Chapter XVIII: Appendix: Ii.61 (1)

THE QUESTION OF TYPES.

The following letter appeared in the _Times_ (London) of April 4, 1885:

“SIR,—May I request the favor of space in the _Times_ in which to
comment upon the opinions recently expressed by Sir Edward Reed
and other writers respecting the designs of the _Admiral_ class of
ships in the Royal Navy, and the four central-citadel ships which
were laid down subsequently to the _Inflexible_?

“Having been closely associated with Mr. Barnaby in the designing
of all these ships, with the exception of the _Ajax_ and
_Agamemnon_, I can speak with full knowledge of both the history
and intentions of the designs.

“Moreover, my share of the responsibility for the professional work
involved in those designs remains, although my official connection
with the constructive department of the Admiralty was severed years
ago. It need hardly be added that the remarks which follow simply
embody my own opinions, and that I write neither as an apologist
for Mr. Barnaby nor as a champion of the ship-building policy of
the Admiralty.

“The sweeping condemnation which has been pronounced against the
most recent English battle-ships is based upon the consideration
of one feature only in their fighting efficiency, _viz._, the
extent of the armor protection of their sides in the region of the
water-line. There has been no discussion in the letters to which
I have referred of the comparative speeds, armaments, or other
qualities of the French and English ships. But the fact that the
French ships are armor-belted from end to end, while the English
ships have no vertical armor on considerable portions of the length
at the region of the water-line, is considered by Sir Edward Reed
so serious a matter that he says, ‘The French armored ships must in
all reason be expected to dispose of these English ships in a very
few minutes by simply destroying their unarmored parts.’

“From this opinion I most strongly dissent, for reasons which are
stated below; and I venture to assert that if attention is directed
simply to the possible effects of gun-fire, while the possibly
greater risks incidental to attacks with the ram and torpedo are
altogether neglected, then there is ample justification for the
belief that the English ships of recent design can do battle on at
least equal terms with their contemporaries in the French or any
other navy.

“In all recent armored ships, if the wholesale and extremely rapid
destruction of the unarmored portions of the ships which Sir
Edward Reed contemplates actually took place, very considerable
risks would undoubtedly result; but in my judgment these risks
are not sensibly affected by the different distribution of the
armor on the ships of the two great navies. And, further, there
is every reason for doubting whether such wholesale destruction
of the unarmored parts could be effected with the appliances
which are now available, not merely in ‘a few minutes,’ but in a
very considerable time, and under the most favorable conditions
for the attack. Nor must it be forgotten that armor, even of
the greatest thickness, applied to the sides or decks of ships
is not impenetrable to the attack of guns already afloat, while
the _mitraille_, which is driven back into a ship when armor is
penetrated, is probably as destructive as any kind of projectile
can be, and attacks directly the vital parts which the armor is
intended to protect.

“In support of these assertions I must ask permission to introduce
certain detailed statements which appear to be absolutely necessary
to a discussion of the subject, but which shall be made as brief
and untechnical as possible.

“It appears that the points raised by the discussion may be grouped
under two heads. First, does the shortening of the belt in the
English ships introduce such serious dangers if they have to do
battle with the French ships? Secondly, what should be considered
the principal uses of armor-plating in modern war-ships? The second
question may be considered to include the first; but it will be
convenient to take the questions in the order in which they have
been placed, as, after all, the greatest immediate interest centres
in the comparison between existing ships.

“At the outset it is important to remark that in the most recent
designs of armored ships for all navies, increase in speed,
armament, and thickness of armor has been associated with a
decrease in the area of the broadside protected by armor. Further,
it has been considered important in most cases to distribute the
armored positions of the heavy guns in the ships in order to reduce
the risks of complete disablement of the principal armament by
one or two lucky shots which may happen when the heavy guns are
concentrated in a single citadel or battery. This distribution
of the heavy guns also gives greater efficiency to the auxiliary
armament of lighter guns, and enables these heavy guns to be placed
at a considerably greater height above water than was usual in
former days, so that the chances of the guns being prevented from
being fought in heavy weather are diminished, and their power
as compared with the lower guns in earlier ships is increased,
especially when firing with depression.

“The days of the ‘completely protected iron-clad,’ with the
broadside armored throughout the length from the upper deck down
to five or six feet below the water-line, have long gone by.
The ‘central battery and belt’ system has also been practically
dropped, whether the battery contained broadside guns or formed a
citadel protecting the bases of the turrets. In short, on modern
battle-ships there now remains only a narrow belt of armor, rising
from five or six feet below the load-line to two or three feet
above it. This narrow strip of armor in the French ships extends
from end to end, and is associated with a protective deck worked
at the height of the top of the belt, and forming a strong roof
to the hold spaces beneath. In the English ships of the _Admiral_
class the belt of armor extends somewhat less than half the total
length, protecting one hundred and forty to one hundred and fifty
feet of the central portion of the ship (in which are situate
the engines and boilers), and protecting also the communications
from the barbette towers to the magazines. At the extremities of
the belt strong armored bulkheads are built across the ships. The
protected deck is fitted at the upper edge of the belt over the
central portion. Before and abaft the bulkheads, where there is
no side armor, the protection consists of a strong steel deck,
situated from four to five feet below water, and extending to the
bow and stern respectively. Upon this under-water deck are placed
coal-bunkers, chain-lockers, fresh-water tanks, store-rooms, etc.,
the spaces between it and the deck next above being subdivided into
a large number of water-tight compartments or cells by means of
longitudinal and transverse bulkheads. A water-tight top or roof to
these compartments is formed by plating over the main deck-beams
with thin steel at the same height above water as the top of the
armor-belt. In this manner the unarmored ends above the protective
deck are not merely packed to a large extent with water-excluding
substances when the vessel is fully laden, but they are minutely
subdivided into separate compartments, which can only be thrown
into communication with one another by means of very extensive
injuries to the partitions.

