Chapter X: Introduction (2)

=486. Pursuing fire; disordered units not to pursue.= If the enemy has left the position when the charging troops reach it, the latter should open a rapid fire upon the retreating enemy, if he is in sight. It is not advisable for the mixed and disordered units to follow him, except to advance to a favorable firing position or to cover the reorganization of others. (472)

=487. Pursuing troops; reorganization of charging line; preparations to meet counter-attack.= The nearest formed bodies accompanying or following the charge are sent instantly in pursuit. Under cover of these troops order is restored in the charging line. If the captured position is a part of a general line or is an advanced post, it should be intrenched and occupied at once.

The exhaustion of officers and men must not cause the neglect of measures to meet a counter-attack. (473)

=488. Steps to be taken when attack receives temporary setback.= If the attack receives a temporary setback and it is intended to strengthen and continue it, officers will make every effort to stop the rearward movement and will reestablish the firing line in a covered position as close as possible to the enemy. (474)

=489. Steps to be taken if attack is abandoned.= If the attack must be abandoned, the rearward movement should continue with promptness until the troops reach a feature of the terrain that facilitates the task of checking and reorganizing them. The point selected should be so far to the rear as to prevent interference by the enemy before the troops are ready to resist. The withdrawal of the attacking troops should be covered by the artillery and by reserves, if any are available.

(See Night Operations, pars. 580-590.) (475)

PURSUIT

=490. Full fruits of victory reaped by pursuit.= To reap the full fruits of victory a vigorous pursuit must be made. The natural inclination to be satisfied with a successful charge must be overcome. The enemy must be allowed no more time to reorganize than is positively unavoidable. (476)

=491. Parts played in pursuit by reserve, artillery, and charging troops.= The part of the reserve that is still formed or is best under control is sent forward in pursuit and vigorously attacks the enemy's main body or covering detachments wherever found.

The artillery delivers a heavy fire upon the retreating enemy; the disordered attacking troops secure the position, promptly reform and become a new reserve. (477)

=492. Strengthening of position captured, if section of general line.= If the captured position is a section of the general line, the breach should be heavily occupied, made wider, and strongly secured by drawing on all reserves in the vicinity. (478)

=493. Pursuit by parallel roads.= After the pursuit from the immediate battlefield, pursuit by parallel roads is especially effective where large commands are concerned. (479)

=494. Artillery and cavalry in pursuit.= Artillery and cavalry are very effective in pursuit. (480)

ATTACK OF FORTIFICATIONS

=495. Modifications of attack in case of fortifications.= Few modifications enter into the problem of attacking fortifications. Such as are to be considered relate chiefly to the greater time and labor of advancing, the more frequent use of darkness and the use of hand grenades to augment the fire. (481)

=496. Approaching charging point under cover of darkness.= If the enemy is strongly fortified and time permits, it may be advisable to wait and approach the charging point under cover of darkness. The necessary reconnaissance and arrangements should be made before dark. If the charge is not to be made at once, the troops intrench the advanced position, using sand bags if necessary. Before daylight the foreground should be cleared of obstacles. (482)

=497. Charging without fire preparation.= If the distance is short and other conditions are favorable, the charge may be made without fire preparation. If made, it should be launched with spirit and suddenness at the break of day. (See Night Operations pars. 580-590.) (483)

=498. Advancing to charging point by sapping.= In siege operations troops are usually advanced to the charging point by sapping. This method, however, presupposes that an early victory is not necessary, or that it is clearly inadvisable to attempt more direct methods. (484)

HOLDING ATTACK

=499. Requisites of the holding attack.= The holding attack must be vigorous enough to hold the enemy in position and must present a front strong enough to conceal the secondary nature of the attack.

The holding attack need have comparatively little strength in rear, but conceals the fact by a firing line not distinguishable from that of a decisive attack. (485)

=500. Post and strength of supports and reserves.= Supports and reserves are kept at short distances. Their strength is less if the object is merely to hold the enemy fast than if the object is, in addition, to compel him to use up reserves. (486)

=501. Holding attacks developing into decisive attacks.= Holding attacks which may later develop into decisive attacks should be correspondingly strong in rear. (487)

=502. Feint attacks.= All feint attacks should employ dense firing lines. Their weakness is in rear and is concealed. (488)

DEFENSE

POSITIONS AND INTRENCHMENTS

=503. Requirements of a good defensive position.= The first requirement of a good position is a clear field of fire and view to the front and exposed flanks to a distance of 600 to 800 yards or more. The length of front should be suitable to the size of the command and the flanks should be secure. The position should have lateral communication and cover for supports and reserves. It should be one which the enemy can not avoid, but must attack or give up his mission.

A position having all these advantages will rarely, if ever, be found. The one should be taken which conforms closest to the description. (489)

=504. Utilization of natural cover; construction of fieldworks and obstacles.= The natural cover of the position should be fully utilized. In addition, it should be strengthened by fieldworks and obstacles.

The best protection is afforded by deep, narrow, inconspicuous trenches. If little time is available, as much as practicable must be done. That the fieldworks may not be needed should not cause their construction to be omitted, and the fact that they have been constructed should not influence the action of a commander, if conditions are found to be other than expected. (490)

=505. Construction of communicating and cover trenches, head cover, etc.= When time and troops are available the preparations include the necessary communicating and cover trenches, head cover, bombproofs, etc. The fire trenches should be well supplied with ammunition.

