Chapter XI: At the India Office (2)

My dear Randolph,--I am sorry you take such a view of a
correspondence that is perfectly regular. The Queen has always
written private letters to the Viceroy, and has always received
private answers from him, both received and sent without any
knowledge of any of her Ministers. She would have telegraphed in
the same way, only the Viceroy did not happen to have her cypher. I
did nothing else but cypher and decypher the message for her. I
could no more inform you of her private telegram, without her
leave, than I could inform you of a private letter, if I had been
asked to copy it for her, without her leave.

I regret very much that you should think I have not shown you
confidence. I have done my best to give effect to your wishes as
far as I possibly could. In this case I think you are really under
a misapprehension. What has passed does not pledge your liberty of
action, or decide the question in issue. The question is exactly
where it would have been if the Queen, instead of telegraphing, had
written to Lord Dufferin. It would still have remained to be
decided by her responsible Ministers. The only effect of the
telegraphing has been to ante-date the issue by five or six weeks.

I trust I have removed from your mind all misapprehension of the
character and effects of the Queen’s correspondence with Lord
Dufferin.

Believe me Yours very truly, SALISBURY.

_Lord Randolph Churchill to Mr. Moore._

Dear Mr. Moore,--Will you copy the enclosed letter to Lord S., and
send it to Hatfield? A special messenger is not necessary.

Yours very truly, RANDOLPH S. C.

_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury._

2 Connaught Place, W.: August 15.

Dear Lord Salisbury,--You write to me, as usual, very kindly, for
which I am indeed grateful; but the impressions with which I
received your letter of yesterday remain as strong as ever. God
forbid that I should allow myself for one moment to throw a shadow
of a doubt upon the right of the Sovereign to communicate with the
utmost freedom on any conceivable matter with any one of her
subjects; but I submit that a very different question arises when a
communication from the Queen to so high an official as the Viceroy
of India on a matter of high State importance passes through the
Prime Minister. Such a communication, so sent, acquires a character
of responsibility which it would not otherwise possess.

Moreover, the matter becomes complicated indeed when it happens to
be the fact that it is in the knowledge of the Prime Minister that
the Royal communication which he forwards contains a suggestion--or
rather, I may say, makes a proposal--to which the responsible head
of the Department chiefly concerned entertains the strongest
possible objections.

The communications from the Queen direct to the Viceroy may be
frequent--I can see no reason why they should not be; but it would
appear that telegraphic messages on matters of a very confidential
and important nature have not been usual hitherto; otherwise surely
the Viceroy would have been provided with a copy of the Queen’s
cypher.

Generally, I would further submit to you the following: My
position in relation to Lord Dufferin is in many ways anomalous. He
is old enough to be my father, has been all his life in public
affairs, has acquired an immense reputation. Clearly, therefore, it
is curious that I should be placed in a position of superiority
over him--I who have had no experience of official life, a very
short experience of public life, and have not acquired any
reputation worth speaking of.

Under the circumstances the relations between the Secretary of
State and the Viceroy can be attended with no advantage to the
public service, on the contrary must be attended with the utmost
disadvantage, unless it is, more than usually even, obvious to the
latter that the former possesses the full, complete and perfect
confidence of the Prime Minister.

Lord Dufferin is no ordinary man. He has a greater faculty for
putting two and two together than most men. I have not the smallest
doubts as to the nature of the impression left upon his mind by the
Royal communication on the subject of the Duke of Connaught as it
has reached him. In about a week he will get a letter from me in
which I gave at great length, and with all the arguments that had
occurred to me, my strong objections to the appointment in
question. He will find that he has committed himself somewhat
lightly, and after the manner of a courtier--influenced, no doubt,
by the fact that the inquiry came through you--to an opinion
diametrically at variance with that of the Secretary of State, and
he will know that in so doing the Prime Minister is on his side. If
you follow my argument and concur in the premises on which it is
based, I think you will easily see that satisfactory and
advantageous relations between me and Lord Dufferin, which under
the best circumstances were difficult, will now have become
impossible.

The superiority of the Secretary of State over the Viceroy, as
intended by the Constitution of the Indian Government, will exist
only in name as far as I am concerned, and this must have a most
unfortunate effect on all questions of Indian administration. I
shall never know, moreover, what communications may not be passing
between the Queen, the Prime Minister and the Viceroy on matters of
great and small importance; and this element of uncertainty and
ignorance of events will prevent me from being of the smallest
utility.

The appointment of the Duke of Connaught to a high and very
responsible military command in India is, as it appears to me, a
question of the utmost importance. It is not my business to point
out how largely is raised by it the constitutional position of
Royal Princes in these days; though I infer that you are aware of
the existence of objections of very considerable weight, from the
stipulation which you make with the Queen that no public
declaration of the appointment should be made till after the
elections. I am concerned only with the matter as it affects India
generally, and the Indian Army in particular. Although the
Secretary of State is not solely responsible for such an
appointment, he practically is the person most identified with it
in the public mind: and if it was not for my inexperience of
official life, I should have thought that it was absolutely
impossible that the freedom of action of the Secretary of State on
so important a matter could be so absolutely demolished as it has
been in this case.

