Chapter XII: The Twenty-Sixth of January (1)

‘When it was said that the noble lord, the member for Paddington,
had not declared a policy, he pointed, and he was justified in
pointing, not to a sentence, nor even to a phrase, but to a date,
and he said, “Our policy is the 26th of January.”’--_Speech of Mr.
Gladstone, Second Reading Government of Ireland Bill, May 10,
1886._

According to Mr. Morley, the month that followed the General Election was passed by Mr. Gladstone ‘in depth of meditation.’ The questions which he revolved were vast and grave. Important and even vital factors in their decision were hid from him. He saw that the Liberal party was ripe for schism. He faced the united demand of Nationalist Ireland. He knew that the balance of power was held by Mr. Parnell. But he could not know whether the Government would meet Parliament or not; whether they wanted to be dismissed or not; whether they would seek to gain Whig and Liberal support, or would try to preserve the combination which had placed them in power; nor what, in the last alternative, was the Irish policy Ministers would be prepared to offer or parties disposed to accept. Yet time was short and the country waited tip-toe on his deliberations.

The suspense was not prolonged. The results of the elections could not be estimated till after November 30 and were not determined until another week had passed. But on December 17, after ten days of whisperings and rumour, a public announcement of his Home Rule scheme, apparently authentic in character and circumstantial in detail, appeared simultaneously in Liberal and Conservative papers. Mr. Gladstone was prompt to repudiate, as a mere ‘speculation’ upon his opinions, this premature and unfortunate disclosure. But the next day he was writing to Lord Hartington, who had asked for explanations, a frank and full account of his ‘opinions and ideas,’ which shows how closely newspaper assertion corresponded with the workings of his mind. The process by which his conversion was effected, has been at length laid bare. His internal loathing of the Coercive measures he had been forced to impose during the past five years; his suspicion and entire misconception of the cold-blooded manœvres by which his Government had been overturned; his hope of repairing, remoulding and consolidating the great party instrument which he had directed so long; the desire of an ‘old Parliamentary hand’ to win the game; the dream of a sun-lit Ireland, loyal because it was free, prosperous and privileged because it was loyal--the crowning glory of an old man’s life--all find their place in that immense decision. And then the whole mass of resolve, ponderously advancing, drawing into its movement all that learning and fancy could supply, gathering in its progress the growing momentum of enthusiasm, wrenching and razing all barriers from its path, was finally precipitated like an avalanche upon a startled world! All has been set forth. What communications Mr. Gladstone made to his colleagues; how he addressed himself to Lord Granville, to Lord Spencer, to Lord Hartington, to Mr. Chamberlain; and how he was variously met, have now become matters of published fact. An authoritative analysis of the workings of his mind has been published and may be checked or extended by a score of conversations, letters and chance remarks, all carefully recorded. Judgment may be formed of the part he played, upon evidence perhaps more full and accurate than attaches to any similar transaction. But a veil of mystery and even suspicion still hangs over the inner councils of Lord Salisbury’s Government. What were the leaders of the Conservative party thinking about during these anxious weeks? What plans did they resolve, what difficulties did they face within the secrecy of the Cabinet? Their final decision was declared on January 26. But what alternatives were they weighing meanwhile in conclave or consultation? How far were they prepared to go in satisfaction of Irish demands? What purpose lay behind Lord Randolph Churchill’s silence at Sheffield or lurked in Lord Carnarvon’s ‘empty house’? Upon these much-disputed matters it may now be possible to cast some light.

Lord Randolph’s view of the policy which the Conservative party should pursue in Irish matters is described with the utmost candour in a letter which he had written to a friend of mark before the result of the General Election was known:--

_Private._

2 Connaught Place, W.: October 14, 1885.

I have no objection to Sexton and Healy knowing the deliberate
intention of the Government on the subject of Irish Education; but
it would not do for the letter or the communication to be made
public, for the effect of publicity on Lancashire might be
unfortunate and might cripple the good intentions of Her Majesty’s
Government.

...It is the Bishops entirely to whom I look in the future to turn,
to mitigate or to postpone the Home Rule onslaught. Let us only be
enabled to occupy a year with the Education Question. By that time,
I am certain, Parnell’s party will have become seriously
disintegrated. Personal jealousies, Government influences, Davitt
and Fenian intrigues will all be at work on the devoted band of
eighty: and the Bishops, who in their hearts hate Parnell and don’t
care a scrap for Home Rule, having safely acquired control of Irish
education, will, according to my calculation, complete the rout.

That is my policy, and I know that it is sound and good, and the
only possible Tory policy. It hinges on acquiring the confidence
and friendship of the Bishops; but if you go in for their mortal
foes the Jesuits on the one hand, and their mortal foes the
anti-clerical Nationalists on the other, for the purpose of
humiliating and beating back Archbishop Walsh and his colleagues,
this policy will be shattered.... My own opinion is that if you
approach the Archbishop through proper channels, if you deal in
friendly remonstrances and in attractive assurances, ... the
tremendous force of the Catholic Church will gradually and
insensibly come over to the side of the Tory party.

