Chapter XVII: The Turn of the Tide (1)

‘The rising unto place is laborious; ... the standing is slippery,
and the regress is either a downfall or at least an eclipse which
is a melancholy thing.’--BACON.

Lord Randolph Churchill had divested himself by a single short letter of all that authority which is centred in a political chief and a Minister of the Crown. The solid array of Conservative members who had stoutly sustained him, ‘proud to follow a leader who was proud to lead them on’; the wise and busy secretaries of a great department with their hives of fact and counsel; hundreds of sharp pens, thousands of friendly voices; the vast, pervading, persisting machinery of party, all hitherto obedient in his service, now in a moment fell away. He was only the representative of a Metropolitan constituency who possessed some skill in speaking and a small house overlooking Hyde Park. He had cast away all advantages. He had neglected every preparation. He had chosen bad ground and the worst time. Moreover, as shall be seen, he had bound himself hand and foot. Yet such was the personal importance this man had acquired, so highly were his services valued, so much was his hostility feared, that for a time the British Government tottered and his place remained unfilled.

_Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Randolph Churchill._

Highbury, Moor Green, Birmingham: December 23, 1886.

My dear Churchill,--Whew! The cat is among the pigeons with a
vengeance.

My sympathies are entirely with you, and I think you may rely on my
cordial co-operation, if it can be of any value.

I have to speak to-night, and must express my first thoughts on
what is an entirely changed situation.

I wish I was able to communicate with you beforehand, but if you
have any wishes or ideas as to immediate action let me know. If
necessary we will arrange a meeting, and I will run up to London
again.

The Government is doomed, and I suspect we may have to re-form
parties on a new basis. You and I are equally adrift from the old
organisations.

Yours ever, J. CHAMBERLAIN.

_Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Randolph Churchill._

Highbury, Moor Green, Birmingham: December 26, 1886.

My dear Churchill,--Yours of 24th with its very interesting
enclosures only reached me to-day.

The breach was inevitable. There is much to be said _pro_ and _con_
about the estimates, but you were altogether in a false position.
You had to fight--alone and single-handed--for every point, and
were necessarily condemned to gain on each a partial victory, which
left you with all the responsibility, but without a consistent and
thoroughly defensible policy.

You will have a hard time to go through. Your case will be mine
almost exactly, and I can tell you it is a bitter pilgrimage which
is in prospect. The party tie is the strongest sentiment in this
country--stronger than patriotism or even self-interest. But it
will all come right in the end for both of us.

I assume that you will maintain an independent position, and in
that case you will be a power that your party cannot ignore. The
_Standard_ has a right to be angry, and the Caucuses will denounce
you; but in their hearts they know you are indispensable, and when
they find they cannot bully you into submission they will come to
your terms. Next time, however, that either you or I join a Cabinet
we must be certain of our majority in it.

My speech has fluttered the dovecotes tremendously, and my
correspondence shows that many of the Gladstonians are very
uncomfortable and anxious to come to terms. But I do not believe
that there will be any practical result. Mr. Gladstone does not
give way on the main point--neither will I.

Whenever I come to London I will let you know, and we will have
another talk. Meanwhile you have made the situation intensely
interesting.

With all good wishes, Yours sincerely, J. CHAMBERLAIN.

_Mr. Labouchere to Lord Randolph Churchill._

_Private._

10 Queen Anne’s Gate: December 23.

Dear Churchill,--In your own interests think it over. This would
have been all very well if you had not been Leader of the House, or
if you had been Leader for some years. In the former case, you
might have upset your friends and been Leader; in the latter case
you would have become a fetish.

Parties just now do not hang together by principles. They are gangs
greedy of office. You got your lot in--there is a wide difference
between this and aiding in getting them out.

You and Chamberlain seem to me both to make the same mistake. You
ignore the power of the ‘machine.’ It has crushed many an able
man--Horsman, Lowe, Goschen, and Salisbury himself.

Whether Hartington joins or not, he will not be sorry that you have
resigned, and he will be all the more inclined to help the
Government. They only want thirty Unionists to have a good working
majority. The tendency of the Government will be to yield a little
more to him in order to revenge itself on you.

Joe is of no good to you. You have no idea of the feeling of the
Radicals against him. There is a good deal of sentiment in these
things; and just as Gladstone is their Christ, Joe is their
Anti-Christ. They will laugh to scorn his ‘Grand Councils.’ They
are, indeed, absurd. There are only two policies for
Ireland--Coercion, or a domestic legislature, &c. All else is
intrigue. You are not a Radical; on that line Joe will always cut
you out.

I don’t think that the occasion you have selected is a good one.
There is a strong public opinion, even amongst Liberals, for an
expenditure on armaments. It is true that Salisbury may wish to
obtain the money in order eventually to join in some absurd
European war, but this cannot be proved, and the basis of politics
is ‘hand to mouth.’

I should have thought that your game was rather a waiting one.
Sacrifice everything to becoming a fetish; then and only then, you
can do as you like. Hartington must go to the Lords. There is no
such thing in politics as burning boats, until there have been
explanations in the House of Commons. A Conservative Government
must spend, and generally a Liberal Government suffers from not
spending.

I write this--not, as you will perceive, in the interests of my
party, but in your individual interests. Surely when it is a
question of figures, and the figures are not known, there are the
elements of an arrangement.

Yours truly, H. LABOUCHERE.