I may add, to show the extreme inconvenience of allowing matters of
this kind to be prematurely settled without the knowledge of the
Department chiefly concerned, that the Viceroy’s proposal that the
Duke of Connaught should have the command of a Corps d’Armée with
the rank of Lieutenant-General is absolutely impracticable at the
present time. Even assuming that the new proposals of the
Government of India for the amalgamation of the Bombay and Madras
Commands were approved of by the Secretary of State in Council, and
this is very uncertain, they would require, before they could be
entered upon, an Act of Parliament. A Bill introduced into the
House of Commons for this purpose would lead to much debate; it
would necessarily raise very large questions of Indian government,
military and political; might easily fail to pass into law, and at
the best would hardly receive the Royal Assent till the early
autumn of next year. It cannot be supposed that all this while the
Bombay Army could be left without a responsible chief.

Under all these circumstances I remain of the opinion which I
expressed to you yesterday. From the first I always had great
doubts whether my being in the Government would be any advantage to
the Government or to the party. All doubts on the point are now
removed from my mind. A first-class question of Indian
administration has been taken out of my hands, and at any moment
this action may recur, and it is clear to the Viceroy that I do not
occupy towards himself the position which the Secretary of State
ought and is supposed to occupy.

I therefore with much respect adhere to the views which I put
before you yesterday.

Believe me to be Yours very sincerely, RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

P.S.--I enclose for your consideration an extract from my letter to
Lord Dufferin of July 31.

His advice, which I asked for, will not be worth much now.

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Randolph Churchill._

_Private._

Hatfield House, Hatfield, Herts: August 15, 1885.

My dear Randolph,--I had no intention of taking any decision out of
your hands, and I think in attributing it to me you do not put
fairly the position in which I was placed. The Queen’s desire for
privacy was very natural. The question she was asking about her son
might have had an unfavourable answer: and then she would naturally
wish that as few should know it as possible. I could not,
therefore, do otherwise than I did--send the message, and urge her
to communicate it to you as soon as I knew it could be done
satisfactorily. It would not have been honourable to communicate it
before. Perhaps I might, if I had thought of it, have sent the
cypher to Ponsonby--but that would hardly have been civil; and it
did not occur to me that you would take this objection. As a matter
of fact I did not communicate with the Viceroy otherwise than by
transmitting that which was sent to me. But if I had done so I
should not have done anything unusual. Lord Beaconsfield used to do
it occasionally: and Lord Dufferin wrote to me and asked me to
correspond with him. The Viceroy is nominated by the Prime
Minister, not by the Secretary of State. I only say this because I
am concerned to show that I have not behaved unfairly to you, or
taken anything out of your hand. But I do not hold to this power of
corresponding either by letter or wire with the Viceroy: and if you
really feel that ‘you will never know what communications are
passing between the Queen, the Prime Minister, and the Viceroy,’ I
am quite ready to give up for myself the right of communicating
with him.

Of course, you must take what course you think right. I should be
sorry if, out of mere suspicion of me, you took a step which will
tend to break up the party at a critical time: and still more that
you should do it on a matter which can hardly fail to make the
Queen’s name and actions matter of public controversy. But, at all
events, before you take any definite step I trust you will talk to
me about it. I shall be going through town on Tuesday to Osborne.
If you are still there, would you come to me at two o’clock?

Yours very truly, SALISBURY.

_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury._

2 Connaught Place, W.: August 16.

Dear Lord Salisbury,--I feel I cannot persist easily in urging my
view upon you after your letter received this morning, though it
does appear to me that you have not allowed yourself to appreciate
with perfect justice the consideration which I tried to convey to
you. It can be no satisfaction to me to be the means of depriving
Lord Dufferin of the advantage, instruction and pleasure which
correspondence direct with you cannot fail to afford him, and I do
not quite understand how you can think me capable of such a
purpose.

Further, I am much distressed that you should suppose that the step
which I was anxious to take (and which I still firmly believe would
be for the advantage of all concerned) could be animated by so
unworthy a motive as ‘suspicion of you.’

My argument was that, viewing all the surrounding circumstances
together, the peculiar occurrence about which I wrote had
seriously, if not irreparably, impaired my power of being useful to
your Government.

Perhaps, before finally putting aside what I have pressed upon you,
you will kindly give Mr. Moore an interview. He understands and can
explain the position as I regard it much better than I can make it
clear by letter.

I shall be happy to wait upon you on Tuesday in accordance with
your desire, if I am allowed to leave the house, to which for the
last two days I have been kept a prisoner.

Yours very sincerely, RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

_Note by Mr. Moore._

I went to Hatfield on Sunday August 16, and saw Lord Salisbury. The
result was that he spontaneously proposed to send the subjoined
telegram to the Viceroy, which he thought would remove any
misapprehension on the part of Lord Dufferin. I took the draft to
Lord Randolph, who quite concurred. The matter was thus
settled.--A. W. M.

_Lord Salisbury to Mr. Moore._

_Private._

Hatfield House, Hatfield, Herts: Sunday, August 16, 1885.

Dear Mr. Moore,--I am not sure that the last phrase in the draft
telegram I gave you is sufficiently accurate. It should run:

‘My own view--_though inclining towards the proposal_--is not very
decided on the subject.’

That is very much what Lord R. C. said in his letter.

Yours very truly, SALISBURY.

