Chapter II: Appendix: III 283 (1)

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RANGE OF GUNS 283

ILLUSTRATIONS.

THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR, OCTOBER 21, 1805.—From
a drawing by J. O. Davidson _Frontispiece._

PAGE
The “Victory” 13
The “Glatton” 15
The “Dreadnought” 17
The “Inflexible” 19
Section of the “Amiral Duperré” 23
Section of the “Inflexible” 23
Section of the “Collingwood” 23
New Admiralty Ship 23
The “Devastation” 24
The “Sultan” 27
Section and Plan of the “Alexandra” 28
Section and Plan of the “Téméraire” 28
Section and Plan of the “Nelson” 29
Section and Plan of the “Shannon” 29
The “Alexandra” 30
The “Téméraire” 31
The “Hotspur” 34
The “Warspite” 37
Transverse Section of the “Mersey” 38
The “Inconstant” 41
The “Colossus” 43
Transverse Section of one of the New “Scouts” 49
The “Jumna” 50
The “Dévastation:” French Armored Ship of the First Class 73
The “Courbet” (formerly the “Foudroyant”): French Armored Ship
of the First Class 75
The “Richelieu” 77
The “Amiral Duperré:” French Armored Ship of the First Class 81
The “Vengeur:” French Iron-clad Coast-guard Vessel 87
British Torpedo Gun-boat of the “Grasshopper” Class (side view) 90
The “Grasshopper”—Plan of Upper Deck, Poop, and Forecastle 90
The “Duilio” 105
Section of the “Italia” 110
Deck Plan of the “Italia” 110
The “Italia” 111
The “Esmeralda” 113
The “Amerigo Vespucci” 115
The “Catherine II.” 119
Half-deck Plan of the “Sachsen” 121
Side Elevation of the “Sachsen” 121
Half-deck Plan of the “Kaiser” 122
Side Elevation of the “Kaiser” 122
The “Sachsen” 123
U. S. Side-wheel Steamer “Powhatan” 150
U. S. Frigate “Franklin,” of the “Merrimac” Class 152
U. S. Sloop-of-war “Hartford” 153
U. S. Sloop-of-war “Brooklyn” 154
U. S. Sloop-of-war “Kearsarge” 155
U. S. Iron-clad “New Ironsides” 156
U. S. Monitor “Passaic” 156
U. S. Double-turreted Monitor “Terror” 157
U. S. Frigate “Tennessee” 159
U. S. Sloop-of-war “Adams” 160
U. S. Sloop-of-war “Marion” 161
U. S. Sloop-of-war “Alert” (Iron) 162
U. S. Sloop-of-war “Trenton” 163
U. S. Frigate “Chicago” (Steel) 169
Deck Plans of the U. S. Frigate “Chicago,” showing Battery 171
Deck Plan of the U. S. Sloop-of-war “Atlanta,” showing Battery 171
U. S. Sloop-of-war “Atlanta” (Steel) 173
U. S. Despatch-boat “Dolphin” 176
Light Draught Coast-defence Vessel, with Deck Plan 180
The Howell Torpedo 182
Bronze Breech-loading Cannon captured in Corea, age unknown 194
Bronze Breech-loader used by Cortez in Mexico 195
Breech-loader captured in the War with Mexico 196
Bronze 12-pounder, “El Neptuno,” 1781 197
U.S.N. Carronade, Slide, and Carriage 198
U.S.N. Medium 32-pounder 199
U.S.N. 9-inch Dahlgren (9-inch Smooth-bore) 201
Horizontal Section of Millwall Shield 204
A Krupp Gun on a Naval Carriage 206
Alfred Krupp 207
Breech-loading Rifle-tube ready for receiving Jacket 210
Breech-loading Rifle-jacket, Rough-bored and Turned 210
Putting the Jacket on a 6-inch Breech-loading Rifle-tube 211
Breech-loading Rifle after receiving Jacket 214
A Krupp Hammer 215
Transporting Cannon at Bremerhaven 217
Breech-loading Rifle after receiving Jacket and Chase Hoops 218
Breech-loading Rifle with Jacket, Chase Hoops, and Jacket
Hoops in place 218
U.S.N. 6-inch Breech-loading Rifle 218
Cartridge Case and Grains of Powder, U.S.N. 220
Common Shells, U.S.N. 220
Unburned and Partially Consumed Grains of U.S.N. Powder 222
Section of U.S.N. 6-inch Built-up Steel Breech-loading Rifle 222
Broadside Carriage for 6-inch Breech-loading Rifle 223
Rapid-firing Single-shot Hotchkiss Gun 224
New 6-inch Breech-loading Rifle 238
Longitudinal Plans of Nordenfeldt Boat 254
The Submarine Monitor “Peacemaker” 257

MODERN SHIPS OF WAR.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

During the last thirty years the changes in naval science have been so much greater than in its whole previous history as to be epoch-making. Between the wooden vessel of 1857 and the metal machine of 1887 there exist in common only the essential principles that each is a water-borne structure, armed with guns and propelled by steam. Beyond this everything is changed—model, material, machinery, rig, armament, equipment. In truth, so radical are the differences, and so sudden have been the developments, that authorities are widely separated in opinion, even upon such a primary question as a universally accepted system of classification. But as this is necessary to a proper appreciation of the subject, a generalization may be made in which war-vessels are divided into armored and unarmored types, the former including battle-ships, and the latter those employed in the police of the seas, in commerce protection or destruction, or in the attack of positions which are defenceless.