“In all the modern French ships, as well as in the _Admiral_ class,
a light steel superstructure of considerable height is built above
the level of the belt-deck; the living quarters of the crew and the
stations of the auxiliary armament are contained within this light
erection, which also surrounds the armored communications from the
barbette towers to the magazines. In this manner a ship with a
small height of armored freeboard is converted into a high-sided
ship for all purposes of ordinary navigation, sea-worthiness, and
habitability; while spaces are provided in which a more or less
considerable number of light guns can be fought concurrently
with the heavy guns placed in the armor-protected stations. The
radical difference, therefore, between the French ships and the
_Admiral_ class, independently of other considerations than the
armor protection of the water-line, consists in the omission of
the side armor at the extremities, and the use instead of the side
armor of the strong under-water deck with cellular subdivision
and other arrangements for adding to the protection and securing
the buoyancy of the spaces at the ends, into which water may
find access through the thin sides if they are shot through and
seriously damaged in action. If the completely belted French ship
has to fight a vessel of the _Admiral_ class, the latter has
obviously the greater chance of damage to the narrow strips of the
sides lying above the under-water deck before and abaft the ends
of the belt. If the action takes place in smooth water, when the
ships are neither rolling nor pitching, but are simply in motion,
the chances of hitting these narrow strips in the water-line region
might not be very great; but it must be admitted that even the
lightest guns would penetrate the thin sides of the English ships
and admit more or less considerable quantities of water into the
ends. If, on the other hand, the fight takes place in a sea-way,
with the ships lolling and pitching, then the relative importance
of penetration of these narrow’ strips of the ends of the English
ships becomes much less, because the belt armor of the French ships
will be brought out of water for a considerable length of the bow
and the stern by a very moderate angle of pitching, or by the
passage of a comparatively low wave, and because rolling motion
of the ships will alternately immerse or emerge the belt armor,
even at the midships part, where it has its greatest thickness.
In fact, as I have more than once said publicly, it is clearly an
error to limit criticism to the longitudinal extent of the belt
armor in modern ships, and to exclude consideration of the vertical
extent of the armor above and below the load-line. Apart from any
discussion of the question from the artillerist’s point of view,
or any attempt to determine the probability or otherwise of the
wholesale destruction of the unarmored portions of modern battle
ships by shell-fire from large guns, or by the projectiles from
rapid-firing and machine guns, it is perfectly obvious to any one
who will examine into the matter that the risk of damage to the
light superstructures situated above the belt must be greater than
the corresponding risk of damage to the narrow strips of side area
exposed at the unarmored ends of the _Admiral_ class, between the
level of the belt-deck and the water-line.

“Sir Spencer Robinson, after his inspection of the models shown
him at the Admiralty, recognizes the fact that in the French
belted ships (of which the _Amiral Duperré_ is an example), if the
light sides above the belt-deck are destroyed or very seriously
riddled in action, the ship would be capsized in a very moderate
sea-way. He further emphasizes the statement that the ships of
the _Admiral_ class in the English navy, if similarly treated,
would also capsize under the same conditions, and he appears to
be surprised at the admission having been made. The fact is that
there has never been any assertion that the _Admiral_ class would
be safe against capsizing independently of assistance given to the
armor-belted portions by the unarmored structure situated above.
On the contrary, from the first, in the design of these ships, it
was recognized that their stability, in the sense of their power
to resist being capsized, if inclined to even moderate angles of
inclination, was not guaranteed by the armor-belts. In this respect
they were in identically the same position as all other armored
ships with shallow water-line belts and isolated armored batteries
placed high above water.

“What has been said respecting the _Admiral_ class is this: If the
unarmored ends above the protective deck were completely thrown
open to the sea, then the initial stability (that is to say, the
stiffness of the ships or their power to resist small inclinations
from the upright) would still be guaranteed by the central armored
portions. So fully did we appreciate the fact that the life of
the ship in action (as determined by her power to resist large
inclinations) depends greatly upon the assistance given by the
unarmored superstructures to the armor-belted parts, that we were
careful to make the structural arrangements of the superstructures
above the belts such that they could bear a very considerable
amount of riddling and damage from shot and shell without ceasing
to contribute in the most important degree to the buoyancy and
stability.

“There are double cellular sides between the belt and upper decks;
the main bulkheads are carried up high above water; hatches and
openings are trunked up and protected by coffer-dams. In short,
every possible precaution is taken to subdivide into compartments,
and thus limit the spaces to which water can find access when the
outer sides are penetrated or shattered, as well as to facilitate
the work of stopping temporarily shot-holes in the sides.