Lord Randolph Churchill’s resignation had been received with universal surprise; but astonishment was swiftly succeeded by anger. His enemies--and they multiplied rapidly--raised an exultant chorus of ‘I told you so!’ His friends everywhere found themselves without an answer. The Unionist Press was unanimous in its censures, and the London clubs were loud in their abuse. The cohorts of tale-bearers and gossips on the flanks of a Government were eager to impute the worst and meanest motives, and his action, already difficult to vindicate, was variously attributed to temper, to treachery, and to both. The whole strength of the party organisation was exerted against him. The public was informed through a thousand channels that he had aimed a deadly blow at the Union upon an impulse of personal ambition or of personal spite. His rupture with Lord Salisbury was utter and complete. The Queen was grievously offended by his premature disclosure to the _Times_; and in the mood that was abroad he found, like Macaulay before him, that to write on Windsor Castle paper may sometimes be accounted as a crime. Yet, although he was thus the object of so much reproach, he was of course unable to defend himself. He requested permission to publish his letters of resignation.

‘I cannot agree,’ replied Lord Salisbury by telegraph. ‘It would be entirely at variance with the accepted practice, according to which such explanations should be reserved for Parliament. You clearly cannot do it without the Queen’s leave.’

‘Obviously,’ rejoined Lord Randolph, ‘the letters have been shown to the _Standard_.’

‘No,’ was the answer. ‘Your supposition is incorrect; the letters referred to have not been seen by anyone.’

The Prime Minister was plainly within his rights in his refusal; yet while Lord Randolph Churchill was prevented by constitutional observance from publicly anticipating the explanation to be made in Parliament, and so from making any effective reply to his traducers, that explanation was being discounted in a dozen informal versions, disparaging sometimes by lavish falsehood, sometimes by ungenerous truth.

After accepting the resignation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer Lord Salisbury turned at once to Lord Hartington. He had hitherto, as we have seen, resisted the introduction of the Whigs into the Ministry; but the situation was now critical, if not indeed desperate, and he accepted the necessity. He therefore telegraphed to Lord Hartington, who was in Rome, and invited his co-operation, offering either to make such Cabinet arrangements as might suit him and his friends, or to serve under him if he would himself undertake to form a Government. Above all, he pressed for his immediate return to England. Lord Hartington responded to these appeals without alacrity. He tarried in Rome till the night of Sunday the 26th. Thence he proceeded to Monte Carlo ‘to pick up his letters.’ On the 28th he resumed his journey. It was not until the evening of the 29th that he arrived in London. His deliberation was justified by events.

The Prime Minister, having collected his Cabinet together from all parts of the country, met them on Tuesday, December 28, with a statement of his views upon the situation. ‘Master of tactics,’ as Lord Randolph called him, he rigidly confined the dispute to the single special question of the Estimates. The Ministers responsible for the defence of the Empire demanded a certain sum. The Minister responsible for the finances had refused that sum. The head of the Government, having to choose between them, was bound as a patriot to stand by the Empire. In the face of a vast Imperial issue and of the grave crisis in European affairs, the ordinary disputations of party politics--and, indeed, all personal predilections--must stand aside. The coaling stations, on which the British fleet depended for its world-wide mobility, were at stake. To defend them or not to defend them--that was the question: and who would hesitate in his answer, especially when the sum involved was remarkably small? Such, at least, was the version semi-officially communicated to the public and faithfully reproduced in every form of artistic variation by the party press, from the _Times_ newspaper to the remotest ramifications of the provincial and local journals.

Lord Salisbury also informed his colleagues that he was in communication with Lord Hartington, and he laid before them the nature of the offers he had made. The proceedings of the Cabinet were reported to be so harmonious that the _Times_ and many other Ministerial journals came to the conclusion that a Coalition with the Whigs was certain, and devoted many columns of print to preparing the minds of their readers for so excellent an arrangement. It was not until the next day that it dawned upon the journalistic world that numerous and influential members of the Government were very much averse on public grounds--the Empire, and, no doubt, the European crisis--from that ‘wide reconstruction’ which a Coalition or a Hartington Administration incidentally, but necessarily, involved. This reluctance was shared, not without reason, by the Conservative party generally, and voiced by the large number of members of Parliament whom the crisis had drawn to the Carlton Club. The Conservative party, although wanting thirty-five of an absolute majority in the House of Commons, were nevertheless by far the strongest and most compact party in the country; and they were by no means ready to acquiesce in their leader’s disinterested willingness to surrender the chief place in the Administration and to work on equal terms with a party which only numbered seventy. By the time that Lord Hartington’s train reached Charing Cross, on the night of the 29th, a Coalition Government had become excessively unpopular, and the _Times_ was forced to admit, with a blush for the frailty of political mankind, ‘that Lord Salisbury’s foresight and patriotism were a good deal above the level of the rank and file.’ Lord Randolph Churchill had counted upon Tory Democracy. It was not Tory Democracy that stopped the Coalition; but Tadpole and Taper.