In the absence of any accepted differentiations of these classes, the new British nomenclature may be adopted with safety, for to a certain degree it explains the terms and includes the types now used so variously in different navies. Under this armored vessels are grouped into (1) battle-ships, (2) cruisers, (3) special types, such as rams and torpedo-boats, and (4) coast-service ships; and unarmored vessels comprise (1) cruisers, (2) sloops, (3) gun-vessels, (4) gun-boats, (5) despatch-vessels, and (6) torpedo-vessels. “As it was impossible to unite all the qualities which are to be desired in a ship-of-war in a single vessel, it became necessary to divide the leading types into subdivisions, each specially adapted to the use of a particular arm, or to perform some special service. For the battle-ships designed for naval operations in European waters great offensive and defensive powers and evolutionary qualities are essential, while the highest sea-going qualities, including habitability, are, in the opinion of some, less essential. For sea-going battle-ships offensive and defensive strength must be partially sacrificed in order to secure unquestionable sea-worthiness. In ocean-going battle-ships canvas is a valuable auxiliary. In battle-ships for European waters, masts and yards involve a useless sacrifice of fighting power.... Heavily armored ships intended for the line of battle must necessarily carry powerful guns. They must be able to traverse great distances, and must therefore have considerable storage for coal. Great speed is required to enable them to meet the inevitable contingencies of an engagement. In a word, the class of ships which may be called battery-ships must be furnished with very considerable offensive and defensive power. Their great size, however, and the enormous weight of their armor and armament, necessitate such displacements as render them unfit for coast defence” (BRASSEY).

While the antagonistic elements of offence, defence, speed, or endurance have caused the main differences of design in all types, the greatest variances with battle-ships are found in the distribution of armor for protection. A hasty summarization of the policies now adopted by the great maritime nations shows that the French generally adhere to a complete armor-belt at the water-line, that the Italians have in their latest ships totally abandoned side-armor, and that the English favor its partial employment. The popular idea that armor consists only of thick slabs of wrought-iron or steel, or of steel-faced iron, bolted to a ship’s side, is erroneous. “In the earlier broadside ships,” writes the present director of English naval construction, Mr. W. H. White, “this view was practically correct; they had no armor or protected decks, the decks being covered only by thin plates fitted for structural purposes. But in the _Devastation_ class, and all subsequent ships, considerable and increasing weights of material are worked into the deck armor, and with good reason. Experiments showed conclusively that horizontal protection at the top of the armor-belt, or citadel, was of vital necessity, and even now (1887) it is open to question whether the provision made for horizontal protection in relation to vertical armor is as large as it might advantageously be.”

The factors which have most influenced the problem are the torpedo, ram, and gun. Of these the last is indubitably of the highest importance, for the number and nature, the effective handling, the disposition and command, and the relative protection of the guns are the elements which control most powerfully the principles of ship design. In the first stage of the contest between gun and armor the defence was victorious, but so rapidly have the art and science of ordnance developed that to-day the power of the heaviest pieces as compared with the resistance of the heaviest armor is greater than ever before.

The story of the contest can be briefly told. In 1858 the armament of the newest ships was principally a broadside battery of 32-pounders; in this were included a few 56-pound shell-guns and one or two eight-inch 68-pounders, though of the whole number not one had an energy, that is, a force of blow when striking, sufficient to penetrate four and a half inches of wrought-iron at short range. In the earliest iron-clads—the French _La Gloire_ and the English _Warrior_—batteries mainly of nine-inch calibre were carried, the latter mounting forty guns of all kinds. The _Minotaur_, the first representative of the next English type, had fifty guns, but after this class was launched there appeared that distinctively modern tendency to decrease the number of pieces while increasing the intensity of their fire. The succeeding vessels carried from fourteen to twelve pieces, until, in 1874, the principle of concentration reached its maximum in giving the _Inflexible_ only four guns. These, like the _Warrior’s_, were muzzle-loaders, and their relative dimensions and power may be compared as follows:

The term energy, when employed to indicate the work that a gun can perform, is expressed in foot-tons, and signifies that the amount developed is sufficient to raise the given weight in tons to the height of one foot. The piercing power of the _Inflexible’s_ projectile was, under the same conditions of charge and range, sufficient to penetrate twenty-five feet of granite and concrete masonry, or thirty-two feet of the best Portland cement.

When the thickness of armor-plating increased, gun-makers tried to overcome the resistance by giving greater energy to the shot. As this required large charges of powder and very long guns, muzzle-loaders became impracticable on shipboard, and were supplanted by breech-loaders. From this stage guns developed greatly in power until, in 1882, those designed for the _Benbow_ were to weigh 110 tons, to be 43 feet long and 16¾ inches in calibre, and with 900 pounds of powder and an 1800-pound projectile were to develop 54,000 foot-tons, or an energy sufficient to penetrate thirty-five inches of unbacked wrought-iron at one thousand yards. The guns for the latest English ships, the _Trafalgar_ and the _Nile_, weigh 67 tons, are 36 feet 1 inch in length and 13½ inches in calibre, and with a 520-pound charge and a 1250-pound projectile are expected to develop 29,500 foot-tons, or an energy sufficient to penetrate an iron target twenty-two and a half inches thick at a thousand yards. These results apparently show a retrogression in power, but a comparison of the _Inflexible’s_ and _Trafalgar’s_ batteries proves that the more modern gun of the latter weighs 13 tons less, is 2½ inches smaller in calibre, fires a shot 450 pounds lighter, and yet develops an energy greater by 3000 foot-tons.