“Now, without in the least intending to discredit the work of the
French designers, I have to state that no corresponding or equal
precautions have been taken in the portions of their ships lying
above the belt-decks. And the absence of these features in the
French ships is a great relative advantage to the English ships.
Of course there is nothing to hinder the French from imitating
our practice, but they are content to take the risks involved in
a simpler construction, and in so doing they show their practical
disbelief in the doctrine of armor-protected stability. I am aware
that some eminent authorities do not concur with this view, and
maintain that stability and buoyancy should be guaranteed by armor.
To this point I will revert hereafter, but for the present I am
content to say that, as between the French ships and the _Admiral_
class, the most serious risks of damage by gun-fire in action
are of the same kind, and, practically, are not affected by the
shortening of the armor-belts in the English ships.

“Next I would refer to the differences which are undoubtedly
involved in shortening the belts of the English ships. In the
first place, by dispensing with the side armor towards the
extremities a very considerable saving is effected in the weight
and the cost of the armor fitted to the ships. Mr. Barnaby has
recently given an illustration of this, where a ship, in other
respects unchanged, has to be increased from 10,000 to 11,000 tons
in displacement in order to carry the shallow armor-belt to the
ends. In the _Collingwood_ herself quite as large a proportionate
increase of size would be involved in having a thick armor-belt
from stem to stern. This saving in weight and cost of armor might,
of course, be purchased too dearly, if dispensing with the armor
involved possibly fatal risks to the ship. However the result
may be attained, there is universal agreement that a ship-of-war
should have her buoyancy, stability, and trim guaranteed as far
as possible against the effects of damage in action. Now, in the
_Admiral_ class this matter was very carefully investigated before
the design was approved. In order to prevent derangement of the
trim of the vessels by penetration of the light sides above the
protective deck at one end, arrangements were made in the design by
means of which water can be introduced into the spaces occupied by
coal-bunkers, etc., before the ships go into action.

“The extent to which water may be introduced is a matter over which
the captain would necessarily have control. But even if the whole
of the unoccupied spaces were filled with water, the increase in
draught would not exceed fourteen to eighteen inches, and the loss
in speed would not exceed half a knot. If only the coal-bunkers
were flooded as a preliminary to action, the chance of any serious
disturbance of trim, and consequent loss of manœuvring power or
speed by damage to the light sides above the protective deck and
near the water, would be very small, and the ‘sinkage’ of the
vessel would be decreased considerably. But taking the extreme
case, with the ends completely filled and a sinkage of fourteen to
eighteen inches, a ship of the _Admiral_ class would go into action
with practically her full speed available, and with her ends so
protected by under-water deck and the water admitted above that
deck that damage to the thin sides by shot or shell penetrating
at or near the water-line would not produce changes of trim or
alterations of draught to any greater extent than would be produced
if the armor-belt had been carried to the stem and stern. Nor would
the admission of water into the ends render the vessel unstable.

“It has been urged that the sinkage due to filling the tank ends
with water is a disadvantage, because it brings the upper edge of
the belt armor in the _Admiral_ class about fourteen to eighteen
inches nearer the water than the upper edge of the belts of the
French ships. If the greatest danger of the ships was to be
measured by the smallness of their ‘reserve’ of ‘armor-protected
buoyancy’ (that is to say, by the buoyancy of the part of the ship
lying above her fighting water-line and below the belt-deck), then
the _Admiral_ class would not compare favorably with the fully
belted French ships. But I have already explained that this is not
the true measure of the greatest danger arising from the effects of
gun-fire, and that it would be a mistake to assume that in either
the French or the English ships the armor-belted portions of the
vessels guarantee their safety when damaged in action.

“As between the _Admiral_ class and the central-citadel ships
of the _Inflexible_ type there is a difference in this respect
which has been much commented upon. When the ends of the citadel
ships are filled with water, the armored wall of the citadel
still remains several feet above water; whereas, in the _Admiral_
class, the top of the belt under similar conditions is very near
the water-level. All that need be said on this point is that,
notwithstanding the greater height of the armored wall above water,
the citadel ships have practically no greater guarantee of safety
against capsizing by means of armor-protected stability than the
_Admiral_ class. In both classes the armored portions require the
assistance of the unarmored to secure such a range and amount
of stability as shall effectually guarantee their security when
damaged in action. And, as has been stated above, this condition is
true of all armor-clads with narrow armor-belts.

“One other objection to the shortened belts yet remains to be
considered.

“It is urged that when the thin ends are broken through or damaged
by shot or shell, jagged or protruding holes will be formed in
the plating near the water-line, and then if the ships are driven
at speed, the water will flow into the holes in large quantities,
and produce serious changes of trim and loss of speed. In support
of this contention, reference is made to the published reports of
experiments made with the _Inflexible’s_ model about eight years
ago. It is impossible to discuss the matter fully, and I must
therefore content myself with a statement of my opinion, formed
after a careful personal observation of these model experiments.
First, it cannot be shown from the experiments that the presence
of a shallow belt of armor reaching two to three feet above the
still-water line would make any sensible difference in the dangers
arising from the circumstances described. Holes in the thin sides
above this belt would admit water in large quantities on the
belt-deck when the vessel was under way, and if it could flow along
that deck changes of trim and other disagreeable consequences would
result. Secondly, it is certain that the numerous bulkheads and
partitions, coffer-dams, etc., built above the belt-deck level in
the _Admiral_ class for the very purpose of limiting the flow of
entering water would greatly decrease any tendency to check the
speed or change the trim. Whether the belt be short or long, it is
evident that gaping holes low down in the light sides will make it
prudent for a captain to slow down somewhat if he wishes to keep
the water out as much as possible. But between such prudence and
the danger of disaster there is a wide gulf.