[Sidenote: 1887 ÆT. 37]

By December 31 all prospect of a Coalition Ministry had been definitely abandoned. Lord Hartington’s prudent and dignified delay had alone prevented him from being placed in a false position. During the whole of the 30th he consulted his friends and considered the reports which reached him of the temper of the Conservative party. He had no difficulty in coming to a decision. Even if the opinion of the Tory party had been as favourable as it was unfavourable, it was certain that the Liberal Unionists were not ripe for a Coalition, and that any attempt to force them forward would lead to their disruption, and certainly end in a separation from Mr. Chamberlain and his followers. There was another obstacle--small, but not insignificant. Lord Hartington’s position at Rossendale was not so secure as to make his re-election certain. A Coalition was, in fact, so difficult and undesirable that it could only be attempted in the last resort. And until Lord Salisbury’s Government had been defeated in the House of Commons no one could say that all alternatives had been exhausted. Lord Hartington therefore declined, on January 1, the various propositions which Lord Salisbury had made to him.

Three courses were now, according to the _Times_, open to the Prime Minister: ‘To endeavour to induce Mr. Goschen to take the post of Chancellor of the Exchequer; to come to an understanding with Lord Randolph Churchill; or to reconstruct the Ministry from the Conservative ranks.’ All three were strenuously debated throughout the country. The idea of a reconciliation on some compromise between Lord Randolph Churchill and Lord Salisbury obtained powerful support. Rumour was tireless in formulating the terms on which peace might be made--was to be made. The _Morning Post_, always an ardent and faithful friend to Lord Randolph Churchill, never ceased to urge reunion with all the weight of its unimpeachable Toryism. Every movement of the Prime Minister and his late colleague was watched with cat-like attention. No one could call at Arlington Street or Connaught Place without the closest scrutiny; and when it became known that Lord Abergavenny, Lord Rowton and Sir Henry Wolff had visited both houses, the gossips and quidnuncs of the clubs thought the dispute as good as settled.

It was pointed out at this time that the circumstances of Lord Randolph Churchill’s resignation bore a very curious resemblance to those in which Lord Palmerston had resigned the Home Secretaryship in 1853. Lord Palmerston had resigned on December 15, ostensibly on certain details of the Reform Bill. It was asserted that he differed from the Cabinet upon its policy in Eastern Europe; and this was strenuously denied by the adherents of the Ministry. Lord Palmerston’s resignation was made public before he had heard that it had been accepted by the Queen. Inspired articles attacking Lord Palmerston appeared in the _Times_. Lord Derby, writing to Lord Malmesbury, observed that Lord Palmerston is ‘much, and justly, annoyed’ at this. ‘As _his_ lips are sealed, Aberdeen has no business to speak through the newspapers.’ To cap all this, there were on both occasions heavy falls of snow, which made communications difficult and slow. After some days of suspense Lord Palmerston was prevailed upon to withdraw his resignation and to resume office. Would the parallel be completed?

Lord Randolph Churchill had so little expected to fail in his conflict with the Cabinet that he had not clearly thought out how he would stand in that event. Lord Salisbury’s acceptance of his resignation, without interview, remonstrance, or offer of compromise, had surprised him; but he faced the situation calmly. Not to be behindhand in determination, he had clinched matters by himself publishing the news. He realised at once how serious were the consequences and how narrowed and difficult his position had become. He found himself, alone and unprepared, on ground most unfavourable; yet he did not seek to avoid the issue. He made no suggestions of reconciliation. Even after the failure of the Hartington coalition he would lend himself to no overtures. He forbade his friends to concern themselves in the affair. He rebuked Wolff with unnecessary violence for an unauthorised attempt, not ill-received by Lord Salisbury, to make peace: ‘Do you think you can manage me like one of your Cairene Pashas?’ During the whole fortnight that the Cabinet was in flux he abstained from the slightest action, covert or overt, which could aggravate the crisis.

To remodel the Government and to allow the excitement to cool down, Ministers prorogued Parliament from January 13--the date which Lord Randolph had fixed--till January 27, and the time when an explanation could be offered was further delayed. But in face of harsher misrepresentation and abuse than has been directed against any politician since, Lord Randolph remained absolutely silent to the public. He said nothing, he did nothing: and yet there were many close observers of politics who thought more than once that all would fall back into his hands, that Lord Salisbury would be forced to invite him to rejoin upon terms or leave him to form a Government of his own.

To Chamberlain, who had spoken of him in words of warm appreciation a few days before--saying, among other things, that Lord Randolph Churchill’s position in the Government had been a guarantee that they would not pursue a reactionary policy--he wrote with complete candour:--

December 24, 1886.

Your letter just received and your speech gave me equal delight. I
told you that a Ministerial crisis was coming when you dined with
me, but I own I did not think that I should have failed to persuade
Lord S. to take a broad view of the situation. I had no choice but
to go; he had been for weeks prepared for it, and possibly courted
the crash. I did my best for his Government while I was in it, but
I had ceased to be useful.... Their innate Toryism is rampant and
irrepressible.

Party papers seem to think the most awful crime which a modern
politician can commit is to have a spark of principle or a regard
for former pledges.... I feel much in the dark as to the future;
my position is completely _déclassé_. I hear the Carlton would like
to tear me limb from limb; and yet does no blame or responsibility
attach [to Lord S.?] The anxiety of the last two days has made me
very seedy.

His mother had, as usual, a somewhat more hopeful account.

Treasury Chambers, Whitehall: December 28, 1886.

I have as yet no news. Hartington may join. Goschen is to meet him
in Paris to-morrow; it all depends whether he can be re-elected or
not. Wolff is too faithful for description. I am pleased with the
general tone of the Press. I expected it to be much worse. I can’t
bear to leave this room, where I can sit and think and hear
everything quickly. The matter is very critical, but by no means
desperate, and may drag on indefinitely for some days.