This gain is mainly due to the improvements made with powder and projectiles. In 1883 a 403-pound Whitworth steel shell penetrated a wrought-iron target eighteen inches thick backed by thirty-seven inches of well-packed wet sand, one and a half inches of steel, various balks of timber, and sixteen feet more of sand. When the projectile was recovered after this stratified flight it was found to be practically uninjured. On the Continent, where breech-loaders were favored earlier than in England or with ourselves, the heaviest rifles afloat are the 75-ton, 16.54-inch calibre, French, and the 106 tons, 17-inch Italian guns. These are, however, not the largest pieces designed, for there is an 120-ton Krupp gun, and the French have projected one which will weigh 124 tons, be 18.11 inches in calibre, and fire a 2465-pound projectile—over a ton—with a powder charge of 575 pounds. A comparison of the Krupp 120-ton gun with the 110-ton Armstrong shows that the former is more powerful; that its projectile is much heavier, and the initial velocity and pressure are smaller. The results at the recent test were as follows:

Armstrong. Krupp.
Charge 850 pounds 847 pounds.
Shot 1800 ” 2315 ”
Velocity 2150 feet 1900 feet.
Pressure 19.9 tons 18.8 tons.
Energy 57,679 foot-tons 67,928 foot-tons.

From the _Warrior_ to the _Inflexible_ the evolution of design was based upon a principle that sought the best results for the offence in small, powerful batteries, with all-around fire and armor protection; and for the defence, in thick armor carried over the vitals of the ship. This was satisfied by larger weights of armor and a smaller ratio of armored part to total surface. Wrought-iron armor was also replaced by compound, with a corresponding gain of twenty per cent. for equal thicknesses, and at present all-steel plates, of which great things may reasonably be expected, are now employed by France and Italy. In 1861 the _Minotaur_ was belted throughout her 400 feet of length with 1780 tons of armor, or with a weight nearly double that given to the _Warrior_ two years before. The _Inflexible_ has 3280 tons, and the _Trafalgar_ 4230 tons, of which 1040 are fitted horizontally. The maximum thickness of the _Warrior’s_ wrought-iron armor is 4½ inches, of the _Devastation’s_, 12 inches, and of the _Inflexible’s_ 24 inches; the compound (iron steel-faced) armor of the _Trafalgar_ is 18 and 20 inches thick, and the _Baudin_ and _Formidable_ have 21.7 inches in solid plates of steel. These, of course, are some of the dry-as-dust figures before referred to, and they are cited only to assist a comparison, their mere enumeration having no scientific value, because the disposition and character of the plates are unconsidered.

To meet this development of offence and defence many changes in design have been adopted. The _broadside system_ of the first armored ships was followed in 1863-1867 by a _belt and battery type_, wherein the principal guns, much reduced in number, were carried in a box battery amidships, and given a fore-and-aft fire by means of recessed ports or outlying batteries. In 1869 the Admiralty adopted the _breastwork monitor_, a low free-boarded structure, which was plated from stem to stern in the region of the water-line, and had in its central portion an armored breastwork that carried at each end a revolving turret. In 1870 this type was pronounced unsafe, and after a careful investigation by a special committee on design certain modifications were recommended. These did not affect materially the essential features of Sir Edward Reed’s plan, for the complete water-line belt and the central armored battery were retained; and to-day many of the critics who then denounced it claim that, after all, it is the true type of an ideal battle-ship.

In 1872 the Italian naval authorities accepted the conclusions of the British committee, and laid down the first _central-citadel_ battle-ships, now known as the _Duilio_ and _Dandolo_; and about the same time Mr. Barnaby, the new Chief Constructor of the British Navy, brought forward a similar design in the _Inflexible_. The engines, boilers, and the bases of two turrets in this vessel are protected by an armored box-shaped citadel, from the extremities of which a horizontal armored deck extends fore and aft below the water-line; above this deck an armored superstructure completes the free-board, and has its unprotected spaces at the water-line, subdivided into numerous water-tight compartments. This ship met with so much hostile criticism that a committee was appointed to investigate the charges, but in the end the Admiralty plans were officially sustained.

The French, with characteristic ability and independence, have in the mean time made many notable departures from their first types of broadside ships. Believing in the association of heavy guns with light ones—mixed armaments, as they are called—the central armored casemate of wholly protected guns has been rejected in order to give a maximum thickness of plating at the water-line. The largest guns are mounted _en barbette_—that is, in towers which protect the gun mechanism, and permit the pieces to be fired, not through port-holes, but over the rim of armored parapets. The French constructors reason, and with justice, that no single shot from a heavy gun should be wasted, and that, in addition to an extended range, gun captains must be enabled, by keeping their eyes upon the enemy, to select the best opportunity for firing. With broadside pieces this is impossible, for apart from the limited range, and the obscurity caused by the smoke, the port-holes through which the sighting has necessarily to be done are almost choked by the gun-muzzles. Turrets have their objections also, because the poisonous gases which formerly escaped wholly from the muzzle will, as soon as the breech is opened, rush into the turret and make it almost uninhabitable. Often after one discharge the air becomes stifling, and in the _Duilio_ it deteriorated so quickly as to be unfit for respiration until a part of the turret-roof had been lifted. Then, again, structural difficulties not easily overcome in the turret are simplified in the barbette, as the latter, with equal gun facilities, weighs fifty per cent. less, and at the same time escapes all those chances of disablement which a well-placed shot is almost sure to cause in any revolving system. At sea the chance of hitting the gun is never great, and the main things to protect are the gun machinery and the gunners; the armored wall of the barbette tower does this for the former, and the latter have a fair fighting chance afforded by the gun-shield. Of course war is not deer-stalking, and the patriot who wants to go into battle so fully protected as to be in no danger had better stop playing sailor or soldier, and take to the woods before the fighting begins. In addition to the heavy ordnance, the French mount a number of lighter pieces, and carry powerful secondary batteries of rapid fire and machine-guns; and sufficient armor defence is given by a belt at the water-line, an armored deck, and a glacis and parapet for the barbette. It is quite probable that these purely military terms may seem odd when applied to ships, but they are the only ones which can exactly explain what is meant, and, after all, they show how much a battle-ship has become a floating, transferable fortress.