Lord Randolph furthermore openly avowed and defended his Irish policy during these months--in its general scope--on March 4, 1886, in the House of Commons _after_ the election and after the accession to power of Mr. Gladstone’s Home Rule Government. ‘I am not going to deny,’ he said, ‘that at one time I had an idea that the Tory party might co-operate with the Irish party. I have often worked with Irish members. I hope to be able to do so again. I have never concealed in the last Parliament that I thought it possible that on many Irish subjects the Tory party might co-operate with the Irish National party.... It always appeared to me that the Tory party were well qualified to deal with many questions of Irish interest in a manner agreeable to the Irish people and not in the least dangerous to the general welfare of the British Empire. I particularly allude to the question of education and to the question of the land. Judging by past history, I imagined that the cry of Repeal might be raised as strongly as ever and that Irish members might say again: “Live or die, sink or swim, we go for Repeal.” Still, I imagined that might merely turn out to be a sentiment for keeping together a powerful political party; and that, if Repeal were shown to be absolutely against the will of the Imperial Parliament, the policy of Repeal would be dropped.’ Whatever may be thought of the merits of such a policy, there is nothing disingenuous or obscure either in its private handling or its public declaration.

Lord Randolph’s Irish opinions were not altered by the verdict of the constituencies. His natural delight at the Tory victories in the boroughs led him to form a more sanguine estimate of the mood of the counties than the event sustained. But even his highest anticipations did not place the number of Conservative members at more than 300; and his mind turned at once towards a Whig coalition:--

_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury._

2 Connaught Place, W.: November 29, 1885.

Dear Lord Salisbury,-- ...If we have any luck this week we ought to
number 300 in the House.

I saw Sir Erskine May yesterday--very grumpy. He said the first
trial of strength would be a vote of want of confidence. I said
that did not follow; that the first trial of strength in a new
Parliament often took place on the election of a Speaker. He said:
‘What, oppose Mr. Peel!’ I intimated that, though we were very fond
of Peel, he had no prescriptive possession of the Chair, and that
his election would require something in the nature of a _quid pro
quo_. I also gave him to understand that we have quarrelled with
the Irish, and, having put these and various other false ideas into
his head, left him in a state of exasperated perplexity.

I hope you may be a little in town next week, for the future seems
to require the most careful consideration before any policy is
submitted to the collective luminosity of the Cabinet. I think you
ought to negotiate with the other side, giving Hartington India,
Goschen Home Office and Rosebery Scotch Office. You will never get
Whig support as long as I am in the Government, and Whig support
you must have. I should like to contribute effectively to your
getting it, for my curiosity as to the internal and mysterious
mechanism of Government is completely satiated. Very indifferent
health makes me look forward irresistibly to idleness regained. If
you wanted another bait for the Whigs, ----’s elevation to the
Lords might supply it, for I hear on the very best authority that
chaos and the ---- Office are at present indistinguishable. I
believe that by some process of this kind you could institute a
Government which would keep the Parnellites and Radicals at bay for
years; and, after all, that is what must be arrived at.

Yours most sincerely, RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

Lord Salisbury’s answer reads strangely in the light of after-events:--

November 30, 1885.

My dear Randolph,--I am afraid your patriotic offer of giving place
to Goschen for the sake of making a coalition will be of little
avail. They hate me as much as they hate you--and if retirements
are required for the sake of repose and Whig combinations I shall
claim to retire with you in both respects.

The time for a coalition has not come yet--nor will, so long as the
G.O.M. is to the fore. But I don’t expect we shall be long in
office this time. I must try and see you some time this week about
our future measures. Are you staying in town? I have not yet had
time to read your Burma papers, but will send them you back, with
any comments that occur to me, when I have.

Yours very truly, SALISBURY.

Lord Randolph, however, held tenaciously to the idea of a coalition. The fact that the accession of Lord Hartington to the leadership of the House would block his own path effectively and that the acceptance of office by important Whig Ministers must diminish his personal influence, does not seem to have affected this self-seeking and unscrupulous man; and about December 4 or 5 he sent the Prime Minister a formal and elaborate account of his views, which is for many reasons worthy of attention:--

MEMORANDUM.[46]

Assume that the supporters of the Government will number 300.

Under ordinary circumstances Government would probably resign at
once, there being a clear majority of seventy against them. The 370
opponents of the Government are so singularly disunited that there
is no reason to suppose the Government need be placed in a
minority, and there is every reason to suppose that no other
Government could command so large a following as the present
Government.

CONSTITUTION OF THE 370 OPPONENTS.

It is almost certain that there are in this number some twenty-five
members who without doing any violence to their political
principles would habitually support the Government. It may be
reckoned that 200 will follow the lead of Lord Hartington as long
as he remains leader of the Liberal Opposition. The party more
immediately under the control of Messrs. Chamberlain, Dilke, Morley
and Labouchere may be estimated at sixty-five votes. There remain
eighty Nationalists under the leadership of Mr. Parnell.

It is certain that no Vote of Censure or of Want of Confidence will
be moved at the assembling of Parliament because--

1. Neither Mr. Gladstone, nor Lord Hartington, nor Mr. Chamberlain
could form a Government.

2. Without the support of the eighty Nationalists a Vote, of
Censure or otherwise, would be heavily defeated.

3. The support of the Nationalists would demand a heavier price
than any large portion of the Liberal party would be prepared to
pay.

On what occasion can a trial of party strength arise?

1. On the election of Speaker.

2. On the question of Parliamentary Oath.

SPEAKERSHIP.

The Irish are hostile to Mr. Peel.

The Whigs equally strong in his favour. The Government can displace
Mr. Peel with the help of the Irish. The Whigs will be bitterly
alienated. On the other hand, the Government can support Mr. Peel
and carry his election. The Irish will find their revenge in voting
for Mr. Bradlaugh. The triumph of Mr. Bradlaugh would be a shaking
blow to the Tory Government and party. The alienation of the Whigs
by the defeat of Mr. Peel would certainly in the course of a few
weeks or months destroy the Government.