I am very well and in very good spirits. Please do not worry about
me or put off your journey.

The pleasant party at Howth, to which he had been looking forward, must be forsaken.

_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Justice FitzGibbon._

Treasury Chambers, Whitehall, S.W.: December 24, 1886.

You see my Irish hopes are shattered. I mean the Howth hopes. I
have nothing to do but to keep very quiet for the moment, and
pleasure is out of the question.

I hope you do not blame me hastily. It was certain to come, and
delay produced danger.

I should like to tell you all about it; it is too long to write.

I feel rather seedy, as the anxiety has wearied me awfully; so do
not write more.

Treasury Chambers, Whitehall, S.W.: December 26, 1886.

I cannot manage Howth this year, though you must know what a
disappointment to me it is not to join you. But I should be a
wet-blanket altogether, and, moreover, I could not stand the
‘Tutissimus.’[60] He would drive me wild with his airs of moral
triumph and success.

What a time we are having! Lord S. has committed a capital blunder
in again prostrating himself before Hartington. Why did he not set
his back to the wall and go on, _coûte que coûte_? Still, you must
not think I have any illusions about myself. In inflicting on the
old gang this final fatal blow, I have mortally wounded myself. But
the work is practically done; the Tory Party will be turned into a
Liberal Party, and in that transformation may yet produce a
powerful governing force. If not, G.O.M., Labby, anarchy, &c., are
triumphant.

Interesting times, my dear FitzGibbon! I wonder what old Ball says.

So far as the political world was concerned, he contented himself with writing a private letter to Mr. Akers-Douglas for the assurance of his political friends and for the information of Conservative members of Parliament who might inquire. It is remarkable that this letter has never yet been published:--

Treasury Chambers, Whitehall, S.W.: New Year’s Day, 1887.

My dear Douglas,--Having noticed in the newspapers this morning a
variety of mischievous nonsense taking the form of statements as to
my reasons for quitting the Government, my views as to what would
be necessary to secure my return to the Government, and suggestions
as to terms of reconciliation, I think it proper in the public
interest, and as much for purposes of future record as for any
other more immediate object, to lay before you my views on the
position.

The primary object of all government at the present moment is to
maintain the Union, to maintain it not for a session or for a
Parliament, but for our time. The maintenance of the Union is, to
my mind, in no way a question of men, but entirely a question of
measures and administration. Mr. Gladstone has identified the
Liberal party with the policy of Repeal; he has behind him
Scotland, Wales and Ireland, and no inconsiderable portion of
England. In the event of the Conservative Government and party
pursuing in the coming session a policy, foreign and domestic,
which for one reason or another becomes unpopular with, and is
discredited in the eyes of, that great portion of the English
electorate which, after a tremendous struggle, has been kept true
to the principle of the Union, the inevitable result will be that
at the next election Mr. Gladstone and the Liberal party will
return to power, pledged to immediate Repeal, and in a position to
give immediate effect to their pledge.

The composition of the present Parliament renders it a matter of no
insuperable difficulty to carry on the government of the Queen for
a session or two, or even longer, _tant bien que mal_; but such a
proceeding, so limited and so narrow in its view, would be, to my
mind, the most fallacious and dangerous of statesmanship. From the
time when I joined the Government I have never taken my eyes off
the next General Election. My one desire has been that Lord
Salisbury should be in a position to go boldly to the country at
any moment, confident of popular support. To this end every word of
advice on any subject which I have ever offered him has been
directed, and it was only when it was forced upon me that these
views did not practically commend themselves either to him or his
colleagues that I took the grave and serious step of releasing
myself from all responsibility for a policy which in two or three
years would, as far as human judgment may be exercised in such a
matter, have led straight to Repeal.

A foreign policy which may at any moment involve this country in a
European war; a domestic policy which would be marked by stagnation
rather than progress; free expenditure, necessitating continued
high taxation, when combined with the defence of the Union, would
without doubt weigh down and crush out of all popular life that
great and vital Imperial principle. Not only so, but a policy of
which the above were the main characteristics not only involved so
insignificant a person as myself in a marked violation of pledges
given to the public, but also to all intents and purposes the
entire Conservative party in the House of Commons. From 1880 to
1885 every Conservative speaker on every public platform has
proclaimed, with every variety of style and paraphrase, that the
Liberal party have been false to their traditions, and that ‘Peace,
Retrenchment and Reform’ could only be practically given effect to
by the Tories. Nor can it be doubted that this persistent iteration
of a political position which, so far as the Liberals were
concerned, could be demonstrated by facts, produced an immense
effect upon the masses in the great English towns. Should, however,
the results of a year or two of Tory government show that the
accusations against the Tory party so constantly made by the
Liberals--namely, that the Tory party are the war party, that they
are the extravagant party, that they are the do-nothing and
obstructive party--can be demonstrated by actual facts and events,
it seems certain that the great town electorate, which we have had
so much trouble in winning, will sway back violently to the Liberal
party, their earlier love, and that the disaster of 1880 will be
repeated on a larger scale and with more deadly effect.

To avert such a disaster there is nothing I would not do, nothing I
would not sacrifice; but if the catastrophe must come, I will not
that anyone shall be able to say that any large portion of
responsibility rested upon me.