The Italians were not altogether satisfied with the _Duilio_, as she lacked the high speed and coal endurance which they deem essential in any Mediterranean naval policy; so in 1878 they adopted an idea advanced some years before in England, and startled the world with the _Italia_ type. In this ship protection is given, not by vertical or side armor, but by an armored deck, between which and the deck above there is a very minute subdivision of the water-line space. The system is based upon the theory that the power to float must be obtained, not by keeping our projectiles, but by so localizing their effect as to make any penetration practically harmless. The _Italia’s_ heavy guns are carried in a central armored redoubt, at a height of thirty-three feet above the water-line, and with their machinery and fittings weigh over two thousand tons. This fact shows the magnitude of the task accepted by her designer, for it means that a load nearly equal to the total weight of a first-class line-of-battle ship of the last century has to be sustained at this great elevation. Besides the main battery of four 106-ton guns, eighteen six-inch breech-loading guns are carried—twelve in broadside on the upper battery deck, four in the superstructure before and abaft the redoubt, and two under cover at the extremities of the spar-deck. The redoubt is protected by seventeen inches of compound iron, inclined twenty-four degrees from the vertical; and the complete armored deck, which is nearly three inches thick, dips forward to strengthen the ram, curves aft to cover the steering gear, and, at the ship’s sides, extends six feet below the water-line.

To cope with this formidable rival, which, whether right or wrong in principle, must, under England’s policy, be surpassed, the ships of the _Admiral_ class were designed. In these the main battery is mounted in two barbettes built high out of water, near the extremities of the vessel, while in a central broadside are carried the armor-piercing and rapid-fire guns. The engines, boilers, and barbette communications are protected by a water-line belt of thick armor which covers about forty-five per cent. of the ship’s length; at the upper edge of this there is a protective deck, and at its ends athwartships bulkheads are erected; before and abaft the belt and beneath the water-line there is a protective deck, together with the usual minute subdivision into water-tight compartments. The barbettes and the cylindrical ammunition tubes which extend from the belt-deck to the barbette floors are strongly armored. Owing to the strong protest made against these vessels, more efficient armor protection has been given to the battle-ships lately laid down.

* * * * *

From this very hasty and incomplete review it may be gathered that the first and most lasting influence in the development of battle-ships is due to France and England, though the _Monitor_ had no little share in the result. It is difficult to say, in the ceaseless struggle for something which, if not good, is new, what may be the outcome of the latest efforts to revolutionize the question, or, curiously enough, to bring it back to the point whence its departure was taken. Whatever may be the courage of one’s opinion, there is not sufficient data—a first-class war can only supply these—upon which to say, Yea, yea! or Nay, nay! and prophecy is certain to be without honor, especially as the discussions given in the appendices demonstrate how the wisest and most experienced have no substantial agreement in views.

An editorial in a late number of the _Broad Arrow_ declares that “the days of armored plate protection are, in the opinion of many thinking men, coming to a close. The gun is victorious all along the line, and the increased speed given to the torpedo-boat, taken in conjunction with the destructive efficiency attained by the torpedo, makes it a questionable policy to spend such large sums of money as heretofore upon individual ships.” There is no room here to give the various arguments, though very clever and ingenious they are, by which this position is fortified; it may be added, however, that to a large degree this is the opinion of Admiral Aube, the late French Minister of Marine, and undoubtedly this declaration re-echoes the shibboleth of those other French officers who, in the absolute formula of their chief, Gabriel Charmes, insist that “a squadron attacked at night by torpedo-boats is a squadron lost.”

English authorities, with a few notable exceptions, do not go so far as their more impulsive, or, from the Gallic stand-point, less conservative neighbors. Chief Constructor White believes that at no time in the war between gun and armor has the former, as the principal fighting factor, so many chances of success. He concedes the value of light, quick-firing guns in association with heavy armaments, grants the importance of rams, torpedoes, submarine boats, and torpedo-vessels generally, but denies that the days of heavily armored battle-ships are ended. Lord Charles Beresford asserts that the value of large guns at sea is overestimated, advocates from motives of morals and efficiency mixed armaments, agrees to the great, yet subordinate, importance of the usual auxiliaries, and insists that England builds cumbersome and expensive battle-ships only because of their possession by her dangerous rivals.

There are equally rigorous disagreements upon all the other types of armored, unarmored, and auxiliary vessels, as needs must be, so long as the naval policies of no two nations can be alike. England and Russia are at opposite poles, so far as their environments are concerned, and between France and Turkey the differences are as radical as their national instincts and ambitions. But, among all, England is as isolated as her geographical situation. Whatever fleets other nations may assemble, whatever types other countries may deem best for their interests, England, whose existence depends upon her naval strength, must have all; not only the best in quality, but so many of every class that she will be able to defend her integrity against any foe that assails it. England can take no chances.