“Summing up the foregoing statements, I desire to record my
opinion, based upon complete personal knowledge of every detail
in the calculations and designs for the _Admiral_ class, that the
disposition of the belt armor (in association with the protective
decks and cellular sides, water-tight subdivision, etc., existing
in the unarmored portions of the vessels situated above the
protective decks) is such that the buoyancy, stability, trim,
speed, and manœuvring capabilities are well guaranteed against
extensive damage from shot and shell fire in action. And, further,
that in these particulars the _Admiral_ class are capable of
meeting, at least on equal terms, their contemporary ships in the
French navy.

“I must add that I am not here instituting any comparison between
the ‘fighting efficiencies’ of the ships of the two fleets; nor
have I space in this letter to do so. Opinions have differed, and
will probably always differ, as to the relative importance of the
different qualities which go to make up fighting efficiency. There
is no simple formula admitting of general application which enables
the comparative fighting values of war-ships to be appraised.
As the conditions of naval warfare change and war material is
developed, so the balance of qualities in ship-designing has to be
readjusted, and estimates of the fighting powers of existing ships
have to be revised. And, further, different designers, working
simultaneously, distribute the displacement, which is their sum
total of capital to work upon, according to their own judgments of
what is wisest and best for the particular conditions which the
ships built from those designs have to fulfil. The designer who has
the larger displacement to work upon has the better opportunity of
producing a more powerful ship; but it by no means follows that he
will secure so good a combination of qualities as a rival obtains
on a smaller displacement. And hence I cannot but dissent from the
doctrine that displacement tonnage is to be accepted as a fair
measure of relative fighting efficiency, or that recent English
ships are necessarily unable to fight recent French ships because
they are of smaller displacement.

“In the preceding remarks I have been careful to confine myself
chiefly to the naval architect’s side of the subject, as it
would clearly be out of place for me to say much respecting the
artillerist’s side. But, having had the great advantage of knowing
the views of some of the most experienced gun-makers and gunnery
officers, and having studied carefully what has been written on the
subject, I would venture to say a few words.

“First, there seems, as was previously remarked, every reason
for doubting, in the actual conditions of naval gunnery, whether
it would be possible, not merely in a few minutes, but in a
considerable time, to produce the wholesale destruction of the
unarmored parts of modern war-ships which has been assumed in
the condemnation of the _Admiral_ class. If the _Collingwood_,
or one of her successors, were simply treated as a moving target
in a sea-way for the _Amiral Duperré_ or one of her consorts,
this would be a most improbable result. But, remembering that the
_Collingwood_ would herself be delivering heavy blows in return for
those received, the chances of her disablement would necessarily
be decreased. Secondly, it does not seem at all evident that the
introduction of rapid-fire guns has such an important influence on
the question of shortened belts as some writers have supposed. So
far as machine guns are concerned, I well remember at the board
meeting which decided to approve the building of the _Collingwood_
the possible effects of machine-gun fire were discussed at some
length, both in reference to the adoption of the barbette system
and to the system of hull protection. The rapid-firing gun which
has since been introduced is now a formidable weapon; but it may
be questioned whether its effects upon the unarmored portions of
modern war-ships would be so serious as those resulting from the
shell-fire of heavier guns, and therefore it cannot with certainty
be concluded that it would be advantageous to make arrangements
for keeping out the projectiles from the rapid-firing guns now in
use at the ends of the _Admiral_ class. More especially is this
true when it is considered that already rapid-fire guns of much
larger calibre and greater power than the 6-pounder and 9-pounder
are being made. To these guns three inches of steel would be
practically no better defence than the existing thin sides, and
the real defence lies in the strong protective deck. Shell-fire
from heavier guns will probably be found the best form of attack
against the unarmored or lightly armored portions of battle-ships,
especially now that the use of steel shells with thin walls and
large bursting charges is being so rapidly developed.

“I would again say that on this side of the subject I do not
profess to speak with authority, and it is undoubted that great
differences of opinion prevail; but it must not be forgotten
that the Board of Admiralty, by its recent decision announced
in the House of Commons, has reaffirmed the opinion that from
the artillerist’s point of view the existing disposition of the
armor in the _Admiral_ class is satisfactory. This has been done
after the attention of the Board and the public has been most
strongly directed to the supposed dangers incidental to the
rapid destruction of the light superstructures lying above the
under-water decks of the _Admiral_ class. It would be folly to
suppose that in such a matter any merely personal considerations
would prevent the Board from authorizing a change which was proved
to be necessary or advantageous. With respect to the possibility
of making experiments which should determine the points at issue,
I would only say that considerable difficulties must necessarily
arise in endeavoring to represent the conditions of an actual
fight; but in view of the diametrically opposite views which
have been expressed as to the effect of gun-fire upon cellular
structures, it would certainly be advantageous if some scheme of
the kind could be arranged.