It was if possible by a desperate effort (so profoundly was I
convinced of the magnitude of the peril into which the Tory
Government and party were drifting by looking too much to tiding
over the difficulties of the moment, and not at all to the next
General Election) to rouse my friends to a sense of the position
that I resigned my office and incurred with much equanimity the
tornado of slander, obloquy and every variety of misrepresentation
that friends, and possibly even colleagues, have let loose upon me.

I seek for no re-entry into the present Government; I decline to
commence any undignified or unworthy bargaining and huckstering as
to the terms of reconciliation; but this I say--that if by any
coalition, fusion or reconstruction a Government is formed which by
its composition and its policy will be an earnest and a guarantee
to the country that a period of peaceful progressive administration
has in reality set in, I would serve that Government with the
utmost loyalty in any capacity, however humble, either as a member
or a follower, only too glad that by any sacrifice or any action of
mine I might possibly have averted danger to the State.

Furthermore, this I add: that whatever course the Prime Minister
may take at this moment, he need not for one moment fear the
smallest opposition, direct or indirect, from me, in Parliament or
in the country. I shall make no further attempt to defend my
action, lest by any such attempt I might, even by one iota,
increase the difficulties which surround him; but, recognising to
the full my great fallibility of judgment, I shall watch silently
and sadly the progress of events.

Believe me to be Very sincerely yours, RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

Mr. Chamberlain’s comment was characteristic:--

Highbury, Moor Green, Birmingham: January 3, 1887.

My dear Churchill,--I return your very interesting Memorandum. If I
had been you I do not think I should have added the last paragraph.
When a man says that in no case will he return a blow, he is very
likely to be cuffed.

However, I dare say Lord Salisbury will not take you too literally
at your word, and will avoid any extreme test of your most
Christian disposition.

I heard before I left that Goschen was likely to join. He will
certainly carry no one else with him, but he may be able to commit
Hartington to a more unqualified support than he would otherwise
have given to a purely Tory Government.

I understood that one cause of his hesitation was his fear that you
would be actively hostile, if he took your place. Probably he has
since been reassured by a sight of your letter to Akers-Douglas.

I do not know yet whether anything will come of negotiations
between the Gladstonians and the Radical Unionists. I never felt
less like ‘a surrender’ in my life, and Labouchere and his crew may
put what interpretation they like on the matter, but they will not
be able to show that I have advanced one iota from the position of
my telegram to the Unionist meeting, extended as it was by my
speech in Birmingham.

The future is still obscure to me, but the game is exceedingly
interesting at this moment.

Yours sincerely, J. CHAMBERLAIN.

Another explanation was not neglected:--

_Lord Randolph Churchill to Sir Henry Ponsonby._

2 Connaught Place, W.: January 13, 1887.

Dear Sir Henry Ponsonby,--I saw His Royal Highness the Prince of
Wales to-day, and from an observation which he made I learnt for
the first time on authority that the publication of the news of my
resignation took place before the matter had been made the subject
of official communication to Her Majesty, and that in so far as my
action was responsible for such publicity the Queen had cause for
displeasure with me.

I am much grieved at this news, and anxious to place on record the
facts bearing upon the matter as they are known to me. On Thursday,
December 18, I had a long conversation with Lord Salisbury, in
which I intimated to him that the expenditure proposed for the
Army and Navy was considerably higher than what I could be
responsible for in view of my reiterated public pledges as to the
necessity for and possibility of retrenchment. On Monday, the 20th,
I had a long conversation with the Secretary of State for War, and
a written communication from the First Lord of the Admiralty which
confirmed me in the views which I had communicated to Lord
Salisbury on the previous Thursday.

On Monday, the 20th, in the evening, I wrote from Windsor to Lord
Salisbury intimating my desire to withdraw from the Government.

It would have been a source of immense relief to me if I had been
able to acquaint Her Majesty with what was passing when I had the
honour of dining at Windsor, but my great want of experience of
official life led me to believe that had I initiated so grave a
matter in the conversation which Her Majesty was graciously pleased
to hold with me I should have been guilty of a most unusual breach
of etiquette and of Ministerial practice and decorum: all the more
as no opening presented itself for bringing up the subject, though
in truth my mind was entirely absorbed by it.

Lord Salisbury received my letter early Tuesday morning, the 21st,
and no answer from him reached me till eight o’clock on Wednesday
evening--a considerable interval, remembering the proximity of
Hatfield either to Windsor or London. Lord Salisbury’s answer was
of a most definite character, accepting my resignation; and bearing
in mind the interval which had elapsed, I made perfectly certain
that the fullest communications on the subject had passed between
Her Majesty and Lord Salisbury, and that Lord Salisbury’s answer
was written with Her Majesty’s knowledge. In fact, it never crossed
my mind that the reverse could be the case, and I thought myself
justified in no longer making any secret of the fact that I no
longer had the honour of belonging to the Government. If I erred in
this, it was from ignorance and from misunderstanding, and not the
least from design and I would be intensely distressed if it might
be supposed that by any action of mine I had been wanting in that
profound respect to Her Majesty which it is the high and grateful
duty of all to render, and which Her Majesty’s most gracious
treatment of myself on several occasions doubly and trebly imposed
upon me.

Perhaps indeed I am doing wrong in making you this communication.
If so, I trust to your kindness to inform me on the subject before
making any use of this letter.