Upon one point alone, the necessity of high speed, is there substantial agreement. Less than four years ago fifteen or sixteen knots were accepted as a maximum beyond which profitable design could not be urged. Greater speed, it is true, had been attained by our first type of commerce destroyer. In February, 1868, the _Wampanoag_ ran at the rate of 16.6 knots for thirty-eight hours, and made a maximum of 17.75 knots; but great as was the achievement, there is a general acceptance of the fact that this vessel was a racing-machine, and not in the modern sense a man-of-war.

Fighting-ships, with the power to steam thousands of miles at sea without recoaling, are now being built under contracts which, for every deficiency in speed or horse-power, pay penalties that at our former summit of expectations would have been prohibitive to ship construction; and, what is more startling yet, the bonus which goes to any increase upon this speed proves the co-relation between scientific attainment and popular appreciation of the subject, and shows how readily the impossibilities of yesterday become the axioms of to-morrow.

The development of speed has therefore a special interest. Between 1859 and 1875, that tentative period which led to such wonderful realizations, the highest speed, under the most favorable circumstances, of large war-vessels was fourteen knots; in the smaller classes of unarmored ships it ranged between eight and thirteen, while that attained by fast cruisers was from fifteen to sixteen and a half knots. In 1886 Italian armored vessels made eighteen knots. Cruisers like the Japanese _Naniwa-Kan_ and the Italian _Angelo Emo_ reached nearly nineteen, and the _Reina Regente_, launched in February last, is expected to steam over twenty. Torpedo-vessels beginning in 1873 with fourteen knots are now running twenty-five, and at the same time the type has so much increased in size and importance as to be an essential and not an accessory in naval warfare.

It is impossible to explain the difficulties which have beset this development, because the conditions that surround any attempt at speed-increase are such as can be properly understood only by those who have technical training; and then, too, the great ocean racers have so much accustomed the public to wonderful sea performances that the results are accepted without a knowledge of the credit which is due the mechanical and marine engineers who have achieved them. But with greater experience the higher, surely, will be the appreciation which every one must give; for, in the words of Chief Constructor White, “when it is realized that a vessel weighing ten thousand tons can be propelled over a distance of nine knots in an hour by the combustion of less than one ton of coal—the ten-thousandth part of her own weight—it will be admitted that the result is marvellous,” and that “‘the way of a ship in the midst of the sea’ is beyond full comprehension.”

It is often asked which has the better fleet, France or England. Who can tell? No one definitely. Admiral Sir R. Spencer Robinson, late Comptroller of the British Navy, declares, in the _Contemporary Review_ of February, 1887, that “the number of armored vessels of the two countries may be stated approximately as fifty-five for England and fifty-one for France. Without going into further details, taking everything into consideration, giving due weight to all the circumstances which affect the comparison, and assuming that the designs of the naval constructors on each side of the Channel will fairly fulfil the intentions of each administration (a matter of interminable dispute, and which nothing but an experiment carried to destruction can settle), the iron-clad force of England is, on the whole, rather superior to that of France. A combination of the navy of that Power with any other would completely reverse the position. I should state as my opinion, leaving others to judge what it may be worth, that in fighting power the unarmored ships of England are decidedly superior to those of our rival’s; but if the _raison d’être_ of the French navy is—as has been frequently stated in that country, and by none more powerfully and categorically than by the French Minister of Marine—the wide-spread, thorough destruction of British commerce, and the pitiless and remorseless ransom of every undefended and accessible town in the British dominions, regardless of any sentimentalities or such rubbish as the laws of war and the usages of civilized nations; and if at least one of the _raisons d’être_ of the British navy is to defeat those benevolent intentions, and to defend that commerce on which depends our national existence and imperial greatness—then I fear that perhaps they have prepared to realize their purpose of remorseless destruction rather better than we have ours of successful preservation.”

A long sentence this, but it emphasizes the great axiom that war is business, not sentiment, and teaches a lesson which this country will do well to learn. Fortunately, we are at last out of the shallows, if not fairly in the full flooding channel-way, though many things are yet wanting with us. Perhaps this over-long chapter cannot be made to end more usefully than by quoting in proof of this the concluding paragraph of that brilliant article on naval policy which Professor James Russell Soley, United States Navy, contributed to the February (1887) number of _Scribner’s Magazine_:

“It is the part of wisdom,” he writes, “to study the lessons of the past, and to learn what we may from the successes or the failures of our fathers. The history of the last war is full of these lessons, and at no time since its close has the navy been in a condition so favorable for their application. At least their meaning cannot fail to be understood. They show clearly that if we would have a navy fitted to carry on war, we must give some recognition to officers on the ground of merit, either by the advancement of the best, or, what amounts to nearly the same thing, by the elimination of the least deserving; that we must give them a real training for war in modern ships and with modern weapons; that the direction of the naval establishment, in so far as it has naval direction, must be given unity of purpose, and the purpose to which it must be directed is fighting efficiency; that a naval reserve of men and of vessels must be organized capable of mobilization whenever a call shall be made; and, finally, that a dozen or a score of new ships will not make a navy, but that the process of renewal must go on until the whole fleet is in some degree fitted to stand the trial of modern war. Until this rehabilitation can be accomplished the navy will only serve the purpose of a butt for the press and a foot-ball for political parties and its officers—a body of men whose intelligence and devotion would be equal to any trust will be condemned to fritter away their lives in a senseless parody of their profession.”