DRAFT TELEGRAM.

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Dufferin._

Most secret. Your telegraphic correspondence with the Queen. It may
be as well to put upon record that the telegram I sent you was from
the Queen and that I merely transmitted it. The Cabinet have not
considered the question; there is much difference of opinion on the
subject, and my own view, though inclining to the proposal, is not
very decided.

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Randolph Churchill._

_Private._

Hatfield House, Hatfield, Herts: August 16, 1885.

My dear Randolph,--I was very glad to receive your letter, for it
would have been very painful if we had ‘come in two’ over this
matter. I saw Mr. Moore, whose power of exposition I knew of old. I
gave him a draft telegram which, if you approve, I will send, and
which will prevent any possible misapprehension in Dufferin’s mind.
I do not the least fear any such misapprehension--for he is an old
public servant, and knows the Queen’s ways well. You need not have
the least anxiety about your authority with Dufferin. I shall be
very glad if your health is sufficiently restored to enable you to
come about two on Tuesday to my house. I can explain any point you
wish explained, and I can tell you what Staal has said.

Ever yours very truly, SALISBURY.

Opinions vary on the merits of this dispute. Some of those who have held great office have informed me that the Secretary of State for India had no choice but to tender his resignation after such an incident: and it is certainly curious that so high an authority upon Ministerial propriety as Lord Salisbury should have allowed the difficulty to arise. On the other hand, it may be urged that personal slights, however provoking, ought never to be allowed to compromise a great political situation. Probably Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, in his dry way, summed the question up correctly:--

_Sir Michael Hicks-Beach to Lord Randolph Churchill._

Many thanks for sending me the correspondence, which I return. I am
the more glad of its conclusion, because I think there is reason on
both sides. The Queen put Salisbury in an almost impossible
position by asking him to forward the telegram. He could not tell
you of it and it would have been very difficult, perhaps
impossible, for him to interfere with her _private_ correspondence
by suggesting that she should reconsider it. But, on the other
hand, I agree with you that the very fact of _his_ forwarding it
must have suggested to Dufferin that it was something more than the
Queen’s private opinion.

Salisbury has written to tell me what has passed and I have
therefore ventured to suggest to him that Ponsonby should have the
cypher, so that what has occurred should not happen again. So far
as I know, the Queen exercises her right of private correspondence
with great care, to avoid anything that would affect the decisions
of Ministers; and this exception to the rule was obviously due to
the personal nature of the question, which Dufferin (had the
telegram been sent by Ponsonby) would have quite appreciated.

But please forgive me for saying that I think you looked at this
matter rather too seriously last Friday. I think I should have been
more inclined to laugh at the story of the telegram than to treat
it as a proof of want of confidence on the part of the Queen and
Prime Minister. If you had not been ill you would never have said
of yourself in your letter to me that ‘I have no longer any energy
or ideas, and am no more good except to make disturbance.’ And I
suspect the same reason has influenced your view of this telegram
affair.

The sequel, so far as concerned the Bombay command, was simple. Lord Dufferin perceived from Lord Salisbury’s second telegram that grave differences had arisen in the Cabinet and that the matter would not be settled with easy and deferential good-humour. Upon receiving Lord Randolph’s despatch on the subject, the Viceroy, while seeming to re-iterate his opinion, ranged himself with the Secretary of State in the following dexterous sentence: ‘The fact of our having proposed the abolition of the Presidential Commanderships-in-Chief has got rid of what otherwise would have been _an insuperable objection_[42]: namely, the political responsibilities of the Bombay Commander-in-Chief as a member of Council’ (August 21). As this proposal involved the carrying of a Bill through the House of Commons, the ‘insuperable objection’ must have held good until the autumn of 1886--even had the Government survived. The Cabinet, to whom the matter was referred, unanimously decided (October 9) ‘that the political position of the Commander-in-Chief of a presidency army could not be filled by a son of the Queen’;[43] and the Bombay command remained vacant during the remaining tenure of the Government. It should, however, be added, lest anything in the foregoing correspondence should seem to reflect upon the Duke of Connaught, that under Lord Salisbury’s second Administration, the ‘insuperable objection’ being removed by the abolition of Presidential Commanders-in-Chief with their customary political functions, he was appointed to the Bombay command and discharged its military duties with conspicuous advantage to the public.

But the consequences were more lasting outside the actual subject of dispute. Although the correspondence between Lord Randolph and the Prime Minister ripples on as pleasantly as ever, although in the next few months their comradeship became increasingly cordial, it cannot be supposed that such a conflict could pass away without leaving scars. Lord Salisbury could not forget, Lord Randolph Churchill could not but remember, what the result of a resignation had been.