Believe me to be Yours very truly, RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

The reply was frigid:--

_Sir Henry Ponsonby to Lord Randolph Churchill._

Osborne: January 15, 1887.

Dear Lord Randolph,--The Queen has read your letter relating to the
announcement of your resignation before it had been accepted by Her
Majesty; and commands me to thank you for your explanation.

Yours very truly, HENRY PONSONBY.

It was about this time, when many from whom he might have expected service were falling away, that Lord Randolph received the sympathy and support of an able man with whom during the next four years he was to be associated, and from whom he was ultimately destined to part in very gloomy circumstances. Mr. Louis Jennings, the Conservative member for Stockport and a full-blooded Fair Trader, looked upon ‘Tory Democracy’ as a living political faith. He was a man of strong character and extensive information who had reached the House of Commons late in life, after a varied career. He had travelled widely, and had taken an active part in the politics of other countries than his own. As the editor of the _Times of India_ he had been largely concerned in the agitation which had led to the suppression of the Juggernaut ceremonial. With the _New York Times_ as his weapon he had broken up, by a prolonged and pitiless audit of their accounts, the Tammany Ring in 1871; and, after a struggle in which his life was said to be in danger, he had hunted the notorious ‘Boss’ Tweed to the gaol in which he died. Taught alike by experience and study, a man of action and a writer, Mr. Jennings was well fitted to become an effective political force, and, as the editor of the Croker papers, he did not lack recognition in the world of letters. He now made himself known to Lord Randolph Churchill in a style which expresses the sincerity of his feelings and reveals the slenderness of their acquaintance:--

73 Elm Park Gardens, S.W.: December 31, 1886.

My Lord,--At a time when all the busybodies and nobodies in the
country are thrusting advice upon you I am very reluctant to appear
to join the throng. I hope, however, you will permit me to assure
you that I have tried to keep my own constituency from committing
the gross injustice of condemning a man before he is heard. For my
own part, it will take a great deal to convince me that in the
great sacrifices you have made, and the grave responsibilities you
have incurred, you have not been actuated by a high sense of duty
and by the purest and best motives. If this be so--as I feel sure
it is--there will be a reaction against all this wild clamour, and
the people will do you justice.

I am, my Lord, Yours very truly, L. J. JENNINGS.

Lord Hartington’s determination having been made public, Lord Salisbury next turned to Mr. Goschen. Mr. Goschen’s position was different and distinct from that of Lord Hartington. He was not tied to any particular constituency, and in respect of a seat could avail himself of the large resources of the Conservative party. He had for several years been out of tune with the Liberal policy and, more than any other Whig, he had been alarmed and estranged by the growing influence of Radicalism. He had not joined the Government of 1880, and he was free alike from responsibility for its failures and resentment towards its assailants. Lord Hartington was the leader of a party with the obligations and restrictions of leadership. Mr. Goschen was eminent, but detached. Moreover, his high financial authority would strengthen the Government at the very point where it had been most seriously weakened. He was now invited to go to the Treasury, and it was generally believed that, whatever temporary arrangements were made, the leadership in the Commons would soon devolve upon him.

Mr. Goschen nevertheless showed some hesitation in joining the Government. To participate in a regular Coalition in company with political friends wore a different complexion from entering the Cabinet of the opposite political party alone. He desired most strongly to preserve his relations with Lord Hartington and his character as a Liberal; and even when reassured on these points he stipulated that two other Whigs should be included in the Cabinet to give him countenance and support. Places were thereupon offered to Lord Northbrook and Lord Lansdowne. But at this the Conservative party, so far as it was represented by the Carlton Club, again showed such disapproval that these peers felt it their duty to decline office, and in the end Mr. Goschen was fain to join without them. For the rest, Mr. Smith became First Lord of the Treasury, with the leadership of the House of Commons; Stanhope took the War Office and Sir Henry Holland the Colonies; while Lord Salisbury himself assumed, none too soon, the direction of foreign affairs.

Mr. Goschen’s acceptance of office definitely put an end to the Cabinet crisis. ‘The new Chancellor of the Exchequer,’ observed the _Times_ tartly, ‘will take Lord Randolph Churchill’s place in more senses than one.’ The Government was completely reconstituted, and no expectation of overtures or reconciliation could be entertained. It has in consequence often been represented that this appointment was to Lord Randolph a contingency utterly unforeseen. The saying, so often attributed to him, ‘I forgot Goschen,’ is interpreted as a key to deep designs. In an elaborate calculation he had overlooked a vital factor. In the moment of success he was ruined by an inexplicable neglect. The evidence upon these pages does not sustain this view. He marshalled no forces against the Prime Minister. With an imprudence born of repeated success, he prepared no combination, either of circumstances or men, to support his demands. He went into battle without allies or armour. He set his unaided personal power--as he had often done before--to back his opinions, and awaited the issue with an easy mind. He had not, of course, considered Mr. Goschen’s financial reputation in connection with a vacancy at the Exchequer; but, so far from forgetting Mr. Goschen himself, he was constantly solicitous for him. A Coalition with all or any of the Whigs had been for three years his consistent and persistent aim. After the election of 1885 he was willing to resign, that Mr. Goschen might join the Administration. In his memorandum written before the first meeting of Parliament in 1886 he again strongly pressed upon Lord Salisbury that places should be offered to the Whigs, including Mr. Goschen. In November he was concerned that Mr. Goschen should be elected to Parliament and urged Lord Salisbury to put him forward for a seat which might soon be vacant. And lastly, on December 18, two days before his letter of resignation, when the dispute in the Cabinet was at its height, both Lord Salisbury and Mr. Goschen were his guests at a dinner the avowed object of which was to bring them together. However decisive, however disastrous to Lord Randolph the inclusion of Mr. Goschen in the Government at this time may have been, it was no surprise; for he had always been its advocate. It was not fatal to his schemes; for there were no schemes.