Which course to choose?

Seeing that the Irish support can never be other than momentary,
seeing that by no possibility can [that] support be clothed with
any elements of stability, seeing that the alienation of the Whigs
from the Government must lead to great evils, seeing that Whig
support, if attained, is honourable, stable, and natural, in my own
mind I pronounce for the re-election of Mr. Peel and for running
the risk of the triumph for Mr. Bradlaugh.

We have proceeded thus far.

The Whigs will not be displeased by the election of Mr. Peel. The
Whigs will not be indignant at the seating of Mr. Bradlaugh. Is it
possible to convert this negative frame of mind of non-hostility
into one of positive co-operation?

Three methods suggest themselves.

1. The offer of places in the Government.

2. The production of a large, genuine and liberal programme.

3. After such a programme has been produced and proceeded with
satisfactorily, the renewal of the offer of places in the
Government.

I think that all these three methods should be honestly tried in
their order. The first must be done with liberality. The leading
members of the Whig party who should be offered places in the
Government are Lord Hartington (with the lead of the House of
Commons), Mr. Goschen, Lord Rosebery and Sir Henry James.

I do not imagine that these offers would be now accepted.
Nevertheless the fact that they have been honestly made may before
long be a powerful weapon in the hands of Lord Salisbury, either as
influencing his own party or the public. The making of these offers
in a generous spirit cannot possibly do harm.

II. THE PROGRAMME.

On foreign questions there does not at present appear to be any
difference of opinion, nor on colonial questions. Attention may be
concentrated on domestic questions. I suggest that the programme
should include:--

1. Parliamentary Procedure }
2. Departmental Reform } Executive.
3. Indian Inquiries. (H. of C. Committee) }
4. Education Inquiries. (Royal Commission) }
5. Local Government }
6. Land Laws } Legislative.
7. University (Ireland) Education }
8. Codification of Criminal Law }

PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE.

The following measures might be informally submitted to the leaders
of parties in the House of Commons:--

_A. The Resort to Autumn Sessions._--The session at present is too
long and too short--too long for a consecutive session; too short
for the decent and efficient transaction of executive, financial
and legislative business.

If this is granted, the following reform suggests itself:--

That Parliament should meet not later than the first week in
February, and, with the usual Easter and Whitsuntide holidays,
should continue in session not later than the first week in
August. That an adjournment should then take place to a period not
later than the second week in October, and that the annual session
should formally be brought to an end by prorogation not later than
the first week in December.

_B. The Alteration of Hours of Business._--That the House should
meet four days in the week at 1 P.M., adjourn from 7 P.M., and rise
at midnight.

_C. Clôture._--That, in addition to existing regulations, it shall
be within the right of the Minister to demand a division on the
subject under discussion a quarter of an hour before the
adjournment of or rising of the House.

_D. Questions._--That the Speaker should appoint a Committee of
three, not being Privy Councillors, who shall decide what questions
can be answered in the House, and which in the votes; and that no
question shall be put without notice, other than explanatory
questions, except by the leave of the House on the demand of 100
members.

_E. Adjournment, Motion for._--That the existing rule be altered,
substituting the number 100 members for the present number 40.

_F._ That Grand Committees deal with the report stage of any Bill
referred, as well as with Committee stage; and that all Bills be
referred to Grand Committees after second reading.

_G._ That the bulk of private business relating to local
development and local enterprise be transferred to local boards
whose proceedings must be sanctioned by provisional orders.

_Departmental Reform._--That Committees of the House of Commons be
appointed to examine and report upon the constitution, staff, work
performed, comparative cost of all public departments, with a view
to the effecting of economies and the rearrangement of salaries,
promotions and retirements.

_Indian Inquiry._--This has been agreed upon.

_Elementary Education Inquiry._--This requires no further notice.

LEGISLATIVE.

_Local Government._--Two essentials: (1) purely popular election by
ratepayers; (2) large and liberal measure of executive and local
legislative powers. Workhouse management need not be touched, nor
education arrangements. But all Quarter Sessions business, all
sanitary matters, registration of votes, survey of land and
registration of titles should be among the duties of the local
boards. Also powers might be given, as in Ireland, to local boards
to advance money on security of rates for purchasers of small
holdings and allotments.

LAND LAWS, REFORM OF.

1. Abolition of primogeniture in cases of intestacy.

2. Compulsory registration of title.

3. Enfranchisement of future leaseholds.

4. Enfranchisement of copyholders.

5. Enfranchisement of lands held in mortmain.

UNIVERSITY (IRELAND) EDUCATION.

This should take the form of--

1. The transference of Cork College to a Catholic board of
management.

2. The endowment of the Catholic University College in Dublin.

3. The establishment of a Catholic College in Armagh.

4. The transference of the Belfast College to a Presbyterian board
of management.

CODIFICATION OF AND REFORM OF CRIMINAL LAW.

This can never be attained if it is left to the action of
Parliament entirely. The procedure suggested is:--

1. The proposing and carrying of certain general resolutions
through both Houses.

2. The appointment by statute of jurisconsults with full power
under aforesaid resolutions to codify; and

3. That the code as drawn shall, after lying on the table of either
House for six months, become the criminal code of the United
Kingdom.