Last in chronology, first in importance, among Lord Randolph Churchill’s enterprises at the India Office came the conquest and annexation of Burma. When Lord Randolph Churchill had travelled in India in the winter of 1884, he had consulted a native fortune-teller and thought it worth while to keep a note of what he said. The astrologer, after saying, perhaps ambiguously, ‘that he had never seen so good a star since Lord Mayo’s (for during his Viceroyalty Lord Mayo was assassinated in the Andaman Islands), repeatedly asserted that his visitor would ‘return to India shortly in connection with a warlike expedition,’ and that he was ‘about to go on a warlike expedition.’ The prediction may perhaps in a sense have come more nearly true than many others of its class. When the Conservatives came into power, the British administration in Burma was confined to the maritime province at the mouth of the Irrawadi and the strip of sea-coast bordering on the Bay of Bengal. The inland country up to the confines of China still remained an independent State under its native ruler, the King of Ava. The relations of the British Government with that State had long been unsatisfactory. By the Treaty of Yandaboo, which terminated the first Burmese War in 1826, the right of a British representative to reside at Mandalay had been secured, and until 1876 this agent of the Imperial Government had from time to time--sitting on the ground and barefooted, according to the inflexible ceremonial of the Burmese Court--endeavoured, with small success, to safeguard the ever-growing commercial interests of British and British-Indian subjects.

In 1878 the old King of Burma died, leaving behind him thirty sons with families on the same generous scale. A palace intrigue secured the throne to Prince Theebaw and the new reign was inaugurated by an indiscriminate massacre of the late King’s other sons, with their mothers, wives and children. Eight cart-loads of butchered princes of the blood were cast, according to custom, into the river. The less honourable sepulchre of a capacious pit within the gaol was accorded to their dependents. Two of the thirty sons had had the prudence to take refuge with the British Resident, who not only stoutly refused to surrender them but addressed a strong remonstrance to the Burmese Government. The Burmese Minister for Foreign Affairs replied tartly that the procedure followed was in accordance with precedent and that under the existing treaties of ‘grand friendship’ the two great Powers were bound to respect each other’s customs. With this answer the Government of India were forced to be content, though Ministers at home seem to have had some difficulty in persuading Queen Victoria to sign the necessary message of cousinly congratulation to the new monarch.

The unpleasant feelings which had been aroused were not readily allayed. Since 1876 the British representative had been instructed not to sit upon the ground barefooted when enjoying the honour of a royal audience but to sit upon a chair, clothed in the ordinary manner. The etiquette of the Burmese Court could not, however, be relaxed. The King refused to countenance the innovation and all direct access to the Sovereign ceased. Forced now to deal only with the Minister of State, the British representative found his personal influence vanishing and his personal safety impaired. For nearly a year the British Residency remained guarded by a scanty escort, wholly indefensible in itself, within a mile of the palace where ‘the ignorant, arrogant, drunken boy-king, surrounded by a set of parvenu sycophants, the men of massacre and bloodshed, ignorant and savage enough to urge him on to any further atrocities,’[44] disposed of a body of two thousand soldiers. It was therefore decided in 1879 to recall the whole Residency and the Government of India, whose patience was inexhaustible, were left without a representative at the Burmese capital.

For the next five years disorder and misgovernment gripped the land of Upper Burma. In 1883 a hideous massacre was perpetrated upon three hundred prisoners in the gaol. Outrages upon British subjects and upon British vessels on the Irrawadi were frequent. The protests of the Viceroy were treated with disdain. Innumerable vexations arose. Trade was strangled. The life and property of a large European-Indian community were insecure. So threatening was the Burmese attitude that a considerable addition, involving much expense, had to be made in the garrison of the maritime province, and this necessary precaution aggravated the prevailing uncertainty. To complete the tale of grievances, Burmese Missions were found in March 1885 to be negotiating treaties of commerce in various foreign capitals. Such was the situation when Lord Randolph Churchill became Secretary of State.

Events were now to force a crisis. The Burmese Mission had already negotiated in Paris a Franco-Burmese Convention. The French Consul at Mandalay, an energetic man, had acquired great authority. French influence was rapidly becoming predominant and ousting British interests, both diplomatic and commercial. Banks, railways, mining and timber concessions were falling almost daily into their hands. The long procession of facts which advanced upon the British Government in July 1885, left no room to doubt the imminence of a dominant foreign influence in Upper Burma, involving the most serious and far-reaching consequences to the British province of Lower Burma and to the Indian Empire. The whole question at once became urgent.

While these considerations were causing Her Majesty’s Government the utmost anxiety, a lucky incident occurred. King Theebaw, partly from want of money, partly in a spirit of sheer bravado, imposed a fine of 29 lacs of rupees upon an important British company trading in his dominions, on a pretext that certain Customs duties had not been paid, and with the intention of ruining the company and transferring their concession to a French firm. With this final and definite provocation Lord Randolph Churchill considered the case for action complete both as regards Parliament and the country. He threw himself into the enterprise with characteristic vigour. The official papers show on almost every page the driving power which he exerted. As early as July 25 he drew Lord Salisbury’s attention to the rumours of a new Franco-Burmese Convention. Lord Salisbury’s reply was terse: ‘The telegram, if not a _canard_, is painfully important. The King of Burma must not be allowed to conclude any such convention.’ Unofficial remonstrances having produced no effect, Lord Randolph addressed the Foreign Office formally on August 28, urging that a communication should be made to the French Government stating that any further prosecution of the commercial projects in contemplation ‘will necessitate such prompt and decided measures as may most effectually satisfy the paramount rights of India in the Indo-Chinese Peninsula.’ The French Government recognised frankly that the British interest in Burma was much more intimate and substantial than their own. Their Ministers temporised politely and deprecated, while they did not arrest, the activities of the Consul.