“There still remains to be considered the question of the uses of
armor in future war-ships. This letter has already extended to too
great a length to permit of any attempt at a full discussion. It
will be admitted by all who are interested in the questions of
naval design that an inquiry into the matter is urgently needed,
even if it leads only to a temporary solution of the problem, in
view of the present means of offence and defence.

“Armor, by which term I understand not merely vertical armor,
but oblique or horizontal armor, is regarded in different ways
by different authorities. For example, I understand Sir Edward
Reed to maintain that side-armor should be fitted in the form of
a water-line belt, extending over a very considerable portion of
the length, and that such armor, in association with a strong
protective deck, and armored erections for gun-stations, etc.,
should secure the buoyancy, trim, and stability of the vessel.
At the other extreme we have the view expressed in the design
of the grand Italian vessels of the _Italia_ class. In them the
hull-armor is only used for the purpose of assisting the cellular
hull subdivisions in protecting buoyancy, stability, and trim,
taking the form of a thick protective deck, which is wholly under
water, and above which comes a minutely subdivided region, which
Signor Brin and his colleagues consider sufficient defence against
gun-fire.

“In these Italian vessels the only thick armor is used to protect
the gun-stations, the pilot-tower, and the communications from
those important parts to the magazines and spaces below the
protective deck. The strong deck, besides forming a base of the
cellular subdivision, is of course a defence to the vital parts of
the ship lying below it.

“Between these two types of ships come the _Admiral_ class of the
English navy and the belted vessels of the French navy, whose
resemblances and differences have been described above.

“In addition, there are not a few authorities who maintain that the
development of the swift torpedo-cruiser, or the swift protected
cruiser, makes the continued use of armor at least questionable,
seeing that to attempt to protect ships by thick armor either on
decks or sides, and to secure high speeds and heavy armaments,
involves the construction of large and expensive vessels, which
are necessarily exposed to enormous risks in action from forms
of under-water attack, against which their armor is no defence.
In view of such differences of opinion, and of the heated
controversies which have arisen therefrom, the time seems certainly
to have arrived when some competent body should be assembled
by the Admiralty for the purpose of considering the designs of
our war-ships, and enabling our constructors to proceed with
greater assurance than they can at present. Questions affecting
the efficiency of the Royal Navy clearly ought not to be decided
except in the most calm and dispassionate manner. The work done
by the Committee on Designs for Ships of War fourteen years ago
was valuable, and has had important results. What is now wanted,
I venture to think, is a still wider inquiry into the condition
of the navy, and one of the branches of that inquiry which will
require the most careful treatment is embraced in the question,
‘What are the uses of armor in modern war-ships?’

“My own opinion, reached after very careful study of the subject,
is that very serious limitations have to be accepted in the
disposition and general efficiency of the armaments, if the
principle of protecting the stability at considerable angles of
inclination by means of thick armor is accepted, the size and
cost of the ships being kept within reasonable limits. There is
no difficulty, of course, apart from considerations of size and
cost, in fulfilling the condition of armor-protected stability; but
it may be doubted whether the results could prove satisfactory,
especially when the risks from under-water attacks, as well as
from gun-fire, are borne in mind, and the fact is recognized that
even the thickest armor carried or contemplated is not proof
against existing guns. No vessel can fight without running risks.
It is by no means certain, however, that the greater risks to be
faced are those arising from damage to the sides in the region
of the water-line and consequent loss of stability. So far as I
have been able to judge, it appears possible to produce a better
fighting-machine for a given cost by abandoning the idea of
protecting stability, buoyancy, and trim entirely by thick armor,
and by the acceptance of the principle that unarmored but specially
constructed superstructures shall be trusted as contributories to
the flotation and stability. Thick vertical side armor, even over
a portion of the length, appears to be by no means a necessary
condition to an effective guarantee of the life and manageability
of a ship when damaged in action; and it seems extremely probable
that in future the great distinction between battle-ships and
protected ships will not be found in the nature of their hull
protection in the region of the water-line, but in the use of thick
armor over the stations of the heavy guns in battle-ships.

“The decisions as to future designs of our battle-ships is a
momentous one. It can only be reached by the consideration of the
relative advantages and disadvantages of alternative proposals. It
cannot be dissociated from considerations of cost for a single ship.

“On all grounds, therefore, it is to be hoped that a full and
impartial inquiry will be authorized without delay; for it may be
assumed that, however opinions differ, there is the common desire
to secure for the British navy the best types of ships and a
sufficient number to insure our maritime supremacy.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,
“W. H. WHITE.

“ELSWICK WORKS, _March 26th_.”

The following reply by Sir Edward Reed appeared in the _Times_ of April 8, 1885, the omitted portions being personal allusions which have very little bearing upon the discussion, and which are of no interest to a professional reader outside of England:

“It is not Mr. White’s fault but his misfortune that he is
compelled to admit the perfect correctness of the main charge which
I have brought against these six ships, _viz._, that they have been
so constructed, and have been so stripped of armor protection, that
their armor, even when intact and untouched, is wholly insufficient
to prevent them from capsizing in battle. Mr. White expends a
good deal of labor in attempting to show that their unarmored
parts would have a better chance of keeping the ships upright and
afloat than I credit them with, which is a secondary, although an
important, question; but he frankly admits that these six ships of
the _Admiral_ type are, and are admitted to be, so built that their
‘stability in the sense of the power to resist being capsized if
inclined to even moderate angles of inclination is not guaranteed
by their armor-belts.’