This, as above, is my second method for attracting Parliamentary
support from the ranks of the nominal Opposition. Should this
programme, or one more or less closely analogous to it, be
introduced, generously received by the bulk of the Whigs and
honestly supported, a further offer of places in the Government
might with advantage be made.

‘The success of foregoing,’ concluded Lord Randolph, ‘turns upon
Ireland. I assume two facts:

‘1. That Coercion is impossible now.

‘2. That anything in the nature of an Irish Parliament is
impossible always.

‘_Similarity_ of treatment between England and Ireland in respect
of Local Government:

‘_Liberality_ of grants from Treasury towards Irish objects:

‘_Concession_ to the Roman Catholic hierarchy on education
questions:

‘These are the main lines of a policy towards Ireland which will
secure a great amount of Parliamentary and public concurrence and
will, if vigorously and boldly followed, bring about inevitably the
disintegration of Mr. Parnell’s party. The great size of this party
is its chief danger. Its members are open to various
influences--jealousy of each other and of Parnell; want of funds;
Ministerial influences, priestly influences; and last, but not
least, the capricious, unstable and to some extent treacherous
character of the Irish nature. If that party is boldly dealt with
at the outset it will soon dissolve. I do not consider that the cry
for an Irish Parliament now need be more dangerous than was the cry
for Repeal in the days of O’Connell. As that latter danger
altogether disappeared, so may this present danger if the
Government is strong in Parliament, undivided in council and
unwavering in action.

‘I wish to express my firm conviction and belief that if the
general spirit of this Memorandum could be acted up to, the
Queen’s Government might well be carried on with dignity and
efficiency, and the Parliament will have every reasonable chance of
running a normal course and of being the means of benefit to the
people.’

Lord Salisbury did not answer until the 9th:--

_Private._

Foreign Office: December 9, 1885.

My dear Randolph,--Lord Melbourne used to say that if you only
would let a letter alone, it would answer itself. Your very
interesting memorandum is not quite in that condition: but some
important parts of it have been answered by events. After
Hartington’s speech of Saturday, there can be no longer any
question of offering office _just yet_ to the Moderate Liberals;
and, therefore, no question of your or my resigning to facilitate
that operation. He evidently said what he did to prevent his
friends from suspecting him of any intention, under any
circumstances, to join us. His resolves are not eternal, but he has
effectually debarred himself from any such course until some little
time has passed or something new has happened. Then, again, I don’t
think the Irish will expect us to upset the Speaker; but, if they
did, I quite agree with you in thinking that it would be poor
policy to do so.

But we shall have to make a Queen’s Speech--at least, I can hardly
imagine the Cabinet resolving on an immediate resignation. It would
be deliberately excusing the other side from the necessity of
showing their hand.

In making this Queen’s Speech I entirely agree that our leaning
must be to the Moderate Liberals, and that we can have nothing to
do with any advances towards the Home Rulers. The latter course
would be contrary to our convictions and our pledges, and would be
quite fatal to the cohesion of our party.

But in leaning towards the Moderate Liberals we should take note
of the fact that the moment for bargaining with them has not yet
come. Whenever it does come, two results will follow: (1) Our own
people will recognise the political necessity of admitting a
somewhat stronger ingredient of Liberal policy into our measures,
and (2) the Moderate Liberals will require some such concession as
a condition of their joining us and as a proof to their own friends
that they have not been guilty of any _apostasy_ in so doing. That
being so, the extra tinge of Liberalism in our policy will be part
of the bargain when it comes, and must not be given away before
that time comes. If we are too free with our cash now, we shall
have no money to go to market with when the market is open.

In this view I should offer one or two suggestions in revisal of
your programme. The abolition of primogeniture is in itself of no
importance except on strategic grounds--it is not worth the trouble
of resistance. But it is a bit of a flag. The concession would be
distasteful to a certain number of our people now, and it might be
acceptable as a wedding-present to the Moderate Liberals whenever
the Conservative party leads them to the altar. I would not proffer
it, therefore, now; though, if carried against us, I should make no
serious fight over it.

The proposition of Leasehold Enfranchisement in the future requires
more thrashing out. I doubt whether it would effect your object,
which is that more occupiers should be owners of the houses they
inhabit. I quite agree in the object. I should be more disposed to
follow the Irish precedent and give local authorities the power of
advancing (on the security of the tenement) some large fraction of
its value at low interest, limiting the advance to cases where the
occupier was owner of the whole lease--and, of course, confining it
to voluntary purchase. This for existing leaseholds. For future
buildings the most effective plan would be to allow exemption from
the rates and house tax for five years in all cases where the
occupier was also the owner. (3) With respect to Local Government,
I admit that a general ratepaying franchise may be difficult to
avoid; and, on the whole, I think the Local Government Bill should
be mentioned in the Queen’s Speech. But I should mention in the
same sentence, and as part of the same subject, a London Local
Government Bill, which might be drawn in a very popular manner. The
multiplication of municipalities--say eight or nine--would please
the local leaders, who hope to figure in them and become Mayors. I
should introduce this before the big Local Government Bill. If we
are turned out, we shall be able to fight the question better for
not having shown our hand.

I should be disposed--subject to counsel--to introduce a Church
Reform Bill giving an easy method for getting rid of criminous
clergy, and perhaps also of incompetent clergy; but that craves
wary walking. Then a Bill for making the sale of all corporate land
easy; a Bill to enable marriages to take place in Dissenting
chapels without the presence of the Registrar; and, perhaps, a Bill
for dealing with the Scotch marriage law, but that is doubtful.
With respect to the other articles of your programme--such as
Parliamentary Procedure, Criminal Code, and Roman Catholic
Education--I need say nothing, because I generally agree with you.
I have inflicted on you an abominably long letter, but I thought it
better to put my thoughts before you....