Meanwhile King Theebaw, in his great unwisdom, rejected almost insolently the remonstrances of the Government of India and their proposal that the case should be referred to arbitration. On October 16, therefore, Lord Dufferin transmitted to the India Office the draft of an ultimatum insisting that a special envoy of the British Government should be received at Mandalay to settle outstanding disputes and that a British Resident, suitably guarded, should be permanently admitted, without being forced to submit to any humiliating ceremony, to the Court of Ava. It was further intimated to King Theebaw that he would be required in future to accept the same position in regard to his foreign relations as the Amir of Kabul and to regulate them in accordance with British advice. Lord Randolph Churchill, in approving the despatch of the ultimatum, telegraphed as follows:--

The terms of your ultimatum are approved. But I am strongly of
opinion that its despatch should be concurrent with movement of
troops and ships to Rangoon. If ultimatum is rejected, the advance
on Mandalay ought to be immediate. On the other hand, armed
demonstration might bring Burmese to their senses. Also, on account
of security of many British subjects and Europeans in Upper Burma,
it is of vital importance that Burmese should feel that any injury
to them or their property would be followed by rapid punishment.
Under all the circumstances of the case, and in view of public
opinion here, I do not think that considerations of expense should
deter you from these precautions. Lord Salisbury concurs. I would
suggest that you should demand an answer within a specified time.

Overwhelming force was employed. An expedition, consisting of a naval brigade of 433 seamen and marines, with 49 guns and machine-guns, and 3,029 British and 6,005 native soldiers, with 28 guns, was ordered to assemble, together with a flotilla, at Thyetmyo by November 14, under command of General Prendergast, with Colonel White (afterwards Sir George White) and Colonel Norman as Brigadiers. These troops were collected swiftly and unostentatiously. No sufficient reply having been received by the appointed date--November 10--General Prendergast was ordered to advance. The strength of the force employed, prevented any effectual opposition in Burma. Its rapid movement allowed no time for serious complications to develop either with France or China. The Burmese army was routed at Minhla on November 17, at a cost of one officer and three men killed and five officers and twenty-four men wounded. On the 27th Mandalay was occupied and King Theebaw was a prisoner. Injuries and embarrassments tolerated for fifty years were swept away in a fortnight. General Prendergast’s advance was pressed forward to Bhamo, on the Chinese frontier, which was soon occupied without any serious fighting.

Although a sporadic resistance--euphemistically termed ‘dacoity’--disturbed the less accessible regions for several years, Burma was now in British hands. What was to be done with it? Lord Randolph Churchill was for annexation simple and direct. The Council of the Governor-General disapproved of this course, which they feared would excite the hostility of China. Many important authorities preferred the establishment of a native prince under British advice. Lord Salisbury thought the great cost of British administration would overweight the new territory. In the end, however, the Secretary of State for India prevailed. The Chinese Government was reassured by the abandonment of Lord Randolph Churchill’s projected mission to establish commercial relations between India and Thibet, to which they had been persuaded to give a rather reluctant consent. They were soothed and even gratified by the establishment of a Llama in Burma--‘a spiritual king sending decennial presents,’ as Lord Salisbury with relish describes him, ‘though,’ he adds, ‘the Chinese Empire is no more Buddhist than Chartist.’ The annexation was resolved. Lord Randolph arranged that the proclamation should be made on January 1, 1886, as ‘a New Year’s present to the Queen.’ On the last day in December he was staying with FitzGibbon for his Christmas party; and as the clock struck midnight he lifted his glass and announced, with due solemnity, ‘Howth annexes Burma to the British Empire.’ The next morning the Viceregal proclamation was published. It is one of the shortest documents of the kind on historical record:--

_By command of the Queen-Empress, it is hereby notified that the
territories formerly governed by King Theebaw will no longer be
under his rule, but have become part of Her Majesty’s dominions,
and will during Her Majesty’s pleasure be administered by such
officers as the Viceroy and Governor-General of India may from time
to time appoint._

APPENDICES

I

_THREE ELECTION ADDRESSES_

1874.

_To the Electors of Woodstock._

I gladly avail myself of the opportunity afforded me by the retirement of your late member, Mr. Barnett, to offer myself as your representative in the coming Parliament.

The politics I profess are strictly in accordance with those of the great leaders of the Conservative party which the Borough of Woodstock has now so long supported.

Many questions of great political importance which formerly divided the Conservative from the Liberal party have passed for the present out of the field of conflict; their settlement, whether for good or evil, being now stamped on the face of our Statute Book. The essential features of the Constitution of this country continue, however, to defy the attacks of extreme Reformers. All legislation should, in my opinion, be based strictly on the outlines of these features, which are capable of being developed and expanded in accordance with the demands of a progressive age.

Any measures that would ameliorate the condition of the working classes would ensure my best and most earnest assistance. My desire would be to place at their disposal, if it were possible, the common necessaries and comforts of life free from the prohibitory impost of taxation.

Some reforms of the systems of rating and local taxation are much required. This subject, however, I hold to be one which should be dealt with largely in one comprehensive measure, and not piecemeal or by small instalments after the manner of recent futile attempts.

Legislation tending to the severance of the Established Church from the State would be vigorously opposed by me. On the other hand, measures which would increase the great sphere of usefulness of the Church of England and render her more and more the Church of the nation, I would as vigorously support.

