infinite labour, had been brought, was expended: no prospect
remained of being farther supplied, on account of the broken
roads, which lay between them and the fleet. The council of
war held in consequence of this report, balanced the reasons
for continuing or abandoning the enterprise, if men can be
said to balance where they find nothing on the one side but an
extreme desire to serve their king and country, and on the
other every maxim of war and prudence. They unanimously agreed
to abandon the attempt, and return on board the transports.
The whole troops were accordingly re-embarked by the 28th of
September, with the loss of near twenty men killed and
wounded, on the whole enterprise.

FOOTNOTES:

[441:1] See ante, p. 218.