Lord Randolph replied:--

India Office: December 9, 1885.

Dear Lord Salisbury,--It will be a great pleasure to me to wait
upon you to-morrow afternoon at three o’clock at the Foreign
Office.

It is very kind of you writing to me at such length; but as this
will require no answer, other than what you may give in
conversation to-morrow, I venture a few additional observations.

As to offer of places to Whigs.

I can imagine a crisis supervening, to deal with which might
require heroic measures and a great appeal to your followers in
both Houses of Parliament for confidence and support. Under such
circumstances the fact of the offer having been made and sulkily or
arrogantly refused would be of great moral value to you. A proper
recognition of two leading features of the situation seems to me
almost to compel you to make an attempt _now_ at such a
negotiation, even though you may be certain that it will fail:--

1. The fact that your Government is in a minority in the House of
Commons.

2. The division in the Opposition, so glaringly and so recently
shown by Mr. Chamberlain’s speech at Leicester and Lord
Hartington’s in Derbyshire.

I submit with great deference that, your task being to carry on the
Queen’s Government, it is incumbent upon you to take advantage of
every apparent circumstance which may be made to contribute to the
efficiency and solidity of the Government; nor ought you, under
such grave conditions as now exist, to shrink unduly from any
reasonable sacrifice of friends or colleagues which might enable
you honourably to attain the end in view. Having put your hand to
the plough under the uninviting conditions of June last, it is
hardly possible to look back, or to act as if the responsibility
for Government was not upon you.

It is very pleasant to me to learn that my suggestions with regard
to Parliamentary Procedure, R.C. University Ireland, Education, and
criminal law reform and codification meet with your general
concurrence; and that being so, I allow myself to risk a few
arguments which seem to me to militate somewhat against the views
expressed in your letter on the question of the programme
generally, and in particular the questions of Local Government and
Land Law reform.

If I apprehended your meaning rightly, you would make your
programme rather rigidly orthodox Tory, with a view of expanding it
into Whig heresy when the time for a fusion should seem to have
arrived. Now I hold very strongly that in that case the moment for
a fusion will never arrive. If the Newport programme is not at once
presented to Parliament in a large and generous measure, the Whigs
will be justified in their contention that it did not signify real
progressive legislation--that they were right and discriminating
when they mocked at it. That has been Lord Hartington’s cry all
along, which he reiterated with emphasis last Saturday. The
difference between the Newport programme and the concrete portions
of the Midlothian address was not easy to be distinguished, and I
doubt its existence. That being so, if you produce the former,
without timidity, skimping, paring, or scraping, and if the Whigs
turn you out, obviously their motive is office, and office only.
The country will not be deceived or edified by such purely party
manœuvres. And as by your administrative record, so with your
legislative programme, you will have laid up for yourself treasure
in the constituencies, you will have cast bread upon the waters
which you will find after many days.

This is indubitably the lesson of 1835.

I do urge as strongly as I may that you should decide in your mind
how far you can go in legislation--not under Whig pressure, not
with a view solely of gaining Whigs, but solely with a view of what
appears to be best for the country without infringement of any
great Tory principle; and that, having so decided, you should offer
the result to Parliament without delay, without stint, without
qualification, and with all confidence. It is, I am convinced, by
‘showing your hand,’ by showing how many good trumps you have in
it, that you will gain support--if not immediate, at any rate in
the near future. It is by hiding your hand--by giving cause for the
belief, or ground for the accusation, that it is a poor hand and
that you have no trumps, that you will lose support now and make it
most difficult to gain later. The boroughs have gone for you so
strongly because they believe in the fulness and genuineness of the
Newport programme. Our task should be to keep the boroughs, as
well as to win the counties; this can only be done by an active
progressive--I risk the word, a democratic--policy, a casting-off
and a burning of those old, worn-out aristocratic and class
garments from which the Derby-Dizzy lot, with their following of
county families, could never, or never cared to, extricate
themselves.

This being so, in my mind, I find the suggested postponement of
rural Local Government a course open to the deepest suspicion; the
preference given to London government an error in tactics of the
largest kind. No one in the country, or in London either, cares a
damn about a London municipality, nor would many municipalities
attract them. But county government, involving as it does a
redistribution and relief of burdens, to which every man of our
party is deeply pledged, is without doubt anxiously expected by the
constituencies, and will not brook delay. So I would say about land
law reform. I am very sure that the feeling of the boroughs is in
favour of extensive changes in our land system, on the ground that
the labour in the towns is depreciated by agricultural migration,
and that this latter is the effect of an antiquated land system.
This, rightly or wrongly, is the notion in the manufacturing minds,
and failure on our part to come up to their legitimate and
reasonable expectations would produce incalculable disappointment
and mortification.

If you decide that the large constructive measures which the times
seem to demand are beyond the capacity of the Tory party, or the
scope of their political principles, though I should regret the
decision I would accept it without demur. But in that case I would
press upon you the advisability of prompt resignation, on the
ground that the country had for the time decided that the function
of the Tory party would be more usefully displayed in Opposition,
in efforts purely critical, in attempts to amend Liberal
legislation and moderate Liberal zeal. If you show your hand at
all, show it fully and show a good one; but if you have no hand
good enough for the game or the stakes, place the cards face
downwards on the table, decline to play, and leave the Downing
Street table. I cannot think there is any safe _via media_ between
these two courses.