_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Dunraven._

2 Connaught Place, W.: January 12, 1887.

My dear Dunraven,--I consider honestly that you are quite as good a
judge as to what the political position requires from moderate
progressive politicians as I am. You have seen all the
correspondence between me and Lord Salisbury, as well as my letter
to Akers-Douglas, about which last Lord S. says it makes the breach
unbridgeable. Therefore my explanation, when it comes, will add
little or nothing to your knowledge.

With respect to persons like ----, ----, &c., whom I look upon as my
friends, I have been most careful to check any tendency to follow
my example, for resignation might be fatal to their political
career, on which they depend almost for social existence, and I was
most fearful of any responsibility attaching to me for having led
them to extinction.

With you I feel in a different position. You have a social and
political position of your own, which the holding of a minor office
in the Government by no means enhances, and which the loss of such
an office would by no means affect.

Tory Democracy may be a bad name, but it represents to you and me
and many more certain distinct political principles which you and I
hold very strongly. That those principles are in the utmost peril
just now there can be no doubt. We know what Lord Salisbury is, and
we know what Goschen is, and we know that our views are regarded by
both with unrelenting distrust and aversion.

On the whole, I think you are in a position to try a bold course;
and you must not undervalue your strength in the country, where you
are well known, followed by many, and greatly regarded by all.
However, let us talk it over this afternoon at the Carlton.

Yours ever, RANDOLPH S. C.

Eventually Lord Dunraven decided to resign the office which he held, of Under-Secretary for the Colonies; but his partnership with Lord Randolph Churchill proved in the end more noticeable at Newmarket than at Westminster.

Perhaps some day it may be possible to publish in a complete form the letters, some of which have been quoted in these pages, which passed between Lord Salisbury and Lord Randolph Churchill during their eventful association. Although the period scarcely extended above two years, the correspondence would attain considerable dimensions. Yet the reader would be wise to persevere: for when we consider the easy yet forceful pens employed; the profound and secret knowledge of political movements and forces at work which both possessed; the importance, range and fascinating variety of subjects; the changing relationships and antagonisms of the writers; above all, the free and candid style of their intercourse--whether in regard to men or things--one cannot imagine any compilation which would more truthfully illuminate the dark and stormy history of those times. All that, however, is a matter for the future. Such as it had been, the correspondence was now to close, for hardly any communication--and that only of a formal nature--was desired on either side in the years which followed. Nevertheless, its conclusion was not unworthy.

Lord Iddesleigh had been apparently forgotten in the reconstruction of the Cabinet. In the strife and excitement of these harsh days this unwarlike figure had dropped out of men’s minds. Lord Salisbury’s assumption of the Foreign Office necessarily displaced him; and he was, perhaps not unreasonably, offended to read the first news of it in the daily papers of January 12. It was said by the wags that ‘Randolph had driven him from the House of Commons in his rise, and from the Cabinet in his fall.’ Tragedy, never very far behind the curtain, came forward swiftly on the heels of this. That same afternoon Lord Iddesleigh called upon Lord Salisbury at Downing Street, and, being overtaken in the anteroom by the heart disease from which he had so long been afflicted, he expired in the presence of the Prime Minister.

The disputes between Lord Randolph Churchill and Sir Stafford Northcote have been very fully recorded in this story; and I fear their harsh features cannot truthfully be softened or smoothed away. They must be judged as a whole and in relation to the circumstances of the time. Here is the last word upon them:--

_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury._

2 Connaught Place, W.: January 13, 1887.

Dear Lord Salisbury,--Although a great and wide political
difference has separated me from you officially, I cannot refrain
(even possibly at the risk of being misunderstood) from writing you
a line to express how greatly I grieve for the shock you must have
experienced owing to the melancholy occurrence of yesterday
afternoon. It seems very hard on you that this grave event should
have come now to add its own weight to the many other troubles and
worries which circumstances purely political have occasioned.

I felt much the old Lord’s death, for he had for years past gone
through much bother, disappointment, and probably vexation, nor
can I conveniently repress the reflection _quorum pars magna fui_.
But this I can say from my own knowledge, consisting of the
recollection of many facts and conversations, that never in public
life did any man have a truer friend and colleague than Lord
Iddesleigh had in you; and certainly if rewards, honours and the
praise of men are sources of satisfaction, Lord Iddesleigh enjoyed
them in a fuller measure than any other contemporary, and that he
did so I consider to be mainly owing to the unwavering loyalty with
which you invariably supported him, checked all depreciation, and
stimulated constant recognition of his public services.

I like to place this on record, though possibly it may be deemed
somewhat presumptuous, for it has been my fortune in the last two
or three years to see as much almost perhaps as anyone into the
inner and more concealed working of our party life.