THE BRITISH NAVY.

BY SIR EDWARD J. REED.

When timber gave place to iron and steel in the construction of war-ships, the naval possibilities of Great Britain became practically illimitable. Prior to that great change the British Admiralty, after exhausting its home supplies of oak, had to seek in the forests of Italy and of remote countries those hard, curved, twisted, and stalwart trees which alone sufficed for the massive framework of its line-of-battle ships. How recently it has escaped from this necessity may be inferred from the fact that the present writer, on taking office at the Admiralty in 1863, found her Majesty’s dockyards largely stored with recent deliveries of Italian and other oak timber of this description.

And here it may not be inappropriate for one whose earliest professional studies were devoted to the construction of wooden ships, but whose personal labors have been most largely devoted to the iron era, to pay a passing tribute of respect to the constructive genius of those great builders in wood who designed the stanch and towering battle-ships of the good old times. Skilful, indeed, was the art, sound, indeed, was the science, which enabled them to shape, assemble, and combine thousands of timbers and planks into the _Grace de Dieu_ of Great Harry’s day (1514), the _Sovraigne of the Seas_ of Charles’s reign (1637), the _Royal William_ of half a century later (1682-92), the _Victory_, immortalized by Nelson, and in our own early day such superb ships as the _Queen_, the _Howe_, and scores of others. Only those who have made a study of the history of sea architecture can realize the difficulties which the designers of such structures had to overcome.

With the introduction of iron and steel for ship-building purposes the necessity for ransacking the forests of the world for timber suitable for the frames and beam-knees of ships passed away, and Great Britain, which early became, and thus far remains, first and greatest in the production of iron and steel, was thus invited to such a development of naval power as the world has never seen. The mercantile marine of England at the present time furnishes a splendid demonstration of the readiness with which the commercial classes have appreciated this great opportunity; but the Royal Navy, by almost universal assent, supplies a melancholy counter-demonstration, and shows that neither the capabilities of a race nor the leadings of Providence suffice to keep a nation in its true position when it falls into the hands of feeble and visionary administrators. Any one who will contrast the British navy of to-day with the British navy as it might and would have been under the administration, say, of such a First Lord of the Admiralty as the present Duke of Somerset proved himself in every department of the naval service five-and-twenty years ago, will understand the recent outcry in England for a safer and more powerful fleet.

From a photograph by Symonds & Co., Portsmouth.]

It is impossible, as will presently appear, to describe the existing British navy without making reference to those administrative causes which have so largely and so unhappily influenced it; but the primary object of this chapter is, nevertheless, to describe and explain it, and only such references will be made to other circumstances as are indispensable to the fulfilment of that object.

It is fitting, and to the present writer it is agreeable, in this place, to take early note of a matter which has, perhaps, never before been fully acknowledged, _viz._, the indebtedness of Great Britain and of Europe to the United States for some invaluable lessons in naval construction and naval warfare which were derived from the heroic efforts of their great civil war. The writer is in a position to speak with full knowledge on this point, as his service at the Admiralty, in charge of its naval construction, commenced during the American conflict, and continued for some years after its fortunate conclusion. There can be no doubt whatever that from the _Monitor_ and her successors European constructors and naval officers derived some extremely valuable suggestions. The Monitor system itself, pure and simple, was never viewed with favor, and could never be adopted by England, except under the severest restrictions, because the work of England has mainly to be done upon the high seas and in distant parts of the world, and the extremely small freeboard of the _Monitor_, or, in other words, the normal submersion of so very much of the entire ship, is highly inconvenient and not a little dangerous on sea service, as the fate of the _Monitor_ itself demonstrated. But for the work the _Monitor_ was designed to do in inland waters she was admirably conceived, and her appearance in the field of naval warfare startled seamen and naval constructors everywhere, and gave their thoughts a wholly novel direction. In saying this I am not unmindful that seven years previously England had constructed steam-propelled “floating batteries,” as they were called, sheathed with iron, and sent them to operate against the defences of Russia. But useful as these vessels were in many respects, their construction presented no striking novelty of design, and their employment was unattended by any dramatic incidents to powerfully impress the naval mind. The _Monitor_ was both more novel and more fortunate, and opened her career (after a severe struggle for life at sea) with so notable a display of her offensive and defensive qualities that all eyes turned to the scene of her exploits, and scanned her with a degree of interest unknown to the then existing generation of sailors and ship-builders. Her form and character were in most respects singular, her low deck and erect revolving tower being altogether unexampled in steamship construction. He must have been a dull and conservative naval architect, indeed, whose thoughts Ericsson’s wonderful little fighting ship did not stimulate into unwonted activity. But the service rendered to Europe was not confined to the construction and exploits of the _Monitor_ itself. The coasting passages, and, later on, the sea-voyages, of other vessels of the Monitor type, but of larger size, were watched with intense interest, and gave to the naval world instructive experiences which could in no other way have been acquired. Some of these experiences were purchased at the cost of the lives of gallant men, and that fact enhanced their value.

It is not possible to dwell at length upon the means by which the Monitor influence took effect in the navies of Europe, but it may be doubted whether ships like the _Thunderer_, _Devastation_, and _Dreadnought_, which naval officers declare to be to-day the most formidable of all British war-ships, would have found their way so readily into existence if the Monitors of America had not encouraged such large departures from Old-world ideas. In this sense the _Times_ correctly stated some years ago that the “American Monitors were certainly the progenitors of our _Devastation_ type.” The one ship in the British navy which comes nearest to the American Monitor, in respect of the nearness of her deck to the water, is the _Glatton_, a very exceptional vessel, and designed under a very peculiar stress of circumstances. But even in her case, as in that of every other armored turret-ship of the present writer’s design, the base of the turret and the hatchways over the machinery and boilers were protected by an armored breastwork standing high above this low deck, whereas in the American Monitors the turret rests upon the deck, which is near to the smooth sea’s surface.