The supports are placed close at hand in cover trenches when natural cover is not available. (491)

=506. Dummy trenches.= Dummy trenches frequently cause the hostile artillery to waste time and ammunition and to divert its fire. (492)

=507. Location, extent, garrison, etc., of fieldworks.= The location, extent, profile, garrison, etc., of fieldworks are matters to be decided by the infantry commanders. Officers must be able to choose ground and properly intrench it. (See "Field Fortifications," Chapter XVI, Part III.) (493)

=508. Outlining trace of trenches in combat exercises.= In combat exercises, when it is impracticable to construct the trenches appropriate to the exercise, their trace may be outlined by bayonets, sticks, or other markers, and the responsible officers required to indicate the profile selected, method and time of construction, garrisons, etc. (494)

DEPLOYMENT FOR DEFENSE

=509. Density of whole deployment.= The density of the whole deployment depends upon the expected severity of the action, the character of the enemy, the condition of the flanks, the field of fire, the terrain, and the available artificial or natural protection for the troops. (495)

=510. Density of firing line.= If exposed, the firing line should be as dense in defense as in attack. If the firing line is well intrenched and has a good field of fire, it may be made thinner.

Weaker supports are permissible. For the same number of troops the front occupied on the defensive may therefore be longer than on the offensive, the battalions placing more companies in the firing line. (496)

=511. Strength in rear to be increased when change from defensive to offensive is contemplated.= If it is intended only to delay the enemy, a fairly strong deployment is sufficient, but if decisive results are desired, a change to the offensive must be contemplated and the corresponding strength in rear provided. This strength is in the reserve, which should be as large as the demands of the firing line and supports permit. Even in a passive defense the reserve should be as strong as in the attack; unless the flanks are protected by other means. (497)

=512. Post of supports; cover for supports.= Supports are posted as close to the firing line as practicable and reinforce the latter according to the principles explained in the attack. When natural cover is not sufficient for the purpose, communicating and cover trenches are constructed. If time does not permit their construction, it is better to begin the action with a very dense firing line and no immediate supports than to have supports greatly exposed in rear. (498)

=513. Post of reserve.= The reserve should be posted so as to be entirely free to act as a whole, according to the developments. The distance from firing line to reserve is generally greater than in the attack. By reason of such a location the reserve is best able to meet a hostile enveloping attack; it has a better position from which to make a counter attack; it is in a better position to cover a withdrawal and permit an orderly retreat.

The distance from firing line to reserve increases with the size of the reserve. (499)

=514. Post of reserve when situation is no longer in doubt.= When the situation is no longer in doubt, the reserve should be held in rear of the flank which is most in danger or offers the best opportunity for counter attack. Usually the same flank best suits both purposes. (500)

=515. Detaching part of reserve to protect opposite flank.= In exceptional cases, on broad fronts, it may be necessary to detach a part of the reserve to protect the opposite flank. This detachment should be the smallest consistent with its purely protective mission. (501)

=516. Assignment of front to units.= The commander assigns to subordinates the front to be occupied by them. These, in turn, subdivide the front among their next lower units in the firing line. (502)

=517. Division of extended position into sections.= An extended position is so divided into sections that each has, if practicable, a field of fire naturally made distinct by the terrain.

Unfavorable and unimportant ground will ordinarily cause gaps to exist in the line. (503)

=518. Size of units occupying sections; battalions to be kept intact.= The size of the unit occupying each section depends upon the latter's natural strength, front, and importance. If practicable, battalions should be kept intact and assigned as units to sections or parts of sections. (504)

=519. Adjoining sections or machine guns to cover dead space.= Where important dead space lies in front of one section, an adjoining section should be instructed to cover it with fire when necessary, or machine guns should be concealed for the like purpose. (505)

=520. Advanced posts and other dispersion to be avoided.= Advanced posts, or any other form of unnecessary dispersion, should be avoided. (506)

=521. Position itself not fully occupied until infantry attack begins.= Unless the difficulty of moving the troops into the position be great, most of the troops of the firing line are held in rear of it until the infantry attack begins. The position itself is occupied by a small garrison only, with the necessary outguards or patrols in front. (507)

=522. Fire alone unable to stop attack.= Fire alone can not be depended upon to stop the attack. The troops must be determined to resort to the bayonet, if necessary. (508)

=523. Steps to be taken if night attack is expected.= If a night attack or close approach by the enemy is expected, troops in a prepared position should strengthen the outguards and firing line and construct as numerous and effective obstacles as possible. Supports and local reserves should move close to the firing line and should, with the firing line, keep bayonets fixed. If practicable, the front should be illuminated, preferably from the flanks of the section. (509)

=524. Short range fire and bayonet in night attack.= Only short range fire is of any value in resisting night attacks. The bayonet is the chief reliance. (See Night Operations pars. 580-590.) (510)

COUNTER ATTACK

=525. Passive defense; only offensive wins.= The passive defense should be assumed only when circumstances force it. Only the offensive wins. (511)

=526. Active defense seeks favorable decision; counter attack necessary.= An active defense seeks a favorable decision. A favorable decision can not be expected without counter attack. (512)

=527. Protection of flanks by natural obstacles necessary in passive defense position.= A passive defense in a position whose flanks are not protected by natural obstacles is generally out of the question. (513)

=528. Post of troops for counter attack.= Where the defense is assumed with a view to making a counter attack, the troops for the counter attack should be held in reserve until the time arrives for such attack. The defensive line should be held by as few troops as possible in order that the force for the offensive may be as large as possible.