Believe me to be, with much sympathy,

Yours most sincerely, RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Randolph Churchill._

Hatfield House, Hatfield, Herts: January 14, 1887.

My dear Randolph,--I am very grateful for the kind sympathy
expressed in your letter of yesterday, and very much touched by it.
Your testimony to my bearing towards our old friend in the past is
thoughtful and generous.

It was a very painful scene that I witnessed on Wednesday in
Downing Street. I had never happened to see anyone die before--and
therefore, even apart from the circumstances, the suddenness of
this unexpected death would have been shocking. But here was, in
addition, the thought of our thirty years’ companionship in
political life; and the reflection that now, just before this
sudden parting, by some strange misunderstanding which it is
hopeless to explain, I had, I believe for the first time in my
life, seriously wounded his feelings. As I looked upon the dead
body stretched before me I felt that politics was a cursed
profession.

I have received very kind and considerate letters from his family.

Thanking you again for the thoughtfulness of your letter,

Believe me Yours very truly, SALISBURY.

As the time for the meeting of Parliament drew near, it was necessary for Lord Randolph to think very carefully upon the explanation he would offer for the unexpected events of the Recess. Circumstances complex and adverse made his position one of extreme disadvantage. It was hardly possible for him to move in any direction without estranging friends or exposing himself to enemies.

The spirit of his differences with Ministers was vital, but the actual matter in dispute could only be regarded as trivial. Two courses therefore presented themselves at the outset: either to fight on the large ground of the unsatisfied aspirations of Tory Democracy, as set forth in his letter to Mr. Akers-Douglas, or upon the small ground of the Estimates. The first involved a downright assault upon the Conservative Government, an irreparable breach with its leaders, and the breaking of many old friendships and associations. The second whittled the difference down to a question of not very important figures, on which Parliament must soon decide. The one promised a chance of successful strife, the other offered a prospect of reconciliation; the one led soon into very deep waters, the other lay among the shallows. But, in all respects save one, the first was the path of courage, of consistency and perhaps of prudence also. It suited his nature. It freed his hands. It justified and explained his action in a manner which the people could easily understand. ‘I fondly hoped to make the Conservative party the instrument of Tory Democracy. It was “an idle schoolboy’s dream.” I must look elsewhere.’

No doubt that was the road to tread. It might have ended in Liberalism; but from that he would not at a later date have shrunk. Chamberlain and Rosebery were better friends to him personally and politically than Smith or Hamilton or Balfour could ever be. To act with the Conservative party meant political paralysis, perhaps for years. To stand independently, or upon a moderate Liberal platform, putting away once and for all any thought of reconciliation, meant usefulness, support and growing power. But one great barrier interposed. The Union was a cause to which he was pledged, not only by memorable votes and speeches, but by profound and unalterable conviction.

So this first course, with its various chances, was forbidden. The second was scarcely more satisfactory and far less congenial. In whatever proportion he restricted the dispute to a mere question of expenditure, he deprived himself of the power of defending his resignation, and therefore weakened his position with the country. To fight on finance alone, when the other differences were known to his late colleagues, looked like repentance and admission of error. It was a course which counted on generosity where generosity was lacking; which counted on gratitude for past services, while in politics present and proximate utility is mainly considered; and it was a course requiring in an unusual degree patience and restraint. But, so far as outside influences could avail, this course was made easy for him. His friends and his family besought him not to break with his party. Ministers addressed him in terms uniformly friendly and considerate. ‘The subject on which he parted from us,’ wrote Lord Salisbury to the Duchess of Marlborough on January 11, ‘is one which the House of Commons must decide one way or the other very shortly, and no one would dispute that its decision, once gained, must be accepted. After that it will be quite open to Randolph to rejoin this or any other Conservative Ministry as soon as opportunity occurs.’

And Mr. Smith on the 13th:--

You have a perfect right to hold the views you expressed to me in
my room. I differed then and now from you, but it may turn out that
you are right and that I am wrong, and I shall accept a
demonstration of that fact without the very slightest personal
annoyance.

But, however that may be, all that has happened is an incident in
the career of a young politician of quite a temporary character,
and, unless my life is cut short as Northcote’s has been, I look
forward with confidence to a future--and the sooner it comes the
better--when I shall be in the retirement I long for, and you will
be leading a great party with prudence and firmness and courage.

Lord Randolph chose to follow the second course; he avowed himself an independent supporter of the Government, and his formal request for permission to explain made no allusion to differences on foreign policy or legislation.

_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury._

2 Connaught Place, W.: January 18, 1887.

Dear Lord Salisbury,--May I ask you to be so kind as to obtain for
me Her Majesty’s permission to make to the House of Commons the
necessary explanation of my reasons for quitting the Government? I
propose, if this permission is granted, to state briefly the nature
and amount of the expenditure to which I objected, to answer with
equal brevity certain precipitate criticisms on that resignation to
which many Members of Parliament and much of the Press are
committed, and to conclude by reading the three letters which
passed between us, viz. mine of the 20th, yours of the 22nd, and my
reply of the same date.

Believe me to be Very truly yours, RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Randolph Churchill._

10 Downing Street, Whitehall: January 19, 1887.

My dear Randolph,--In pursuance of a message I got from you through
Douglas I asked and obtained the requisite permission when I was at
Osborne the other day. The form in which you propose to give your
explanation seems to me quite correct.

Believe me Yours very sincerely, SALISBURY.