Lastly, I will not conceal my repugnance to dealing with Church
reform. Surely the Russell-Gurney-Disraeli Church legislation is a
warning. The time of Parliament will be wasted in furious
ecclesiastical differences, and votes will be lost on every side by
the party responsible for the effort. The Public Worship Regulation
Act was one of my first House of Commons experiences, and I cannot
forget it. The Nonconformists, so powerful, will offer every
opposition; and nothing will be gained except loss of time, of
temper, and of strength. If those ornamental but, on the whole,
rather useless and expensive Lords Spiritual care to justify their
privileges by attempts at legislation, smile on them, beam on them,
give them every encouragement for bringing the Lords Temporal into
a devout and heavenly frame of mind. Some good may possibly issue
from such a source, if such should be the will of Providence. But
Church reform which is the product of a Cabinet checked and
controlled by party Whips and guided by House of Commons lobbies is
surely in its nature a monstrosity, possibly a profanity, certainly
a farce.

Please pardon me this long letter. I feel that my constant and
lengthy epistolary communications to you may lead you to look
forward to resignation of office as an immense relief, but I find
my excuse in your kindness hitherto, and am

Yours most sincerely, RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

Ireland swiftly overclouded all other projects and puzzles which Ministers might consider. It was late in July that Lord Carnarvon had met Parnell. Four anxious months had passed and the Viceroy had now arrived at definite conclusions. He saw with alarm that the National League was strengthening and expanding every day. The fall in prices had affected the payment of rents. Serious social and economic discontents stimulated the increasing political excitement. Boycottings were flagrant, pitiless and widespread. Alike by his convictions and his public pledges he felt himself debarred from asking for special legislation. Another policy forced itself upon him with crushing weight. He declared that unless the Cabinet could move in the direction of Home Rule he could not continue their servant. It became a question for the Cabinet whether the retirement of Lord Carnarvon on the grounds stated would be so heavy a blow to the Government and so injurious to their main political position that, if he persisted, it would be better for the Government to resign in a body, ostensibly as a consequence of the election. Lord Salisbury desired his principal colleagues to express their opinion upon Lord Carnarvon’s views and intentions.

_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury._

December 10, 1885.

Dear Lord S.,--I return you Lord Carnarvon’s memorandum, which was
carefully considered by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Smith,
and myself.

We came to the conclusion that if the Lord-Lieutenant insists on
the choice being made between the adoption of his policy and
resignation, the latter course becomes compulsory on us. If we go
out merely on the ground of our Parliamentary position, we remain
for the purposes of opposition to Home Rule, as a party, _totus
teres atque rotundus_; but if that blessed man sets the signal for
concession flying, our party will go to pieces, as it did on the
Irish Land Act. The only hope for the country is to keep this
present Tory party well together; and unfortunately Lord Carnarvon
has it once more in his power, as on two former occasions, to
disintegrate, demoralise, and shatter.

However, I wish to say for myself--and I feel pretty certain it
will be the view of Sir M. Hicks-Beach and Mr. Smith--that,
whatever course you may finally decide upon, I will gladly see it
through to the best of my ability, no matter what may be the
result.

Yours most sincerely, R. S. C.

But Lord Salisbury preferred to face the consequences of the Carnarvon resignation, whatever they might be. ‘The fact,’ he wrote (December 11), ‘that Gladstone is mad to take office, will force him into some line of conduct which will be discreditable to him, and disastrous, if we do not prematurely gratify his hunger. The Carnarvon incident is vexatious. I hope he will be induced to stay with us till Parliament meets. But even if he does not, I doubt if his retirement will produce any very serious confusion. He will nominally retire on the ground of health or some private reason. The truth may ooze out. But we shall not mend matters by all retiring with him. The true reason will equally ooze out; and we shall have proclaimed our own impotence very loudly.’

The Irish situation oppressed all minds and from every quarter doubt and foreboding streamed in upon the Conservative leaders. Was it possible in face of Mr. Parnell and his United Ireland, in face of Mr. Gladstone and his ponderous meditations, in face of Lord Carnarvon and his open sympathies, to remain utterly unyielding? Would it not be well to make terms while time remained? Could not a joint conference of parties arrive at some compromise in regard to Irish government? And if not, how could the land be ruled? Everywhere during this month of December the sands were shifting underneath men’s feet. Few were firm. Lord Randolph Churchill was a rock.

_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Chief Justice
Morris._

_Very Confidential._

December 7, 1885.

My dear Chief Justice,--I am very grateful to you for your letter,
which I have sent on to Lord Salisbury for his consideration.

In a memorandum on the situation which I submitted to the Prime
Minister a week ago, I laid down as an axiom that with regard to
any policy towards Ireland in the nature of, or containing an Irish
Parliament, the attitude of the Tory Party could only be an
absolutely ‘non possumus’ one. You suggest a Committee of leading
men on both sides to inquire, and you base the suggestion on the
proceedings which took place with regard to the Reform Bill.

Two objections seem to me to arise.

1. With regard to Irish Government the Ministers cannot yet with
honour or even decency shift the responsibility from off their
shoulders on to Parliament. In so great a matter surely Ministers
must take the lead and state their policy or abdicate.