We have here, in the features just contrasted, the expression of a fundamental difference of view between the American system, as applied to sea-going turret-ships, and the European system of sea-going ships introduced by the writer. It has never been possible, in our judgment on the British side of the Atlantic, to regard even such Monitors as the _Puritan_ and _Dictator_ were designed to be, as sufficiently proof to sea perils. At the time when these lines were penned the following paragraph appeared in English newspapers: “The Cunard steamer _Servia_ arrived at New York yesterday, being three days overdue. During a heavy sea the boats, the bridge, and the funnel were carried away, and the saloon was flooded.” Any one who has seen the _Servia_, and observed the great height above the smooth sea’s surface at which her boats, bridge, and funnel are carried, will be at no loss to infer why it is that we object to ships with upper decks within two or three feet only of that surface. In short, it can be demonstrated that ships of the latter type are liable, in certain possible seas, to be completely ingulfed even to the very tops of their funnels. In the case of the _Glatton_, which had to be produced in conformity to ideas some of which were not those of the designer, one or two devices were resorted to expressly in order to secure in an indirect manner some increase of the assigned buoyancy, and thus to raise the upper deck above its prescribed height. The officers who served in her, however, judiciously regarded her, on account of her low deck, as fit only for harbor service or restricted coast defence.

A very dangerous combination, as the writer regards it, was once proposed for his adoption by the representative of a colonial government, but was successfully resisted. This was the association of a “Coles” or English turret (which penetrates and passes bodily through the weather deck) with a low American Monitor deck. This was opposed on the ground that with such an arrangement there must of necessity be great danger at sea of serious leakage around the base of the turret as the waves swept over the lower deck. It would be extremely difficult to give to the long, circular aperture around the turret any protection which would be certain, while allowing the turret to revolve freely, both to withstand the fire of the guns and to resist the attack of the sea.

It will now be understood that while the Monitor system was from the first highly appreciated in Europe, and more especially in England, it never was adopted in its American form in the British navy. Russia, Holland, and some other powers did adopt it, and the Dutch government had to pay the penalty in the total disappearance of a ship and crew during a short passage in the North Sea from one home port to another. In a largely altered form, and with many modifications and additions due to English ideas of sea service, it was, however, substantially adopted in the three powerful ships already named, of which one, the _Dreadnought_, lately bore the flag of the British admiral who commands the Mediterranean fleet. If the opinion of officers who have served in these ships may be accepted as sufficiently conclusive, it was a great misfortune for the British navy when the ruling features of this type of ship were largely departed from in its first-class ships, and made to give place to a whole series of so-called first-class iron-clads, of which only about one-third of the length has been protected by armor, and which are consequently quite unfit to take a place in any European line of battle.

The characteristic differences between the American type and the English type of sea-going Monitors (if we may apply that designation to the _Devastation_ type) have already been stated, but may be restated here in a single sentence, _viz._, the elevation in the English ship of the turret breastwork deck to a height of eleven or twelve feet above the sea’s surface, and the raising of the upper deck generally, or of a considerable part of it, to at least that height, by means of lightly built superstructures. Over these again, and many feet above them, are built bridges and hurricane decks, from which the ships may be commanded in all weathers. Lofty as these ships are by comparison with American Monitors, it is only gradually that they have acquired the confidence of the naval service, so freely do the waves sweep over their weather decks when driven, even in moderate weather, against head-seas.

The British navy, having very diversified services to perform during both peace and war, requires ships of various kinds and sizes. Its first and greatest requirement of all is that of line-of-battle ships in sufficient numbers to enable England to stand up successfully against any European naval force or forces that may threaten her or her empire. If any one should be disposed to ask why this requirement—which is obviously an extreme one, and an impossible one for more than a single power—is more necessary for England than for any other country, the answer must be, _Circumspice!_ To look round over England’s empire is to see why her failure on the sea would be her failure altogether. France, Germany, Italy, and even Holland, might each get along fairly well, losing nothing that is absolutely essential to their existence, even if every port belonging to them were sealed by an enemy’s squadron. But were Great Britain to be cut off from her colonies and dependencies, were her ships to be swept from the seas, and her ports closed by hostile squadrons, she would either be deprived of the very elements of life itself, or would have to seek from the compassion of her foes the bare means of existence. It is this consideration, and the strong parental care which she feels for her colonies, that make her sons indignant at any hazardous reduction of her naval strength. There are even in England itself men who cannot or will not see this danger, and who impute to those who strive to avert it ambitious, selfish, and even sordid motives. But it is to no unworthy cause that England’s naval anxieties are due. We have no desire for war; we do not hunger for further naval fame; we cherish no mean rivalry of other powers who seek to colonize or to otherwise improve their trade; we do not want the mastery of the seas for any commercial objects that are exclusively our own. What we desire to do is to keep the seas open thoroughfares to our vast possessions and dependencies, and free to that commercial communication which has become indispensable to our existence as an empire. To accomplish that object we must, at any cost, be strong, supremely strong, in European waters; and it is for this reason that England’s line-of-battle ships ought to be always above suspicion both in number and in quality.