* * * * *

“I have no doubt it would suit the purposes of all those who are
or who have been responsible for those ships if I were to allow
myself to be drawn, in connection with this question, away from
the essential points just adverted to into a controversy upon the
efforts made by the Admiralty to give to these ships, which have
been denied a reasonable amount of armor protection, such relief
from the grave dangers thus incurred as thin sheet compartments,
coffer-dams, coals, patent fuel, stores, etc., can afford. (Cork
is what was at first relied upon in this connection, but we hear
no more of it now.) But I do not intend to be drawn aside from
my demand for properly armored ships of the first class by any
references to these devices, and for a very simple reason, _viz._,
all such devices, whether their value be great or small, are in no
sense special to armored ships; on the contrary they are common
to all ships, and are more especially applied to ships which are
unable to carry armor. The application of these devices to ships
stripped of armor does not make them armored ships, any more than
it makes a simple cruiser or other ordinary unarmored vessel an
armored ship; and what I desire, and what I confidently rely upon
the country demanding before long, is the construction of a few
line-of-battle ships made reasonably safe by armor, in lieu of the
present ships, which, while called armored ships, in reality depend
upon their thin unarmored parts for their ability to keep upright
and afloat. Besides, I do not believe in these devices for ships
intended for close fighting. I even believe them likely, in not a
few cases, to add to their danger rather than to their safety. If,
for example, a raking shot or shell should let the sea into the
compartments on one side of the ship, while those on the other side
remain intact and buoyant, this very buoyancy upon the uninjured
side of the ship would help to capsize her.

“Mr. White says that no vessel can fight without running risks,
and thinks that thick, vertical side-armor, even over a portion
of the ship’s length, is not a necessary guarantee of the life of
a ship. Well, sir, we are all at liberty to think, or not think,
what we please, so far as our sense and judgment will allow us;
but Mr. White, like all other depreciators of side-armor, fails
utterly to show us what else there is which can be relied upon to
keep shell out of a ship, or what can be done to prevent shell
that burst inside a ship from spreading destruction all around. He
refers us to no experiments to show that the thin plate divisions
and coffer-dams, and like devices, will prove of any avail for
the purpose proposed. In the absence of any such experiments, he
tells us, as others have told us, that Signor Brin and colleagues
in the Italian Admiralty consider ‘a minutely subdivided region’
at and below the water-line ‘sufficient defence against gun-fire.’
But I do not think Signor Brin believes anything of the kind; what
he believes is that the Italian government cannot afford to build
a fleet of properly armored line-of-battle ships for hard and
close fighting, and that, looking at their limited resources, a
few excessively fast ships, with armor here and there to protect
particular parts, and with ample capabilities of retreat to a safe
distance, will best serve their purpose. I do not say that he is
wrong, and I certainly admire the skill which he has displayed in
carrying out his well-defined object. But that object is totally
different from ours, and our naval habits, our traditions, our
national spirit, the very blood that flows in our veins, prevent
such an object from ever becoming ours.

“Mr. White all through his letter, in common with some of his late
colleagues at the Admiralty, thinks and speaks as if naval warfare
were henceforth to be chiefly a matter of dodging, getting chance
shots, and keeping out of the enemy’s way; and this may be more or
less true of contests between unarmored vessels. But why is not the
line-of-battle ship _Collingwood_ to be supposed to steam straight
up to the enemy, I should like to know? and if she does, what is
to prevent the enemy from pouring a raking fire through her bow,
and ripping up at once, even with a single shell, every compartment
between the stem and the transverse armored bulkhead?

“It distresses me beyond measure to see our ships constructed so
as to impose upon them the most terrible penalties whenever their
commanders dare, as dare they ever have, and dare they ever will,
to close with their foe and try conclusions with him. Why, sir,
it has been my painful duty over and over again to hear foreign
officers entreat me to use all my influence against the adoption in
their navy of ships with so little armored surface as ours. On one
occasion the _Collingwood_ herself was imposed upon them as a model
to be imitated, and I was besought to give them a safer and better
ship. ‘How could I ever steam up to my enemy with any confidence,’
said one of the officers concerned, ‘with such a ship as that under
my feet?’

* * * * *

“Mr. White coolly tells us that the _Collingwood_, with five
hundred tons of water logging her ends to a depth of seven or eight
feet, will not be much worse off than a ship whose armored deck
stands two and a half or three feet above the water’s surface,
and his reason is that even above this latter deck the water
would flow in when the ship was driving ahead with an injured
bow. Well, sir, I will only say that sailors of experience see a
very great difference between the two cases, and I can but regard
such theorizings as very unfortunate basis for the designs of her
Majesty’s ships.

“I have said that Mr. White’s assumptions as to the immunity of the
above-water compartments and coffer-dams from wide-spread injury
by shell-fire rest upon no experimental data; I go on to say that
such data as we have to my mind point very much the other way. The
_Huascar_ was not an unarmored vessel, and such shell as penetrated
her had first to pass through some thin armor and wood backing; yet
after the _Cochrane_ and _Blanco Encaloda_ had defeated her she
presented internally abundant evidence of the general destruction
which shell-fire produces. An officer of the _Cochrane_, who was
the first person sent on board by the captors, in a letter to me
written soon afterwards, said: ‘It requires seeing to believe the
destruction done.... We had to climb over heaps, table-high, of
_débris_ and dead and wounded.... We fired forty-five Palliser
shell, and the engineers who were on board say that every shell, or
nearly so, must have struck, and that every one that struck burst
on board, doing awful destruction.’