With regard to Foreign Policy, it is impossible to blind oneself to the fact that the position of England among foreign nations has deteriorated in the hands of the recent Liberal Administration. While deprecating unnecessary interference in Continental affairs, I am of opinion that in cases where the honour of our country is implicated, the security of the nation can only be attained by a bold and uncompromising policy. To that end I should oppose any large reduction of our naval and military establishments. An economical policy might, however, be consistently pursued, and the efficiency of our forces by land and sea completely secured, without the enormous charges now laid upon the country.

The Colonial Empire of Great Britain, offering as it does a field of development for the talent, energy and labour of the sons of our overburdened island, will continually demand the attention of the Legislature. I would support all efforts which would tend to facilitate the means of emigration, and would at the same time strengthen and consolidate the ties which unite the Colonies with the mother country.

With regard to education, both in this country and in Ireland, I am of opinion that the existing means are capable of a large and liberal development, and that while the rights of conscience should be most sacredly respected, religious teaching should not wholly be forgotten.

The Education Act of 1871 has, on the whole, successfully settled the question and opened the doors of knowledge to all our countrymen without regard to sect. I agree with the spirit of that Act, but any alterations that may be needful to ensure its more perfect working will always receive my best consideration.

The principles of true Conservatism I hold to be those of gradual, unceasing progress, adhering strictly to the lines of a well-founded Constitution and avoiding all violent and unnecessary changes. It is in these principles, in which I firmly believe myself, that I aspire in hopeful confidence to become the Representative of the Electors of the Borough of Woodstock.

Should I be so fortunate as to be successful in gaining your confidence, I can safely promise that the interests of the Borough will not suffer from any neglect at my hands, and the wishes and views of every individual member of the constituency, of whatever political party, will always receive my best and most earnest attention.

I have the honour to be, Gentlemen, Yours very faithfully, RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

Woodstock, January 26, 1874.

1880.

_To the Electors of Woodstock._

Parliament is about to be dissolved, and I venture again to solicit a renewal of your confidence, which for six years I have enjoyed.

When in 1874 you did me the honour to return me as your representative to the House of Commons, I pledged myself to give a general support to the policy and the principles of the Conservative party.

And now that I again offer myself as a candidate for the Borough I confidently appeal to you on the same grounds, renewing my former pledges.

The attention of the Parliament which is about to expire has been chiefly occupied by momentous questions of Foreign Policy involving almost the existence of the Empire.

Her Majesty’s Government have had to contend not only against the dangerous ambition of a great Foreign Power but also against a determined and powerfully-led Opposition at home.

By repeated and unusually large majorities the policy which the Government pursued has been sanctioned by Parliament. A few weeks will surely demonstrate that it has been approved by the country.

In giving a consistent support to that policy I am convinced that I have been carrying out the wishes of a vast majority of this constituency, and I believe that the safety of this Empire can only be secured by a firm adherence on the part of the country to the course pursued by the present advisers of the Crown.

To their credit it may be stated that they have hitherto achieved the great result of ‘peace with honour’ without having added perceptibly to the burdens imposed upon the people by taxation.

My opinions on domestic matters have been more than once stated to you during the six years which have elapsed since my election in 1874. The Conservative party have been instrumental in placing on the Statute Book many comprehensive and useful measures. I would instance the Act to Consolidate and Amend the Law relating to Friendly Societies; the Artisans’ and Labourers’ Dwellings Act; the Act Consolidating and Extending the various Laws relating to the Sanitary Condition of the People; the Act for Modifying and Improving according to Modern Experience the Regulations affecting the Discipline and Control of our Army; and other Statutes which I need not now particularise.

Her Majesty’s Government have now in hand carefully considered measures for the consolidation of the Criminal Code, and for the improvement of the Law of Bankruptcy; also three most important measures relating to the settlement of landed estates, enlarging the powers of life owners and reducing the cost of land transfer, to which, as you may imagine from my remarks to you in the autumn, I shall be prepared, if you return me as your Member, to give a most cordial support.

The present condition of Ireland must be a cause of uneasiness to every thoughtful person and will no doubt occupy the anxious consideration of the new Parliament.

The party led by Mr. Parnell, which has for its object the disintegration of the United Kingdom, must, in my opinion, be resisted at all costs.

At the same time, I do not see how the internal peace of Ireland can be permanently secured without a judicious reconsideration of the laws affecting the tenure of land; and should measures with that object be introduced by her Majesty’s Government, I shall be inclined to give them an unprejudiced support.

It must not be forgotten that the successful and wise solution of the difficulties surrounding the question of Irish education effected by ministers and the Conservative party will greatly contribute to the rapid progress of a future prosperity of the sister Island.

I am in favour of the present system of County Government by Quarter Sessions, but I think that the hands of the magistrates might be strengthened by the addition of elected representatives of the ratepayers.

The contribution from the Imperial revenue to the expenses of Local Government, which was the work of the Conservative party, has no doubt proved a boon to the agricultural community. I should be glad to see this principle further carried out by throwing a portion of the cost of maintenance of highways upon the moneys annually voted by Parliament.

To secure the freedom and to encourage the enterprise of the tenant farmer, it would be expedient to abolish the Law of Distress in its present form.