The force for the counter attack should be held echeloned in rear of the flank which offers it the greatest advantage for the proposed attack. (514)

=529. Manner of making counter attack.= The counter attack should be made vigorously and at the proper time. It will usually be made:

By launching the reserve against the enemy's flank when his attack is in full progress. This is the most effective form of counter attack.

Straight to the front by the firing line and supports after repulsing the enemy's attack and demoralizing him with pursuing fire.

Or, by the troops in rear of the firing line when the enemy has reached the defensive position and is in disorder. (515)

=530. Minor counter attacks.= Minor counter attacks are sometimes necessary in order to drive the enemy from important positions gained by him. (516)

DELAYING ACTION

=531. The important considerations in a delaying action.= When a position is taken merely to delay the enemy and to withdraw before becoming closely engaged, the important considerations are:

The enemy should be forced to deploy early. The field of fire should therefore be good at distances from 500 to 1,200 yards or more; a good field of fire at close range is not necessary.

The ground in rear of the position should favor the withdrawal of the firing line by screening the troops from the enemy's view and fire as soon as the position is vacated. (517)

=532. Thin firing line answers purpose; purposes of supports and reserve.= A thin firing line using much ammunition will generally answer the purpose. Supports are needed chiefly to protect the flanks.

The reserve should be posted well in rear to assist in the withdrawal of the firing line. (518)

=533. Value of artillery.= Artillery is especially valuable to a delaying force. (519)

MEETING ENGAGEMENTS

=534. Characteristics of meeting engagements.= Meeting engagements are characterized by the necessity for hasty reconnaissance, or the almost total absence of reconnaissance; by the necessity for rapid deployment, frequently under fire; and usually by the absence of trenches or other artificial cover. These conditions give further advantages to the offensive. (520)

=535. General action on meeting enemy.= The whole situation will usually indicate beforehand the proper general action to be taken on meeting the enemy. (521)

=536. Meagerness of information; qualities of commander to be relied upon.= Little fresh information can be expected. The boldness, initiative, and determination of the commander must be relied upon. (522)

=537. Meeting engagement affords ideal opportunity to certain commanders.= A meeting engagement affords an ideal opportunity to the commander who has intuition and quick decision and who is willing to take long chances. His opponent is likely to be overcautious. (523)

=538. The mission determines method of attack.= The amount of information that the commander is warranted in awaiting before taking final action depends entirely upon his mission. One situation may demand a blind attack; another may demand rapid, partial deployment for attack, but careful and time-consuming reconnaissance before the attack is launched. (524)

=539. Advantage accrues to side deploying the faster.= A great advantage accrues to the side which can deploy the faster. The advantage of a close-order formation, favoring rapid deployment, becomes more pronounced with the size of the force. (525)

=540. Advantages of first troops to deploy.= The first troops to deploy will be able to attack with longer firing lines and weaker supports than are required in the ordinary case. But if the enemy succeeds in deploying a strong defensive line, the attack must be strengthened accordingly before it is wasted. (526)

=541. Things to be done by the leading troops.= If the situation warrants the advance, the leading troops seek to deploy faster than the enemy, to reach his flanks, check his deployment, and get information. In any event, they seek to cover the deployment of their own troops in rear--especially the artillery--and to seize important ground. (527)

=542. Post of commander of long column meeting enemy; function of advance guard; action of column.= The commander of a long column which meets the enemy should be with the advance guard to receive information promptly and to reconnoiter. If he decides to fight, the advance guard must hold the enemy while the commander formulates a plan of action, issues the necessary orders, and deploys the main body. Meantime, the column should be closing up, either in mass or to form line of columns, so that the deployment, when determined upon, may be made more promptly. (528)

=543. Action of advance guard prior to receipt of orders.= The action of the advance guard, prior to the receipt of orders, depends upon the situation. Whether to attack determinedly or only as a feint, or to assume the defensive, depends upon the strength of the advance guard, the terrain, the character of the hostile force encountered, and the mission and intentions of the commander of the whole. (529)

=544. Main body should be used as a whole and not put into action piecemeal.= If the enemy is beforehand or more aggressive, or if the advance guard is too weak, it may be necessary to put elements of the main body into action as fast as they arrive, in order to check him. This method should be avoided; it prevents the formation and execution of a definite plan and compels piecemeal action. The best results are obtained when the main body is used as a whole. (530)

WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTION

=545. Withdrawal generally effected at heavy cost; rear guard and distance to be placed between enemy and defeated troops.= The withdrawal of a defeated force can generally be effected only at a heavy cost. When it is no longer possible to give the action a favorable turn and the necessity for withdrawal arises, every effort must be made to place distance and a rear guard between the enemy and the defeated troops. (531)

=546. Use of artillery, machine guns, and cavalry.= Artillery gives especially valuable assistance in the withdrawal. The long-range fire of machine guns should also be employed. Cavalry assists the withdrawal by charging the pursuing troops or by taking flank positions and using fire action. (532)

=547. Use of reserve to check the pursuit.= If an intact reserve remains, it should be placed in a covering position, preferably on a flank, to check the pursuit and thus enable the defeated troops to withdraw beyond reach of hostile fire.

The covering position of the reserve should be at some distance from the main action, but close enough to bring the withdrawing troops quickly under the protection of its fire. It should have a good field of fire at effective and long ranges and should facilitate its own safe and timely withdrawal. (533)

=548. Part of line to be withdrawn first; retreating troops to be gotten under control as soon as possible.= If the general line is divided, by terrain or by organization, into two or more parts, the firing line of the part in the least danger from pursuit should be withdrawn first. A continuous firing line, whose parts are dependent upon one another for fire support, should be withdrawn as a whole, retiring by echelon at the beginning of the withdrawal. Every effort must be made to restore the organizations, regain control, and form column of march as soon as the troops are beyond the reach of hostile fire.

As fast as possible without delaying the march, companies, and the larger units should be reformed, so that the command will again be well in hand. (534)

=549. Action taken by commander; selection of rendezvous point.= The commander of the whole, having given orders for withdrawal, should go to the rear, select a rendezvous point, and devote himself to the reorganization of his command.

The rendezvous point is selected with regard to the natural channels of movement approximately straight to the rear. It should be distant from the battlefield and should facilitate the gathering and protection of the command. (535)

SUMMARY

=550.= 1. Avoid combats that offer no chance of victory or other valuable results.

2. Make every effort for the success of the general plan and avoid spectacular plays that have no bearing on the general result.

3. Have a definite plan and carry it out vigorously. Do not vacillate.

4. Do not attempt complicated maneuvers.

5. Keep the command in hand; avoid undue extension and dispersion.

6. Study the ground and direct the advance in such a way as to take advantage of all available cover and thereby diminish losses.

7. Never deploy until the purpose and the proper direction are known.

8. Deploy enough men for the immediate task in hand; hold out the rest and avoid undue haste in committing them to the action.

9. Flanks must be protected either by reserves, fortifications, or the terrain.

10. In a decisive action, gain and keep fire superiority.

11. Keep up reconnaissance.

12. Use the reserve, but not until needed or a very favorable opportunity for its use presents itself. Keep some reserve as long as practicable.

13. Do not hesitate to sacrifice the command if the result is worth the cost.

14. Spare the command all unnecessary hardship and exertion. (536)

MACHINE GUNS

=551. Machine guns are weapons of emergency.= Machine guns must be considered as weapons of emergency. Their effectiveness combined with their mobility renders them of great value at critical, though infrequent, periods of an engagement. (537)

=552. Machine guns to be used for short periods, when opportunities present themselves.= When operating against infantry only, they can be used to a great extent throughout the combat as circumstances may indicate, but they are quickly rendered powerless by efficient field artillery and will promptly draw artillery fire whenever they open. Hence their use in engagements between large commands must be for short periods and at times when their great effectiveness will be most valuable. (538)

=553. Machine guns attached to advance guard; use in meeting engagements.= Machine guns should be attached to the advance guard. In meeting engagements they will be of great value in assisting their own advance, or in checking the advance of the enemy, and will have considerable time to operate before hostile artillery fire can silence them.

Care must be taken not to leave them too long in action. (539)

=554. Use of machine guns with rear guard.= They are valuable to a rear guard which seeks to check a vigorous pursuit or to gain time. (540)

=555. Machine guns in attack; fire of position.= In attack, if fire of position is practicable, they are of great value. In this case fire should not be opened by the machine guns until the attack is well advanced. At a critical period in the attack, such fire, if suddenly and unexpectedly opened, will greatly assist the advancing line. The fire must be as heavy as possible and must be continued until masked by friendly troops or until the hostile artillery finds the machine guns. (541)

=556. Machine guns in defense.= In the defense, machine guns should be used in the same general manner as described above for the attack. Concealment and patient waiting for critical moments and exceptional opportunities are the special characteristics of the machine-gun service in decisive actions. (542)

=557. Machine guns as part of reserve; use in covering withdrawal.= As part of the reserve, machine guns have special importance. If they are with the troops told off to protect the flanks, and if they are well placed, they will often produce decisive results against a hostile turning movement. They are especially qualified to cover a withdrawal or make a captured position secure. (543)

=558. Machine guns not to form part of firing line of attack.= Machine guns should not be assigned to the firing line of an attack. They should be so placed that fire directed upon them is not likely to fall upon the firing line. (544)

=559. Effectiveness of machine guns against skirmish line, except when lying down or crawling.= A skirmish line can not advance by walking or running when hostile machine guns have the correct range and are ready to fire. Machine-gun fire is not specially effective against troops lying on the ground or crawling. (545)

=560. Silencing of machine guns by infantry.= When opposed by machine guns without artillery to destroy them, infantry itself must silence them before it can advance.

An infantry command that must depend upon itself for protection against machine guns should concentrate a large number of rifles on each gun in turn and until it has silenced it. (546)

_In addition to the above, which the Infantry Drill Regulations gives on the subject of machine guns, the following, based on the use of machine guns in the European War, is given:_

=561. Machine guns essentially automatic rifles.= They are essentially automatic rifles, designed to fire the ordinary rifle cartridge and capable of delivering a stream of small bullets at a rate of as high as 600 per minute. Experience in the European war has determined that the rate of 400 shots per minute is the desirable maximum. Their ranges are the same as for the rifle. The fire of a machine gun has been estimated as equal to that of 30 men.

=562. Mounts.= Machine guns are usually mounted on tripods or wheels. The weight of certain types is such that they can readily be carried by the soldier from one point to another.

=563. Methods of transportation.= While machine guns are usually designed to be carried or packed, they are easily adapted to various methods of transportation. In the European war we find them mounted on sleds during the winter campaign; on specially designed motor cycles with side cars and accompanied by other motor cycles carrying ammunition; on wheels; on wagons; on armored automobiles; aeroplanes; and finally in the powerful "tanks" of the English.

=564. Concealment.= Machine guns while usually considered as _weapons of emergency_ have been used in attack and defense in the European war in all stages. Their mobility and deadly effect have made them of great value. Once their position is discovered they are quickly put out of action by artillery. Owing to this fact the armies in Europe have used alternative positions and have used every means to conceal the guns. Hedges, walls, and pits are used and every effort is used to conceal the flame of discharge. This is usually accomplished by keeping the muzzle well in rear of its cover or loop hole. Machine guns almost invariably betray their positions as soon as they enter into action. The present tendency seems to be to hold them concealed and place them into position in the trenches or emplacements at the moment of combat.

Extraordinary means have been resorted to in hiding the guns until they are needed. In the German line, dugouts underground were constructed to conceal the machine guns and crews. Often they permitted the first line of the attack to pass over them and then appeared in rear and opened a deadly fire on the backs of the troops.

=565. Use in villages.= In villages, machine guns were used with terrible effect, firing from cellars or windows. The only successful method of destroying them was with hand grenades and even this was costly.

=566. Location on the defense.= On the _defense_ machine guns should be mounted in salients and at points where cross fire can be obtained. This makes it more difficult for the enemy to locate the guns. Frontal fire is not so often successful.

=567. Location in attack.= In the _attack_ it is accepted that machine guns must cover the Infantry at short and long ranges while other machine guns must accompany the attacking troops to hold the positions or trenches gained.

The second or third line would seem to be the best position for machine guns when accompanying troops.

=568. Economy of men.= Owing to its rapid and effective fire, and the comparative ease with which it can be concealed, the machine gun permits a great economy of men on a front and the concentrating of the forces thus freed for use in other parts of the field. This was done on a large scale on the Russian front by the Germans in 1915. They constructed miles of wire entanglements in front of positions occupied with an enormous number of machine guns and comparatively few men. The main forces were thus free to be transported wherever danger threatened. In this manner the Germans replaced men by machine guns and wire and were able to cope successfully with the immense Russian Armies. The above plate shows a typical machine gun emplacement, constructed in the field. Many elaborate emplacements have been constructed in the European war, using steel and concrete, but for a hasty cover in the field the simple emplacement shown in the figure is recommended.

(NOTE.--For a more detailed study of machine guns, see Subject XI,
Machine Guns in Action, School of Musketry, Fort Sill, Oklahoma,
and Combined Cavalry and Infantry Drill Regulations for Automatic
Machine Rifle, cal. 30, 1909, War Department, 1915.)

AMMUNITION SUPPLY

=569. Method of supplying ammunition to combat train.= The method of supply of ammunition to the combat trains is explained in Field Service Regulations. (547)

=570. Combat train and the major's responsibility for its proper use; a rendezvous for each brigade.= The combat train is the immediate reserve supply of the battalion, and the major is responsible for its proper use. He will take measures to insure the maintenance of the prescribed allowance at all times.

In the absence of instructions, he will cause the train to march immediately in rear of his battalion, and, upon separating from it to enter an engagement, will cause the ammunition therein to be issued. When emptied, he will direct that the wagons proceed to the proper rendezvous to be refilled. Ordinarily a rendezvous is appointed for each brigade and the necessary number of wagons sent forward to it from the ammunition column. (548)

=571. Destination of combat wagons when refilled.= When refilled, the combat wagons will rejoin their battalions, or, if the latter be engaged, will join or establish communication with the regimental reserve. (549)

=572. Company commanders' responsibility for ammunition in belts; ammunition of dead and wounded.= Company commanders are responsible that the belts of the men in their companies are kept filled at all times, except when the ammunition is being expended in action. In the firing line the ammunition of the dead and wounded should be secured whenever practicable. (550)

=573. Ammunition in bandoleers and 30 rounds in right pocket section.= Ammunition in the bandoleers will ordinarily be expended first. Thirty rounds in the right pocket section of the belt will be held as a reserve, to be expended only when ordered by an officer. (551)

=574. Ammunition sent forward with reenforcements; men not to be sent back from firing line for ammunition.= When necessary to resupply the firing line, ammunition will be sent forward with reenforcements, generally from the regimental reserve. (552)

Men will never be sent back from the firing line for ammunition. Men sent forward with ammunition remain with the firing line.

=575. Replenishment of ammunition after engagement.= As soon as possible after an engagement the belts of the men and the combat wagons are resupplied to their normal capacities. Ammunition which can not be reloaded on combat wagons will be piled up in a convenient place and left under guard. (553)

MOUNTED SCOUTS

=576. Scouts to be trained in patrolling and reconnaissance; their use.= The mounted scouts should be thoroughly trained in patrolling and reconnaissance. They are used for communication with neighboring troops, for patrolling off the route of march, for march outposts, outpost patrols, combat patrols, reconnaissance ahead of columns, etc. Their further use is, in general, confined to escort and messenger duty. They should be freely used for all these purposes, but for these purposes only. (554)

=577. Use of mounted scouts for reconnoitering.= When infantry is acting alone, or when the cavalry of a mixed command has been sent to a distance, the mounted scouts are of special importance to covering detachments and should be used to make the reconnaissance which would otherwise fall to cavalry. (555)

=578. Scouts to be used in reconnaissance in preference to other troops; use for dismounted patrolling.= In reconnaissance, scouts should be used in preference to other troops as much as possible. When not needed for mounted duty, they should be employed for necessary dismounted patrolling. (556)

=579. Training of battalion staff officers in patrolling.= Battalion staff officers should be specially trained in patrolling and reconnaissance work in order that they may be available when a mounted officer's patrol is required. (557)

NIGHT OPERATIONS

=580. Purposes of night operations.= By employing night operations troops make use of the cover of darkness to minimize losses from hostile fire or to escape observation. Night operations may also be necessary for the purpose of gaining time. Control is difficult and confusion is frequently unavoidable.

It may be necessary to take advantage of darkness in order to assault from a point gained during the day, or to approach a point from which a daylight assault is to be made, or to effect both the approach and the assault. (558)

=581. Practice in offensive and defensive operations; simple formations.= Offensive and defensive night operations should be practiced frequently in order that troops may learn to cover ground in the dark and arrive at a destination quietly and in good order, and in order to train officers in the necessary preparation and reconnaissance.

Only simple and well-appointed formations should be employed.

Troops should be thoroughly trained in the necessary details--e. g., night patrolling, night marching, and communication at night. (559)

=582. Ground to be studied by day and night, cleared of hostile detachments, etc.; preparation of orders; distinctive badges.= The ground to be traversed should be studied by daylight and, if practicable, at night. It should be cleared of hostile detachments before dark, and, if practicable, should be occupied by covering troops.

Orders must be formulated with great care and clearness. Each unit must be given a definite objective and direction, and care must be exercised to avoid collision between units.

Whenever contact with the enemy is anticipated, a distinctive badge should be worn by all. (560)

=583. Secrecy of preparations; unfriendly guides; fire action to be avoided, relying upon bayonet.= Preparations must be made with secrecy. When the movement is started, and not until then, the officers and men should be acquainted with the general design, the composition of the whole force, and should be given such additional information as will insure cooeperation and eliminate mistakes.

During the movement every precaution must be taken to keep secret the fact that troops are abroad.

Unfriendly guides must frequently be impressed. These should be secured against escape, outcry, or deception.

Fire action should be avoided in offensive operations. In general, pieces should not be loaded. Men must be trained to rely upon the bayonet and to use it aggressively. (561)

=584. Night marches; advance and rear guards.= Long night marches should be made only over well-defined routes. March discipline must be rigidly enforced. The troops should be marched in as compact a formation as practicable, with the usual covering detachments. Advance and rear guard distances should be greatly reduced. They are shortest when the mission is an offensive one. The connecting files are numerous. (562)

=585. Night advance followed by attack by day.= A night advance made with a view to making an attack by day usually terminates with the hasty construction of intrenchments in the dark. Such an advance should be timed so as to allow an hour or more of darkness for intrenching.

An advance that is to terminate in an assault at the break of day should be timed so that the troops will not arrive long before the assault is to be made; otherwise, the advantage of partial surprise will be lost, and the enemy will be allowed to reenforce the threatened point. (563)

=586. Night attacks, when employed; they require trained troops; compact formations; value of bayonet.= The night attack is ordinarily confined to small forces, or to minor engagements in a general battle, or to seizure of positions occupied by covering or advanced detachments. Decisive results are not often obtained.

Poorly disciplined and untrained troops are unfit for night attacks or for night operations demanding the exercise of skill and care.

Troops attacking at night can advance close to the enemy in compact formations and without suffering loss from hostile artillery or infantry fire. The defender is ignorant of the strength or direction of the attack.

A force which makes a vigorous bayonet charge in the dark will often throw a much larger force into disorder. (564)

=587. Reconnaissance; attack to be a surprise.= Reconnaissance should be made to ascertain the position and strength of the enemy and to study the terrain to be traversed. Officers who are to participate in the attack should conduct this reconnaissance. Reconnaissance at night is especially valuable. Features that are distinguishable at night should be carefully noted, and their distances from the enemy, from the starting point of the troops, and from other important points should be made known.

Preparations should have in view as complete a surprise as possible. An attack once begun must be carried to its conclusion, even if the surprise is not as complete as was planned or anticipated. (565)

=588. Time of making attack depends upon object sought.= The time of night at which the attack should be made depends upon the object sought. If a decisive attack is intended, it will generally yield the best results if made just before daylight. If the object is merely to gain an intrenched position for further operations, an earlier hour is necessary in order that the position gained may be intrenched under cover of darkness. (566)

=589. Formation; use of bayonet; preparations to repel counter attack.= The formation for attack must be simple. It should be carefully effected and the troops verified at a safe distance from the enemy. The attacking troops should be formed in compact lines and with strong supports at short distances. The reserve should be far enough in rear to avoid being drawn into the action until the commander so desires. Bayonets are fixed, pieces are not loaded.

Darkness causes fire to be wild and ineffective. The attacking troops should march steadily on the enemy without firing, but should be prepared and determined to fight vigorously with the bayonet.

In advancing to the attack the aim should be to get as close as possible to the enemy before being discovered, then trust to the bayonet.

If the assault is successful, preparations must be made at once to repel a counter attack. (567)

=590. Measures taken by defense to resist night attacks.= On the defense, preparations to resist night attacks should be made by daylight whenever such attacks are to be feared.

Obstacles placed in front of a defensive position are especially valuable to the defense at night. Many forms of obstacles which would give an attacker little concern in the daytime become serious hindrances at night.

After dark the foreground should be illuminated whenever practicable and strong patrols should be pushed to the front.

When it is learned that the enemy is approaching, the trenches are filled and the supports moved close to the firing line.

Supports fix bayonets, but do not load. Whenever practicable and necessary, they should be used for counter attacks, preferably against a hostile flank.

The defender should open fire as soon as results may be expected. This fire may avert or postpone the bayonet combat, and it warns all supporting troops. It is not likely that fire alone can stop the attack. The defender must be resolved to fight with the bayonet.

Ordinarily fire will not be effective at ranges exceeding 50 yards.

A white rag around the muzzle of the rifle will assist in sighting the piece when the front sight is not visible.

See pars. 464, 496, 497, 523, 524. (568)

INFANTRY AGAINST CAVALRY

=591. Cavalry charge against infantry usually futile.= A cavalry charge can accomplish little against infantry, even in inferior numbers, unless the latter are surprised, become panic-stricken, run away, or can not use their rifles. (569)

=592. Measures to check charges from front and flank.= A charge from the front is easily checked by a well directed and sustained fire.

If the charge is directed against the flank of the firing line, the supports, reserves, or machine guns should stop it. If this disposition is impracticable, part of the line must meet the charge by a timely change of front. If the flank company, or companies, in the firing line execute =platoons right=, the successive firing lines can ordinarily break a charge against the flank. If the cavalry line passes through the firing line, the latter will be little damaged if the men retain their presence of mind. They should be on the watch for succeeding cavalry lines and leave those that have passed through to friendly troops in rear. (570)

=593. Standing position best to meet charge.= Men standing are in the best position to meet a charge, but other considerations may compel them to meet it lying prone. (571)

=594. Rifle fire main dependence of infantry.= In a melee, the infantryman with his bayonet has at least an even chance with the cavalryman, but the main dependence of infantry is rifle fire. Any formation is suitable that permits the free use of the necessary number of rifles.

Ordinarily there will be no time to change or set sights. Fire at will at battle sight should be used, whatever the range may be. It will usually be unwise to open fire at long ranges. (572)

=595. Meeting of cavalry charge by infantry in column.= An infantry column that encounters cavalry should deploy at once. If attacked from the head or rear of the column, and if time is pressing, it may form a succession of skirmish lines. Infantry, by deploying 50 or 100 yards in rear of an obstacle, may check cavalry and hold it under fire beyond effective pistol range.

In any situation, to try to escape the issue by running is the worst and most dangerous course the infantry can adopt. (573)

=596. Infantry attacking dismounted cavalry.= In attacking dismounted cavalry, infantry should close rapidly and endeavor to prevent remounting. Infantry which adopts this course will not be seriously checked by delaying cavalry.

Every effort should be made to locate and open fire on the led horses. (574)

INFANTRY AGAINST ARTILLERY

=597. Frontal attack against artillery usually futile; use of machine guns.= A frontal attack against artillery has little chance of succeeding unless it can be started from cover at comparatively short range. Beyond short range, the frontal fire of infantry has little effect against the artillery personnel because of their protective shields.

Machine guns, because their cone of fire is more compact, will have greater effect, but on the other hand they will have fewer opportunities, and they are limited to fire attack only.

As a rule, one's own artillery is the best weapon against hostile artillery. (575)

=598. Flank attack against artillery effective.= Artillery attacked in flank by infantry can be severely damaged. Oblique or flank fire will begin to have decisive effect when delivered at effective range from a point to one side of the artillery's line of fire and distant from it by about half the range. Artillery is better protected on the side of the caisson. (576)

=599. Action against guns out of ammunition.= Guns out of ammunition, but otherwise secure against infantry attack, may be immobilized by fire which will prevent their withdrawal, or by locating and driving off their limbers. Or they may be kept out of action by fire which will prevent the receipt of ammunition. (577)

=600. Action against artillery limbering or coming into action; wheel horses best targets.= Artillery when limbered is helpless against infantry fire. If caught at effective range while coming into action or while limbering, artillery can be severely punished by infantry fire.

In attacking artillery that is trying to escape, the wheel horses are the best targets. (578)

ARTILLERY SUPPORTS

=601. Purpose of artillery support, usually consisting of infantry.= The purpose of the artillery support is to guard the artillery against surprise or attack.

Artillery on the march or in action is ordinarily so placed as to be amply protected by the infantry. Infantry always protects artillery in its neighborhood. (579)

=602. Detailing of supports.= The detail of a support is not necessary except when the artillery is separated from the main body or occupies a position in which its flanks are not protected.

The detail of a special support will be avoided whenever possible. (580.)

=603. Formation of support on march.= The formation of an artillery support depends upon circumstances. On the march it may often be necessary to provide advance, flank, and rear protection. The country must be thoroughly reconnoitered by patrols within long rifle range. (581)

=604. Formation and location of support in action.= In action, the formation and location of the support must be such as to gain and give timely information of the enemy's approach and to offer actual resistance to the enemy beyond effective rifle range of the artillery's flanks. It should not be close enough to the artillery to suffer from fire directed at the artillery. In most cases a position somewhat to the flank and rear best fulfills these conditions. (582)

=605. Support charged only with protection of artillery.= The support commander is charged only with the protection of the artillery. The tactical employment of each arm rests with its commander. The two should cooeperate. (583)

MINOR WARFARE

=606. What minor warfare embraces; regular operations.= Minor warfare embraces both regular and irregular operations.

Regular operations consist of minor actions involving small bodies of trained and organized troops on both sides.

The tactics employed are in general those prescribed for the smaller units. (596)

=607. Irregular operations.= Irregular operations consist of actions against unorganized or partially organized forces, acting independent or semi independent bodies. Such bodies have little or only crude training and are under nominal and loose leadership and control. They assemble, roam about, and disperse at will. They endeavor to win by stealth or by force of superior numbers, employing ambuscades, sudden dashes or rushes, and hand-to-hand fighting. (597)

Troops operating against such an enemy usually do so in small units, such as platoons, detachments, or companies, and the tactics employed must be adapted to meet the requirements of the situation. Frequently the enemy's own methods may be employed to advantage.

In general, such operations should not be undertaken hastily; every preparation should be made to strike suddenly and to inflict the maximum punishment.

=608. March and bivouac formations to admit of rapid action in any direction.= In general, the service of information will be insufficient; adequate reconnaissance will rarely be practicable. March and bivouac formations must be such as to admit of rapid deployment and fire action in any direction. (598)

=609. Formation in open country.= In the open country, where surprise is not probable, troops may be marched in column of squads preceded, within sight, by a squad as an advance party. (599)

=610. Formation in close country.= In close country, where surprise is possible, the troops must be held in a close formation. The use of flank patrols becomes difficult. Occasionally, an advance party--never less than a squad--may be sent out. In general, however, such a party accomplishes little, since an enemy intent on surprise will permit it to pass unmolested and will fall upon the main body.

Under such conditions, especially when the road or trail is narrow, the column of twos or files is a convenient formation, the officers placing themselves in the column so as to divide it into nearly equal parts. If rushed from a flank, such a column will be in readiness to face and fire toward either or both flanks, the ranks being back to back; if rushed from the front, the head of the column may be deployed, the rest of the column closing up to support it and to protect its flanks and rear. In any event, the men should be taught to take some form of a closed back to back formation. (600)

=611. Dividing column on march into two or more separate detachments.= The column may often be broken into two or more approximately equal detachments separated on the march by distances of 50 to 100 yards. As a rule the detachments should not consist of less than 25 men each. With this arrangement of the column, it will rarely be possible for an enemy to close simultaneously with all of the detachments, one or more being left unengaged and under control to support those engaged or to inflict severe punishment upon the enemy when he is repulsed. (601)

=612. Selection of site for camp or bivouac; protection.= The site for camp or bivouac should be selected with special reference to economical and effective protection against surprise. Double sentinels are posted on the avenues of approach, and the troops sleep in readiness for instant action. When practicable, troops should be instructed in advance as to what they are to do in case of attack at night. (602)

=613. Night operations frequently advisable.= Night operations are frequently advisable. With the small forces employed, control is not difficult. Irregular troops rarely provide proper camp protection, and they may frequently be surprised and severely punished by a properly conducted night march and attack. (603)

CEREMONIES

General Rules for Ceremonies

=614. Order in which troops are arranged for ceremonies; commander faces command; subordinates face to front.= The order in which the troops of the various arms are arranged for ceremonies is prescribed by Army Regulations.

When forming for ceremonies the companies of the battalion and the battalions of the regiment are posted from right to left in line and from head to rear in column, in the order of rank of their respective commanders present in the formation, the senior on the right or at the head.

The commander faces the command; subordinate commanders face to the front. (708)

=615. Saluting by lieutenant colonel and staffs.= At the command present arms, given by the colonel, the lieutenant colonel, and the colonel's staff salute; the major's staff salute at the major's command. Each staff returns to the carry or order when the command =order arms= is given by its chief. (709)

=616. Formation of companies, battalion and regiment.= At the =assembly= for a ceremony companies are formed on their own parades and informally inspected, as prescribed in par. 646.

At =adjutant's call=, except for ceremonies involving a single battalion, each battalion is formed on its own parade, reports are received, and the battalion presented to the major, as laid down in par. 308. At the second sounding of adjutant's call the regiment is formed. (710)

REVIEWS

General Rules

=617. Indication of points where column changes direction; flank to pass 12 paces from reviewing officer; post of reviewing officer and others.= The adjutant posts men or otherwise marks the points where the column changes direction in such manner that its flank in passing will be about 12 paces from the reviewing officer.

The post of the reviewing officer, usually opposite the center of the line, is indicated by a marker.

Officers of the same or higher grade, and distinguished personages invited to accompany the reviewing officer, place themselves on his left; their staffs and orderlies place themselves respectively on the left of the staff and orderlies of the reviewing officer; all others who accompany the reviewing officer place themselves on the left of his staff, their orderlies in rear. A staff officer is designated to escort distinguished personages and to indicate to them their proper positions, as prescribed in par. 73. (711)