2. The precedent of the proceedings on the Reform Bill does not
yet, it seems to me, apply at all closely. Those proceedings were
taken to extricate Government, Opposition, and Parliament generally
from a deadlock and to avert a great constitutional crisis. In
this matter of Irish Government neither deadlock nor crisis has yet
arisen. In the event of their arising, the co-operation of parties
may well be resorted to, but this machinery would, I think, be
spoilt by premature recourse to it.

This may happen: Mr. Gladstone may persuade his colleagues and
party to a policy which Parnell might think too good to refuse
absolutely. The policy might be embodied in an amendment to the
Address and carried against the Government by a large majority.
What should be the course of Government under such circumstances?

To resign or to dissolve?

I should be strongly in favour of the latter if Royal sanction
could be obtained. If the Government resign, Gladstone succeeds in
forming an Administration and carrying a Bill through the Commons
by great majorities. Then will crop up again the eternal question
of resistance of the House of Lords to the will of the people, and
an appeal to the people on that ground will cause the essential
question of Repeal or no Repeal to be obscured or perhaps
altogether lost sight of. By dissolution, a clear issue is
presented to English and Scotch constituencies, and the House of
Lords is kept out of the battle.

Then there is no reason, it is true, why the agricultural
labourers, revolving many things in their anxious minds, should not
gladly agree to Repeal in order to obtain three acres and a cow,
and therefore no great change in the state of parties might result,
and the Tories would be definitely and decisively beaten on a
distinct issue. Well, what then? We should have fought our battle
as well as it could be fought, and the Repeal of the Union would be
the work of the people, the responsibility resting absolutely upon
them and not upon us.

This is my own way of looking at the situation, and why I adhere to
the policy, which you think will be ‘brushed aside,’ of changes in
County Government, &c. That policy may fail, but at any rate it is
a Conservative policy; the surrender to Home Rule, no matter how
you disguise it, is the reverse of conservative as you will be the
first to admit. The Disraeli epoch of constant metamorphoses of
principles and party has passed away.

Radical work must be done by Radical artists; thus less mischief
will arise.

Yours sincerely, RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

‘I cannot say,’ wrote Lord Salisbury, to whom this correspondence had been referred (December 6), ‘how heartily I agree in the tone of your letter to Morris.’

The whole political situation was considered at a Cabinet Council on the 16th. Decision was taken to go on with the Government, to meet Parliament and await results. The outlines of the Queen’s Speech were considered. Lord Randolph was most anxious to assign a foremost place to the reform of Parliamentary Procedure, as described in his memorandum. The Cabinet, having listened to long speeches on Irish matters, were tired and disposed to be irritable. The subject was one with which they were very familiar and on which many of them had already committed themselves. One Minister whom Lord Randolph thought he had conciliated the day before, pronounced absolutely against it. Lord Salisbury practised what he called ‘the decorous reserve proper to one who had been so long out of the House of Commons.’ The whole question was abruptly postponed. This defeat filled Lord Randolph with mortification. He loved his own plans ardently. He cared too much for the objects at stake to be skilful in personal diplomacy. He could fight; he could lead; he could drive; but a stolid junta of Cabinet Ministers--‘holy men,’ as he called them, vexed his soul. He was grievously disappointed at what he took to be the summary dismissal of a most important subject. He wrote in deep despondency to the Prime Minister. Lord Salisbury consoled him in a letter almost affectionate in character. All would come right if he drafted his proposals and chose a better opportunity of taking the sense of the Cabinet upon them.

_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury._

India Office: December 17, 1885.

Dear Lord Salisbury,--I am very grateful for your kind letter, and
intensely relieved to learn that you consider the question of
giving to Procedure a prominent place in our programme as still
quite open. I shall do as you tell me, and place on paper
elaborated proposals for the more efficient and speedy transaction
of ‘business.’ You are, I know, quite right in blaming me for
having been precipitate on Tuesday. I cannot help it, and shall
never be able to attain to that beatific state of chronic
deliberation which is the peculiarity of * * *, * * * & Co., and
also of the Turk.

This I add--that Procedure reform does not necessarily entail rapid
legislation. ‘Business’ includes Estimates, Budget, and Supply. It
is the transaction of this that I am more especially anxious to
promote. Further, assuming that owing to some miraculous exercise
of superhuman control H.M. Government remained in office, I would
suggest that there might be very considerable tactical advantages
from not plunging immediately into legislation, and from gaining
time by setting the House of Commons to work on a difficult
question in the consideration and settlement of which no issue of
party or of confidence need arise.

Yours most sincerely, RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

The Cabinet did not meet again until the New Year, but Christmas was not a season of unbroken peace and good-will to Her Majesty’s Ministers. Not one, however experienced and imaginative, could penetrate the obscurity of the future or calculate the crisis to which events were hurrying. The election had left them in a large minority. The Government of Ireland was rapidly passing into the hands of the National League. The Viceroy had resigned. Mr. Gladstone was revolving vast and unfathomable schemes. Parliament was to meet for regular business upon January 21. Meanwhile the days were disturbed by every kind of rumour and alarm. Lord Randolph Churchill, who always cultivated the acquaintance of clever men irrespective of their political opinion, had friends in every camp and possessed many special channels of information. All he could gather he wrote to his chief:--

_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury._

India Office: December 22, 1885.

... Now I have a great deal to tell you.