It appears to me that all matters dealt with by that law should be a subject of agreement between landlord and tenant.

I shall heartily co-operate with any party which brings forward carefully considered measures for the amelioration of the condition of the agricultural labourer, and I think it would be well if powers were given to municipalities and local bodies for the purchase of land to be let in allotments and for the improvement of the dwellings of this valuable class of men.

Trusting that the principles above enunciated will commend themselves to your consideration and will secure your approval,

I have the honour to remain, Very faithfully yours, RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

Woodstock, March 9, 1880.

1885.

_To the Electors of Birmingham._

The time is near when you will be called upon to express your judgment on the past and your desires for the future. Two schools of political thought strive against each other to win your confidence. The one, composed of those who, having had under their complete control the Government of the Empire from May 1880 until June 1885, are unable to justify their claims upon you by any record of foreign or colonial or home achievement, but, contenting themselves with incomplete and misleading extenuation of acknowledged failure, seek to attract you by a renewal of promises, and even bribes, which bitter experience has shown they have neither the capacity nor the strength to fulfil. The other, whose views I share, and whose policy I will endeavour soon, as best I may, personally to uphold among you, appeals to the electoral body in Great Britain and Ireland to confirm the adverse judgment pronounced on June 9, against Mr. Gladstone’s Administration by the Parliament which in a few weeks will be dissolved. That judgment, striking and wide-reaching as it was in its immediate results, was literally wrung from a House of Commons the majority of which would have been only too glad to have continued their support of Mr. Gladstone had it not been for the irresistible influence of popular discontent, excited by various causes--Irish troubles, Colonial losses, Indian dangers, costly wars, fruitless sacrifices of many heroes, financial excesses, Parliamentary impotence, imperilled industries, commercial and agricultural depression growing greater and more alarming year by year. All this was expressed by the action of the House of Commons on June 9. Mr. Gladstone’s Government, the author of these many and long-continued disasters, fell; that Government in 1880 so popular, so powerful, with such immeasurable opportunities for promoting the peace, progress and prosperity of the people, fell, and not a voice was raised, either in Parliament or the country, of sympathy for the vanquished or of mourning over their fall. Mr. Bright will request of you to contribute to restore to power that most unlucky Administration. To this end will be directed all the powers of his unrivalled oratory, his simple but forcible invective, his personal position and experience. But very little of patriotism, very little of self-interest, very little of recollection, reflection and calculation will compel you to remain outside the influence of that persuasive voice. The British Empire is great and powerful from the character of its people, the extent of its dominions and the varied nature of its resources. More than all other Western nations, we can afford to indulge ourselves in experiment and, indeed, caprice, as regards our system of Government or the direction of our Home and Imperial policy. But there are limits even to the strength of the British Empire, and a repetition of the policy of the last five years will, without doubt, transgress those limits. Yet such will be the inevitable consequence of a restoration to office of the Liberal party, as that party is at present constituted. The old divisions, the irreconcilable differences, personal and political, which all the ascendency of Mr. Gladstone was unable to compose, much less conceal, while he was Prime Minister, which were the chief cause of the failure of his Administration, are now blazing forth most fiercely, and Mr. Gladstone, with all honesty, warns you that his controlling hand will be stretched forth only for a little time. To this party, which even hatred of the Tories cannot decently unite, which comes before you with such a past, you will be asked to commit for another six years perchance the destinies of the Empire. You cannot yield to this appeal.

The policy of the Tory party is before you:--To regain the friendship of the European Powers which prejudice, presumption and poltroonery had all but forfeited; and to use that friendship so as to maintain effectually the united European action by which alone the peace and the liberties of the peoples of the Continent and of these islands can be secured and developed; to evolve from the region of sentiment such forces as may enable the mother country to tighten the bonds of union between herself and our colonies and to rear on a practical and permanent basis, for defensive and commercial purposes, that Imperial federation of the subjects of the Queen which many wise and far-seeing minds regard as essential to the perpetuation of our power; to conciliate by equal laws and by just and firm administration our Irish brethren, now much irritated and estranged, so that the Union which Nature, as well as policy, has effected may for all time endure; to place, by material provisions and constructions, the security of our Indian dependency beyond the influence of panic, alarm or even anxiety, and simultaneously, by careful Parliamentary inquiry, to ascertain how we may most safely and most speedily bring to the strengthening of our Government all that is high and good of the traditions, the intellects and the aspirations of the native races; to give to our rural and agricultural population that machinery of self-government which has been of advantage to our great towns; to strive, as far as the laws of political economy may permit, to multiply the number of freeholders and occupiers; to utilise the powers of the House of Commons, in recent years almost forgotten, so as either to effect financial retrenchment and departmental reform, or else to make sure that the present expenditure of the people’s money is justifiable and thrifty; to develop still further the efficiency of Parliament by alterations in its methods of transacting business and in its hours of labour; to restore public confidence; to revive commercial enterprise by a patient continuance of good and prudent administration; in a word, to govern the British Empire by the light of common sense. That is the policy of the Tory party.

Measures are now recommended to you by our opponents which the Tory party will not only not attempt to carry out, but which I hope and believe they will always resolutely oppose. They are the dismemberment of the Empire, under the guise of National Councils, the abolition of the House of Lords, the disestablishment of the Church and the appropriation of its endowments to the support of irreligious education, the compulsory acquisition by local bodies of landed estates for the purposes of arbitrary division, the wholesale plunder of all who have acquired properties, great or small, by thrift or by inheritance, under the names of ‘ransom’ and of ‘graduated taxation.’ These and other similar projects, if they are decided by the nation to be wise and prudent, I freely admit must be confided to the hands of Mr. Chamberlain and his friends. I will have none of them, for I know that they mean political chaos and social ruin.

Such, gentlemen, are to my mind the circumstances of the time, as far as they can be conveniently and concisely summarised in an election address. No one can be more convinced than I am that I should be guilty of intolerable presumption if I based my candidature for the Central Division of Birmingham on any other ground than the truth of the political principles I have endeavoured in this document to set forth; moreover, I am profoundly aware that from many causes, some of them physical, I have feebly and inadequately served in the House of Commons. My opponent has the immense advantage of long-established possession, amounting in the minds of some almost to prescriptive right; he is further supported by a highly (perhaps too highly) finished political organisation. But the experience of the past and the essential truth of the principles which I will endeavour to sustain may, in all probability, outweigh these considerable forces. The people, in the widest acceptance of the expression, are now, for the first time in the history of England, called upon to decide and define their future. If they are guided by reflection and by knowledge they cannot err. But if, unmindful of the last five years, they recur, like the constituencies in 1880, for government and for policy to those who have so misled them and betrayed them, I, in common with the party with which for twelve years I have acted, will patiently accept their judgment; but history will mourn and will wonder long at the blindness and the folly, ay, even the insanity, of a people who, called to the more free and perfect enjoyment of their ancient liberties, deliberately and in spite of warnings writ large and full, flung away a priceless heritage, and consigned to the grave of the past a great and glorious Empire.

I am your obedient servant, RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

India Office, St. James’s Park: October 10.

II

_FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE NATIONAL UNION OF
CONSERVATIVE ASSOCIATIONS_

1884.

_The Marquess of Salisbury to Lord Randolph Churchill._

_Private._

Hatfield: April 1, 1884.

My Lord,--I had the honour of receiving a letter from you, dated
the 19th ult., in which, on behalf of the Organisation Committee of
the National Union, you requested that Sir Stafford Northcote and
myself would give our early consideration to a report and other
documents which you enclosed.

We had already expressed our disapproval of the report; therefore,
in the absence of any explanation, we could not have entered
further upon the consideration of it. We had the advantage,
however, of a conference with yourself and Mr. Gorst, in which some
passages of the report, which seemed to us objectionable, were
explained. It was made clear to us that there was no intention on
the part of the Council of the National Union either to trench on
the province of the Central Committee or to take any course upon
political questions that would not be acceptable to the leaders of
the party. The ‘large and general principles of party policy’
reserved for the determination of the Council by the fourth
recommendation of the report were explained to refer exclusively to
questions affecting the organisation of the affiliated
Associations.

It was very satisfactory to us to find from your language that the
Council were at one with us in the conviction that harmonious
co-operation between them and the Central Committee was of great
importance to the interests of the party, and that the matters
which have hitherto been disposed of by the leaders and Whips of
the party must remain as heretofore in their hands, including the
expenditure of the funds standing in the name of the Central
Committee.

It was thought desirable that, in place of further discussing the
report, Sir Stafford Northcote and I should indicate with more
precision the objects to which the efforts of the Council may with
the greatest advantage be directed. It appears to us that these
objects may be defined to be the same as those for which the
Associations themselves are working. The chief object for which the
Associations exist is to keep alive and extend Conservative
convictions, and so to increase the number of Conservative voters.
This is done by acting on opinion through various channels, by the
establishment of clubs, by holding meetings, by securing the
assistance of speakers and lecturers and by the circulation of
printed matter in defence of Conservative opinions, by collecting
the facts required for the use of Conservative speakers and
writers, and by the invigoration of the local press.

In all these efforts it is the function of the Council of the
National Union to aid, stimulate and guide the Associations it
represents.

Much valuable work may also be done through the Associations, by
watching the registration and, at election time, by providing
volunteer canvassers and volunteer conveyance. But in respect to
these matters it is desirable that the National Union should act
only in concert with the Central Committee, because there are in
many constituencies other bodies of Conservatives who do not belong
to the Associations, but whose co-operation must be secured.

To ensure complete unity of action, we think it desirable that the
Whips of the party should sit, _ex officio_, on the Council, and
should have a right to be present at the meetings of all
Committees. Such an arrangement would be a security against any
unintentional divergencies of policy and would lend weight to the
proceedings of the Union. Business relating to candidates should
remain entirely with the Central Committee. On the assumption,
which we are entitled now to make, that the action of the two
bodies will be harmonious, a separation of establishments will not
be necessary--unless business should largely increase. There is
some advantage, undoubtedly, in their working under a common roof,
for it is difficult to distinguish between their functions so
accurately but that the need of mutual assistance and communication
will constantly be felt. I have the honour to be

Your obedient servant, SALISBURY.

_Lord Randolph Churchill to the Marquess of Salisbury._

The National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations, St. Stephen’s Chambers, Westminster S.W.: April 3, 1884.