It is not a pleasant assertion for an Englishman to make when he has to say that this is very far from being the case at present. A few months ago this statement, from whomsoever it emanated, would have been received with distrust by the general public, for the truth was only known to the navy itself and to comparatively few outsiders. But the official communications made to both Houses of Parliament early in December, 1885, prepared the world for the truth, the First Lord of the Admiralty in the Chamber of Peers and Lord Brassey in the House of Commons having then proposed to Parliament a programme of additional ship-building which provided for a considerable increase in the number of its first-class ships and cruisers, and which also provided, on the demand of the present writer, that the cruisers should be protected with belts of armor—an element of safety previously denied to them. It need hardly be repeated, after this wholesale admission of weakness by the Admiralty, that Great Britain is at present in far from a satisfactory condition as regards both the number and the character of its ships. Were that not so, no public agitation could have moved the government to reverse in several respects a policy by which it had for so long abided.

It will be interesting to broadly but briefly review the causes of the present deplorable condition of the British navy. In the first place, in so far as it is a financial question, it has resulted mainly from the sustained attempt of successive governments to keep the naval expenditure within or near to a fixed annual amount, notwithstanding the palpable fact that every branch of the naval service, like most other services, is unavoidably increasing in cost, while the necessities of the empire are likewise unavoidably increasing. The consequence is that, as officers and men of every description must be paid, and all the charges connected therewith must in any event be fully met, the ship-building votes of various kinds are those upon which the main stress of financial pressure must fall. From this follows a strong desire, to which all Boards of Admiralty too readily yield, to keep down the size and cost of their first-class ships, to the sacrifice of their necessary qualities. This may be strikingly illustrated by the fact that, although the iron _Dreadnought_, a first-class ship, designed fifteen or sixteen years ago, had a displacement of 10,820 tons, and was powerful in proportion, the Admiralty has launched but a single ship (the _Inflexible_) since that period, of which the displacement has reached 10,000 tons. In fact, every large iron-clad ship for the British navy since launched has fallen from twelve hundred to twenty-four hundred tons short of the _Dreadnought’s_ displacement, and has been proportionally feeble.

If this cutting down in the size of the principal ships of Great Britain had been attended by a corresponding reduction in the sizes of the ships of other powers, or even by some advantages of design which largely tended to make up for the defect of size, there might be something to say for it. But the French ships have shown no such falling off in size, and have benefited as fully as the English ships by the use of steel and by the improved power and economy of the marine steam-engine.

Simultaneously with the reduction in the size of the English ships there has been brought about—voluntarily, and not as a consequence of reduced size, for it was first applied in the largest of all British men-of-war, the _Inflexible_—a system of stripping the so-called armored ships of the English navy of a large part of their armor, and reducing its extent to so deplorable a degree that, as has already been said, they are quite unfit to take part, with any reasonable hope of success, in any general engagement. Here, again, there might have been something to say for a large reduction in the armored surface of ships if it had been attended by some great compensation, such as that which an immense increase in the thickness of the armor applied might have provided, although no such increase could ever have compensated for such a reduction of the armored part of the ship as would have exposed the whole ship to destruction by the mere bursting in of the unarmored ends, which is what has been done. But although in the case of the large _Inflexible_ the citadel armor was of excessive thickness, that is not true of the more recent ships of England, the armor of which sometimes falls short of that of the French ships, in two or three instances by as much as four inches, the French ships having 22-inch armor, and the English 18-inch. But by the combined effect of injudicious economy and of erroneous design, therefore—both furthered by a sort of frenzied desire on the part of the British Admiralty to strip the ships of armor, keep down their speed, delay their completion, and otherwise paralyze the naval service, apparently without understanding what they were about—the British navy has been brought into a condition which none but the possible enemies of the country can regard without more or less dismay.

SECTION OF THE “INFLEXIBLE.”

SECTION OF THE “COLLINGWOOD.”

NEW ADMIRALTY SHIP.]

In order to illustrate the extent to which side armor has been denied to the British ships, as compared with the French, we refer the reader to these diagrams of the _Amiral Duperré_ (French) and of the _Inflexible_ and _Collingwood_ (both English). The black portions represent the side armor in each case. It is scarcely possible for any one friendly to Great Britain to look at these diagrams, and realize what they signify, without profoundly regretting that a sufficient force of public opinion has not yet been exerted to compel the Admiralty to a much more liberal use of armor in the new first-class ships, the intended construction of which was announced to Parliament in December, 1885. In these new ships, while the length of the partial belt has been slightly increased, no addition to its height above water has been made (as compared with the _Collingwood_ or “Admiral” class), so that the slightest “list” towards either side puts all the armor below water. To describe such ships as “armored ships” is to convey a totally false impression of their true character. A side view of one of these new ships shows that the two principal guns are carried high up forward in an armored turret, which sweeps from right ahead, round the bow on each side, and well towards the stern, while several smaller guns are carried abaft with very thin armor protection to complete the offensive powers of the ship. The arrangement of the two principal guns in a turret forward resembles that of the _Conqueror_, but in her the armor rises high above the water, and a belt extends to the bow and nearly to the stern. It is a matter of inexpressible regret that the armored surface of these new ships is so excessively contracted as to be wholly insufficient to preserve the ship from that terrible danger to which so many of their predecessors have been exposed, _viz._, that of capsizing from loss of stability when the unarmored parts alone have been injured.

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Modern ships of warChapter II: Appendix: III 283 (1)

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