Labouchere came to see me this morning. He asked me our intentions.
I gave him the following information. I can rely upon him: (1) That
there would be no motion for adjournment after the 12th, but that
business would be immediately proceeded with after three or four
days’ swearing. On this he said that, if we liked to go out on a
motion for adjournment, he thought the other side might
accommodate us. I told him that such an ineffably silly idea had
never entered our heads. Then he told me that he had been asked
whether he could ascertain if a certain statement as to a Tory Home
Rule measure which appeared recently in the _Dublin Daily Express_
was Ashbourne’s measure, and if the Tories meant to say ‘Aye’ or
‘No’ to Home Rule; to which I replied that it had never crossed the
mind of any member of the Government to dream even of departing
from an absolute unqualified ‘No,’ and that all statements as to
Ashbourne’s plan were merely the folly of the _Daily News_. Then I
was very much upset, for he proceeded to tell me that on Sunday
week last Lord Carnarvon had met Justin McCarthy, and had confided
to him that he was in favour of Home Rule in some shape, but that
his colleagues and his party were not ready, and asked whether
Justin McCarthy’s party would agree to an inquiry, which he thought
there was a chance of the Government agreeing to, and which would
educate his colleagues and his party if granted and carried
through. I was consternated, but replied that such a statement was
an obvious lie; but, between ourselves, I fear it is not--perhaps
not even an exaggeration or a misrepresentation. Justin McCarthy is
on the staff of the _Daily News_. Labouchere is one of the
proprietors, and I cannot imagine any motive for his inventing such
a statement. If it is true, Lord Carnarvon has played the devil.
Then I told Labouchere that if the G.O.M. announced any Home Rule
project, or indicated any such project, and by so doing placed the
Government in a minority, resignation was not the only course; that
there was another alternative which might even be announced in
debate, and the announcement of which might complete the
squandering of the Liberal party, and that his friend at Hawarden
had better not omit altogether that card from his calculations as
to his opponents’ hands. Lastly, I communicated to him that, even
if the Government went out and Gladstone introduced a Home Rule
Bill, I should not hesitate, if other circumstances were
favourable, to agitate Ulster even to resistance beyond
constitutional limits; that Lancashire would follow Ulster, and
would lead England; and that he was at liberty to communicate this
fact to the G.O.M.[48]

Meanwhile Mr. Gladstone, although embarrassed and forestalled by the disclosures in the newspapers, was deep in his Irish schemes. A chance conversation which he had had with Mr. Balfour in the middle of December had encouraged Mr. Gladstone to make a proposal to Lord Salisbury. He wrote (December 20) of the ‘stir in men’s minds’ and of the urgency of the question, how it would be ‘a public calamity if this great subject should fall into the lines of party conflict.’ Only the Government could deal with such a question, and on public grounds he specially desired that the existing Government would deal with it. If Lord Salisbury and his friends would bring forward ‘a proposal for settling the whole question of the future government of Ireland,’ he would desire to treat it in the same spirit as he had shown in respect to Afghanistan and the Balkan Peninsula.

We are assured that Mr. Gladstone laid great stress upon this proffer of support. He had told the Queen two years before that the Irish question could only be settled by a conjunction of parties. He seems to have imagined that such a proposal would be regarded us a fair and magnanimous undertaking, and would receive, as some may think it deserved, the unprejudiced deliberation of the Cabinet. He had received full information--denied to Lord Randolph Churchill--of Lord Carnarvon’s interview with Parnell. He believed in all sincerity that the Conservative Government were seriously considering, even if they were not already committed to, a policy of Home Rule in some form or other. He remembered the conferences on the Reform Bill, and the support which he had lately given to the new ministry. Neither he nor his friends seem fully to have appreciated the fear and aversion with which his opponents regarded him. His letter was treated with contempt. No other word will suffice. ‘A public calamity,’ forsooth! ‘If this great question should fall into line of party conflict!’ ‘His hypocrisy,’ wrote a Minister to whom this letter had been shown, ‘makes me sick.’ In the Tory Cabinet there was but one opinion about him. He was ‘mad to take office’; and if his hunger were not ‘prematurely gratified,’ he would be forced into some line of conduct which would be ‘discreditable to him and disastrous.’

Mr. Gladstone wrote again on the 23rd, pressing for a definite answer. ‘Time,’ he said, ‘was precious.’ Lord Salisbury suavely replied through Mr. Balfour, in a letter which has since been made public, that a communication of the views of the Government would at this stage be at variance with usage. As Parliament would meet for business before the usual time, it was better ‘to avoid a departure from ordinary practice which might be misunderstood.’ There, of course, the matter ended; and thus idly drifted away what was perhaps the best hope of the settlement of Ireland which that generation was to see. Mr. Gladstone tarried no longer. On December 26[49] he drafted a memorandum for submission to the various noblemen and gentlemen with whom he proposed to act, setting forth with all possible precision his immediate intentions. If the Government were ready to deal with Ireland in a manner that would satisfy him and satisfy the Irish Nationalists, he would support them. If not, he would turn them out at the earliest convenient opportunity; and if in consequence entrusted with the duty of forming a Government, he would make the acceptance of a plan of ‘duly guarded Home Rule’ an indispensable condition.

Ministers meanwhile preserved an impenetrable silence. No one knew in what spirit, with what intention or with what allies they would meet Parliament. The Queen’s Speech still engaged the attention of the Cabinet. Lord Randolph Churchill was indebted to a friend for a happy suggestion, which he did not delay to forward to Lord Salisbury:--

_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury._

India Office: January 14, 1886.

Mr. Buckle has just been to see me, full of an idea of his own
which struck me as good, and which I persuaded him not to spoil by
bringing it out in to-morrow’s _Times_.

[Sidenote: 1886 ÆT. 36]