“Speaking of the injury which the _Cochrane_ received from a single
shell of the _Huascar_, he said: ‘It passed through the upper works
at commander’s cabin, breaking fore and aft bulkhead of cabins,
breaking skylight above ward-room, thwartship bulkhead of wood,
passed on, cut in two a 5-inch iron pillar, through a store-room,
struck armor-plate, glanced off, passing through plating of
embrasure closet at corner, finishing at after gun-port, and went
overboard. This shell passed in at starboard part of stern and
terminated at after battery port on port side, which is finished
with the wide angle-iron, carrying out a part of the angle-iron in
its flight.’

“This was a shell of moderate size, from a moderate gun, but it is
obvious that it would have made short work of penetrating those
very thin sheets of steel which constitute the compartments,
coffer-dams, etc., upon the resistance of which, to my extreme
surprise, those responsible for the power and safety of our fleets
seem so ready to place their main dependence.

* * * * *

“For resistance to rams and torpedoes, and for the limitation of
the injuries to be effected by them, as much cellular subdivision
as possible should be supplied; but, as against shot and shell,
subdivision by their sheet-steel is no guarantee whatever of safety
in any ship, least of all in line-of-battle ships, which must be
prepared for fighting at close quarters.

“I must now ask for space to remark upon a few minor points in
Mr. White’s letter. He seems to consider that the scant armor
of the _Admiral_ class is somehow associated with the placing
of the large, partly protected guns of these ships in separate
positions, ‘in order to reduce the risks of complete disablement
of the principal armament by one or two lucky shots, which may
happen when the heavy guns are concentrated on a single citadel
or battery.’ Suffice it to reply that in the proposed new designs
of the Admiralty ships now before Parliament, which have almost
equally scant partial belts of armor, the guns are nevertheless
concentrated in a single battery.

“Again, Mr. White says the Admiralty have declined to adopt
my advice to protect the _Admiral_ class in certain unarmored
parts with 3-inch plating, and declares that such plating would
practically be no better defence against rapid-fire guns than
existing thin sides; but has he forgotten the fact that my
suggestion has been adopted in the new designs for the protection
of the battery of 6-inch guns, although it is perversely withheld
from those parts of the ship in which it might assist in some
degree in prolonging the ship’s ability to float and to resist
capsizing forces?

“Mr. White makes one very singular statement. He takes exception
to my claiming for the _Inflexible_ type of ship, on account of
their armored citadel, a much better chance of retaining stability
in battle than the _Admiral_ type possesses, because, he says, ‘in
both classes the armored portions require the assistance of the
unarmored to secure such a range and amount of stability as shall
effectually guarantee their security when damaged in action.’
The fair inference to be drawn from this would be that where the
principle long ago laid down by me, and supported by Mr. Barnaby in
the words previously quoted, is once departed from, the danger must
in all cases be so great as to exclude all distinctions of more or
less risk. Mr. White can hardly mean this; but if he does not, then
on what grounds are we told that a ship which has no armor at all
left above water at an inclination say of six or eight degrees is
no worse off than a ship which at those angles and at still greater
ones has a water-tight citadel over one hundred feet long to help
hold her up?

* * * * *

“I am not at all disposed to enter into a discussion as to the
relative stabilities of the English and French ships under various
conditions. The French ships have armored belts two and a half to
three feet above water from end to end. That fact, other things
being presumed equal, gives them an immense advantage over our
ships, which in battle trim have belts scarcely more than a foot
wide above water, and for less than half their length. It is quite
possible that the French constructors may have given their ships
less initial stability than ours; from such information as I
possess I believe they have; but in so far as the ship below the
armor-deck, and the action of shot and shell upon that part of her,
are concerned, whatever stability they start with in battle they
will retain until their armor is pierced; whereas our ships may
have a large proportion of theirs taken from them without their
armor being pierced, and their armored decks are then less than
half the height of those of the French ships above water.

* * * * *

“I will add that I doubt if the French ships are dealt fairly by at
Whitehall. I lately heard a good deal of the extreme taper of their
armor-belts at the bow, and the _Amiral Duperré_ was always quoted
in instance of this. It is true that this ship’s armor does taper
from fifty-five centimetres amidships to twenty-five centimetres at
the stem, but she stands almost alone among recent important ships
in this respect, as the following figures will show:

+------------------+--------------+--------------+
| | Thickness | Thickness |
| NAME OF SHIP. | of Armor | of Armor |
| | Amidship. | at Bows. |
+------------------+--------------+--------------+
| | Centimetres. | Centimetres. |
| Amiral Baudin | 55 | 40 |
| Formidable | 55 | 40 |
| Hoche | 45 | 40 |
| Magenta | 45 | 40 |
| Marceau | 45 | 40 |
| Caiman | 50 | 35 |
| Fulminant | 33 | 25 |
| Furieuse | 50 | 32 |
| Indomptable | 50 | 37 |
| Requin | 50 | 40 |
| Terrible | 50 | 37 |
+------------------+--------------+--------------+

“A friend writes me: ‘Comparing the _Amiral Duperré_ with the
_Amiral Baudin_, _Dévastation_, _Formidable_, and _Foudroyant_,
which are ships of about her size, the following peculiarities
are observable: The _Duperré_ is about three feet narrower than
the other ships mentioned, and has fully fifteen inches less
metacentric height. She is also slightly deeper in proportion to
her breadth than the other ships.’

“As narrowness, small metacentric height, and excessive depth
all tend to reduce stability, it would appear that the Admiralty
office has, as I supposed, been careful to select a vessel not
unfavorable to their purpose. But however this may be, it is no
business of mine to defend the French ships in the details of their
stability, nor even to defend them at all; and, as a matter of
fact, the French Admiralty, although stopping far short of ours,
has in my opinion gone much too far in the direction of reducing
the armored stability at considerable angles of inclination. But
their falling into one error is no justification for our falling
into a much greater one, and deliberately repeating it in every
ship we lay down. In this connection I will only add that the
experiments performed at our Admiralty on models must be viewed
with great distrust for a reason not yet named. They deal only, so
far as I am acquainted with them, with models set oscillating or
rolling by waves or otherwise. But the danger thus dealt with is a
secondary one; the primary one is that due to ‘list’ or prolonged
inclination to one side. What sort of protection against the danger
of capsizing from this cause can be possessed by a ship the entire
armor on each side of which becomes immersed even in smooth water
when the ship is inclined a couple of degrees only, and which then
has no side left to immerse, save such as single shells can blow
into holes ten by four feet?

“It is to be observed that although Mr. White does not venture
to join the only other apologist for these deficiently armored
ships in stating that India-rubber umbrella shot-stoppers are to
be employed for their preservation in battle, he does go so far
as to tell us that the spaces into which water would enter when
the unarmored parts have been penetrated have been subdivided ‘to
facilitate the work of stopping temporarily shot-holes in the
sides,’ and I know independently that a good deal of reliance is
placed at the Admiralty upon the presumed ability to stop such
holes as they are made. But the whole thing is a delusion. The
officer of the _Cochrane_, before quoted, said, ‘I wish to state
that shot-plugs are out of the question after or at such a fight.
They are entirely useless. Not a hole was either round, square, or
oval, but different shapes—ragged, jagged, and torn, the inside
parts and half-inch plating being torn in ribbons; some of the
holes inside are as large as four by three feet, and of all shapes.
There are many shot-plugs on board here, all sizes, conical shapes
and long, but they are of no use whatever.’

“Mr. White’s letter invites many other comments, but I have said
enough to show that it in no way changes my view of the question
of armor-plated line-of-battle ships. In so far as it advocates
a further abandonment of armor and a further resort to doubtful
devices in lieu thereof, it is already answered by anticipation
by the Admiralty itself. Until I wrote my recent letters to you,
our Admiralty thought as Mr. White still thinks, and tended as
he still tends. In the case of all our recent cruisers but two
they had abolished side-armor altogether. To my public appeal
for armor-belted cruisers they have, however, responded, and are
about to order six of such ships. So far, so good. We ought to be
grateful for this concession to a most reasonable demand. I wish
these cruisers were to be faster, much faster, but in Admiralty
matters the country must be thankful for small mercies.

“It only remains for me to note with satisfaction one or two of
the points upon which Mr. White is in agreement with myself. He
admits that it ‘would certainly be advantageous’ to carry out those
experiments which I regard the Admiralty as afraid to make, _viz._,
experiments to test the effect of gun-fire upon the subdivided but
unarmored parts of ships.

* * * * *

“It may be taken for what it is worth, but I declare that the
abandonment of armor has not at all been forced upon us by
unavoidable circumstances, nor is it from any intrinsic necessity
that we go on refusing to provide our ships with torpedo defence.
On not immoderate dimensions, at not immoderate cost, ships might
be built, still practically invulnerable to gun, ram, and torpedo
alike, ships which could dispose of the _Admiral_ class of ships
more quickly and certainly than she could dispose of the feeblest
antagonist that she is likely to encounter. But in order to
produce such ships we must revive the now abandoned principle that
armor, and armor alone can save from destruction those ships whose
business it is to drive our future enemies from the European seas
and lock them up in their own ports.”

The Committee on Designs of 1872, previously alluded to, contained sixteen members, of whom six were naval officers. Two of those members, Admiral George Elliot, R.N., and Rear-admiral A. P. Ryder, R.N., dissented so far from their colleagues that they could not sign the report, and accordingly they submitted a very able minority report embodying their views.

The first of the “general principles” laid down in their report is as follows:

“That it is of the last importance that the modifications in
existing types of men-of-war which the committee have been invited
to suggest should be calculated not merely to effectually meet the
necessities of naval warfare now and in the immediate future, but
in full view of the probable necessities of naval warfare in the
more remote future.”

It must be a source of satisfaction to these gallant officers to observe in some designs of the present day a confirmation of their forecast in many particulars.

The following extracts from a letter bearing upon the present controversy, by Admiral Elliot, appeared in the _Times_ (London) of April 24, 1885, and contain the pith of his oft-quoted arguments: